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New Recommendations from the Brookings-CSIS Task Force

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Falk Auditorium
1775 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.
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PANEL II: Humanitarian Intervention and Transnational Threats

MS. LINDBORG: I'm going to get us started, and if people need to find their way back to their seats, please do so.

My name is Nancy Lindborg. I'm very pleased to join you for this panel on Humanitarian Intervention and Transnational Threats, and I've definitely joined with Steves for this one. Charlie has -- Charlie -- we need him up here to - - there you go.

MR. FLICKNER: I'm Steven Charles, by the way, so --

MS. LINDBORG: Oh, there you go, just to mix it up, huh?

MR. FLICKNER: Bridged.

MS. LINDBORG: Always looking for bridges.

Anyway, it's -- I'm very happy to be a part of this discussion, because I think it's a critical piece of this whole conversation, and as Lael mentioned in her opening comments this morning, you know, there's the need to mesh those perspectives of development and the kind of -- what we talked about in the early session -- that moral impulse for humanitarian response and mesh it with what's going on from the security perspective and how it works within those three deeds (phonetic), and I think the issues that this panel will be talking about are very much where those views need to and can further be meshed.

So, I'm very pleased to have with us -- I think that everyone has already met the three Steves, so we don't need to do further bios, is that right? Okay. So, let's just go ahead. We'll do rather short presentations by each of the three
speakers and open it on up for conversation, starting with you, Steve.

MR. HANSCH: Thank you, Nancy. And thank you for agreeing to do this.

Just as a matter of advertisement, we passed around earlier this notice that Hilary Benn will be speaking next week on Wednesday, the 28th, at -- it's now 3 p.m. -- at CSIS, and please join us and please encourage anyone that you know who is interested. The title is "Fighting Extreme Poverty: The Challenge for a Generation." As you know, Hilary Benn had a difid (phonetic) and Secretary of State for International Development.

First of all, I want to thank Alan (phonetic) Moore and Jen Cates (phonetic) for giving quite a bit of time in going over some of the earlier drafts. Charlie offered some very good comments, and then of course Lael, throughout the entire process, and Ben at different points extremely helpful.

This -- you know, the subject here was really looking at this as a signature White House initiative for a new emerging challenge and one that took a couple of surprising turns. We talked a bit about that this morning, but one that had some unprecedented aspect, features to it, that you would elevate to a foreign policy priority, putting two million people on antiretroviral treatment for a disease -- life sustaining therapies for a disease for which there's no cure and there's no vaccine and there's none in sight, and leaving open the window that maybe you'd go from to two to five million but that this was going to be a foreign policy priority embraced by the President to carry forward throughout the various parts of the government, and you were embracing that, and that's a sort of startling fact,
and it's high risk. And, I think some of the risks have been somewhat deflected or concealed by some of the early startup -- promising early startup circumstances that gave this such an exciting aspect to it.

So, this is a somewhat, you know, unusual or exceptional, very vertical, focused-upon-a-single-disease initiative that, unlike anything we've seen before in terms of global health in the alignment with foreign policy priorities, and it had in its early days a sort of quick success. It could make the case fairly early that it was worthwhile and it was showing results, and it was -- and much of that rested on the White House and the President picking this up and driving it and sticking with it and making the security and moral rationale, doing it in a -- you know, the White House State of the Union address on January 28, 2003, and sticking with it and supported by high-level NIC studies -- National Intelligence Council studies -- and studied by a realm of speech making by other cabinet officers and others that combine the security in the moral dimensions around, why this had suddenly blossomed from going almost nowhere in the agenda, and certainly the agenda of the President -- of President Bush as a presidential candidate -- to being a major priority.

It was a success because of the preservation or the presence of a bipartisan center, a core of activists, partners who were willing -- who could find their way forward around some of the edges, and Alan can fill in sort of the greater details of the way in which those debates unfolded. The fact of the matter is that you had a core that carried this through at various moments very rapidly.

Some of those key figures are departing, and there's uncertainty -- and
I'll talk in a moment -- there's uncertainty about who steps in as the next folks to carry this. It got -- I think part of its success was resting on reaching really high, suddenly saying we're going to go from -- we're no longer talking about a life initiative of a hundred million dollar increment. We're going to go to billions, and we're going to go to 15 billion, and it -- there -- it suddenly took off the table you're not serious. It suddenly changed the whole question around treatment --as treatment's impossible to treatment is possible but with difficulty but look at all this cash and this determination.

So, it built credibility, because it reached high and it promised money and it was new money. Now, you can go back and forth around how much is new? Is it 9 billion? Is it 10 billion? But it had drama; it had credibility; it had speed and big targets. You know, it put this up on the charts as well, you're no longer just dithering around the margins, around something that is this dramatic as a threat. You're beginning to bring forward a strategy that's commensurate with the name and proportional to what we've all been saying and some things like well, okay, you are credible, and that changed the politics in the debate by doing that.

You were able because it was so narrowly piped around treatment, prevention, care on a subset of countries you could argue the value or merit of that, but because it was so carefully piped, it disarmed the skeptics, because it allowed you to come back 12 or 18 or 24 months later with numbers to say well, here we've gone from here to here. And you can debate whether you're really fudging the numbers a little bit but piping it in such a narrow way also built your
credibility and gave you the capacity to come back quickly.

Now, there was a great advantage in that you selected 15 countries that had -- most of them had existing AID and CBC platforms with existing programs and dollars and personnel and talent and strategies and understandings with host governments, and you could enlarge quickly. You could go and say to them.

And, I think one of the brilliant factors of Tobias' strategy was they didn't enter this position with this in his head, but he very rapidly, within two or three months of coming on the job, concluded that one of the key elements of his success was winning the confidence of the mission directors in the focus countries and empowering them and getting out of the way and giving lots of money really fast. And that worked. Believe me, I was at the first consultation in Abaroni (phonetic) a week after he was cleared by the -- confirmed by the Senate, when all the heads of missions, all of the ambassadors and AID mission directors, CBC directors, were brought forward, and they were all deathly afraid that they were going to be sort of lined up and given marching orders that they weren't going to like and they weren't going to have authority. A year later, or 15 months later, they were gathering in Johannesburg and singing his praises, saying we were -- he delivered what he promised us and he recognized that we had -- and those platforms were recognized early on as key.

The success -- I'm jumping ahead of myself, but the success had to do not with just the White House jumping in but creating a leadership structure with a centralized, authoritative -- brought in a particular individual who was accustomed to moving complex organizations rapidly, who is undeterred by
bureaucratic gamesmanship and could override bureaucratic gamesmanship and do it in a way that was very daft and Congress would back him. There was no back ending into Congress that I could tell that was ever serious. When Tobias decided to launch forward and move 8 or 900 million dollars quickly in the first nine months, he didn't have a lot of eruptions on the Hill with folks who were, again, being forced to do things they didn't like coming and creating small eruptions that he then had to go and deal with, and that was absent, and I attribute that to Tobias' skill and leverage that he entered into this.

We leveraged others, and we could clearly point to that. Congress was putting conditionalities on, but the money began to step up pretty dramatically as a result of this, and the bump-up effect was -- even despite our bad diplomacy, we didn't have, in the initial phase of PEPFAR (phonetic) a serious diplomacy. In fact, we took some of our good diplomats and sort of sent them packing. But there wasn't an exorable bump-up of others that followed on the U.S. approach even despite bad diplomacy. Our diplomacy is much better today than it was then.

The sustainability issue that we flag is how do you guarantee the White House or whoever comes into the White House next picks this up? Well, there is no clear answer to this except to say you have to play the campaigns. You have to play the candidates and the campaigns, and certainly John Kerry's experience during the '04 cycle was quite telling. I mean, he picked up and made a commitment to the tripling of the U.S. efforts in a heartbeat.

In other words, it was seen as a winning issue, whether that was credible
or whether that's overstated, but HIV has a credibility that gives it a cachet that allows you to engage to say maybe it's not a doubling of HIV alone; maybe it's a doubling of commitment on global health. And that's a separate issue that we can go into.

But I think the sustainment of White House interests is selling it as a winning issue on a domestic basis, a winning issue on international prestige and return, and something that has a bipartisan lane where you're not going to get stuck in nastiness.

Congressional leadership and continuity -- that's something that we don't have an answer for how to find the new champions.

We're in the post-euphoria period. We're in an implementation phase. We talked this morning about our culture wars around abstinence versus condoms. We're getting better at having the center pushed back on the ambushes that happen from different directions.

The health work force deficits -- we still have no strategy -- finding the real money to sustain these efforts -- difficult -- coming to terms with the differentiated outcomes that we're seeing in Africa where some places are just not going to do very well. We don't have answers for the Nigeria or the Ethiopia cases. We've got some very large ticket items but we're not going to do well in (off mike).

Vietnam's going to be very difficult and force us to deal with injection drug use and human rights issues and reeducation centers. There are a lot of tough issues lurking around the margins, and we need a strategy, and we don't --
you know, we're going to need this next phase to talk more about China and Russia (off mike) and Indonesia, sort of next-wave states, and how we leverage the leadership of the Chinese, the Indians, and the Russians in doing this.

I'll just close there. Thank you.

MS. LINDBORG: Steve. It's just like the equivalent of you can't remember your boyfriend or girlfriend's name, right? You know, honey, Steve? You're next.

MR. MORRISON: I also want to thank Lael and Patrick Cronin (phonetic) and Charlie for a lot of help on the chapter. I think the chapter reflects a bunch of ideas that come from all of us at once -- humanitarian aid.

The humanitarian aid chapter does not have the same time frame as the PEPFAR chapter, which started at (off mike) point in time, but it kind of draws on various long-term trends, future trends. It tries to make the point that over the long run, humanitarian aid has been one of the most (off mike) supported sectors of the American public support and Congress, but it tends to give that support in a piecemeal manner. But one of the things that's happened over the last 13, 14, 15 years is that the notion of what humanitarian aid is has jelled a bit. We used to do (off mike) departments.

One of the benchmark changes that happened in the early 1990s was that an office was created at USAID to try and take a little bit of a longer-term picture to try to bring coherence that was (off mike) to create. Brought in issues of displacement and transition, mitigation, long-term (off mike); but some of the same issues that that office was created to deal with are still front-burner issues
that we don't the answers for.

We don't have any good core within the U.S. humanitarian assistance offices that looks at what to think about the long term for Zimbabwe or Burma. We're still mostly reactive and still piping aid for a country. We don't even have an office that has responsibility for discussing and thinking through with the American civil society with practitioners and people who have hands-on, can-do thoughts about what to do with these countries where, by the way, the locals can do much. We can't even have a discussion on the future of Zimbabwe within the Zimbabwe (off mike). But we have a lot of success stories.

We've done tremendously good work on saving lives from child survival issues (off mike) immunizations to save hundreds of thousands, maybe millions of lives in crisis zones. We've done a fantastic job in the last 15 years, 20 years at getting ahead of the curve and (off mike), getting food to crisis zones, doing local purchase, thinking more mature about how to prevent deaths in families.

We need to begin retrofitting for emerging threats. Hurricane Katrina was not an anomaly. We're going to see increasingly large numbers of people displaced by disasters in urban concentration areas where natural disasters threaten large numbers of people who are in mega-cities, because that's the trend. Over the last generation, or two generations, the world population's gone from being mostly rural to being mostly living in large urban concentrations. The nature of disaster risk, when you combine that with global warming and other climate changes, is something that we don't have any long-term plans for.

Generally speaking, we're not solving the problems of complex emergencies, but
groups like (off mike) are thinking in terms of the root causes and resource
poaching and the economic grievances and how to address economic grievances
by doing the kinds of things that (off mike) emphasized, which is getting people
employed and getting the unemployed youths off the street.

In terms of where we are recommending that we need to be making
changes, I've alluded to the notion that we don't have a locus within the U.S.
government for thinking about these things. So, rather than continuing to fiddle
with the State Department having some responsibilities which are largely on the
multilateral side or USAID having responsibilities more on the bilateral side, try
and bring these offices together so that a lot of the funds that are available now
for refugees can be flexibly deployed to deal with the gap of internally displaced
people and to give more of a writ and more of a band-aid, more financial support
for getting upstream -- which we use as buzz words for risk production or
prevention, preparedness, mitigation, which has been a gap throughout the whole
system. It's a gap for NGOs; it's a gap for the funders; it's a gap for the U.N.
agencies; it's a gap internationally.

So, among the recommendations -- we are now sort of reiterating some
of the points made this morning at the opening presentation -- are to pull together
the various humanitarian offices, which is (off mike). Used to be that the (off
mike) just sat by itself, was not part of OSDA and (off mike), but then the bureau
was created (off mike) to take on a larger group of (off mike) responsibilities, to
put that bureau probably within USAID where technical competence is
emphasized, where it can bridge in with the health bureau and other bureaus. To
give that office more of a public education mandate within the United States is more than any other area of aid. Humanitarian aid is something that is done in partnership with private volunteer relations who bring to bear half of the total amount of funding that goes toward (off mike). So, it's a partnership. And those organizations have a close relationship with the public, whom they educate. So, (off mike) does a fantastic job of educating the public about all of these issues.

But the U.S. government, it seems to me, has not shown a great leadership role. The kind of situation of course that circulates within the Beltway that talk about what's really (off mike) is not anything that the (off mike) pulpit at the White House (off mike) does a good job of communicating, in partnership with NGOs, to the public, which is ultimately what brings to bear the kind discipline to make this efficient, or increasingly more efficient.

So, we've seen a proliferation of agents, of offices, Health and Human Services. Almost every branch of the U.S. government has gotten involved in humanitarian assistance because it's popular, and they are not fully vetted, there is not any leadership shown that I can see from USAID, and so this is something that other people think Congress can (off mike) based on the recommendation (off mike).

The biggest change that I've seen, since I'm on the subject of civil society, American public, is that when I was growing up, reading newspapers, I don't remember in the '60s or '70s reading more than one article on Africa of the front page of the major newspaper more than once a year -- maybe even go two years. Never see a picture. I noted a few weeks ago that we had pictures of
Africa, talking about (off mike) Somalia, Ethiopia, Nigeria every single day in The New York Times every for several days running. The American public is much more savvy about the problems of humanitarian crises. (Off mike) than ever before, and I feel as though (off mike) the Beltway are sort of still living (off mike) world that we're the only sources of interest and response.

So, the major responses that we're talking about are giving some type of reshaped humanitarian organization both the expertise to be leading the whole U.S. government response and bringing them together to have more (off mike), but also I would suggest less micromanagement, less intrusion of the humanitarian agenda where it is being (off mike) that by -- you know, they'd rather let the humanitarian office tell the military what is the best thing that they can do, and now that the military is a bureau of the Department of Defense they have to make up their own (off mike) the technical aspects of (off mike).

MS. LINDBORG: Thank you, Steve.

I'd like to conclude the comments (off mike) have questions?

STEVE RADELET: Thanks. Let me just kind of emphasize a little bit more detail on some of the points that I made this morning. But first, for those of you who (off mike), and I hope no one (off mike).

MS. LINDBORG: That's right, that's right.

STEVE RADELET: And, by the way, I don't know if you heard but the MCC suspended Ghana --

(Laughter)

STEVE RADELET: -- today for not achieving the standard on the new
criteria called playing fairly. A little different from the (off mike).

(Laughter)

STEVE RADELET: And all of it said we're all about results at the MCC, and the results were not up to our standards.

Anyway, I think -- speaking of the MCC -- it's part of a new thinking that I think is an important shift of the U.S. beginning to recognize differences among recipient countries in terms of their capacities, in terms of their commitment to real development success that didn't really exist before that where we treated most countries pretty much the same -- some differences, but really treated countries much the same. And there are big differences beginning to emerge within developing countries.

Steve was just talking about front-page news in Africa, which is great except that it's almost always bad news that comes out of Africa, and what you don't hear is the good news that's coming out of Africa, and there's actually a fair amount of good news.

I just actually ran some numbers the other day, looked at both changes in democracy and economic growth rates, and I looked at ratings of democracy. In 1989 there were three countries in Africa that were democracies by the (off mike), and today there are 17. That's a major size (off mike) actually that's taken place very quietly and slowly, starting with South Africa and (off mike) partly because of the end of apartheid, also partly because of the end of the cold war. Senegal, Ghana, Tanzania, Mali, Verkeenophoso(phonetic), Zambia, Mozambique.

Now, some of these -- Nigeria, Kenya -- some of these are quite fragile
and some will fall back. I certainly wouldn't bet my pension on Nigeria. But some are doing pretty well. Ghana's gone through several elections, and Sengal's gone through several. Botswana, of course, was all alone. So, there's a major shift going, and that's what you never read about in *The New York Times*. You don't read about, actually, those 15 or 16 or 17 countries. They're not in the news, which is good that they're not in the news, but it's kind of bad that they're not in the news, because people still have the perception that all of Africa is going down the tubes, and it's just not true. There's a real split going on in Africa where it's increasingly difficult to talk about subsidy in Africa as a singular entity, and I think that needs to be reflected more. It's beginning to be reflected more in our policy approaches, but I think it can be reflected more.

In a reasonably well-governed country -- in Ghana, in Senegal, in Mozambique -- we should be prepared to give those countries much more say in setting priorities and in designing development programs, and that's kind of what -- that's what the MCC is partly about. We should do it for other programs as well.

These are countries that have gone through democratic elections. They are -- they've got pretty decent policies. They face huge problems, and there are still lots of problems, but they are moving in the right direction, and we ought to be much more supportive of that and do much less micromanagement. Give them some credit for the commitment that they've shown and allow them much greater voice in setting priorities.

This is all about, you know, the participatory approach and country
ownership. I'm all for it in countries like that, but too often that kind of debate in international aid circles is as if country ownership and participatory approach and all that is a good thing, period, for all aid recipients, and it's not -- it's not -- and I think that that sort of universal application, at least in our dialogue, actually undermines the support for the approach, because I'm not willing to give country ownership to Zimbabwe right now, and I would fight anybody who said we would. Now that's a fairly obvious case, but there are lots of others like it. So, to talk about country ownership and the participatory approach is a good thing everywhere is crazy, and I think it undermines the approach, because people who are a little bit skeptical say I don't want to move in that direction, because you're going to give too much say to countries that I don't trust.

Now, the problem, of course, is how you draw the line between countries that you trust enough to give some flexibility to and the ones that you don't, and there's no perfect way to do that. There's never going to be a perfect way to do that.

The MCC is trying. It's not perfect, but it's pretty good, actually. I think it's not a bad mechanism and it can be extended to figure out different groups of countries as well, so something like that is a decent starting point. And in countries that do have -- that have shown a stronger commitment and do have some capacity, we should be making longer-term commitments, we should be providing more money, we should be letting them design the projects and setting priorities, and I think in some of those cases -- not all of them but some of them -- we ought to be providing budget support.
Now, U.S. hates to do it, and Charlie's over here -- he's about to fall off his chair and, you know -- but I actually believe that that's a way to strengthen the very institutions that we want to strengthen, like the government financial institutions, and that by avoiding them the way that we do we undermine them, because we hire away the best accountants and the best auditors, because we pay them a lot more money and because we set up our own project with our own separate mechanism and we hire people away from the Ministry of Finance. I think when these countries begin to meet some basic standard of accounting and auditing standards and financial transparency that we ought to give a portion of our money as budget support, and as they show that their auditing and accounting and transparency standards improve, we would give more as budget support. That is building incentives, that if they take the steps to improve auditing and accounting reporting transparency, that that builds -- that if they do that, they will get more of the money the way want it, which is as budget support. But it's based on actually rating the financial systems of the country. The MCA, we rate a whole bunch of broad things. This is basically taking that ratings idea somewhere -- to Standard and Poors or (off mike) -- lots of ratings and rating the quality of the government financial institutions, and when they meet a basic standard we would give a portion of our assistance as budget support and build in the incentives, internal incentives, for them to get more of it. So, the Minister of Finance can go to the President and say if we do this on our accounting and auditing, and if we publish our accounts and we do all this stuff and we take these anti-corruption measures, we'll get more of the money through the budget, which
is the way we want it.

Now, in some countries that will work; in some it won't. So, I wouldn't do it in every country, but I would do it in countries that are meeting some standards, and there are some ratings now that the IMF and the World Bank (off mike).

On the other hand, there's the bad guys, where I think, you know, much shorter time commitments, work through NGOs, you know, in places like Zimbabwe, not through the government but through NGOs to try to deliver very targeted, very specific relief efforts that we oversee, that we have a lot more say in, that we deliver through out mechanisms and through local NGOs and try to get much smaller but definable results probably focused really clearly on delivering basic services. I don't even think, frankly, we have much -- in many of these countries have much impact on governance and institutions. I think it's really just delivering basic health and education and food services to the people in poverty.

So, there's a whole spectrum, and you can think of lots of categories in between and in the paper, just for simplicity, we've got three categories, which you could have four or five, and there are transition countries, like Liberia, for example, where I've been spending a lot of time -- I've been there four times recently and I'm going to be there again on Tuesday -- where, you know, by all of our regular indications it's a total failed state, and it is, but they're emerging from that. They've got a great government, put together the best cabinet, frankly, I've ever seen in Africa. Whether they will succeed or not I don't know. It's a long shot. But it's the best shot they've got. And I think we need to be a little bit more
flexible in those kinds of situations and be a little bit more imaginative, and perhaps even temporarily provide a little budget support in those circumstances -- not for the same reasons but because they are so constrained in their resource base right now. Their total budget is $83 million, because all the revenue is gone because the war is under sanction, the diamonds are under sanction, timber is -- everything stopped, everybody fled, agriculture -- there's no income, so there's no revenue. So, we need to be more flexible, and it's a hard country to categorize, because it's moving, but it requires flexibility, different kinds of approaches, which we don't have in our systems, and since we don't have that flexibility we can't address the real needs on the ground in the way that they need to be addressed and therefore it undermines our efforts.

Okay, so that's sort of the story on different approaches in different countries.

The other issue that I'll raise again briefly, which we talked about a little bit this morning, is monetary and evaluation. And I think it's really important that we strengthen our monetary and evaluation.

I don't think everything can be measured -- it's true -- a lot of things can't be measured, and there are some risks and some dangers in moving toward a more sort of performance-based approach. I'm very cognizant of that, but to err -- I think we err way too much on the side of not focusing enough on results and articulating our job.

There are several reasons why you want to do that. One is -- as I say, one is punitive. If countries don't do what they're supposed to do, they get
penalized, and the money gets allocated to countries that do meet standards. So, part of it is basic incentives and as a punitive measure, but that's not all of it. Part of it is to monitor things and create mid-course corrections when a project is off base for whatever reason. You can't know that it's off unless you're measuring and doing decent monitoring and evaluation so as to improve effectiveness as you go along.

A third reason is to learn after the project is over, to learn what we do well and what we don't do well. As I mentioned this morning and a couple of other people said the same, we don't know what we do well, what AID does well and what it doesn't do well. We have some kind of sense of it but, really, systematically we don't really have a good idea of here's what we really do well and here's what we don't do well, other than humanitarian. But even on humanitarian it's not really measured. We all kind of have the sense that we do that better than everybody else -- and I think that's probably true, but I can't actually point to any systematic data that shows that. So, there's a lot of reasons why monitoring and evaluation would be helpful, partly, as I say, punitive but partly to actually improve what we're doing -- to learn what we're doing.

How we would do that -- part of it is just collecting more information and more data, and that sounds boring but you've got to have information and data, and it's got to start from the beginning of projects. The way that we typically evaluate our projects is two years into implementation AID signs up a consultant firm that's independent. They bring in a group of consultants for two weeks that have never been involved in this project. They run around and they
interview everybody in town and say how is this project doing? What are they doing? And then they leave two weeks later and then they write a report, and it's just -- it's nonsense. It's actually nonsense. And the World Bank actually does this.

You need to build it in from the beginning -- how you design the project; what's measurable at the baseline, what's not; what the objectives are -- and have people that are familiar with it but yet are independent, which is not easy, come back and periodically be measuring progress along the way. So, you've got to have the information. Then you've got to have the institution. And to get some independence is key. As I mentioned this morning, Nancy Birdsall has been pushing the idea of an independent evaluation agency, and you could do that within the U.S. government -- have one independent agency within the U.S., something like a GAO, that would be independently evaluating all of our aid efforts to get around the fact that once USAID -- the same people at USAID design a project, it's obviously in their interest to make sure that that's evaluated to get good grades. You want to have some independence, so something like GAO could take on that role. Or, more internationally, you could have an independent agency that looks at U.S. programs and U.K. programs and the World Bank. That's part of it. But I think conceptually it's the right way to kind of move to get some independence in what we're doing.

So, let me leave it there.

MS. LINDBORG: Thanks to each of the speakers. That was a pretty rich tour through three significant types of systems that we (off mike), each of
which could constitute a whole seminar. We have about 20 minutes for discussion.

I just want to -- like, a couple of quick comments that pertain in listening to the speakers, and, you know, the one -- if you want to boil it down to a very simplistic observation, one thing that we are missing even in the previous panel's focus on the policy and the structure is the flexibility to be able to put the right intervention with the right country at the right stage of its development, and I would say that across all of these institutions -- and there are really somewhat three represented here (off mike) a split between (off mike) and the (off mike), and you say there is no ability to connect fluently across these, and it doesn't match the reality (off mike) at all. Although aid has (off mike) by sectors and by the type where it is, and (off mike).

And the one thing I would just throw out for the people to reflect on -- and maybe Steve to comment on a little bit later -- in my mind, this category, particularly humanitarian interventions where when you think about claiming this as an address and also the moral imperative is where you get the additional actor of the military in the Pentagon and make a quick recommendation -- your comment, Steve -- but it's really a much larger set of considerations so that institutional kind or moral PR -- you know, when you do a PR (off mike) address the needs. We saw them deployed after the job (off mike). So, I think that as we look how you train additional (off mike).

So, with that, let's open it up for questions, and if people could say your name and (off mike), for my benefit.
(discussion)

MS. BRAINARD: Thank you to the panelists and thanks, everyone, for the discussion. And I think we're ready to move to your next session. I would say take a maybe five minute break. We've got John Hamre and Mike O'Hanlon and Bob Polk, I think, are just going to come up and circulate. And for those people who are sitting in the back row, let's just fill in the table when you come back.