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P R O C E E D I N G S

AMBASSADOR PASCUAL: Good afternoon. My name is Carlos Pascual. I am the vice president and director of the Foreign Policy Studies Program at the Brookings Institution. I would like to welcome you today to Brookings, and thank you very much for joining us today.

It is for us a real pleasure to be able to provide a base for both the presentation and discussion of some of the issues that are raised by the Pew Global Attitudes Project and the survey work that they have been doing.

I might just say a couple of words from the perspective of someone who runs a foreign policy studies program here at Brookings. It has almost become clichéd that in the global and transnational world in which we live in today, that no country can make itself invulnerable and that every country needs to depend on others to deal with the principal challenges of our time, whether they be terrorism or organized crime or proliferation or environmental threats or economic threats. We have come to understand that the nature and concept of borders is different from what it used to be and that, indeed, nations need to cooperate with one another. Hence it makes absolute sense that the perspective that other nations have toward the United States is relevant to their confidence and trust in the United States and the ability and the capacity of the United States to lead.

In that sense, we are extremely indebted to the Pew Global Attitudes Project for providing the firmest base of information which currently exists in the broader marketplace right now to give a factual understanding of what global attitudes have been toward the United States and how they evolved over time. For that, Andy, we thank you very much. The Pew Global Attitudes Project -- I am sure Andy will say a little bit more -- is a project which is co-chaired by former Secretary Albright and former Senator Danforth. They have been doing survey work over a number of years. Many of you, I am sure, are familiar with these surveys. What they help really do is establish an evolution of perceptions of people, their countries, the

dynamics of change, and the dynamics of leadership in the international environment.

Part of the success that Pew has had has really been with Andy Kohut as the director. Andy, prior to becoming the director of the Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, was from 1979 to 1989 the president of the Gallup Poll organization. He was the founding director of surveys for the Times Mirror Center and was there from 1990 through 1993. He was the president of the American Association of Public Opinion Research from 1994 to 1995. He was president of the National Council of Public Polls from 2000 to 2001. Many of you have seen him on the McNeil-Lehrer News Hour. Others have heard his voice on National Public Radio. His background, I think, should give everybody a sense of confidence that, when he speaks about surveys and what they mean and their significance, that he certainly has tremendous background in the field.

Following Andy's presentation, we will have the benefit of commentaries by two distinguished individuals. First will be Susan Rice. Susan is a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution in the Foreign Policy Studies Program. She has done some landmark work on issues related to transnational threats, to poverty, to the interlinkages between poverty and threats such as terrorism, and the ability for countries to manage against problems such as environmental degradation and infectious diseases. Prior to joining the Brookings Institution, Susan was Assistant Secretary for African Affairs during the Clinton Administration as well as a senior director and part of the National Security Council staff under President Clinton.

Then the second commentator will be William Kristol. I am sure all of you know Bill Kristol from his work as the editor of *The Weekly Standard*. In addition to his regular voice on *The Weekly Standard*, many of us have come to know him on Fox News Sunday and on the Fox News Channel. Not everybody is aware that he also had a very significant and extensive stint in government, including helping shape, in 1994, the Republican victories in the U.S. Congress. He was chief of staff to Vice President Dan Quayle during the Bush administration as well as

chief of staff to the Secretary of Education, William Bennett, during President Reagan's administration.

I think we have a really outstanding panel that can offer a wide variety of views.

Without further ado, let me ask Andy to come and give you an overview of the survey and what it teaches us. Thank you.

MR. KOHUT: Thank you very much. I am happy to be here.

I apologize in advance for the configuration of this room. Some of you in the back are in the way back. I was thinking as I came in here, having read so much about the generational perception gap, that we might ask all of the people under 30 years of age to go to the back and ask all of the older people to come to the front, but for the sake of getting this on, we will not do that. I will try to explain to you in the back when we get to the slides a little bit of what they say, because you probably can't see them.

What I would like to do today is talk to you first a little bit about what this survey found and then show you some pictures or describe some pictures to you way back there.

This is the sixth wave in a series of global surveys that we have done about the image of the United States and global issues. We have interviewed, prior to this, 94,000 people in 50 countries, and this started in 2002. In 2002, we did 38,000 interviews in 43 countries. Our headline was that the image of the United States was slipping all around the world, but there was a still reserve of good will toward the U.S. One year later in 2003, after the war in Iraq, our headline was that the image of the United States had plummeted all around the world. In March of 2004, before the insurgency got going and we were doing reasonably well, our headline was opinions about the U.S. really hadn't improved from the fall of and post-war in Iraq. Last year we talked a lot about anti-Americanism being entrenched in the survey that we did in 2005, but there were some signs of gains for the United States in its image.

This year, we did a poll of more than 17,000 people in 15 countries, 14 countries plus the

United States, and our overall finding is that the U.S. image is going in the wrong direction again. Favorability ratings are down in most places or in many places, and the most serious problem is backsliding in the image of the U.S. in countries where we saw improvement last year, specifically in India and Indonesia where tsunami aid appeared to have made a real difference. Some of that difference seems to have eroded based upon this current survey.

To my mind, the fact that the improvements that we saw in Indonesia and India did not stick speaks to the enduring nature of the problem of anti-Americanism. There will be no quick fix to this. There will not be just one good thing that the United States does that will bring the image of America back to what it was in the 1990s and earlier.

The poll, besides showing declining favorability ratings for the U.S., also shows declining support for the U.S.-led war on terrorism; it shows President Bush's ratings and confidence in him to do the right thing with regard to foreign affairs ever lower in Europe; and most people predicting that the United States will not achieve its goals in Iraq. Clearly, the U.S. presence in Iraq is a drag on the image of the United States. It is cited more often than the current Iranian government as a threat to regional stability and world peace by many people in these countries, and it is a plurality view in many of the countries in which we conducted the survey. I will show you that in the pictures.

There is almost universal awareness of reports of abuses at Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo in Europe, and there is substantial awareness of these things in the Middle East. One of the little sidelights of this survey is that while 95 percent typically in European countries are aware of these abuses, only 76 percent of Americans say they have heard about them. It is not a matter of denial, because Republicans and Democrats are about even. It is more a matter of education and Americans looking inward, even on issues of such importance.

Further, a thing that also comes home to us in this survey is the irony of the American image slipping at a time when there is so much consensus between the American public and the

publics of our traditional allies when it comes to the top geopolitical problems. There is a consensus, at least in the West, about the risks posed by Iran and the impact of the Hamas Party's victory in the Palestinian Territory. There is even a small uptick in Europe in attitudes toward Israel with respect to the conflict with the Palestinians.

Getting back to Iran, there is a near universal opposition to Iran possessing nuclear weapons. There are increased worries about Iran in the West since 2003, but only modest increases in the Muslim countries. Specifically, Western publics worry about attacks on Israel and that Iran might provide weapons to terrorists. Neighboring countries see little threat that Iran might attack them with nuclear weapons. There is certainly no sign in any one of these questions of alarm about a nuclear-armed Shiite country in the surrounding countries of Sunni Muslims.

Western publics see the Hamas victory as a bad thing for Palestinians and a bad thing for the peace process. Muslims in each of the countries that we surveyed say, no, it is not.

The poll also covered awareness about some global problems. One of the extraordinary findings in this survey is how many people know about bird flu. In the 15 countries, there were only two countries where the percentage having heard of bird flu was under 95 percent, and that was Pakistan, where I think it was 85 percent, and China, where it was 93 percent. Given all of that awareness, the concerns are mostly greatest in Asia, but the awareness levels are unbelievable to me. Having looked at awareness of problems around the world, this one is really quite remarkable.

With respect to global warming, the other issue that we looked at, there is a good deal of awareness of that, but nowhere near comparable to bird flu. What really stands out in this survey is the extent to which the Americans and the Chinese publics express less concern about this issue than people in other parts of the world.

Let me show you just a few pictures to bring home some of these points, and then we can

have a discussion about them.

First of all, where we did the survey: The United States, Great Britain, France, Germany, Spain, and Russia were the European countries. These surveys in Western Europe are about 900 interviews. About half or 400 of these interviews are over samples of the Muslim publics in these countries. The samples have been weighted so that they are properly represented. We do not break out the Muslim minorities in this particular poll. We are going to do that next week, but I wanted to explain this to those of you who will be reading the report.

We have a survey in Egypt, Turkey, Indonesia, India, Pakistan, Jordan, Nigeria, China, and Japan. I am reading for the back of the room. The surveys are mostly national, except in Indonesia, Pakistan, and China, where they are mostly surveys of urban populations, although not exclusively urban populations in those countries.

The first slide shows the trend in favorable opinions of the United States, and for most of these countries, there is either a small decline or a significant decline. Two that really jump out are Spain, where the U.S.'s favorable rating fell from 41 percent to 23 percent; Russia, from 52 percent to 43 percent; and India, from 71 percent to 56 percent. This survey was done right after President Bush had visited India, to put this into some perspective.

In the Muslim world, I will read to you the trend in Indonesia. Prior to the war in Iraq, 61 percent of Indonesians had a good opinion of the United States. It fell to 15 percent in 2003 right after the war. It went back up last year to 38 percent, but now it slips down again to 30 percent.

We see a little bit of an uptick in Pakistan, from 23 percent to 27 percent. There is awareness in Pakistan of the aid that we have given, but clearly the United States did not get the same kind of bump in Pakistan than it got in Indonesia or India last year.

In Turkey, one of the more surprising results, the U.S. favorability rating is down to 12 percent. It had 30 percent in 2004, 23 percent last year, and 12 percent now. There is really a

problem for us in Turkey.

This slide shows a rating of various problems and the extent to which each is seen as a danger to world peace. In Britain, for example, 34 percent say that the Iranian government, the new Iranian government, is a danger to world peace; 41 percent say that the U.S. presence in Iraq is that. We have similar responses to Iran versus the U.S. presence in Iraq in many other countries. Obviously, when we get to Muslim countries, it is Iraq that is seen as the danger, not Iran.

There is an inching down of support for the U.S.-led war on terrorism in just about every one of these surveys that we conducted. I will read one to you. In Germany, when we first did this survey, 70 percent said they supported the U.S.-led war on terrorism. In 2003, after Iraq, that fell to 60 percent, 55 percent in 2004, 50 percent in 2005, and 47 percent currently. That is one of the more dramatic and clearly very important findings.

There is little support for the war on terrorism in Muslim countries, 16 percent in Jordan and 30 percent in Pakistan, although there is some improvement in Pakistan this year, reflecting better attitudes towards us. But 30 percent is still pretty low.

Iran's favorability is mostly negative for majorities or pluralities in the West -- 77 percent unfavorable in France, for example -- but mostly positive in the Muslim world, 77 percent favorable in Indonesia, 72 percent in Pakistan, 59 percent in Egypt. There is a real gap between East and West on how Iran is seen, both generally and with respect to specific issues.

The Iranian government is seen as a greater danger than it was two years ago. I will pick Spain. In Spain in 2003, 11 percent said that the government of Iran represented a particular danger. It is up to 38 percent in the current survey. In Britain, we see a similar pattern. It is the case in Europe and also in Russia. There are even modest increases in the Muslim World, but they are modest. Only 19 percent of the Jordanians, for example, say that the new Iranian government is a danger, up from 6 percent, but 19 percent is still a small number.

Iran acquiring nuclear weapons, a near universal opposition to this idea in the West such as 97 percent in Germany, but more or less, divided opinions in many Muslim countries such as 42 percent opposed in Egypt, 44 percent in favor. In Jordan, it is 42/45, and strong opposition only in Turkey and Indonesia to this idea.

What if Iran were to develop nuclear weapons? In the West, the concerns are that large percentages say that Iran would give them to terrorists. In the Muslim countries, the notion is that the vast majority say that Iran would only use these weapons defensively -- 80 percent in Indonesia, 67 percent in Jordan, 57 percent in Egypt.

Again, what would happen if Iran develops nuclear weapons? In the West, there is great concern about Iran attacking Israel. About two-thirds in Europe and the United States say that is likely to happen. Significant numbers of Muslim publics say that as well. You have to square that with the fact that most Muslims also think that Iran would use these weapons defensively. So we are not sure what that means. Relatively few of these people in the Muslim countries worry that Iran would attack other Muslim nations -- 29 percent in Turkey, 20 percent in Jordan.

The impact of the Hamas victory on the Palestinian people again is seen very different in the West than in Muslim countries. In Pakistan, for example, 87 percent say this will be a good thing for the Palestinian people. In France and Germany, 69 percent and 71 percent say it will be a bad thing.

There is an inching up of support for Israel in Western Europe. Traditionally, in the United States or for as long as I have been doing polls, when we ask with which country, with which side do you sympathize more, the plurality sympathize with the Israelis, not the Palestinians. In Europe, it is mostly a plurality sympathizing with the Palestinians, but we see in France, the percentage saying they sympathize with Israel jumping from 20 percent to 38 percent since 2004 and in Germany, from 24 percent to 37 percent. These numbers are still not

like what they are in the United States, but they represent movement in the direction of Israel. It may reflect the Hamas victory. It may reflect concerns about Islamic terrorism in Europe. More about that next week.

The global warming finding: Only 19 percent of Americans think say they are personally worried a great deal about global warming. That compares to 51 percent in Spain, 46 percent in France. The bottom line is 47 percent of Americans say, I am not too worried about this problem. No countries match that number. The only other country that comes close to expressing so little concern about global warming is China.

I will leave it there. Thank you very much.

(Applause)

MS. RICE: Thank you, Andy. That was a fascinating survey.

While I think we would all agree that the negative and declining views of the United States overall are deeply disappointing, I don't think they are particularly surprising to any of us. What is surprising to a certain extent, or at least more worrying, is the reality that this negativity seems to be more enduring and more deep-seated and seems to be bleeding over into perceptions of the American people, not just perceptions of the United States Government. While the American people remain across the board more well liked than the U.S. Government, it is a negative trend for the most part that is tracking the downward trend in perceptions of the United States, which suggests that this problem may endure, that it is not simply a problem of one administration or one President, although confidence in President Bush is the lowest of all of the indicators related to the United States. Andy didn't have an opportunity to really go into that, but when you have a chance to read the whole survey, you will see that. The suggestion is that this is not simply a problem that will go away when a new administration of either party steps into office. What perhaps we are beginning to see is a more enduring and deep-seated decline.

I think that causes us all to have to ask the question: How much does this really matter? All of us prefer to be liked, for the most part, than disliked. But if this were just a popularity contest, I think we could learn to develop a thick skin and blow off the rest of the world when they became too tedious. The fact is this is not a popularity contest. The negative opinions of the United States, particularly to the extent that they are sustained and seemingly entrenched, have negative and potentially lasting security implications for the United States.

Why do I say that? Well, Carlos alluded to it a little bit in his opening comments. When you consider the nature of the world we are living in, one that is characterized by increasingly rapid globalization, not just of the economic sort but the globalization as well of security threats, it is wise to recall that the nature of the threats we face, despite our focus today on important concerns like Iran and North Korean, are increasingly transnational in nature. Transnational threats being terrorism, proliferation, disease and environmental degradation, international crime and narcotics flows, and relative to the Cold War era, for instance, less and less state-based. In a world where the threats that we need to contend with are increasingly transnational, which means that they can flow to anywhere from anywhere, emanate from anywhere, it suggests that we have some different security considerations than we might have had in the past.

In order to deal effectively with transnational threats that can pop up anywhere on the planet, it stands to reason that we need the effective cooperation and the willing cooperation of the maximal number of countries and peoples that we can muster around the world. To the extent that effective cooperation is a function both of the will of government and its people to cooperate with the United States and with international institutions on these transnational security threats, we have to remember that this is a function not only of will but also of capacity. There are many states around the world that lack the capacity to control their territory, their resources to provide for their people, and they are weak inherently. That is one

concern.

An added concern, and one that the survey I think underscores, is that we also have a deficit potentially of will -- will at the popular level and in some cases will at the governmental level to cooperate on issues that we deem most important, whether it is terrorism, proliferation, or international crime.

If you step back and think about what Andy said, which is that 12 of the 14 countries surveyed view the U.S. presence in Iraq as a bigger threat to the Middle East region as well as to international peace and security than Iran, you have to wonder how much will remains at the popular level in various parts of the world to cooperate with the United States on our key concerns like terror and proliferation. If you think about the implications for specific policy issues, it becomes even more worrying. With respect to Iran, while it is encouraging that, unlike in Iraq three years ago, the publics of our key European allies seem to share our deep concern about the implications of Iran acquiring nuclear weapons, in the rest of the world, it may be quite a different picture. The fact that we went into Iraq and have equated Iran and Iraq as co-equal members of the Axis of Evil has arguably damaged our credibility, given the outcome in Iraq, and raised the bar for the United States to have to jump over to demonstrate to the rest of the world or convince the rest of the world that in fact our concerns about Iran are justified, that we are right and they are wrong. That problem becomes or that challenge becomes even greater to the extent that force is contemplated.

On Iraq, it is harder to see the immediate implications for U.S. policy as the source of negative views around the world. But I think it is fair to say that it adds, at least at the subtle and subliminal level, to the drumbeat of pressure that may be forming for the United States to consider an earlier rather than a later withdrawal. To the extent that the strong negative attitudes towards the United States are tied substantially to our presence in Iraq, it certainly raises the cost, which is already enormous, of our continued presence.

Then on the larger global war on terrorism, Andy's numbers point out that support for the United States and the war on terrorism is, in many if not most countries, declining. That is in part, I assume, a function of the fact that both in the American mind and in the international mind, quite deliberately, the war on terrorism and Iraq have become allied. That is a problem when you consider that the war on terrorism is far larger than Iraq, that we have important considerations at stake in Afghanistan and other parts of the world, and that in fact we are arguably losing ground in recent weeks in places like Somalia and obviously even more seriously in Afghanistan.

I also think the problem of negative opinion towards the United States has to be viewed as significant when you consider the implications down the road for the American ability to sustain our leadership role in the world. We have been and I think we pride ourselves on being a global leader. That is not just a mindset or a status that we perhaps want to maintain for its own benefit. It is of practical significance to the United States. To the extent that we are effective leaders who can bring people along by inspiring, rather than intimidating, we are better able to achieve our objectives bilaterally in international fora, and to secure our interests. When that leadership is eroded and that erosion is potentially long-lasting, it does call into question our ability to maintain it and to restore it, in fact.

I think it is interesting to ask ourselves and indeed to ask the rest of the world: What would it take to restore, to pre-2002 levels, the view of the U.S. role in the world, the level and esteem of U.S. leadership? In asking that question, again, it is not about a popularity contest. It is not about wanting to be liked for the sake of being liked. It is in order to achieve our fundamental security and other national interest objectives.

If we step back and ask ourselves, to what extent are these negative numbers a function of more than Iraq? To what extent are they a function of other American policies? To what extent are they the function of some of our domestic choices including international perceptions

of the United States' failure to deal effectively with Katrina, perceptions of eroding civil liberties, perceptions of our treatment of detainees? What is the panoply of issues and factors that in fact might be at play? What about the tone and style of American leadership? How much does that matter?

I think we shouldn't be shy, and I would love, Andy, to see you and your colleagues in a subsequent survey to begin to try to ask the question of not only what do you think of the United States today, but what would it take, what sorts of policies, what sorts of approaches, what sort of leadership style would cause you to begin to change your views of the United States in a more favorable direction.

Let me just close by making a few other quick observations about some other points in the survey that haven't gotten as much attention. I was struck by the fact that the view of the United Nations is deteriorating not only in the United States, I think which we have come to expect, but rather markedly in other parts of the world including in Russia, in Britain, and in Turkey. That suggests that there is a more than minor challenge ahead for the new U.N. Secretary General as he or she takes on the multiplicity of challenges that the institution faces and its eroding popularity in various parts of the world.

On global warming, you saw how the United States ranked with China relative to the rest of the world on the spectrum of popular concern. What is also interesting is how the views of the seriousness and significance of global warming are extraordinarily divided along partisan lines with Democrats being substantially more concerned about the seriousness and implications of global warming than Republicans. I think it will be interesting to see, not only for human interest but also for the policy implications, whether Vice President Gore's movie has the impact of broadening the popular concern about global warming or exacerbating the partisan nature of that concern.

Finally, just a comment about Nigeria and bird flu. The survey was fascinating in its

illumination of Nigerian public attitudes. You may have noticed that Nigeria across the board has among the most favorable attitudes toward the United States of any of the countries surveyed. But when you get beneath that, as Andy's analysis indicates, and parse that opinion, you see dramatic polarization with the Christian population of Nigeria which is about 40 percent and the Muslim population which is 40 percent and another 20 percent in between. The Christian population is extremely favorable towards the United States and views President Bush in very high esteem. The Muslim population is extremely negative on the United States. That gap is growing, which I think ought to worry us significantly, not only in the Nigeria context as they go into elections next year -- elections that come against the backdrop of a newly installed democratic government and the question of whether Nigeria will achieve the first peaceful transition from one democratic government to another -- but also with the country deeply polarized and the economy remaining in the tanks and, very interestingly, as your survey pointed out, only 7 percent of the Nigerian people viewing their government in a positive light -- 7 percent for a new democracy. That ought to worry us greatly.

Lastly -- I said lastly already once -- but bird flu, Andy pointed out how extraordinary it is that there is such universally high awareness of bird flu. I find very little to take comfort in these days with respect to the potential for an avian flu pandemic, but those high numbers suggest that if the awareness can be sustained and broadened at a popular level across the countries not only of Asia and Africa but of Europe where the virus has shown up, it does suggest that there is a greater possibility of it being detected and contained earlier than we might otherwise have anticipated.

MR. KRISTOL: Thank you. It is great to follow Andy and Susan. I am always happy to visit Brookings, a place I have a high regard for and whose work I depend on often, and to do an event with Andy and the Pew Research Center, another place I have a high regard for.

My role, however, always is or I would say usually is to be the skunk at the garden party

-- the conservative or neoconservative skunk at a garden party of enlightened liberals who want us to be liked in the world and are very upset that these numbers have drifted down a little bit, I would say, incidentally, in the last year.

I think Susan put the question, and so I am happy to be the skunk here and to say that nothing in this survey particularly surprises me and very little particularly alarms me, and in fact, I think this is the way it is going to be. I mean, this is the world we are living in. It is not the world of the nineties.

Incidentally, it would be interesting to actually look at the data from the nineties, to say nothing of decades before that, and do a real comparison. As Andy alluded to, and this often happens, remember the old days when we were so popular. I would like to see data for us from India in the sixties, seventies, eighties, nineties, and this decade. I would like to see data from China. I would like to see data from Indonesia when it was a dictatorship. I don't know how much we could trust that data. I am not so sure that the current world U.S. popularity or respect for the U.S. is so much worse than when there were riots in the streets against the U.S. in the fifties and sixties in the Arab World and when we had decades of hostility in a place like India, not an unimportant country, as recently as 10 to 15 years ago.

Even looking, just as a factual matter, if you look at the chart on the first page of this handout which summarizes it, the truth is in Europe, we lost a chunk of favorability in Europe because we went to war in Iraq -- no surprise there. We disagreed on that. We continue to disagree on that. Europe has been stable over the last three or four years, almost literally stable. Great Britain: 56, 55, 56. These are literally within the margin of error. France: 37, 43, 39. So it basically fell off in 2002, 2003 and has been stable. Russia has been stable in the last four years, up a little from 1999-2000 for whatever reason.

It makes me wonder sometimes. I am sure these polls are done scientifically. But what are you really capturing?

In 1999-2000, Yeltsin was President of Russia. The Clinton administration was very favorably disposed to Yeltsin, a policy I supported, incidentally. There were no big issues that I recall. I guess the Balkans would have been the issue, now that I think about it. I will go back to that, which is a very important reminder. There are real events in the real world that the countries have differences on that will move public opinion. Our Balkan policy was correct. We did the right thing in Kosovo and in Bosnia before it, and it hurt our favorability in Russia. That is a fact, and it is an important fact for policymakers to know about and to deal with, but it doesn't mean the policy was wrong.

Obviously, I think Susan would agree with this, the key judgment of foreign policy is results, whether we are doing the right thing and whether we are doing it effectively. It is easier to do something effectively if one has more support around the world, but that is one factor. That is one element, not the only one, and it is sometimes not the main one, especially in countries that are very far away and aren't direct players, as some of these countries aren't, in the policy areas we are talking about.

In any case, if you look at it, basically Europe is down. Lots of the rest of the world is basically flat. Nigeria is up and down. Japan is down a little from 1999-2000. Well, we don't know, because there is not much data, but not significantly different. India is the same as it was in 2002. I don't believe the 15-point drop in India in the last year. Maybe it is due to squabbling over the U.S.-India nuclear deal, but to step back and say that U.S.-Indian relations at the popular and business and government levels aren't better than they have been for the last 50 years, basically, and aren't on an upward trend, I think would be hard to sustain. China is up a little bit for whatever reason in the last year and pretty level.

It is not a catastrophic or traumatic picture, frankly. It really isn't a traumatic picture. If you take out the 2002-2003 situation with Europe, which is better and I think tells us something about the likely state or complicated state of U.S.-West European relations in the post-9/11

world -- I think regardless of who is President, but let's say at least in the Bush Administration -- if you take that out, it is hard to really generalize too much.

The Middle East or the Islamic world is complicated, and those numbers seem to bounce around an awful lot and to be a little hard to read. Why Indonesia should go from 60 to 30 and Pakistan should go up from 10 to 30, basically, 10 to 27 in the same time frame, from 2002 to 2006, is a little hard to see. In any case, we obviously have some disagreement.

A lot of the publics in the Middle East and the publics in the Islamic world do not like the idea of a U.S.-led war on terror which is really a U.S.-led fight against Islamic jihadism. We could do a much better job of explaining ourselves, I am sure, and I have been as critical of this Administration's public diplomacy as anyone. But I don't think it would fundamentally change one's judgment about whether we are right or not to be doing most of the basic policies that we are following.

I would just put a little bit of a caution in over-interpreting the numbers themselves or their significance. Then I would come back to Susan's point: What is the effect of this? How much does this really matter?

I would say there are a couple of ways I will quickly mention to judge this. Is there less or more effective and willing cooperation with other nations in dealing with various problems around the world today than there was three years ago, six years ago, ten years ago? Well, that is not so easy to see. There is an awful lot of cooperation going on right now.

I don't think the WHO is any more or less cooperative as an institution in dealing with bird flu. On Afghanistan, NATO is probably stronger than it has ever been, doing a serious out-of-area engagement in Afghanistan, which is more than they were able to do before, more than they were called on before. The war on terror, my sense is the cooperation with other intelligence services and other police services in Europe, and for that matter in the Middle East, is very strong.

I myself, being more of a human rights neoconservative type, actually wish that we cooperated a little less with some of the intelligence services in the Middle East, but there doesn't seem to be any effect. There don't seem to be services that aren't cooperating with us and larger governments that aren't cooperating as much.

I would say with proliferation, there is much more cooperation than there was in the nineties when we didn't have cooperation, and that is when the proliferation happened -- the AQCon Network, China. Again, this is mostly affected by real world events and real world policies. The Pakistanis didn't decide they liked us better on September 12, 2001. They decided they had to make a choice, and they made a choice, and finally the AQCon Network got closed down. Other countries, like China hopefully, if we are at all effective in our policy, has decided it can't continue to be as reckless a proliferator as it was. For whatever reason, Libya decided to throw in the towel on its nuclear program and the like.

On Iran, which is a major issue facing us, the Europeans are closer to us now than they were in the nineties, in truth, and are more hawkish than they were in the nineties. Again, that is not because of some genius diplomacy on our part. It is because they are alarmed that an extremely radical and terror-friendly regime is chugging ahead to get nuclear weapons. But we are certainly working more closely with Europeans on Iran than we have since 1979, and we are now often joining the Europeans at the negotiating table with the Iranian issue.

In terms of actual cooperation on actual issues that we are dealing with, Israel-Palestine is a difficult issue. There was a certain amount of cooperation in the nineties. Truth to tell, if you actually went to Europe, they complained bitterly about Clinton's unilateral policy vis-à-vis the Europeans were not invited to be major participants in most of the negotiations. They were three-sided really with Israel and the Palestinians, Arafat and the U.S. I don't have a problem with that. We have a quartet, and the Europeans are sort of marginal players now as they were then, and the disagreements exist now as they did then, but I think neither more or

less striking.

Again, just as a matter of true policies out there, it is very hard to make the case, I think, that we are getting appreciably less willing cooperation or appreciably less effective cooperation than we got in some alleged heyday when we were loved and when it was easier to be loved because the decisions that were made or that weren't made seemed easier.

The second point, and really another way of making a similar point, I will put it this way: economists like public opinion data. It can be misleading. I think it is very important to look at what economists call, I believe -- I will be corrected by some Brookings economist here -- revealed preferences as opposed to expressed preferences. Revealed preferences is how do people behave, what do they do -- that tells you an awful lot about what people really think -- as opposed to a little survey of do you approve or disapprove of this, and the media has been very negative, and some bad news happened in the last two months, and people are telling you it is a crummy administration in Washington, so you say you disapprove.

But let's talk about real revealed preferences, which will be reflected in behavior, the behavior of governments in representative democratic systems. The revealed preferences of citizens in an undemocratic system is a little hard to tell, but you could still, presumably by certain other measures, ranging from tourism to commercial arrangements to ways in which they are able to express opinions despite lacking full political freedom.

I think if you just go down the list of these countries, again, it is very hard to make the case that we are facing a huge anti-American wave in these countries. In some countries, the more anti-American party has won elections in the last two or three years, Spain in particular, although the collapse of support for the U.S. in Spain in the last year, you could have seen it two or three years ago after the Madrid bombing and Aznar lost and his joining us in Iraq was unpopular. Why exactly, from 2005 to 2006, we have some halving of support, cutting in half of our support from Spain, is a little mysterious.

If you look at other countries, of course, the more pro-American candidate won. Merkel in Germany won a very close race. Her party lost a very close race in 2002. I am not sure. You can't really read much into that.

If you just go through the major countries, let's say the democratic countries to make it easier that are listed here. Relations with India, closer and better, I think I would say than ever in our lifetimes. Indonesia, complicated since it is now a democracy, and it wasn't one for most of our lifetimes, but good relations, and we are being helpful. I don't think we have major issues with Indonesia. Japan, very strong relationship, and Koizumi, a very pro-American prime minister who won a landslide election most recently. Russia, sort of a democracy; that is complicated. Again, someone like me would be critical that we have been too friendly with Putin. Anyway, it is hard to know what to make of those numbers, but to the degree that they have been cooperative, they probably are being, and to the degree they are not, they are not. The U.K., France, hard to tell. Blair and the Tories are both pretty pro-American. France is pretty anti-American in a way but hard to read much from the election results. I don't really see some dominating pattern here.

Turkey is a problem, I think, but Turkey is a problem that has much, much more to do with indigenous development in Turkish politics and a rethinking by the Turkish people about their identity and with the Atatürk solution and their difficult negotiations with the E.U. They don't like the war in Iraq either, granted. Turkey is a big question mark for U.S. foreign policy but less because of particular decisions Bush has made and more because of bigger developments for Turkey.

I don't mean to simply minimize the importance of all this. It is much better to have strong support and admiration and respect around the world than not. I think actually the numbers suggest that the U.S. has a fair amount of that. I would say and I really do believe this that the Bush administration was pitiful in its public diplomacy, especially in Europe. I think

the Middle East is a much more complicated situation.

The notion that having a better TV show or sending more envoys over there can change pretty fundamental political and cultural differences quickly is probably a little fanciful. Frankly, if you go into a region and say you are an ally of those who want to shake up the status quo in a region, an awful lot of people on all sides will distrust your motives and sometimes make judgments and will worry about what effects you are having. So the Middle East is just a very complicated situation.

In Europe, in the first term I would say in particular, that was a just foolish squandering of goodwill. Some of it was inevitable, but it was worse just because of failures on the part of the administration. That, I think, has been fixed basically, and you have a very Europe-friendly State Department now, a little too friendly occasionally for the taste of some of us, but no one can accuse them of not working as closely as possible with Europe on a ton of issues. To the degree it doesn't fix public opinion, what it suggests to me is we have a deeper cultural difference with Europe about the use of force, about all kinds of issues that have been well ventilated over the last three or four years here at Brookings and elsewhere that aren't going to change much. We aren't going to go back to a nineties or eighties type of relationship with the major nations of Western Europe.

MS. RICE: Thank you, Bill. I am very tempted to respond, but I am now going to take over the moderator's role, and so I will try to discipline myself to the extent I possibly can.

I wanted to ask Andy if he wanted to comment at all briefly on what Bill and I have said before we open it up for questions.

MR. KOHUT: Sure. Just briefly, Bill, a couple of things -- you are right. The differences here, the declines in many of the European places were small, but they were going in the other direction last year, and now they have reversed themselves.

MR. KRISTOL: But not statistically significantly -- 58, 55, 56. You can't deduce

anything from that.

MS. RICE: I will restrain myself as long as I can.

MR. KRISTOL: This is a serious question. You have to deal with it.

MR. KOHUT: I will deal with it. Let me just finish this.

If you look at opinions of the United States in Germany, which I think is really the most important country here of this list, assuming that it is our traditional ally and remains that. We started out at 70 percent. We went to 61 percent. Then in 2003, even right after Iraq, the fall was only to 45 percent. It went back down to 38 percent in 2004 and then slightly back up to 41 percent. Again, not statistically significant, but the tendency in both France and Germany and even Spain was to go in that direction. If you look at all three of then going in that direction, you ascribe greater confidence to the fact that all three patterns are the same and now all three patterns show the reverse.

MR. KRISTOL: Let me be clear. I didn't deny, and no one denies, that there was a falloff in 2002-2003. There is no statistically significant pattern in Britain, France, and Germany from 2004 to 2006. Let me read those numbers -- 58 to 56 in Britain, 37 to 39 in France, 38 to 37 in Germany. Opinion in three major countries in Western Europe is flat.

MR. KOHUT: It has been more or less stable, but there are these ups and downs, and yes, in any one place, they are not statistically significant. If you were to make a calculation, taking into account the fact that all three go in one direction in one year and then all three go in another direction in the next year and then they all go back in the third direction, you could probably say the odds are pretty good that there is something going on. In terms of conventional judgments about statistical significance, you are absolutely correct.

In Spain, though, you have a 20 percentage point decline in the favorability of the United States. You go to Spanish newspapers, celebrating the fact that they tried a terrorist when the Americans lock them up in Guantanamo, which has happened in the past year, and you get

some sense of the way the Spanish feel about us.

I also think that the Turkish numbers are not anomalous and really are pretty significant. We are down to 12 percent favorable in Turkey. It was 52 percent back in 2000. Last year, there was a movie in Turkey that was extremely popular, where we, the Americans, represented cartoon-like bad guys and to a large extent, in the Muslim world, that is the conception of the United States. I think that is the significance of this.

I would also say that I take your point with respect to revealed preferences versus the preferences in surveys and things like this. But keep in mind that in both Spain and France, the United States and anti-Americanism, maybe not in the most recent election, were legitimate campaign issues. Public opinion polls and manifest expressions of public opinion play a much greater role in the world than they did 10 to 15 years ago.

Going back to your point about the sixties and seventies and fifties, I am sure you are right about India, and these numbers are still on balance pretty positive about India. It was ironic that we are off 20 points after Bush negotiates this treaty which he has taken a lot of heat with here.

I think the larger point with respect to how do we judge this is there is no basis of judging it in the sixties and seventies. But in the eighties, when there was a lot of discontent with President Reagan's foreign policy, the levels of discontent with the United States were not nearly as great, not nearly as deep, and never really affected many of the things we see in these polls these days.

I guess the only thing I would say with respect to how can we do surveys that would direct us to what the public wants of American foreign policy is it is just not possible to do those kinds of surveys. We can only ask people about things that are within their realm of experience, not foreign policy options and things they don't think about.

MS. RICE: A question from that first section back there. Can you identify yourself?

MS. MATHEWSON: Hi, my name is Judy Mathewson. I am a reporter with Bloomberg News, and I have a question for Mr. Kohut.

To what do you attribute the change in the Spanish attitude? You mentioned the newspapers making much of the fact that we don't try our detainees, but I am hoping you can elaborate a little bit on that shift.

MR. KOHUT: To be honest with you, I don't have a good explanation for why that Spanish number is as low as it is. It really is surprising. In fact, we were surprised that the numbers in Europe didn't continue to go up even further, and the Spanish numbers have clearly gone in the opposite direction.

I think the more general observation that we make in the survey is that discontent with the American presence in Iraq is having a deleterious impact on the image of the United States. I don't know why in Spain that would be so much more the case, but I guess I will leave the answer at that.

MS. RICE: Spain is a classic case of revealed preferences as is Italy, as is Britain and France, Britain in particular for Tony Blair, if you take a look at the polling numbers.

MR. KARRISON: I actually have a question for the entire panel. My name is Joe Karrison (?).

I was wondering, and this is just something that, Susan, especially you discussed, doing things that the rest of the world necessarily isn't always perceiving as well, and you were talking about the long-range global leadership of the United States. I am curious if doing extreme things like pulling out of Iraq early, things like that, would necessarily be an intelligent move into getting the public to like us, and is that seriously that important if you think about all the implications of doing something quite extreme in that regard. Would it be smart to do something in that nature just to get the public opinion up in the rest of the world?

MS. RICE: I certainly wouldn't suggest that we make our policy going forward in Iraq

on the basis of international public opinion. I think that would be folly. The consequences of our next steps, whether we stay or go, are enormous, and we have to make them on the basis of our interests, the situation on the ground, and how we minimize the damage to our long term interests by the policy choices we have already made.

MR. KOHUT: Even in the United States and people who say they want to see the United States leave Iraq, there is very little support for just getting out.

MR. MCCOOK: My name is Jake McCook. I am with the United Nations Association.

Just a quick question, is there a reason Latin America was ignored in the survey?

MR. KOHUT: The reason is that in this round of surveys, we have done a pretty limited survey, but we are going to do a 40 nation survey and we will be coming back to Latin America in that polling next year.

MS. RICE: Is everybody seriously spellbound?

MR. GLANCY: Hi, I am Kegan Glancy (?).

I am wondering. You mentioned the differences between Muslim and Christian public opinion in Nigeria as that being somewhat indicative of where their opinion would be of the U.S. In countries like, say, Egypt where there is also a relatively large Christian minority or other minorities, and in Jordan, the numbers are a little shocking. I am wondering whether there might be a difference between, say, Palestinian-identified Jordanians versus natively-identified Jordanians. Was Nigeria the only country that was separated out based on ethnic or religious identities?

MR. KOHUT: It is the only country where there is a sufficiently large cleavage to make this breakout. In last year's survey and in earlier years, we have had Lebanon in the poll. The difference between the Lebanese minority, which is a sizeable Christian minority, and the Muslim minority with respect to the United States looks pretty much the same, although the Lebanese Muslims are not nearly as negative as (interruption).

When we did our last big survey in 2002, I think we had five or six African countries with large enough Muslim minorities to split them out.

MS. RICE: I suspect you will see similar things, particularly in East Africa.

MR. KOHUT: Perhaps.

MS. BRIEGER: Hello, I am Annette Brieger with German television.

In your introduction or rather your announcement of this event, you made reference to the upcoming fifth anniversary of the September 11th events. I am wondering if you could put these findings of this survey into the context of this upcoming anniversary or into the context of September 11th, and that is really a question to the whole panel.

MR. KOHUT: Well, I think that my answer to that would be that the response to the United States immediately after September 11th was very positive. However, even as soon as the summer of 2002, we began to see growing dislike of the United States, but clearly there was still a reserve of goodwill for the United States in 2002. There were concerns about American power. There were concerns about the way we were conducting the war on terrorism even in 2001, when we did surveys during the war in Afghanistan.

I think apart from Iraq, pre-Iraq, one of the concerns about the world is American power when America is on the defensive. America was the sole superpower even in the 1990s, and there wasn't discomfort with that power because the United States didn't feel itself under attack. I think that one of the legacies of September 11th is the world looks at American power as more threatening when America feels threatened. Obviously, that is a consequence of September 11th.

MR. KRISTOL: I don't think the fact of the fifth anniversary is going to matter much one way or the other. What matters is real events in the world and particularly Iraq, obviously.

I will make a prediction. Most people in these countries were against the Iraq War. If Iraq goes badly, and we have to leave with ignominious defeat, we will be less popular as a

result. Indeed, if we win in Iraq, we will be more popular, despite the fact that people didn't approve and will remain disapproving of the war. Results actually matter.

The Russians got over their unhappiness about our intervention into what they regarded as against the people, or the government I guess, that they regarded historically as something of a friend. So reality matters the most.

Having pooh-poohed the poll a little bit, I do want to really just add a word about what I took from this poll in substantive matters, if I can put it in that way, the actual dealings with different regions of the world and different countries. Three things:

Europe, I think once we decided -- and frankly, I think a Democratic administration would have decided the same thing -- that we had to understand the meaning of 9/11, not in a small way, as requiring some fundamental changes in the Middle East, not as simply a continuation of a very targeted war against one terrorist group basically or a set of terrorist groups. Once that decision was made, I think it was inevitable that there would be something of a gulf with Europe. I think that is going to exist.

I don't think it is operationally a big problem because we are cooperating with Europe on lots of things. I don't think it is going to change. Europe is a fact, and God knows enough ink has been spilled about the U.S.-European relationship that there is no surprise there. I think it is stable now, as I said, in the last two years, three years, but there was a big moment there where the Europeans realized, oh my God, the Americans don't have the same view about how to deal with this fundamental problem of dictatorship and extremism and terrorism in the Middle East as we do.

Secondly, Turkey -- Turkey is a big question. As a matter of foreign policy, we have taken a very close relationship with Turkey for granted for a long time. It is a longtime NATO ally. We have many, many areas of cooperation with it. We have encouraged the E.U. to invite Turkey to join it. We have encouraged Turkey to pursue that path. Turkey is a changing

nation. I don't know how much we can do to influence it, but it is just a big fact that it is an important nation.

Very strikingly, if you look at the Turkey numbers, we are at 12 percent in Turkey. France is at 18 percent. There is a turn against the West, not just the U.S. Germany is at about 43 percent, but there I think are the close Turkish-German ties. The number of Turks in Germany probably affects that somehow or other.

Third, Pakistan, despite the slight uptick that Andy mentioned in Pakistan, Pakistan is a big question mark if you look at this data and you assume that public opinion is and should be reflected in governance at some point and is reflected in some ways even today and should be even more so. If they go back to elections that matter in Pakistan, which we are urging them to and which they say they are going to, the degree of sort of acceptance in Pakistan and I guess applause in Pakistan, if I read the poll correctly, Andy, of the Iranian nuclear weapon particularly is startling.

Incidentally, it makes you wonder about all these experts who spend most of their time explaining how the Sunni/Shiite divide is so fundamental that they could never work together and they disapprove of each other. It turns out one reason the Iranians are going to get a nuclear weapon, if they do, is that there was huge cooperation from a Pakistani-based network, and secondly, it turns out that the Sunnis of Pakistan are rooting unfortunately for the Iranians to get a nuclear weapon and to defy the West.

I think the degree to which Turkish and Pakistani public opinion, it is a broader problem in the Middle East to some degree and the Islamic world, but those are two big nations that historically have been pretty friendly, certainly on the government level, with us and with whom we have very important equities in all kinds of aspects of our foreign policy relationships. I think when we are back in the State Department or the National Security Council and looking at this, you would really want to focus on the relations with those two

countries, I think, over the next several years. There are no easy answers.

MR. KOHUT: The only other thing I would add to this, Bill, is you talked about the Russian numbers going up and down. The Russian numbers are better now than they were in 1999, and I think that has to do with the Russians feeling that they have common cause with respect to us with regard to Muslim extremism, because the Russians have expressed pretty strong support for the war on terrorism at 55 percent in 2005, 52 percent in 2006. It did fall off and has been up and down around the war in Iraq. But the Russians -- I mean, I see the Russian response as kind of rational, having less to do with relationships between Putin and the West and more to do with how the Russians, the Russian people, see us in relationship to their problems with the Chechens and other Muslim rebels.

MS. RICE: I would answer your question by differing with Bill's assertion that the outcome of all of this public opinion is very little when it comes to actual policy outcomes as they affect our vital interests. I think if you step back and look at the key issues of the day, it has not been as positive an outcome for the United States as we might have hoped or wished. How much of that you can attribute to the direct or indirect impact of public opinion, we could debate at some length.

Let me just point out that with North Korea, we have stalled in our efforts to move that issue forward, and part of the difficulty is a quite different view in our close ally, South Korea, about how to approach the problem in North Korea. Anti-Americanism in South Korea, though it is not obviously in this survey, is much higher than it used to be. We have not succeeded in bringing concerted pressure to bear from the Chinese and the others in the Six Parties to move this off the dime. That is one policy outcome that is worrisome, and the causes of which, I don't think can be entirely divorced from larger views of the United States, particularly in South Korea.

In Iraq, obviously, we do not have the degree of international support and engagement

that we have managed to muster in other circumstances -- for example, in the Balkans where the United States' share of the military operation and of the cost has been disproportionate and even where our partners have made commitments to participate to a greater degree. Whether it is on the economic side or on the training side, those commitments have largely gone unfulfilled. Obviously, that is in large part a reaction to the U.S. decision to go into Iraq, the way we went into Iraq, and the difficulties we have had since we have gone into Iraq. But I don't think it is entirely impossible to divorce that as well from how people view the United States since Iraq and our image are now inextricably linked.

Pakistan is an interesting case. Bill alluded to Pakistan. On the one hand, we laud the cooperation that we received from the Musharraf government in going after Al-Qaeda and Taliban remnants. On the other hand, we are not getting nearly the cooperation that we would like. It has been very much a mixed picture, as our own State Department coordinator for counterterrorism has stressed. How much of that is a function of the fact that, despite Pakistan being undemocratic, Musharraf senses at the grassroots level a deep-seated reluctance on the part of the population to be seen to join with us fully in this effort, I think is a question we need to ask and give great thought to.

In Indonesia, we have just seen the courts release the perpetrator of the Bali bombings. That is another setback, arguably, in the global war on terrorism, and we can cite others.

My point is simply to say that, while I am not by any means suggesting a one to one correspondence between popular attitudes towards the United States and our inability to accomplish all that we might like on key issues like Iran and North Korea and Iraq and the war on terrorism, I don't think we can divorce the two. One of the ironies, as we look for and push for and revel in the global spread of democracy, which is good for so many reasons, we also have to reckon with the consequences of that. Populations who find themselves taking a different view than their governments or of their government's policies toward the United

States have exercised the franchise in a fashion that has caused the governments that have been on the other side to find themselves very short-lived. I think this is something that we have to reckon with more and more over time.

Let me go all the way to the back to the gentleman here.

MR. ZEERAK: My name is Ahmed Zeerak and I am a student from Afghanistan, studying political economy.

I first want to laud the work of the authors of the report who I think, in my opinion, provide the best digest of world public opinion that it possibly can come close to. I have read the report with some regularity for the past few years and look forward to the book, *America Against the World*.

I have two questions. The first is directed to Dr. Rice who mentioned in passing the recent developments in my country, Afghanistan, and cited as a serious concern. There have been very few satisfactory explanations of the incidences of the countrywide riots. It has been something really that the American public has become aware of with some sense of shock because they have always viewed Afghanistan and its relative stability there only through the lens of Iraq. I would like to know, how do you read those developments in the context of the developments since 9/11 and since especially 2002 when the U.S. went there?

Lastly, to Dr. Kristol, you mentioned that you singled out poor public diplomacy as one of the things that possibly we can get out of these numbers in the case of the Bush administration. At the same time, you have said that these numbers are largely stable and have been stable for the past few years. It makes me wonder whether these numbers are reflective of a trend that is more fundamental, that is the very design of American exceptionalism, of the U.S. abrogating to itself to sustain itself as an exceptional power with prerogatives to conduct the foreign policy in a very exceptional manner, that is the real factor behind these numbers and not how one or another U.S. administration sells those wars. Thank you very much.

MR. KRISTOL: My only point on our public diplomacy is I think in Europe in particular in 2002-2003, the State Department went totally missing. They didn't like the concept of going to war to remove Saddam very much. I don't base this on any surveys. I base this on traveling occasionally in Europe, and defending the Bush administration policy and foreign policy was always a popular thing to do in Berlin or Paris or Vienna in those years.

People would come up to me afterward, saying they disagreed, but they were grateful I had come to make the case. I said, well, that is nice of you. But what is so special about this? I am sure you hear the case all the time.

These were senior people, government types and media types as well citizens. They would say, no, no, no one has been here making the argument in public. So I think there was just a failure to show up in Europe there for a couple of years. There was a sense that we were at loggerheads with some of these governments, and we just didn't do a very good job of making the case.

Having said that, I basically agree with you that these are all deeper trends. A lot of them have to do with the fact that America is the only superpower in the world, and the U.S. has decided -- this is not really different from Clinton to Bush, I would say -- that it probably has a unique role in both preserving global stability and checking threats against peoples. Maybe we should be doing more and not less in terms of intervening -- in my opinion and I think this might be shared by others -- against genocide around the world. When you are the only superpower and have that burden, many of your decisions, some of your decisions, are not going to be that popular in some parts of the world.

I agree with you and also for various other cultural and sociocultural reasons that aren't going to change and that we couldn't change if we wanted to -- that have to do with just the differences of history, religion, and cultures between us and Europe, us and the Middle East, us and other countries -- there are going to be differences and disagreements and dislikes. So I

basically agree with your point that it probably is less dependent on particular appointments in public diplomacy or even on particular decisions of particular administration than one would think.

Having said that, I would agree that Iraq is the defining decision of the Bush administration, and either it will be vindicated or it won't be. Much of the world disagrees with us, and obviously we paid a price in public opinion for that.

MS. RICE: On Afghanistan, it is obviously an extremely fragile situation and arguably on a steeper downward trajectory at the moment than Iraq which is sort of steady state, flat, low. I think we have great reason to be concerned about the recent rioting, about the more frequent employment of suicide bombing as a tactic, the resurgence of a Taliban in many parts of the country, all of this coinciding with a handoff to NATO.

I think one of the things we have to come to terms with is that despite a lot of resources from us and others, the reconstruction effort, the stabilization effort has not been sufficient. It hasn't stuck or taken, particularly on the economic side in terms of generating a viable economy outside of the heroin sector, the drug sector, putting in place the sort of infrastructure where there are health clinics and schools of the sort that we promised that have not in every case materialized. These sorts of things are work that remains unfinished.

I think we have been reminded recently by the even more optimistic experience of East Timor just how long-term these challenges are and the consequences of approaching them with a short-term horizon. Also, as some recent research suggests, the perhaps folly of frontloading our assistance in investment dollars right after a change in regime or the end of a conflict. Recent research shows that it may well be more beneficial and effective to have that sort of assistance peak at year five when there is some greater institutional capacity to absorb that assistance and to focus in the early days in security and capacity building. I think there are some interesting lessons that we ought to take from all of these post-conflict situations while

we recognize that in Afghanistan, if we are to succeed, we have a long term challenge still ahead.

MS. VARNUM: Jessica Varnum (?) from CSIS.

I was wondering. This discussion has been primarily in the context of post-9/11, and we saw the good favorability numbers post-9/11. Do you have data for the decades prior to 9/11 to suggest whether that data itself immediately post-9/11 was perhaps an anomaly, so that we could look at this precipitous decline post-9/11 as merely a return to normalcy, or does the data pre-9/11, for example, suggest that we really are seeing a major decline over time?

MR. KOHUT: There are not survey data from the sixties and seventies, but there are some surveys in the eighties on the images of the United States, the eighties through the nineties. Some of this is accessible through INR or what was once called USIA. Some of the eighties data are in my book, *America Against the World*, showing that there were declines in the image of the United States which rebounded in the nineties. There are not, unfortunately, long-term numbers, long-term tracking on places like India or even Europe. At one point, President Johnson got tired of the reports from USIA that were increasingly unfavorable during the war in Vietnam, and he forbid them, and that was the end of the USIA surveys.

MS. WHITMORE: Megan Whitmore (?), Cox News.

Looking at the results with the events of the past week, the death of Al-Zarqawi and President Bush's visit to Iraq today, will this have any impact on the U.S. image in our current image as we move forward in Iraq?

MR. KOHUT: I think that the answer to that in the long run on the impact of Al-Zarqawi will depend upon what happens in Iraq with respect to violence and stability. If this signals a turning point, then there will be a turning point for the United States around the world, and there will be a turning point here in the United States in opinions about the war in Iraq. If, on the other hand, we continue to have high levels of violence and seeming instability, then the

public opinion will not change. We saw a little bump in support of the war and in support of President Bush after Saddam Hussein was captured, and that dissipated within a month or two as we moved into the insurgency in 2004.

MS. HYSUM: My name is Jessica Hysum (?) from SAIS.

I was wondering. Looking at the numbers, if you would agree that there might be some statistical discrepancy that could be generated by a tendency to conflate specifically U.S. actions with actions implemented by Western-led or U.S.-led coalitions, for example, Afghanistan coalition-led efforts versus U.S.-led efforts.

MR. KOHUT: My guess is that around the world, there is not much awareness of the fact that Afghanistan is a NATO operation and not strictly an American operation. I remember in a survey that we did in November of 2001 of opinion leaders around the world, there were charges even then that the American approach in Afghanistan was unilateralist when in point of fact, it was a multilateral effort. I don't know if others have an opinion about that.

MS. RICE: I think we have time for two last questions. There was one in the back, the gentleman on the aisle if you still have one, and there was this gentleman right here in the front.

MR. TUN: Thank you. My name is Huang Tun (?) from *Peoples Daily*.

According to the survey, China goes up from 42 percent last year to 47 percent this year. I just want to know why it goes up.

MR. KOHUT: I don't have a good answer for why it goes up. It is up. We have fewer questions in this survey, and we are only releasing part of the survey in this release from China because the number of questions and the kinds of questions that we can ask are limited. I have less of an ability to try to understand what is going on in response to any one opinion because I just don't have a lot of other answers in China, because the questionnaires tend to be more limited.

MS. RICE: Andy, you may not be able to answer this either, but I am curious. What do

you think accounts for the fact that China is one of the very few countries that the Chinese people have a positive view of their government and most other countries, in the West at least, do not?

MR. KOHUT: Actually, there is nothing in this survey about the Chinese view of their government. The question is: How do you feel about conditions in the country which is difference than how do you feel about the government?

MS. RICE: Thank you. That is an important distinction, particularly in China.

MR. KOHUT: They are probably very highly correlated, but maybe not. I don't know. There is a lot of optimism in China, not only in this survey but in the survey we conducted last year. The Chinese think that things are going pretty well in their country. Even though what our surveys found a few years ago was that Chinese respondents don't have a very good view of their lives and they are not as satisfied as Europeans or Americans, there was great optimism in China about personal progress and national progress. I think that is probably what this national satisfaction response is about.

MS. RICE: Last question.

MR. PARRIS: Hi, Sam Parris (?), Hudson Institute.

Dr. Rice, earlier you were talking about perceptions of the American people versus perceptions of the U.S. Government and suggesting that there was a convergence between the two.

MS. RICE: A parallel downward tracking.

MR. PARRIS: A parallel, okay. I was just wondering what makes you say that and why the low favorability ratings aren't just protests of government actions or approaches of the government. Why the connection to the American people?

MS. RICE: Well, I will actually let Andy elaborate, but the survey has a section that you may have seen which tracks views of the American people as opposed to views of the United

States which is generally meant to, I think, assumed to be the United States Government and its policies. Historically, the views of the American people have always been higher than the U.S. Government and its policies, and that remains the case. What is interesting is that those views of the American people are also generally speaking, tracking negative and on a declining trajectory over time.

I haven't plotted it, but it roughly parallels the trajectory or the path of the United States overall, which is to suggest that -- at least my conclusion from looking at that is that we have more than a transient problem of disaffection with the policies of a particular leader or a particular administration or even the United States in this phase of its global leadership. It is beginning to bleed down into and affect popular views of the American people, which I think is a worrisome sign.

MR. KOHUT: If you look in the 2005 survey, which had a great deal more about the American people, you will see that the long-term trend, while it is not as precipitous a decline as it is for the U.S. at large, it does show a decline in many countries, I think 12 of the 15 countries that we polled last year.

MS. RICE: On behalf of Brookings, let me thank you all very much for coming and participating. Thank you and most importantly thank you to my fellow panelists, particularly Andy Kohut and Pew for their good work, and thank you, Bill, for coming back and playing your very valuable role.

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