Panel 3 – The R.O.K.’s Self-Reliant Military Policy and the CFC: Replacing the Armistice

PLANNING FOR CHANGE IN THE ROK-US ALLIANCE: CHALLENGES AND IMPLICATIONS

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The ROK-US Alliance is currently is a state of flux that has existed in many ways since almost the very beginning of the Roh administration in 2003. Because of initiatives that truly began to take shape during 2005, it is now obvious that Roh’s government wishes to make radical changes to several key institutions that are responsible for the defense of South Korea – and wants to ensure that these changes begin as soon as possible.

It is my view that because of the initiatives being pushed for by the Blue House, US planners need to be prepared for the impact these changes will have on the alliance, on military readiness, and on the overall geopolitical situation in Northeast Asia. Nevertheless, it will be the purpose of this paper to address exactly what these Blue House initiated changes will mean for the ROK military and for the readiness of the ROK-US military Alliance and Combined Forces Command (CFC). Thus, I will discuss the challenges faced by the current defense reform that is ongoing in the ROK military, the issue of Wartime Operational Control (OPCON), the impact that radical change
within the military structure of the ROK-US Alliance will have on the readiness and capabilities of allied forces on the Peninsula, scenarios for a changed command structure, and challenges facing the ROK government and its military if Seoul truly wishes to initiate “self-reliant defense” while maintaining the same level of national defense that currently exists under the Combined military structure.

**Sweeping Military Reforms in South Korea: Implications and Challenges**

During 2005, the South Korean military announced a massive military reform plan. By 2020 the plan is to reduce the active military from 680,000 to 500,000. The army will take the biggest cut in personnel, as divisions will be reduced in number from 47 to about 20.\(^1\) Ground and air capability will be increased, and the plan is to cost at least 623 trillion won (Roughly $640 billion at the 2006 monetary exchange rates) by its completion in 2020.\(^2\) One of the ways the Ministry of Defense will increase capability will be to engage in $195 billion in new arms procurements. The nation’s budget is set to increase by 11 percent annually starting in 2006.

Much of the modernization and transformation will occur in the army, as the plan is to expand the operational boundaries of a combat unit from 30 kilometers to 100 kilometers. Next-generation unmanned spy aircraft, armored vehicles, attack helicopters and self-propelled artillery are scheduled to be deployed as part of the plan. The navy plans to have next-generation submarines, and the air force plans to reduce its number of fighter jets from 500 to 420, but upgrade their capabilities. Next-generation aircraft will include F-15K’s, airborne early warning systems, and airborne tankers.\(^3\) The army will overhaul its headquarters to have a more “efficient” organization, and the reorganization went into effect beginning in April of 2006.\(^4\) Minister Yoon Kwang-ung also announced that the
Defense Ministry itself would undergo changes designed to make the military a more efficient force. Yoon announced that the new Defense Ministry would consist of four headquarters with 15 subordinate departments. In addition, the Ministry wants to increase the number of civilians working for the military from 23,000 to 30,000. Reportedly, some military officers in South Korea are worried that without securing the necessary funds to upgrade combat capability (which has to be approved through the National Assembly), the hasty reduction in troop levels could jeopardize the security of South Korea in the face of the North Korean threat.

There are two key problems with the new military reforms – finance and transformation. I will first address the very important issue of finance. It has been widely argued in South Korea that the budget is the biggest obstacle to the achieving the goals discussed above. The announced goal of the South Korean military is to be able to provide “self-reliant defense.” This means an “independent capability” that will have less reliance on support from the US. If independent capability is the goal, it is unlikely to be achieved until at least 2015. Why? That is the date that the Roh administration set for achieving a budget of 3.0% of South Korea’s GDP. But his is only where the concerns begin. The largest question that remains is can the South Korean government actually pay for this? There are currently no bills pending (nor, by South Korean law is this even possible) that will guarantee a stable obtainment of budgets year by year necessary for national defense reforms through a smooth cooperation with governmental agencies, and that stipulates specific measures for securing budgets. In other words, there simply is no guarantee that the budget will not change significantly from year to year or from President to President, between now and 2020.
The second important issue involving the military for the South Korean military is transformation. This is an even more complicated and difficult issue for Seoul than finance. The challenges I will address are numerous and diverse. To begin, the South Korean military has been specifically equipped and deployed since 1953 to engage in complimentary missions with the US military on the Peninsula. Thus, to truly transform, the ROK military must assume certain very important missions, adapting capabilities to reach the level currently held by US forces who now conduct (or until recently conducted) these missions. Specifically, the ROK military must transform and upgrade drastically in two very important missions, airpower and C4I (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence). Otherwise, the very large, highly equipped South Korean military will be just like a big powerful football linebacker “without a head,” lots of power, but no ability to direct or support it.

Current C4I changes and initiatives are minor. Perhaps more importantly, they do no provide an advanced “sensor to shooter” capability. Modern C4I is not just about gaining greater communications across the spectrum, but consists of gaining greater sensor to shooter capability and “information dominance.” This modern C4I capability (information dominance) is what the US brings to the show in Combined Forces Command (CFC), and is the key capability that has allowed US forces deployed around the world to quickly deploy military forces into combat with a flexibility their enemies have been unable to counter in force-on-force conflicts. Current initiatives underway in the ROK military have not addressed this capability completely, and in fact are really just about an advanced spread of C3 (Command and Control Communications) – not information dominance.
Regarding airpower, the South Korean military is in fact purchasing advanced aircraft, but not enough of them to match the capability that US airpower currently gives them. For example, Seoul is only purchasing 40 F-15K’s, an aircraft that will give them specific capabilities to take the fight to the North during a force-on-force conflict. The reason for such a small purchase is financial – the F-15K is a very expensive aircraft. But this is only one example of how the ROK air force is lacking (and likely to continue to be lacking) in vital airpower capabilities. Another important example relates to the lift of South Korea’s elite special-forces and airborne brigades. The army has seven special-forces brigades for airborne operations (para-dropping and air resupply), plus five independent brigades (two infantry and three counter-infiltration), along with other airborne assets – all of which would need to be airlifted during a conflict. To carry this huge force, the ROK air force transport fleet barely has 25 aircraft – 10 C-130HS and 15 Spanish designed, twin-engined CN-235Ms, an inventory that is sadly lacking in the mission it would be expected to carry out. To date, in planning and in exercises, the South Koreans have relied on the US airlift capability to transport the majority of their airborne troops. To upgrade their own airlift capability will involve a huge investment in aircraft purchases, infrastructure upgrades, maintenance, and training of personnel.

There are other important examples of shortfalls that are important to address if Seoul is serious about building a “self-reliant” national defense. The ROK Marine Corps is arguably the finest amphibious landing force in East Asia. The training, discipline, and leadership of the ROK Marine Corps is beyond reproach. But a Marine Corps is only as effective as its amphibious lift (specially equipped ships and craft that carry the troops to the fight and provide command and control for these forces as they phase across the
beach). Currently, the ROK Navy is completely incapable of providing its Marine Corps the lift necessary to conduct large-scale amphibious operations. This is another example where the capabilities of the United States have been factored in (US Navy ships and the associated command and control) and planned for throughout the history of the alliance. Seoul has built one “LPX” class amphibious assault ship, and construction on three more is expected by 2013 – but this and the other smaller craft that the ROK Navy has will still be lacking in the capability to lift all of the landing troops and their associated equipment (and providing the highly important, associated command and control) of the ROK Marine Corps should a large-scale confrontation requiring their services occur.¹⁴

The most recent example of shortfalls that occur as missions are handed over from US forces to the forces of South Korea occurred during 2005. Since the late 1990s, North Korea has moved a large number of long-range artillery systems close enough to the DMZ where they can virtually threaten all of Seoul and many areas of Kyongi Province (the northern-most province in South Korea, and also the area where the largest concentration of South Korean ground forces are located) on a moments notice – with little warning time to U.S. and South Korean forces. Until recently, the ground-based mission of providing counter-fire to this long-range artillery fell to the 2⁰ U.S. Infantry Division, which operated 30 multiple rocket launcher systems and 30 M109A6 Paladin self-propelled howitzers. During April of 2005, as part of the ongoing shift of defense responsibilities on the Korean Peninsula between South Korean and U.S. forces, it was announced that the responsibilities for this mission would shift to the South Korean army. A key to the success of this new mission will be the integration of the South Korean units in the combined ROK-US C4I system on the Peninsula.¹⁵ Unfortunately, one of the key
concerns for the U.S. regarding the current state of readiness for South Korean forces on
the Peninsula, has been the unwillingness of Seoul to spend the money to upgrade their
own C4I infrastructure – or to help with the costs of the current structure. Integration
of these newly assigned units into a modern C4I system is vital, because of what the
quick reaction time will have to be in grasping the location of North Korean artillery
units with radar and destroying them in case the systems have just been fired or are about
to be fired. To date, this integration has not occurred and the South Korean army has
not provided an indigenous capability that would replace the systems used previously by
US forces. Failure to respond properly and quickly in a counter-battery mission could
mean the loss of tens of thousands of lives (many of them civilians) in a conflict with
North Korea.

The military reforms that the South Korean government has planned for the next
several years will be important to the security of the Korean Peninsula. While it is
important for the South Korean government to undertake these reforms, in the view of the
author, to date the government has not addressed many shortfalls that would leave the
military vulnerable during a full-scale war. I have only addressed some of the larger
issues – but there are most certainly many more. The two overarching challenges of
finance and properly initiated transformation are likely to continue to plague Seoul as the
military reform continues in coming years. Hopefully, these will be challenges that will
be successfully addressed with initiatives that will bring about real change and
modernization to the South Korean military.
Key Issue in a Changing Alliance: Wartime Operational Control

The issue that has challenged the alliance since early 2004, and will likely create many challenges for several years as command relationships transition for a changing security environment, is the debate over wartime operational control. This is an issue that has caused a great deal of debate, both in the press, and during the SPI talks. I will address the issues associated with wartime operational control, and offer some insights into the possible future for the ROK-US Alliance as this issue evolves.

It is first important to address how wartime operational control exists in the ROK-US Alliance as of 2006. The current South Korean constitution states that the President can send his military to war, but he must get approval from the National Assembly to send troops overseas. If there is a change in wartime operational control (OPCON), this will mean that the South Korean President will be the sole National Command Authority (NCA) for ROK forces in the case of war with North Korea. Under an agreement signed in 1994, South Korea has peacetime control over all of its armed forces. Only during wartime do designated ROK forces chop to the Commander of CFC. As it stands right now (2006), when agreed on DEFCON conditions have been met, CFC assumes wartime command of all US forces and all South Korean forces who have chopped to CFC. In essence this means that the ROK President, presumably with the advice of the Minister of National Defense and ROK Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff, instructs the Minister and Chairman to chop whatever forces necessary (or previously agreed upon) to CFC. The nature of the crisis would be the key determinant as to when and what ROK units would be chopped to CFC. The same process is generally true for the US side, though technically different and would presumably involve PACOM. If the crisis is war, then
combined planning would provide a bilateral understanding as to what ROK and US forces are expected to be apportioned to CFC.

During wartime OPCON the Commander of CFC works for two NCA’s; the President of South Korea and the President of the United States. He does not work only for the President of the United States. Although the Commander of CFC is a US General, there is in fact a “ROK-US Military Committee” co-chaired by the two Chairmen of both Joint Chiefs of staffs, all of which exists under a “dual command system” under the strategic guidance of the Presidents and Ministers of Defense (US Secretary of Defense) of both countries. The Commander of CFC carries out decisions based on this strategic guidance passed from the two national authorities through the Military Committee, and then uses these decisions to issue operational orders to the combined force. Thus, while designated ROK forces come under the command of CFC during wartime, they do not come under the direct command of the NCA of the United States. They come under a “dual-headed” NCA.

As discussed earlier, President Roh has called for a change in command relationships between the two militaries. In fact, Roh stated during January of this year that he wanted an agreement for South Korea to take back wartime OPCON of its forces. He further clarified the actions that he has levied on the ROK Ministry of National Defense in March of 2006, during a speech given to the 62nd graduating class of the Korean Military Academy where he stated, “Through regular meetings with the US and the Security Policy Initiative, we will draw up a road map for regaining operational control in wartime, which includes exact timeframes and precise procedures, and will report on this at the ROK-US Security Consultative Meeting which is scheduled for October (2006).”
During December of 2005, high-level officials from South Korea and the United States agreed to establish a task force to facilitate discussions on the transfer of wartime command of Seoul’s armed forces from the US to South Korea.\textsuperscript{23} Action on the task force was formalized during late March of 2006, when South Korea and the United States signed an accord to form a joint panel to study a roadmap for South Korea regaining operational control of its armed forces during wartime. According to a press release by the South Korean Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. Lee Sang-hee, Chief of the South Korean JCS, and Gen. B. B. Bell, commander of USFK, signed a document entitled, “Terms of Reference Governing the ROK-U.S. Command Relationships Study and Report.” The “Combined Working Group” agreed to discuss ways of presenting detailed measures for the transfer of wartime command and the change in command arrangements.\textsuperscript{24}

US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld reaffirmed Washington’s intentions regarding Wartime OPCON during March of 2006 when he stated that the United States intends to turn over wartime command of South Korean forces to Seoul – but did not provide a timetable. He commented that the timing would depend on how quickly South Korea can build the capability to assume the responsibility, and further commented that a greater South Korean role would allow further troop reductions on the Peninsula.\textsuperscript{25} When asked whether he thought the change in command structure could start this year (2006), Rumsfeld replied: “No, no, I don't at all.” Rumsfeld further commented, “The South Korean government has raised the question as to when might it be appropriate to transfer responsibility to the Korean command, and that is something that gets discussed.”\textsuperscript{26}

Roh has stated on several occasions that this is a matter of “sovereignty,” as his goal is for the South Korean military to become a “self-reliant” force with “independent
capability.” But does this “call for sovereignty” really make sense? It is important to note that NATO too confers operational control to the NATO Commander (a US General), but NATO countries such as the United Kingdom, Germany, and Italy have never called for a retrieval of their national sovereignty. A transfer of wartime OPCON means that the whole process that has existed since the genesis of the Alliance will cease to exist. To be sure, most conservative lawmakers in the National Assembly, and many in the South Korean public are opposed to Roh’s initiative. As Representative Song Young-sun of the conservative Grand National Party has said during a National Assembly session during 2006, “It is unreasonable to begin full-scale discussions on the issue at a time when South Korea is still dependent on the United States for intelligence and military equipment to deal with North Korea.”

It seems a *fait accompli* that wartime OPCON will change. As this occurs, it will likely also eventually mean a change to the command structure of CFC – and probably the end of CFC. There are options that rate discussion. One of them is to make CFC a Combined Planning Headquarters. At this headquarters, a combined planning staff could write plans and missions for incorporating USFK into the next war. While this seems to be practical, in the view of the author, it is unlikely to happen. Reportedly (as discussed above), the South Korean Joint Chiefs of Staff have been tasked by the Blue House to draw up a roadmap for a new joint forces command to replace the current ROK-US CFC – to be completed by June of 2006. According to defense experts the most likely option under this new roadmap would be a transformation of the CFC structure into one based on the Japan-US model. In Japan, US and Japanese troops maintain OPCON of their own troops in peacetime, but set up an ad hoc body to deal with joint and combined
military operations in case of an emergency.\textsuperscript{29} Government sources in Seoul have said that part of this plan will be to give its military an independent operational center to run an autonomous command that coordinates its troops in a joint or combined operation.\textsuperscript{30}

While an arrangement similar to the Japanese model is the one many experts think is the most likely to be initiated, there is yet another option. This would be to put a South Korean four-star in charge of CFC with a United States three-star deputy. Under this option, the US could keep a four-star in country and that flag-rank officer would remain in command of United Nations Command (one of the hats the Commander of CFC currently wears as of 2006). Of course, this proposal would be as politically volatile in the US as it would be in South Korea, as it would appear to put US forces under ROK OPCON. Such an option would only work of course if the ROK four-star had the same combined staff, resources, and political clout that currently exists within the CFC.

There are many problems with a “parallel” arrangement in South Korea on the model of what currently exists in Japan. This would mean many problems relating to command and control of what should be dominate forces in wartime – and could lead to much higher casualties than would be expected if ROK and US forces came under one commander during a contingency. This view is supported by a report from the South Korean National Assembly’s National Intelligence Committee (NAIC). According to the NAIC report, which was made public on January 25\textsuperscript{th} of 2006, “The issue of transferring wartime operational control to Korea should not be approached from the hardware view of fostering Korea’s own military deterrence against North Korea,” further pointing out the C4I issues that the author addressed earlier, “…the Korean army should first improve its capability to collect information, and other deterrence strategies.”\textsuperscript{31} It should be noted
that according to the latest Ministry of National Defense White Paper released during 2005, it states that the US will bring as many as 690,000 forces into the Peninsula to help South Korea fight the North in a full-scale war. In such a scenario, there would be huge numbers of military forces operating in an extremely confined battle space. Does Seoul truly want separate chains of command for so many forces? Finally, having an ad hoc group that will determine combined operations on the fly will be much different in Korea than in Japan. Japan does not have an enemy just to the North that could attack on a moments notice. Thus, having an ad hoc body determine operations could result in much higher casualties (military and civilian) than if these operations were determined under one combined command – especially in the early stages of any large-scale war.

**Conclusions**

As discussed earlier, President Roh has been pushing very hard for an agreement on radically changed command relationships to be completed before he leaves office. It is unclear as of the writing of this paper, what model will end up being agreed to or even how much real input the ROK JCS has in determining exact details in this roadmap. But it does appear fairly obvious that the concerns relating to C4I and airpower, as well as other important capabilities discussed earlier, are not shared by the administration of President Roh. As the command relationships change many issues and scenarios are possible regarding the structure of US and ROK forces on the Peninsula. As I wrap up this paper I would like to discuss them briefly.

If CFC changes and the two militaries go into two parallel structures, will there be a combined planning staff? This will be a big question that will have to be answered, as CFC in its current structure is designed to support South Korea – not the US. Any
independent structure that evolves for the ROK military will be required to contain all of the same capabilities currently being provided by the US. In addition, fluid, transparent access to US C4I and national level assets will go away because the two military structures would now no longer be seamless and integrated. This is of particular concern at the very highest levels (particularly if the change is implemented immediately).

If the ROK military gets wartime OPCON, this is likely to mean an immediate or very near-term end to CFC. Why? Because it is very unlikely that the US Congress will allow American troops to come under the permanent wartime command of a military force that is clearly lacking in the basic capabilities, infrastructure, and command and control to lead a large, combined military force. This will likely also mean a radical change to the structure of USFK – which will of course have to undergo a massive and expensive reorganization. It will also in many ways mean the end of large-scale combined operations and training in what has been called the strongest and most successful alliance in the world. As a movement to two parallel structures and systems occurs, it is likely that it will evolve into a structure similar to the one between Japan and the US. If this happens, it is possible that as in Japan, the Commander of USFK will be downgraded from a four star to a three star general. What this would mean is also that a movement of much of the U.S. military decision making in the alliance would move from Seoul to Pacific Command (PACOM) in Hawaii. In addition, PACOM would be likely to control (much more so than in the current CFC structure) all assets, tasking, and perhaps even more importantly, C4I. Certain vital US information dominance capabilities would be likely to disappear from the Peninsula. The result in the short term (until the South Korean military can match the US capability – if they are able to do so and if the
financial picture allows it) is that South Korea would become more vulnerable to attack from the North.

The policy of self-reliant national defense may be a legitimate goal to push for. But in order to truly begin the process that has been called for in ROK policy documents and in statements made by Roh and others, several drastic and financially important things need to first occur. A self-reliant military must first have its own trained and equipped war fighting command. That command must also have its own war plans. And of key concern, it is impossible to have a competent, capable war fighting command without a modern C4I system.

According to sources in the MND, Unification Minister Lee Jong-seok and others on his staff and in the NSC have told both high level officials in MND and military officers there who share many of the concerns regarding Defense transformation in the ROK and the important issue of Wartime OPCON, that they “worry too much.”根据几位接受作者采访的韩国军事官员的说法，韩国军方认为青瓦台没有意图在韩国军方需要现代化以弥补一旦合并军指挥结构改动后将会出现的准备和能力差距时进行必要的投资。的确，这些人告诉我，任何试图为谨慎辩护的韩国军方军官都会被贴上“美国的走狗”标签。他们还表示，青瓦台官员和国家安全委员会的成员在内部与军方官员讨论时，实际上是公开“反美”的。
In the out years of 2010 to 2015, the available conscription pool for the ROK military will reduce. Thus, the ROK military, in order to truly achieve self-reliant defense, must modernize forces that have Peninsular Operational Flexibility, not unlike the Strategic Flexibility that the American military is striving for. To achieve this flexibility, the ROK military would need to establish a war fighting command, modernize their C4I systems, establish Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities at modern levels, and begin writing their own war plans – and exercising those war plans. These are serious (and costly) undertakings, but the ROK government has the funds to take on these extremely complicated and expensive tasks in their large holdings of foreign reserves. South Korea has the fourth largest holding of foreign currency reserves ($202 billion) in the world. These reserves were originally acquired in order to prevent a re-occurrence of the ROK financial crisis of 1997 – which entailed strict rules imposed on South Korea by the IMF.\textsuperscript{36} Even if implementation of all of the recommendations of the author started immediately, the process would be likely to take 10 to 15 years.

Hopefully this paper has shown that the current government in the Blue House is pushing extremely hard and made it very clear through a variety of public statements that it intends to radically alter the structure of several elements that currently exist within the ROK-US Alliance. The most important of these elements is CFC - which will have to change, perhaps even disappear as Wartime OPCON changes. This paper has also shown that the current ROK government has not yet properly addressed key challenges that must be overcome if its military is to truly achieve “self-reliant defense.” Two of the most important challenges I discussed were finance and important, expensive military capabilities that to date have been held by military forces from the United States. Key
among these capabilities and closely tied into the financial challenge are C4I and airpower.

As stated above, the ROK government has made it clear that is wants radical change in the current military structure on the Peninsula. The thesis of this paper is that this will happen – and soon, unless extreme political change occurs in the Blue House (highly unlikely). Thus, it will be important for both the US government and the ROK government to plan for this change. That is not to say that this radical change is good for the national security of the Republic of Korea, nor (as I have made quite clear) does it mean that the ROK military in its current form will even be ready for such a change for at least seven to 10 years. All of this seems to be of little concern to the Roh administration, which seems to have a greatly diminished view of the North Korean threat, and because of the worst civil-military relationship in ROK history, a poor understanding of the practical military concerns of pragmatic national defense.

Notes


7 See:


10 For detailed information regarding the “information dominance” capability that United States forces have brought to the Korean Peninsula, See: John DiGenio, “Command, Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence Challenges in the Korean Theater,” *Army Communicator*, Fall 2001, URL: http://www.gordon.army.mil/AC/Fall/Fall%2001/koreac4i.htm

11 See:

12 See:


14 For more information regarding the capabilities of the “LPX” class ship, See:


19 For details regarding Wartime and Peacetime OPCON and DEFCON conditions, See:


The source for this quote is a highly placed official within the Republic of Korea Ministry of National Defense who asked to remain anonymous. Interview conducted by the author, April 14th, 2006.

The author interviewed several South Korean military officers during March and April of 2006. The officers all were either stationed in Seoul or had been recently. All of the officers had close contact with MND headquarters and the National Security Council and/or the Blue House. All of the active duty officers interviewed would only speak on the condition that their identities remain anonymous.
36 For more information regarding the reasons Korea has acquired such large foreign reserves, see: “Foreign Exchange Reserves in East Asia: Why the High Demand?” FRBSF Economic Letter, 25 April 2003, URL: http://www.frbsf.org/publications/economics/letter/2003/el2003-11.html