THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION

TRANSFORMING MILITARY TRAINING:

USING THE LESSONS OF THE PAST TO BUILD

THE ARMY OF THE FUTURE

Washington, D.C. 20036

Thursday, September 14, 2006

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P R O C E E D I N G S

MR. PASCUAL: — Petraeus on Transforming Military Training, Using the Lessons of the Past to Build the Army of the Future.

It's a real pleasure to welcome General Petraeus in the context of Brookings' 90th anniversary. It's a period where we're really trying to honor and sponsor leadership in the United States, and there's no person that can better embody that in an individual than General Petraeus can.

This is an event which is jointly sponsored by the Saban Center for Middle East Studies and a new part of Brookings, the 21st Century Defense Initiative, and both of these are part of our overall foreign policy program.

I want to say just a couple of words about our initiative on the 21st Century defense challenges, because it is extremely important to us, in fact, to build further capabilities in this area and get the most out of the tremendous talent that we have at the Brookings Institution, and let me explain why.

I think in many ways we're at a point in time where we need to be thinking about how we redefine the concept of security. If we think of the concept of war that dominated most of the 20th century, it was a concept of conflict between nations who were sovereign states, and we had the image of two aggressive actors acting across borders.

We had an international security system that was, in effect, designed to deal with those issues, and when we think about the United Nations it was premised on nation states as rational actors coming together to exercise scrutiny of one another in the hope that that kind of scrutiny would avoid the

worst kind of aggressive and egregious behavior. And it's not that that is irrelevant today, but when we think about a world with non-state and sub-state actors with rogue regimes who may not be necessarily rational in the way that they approach issues or rational from the perspective that we might have when they may not necessarily have the interests of the nation state in mind or, for that matter, not care about the opinions of the international community.

We see the evolution of new challenges — things like transnational terrorism and organized crime or, worse yet, the possibility of a link of these issues with the proliferation of sensitive technologies.

We also see, increasingly, issues and conflicts and challenges that occur within nations — internal conflict or poverty or extremism — whereas in one day we might have said that those are issues that might apply to a particular country. September 11th — where Afghanistan, the second poorest country in the world, became the base for the most significant strike that we've ever had in U.S. territory — really forced us to change our conceptualization of these issues.

And, hence, we really have to ask ourselves in the 21st century and as we look ahead: What is the concept of security? What is the concept of war? What is the concept of conflict? How do we prepare for that? How do we develop the capabilities to deal with that? What are the budgetary resources that are necessary to address these challenges? And how is it that our military capabilities have to interact with our civilian capabilities to be able to address these issues effectively?

It's in that spirit that we are extraordinarily pleased to have the first

public event of the 21st Century Defense Initiative, together with the Saban Center, to be able to sponsor General Petraeus. All of you have his bio that was made available up front. I just want to say a couple of things.

First, I think it's important to think about General Petraeus as a leader. The U.S. News and World Report in 2005 said he was one of the best 25 leaders in America. In my mind, that means an individual who can think about future challenges, deal with the demands of today, motivate people to excel in addressing today's challenges but still have the intensity of commitments so that they can actually devote themselves to the future. He has done that in the battlefield as the commander and the creator of the multinational, transnational command in Iraq. For two years he was the head of the 101st Airborne Division operating in Iraq. He demonstrated there that he can motivate his people to deal with some of the most difficult security and military problems that we have today in the world.

Secondly, he is a scholar. He has a Ph.D. from Princeton University where he did his dissertation on lessons from the Vietnam War. He taught at the U.S. Military Academy. He was a Fellow at Georgetown. And now, again, in that spirit, he's bringing the principles of scholarship and applied policy as the commander-general of the U.S. Army Combined Armed Center at Fort Leavenworth, which really means being the rector of a huge university or sets of university — the general staff call it 17 schools and centers — but also the head of the organization which is responsible for the Army's doctrine manuals. So, in effect, how we take the lessons of what we've learned in the real world and apply

them in the way that our soldiers think about their operations.

And, finally, he is indeed a soldier. He has defended the country. He has learned from his activities on the ground. He has shared that with others. In the United States he earned the classification of being a master parachutist, but I think it's also significant that he has jump wings from France, Britain, and Germany as well, indicating the nature of an individual that he is, and indeed, for his performances, won the Bronze Star Medal for Valor.

We're extremely pleased to be able to host General Petraeus in the spirit of looking at transformation.

General, I invite you to the platform.

(Applause)

GENERAL PETRAEUS: Well, good morning to you all and thanks very much for that kind introduction, Ambassador. You've got a great research assistant, but thanks not only for your kind words but, more importantly, thanks for your own contributions as ambassador to the Ukraine, your years in the NSE and the White House, and most recently as the coordinator for reconstruction stability at the State Department where you got that effort underway. And thanks now for what you're doing over here at the Brookings Institution, especially with the initiative that you mentioned.

It's great to see all of you here today. I see a lot of familiar faces, some who are — it's nice to see folks that aren't wearing body armor, some who were with us at various points along the way and out here on a rainy day.

It's great to be back in Washington, since it's for a short period of

time.

(Laughter)

GENERAL PETRAEUS: And, again, it's an honor to be at Brookings. You all know about this organization, all that it's done over the past 90 years to contribute to countless debates in the marketplace of ideas. In fact, I was delighted to see that you had Iraqi deputy prime minister Barham Salih here yesterday.

Dr. Barham is a man with whom I worked closely the first two and a half years in Iraq. He was the governor in the Province of As-Sulaymaniyah and then had a variety of high-level positions in the interim and transition governments before becoming the deputy prime minister in the permanent, now the Maliki government of Iraq, and I'm sure that those who heard him could not have failed to be impressed by the efforts that he is undertaking, the national and international compacts that he is leading to help Iraq achieve its goal of a stable, federal democracy. It's a tall order. There are countless challenges. It is very, very difficult. But I read his remarks last night. In fact, I encourage — for whatever it's worth, he already hung them on the Web, which is pretty impressive. And I happened to talk to him on the phone. He had actually heard that I was coming to town, and we linked up, and he is very realistic about the enormous challenges his country faces, but he's also very resolute in the face of those challenges.

I was impressed to learn about the 21st Century Defense Initiative. I must confess I didn't realize that this is the inaugural presentation of it until I

just heard that, but that's an honor to do. It clearly is a timely and important endeavor, and I'm encouraged by the fact that you've got Peter Singer and, above all, my Woodrow Wilson School wingman, Michael O'Hanlon, to head that up, and I look forward to the products of that effort.

Yesterday, I was at great Fort Benning, Georgia, which is one of those schools and centers the ambassador referred to that we oversee from the greater combined armed center, and I'll explain what that is because it shows how we can, in fact, help be an engine of change for our Army. But I was reminded while I was there, it's the home of the infantry, the home of the Airborne School, Ranger School, and a bunch of great units, and I was talking with some terrific noncommissioned officers there at the good old home of the infantry, and they told me a story, and it is a story, but as the story goes this battalion was deployed on a dessert island in the south Pacific — very highly classified, which is why you've never heard about it before — to conduct operations as part of the global war on terrorism. And upon arrival, they found that they had to hire some local inhabitants as scouts and translators. It turned out, however, that the locals were cannibals, so the commander, who had of course completed all of his language and cultural awareness training — it is now part of preparation for such a deployment — made a point of speaking to the cannibal leaders himself before the contract was finalized. "You're part of our team now," he said, "one team, one fight; make way together; team of teams; all that good stuff. We'll pay you well for your services, and we'll allow you to eat any of our rations. But please," he said, "please don't eat any of our soldiers." Well, the cannibals responded in a

very reassuring manner, promising not to eat any of the troopers on the island, and they shook hands with the commander and went to work. Everything was going smoothly until about four weeks later when the commander called the cannibals together for a meeting once again and spoke with the leader in particular. "You're all working hard now," he said, "and I'm very pleased with your performance. However, one of our sergeants has disappeared. Do any of you know what happened to him?" The cannibals all shook their head no and professed to have no idea of the missing sergeant's whereabouts. After the commander left, the leader of the cannibals turned to the others and asked sternly, "Which one of you idiots ate the sergeant?" The cannibals hung their heads and looked down, and finally one of them meekly put his hand in the air and said, "I did." "You fool," the head cannibal shouted. "For four weeks we've been eating captains, majors, and even an embedded journalist and no one noticed anything. And then you had to go and eat a sergeant." Now, of course, note that I didn't say anything about eating generals or ambassadors or New York Times or News Week. I mean, they would have noticed that immediately. ABC — let's cover all the bases here. They'd have noticed their absence right away.

Well, what I'd like to do this morning is give you an idea of what we're doing in the part of the Army that I'm privileged to oversee — and I'll show you what that is — in response to lessons that we have indeed learned, observations, and insights from observations in Iraq and Afghanistan.

There's been a very comprehensive effort underway as we work hard to do all that we can to prepare our leaders in our units for the complexities

and challenges of conducting counterinsurgency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and anywhere else they might be employed. And that's what I'll talk about during the briefing. Following the briefing, I'll be happy to take your questions, and then I'd like to offer a few final comments if I could.

And if you go ahead and flip it up there.

And, again, we're talking about something that is an engine of change for our Army.

And we'll see how well the mike works, and it works.

Next slide, please.

And when I talk about what this consists of, I do need to explain what it is that we oversee there in these different hats that the Combined Armed Center commander has. There are some different titles there that you saw. But the bottom line is that the guy in my position gets to oversee these different organizations here. There's a number at Fort Leavenworth and some others on another slide that I'll show that include our Command and General Staff College School of Advanced Military Studies, an organization that oversees our so-called dirt training centers — the National Training Center at Fort Ord in California; the Joint Readiness Training Center in Louisiana; and the Virtual Training Center, the one that conducts the very large simulations exercises for our divisions in our corps. These focus at the brigade combat team level. It's supported by a National Simulation Center.

We have the Lessons Learned Center there, as the ambassador mentioned; the Doctrine Directorate that oversees the production of all doctrine

for our Army; a host of folks that do battle command integration at the Leadership Center and so forth; and also a new center that was formed at the direction of the Secretary of Defense. In fact, last September not long after I got home from Iraq having come through Afghanistan to do an assessment of the security forces there, and that is a center that captures and is a repository for expertise and experience in the conduct of these very, very large organize, train, equip, advise, and rebuild missions that we're conducting with the Multinational Security Transition Command in Iraq and the Coalition Security Transition Command in Afghanistan. And that is now off — and, in fact, the deputy director of that is out conducting an assessment right now downrange.

Now, beyond that, we oversee some interesting organizations, and very important ones to this effort, including the Defense Language Institute, a true national asset. It's a jewel in the crown, I think, of the language training programs. Of all of America, it has not quite 3000 students out there at a given point in time, about of a third of them, somewhere between 800 and 900 studying Arabic right now, just to give you an order of magnitude, and it is a joint — a defense, not just an Army organization, although we oversee it. Military Intelligence Center and School, which took the lead, by the way, in producing the manual that was just recently published on human intelligence collector, which had the guidelines for interrogations; the Air Defenders; and also all the noncommissioned office education system, which we oversee through the Sergeants-Major Academy at Bliss; and then the Field Artillerymen at Fort Sill. This is the M.P.s, the engineers, and the chemical corps. We do have an interface

with the Air Force at Nellis Air Force Base in Nevada and also down in Florida, Hurlburt Field. We oversee the warrant officer education program in the aviation center and school, Infantry Center, as I mentioned, at Fort Benning. We also have the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Studies. That's the former School of the Americas—changed the name somewhere along the line to confuse the demonstrators. It hasn't quite worked yet, but we're — we actually have invited them in. We would stand very happy to have on the front page of the New York Times — I don't see the Washington Post here — or the Washington Post — good to see you. Michael's up in the front here, you know.

(Laughter)

GENERAL PETRAEUS: But to have what we have done with respect to human rights, which were the — you know, that was the reason for concern years ago when it was still being taught down in Panama.

Got the signal folks, the armor folks, the civilian education system — which is the Army Management Staff College — and then individuals deployed all around the world — in Afghanistan, in Iraq — wherever we have soldiers at the combat training centers to capture these observations, insights, and lessons from the operational area, feed them back now all digitally, and to do that. We also tie very closely with the Combat Training Center in Hohenfels, Germany.

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There's a couple of others I'd point out. We're the proponent for the Army, which means we're essentially sort of the branch chief for the

information operations field. That's a new field. It continues to expand. It continues to be refined. I'd be happy to talk about that during the questions, focusing very much on trying to integrate the worlds of public affairs and SIOPS, which really you don't want to mix but someone does have to help oversee that.

We're into the electronic warfare business in a pretty substantial way. That was an area where we had not had much effort in recent years, but it has proved very, very important as we shove more and more stuff through the frequency spectrum and need some experts to manage it.

As you know, our Army is going through the modular force transformation. We are reorganizing our whole Army to be brigade combat team centric and focused on that, and we have an element out there that helps with the integration and then captures lessons and makes tweaks to the organizations. Just stood up an Army-Marine counterinsurgency center. Partnered with my old shipmate down at Quantico, Jim Maddis, before he moved out to the West Coast to take OneMeth (?), but Col. Pete Consur(?), a terrific officer, a true soldier scholar, commander of the brigade in Baghdad with First Armor Division, Ph.D. in history, and is leading that effort and very, very important — very small but very important element. In fact, we're about to announce a counterinsurgency professor chair — distinguished chair out at the Command General Staff College as well.

We have some knowledge managers. We have what — you know, "the Army's professional journal." There's some others out there certainly. In fact, each of those branch schools has one, but that — I think if you're looking for

articles on counterinsurgency, in particular in the past year or so, has a large number of those. In fact, we're about to publish a military review reader that captures quite a few of those to make them more accessible.

And then we have an organization of historians called the Combat Studies Institute. They're the ones that did On Point, which was the story of the early part of the effort in Iraq. We are now going to extend that, the really contemporary history — the official history — done here in Washington by the Center for Military History, but they're going to extend that through the elections, the 30th of January '05.

Have interviewed General Sanchez, Ambassador Bremer, all the other key players during that period, and they have also published a very large number of pamphlets and monographs that are very relevant to what we're doing when it comes to advisor efforts, the importance of language and culture in other capturing what has been done recently again in Iraq and Afghanistan.

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Now, when you get your arms around all of that — and the reason I wanted to explain that is because this is how, in fact, my predecessor really — General Wallace — came up with the idea that this is an engine of change for our Army. It is not the only engine of change. There are some key cogs in change in our Army that really aren't on here. One of those is the Materiel cog, the equipment cog. We certainly make suggestions. Our schools bubble up requirements, which are hugely important, but that then passes into another command, the Army Materiel Command, who then sources those, provides those

— but, again, one that is very, very important as well is we have sought to equip our soldiers much better literally all the way from brand new uniforms, body army, up armor, Humvees, you name it, striker vehicles and so forth.

And then another important cog, which is the organization cog, which again we share with others, and that's the Modular Force Transformation, the addition of a large number of intelligence soldiers to the force, infantrymen, military police, civil affairs, SIOPS, Special Forces, you name it, as we have tried to balance the force to meet the needs of the contemporary environment more effectively.

But the cogs that we focus on in our domain, if you will, again the part of the Army that I oversee, are those of doctrine and, again, hugely important. That is, our field manuals. Those are our principles, our concepts. That is what is taught or what our leaders are educated on, because we really are educating now more and more and more with a seminar approach in most of our schools rather than just a pure lecture approach. And I'll talk a bit about that. But that's the leader development cog. That is the education of our noncommissioned, warrant, and commissioned officers throughout the various school systems of our Army at these different branch schools and centers, the Command and General Staff College, and so forth.

We then practice those at these combat training centers that I talked about, the most rigorous of that type of training being the mission rehearsal exercises that are conducted for our brigade combat teams at the National Training Center, the Joint Readiness Training Center, or the center in Germany

before they deploy to Iraq, Afghanistan, or wherever else they might go, and then also the virtual training centers, as I mentioned, the simulations-driven exercises for our division headquarters and corps headquarters.

It's also, of course, what is practiced downrange, and again so this — you have this progression really through here, like that to there, and we certainly have, as I mentioned, lessons learned; collectors capturing observations, insights, and lessons at our training centers downrange in Iraq, Afghanistan, the Philippines, wherever we may be deployed; and then pushing them back to those who refine the doctrine, those who are the seminar leaders in the various courses, and those who design the scenarios at the combat training centers. And now all of this is enabled by this concept of knowledge management, which is a good bit more than just sort of sending e-mail to each other, and I'll talk about virtual communities and so forth, with the hope being that we are helping our Army to be a learning organization, which is hugely important when you're confronting environments that are different from those for which you really were preparing, say, five years ago in particular.

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So, let me just talk through each of these cogs. Then I'll talk about how we have helped units on the road to deployment as well, and then I'll be happy to take your questions.

So, if we look at doctrine, recent publications in particular, the Army Leadership Manual was just recently released. The big idea there — and I'll talk about these big ideas, because big ideas matter. They drive an awful lot of

what we do, and they ripple through all of our different manuals. And the big idea here is the idea of a leader who is a pentathlete leader, if you will. Not just a sprinter, not just a shot putter, but can do a number of different events, and I'll talk about that on the spectrum of conflict on the next slide.

This is a leader that, as our Chief of Staff explains, is comfortable throughout the spectrum of conflict, not just at the high end or the low end but can function anywhere throughout it. This was quite heavily covered in these two newspapers of record, among others. The Human Intelligence Collector Operations Manual talked about the interrogation techniques — what's allowed, what is not allowed, and so forth — that had quite a bit of keen interest or was a good bit of assistance with that, as you know from folks in this town, and that has now been formally released and, in fact, is released — actually hung on the Web, I believe. I know that it was actually an unclassified manual in the end.

The next one that you'll see will be published in October. This is going to be the Army-Marine Corps and, again, it is a multi-service manual. The two services that are most heavily engaged, of course, on the ground in Iraq and Afghanistan. This is very much an update, a refinement, more than that perhaps, of the interim manual that was put out a couple of years ago when General Wallace came home from Iraq. Immediately put an interim manual out to bridge that gap, because there had been over 20 years since we last had a formal counterinsurgency manual back in the mid-'80s. And then this will represent quite a substantial update of that, and again we'll hang that on the Web probably in early to mid-October. They're actually doing the final conference right now to

reconcile a few changes, but in general — by the way, this was hung on the Web also in this brave, new virtual age by somebody who got a copy of the draft manual, and it will not be that dramatically different from the draft manual that was put out there.

Working on an interim manual on Stability Operations that will also complement this manual, and then this manual here, our capstone operations manual, is already in draft as well and the big idea there being the concept of full spectrum operations where, again, the focus previously was on more conventional combat offense and defense. The explicit idea here is that again you expand the aperture. You must be able to do stability operations, and they should be included in the design of every operation that you conduct, as is shown on this next slide.

If you will, this is a very, very important manual. Again the idea of full spectrum operations is already in an existing field manual, but this will refine that pretty substantially, and it will also explicitly note that the idea that we used to subscribe to an organization that is well disciplined, competently led, well equipped, and trained for high-intensity conflict, if you will, major combat operations, and can do the big stuff could then handle the little stuff. Clearly, there has to be much more specific preparation for these very challenging operations in counterinsurgency operations, and it will state that, and certainly we have already begun to act on that long since.

But if you think of the spectrum of conflict — because I do want to expand a bit on this particular idea — but a piece over here all the way up to — General War, Major Combat Operations, is the theme. You see the operational

themes that are familiar to you, and of course they overlap. You're never conducting just one or the other. And then the big idea here is that no matter where you are on this spectrum, no matter what the operational theme or the type of operation, you are always conducting some mix of offense, defense, and — and the "and" is underlined literally in the manual — and stability operations. And that mix changes depending on where you are in the spectrum. In fact, within an area of operations — let's say in Iraq, and I'll show you November '04 as an example of that — at any given time you may have units that are well over here, and you may have some units that are over here. And, again, this reinforces the need, the idea, the importance of the pentathlete leader who is comfortable all up and down this spectrum. And, again, a lot of our education of our leaders reflects that now and as do a number of other programs, such as opening up more civilian graduate school slots to operational branch officers without requiring them to go off and do a utilization tour somewhere that takes them out of the net for another three years.

This is a very, very big concept here. As I said, when we underlined that "and," that's a huge addition, in a sense, to our doctrine of literature, and it will ripple throughout everything that we do, because this is, again, the capstone manual from which all others take their lead as in the doctrinal hierarchy.

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And let me just explain just on two more slides again so you get this context. If you look at November '04 in Iraq, that was the time, as you'll

recall, that multinational corps Iraq went back into Fallujah and cleaned Fallujah out of the insurgents which had been generally left alone there for a number of months since about the April '04 time frame.

At the corps level, which was the major operational headquarters in Iraq, they certainly saw themselves as conducting counterinsurgency operations, and the mix that they saw was about like this. In fact, I discussed this with Lt. Gen. Tom Metz, who's the deputy commander of our Training Doctrine Command, yesterday at Fort Benning when I saw him, and they saw a better balanced mix at their level conducting a mix of stability offense and defense.

But if you went — marched your way up the country — you saw him in (off mike) southeast, the British-led headquarters here, very heavily into the stability ops mode; the Polish-led headquarters in the south center right here, again, very much into the stability, and you see that reflected down here on the bottom as you march your way up in the mix there.

Multinational force, Baghdad — that was then Maj. Gen. Corelli(?) with the first cab division. Pretty balanced. He had quite a good bit of stability — security and reconstruction going on, some certainly a mix of offense and defense as well. Then you get down into multinational force west, which is, of course, is where Fallujah is. Heavily on the offense was their mix, and I'll show you. I'll break that down for you in a second.

North center — that was the first infantry division at that time. Had very much transitioned into stability operations.

Northwest — that was General Hammond and Task Force

Olympia. Regrettably had spiraled downward during the fall of '04 and was about to bottom out with the police up in Mosul, so they were back into a mix after having been heavily into stability for quite some time.

And then northeast — that completely — just about stability with some defense. That's largely in the Kurdish area of Verbeil(?).

So, now if we focus in —

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If you look at Multinational Force West, you see even there a very big mix. Certainly the focus of the first meth(?) at the time — very heavily on the offense because of the Fallujah operation, but even there they had an independent element operating down in Kabul and Nasha(?) that, you'll recall, had been cleared out back in August, and they were completely in the stability mode. You had another organization all the way out in the west, (off mike), that was very much on the defense just awaiting the results of the Fallujah operation, and then you had basically three to four brigades that were involved in Fallujah, two already on the offense at the time that we sort of stopped the clock here for this snapshot. Another that was in a mix of those sort of the outer cordon and also entering in, and then another was down the road in Ramadi but also again helping with the cordon. And then even another that was under the division, which, again, sought very offensive but nonetheless was conducting a mix of stability defense and a small amount of offense in Babíl Province which has Hila(?), which, again, was much more — quite peaceful at that time.

So, you can see the idea again. A mix always of offense, defense,

and stability — leaders that are comfortable with that mix, comfortable with the requirement of the spectrum of conflict. And that runs through all of our efforts in our education of leaders, in our training of our units, and then the preparation of them before they deploy.

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Let me talk a bit about that leader development. Again, the education of our commissioned, warrant, and noncommissioned officer leaders at all the different schools and systems. The basic courses, the career courses, the general staff course, even the war colleges, and then all of the parallel ones in the noncommissioned officer education system and the warrant educations system, each of which is sequential and progressive.

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We are obviously again — there we would reflect naturally the changes in our doctrine, so if the doctrine has gone from a focus that was pretty heavily on combat operations, the full spectrum operations — needless to say, you would expect to see that reflected and echoed in the seminar rooms, and in fact it is in all of our courses.

I don't want to make this out to be more than it was. You know, my generation just sat there in the classroom at Leavenworth or Fort Benning and, you know, just memorized stuff, and now today's guys are great far thinkers. But the fact is that in the NATO Warsaw pact era we had quite a predictable enemy. We could study the daylights out of that enemy. It was reflected at our combat training centers where the opposing force came at you in a very predictable

manner. You literally had a template for how they were going to attack, and you could identify where the long-range reconnaissance and so-called division reconnaissance or dirt teams were, where their forward echelon was, and so forth, and it was something that was much, much more, again, predictable.

The enemy that we are facing now is obviously going to come at us asymmetrically, is coming at us asymmetrically, irregular warfare, difficult to find, puts a much higher premium on intelligence than ever before, and creates a number of other demands, and so again we have tried to reflect that so that there's no longer the so-called school solution. There can be a couple of different school solutions. Right answers. But each of them has some upsides and some downsides. There can be wrong answers, too, by the way, and we're not afraid to point that out. But the idea is to develop thinking leaders, again pentathlete leaders who can deal with the complexities of the operations in which we're involved now, which again are different from that somewhat kinetic focus that we had particularly in certain elements of the force.

We have very explicitly gone from lectures. For example, at Fort Leavenworth the first three or four months the core course. I know in fact there's some Leavenworth graduates out here. That core portion we, you know, used to get in to the section room of 60 students and they'd lecture you for 50 minutes, and then you went to the coffee pot and you repeated the process five more times that day and the next day and the next day, and now it is very much seminar based and in part because the students in those seminar rooms are as experienced, if not more experienced, than the instructors or the seminar group leaders, although we

have quite a good cadre out there. Each of those seminar rooms of about 16 students typically has an international officer. It has typically a maritime officer, naval or marine, and it has an Air Force officer, and then it has a mix of the U.S. Army branches in their as well. And, again, to get that kind of experience and to discuss these issues and, in a sense, to be interactive, which all of us know the newer generations prefer as a model for learning anyway.

Other changes. Huge increase in the amount of counterinsurgency-related courses and seminars. Fort Leavenworth, for example. It's gone just roughly from, say, 5, 10 percent to over 40 percent, depending on what electives a student takes during the course of the year out there, and that is similar in other courses, although certainly the very basic courses certainly still have to get — you must get those basic combat skills, still, the basic skills on which we must build.

The addition of language and culture training. At Fort Leavenworth, if they're getting deployed to Iraq they'll get Arabic. If they're going to deploy to Afghanistan, they'll get Pashto, because that's largely the area in which our forces are working. We have the capability to do others.

Needless to say, have updated reading lists, and I mention this initiative by our Army, as well, to allow basic branch officers — now, we've always had officers going off to graduate school, and if you were then going to teach at West Point — I see my Joe Collins, my old former Social Sciences Department buddy back there — but, you know, we went off to grad school for two years, then we went to West Point for two or three years, and then to the

Command and General Staff College. Well, if you're an infantry officer, that can be a high-risk strategy. It can be a high-return strategy maybe, but knock on wood as you that kind of thing. And so especially when you're in a high-op tempo, officers don't want to go off necessarily and be out of the net for six full years, so now there's an opportunity to still do that, still get in the best and a lot of the best and brightest up at West Point in these other functional areas that require graduate school and before they go off and move into that area. But this is an opportunity for allowing infantry, allowing armor, some of the best and brightest there who want to get back to a unit to go to graduate school either as very young captains or post company command captains, and then they come right back in the force, go the follow-on military school in either the career course or the general staff college. They're sort of re-greened, if you will, and then back out into the force with a degree of flexibility I think that comes from having been out of their intellectual comfort zone, and that is what you get at a civilian graduate school.

Folks have asked me a number of times, you know, what was it that prepared you best, perhaps, for all these sort of really nonstandard, shall we call it, tasks that forces had to take on in the early days in Iraq in particular, and interestingly for me it was graduate school and the fellowship. It was — that is a different culture in itself, as anyone here knows who's an academic, and I know there's a lot of them here. And dealing in that culture is challenging intellectually in a way that, try as we might at Leavenworth — we can put a provocative speaker at the podium, and we do. We can get them all in the auditorium to hear

someone like that. But at the end of the day they're going to the coffee pot with folks who think generally the way they do, and that is not the case, certainly, in a civilian graduate school, and it has a very salutary effect and sometimes an appropriately humbling effect that I think is useful when you go downrange.

Next slide.

Well, what about what are we doing out of there at the combat training centers? And this is a very, very dramatic shift.

Next slide.

And I'll take just the example at the National Training Center out in the Mohave Desert at Fort Irwin, California. Again, pre-9/11 really up until just, say, two and a half years ago or so, what was done in the National Training Center was sort of a monthly refighting of Desert Storm. Typically in a two-week rotation, you fight a battle about every other day. There was the clash of the Titans in the central corridor and then re-do it again two days later, you know, offense, defense, delay, meeting engagement, you name it. They were kinetic. It was a sterile battlefield relatively. There were no civilians on that battlefield. There weren't villages. It was desert. And you went at it.

It is vastly different now. It is absolutely transformed, and it looks like this. And it is absolutely continuous, no-let-up, complex, very difficult counterinsurgency environment. We've added villages out there. There are about 12 of them, and dependent on how you draw the circle for the box in which you're going to conduct that rotation — typically get 9 to 11 of those — those villages are populated by hundreds of real Iraqis. Yeah, they're Iraqi-Americans, but they

are Iraqis or Afghan-Americans. If we're moving up into the hills, we have an Afghan scenario complete with caves dug into the mountains out there. Again, those of you have been out there know it's pretty mountainous as well. But those Iraqi-Americans replicate — this is like putting on a minor, you know, epic drama out there once a month. In fact, we actually have on the consulting staff some folks from Hollywood, of all things, or Los Angeles area, that help carry this out and helped us refine the roles for some — somewhere around 2000, because we augment the several hundred Iraqi or Afghan role players with about 1500 of our own soldiers who are based out at Fort Irwin from the 11th Armored (off mike) Regimen that just returned from Iraq within the last six months of so and very experienced at this and, you know, all of the old veterans out here — hold on to your hat. But we actually allow them to grow beards during the course of the rotations. You know, we're very — you know, you can start here and you end here.

(Laughter)

GENERAL PETRAEUS: But, I mean, we do allow — this is a military organization. We do allow them to grow beards. They strap on suicide vests. They drive suicide car bombs. They will replicate host nation security forces, other civilians, business — you name it — again, to augment those role players who will only speak in their language. You must use translators with them. And, again, it is absolutely realistic to the point where if you woke up out there in the morning and were a little bit disoriented, I think you would actually think in — we've some that did — that, boy, I'm right back in Anbar Province or

wherever it might be.

So, again, a very challenging — in fact, I should mention. We even hired Colonel Weathers. You know, some are old enough to remember Apollo Creed who, you know Rocky and usually got whipped in the final ten seconds, but he's in fact part of this institute that helps advise on the conduct of these operations.

And — oh, by the way, there's no option. You've got to do nation building, reconstruction, working with locals, improving basic services, and all the rest of that.

Very, very realistic. Same has taken place at the training center down in Louisiana — the Joint Readiness Training Center at Fort Pope. Same has taken place at the Joint Multinational Readiness Center at Hohenfels, Germany. Same, to a degree, Camp Shelby where we do some of the training for the Reserve components. Smaller packages of forces than the large brigade combat teams that go through here. And certainly the same in the virtual world, again, with the simulations exercises. We even have a joint non-kinetic effects model now that is inserted into the family of simulations. It helps drive these big exercises for divisions and corps before they go again to deploy to Iraq or Afghanistan. So, big, big shift.

Next slide.

Now, also complementing that, there's a parallel effort for the preparation of transition teams. In fact, the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army recently put out — General Cody announced the top priority that we've got is

manning these teams with the right individuals, keeping them up to strength and so forth and preparing them, and we've had a role in that. That new organization that I mentioned at Fort Leavenworth that was formed last fall really became operational just this summer. Has been helping Fort Riley, Kansas. The Big Red One, the first infantry division commander, has that mission out at Fort Riley. Came home from Germany. Happens to be Major General Carter Hamm, who is in fact the individual who relieved us up in Northern Iraq in Ninawa Province. He is overseeing an effort out there right now training the transition team members who are going to Iraq. They get a two-month program out there or they already have all the basic skills and so forth, and this also has been a change where the original — the early preparation of these teams was pretty heavy on, again, sort of traditional skills — shooting every possible weapon you could encounter out there, driving every vehicle, working every radio and every jammer and everything else — to much greater mix in there of language skills, culture, and, really, advisory skills. I mean, this is a very different endeavor. You're not doing. You're helping someone else do, and that takes certain tactics, techniques, and procedures of itself. And they added on here, again, this kind of functional training that they get to be better advisors, not just the ultimate warrior. We had already created in Iraq what was called Phoenix Academy. In fact, when I was the multinational security transition commander, (off mike) commander, we put it at Taji north of Baghdad. It's the final stop for an advisor for a transition team. Remember, before he or she heads of to a unit and they get a final ten-day period up there, about seven days of a seminar, and then they get works and final

equipment issues.

But complementing that, we've had the combat studies institute, the Center for Army Lessons Learned. They have worked hard to develop products for these transition teams, a whole number of handbooks, pamphlets, and so forth. And, again, the manual certainly addresses the new counterinsurgency manual, and others address the importance of these particular tasks.

Next slide.

Now, what about that lessons-learned effort?

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In a word, it's probably, you know, been sort of shot with steroids. This is about a five-fold increase on the number of hits, on the Center for Army Lessons Learned Website. We have had to move an awful lot of what we do hang on the Web from the publicly accessible Website to a password protected — and then also to a secure internet to make sure that bad guys, frankly, are not hitting that Website and finding out what the lessons are that we're taking from our engagements with them.

But there has also been a huge shift from what used to be these hard-copy publications that we have produced, often focused on how do you deal with the opposing force at the National Training Center or the Joint Readiness Training Center to products that, again, carry the full spectrum. They cover, certainly heavily focused on the counterinsurgency arena, what we're going in Iraq and Afghanistan, but they do talk about some other activities of our Army these days, and now they are very heavily hung on the Web, distributed

electronically. We do do some CD production and that type of thing as well. And each one of these is a pretty important report that comes out, and they're very heavily read in the field, and again this plays into the virtual world, which we're exploiting more and more.

Next slide, please.

And let me talk a bit about that, because all of this that we do here, all of these different cogs and the tasks associated with them are very, very heavily enabled by knowledge management tools.

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And, in fact, we have an organization at Fort Leavenworth that was stood up about a year and a half ago, I guess, the Battle Command Knowledge System. It is a bunch of experts on applications that enable you to do knowledge management, and again it's much, much more than just the internet. We've gone from the Band of Bloggers — they were these four great captains that were up at West Point, former company commanders, three infantry officers and a great wire head, a great electrical engineer, computer expert. The other three came to him and said hey, could you create a virtual community in which we could share lessons, pose questions to each other, and so forth? And it now has thousands of members, and that really was the first of these virtual communities. In fact, now we actually fund them. We don't interrupt them. We don't, you know, squash them or anything like that. You know, there was concern, in fact, when we offered the money initially to fund an administrator for these. But as they become larger, you've got to do that. You have to keep up the information assurance

details in that and so in fact we now fund dozens of different administrators of a whole variety of virtual communities that fun the entire gamut of branches, functional areas, and so forth in our Army. NCOnet now has tens of thousands of members. These have proved so successful, in fact, that the Army magazine published by the Association of the United States Army actually has a column each month, snippets from the discussions among the company commanders, and they're going to add the same here soon for the NCOs as well.

We're also taking advantage of language applications like Rosetta Stone that's hung on Army Knowledge on Line. Our students at Fort Leavenworth use that, in fact, as part of their language training. They also use video teleconference, and then we actually take the actual students because, again, we have dozens of foreign students there, international officers, including Iraqis and Afghan officers, and they get credit for a course by teaching these language and culture courses to American students.

Taking advantage of language translation devices. This is an interactive culture and language application here. And then we're also into the world of command and control. As I mentioned, we do have the command and control integrators out there, and there's a whole host of these applications that are now enabling our commanders downrange to do real-time collaboration, and one of those is Command Post of the Future, which is an application that sits on top of the family of battle command systems, as they're called, and enables them to collaborate real time in a way that we haven't been able to do before.

This organization here also plays a key role in helping show our

leaders how they can virtually look over the shoulder of those who are downrange. So, you can actually get on a secure internet, secure military internet. You can look at the information display, the so-called dashboard of a unit that's downrange that you might replace, see what's going on in their area today, what went on last week, what the trends are, what orders they received, what orders they issued, what their commanders' critical information requirements are, and on and on. And it's an extraordinarily important tool to exploit so that we can, in fact, immerse — leaders can immerse themselves, intelligence officers can immerse themselves in that data, in that information before they even go downrange.

Next slide, please.

Now, the hope is that all of this — again, these elements that make up this part of the Army engine of change are, in fact, contributing to our Army being a learning organization. In fact, one of the things that we learned is that we also needed to help our brigade combat teams get off on the right foot as they headed on the road to deployment. And I'll just talk about that — will be my last slide before taking questions.

General Casey about now, I guess, a year ago or so started a Counterinsurgency Academy up at Taji, in fact, right next to that Phoenix Academy that I talked about for the advisors, and we actually contributed a couple of instructors from the Command and General Staff College to that effort. It's turned out to be quite successful. It's a very good last stop for leaders. When they're planes touch down in Kuwait, they go up to Taji while their soldiers then

go through a variety of desert environmental training lanes and unload ships and get ready to move into the country.

They spend about a week or ten days up there, and among the comments that we got were from some of the leaders. They said this is terrific stuff but I wish I'd had it eight months ago. And that was a pretty good catalyst. We had always been teaching a seminar back here with elements of the Battle Command Training Program at Fort Leavenworth, the Virtual Training Center organization that oversees those, to our brigades. It was focused, though, still on largely our urban operations and somewhat kinetic skills, and we transitioned that now to a counterinsurgency seminar. It's a week long. We partner with the brigade commander to ensure that we are filling the gaps that he may be aware of. They conduct that course. Included is the ability, again, to look virtually over the shoulder so they see that. We marry them up with experts from the so-called Asymmetric Warfare Groups and very highly specialized trained individuals, many of whom are special mission unit operators. We spend time in Iraq, come back, and marry up with the units and pass on the latest observations that they have. We give them the benefit of the latest in doctrine, the latest area updates. We give them a huge list that's much more comprehensive than this of the different courses and mobile training teams that could help them while they're on the road to deployment. And then at the end of that, they sit down with their leaders, their senior officers, senior noncommissioned officers and say okay, what do we want to change or what do we want to include in our road to deployment, which will always include this mission rehearsal exercise at the National Training

Center, Joint Readiness Training Center, which does have a leader seminar connected with it as well, which has also been transformed and much more focused, again, on full spectrum counterinsurgency flavor operations, not just kinetic operations or lethal ops. They will do a leaders' recon downrange, and they're deploying larger advance parties so that you avoid the dip that takes place and situational awareness in the knowledge of the enemy, of the local area that is somewhat inevitable when one unit replaces another. And so they're working that very hard as well.

And then, of course, they get on the plane and go downrange and do the usual right seat, left seat ride where they watch the other guys do it, and then they switch over. The outgoing troops watch them do it, and you have the transition of authority. So, that effort is ongoing as well.

There are challenges in certain areas of this. I don't want to make you to think that this is just an easy, smooth — because they are also, in most cases, doing the reset and train simultaneously, and that involves having turned their equipment in, left some behind in theater. They've got to get that refurbished. The depots do that for them. They have to get that reissued. In many cases, it involves a lot of upgrades. It involves new equipment training courses, and it involves receipt of a number of new personnel as others have gone off in these life-cycle manners brigades once they have finished their deployment to schools, to other assignments, and so forth. So, this is a challenging period for a brigade commander, but we believe this is helping those commanders substantially to get the intellectual construct right for them and for their

subordinate leaders in that organization as they embark on that road to deployment.

Well, again, that is what I wanted to lay out for you — what we're doing in our portion of the bigger engine of change of our Army, and we're helping units as they prepare to deploy to these very challenging and complex endeavors that are ongoing in Iraq and Afghanistan, and now I'd be very happy to take your questions.

(Applause)

GENERAL PETRAEUS: Yes, sir — I guess I can go ahead and do it. Yeah, okay, please.

MR. SMITH: Dane Smith, American University. General Petraeus, I wonder if you comment in a little more detail on the training for stabilization, post-conflict reconstruction, and the extent to which that includes the idea of coordination with other U.S. government agencies that are working in post-conflict reconstruction.

GENERAL PETRAEUS: That is a great question. In fact, needless to say we were discussing that before, as you might imagine. And, interestingly, there are some good advances there that — for the journalists in here, I'm sure you're all vying for a ticket to the State Department-hosted seminar that they're going to do later this month for two days in which they're going to gather all the interagency partners that are involved in this and discuss the way ahead to have a coordinated effort. It's somewhat similar to what we did in February out at Fort Leavenworth when we had the two-day conference out there

to really push the Counterinsurgency Field Manual downrange, but obviously a couple of levels above that, not just at a single service or two services but at the interagency level. We think that this is a real important initiative. Assistant Secretary John Hillen for Political Military Affairs at State is the one leading the charge for this. We're certainly eager to see it. I actually am going to participate in that, probably give, in fact, something similar to this that day — as an example, perhaps what one institution is doing to try to make change. And, again, we hope that what will come out of that will be, again, an increased embrace by the whole inner agency of what really is supposed to be going on as directed by the National Security Policy directive that discussed stability operations and then assign the lead on that, in fact, to the State Department. So, we'll see how that goes, and we're very eager to see that.

I think you all know that — I mean, there are huge challenges for Iraq. Among them certainly are the development — perhaps the most important ones at this point, because it is a political — an awful lot of these are political issues now, economic basic service issues that are, in many respects, shaping the environment. Certainly the security environment is a huge part of that as well. But the development of capability and then of real capacity in these ministries is of huge importance in Iraq, in Afghanistan, in any country that has gone through what those two countries have gone through.

The new Iraqi government obviously has just been in place for a few months now, the permanent government having had, really, four governments now in the course of the last two and a half years, and, again, it's really incumbent

that we all link arms and help them — every member of the interagency providing the expertise that the respective organizations can provide to ensure that if you can get everything right in this particular arena that, you know, the Ministry of Finance doesn't sort of undermine — and I'm just taking that as an example — or, you know, make sure the Ministry of Oils is doing all that it can to continue to generate revenue and even more revenue in the Minister of Agriculture, given the important aspect of that to their economy.

So, that's the kind of impetus that's out there. Again, we're really — we're certainly applauding that very heavily. We would welcome the opportunity to participate in that and to assist. In fact, we just had a number of the members of the (off mike) office out at Fort Leavenworth and talked through some of the stuff that you saw here in the new Counterinsurgency Manual. Again, they were partners in that effort. We had several members of the State Department out there with us helping us, and we look forward to partnering with them, as all of, really, the Defense Department. And, of course, DoD put out a Special Instruction on Stability Operations as well. If you look at the Quadrennial Defense Review, there's pretty strong language in there as well, again, about stability operations, about this type of operation that we're really given a great deal more emphasis to in the Army training, education, and other elements.

MR. PASCUAL: General, if I could take the prerogative of the chair.

GENERAL PETRAEUS: Sure, go ahead, please, because you might know them.

MR. PASCUAL: Well, actually, I wasn't going to so much going to explain on that, but let me continue with that question, because —

GENERAL PETRAEUS: Absolutely.

MR. PASCUAL: And this is in the spirit of, as you said, pushing people out of their intellectual comfort zone.

GENERAL PETRAEUS: You're not allowed to push me out of my comfort zone.

MR. PASCUAL: No, no, not at all.

GENERAL PETRAEUS: There are limits to this.

(Laughter)

MR. PASCUAL: Let's assume that that could be possible, but what we are thinking of here is the importance of actually pushing both military and military pushing civilians out of our intellectual comfort zones to get us to think about in ways that we might not necessarily otherwise, but a different aspect of interaction between the military and civilian world really is on these broader political and policy issues, and let's just continue with Iraq as an example. I mean, here is a case where the viability of an Iraqi government is absolutely central to the viability of a military mission. I mean, a military mission can create —

GENERAL PETRAEUS: No question about it.

MR. PASCUAL: — space for transition, but you can't —

GENERAL PETRAEUS: That's right.

MR. PASCUAL: — you can't substitute for an Iraqi government.

So, you've got an obvious — the military has an obvious challenge on the ground of trying to figure out how to create a space for security. You've got a window within which you can operate, but you've also got this challenge that if you don't get progress on the political side, your ability to operate and maneuver gets shorter and narrower and narrower, and the time gets narrower. So, can you give us a sense for what kind of exchange, what kind of interaction occurs between the military and civilian world, the State Department and the military, in addressing these issues in the —

GENERAL PETRAEUS: That's a great — that's really a great question — obviously, you know, asked by someone who's in that world and did work that.

I think in large measure we're perhaps catalysts for each other, maybe sometimes burrs under the saddle of each other, you know one pushing one to, you know, give me a little more security space and the other saying well, you know, it is a political issue. In fact, by the way, the field manual that we'll publish on counterinsurgency operations, you know, "uses Galoolah(?)". David Galooah wrote really perhaps the best single, small book on counterinsurgency operations, which in fact we got a special deal with the publisher to bring back into publication and issue to every Commander General Staff College student. And it says that the counterinsurgency typically is 80 percent political, 20 percent military roughly. You can argue one way or the other. But (off mike) sort of pushing the other, you know, saying look, in particular I think arguably, since February of '06 with the bombing of the Gold Dome Mosque in Samarra, which I

think was hugely harmful. I mean, that was a very, very devastating blow to that entire effort, because what it did at the end of the day is it really, in some respects, sort of took the gloves off some of the militias and particularly the Shi'ia militias, and it unleashed this whole tit-for-tat that is just very, very difficult, and it starts a downward spiral, which is very hard to arrest, and certainly that's the essence of the strategy of together for the so-called battle of Baghdad that's ongoing right now.

And so again there is a back-and-forth very, very much. I think that, you know, again you've seen very, very high levels in particular between the ambassador and General Casey that there is the linking of arms but at the same time there's at various times an encouragement, certainly, to each side, you know, occasionally to do more. And occasionally we've had, you know, to move into some more, frankly. And the challenges that — the military has such a vast capability compared, candidly, to the capability of the organization from which you came. I mean, you might, in fact, comment on what you were talking about earlier, the history of some of the elements of –

(Interruption)

— need for resources and so forth, and, in fact, that's how you end up, to some degree, with military organizations having to do certain tasks that perhaps would be ideally done by others on occasion. In fact, I might offer that one back to you. But certainly there's a back-and-forth — there's an encouragement, and I think it's a fairly productive dialog right now. I know that the dialog that we've had certainly with the Assistant Secretary for Paul Millen and his office has certainly

been that. There's a desire on their part, certainly, to help the interagency, because, again, it's obviously not by any means just State, it's other elements of the interagency that, again, we've really got to exploit and get everyone to link arms and go forward with this.

In fact, do you want to say something about that.

MR. PASCUAL: I can just say a couple of words. I think one of the very important things that you said is that this kind of interaction engagement needs to take place at a number of different levels. One is on a high political policy level.

GENERAL PETRAEUS: Absolutely, yeah.

MR. PASCUAL: Because what happens in the political world influences the military possibilities and vice versa, and so there needs to be a constant adaptation of the strategy and the tactics based on that.

There are practical — there's practical engagement on recovery and reconstruction activities, depending on progress on those recovery and reconstruction activities.

GENERAL PETRAEUS: Right.

MR. PASCUAL: It influences the practical possibilities on the security side and on the political side.

I think one of the things that people need to understand is that the security environment creates the space for economic recovery and reconstruction. If you don't have the economic and recovery activities, it is impossible to actually sustain the security space.

GENERAL PETRAEUS: They all reinforce each other, yeah.

MR. PASCUAL: So, there is a reinforcement of one another.

And then there are all of the military tactics of those things which the military is undertaking on its own, which are all of the world that you described here.

GENERAL PETRAEUS: Um-hmm.

MR. PASCUAL: So, there is a broad range of levels in which this has to occur.

What I would just say is that State Department — in fact, the U.S. government — under the basis of a National Security Council decision decided to create an office based on the State Department on stabilization and reconstruction, and the idea was to create within the civilian part of the government something which is akin to the Joint Staff of the military so that you have the capacity to create a common strategy within a theater and have interoperability among the various civilian agencies we're working. So, the various parts of the State Department, USAID, the Treasury Department, the FBI, etc., would be able to have an interoperable capability and then work interoperably with the military in this kind of coordination.

The difficulty of introducing this in the civilian part of our government is that it's extraordinarily hard to get resources. The military budget is, depending on how you count supplementals, somewhere between 450 billion, $500 billion a year. The Foreign Affairs budget and the State Department budget together are about $33 billion, and it's already oversubscribed by another

4 billion. So, you try to get a few hundred million dollars out of that budget, and the answer is no, and then the next answer is no, and the following answer is no, and maybe if you beg hard enough you can get ten. And so you have this ironic situation where you have a civilian capability, which is absolutely fundamental to the success of a military mission, which is costing us billions of dollars a week and you can get the money for the billions of dollars a week in a military operation. You can hardly get a few tens of millions, much less hundreds of millions, for the civilian part of the operation, which is so fundamental to interlinking with the other. And that's the struggle that's being faced right now, and it's a very real one.

When the Foreign Ops bill goes to the floor on the Senate, right now the prospect is that the funding for these activities in both — well, the House has already voted. The amount provided by the House was zero. And right now the level in the Senate bill is zero. And so the funds that will be available for this in the future will essentially come out of the State Department budget being reallocated from other purposes. And it just shows how difficult it is to make the pieces of it work.

GENERAL PETRAEUS: Thanks.

Hi, yeah. Thanks.

MS. HESS: Pam Hess, with UPI.

GENERAL PETRAEUS: Good to see you, Pam.

MS. HESS: Nice to see you again. Two questions. What do you think are the most significant changes in counterinsurgency doctrine reflected in

the new field manual versus the old one? What have you guys learned actually — interact specifically. And what are you doing in this whole process to get out ahead of the next threat? This is all reactive.

GENERAL PETRAEUS: Sure. Let me just talk in a broad sense about the counterinsurgency field. I mean, first of all, there's just enormous significance that we are in fact publishing a final counterinsurgency manual. The interim one was very important in itself, but the fact is that there was a gap of some 20, 25 years between the publication of these manuals. And during that time the world turned quite a bit, and the enemies — the insurgents, if you will — have certainly taken advantage of new technologies. It's much more urban now. We're certainly not in jungles right now anywhere as we were in many respects in the past. And this is a very, very thinking, electronically linked enemy that can turn inside our own circle sometimes when it comes to information operations and so forth.

So, on the one hand you have to sort of update sort of conventional thinking about counterinsurgency operations. You do have to certainly hearken back to Galoolah and all the others, the classics if you will, but you then must put them in the current, the contemporary operational context.

Beyond that, the idea is to help our leaders develop a nuanced understanding of counterinsurgency operations in general. It is not to help them solve necessarily the problems of Iraq, and, in fact, no manual could even do that, because every different part of Iraq is different. One of the lessons that's in the manual, of course, is you must continually adapt. You must continually assess

and reassess a situation, because what works here today may not work here tomorrow. What works here today may not work down in the other province today.

And so, again, there's this attempt to try to stimulate that kind of contextual thinking, so it doesn't have the answers for Iraq or Afghanistan right now, but it sure will help people ask the right questions when they determine where specifically they're going to deploy.

We put in there, in fact — there's a series of paradoxes, which give you — I just want to throw these up here to give you a flavor for this manual, if you will, and we have some historical best practices and so forth. But I mean, these are the kinds of things that we're trying to get, again, to develop real thinking about this kind of operation. You know, by, in fact, protecting your force more, you may actually end up less secure over time. Yeah, you might, you know, prevent today's attack, but you might not be aware of what's going on out there that is developing that will be a far greater challenge in the future.

Oftentimes, you know, more force produces less results. Sometimes the best weapons — you know, this is the — the money is ammunition one. Hugely important insight. This runs through this all the way. You know, this harkens to the T. E. Lawrence quote about, you know, better to have them do it tolerably again than — and, oh, by the way, what we think is perfect may not actually be perfect in their world anyway.

This is the idea I just mentioned right here that, again, tactical success gives you nothing more than tactical success. You've got to figure out

how you string it all together, how you do tie in the political and the economic and the basis service components of this.

So — and, oh, by the way, the importance of the so-called strategic corporals, the strategic lieutenants, and the enormous impact that their decisions can have — and, in fact, we spend quite a bit of time, now, in Army. In fact, we even issued recently a whole set of kit rationed to units as they go downrange now so that they can shape these situations better so that you don't end up in a situation with a hasty traffic control point where the only thing between you and that speeding car is the bullet you're going to pump into the window, where, instead, you have a chicane that can be very hastily laid down. You have speed bumps. You can have a huge sign with an American flag. And, again, just by the way it shows how things have changed. In the beginning, the first year, if you fired warning shots they'd screech to a halt. Now, in some parts of the country, if you fire warning shots, they may speed up because they may think that it's a militia. So, you've got to be sure that they know that this is an American checkpoint, a coalition checkpoint, and so forth.

And then ideally you have something that stops a vehicle other than, again, having to put rounds into the windshield, and ideally you have some hasty protection for your soldiers if, in fact, it is a suicide car bomb and not just a confused or scared motorist.

Again, this is the kind of nuance, if you will, that runs through this manual and that we're trying to help our leaders gain the kind of understanding of the complexity and the challenges of counterinsurgency operations, and that's

what we're really all about with this particular manual.

Again, as you saw, what we've already tried to do, candidly, is this is already in the seminar rooms, in the education system. It's already being carried out in the training centers, the combat training centers, the virtual training center, and so forth. It's already — the knowledge of a lot of this has already been parted to units as they've gone downrange, and what we do is continue to refine, because, again, you have to keep adapting down there, because the enemy certainly does, and the situation certainly does.

Thanks, you can go back to the —

Yes, sir.

MR. MITCHELL: Thanks, General. Gary Mitchell from the Mitchell Report. I want to ask a question that really comes off the quote about sometimes having the host nation do something tolerably well is better than having us do it better, which is sort of a cheap shot way into ask the question about the philosophy behind or the questions behind how long and — whether and how long we stay in Iraq and the old — you know, as they stand up we stand down.

GENERAL PETRAEUS: Sure, yeah.

MR. MITCHELL: And I guess my question is at some point if that observation is true, it's time for us leave. And I'm interested to know (a) whether you agree with that and (b) how a decision like that really gets made.

GENERAL PETRAEUS: Well, you know, candidly, I'm glad that it's made by other folks. I mean, one of those questions is a two part up front.

One of those obviously is made by folks at the very top level of this government and of coalition governments, and then the other is made by — really right now is being made by folks on the ground driven by that, and in fact I think, you know, those leaders on the ground did ask for additional forces some weeks back and did, in fact, get additional forces. And for whatever it's worth, you know, God bless the soldiers and the families of the 172nd Striker Brigade for the additional sacrifice that they're making by staying four months longer in the country.

I mean, this is the conundrum always. You know, it's — we used to use an image that I'd say what we want to do is we'd like to get to a situation where you are — this is with the security forces. But the truth is that this covers all of the different aspects. Again, as the ambassador mentioned, you can't succeed with security forces if you can't get a political dimension to this that, again, provides the kind of national support, national policies. You know, the ministers have to, you know, not interfere in a sense. They have to — I mean, we had eight policies approved one time. They were simple policies in our system, but of course they hadn't existed before, having to do with promotions; who selects and fires battalion commanders; what are the criteria for — these kinds of things are of enormous importance, and the effect is substantial. But what we used to say was we're trying to, you know, support these guys. We'd like to get it to where we're just sort of right here, and then, you know, you sort of back away, and if they start to wobble you try to get back there before they actually collapse, if you will, because the danger of an actual collapse can be substantial, not just in terms of the loss of physical facilities that you may have spent tens of millions of

dollars to rebuilt, not just in loss of lives to those that are involved in that, but also a psychological blow that can be very, very serious regionally, locally, or even nationally.

You know, you certainly want to get out of the world where you're sort of carrying them on your shoulders. I think we're long since past that in most areas, although again there's certainly unevenness in particular in those security forces.

But that's the sort of the art that I guess supplements whatever science is to that. You do have science in terms of, you know, the so-called transitional readiness assessment, which is a fairly detailed readiness report that's rendered on these units that was developed some time back and, again, figuring out where that is. And you don't want to keep doing that a moment longer than you should or can, and so you have to be willing to take some risk. And, again, you know, various leaders at various times have been willing to take more or less risk so that you don't create more of a dependency culture but you, rather, created an independency culture while still making sure that it's a constructive independency and it will survive on its own two feet.

You know, certainly there are pretty substantial parts of the country that have achieved that. It was significant the other day that, for example, the Eight Division is under Iraqi control. There's a Major General Authman(?). That's five provinces of Iraq: Kabala, An-Najaf, Kùt, Díwáníyah, and Babíl. That covers that area. Quite competent. Quite good. They can face off. They will get their nose bloodied every now and then, but they can generally certainly

stand on their own two feet. The can go get logistics for themselves. They can do a lot. That's what you're trying to get to. It's obviously a more unified, more coherent area, although they have their own militia challenges as well, as we saw in Díwáníyah, in fact, a month or so ago. So, again, not easy in any of those places, but more manageable, more doable in those areas, certainly. And, again, that's — I mean, this is the issue there.

You know, Trudy Rubin, who I think is in here somewhere, from the Philadelphia Inquirer, wrote a piece yesterday talking about, you know, the importance of sort of — of helping this new government, the downsides of, you know, if we don't and so forth, and I think those are the big calculations that, again, I'm happy to have others here in this town do the math on, frankly, certainly, those — my counterparts out there certainly providing the input to that. But it's going to be a — you know, it's a tough discussion. A lot of judgments being made there, and, again, the truth is that they ended the day happy to leave that to some folks here a few blocks from here.

Thanks.

Yes.

Now, you don't have a camera in the back, do you, though?

(Laughter)

MS. RATITS: Martha Ratites from ABC. No, I quite like you in body armor.

GENERAL PETRAEUS: All right, and I you.

MS. RATITS: One of the things we hear over the past couple of

months is the changing name of the enemy. Would you just comment on that —

GENERAL PETRAEUS: Yeah, that's a great question, yeah.

MS. RATITS: We've gone from Islamofascists (off mike).

GENERAL PETRAEUS: Yeah, no, no.

MS. RATITS: Does it matter — two things: Does it matter what you call the enemy; and also if you'd comment generally on sectarian violence and the militias and the militia challenge —

GENERAL PETRAEUS: That is —

MS. RATITS: — and how you adapt (off mike) to that.

GENERAL PETRAEUS: May I again — a two-part question. Martha always gets right to it. And, I mean, the first part — you know, names do matter and titles matter. I mean, big ideas matter. How you — you know, what you title a manual matters. I mean, full-spectrum operations as a title is hugely important. Maybe you think about the good thinkers in America. I mean, they can capture the essence of some big idea in the theme sentence. And then, of course, they then expand on it perhaps for another 500 pages. But, you know, that's the science of it.

In this case, certainly names matter. I, candidly, have spent less time keeping with them, frankly, than with the second part though, and I think that's hugely important. I mentioned that earlier.

This action back in February — the blowing up of the Gold Dome Mosque, the third holiest shrine in Shi'ia Islam, the mosque that was up in Samarra, which is a mixed area but predominantly Sunni Arab but still mixed,

was hugely harmful. And it's a case of the insurgents, frankly, you know, finding that hot button that has really had, you know, a horrific effect on the security situation. And since then — and that has changed dynamics. As I mentioned earlier, it did have an effect that was somewhat the taking the gloves off some of these militias, in particular some of the Shi'ia militias, and, again, created quite a tit-for-tat, created sectarian violence, sectarian displacement, a greater environment for criminality to take place, which again — you know, everyone then moves into spaces when they can. And certainly the traditional, if you will, insurgents that we were dealing with over there that I sort of felt we could get our arms around — I mean, that was the Zarqawi crowd, the international extremists, and it was some of the old Saddamists, some of the, you know, the Sunni Arabs that wanted once again to dominate the country and not participate in the stable federal democracy; that is, the goal is, as Barham Salih explained yesterday, the deputy prime minister.

That was, again, a very, very big event, and I don't know if any of us — I think a lot of us knew that that was significant, but I think that its significance is played out sadly day after day after day in Baghdad in particular, and it is — you know, the evidence of its importance is, of course, dead bodies; it is sectarian violence; and it is, again, the ripping, if you will, or the tearing at the efforts to reestablish the rule of law, which is so very, very important. And then if you can get that going, then you could have individual police be effective. But in an environment like this, very, very difficult. You need units. That's why, in fact, the Iraqi army has become so important. Certainly the Iraqi national police,

which are units as well, can contribute, as well, although they've got to get the right training, the right approach, and then ensure that they are not, in fact, infected, if you will, by some of those militias. But, I mean, you really did highlight a very, very significant challenge that has emerged since February and that has caused a lot of the problems, I think, since then and sadly came just as you sort of had the bit of this emotional lift, the psychological lift that came out of the elections of mid-December, which were so successful, and the, you know, the formation of the government moving forward and finally getting a permanent government, you know, that avowedly is of reconciliation. Again, I really do suggest that you read Dr. Barham's speech from yesterday, which, again, you can get online, because it is — you know, he says yes, he's an idealist, he's a politician because he's an idealist but he is in government because he's a realist and, you know, he, truthfully, was about the most impressive Iraqi official I worked with in the two and a half years that I was engaged over there, and it's great to see him as a deputy prime minister. So,

QUESTIONER: Talk a little bit about how the U.S. military handles sectarian violence. I mean, you have all these great things about counterinsurgency, and you have adjusted, but what do they do on the ground there?

GENERAL PETRAEUS: Well, I mean, illegal actors are illegal actors. I mean, I don't — I would not get — I mean, it's the same way we dealt with criminals. I mean, these are the criminals at the end of the day. I mean, they are carrying out violence against other citizens. Yes, it is sectarian in nature, but

in that respect it is not vastly different from the kidnappings gangs that we also helped the Iraqis break up. It's certainly a different orientation, perhaps, in its political goals than the insurgency of — certainly of Zarqawi or the insurgency of perhaps the former Saddamists, that which was largely Sunni Arab. But in that respect, I think they are, again — they are illegal, they're using weapons illegally, and that is the distinction. You know, a government has to have a monopoly on the legal use of force, and with these militias running around, that is really challenging that ability.

Yes, sir.

MR. PASCUAL: Let me suggest this might be the final question and then from that if there are final thoughts you want us to leave us with based on the questions —

GENERAL PETRAEUS: I would, actually, like to —

MR. SHAUNESSY: Larry Shaunessy, CNN. In testimony yesterday on the Hill, one State Department official said that the next six months is crucial, that if something doesn't improve in Iraq then we may see it delve into a civil war. Do you believe that? Why six months? Why not three months? Why not another year?

GENERAL PETRAEUS: Yeah.

MR. SHAUNESSY: And is more U.S. aggression the answer?

GENERAL PETRAEUS: First of all, I need to be up front. I mean, I haven't been in Iraq in a year. I think it's for folks on the ground to make that kind — certainly to make the kind of discussion about, you know, how many

months. I mean, there is no question but that this is a pivotal time for Iraq. There's no question, I think, of the importance of the battle for security in Baghdad. There's no question about, again, the importance of getting a bit more of an upper hand on the Islamic extremists that are in (off mike) province, the Saddamists, and so forth — the Al-Qaeda, the former very senior Baathists that are operating out there.

As to assigning the particular amount of time, I wouldn't hazard a guess as to that. Again, we've got to help this government, the first permanent government in Iraq after four Iraqi governments if you count the Iraqi governing council under the CPA days, which has only been in office for several months. Obviously, very, very difficult to form a government and to develop its capability and capacity in the kinds of security challenges, the face of those challenges. And, again, our job is certainly to help them and to help the security forces to both create the security space and then to help them develop the political, the economic, the basic service components that reinforce that security, complement it, and again enable you to spiral up instead of spiral down.

Let me, if I could — I just want to say a couple of final comments, and they're actually not necessarily about the engine of change. They're really more about the wonderful soldiers with whom I've been privileged to serve downrange in recent years.

They have not all been perfect. There have been missteps by some of our troopers in units in Iraq and Afghanistan, some of those serious. We've learned all that we can from those. That also is a factor informing the various

cogs of the engine of change. But for each trooper who has failed to live up to our country's expectations, there are thousands of others who have selflessly gone about their mission doing what they're asked to do and during separation from loved ones — and I mentioned the 172nd Brigade and their extension for four months and, again, God bless them and their families. Soldiering in the heat and sandstorms of these environments, battling a truly barbaric enemy that stops at nothing, and grappling with the complexities and frustrations of working in cultures that are very different from our own, and, of course, in some cases, giving the last full measure of devotion in carrying out their assigned missions.

So, as I close this morning, I'd like to share the story of one of the many soldiers who exemplifies what makes our troopers so special. It's the story of Master Sergeant Luis Rodriguez, a great Army medic, a great leader who reveled in being doc to the infantrymen he supported during the 101st Airborne Division's first deployment in Iraq. He was a very highly competent, professional noncommissioned officer who always led from the front, gave energy to everyone around him while he was serving as a medical platoon sergeant for one of our aerosol teamster (?) battalions. After nine months of great work in Iraq, however, tragedy struck. His convoy was ambushed en route to a hospital that they were helping to reestablished. He was hammered by shrapnel. He lost the tip of one finger and had his right leg severed just above the knee. I saw him shortly after he came out of the operating room in the field hospital there at Mosul Air Field, and after pinning the Purple Heart on him I tried to make a little small talk to up him on the status of the other members of his platoon who were generally okay to

see how he was bearing up. What happened next will remain with me forever. He looked up at me, thanked me for my concern about him and his troopers and then asked how I was doing. "I've been worried about you," he said. "The division's had a tough month, and I know it's had to have been hard on you as well." And I was stunned. Here's a man who just lost a leg, and he was asking me how I was doing. But this is what typified and still typifies all these soldiers out there with whom we're privileged to serve in the brotherhood of the close fight, certainly Master Sergeant Rodriguez being stellar in every regard. He spent the next four months in the amputee ward at Walter Reed undergoing 16 different surgeries, learning how to walk again with a new prosthetic leg and crutches. I visited him there as well and was surprised to hear him say that he wanted to stay in the Army and to continue to train combat medics. After a final operation, he was released to return home to his wife and their two daughters in Clarksville, Tennessee, outside Fort Campbell. But problems awaited him there. They had a relatively small house. It had narrow hallways, and it didn't really easily accommodate his new needs, his crutches, and so forth. Then his prayers were answered. He received a new high-tech prosthesis and, more importantly, he and his family were selected by ABC's Extreme Makeover Home Edition to receive a completely remodeled home. And this shows him. He is on the left here. And you can see a considerable amount of emotion as he sees what his old home was transformed into to help him out. This is one of those occasions, without question, when one feels that there is good in the world.

Meanwhile, he continued his fight to stay in the Army doing the

job he loves — training combat medics. And thanks to some senior leaders in our Army demonstrating the same flexible leadership that's so important on the battlefield, he was allowed to stay in uniform and was selected to be the noncommissioned officer in charge of a combat medical training facility at Fort Campbell. And this shows him teaching a course in that particular facility.

Meanwhile, his wife proved to be a hero in her right. Not only did she provide enormous strength during her husband's ordeal, she started studying to be a social worker so that she could be a counselor to families of soldiers who are killed or injured. This couple clearly took tragedy and turned it into triumph, and they're sterling examples of the wonderful, selfless individuals who serve our country on a daily basis.

And this final photo shows Master Sergeant Rodriguez when I saw him at Fort Campbell a few months back.

I strongly believe, in fact, that all Americans should be very, very grateful for what their young soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines have been doing in Iraq and Afghanistan and, oh, by the way, what their interagency partners have been doing there as well and in a host of other places around the world.

Tom Brokaw, who you recall wrote the book, The Greatest Generation, spent some time with the 101st Airborne Division when we were deployed in Northern Iraq — a number of days, in fact. And after one of those days before getting on a helicopter after seeing the myriad of tasks in which we were engaged, he turned to me and said, "Surely these soldiers are the new

greatest generation." I agreed with him then, and I still do. Repeatedly in Iraq I saw the concept of the Army of one slogan played out as soldier after soldier proved to be the decisive individual in the performance of a particular task at a particular place on the battlefield. In fact, I often wondered, especially while observing soldiers rendering the final salute to a fallen comrade after a memorial ceremony, where does our country find such individuals — young men and women who, despite the personal flaws that we all have, serve so selflessly and in the face of enormous challenges repeatedly demonstrate impressive initiative, determination, innovativeness, and courage.

I arranged this today, because as the discussion over Iraq continues, it's my hope that our country will never turn its back on those in uniform who have done what their country asked them to do even though that duty required enormous sacrifice and entailed substantial hardship. And so today before this great group of individuals at this great institution, I want to express my hope and conclusion that our country will never forget and never fail to honor the sacrifices of those who wear and have worn our country's uniform. Thank you very much.

(Applause)

MR. PASCUAL: Thank you.

GENERAL PETRAEUS: My pleasure.

MR. PASCUAL: We really do thank you for your leadership, your scholarship, your valor (off mike) great example (off mike). Thank you very much.

GENERAL PETRAEUS: Thank you.

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