CURRENT POLICY OPTIONS FOR DARFUR

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ROBERT B. ZOELLICK
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Panelists:

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MR. PASCUAL: Good morning, everybody. My name is Carlos Pascual. I am the Vice President of the Brookings Institution responsible for the Foreign Studies Programs, and I would really like to welcome you today to the Brookings Institution for this event on Darfur.

The event is being co-sponsored by Brookings and the Brookings-Bern Project on Internally Displaced Persons. This has been a very creative and innovative project which we have housed here at Brookings, and it is co-directed by Roberta Cohen who is one of our Senior Fellows here, together with Walter Kalin who is the Representative of the U.N. Secretary General on the Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons.

One of the things which this Project has done is to produce guiding principles on internal displacement which were presented to the U.N. in 1998, and they are the first international standards for the treatment of internally displaced persons. Brookings was responsible for organizing the process for developing them. Then a team of international lawyers actually did the drafting, and since then they have been recognized by the World's Summit Outcome Document, by a number of U.N. Resolutions, and a growing number of governments which are in fact putting in place laws and policies to actually act on these guidelines for IDPs.

Those guidelines are being put severely to the test in Sudan, in an environment in Darfur where 2.5 million people at least have been displaced, there have been hundreds of thousands of refugees, and the numbers of deaths have been
numbered in the range of 200,000 to 300,000. Indeed, it is not just a question of Darfur, but it is an issue which spills over to the entire Sudan. It influences the capacity of Sudan to effectively move forward with a comprehensive peace agreement, and as we have seen in the news even this morning, can have impact on the situation in Chad. So it is not just a localized issue, but one that infects an entire nation, and possibly several nations, and an entire region.

We are very lucky to have with us today to be able to address this issue the Deputy Secretary of State Bob Zoellick. In the event today we will have two parts. We will first have the opportunity to hear from the Deputy Secretary in his comments, and then following that, we will have a panel with three distinguished experts, Francis Deng, Ken Bacon, and Bill O'Neill, and I will introduce them a little bit later, who will follow-up with additional commentary and give us an opportunity for further exchange.

Deputy Secretary Zoellick took his position as Deputy Secretary in February 2005, but all of us have known him for a much longer period of time. I think everybody is well aware of his tremendous efforts and work as the U.S. Trade Representative, and in particular, the tremendous contributions that he made to the Doha Round in which the United States was a leading voice for the liberalization of international trade regimes.

He has served in a number of different administrations, and previously during George H. W. Bush's Administration, he served as the Under Secretary of State for Economic and Agricultural Affairs, and a Counselor to the Department.
He has served in senior positions in the Department of the Treasury, he has served in the private sector, he has been an academic, and he has been part of the think tank world. He is truly an intellectual and a practitioner of public policy.

I can say from personal experience from having worked under him in the State Department that he is also tremendously dedicated to addressing the issues related to Sudan. Very soon after he came into office he immediately started holding meetings with senior people in the State Department, USAID, and other departments, to really understand the dynamic of change in Sudan, the complexities of issues in the South, and the complexity of the issues in Darfur. He has traveled to Sudan a number of times to engage the leaders of the region and try to urge them on to a viable and comprehensive peace for the entire nation, to build peace in the West in Darfur, to sustain the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in the South. He is someone who approaches these issues with tremendous integrity and personal commitment, and a great deal of intellectual integrity, willing to ask the tough questions to understand what needs to be done and how to make an impact.

With that note, Bob, I just want to say thank you for joining us today, and we look forward to hearing your remarks.

MR. ZOELLICK: Let me say how much I appreciate the opportunity to be here, to thank Strobe Talbott, prior Deputy Secretary of State, for the invitation. I know he has done a fine job with Brookings as an institution. Indeed, I was reminded of that as I came in because I have also been spending a fair amount of time recently on President Hu's visit, and as I saw Jeff Bader here
who was a great colleague dealing with China when I was at USTR and I think one of the foremost people in the United States on China, I was worried I had come to the wrong session and I was supposed to be talking about China.

I particularly wanted to comment on the role that Carlos has played, frankly, on this and many other issues. He taught and helped me a great deal when I started at the State Department, and I expected that the group that he assembled here would be able to help us further. I have had an opportunity to work with the panelists who are going to be following me, and I could not think of a better group to help shed some light on what is a very challenging subject.

I also appreciate all of your strong interest. I have dealt with a lot of foreign policy issues over the course of some 20, maybe 25 years now, and I am not sure I have one that has generated as much interest across a wide spectrum of Americans as this one has. So I very much appreciate that, and I think it is particularly timely because I think it is a very important moment for Sudan and the region as a whole.

Let me start briefly by sharing a little perspective on Sudan, because I think it may give you a context, at least from my thinking. The problems that we are struggling with have very deep historical roots. In trying to summarize those, I believe that our core challenge is trying to reconcile and reorganize Khartoum's relations with the peripheries of Sudan.

Khartoum, as many of you know, was settled by soldiers, administrators, traders, its lifeblood was the Nile, and its orientation has been
traditionally towards the centers of development and learning in the Arab world, Cairo, Damascus, Saudi Arabia. Its relations with the rest of Sudan have been one of ruler, manipulator, exploiter, and, indeed, this is a tradition that runs across not just the current Sudanese independent government, but it goes back to colonial periods and even pre-colonial periods. If you look at the history of indirect rule, this, too, followed this pattern of a center with the periphery and how it would manipulate the regions for the overall good of the center.

Southern Sudan and the long-standing conflict between Khartoum and South Sudan, represents the sharpest example of this long-standing struggle. It has tribal dimensions, it has religious dimensions, it has dimensions between Arabs and Africans, and, of course, it has a very, very sad history of long-standing and terrible violence. But there is an analogous problem that you see in Darfur, which has gotten much attention in the United States, but it extends beyond Darfur. These are also issues that relate to Khartoum's relations with the East, with Beja, and also parts of the North.

The fundamental question that we are struggling with is how do we try to reconcile the metropolitan center with the peripheries in a new fashion? As Carlos alluded to, there is a recognition, especially in Africa that how Sudan comes to terms with these questions is going to affect many others beyond Sudan. Keep in mind that Sudan is the largest country in Africa. It has nine neighbors. It has overlaps that are tribal, religions, Arab and African. From this perspective you can see that the Comprehensive Peace Accord that was achieved in January
2005 represents a potentially critical historic change. In referencing that, I have to pay my respects to the work of Senator Jack Danforth, also the late John Garang, also those in the Sudanese government, that took some very courageous steps in changing this long, historic pattern.

Obviously, that accord ended a 21-year civil war which produced millions, not hundreds of thousand, but millions of deaths. Equally important, perhaps even more important, is that the CPA offers a constitutional framework for all of Sudan. It starts out with elements of wealth sharing and power sharing and security, but the key is that those are transitional elements looking towards a pattern of development, integration, elections, and an opportunity for democracy and unity. I said potentially historical because there are two critical challenges. First, the CPA, as many of you know, is a very complex agreement, and it needs great care in its implementation. Second, we have this problem that you cannot separate the North-South divide from other splits within Sudan, and most striking over the past years, has been that with Darfur.

A word on the CPA and its implementation. My sense is that the record is mixed. It is not a small achievement that it has survived the death of one of its key founders, Dr. John Garang, who as many of you know, played a critical role not only in the course of the civil war, but in negotiating the peace. On one of the trips that I took to Sudan last year, I was at the inauguration of the new Government of National Unity in Khartoum, and when you could see Dr. John Garang there, you could see in a sense his vision, because his vision was not for
the people of the South, but it was for trying to accomplish a democratic, unified Sudan. So the tragedy of his death is not only one for the many of you I know who have worked with him and strived with him, but it was a real challenge because the nature of his leadership created a crisis in the South. Salva Kiir, one of his top military commanders, stepped into his position, and I do not envy his job because it is an extremely challenging assignment to try to recreate the cohesion not only of the movement, the SPLM in the South, but also then to help start to create the government of Southern Sudan, and then as part of a Government of National Unity, to promote this vision of Sudan.

I had the chance to visit both Rumbek and Juba in the South on different trips. This is not a challenge of reconstruction, although you see the signs of war, it is a question of building. This is the most basic situation. The challenge is trying to take a political movement, a military movement, transform it into a government, bring together other players in the South who were in conflict, and this is an area where Salva Kiir has made some important progress, as part of that system. It is a question of reconstruction, it is a question of the basic infrastructure, and it is a question of development. And while much of our focus has been on meeting basic needs, we also have assistance programs that are vital to trying to create the self-sustaining nature of this regime, for example, a road system, and demining in the South, education, and health. As in the case of many developing countries, Southern Sudan and Sudan as a whole has the mixed blessing
of oil. It is a possible source of resources and revenue, but it also a danger because it runs the risk of the cancer of corruption.

While all this is going on, and this is another point that Carlos alluded to, it is important to keep in mind the huge challenge of absorbing the internally displaced people, plus a group of refugees, from the longstanding North-South conflict. Of the numbers that I have looked at recently, of the approximately 6.1 million internally displaced people in Sudan, approximately 4 million are from the South. So while there is an appropriate and due attention about events in Darfur, you can see that creating an environment out of a very, very rough, bare-bones economic situation where you can reabsorb 4 million people is no small task, and there are about another 358,000 people from the South in scattered neighboring countries.

That would be challenge enough, but of course, one of the aspects of the interconnections of various conflicts is that of something called the Lord's Resistance Army, which I am sure many of you are also familiar with. This terrible group of killers is led by a man named Kony that impresses young people, and while their numbers are not big, the destruction they can wreak is terrible, particularly at a time for Southern Sudan, when much of its development prospects are most likely going to be in its relations with Uganda in the South. So this, too, is part of the challenge of the region.

In terms of the other aspects of the CPA implementation, it has been slow, there has been slippage, and there is no doubt that there are obstacles, but I
do feel there is progress. So I think one of the messages on this and also in Darfur is that for all the tragedy and for all the difficulties, it is very important that all of you sustain the effort because I do believe there is a possibility to improve this situation.

As I mentioned, if you study the Comprehensive Peace Accord, you will see it is a very extensive document. One of the things that Carlos and some of his colleagues in the African Bureau put together is a Milestone Chart, and it is about this thick of different things that have to be done. When you are in a situation like that, I think it is vital to focus on those that are most important. The one that we have considered to be the capstone is the Assessment and Evaluation Commission because this is the body, chaired in part by our urging by a Norwegian named Tom Vraalsen, and comprised of outsiders working with the Sudanese parties to monitor and to press forward this large effort. It is a commission for which the United States has helped provide some funding and logistics support, and I am very delighted that one of the colleagues of our group, Kate Almquist, who many of you know, who spent a lot of time helping with the negotiation of the CPA, has just become our Aid Director for Sudan, but also our representative on the Assessment and Evaluation Commission, because we thought it would be important for her to not only apply her experience to support Tom Vraalsen in the role of implementation, but, frankly, it does not hurt that she is also the person who is the lead in terms of our aid program which is heavily directed, obviously, towards the South and humanitarian needs in Darfur.
A key element is that of the Oil Commission, and here I had an opportunity a couple of weeks ago to be in Europe with an effort that my friend Javier Solana put together, and leaders of the A.U., President Konare, but also leaders from the Sudan and from Khartoum. I think we at least have on path a reconciliation of this very difficult issue of some of the oil revenues. The numbers that the U.N. has now come up with is a little bit over $700 million. This is vital, because it is not only critical resources to develop the South, but as I emphasized, the transparency in how this is done is going to be key to developing a successful government of Southern Sudan and its relationship with Khartoum.

Another key area is that of dealing with the security and military integration. Part of the CPA calls for the development of something called Joint Integrated Units, which are military units from both the North and the South and creating a new Defense Board. That process has started, and the U.N. now has a system for monitoring the withdrawal of the government of Sudan's forces from the South.

But there is no doubt that there are going to be some extraordinarily difficult challenges. One of them deals with the boundary area. One of the elements of the CPA was creating a Boundary Commission dealing with Abyei, and this came out with a result that has led to some additional tensions. It has not been implemented, and it is part of a larger question, when you look at the states that are on the North-South border about drawing the demarcation line because as in all of Sudan, you have different tribes, and you have different tribes that have
been on different sides of the conflict over the course of decades, so this is not an easy reconciliation process.

To make this work, and this is part of my message to all of you, from the United States and many other countries you are going to need substantial contributions. This has been a terribly difficult process. There was a funding conference that I attended in Oslo shortly after I took office that pledged about $4.5 billion over the next 3 years. I am proud to report to you that the United States, which is one of the largest pledgers, is ahead of our pledge. We have been contributing about $1.3 billion a year to Sudan, roughly divided between Darfur and the South. The most frustrating part of this is a huge amount of that money still has to go to meet basic needs, it's food, it's humanitarian, and it's medical supplies, where I hope over time we can devote more of that money to demining the roads, to education, to health systems, to helping create the prospects for development.

You might say that is challenge enough, but sadly, reality intrudes. Even for the leaders in the South, one cannot rest with that because they are part of a Government of National Unity, and we are going to need their help in dealing with the larger challenges that I mentioned, of Sudan's history and making the CPA work. Here, again, I have had an opportunity to work with Salva Kiir and many of his colleagues about trying to make sure that in what no doubt is going to be a very difficult transition process where the SPLM is a minority in the
government, that we have to keep trying to forge ahead, including where we need their help in Darfur.

I say this with some sympathy, because, again, if I imagine myself as a Southerner trying to build a country, trying to deal with the challenges of the CPA, trying to integrate with a new government in Khartoum, in some ways it may be a lot to ask to have them also help with Darfur. But the reality is, if they do not, I am afraid that the overall project of creating a new Sudan will not succeed, and that is why we need their help.

Let me turn to Darfur, and this is a topic obviously that one can go into lots of different levels of detail. I thought what might be most helpful for you today would be to focus on three parts: humanitarian, security, and the peace negotiations in Abuja, although, of course, all three of these are interrelated.

First, on the humanitarian side, conditions remain extraordinarily fragile. I had an opportunity to visit Darfur, I think four times last year, so I visited all three of the different states, and I have had a chance to visit many, many camps. Your heart cannot help but go out to people who amazingly manage to keep morale up under extraordinarily difficult conditions.

During the course of 2005 until the end of the year, there was some progress in terms of reducing the mortality rates which was a good sign, but the changing nature of the conflict in late 2005 started to increase the danger, and what has always worried me is that we have a very, very thin veneer here in terms of security and humanitarian support and it would not take much to break through
and take a situation that is already terrible and make it beyond belief. That is why we have the intensive focus that we do.

The situation I think started to evolve late in 2005 for a number of reasons. Part of this was conflicts among different rebel groups. You had rebel-on-rebel violence, and this is partly as people were positioning themselves for the peace negotiation, it was their positioning. You have the ongoing conflicts with the Janjaweed and some of the government forces, some of which is retaliation, some of which is pursuing their own agendas. Then you have the new element of instability related to the Chad border where you have rebels on both sides crossing and creating an even more dangerous situation. Within the context, you also have people who are just turning to banditry. Some of the most heroic people that I have had a chance to meet out there are the NGO workers from a variety of countries under extraordinary conditions who continue to try to provide food and medical supplies, and a lot of these people, and those from Sudan that are helping them, their lives are at risk because others raid their convoys to try to get food for either rebel groups or various tribal groups.

So far in 2006, the United States has supplied 86 percent of the food to the World Food Program for all of Sudan. The World Food Program's delivering target now in the months of February and March has been about 85 percent to the people in Darfur. Given the nature of the violence, the groups shift, you might have violence in one area and so that group will get additional support elsewhere, so it is a fluid situation. Nevertheless, those numbers are down from
about 90 to 100 percent in November and December, and it shows the changing nature of the violence.

Also we have to try to edge beyond basic needs. Some of the programs that we are dealing with try to deal with some fundamentals of education, some work in terms of trying to help people develop basic livelihoods. Again, stability is vital in trying to create a context not only where people can exist, but where they can have some chance of hope for the future.

The Sudanese government is not doing enough. The conditions do vary by each state. It varies by the walis, the local leaders and governors. I have had a chance to meet a number of them. Some are more cooperative than others. Frankly, all of us were disappointed recently when the government ended the contract of the NRC, the Norwegian NGO that was dealing with one of the most difficult camps, the Kalma camp. A few months earlier, they had been pushed out and I made a special effort to get them back in, but it is not a good sign that the local leadership is now not allowing the NRC in that camp.

Second, a word on the security situation. Here I think we all owe a substantial statement of thanks to the African Union military force that is called the AMIS Force, which has played a key role in Darfur in countering the widespread violence of 2004 that led to the genocide. Again, I have had a chance to meet a lot of these soldiers, not only their officers, but also the soldiers patrolling. They are an extremely courageous, dedicated, committed group of people. Of course, performance varies, but Rwandans, Nigerians, Senegalese,
others, these people are under very difficult conditions and they have done a good job.

However, they cannot do it by themselves, so during the course of 2005, in addition to the support that the United States and the E.U. has provided, whether it be financial support or logistical support, the United States built a lot of their camps and provided the basic supplies for their operations, we have tried to strengthen the operation. One of the, again, modest but I think important steps was we got NATO to play a role in terms of logistical support and some training support, and we got the government of Sudan to accept this role. It also played a transportation role in increasing the size of the African Union force. And at the end of the year after a long struggle, we got 105 Canadian armed personnel carriers which were critical because of those of you who have seen this issue, you know people talk about mandate and a mandate is one thing, but if you have lightly armed forces with other guys that are much better armed, you are not going to exercise even what are the words on paper. So getting the AMIS forces better armed and better protected was critical.

I will also tell you we had a financing challenge. This gives you insight about some of the challenges of how government works. The United States government is set up for dealing with U.N. peacekeeping operations. There is a special funding arrangement for that. There is no funding arrangement for these types of operations, and since your budgets are developed years in advance, when we had to put together basically $11 to $12 million a month for this operation, we
had no money. So, frankly, I and my colleagues have been raiding various accounts in the State Department and reallocating things to try to do this, and this is a point where, for those of you interested, I hope you can be of help to us. Even late last year when we were trying to get $50 million from the Congress who said that they wanted to help in Darfur, we could not get it.

Again, I have been raiding one account after another, and the good news is there is a supplemental bill in terms of appropriations for this year, and both the House and the Senate took our request of $123 million and even upped it by $50 million. That has not yet passed, I am continuing to have to raid accounts, but I hope that that will pass so that we can continue to fund this operation at least through the course of this year.

The problem we encounter is not one that is unique to the United States. Frankly, my colleagues in the European Union have the same issue, and this is one reason why if we now are moving to a phase where the African Union force played sort of a critical entry role, that we believe it is important to move to a U.N. peacekeeping operation. When the AMIS African Union force came in, there was hope that they might be able to get to 12,000 people. For understandable reasons, they are not going to get to that number. They are at about 7,000, and that includes perhaps a thousand more police, and so this is one of the reasons why working with the African Union and also assessing the increased violence on the ground, we decided at the end of last year that we had to
try to transition from an African Union mission to a combined African Union-U.N. force.

There are ways that we can help the African Union force even while it is there, and I will come back to these. There have been a number of assessment missions where there have been U.S., European, African and U.N. forces, so at this point on the security issue, we have to try to strengthen the African Union mission as it transitions to be the core of a U.N. force.

In January we had the first statement by the African Union saying that it wanted to make this move. In February, when the United States was the Chair of the U.N. Security Council, we had a Presidential statement that pushed forward the U.N. peace process. And on March 10th, the African Union Peace and Security Council issued a statement that extended the mandate of the AMIS mission until September 30th. But very importantly, it also requested a U.N. transition. This is where the diplomatic challenges come in, because in this language there is going to be a debate about what are the terms of the transition.

Some, the government in Khartoum, have argued that it has to be conditioned on the Abuja Peace Settlement. That is not the view of the U.S., it is not the view of the E.U., and it has not been of at least most in the African Union, and we need to continue that pressure for reasons that I will talk about.

However, one other issue that always looms in the background is the role of the government of Sudan in bringing in any force, because you either get
the approval of the government as the government did for the African Union force and the NATO support, or you invade, and that is a very big, serious challenge.

Following that African Union resolution, we brought this back to the U.N. Security Council which passed Resolution 1663 on March 24th. The prime purpose of that resolution was to support and to extend the North-South peacekeeping force as part of the CPA, but it also authorized the U.N. to request assistance from regional institutions, and that is important because that is the connection to possible NATO support, E.U. support, or even Arab League support. And it also requested the Secretary General, Kofi Annan, to report back to the U.N. Security Council late in April on the options, size and shape of the U.N. mission.

We have been trying to work with the U.N. Peacekeeping Office to try to improve and expedite that work. There are always sensitivities when you have an U.N. office in terms of support, but I think our cooperation has generally been good. But also, to try to get ahead of the curve, we have been trying to work with the U.N. Peacekeeping Office to recruit potential supporters and suppliers of troops, whether they be African or Asian would be preferences here. When President Bush visited South Asia, he asked both the Indians and the Pakistanis to possibly contribute troops. We have talked to the Egyptians. Yesterday I was meeting the Algerian Foreign Minister and asked him about this possibility. And we have talked to the Chinese who have actually supported the mission in the North-South area.
A critical issue on today's agenda, and this just gives you a little sense of the granularity of these challenges, is that for the U.N. Peacekeeping Mission to do its assessment, it has to get visas to come into the country. Frankly, it was our preference that the U.N. simply ask for those visas, insist on those visas. The U.N. Peacekeeping Office actually yesterday and today is trying to work with the African Union and the government of Sudan to see if it can smooth the way for those visas. And it is certainly our view that if they run into any resistance, they should forge ahead and let's point the finger at who is stopping the next step in terms of bringing this action. As a way of trying to support that, this week, I believe it was yesterday, we had another statement from the U.N. Security Council emphasizing the importance of this step.

There is a point here, though, that is critical, which is that through all this effort, we need to work very closely with the African Union on its diplomatic side and also its military side. They will be the core of any force going forward, and they have done an important job. Frankly, they just need additional support. As part of that, this resolution that I mentioned, 1663, created an opportunity for Kofi Annan, the U.N. Secretary General, to call the Secretary General of NATO to request their help in terms of developing operations and support for the AMIS mission. When I was in Europe a couple of weeks ago, I talked with de Hoop Scheffer, the Secretary General of NATO, President Bush had had extensive discussions with him in advance, to try to line up this contact. So, again, as we
are meeting, the NATO member states are considering the options in terms of their possible support for the African Union mission.

Here just to digress a minute again, what the assessment missions for the AMIS force have revealed, and we have been in very close contact with the various commanders, you have had a Nigerian commander and a Rwandan deputy who have done very good jobs, and now they have transitioned to another Nigerian commander and a Rwandan deputy, is that performance could be substantially increased if you gave some basic support and planning functions. And keep in mind, this is an area that is about the size of Texas and you have roughly 7,000 AMIS people. It is critical for them to be able to have intelligence to know where the potential points of conflict are so you can get there to head them off. It is critical to be able to have the transportation to move your forces. It is critical to be able to have the logistics so you have the fuel for your transportation, whether it be the ground capabilities or the air capabilities. So a host of things that might fit into the category of operational planning and logistical support could probably improve the overall execution of the mission of the current forces.

Will that be enough without more forces? Not in my view. But can it make an important difference as we are building more forces? I think that it can. So, again, for those of you who I know have a very strong, active interest in this, and some come from European countries, please press European allies. There are some mixed feelings about what our European partners are willing to do on this.
As I said, a key here is also continuing to respect the fact that the African Union has made a big step with this force. This is not the way that the African Union used to deal with things in the days of the old OAU. Part of the request of money we have for the U.S. Congress is a $13 million fund that would help us make sure that some of the African Union forces can meet the U.N. standards. We want those people a part of the force. They have experience, they have done a good job, and this is a way to make sure they can take part in the next stage. The new Nigerian commander is also someone who we have established a good working relationship with and as his time permits, we also hope to bring him to the United States and talk to our colleagues in the Pentagon, again, to see where some of the special needs are.

All of you know, and I am sure most of you, are aware that all of this takes place in an environment where you still have resistance from the government of Sudan, the Government of National Unity. Here I think there is a basic diplomatic approach which is that we have to make clear to them that they stand alone in resisting this, that the genocide, the ongoing violence, the terrible risks for their own people, have led to a group of Americans, Europeans, Africans, Arabs, Asians, all telling them that they must move on this topic, and here again, is where we need from the inside the help of the SPLM.

There is another part to this which is a point that I have made to a number of the Sudanese officials. This step of bringing in the U.N. is in the interests of the government of Sudan, because anytime anything happens wrong in
Darfur, whatever the cause, whether it is rebels or bandits or the Janjaweed or whoever has got responsibility, the blame goes on Khartoum. So if they are serious in dealing with the underlying problem, they have to create a better security situation in Darfur.

They have already accepted U.N. forces in the South, so one has to ask what is the problem with accepting them in Darfur. And while there is an appropriate interest in having an African core of this, it would be our recommendation, as I have said, that the AMIS mission would provide the core, and you would have an African commander. There is a worry that the government of Sudan has expressed that this sort of force might lead some of the rebel groups to pull away from the peace negotiations, and that would be a bad step. So we have assured them and we have made very clear to the rebel groups that improving security in Darfur for the poor people there suffering, or whoever is doing the fighting, is no excuse to move away from the peace negotiation table.

To the contrary, if we are successful in achieving this peace accord, you are going to need a bigger security force. You are going to need a bigger security force because you are going to have to disarm the Janjaweed, you are going to have to make sure that conditions are secure so people can go home. There are about 2 million in camps. This is just a holding action. They are going to eventually have to be able to return to their homes. To do that, they are not going to go there unless it is a secure situation. And if there is no peace settlement, the need is even going to be greater.
So the key is working in these broad coalitions, and at the same time, one of the other aspects that I know many of you paid close attention to, is how the U.N. can continue to stress the accountability and the avoidance of impunity for the people who have taken part in the killings and the murders. Here, again as we speak, we are following through on one of the U.N. resolutions from early 2005 in terms of implementing sanctions against individuals whether they be rebels, whether they be government officials, or whether they be Janjaweed and have had associations with the government, and there will be a first list of names unless it is blocked over the next 24 hours that you will see coming out, but I would see these as a down payment, because what we in the process, frankly, working closely with the British government are trying to do is make sure you get the information on these individuals without which you cannot implement these types of steps.

The third and final dimensions that I want to emphasize, and it is absolutely critical, are the peace agreements and negotiations in Abuja. The reason I want to stress this is because, obviously, there is key need to provide basic humanitarian needs, and there is a need to strengthen security, but without a peace accord, those are just band-aids on a problem. You ultimately are going to have to reach a peace agreement analogous to the one that was reached between North and South. Here, again, I am pleased to say that the African Union has been playing a very important role. The chief mediator of this is Salim Salim, a former Tanzanian Prime Minister. I have met with him a number of times, including a couple of weeks ago on this European trip. I think on this trip where Mr. Solana
and I, and Pekka Haavisto, a Finn who has been a Special Representative of the European Union, have been able to get Konare, Salva Kiir, and Vice President Taha, to rejuvenate and create some momentum for these negotiations.

In the aftermath of that trip, Vice President Taha, who was the key negotiator in the North-South Accord, has gotten much more actively engaged in the Darfur negotiations, which is what I have been urging him to try to do. On the way back he actually was able to meet with a number of the rebel leaders in Libya. They had a good set of discussions. Taha then came and joined his delegation in Abuja, which is where the peace negotiations have been taking place. He has been there for the past number of days. The encouraging sign is now we have the key players from the government of Khartoum, we actually now also have some stronger SPLM, the Southerners' representation, as part of that delegation, and we have all the rebel leaders there, because part of the problem is we did not have rebel leaders who were willing to negotiate.

Here part of the challenge is you have different factions. You have one faction, the SLM, led by Minni Minawi, who probably has the greatest contact with some of the soldiers on the ground. For him, the security arrangements are absolutely fundamental. Another SLM faction led by Abdul Wahid who is very important and he has very important ties with the Fur community, hence, Darfur, Land of the Fur, and he will be important in terms of any political negotiation and settlement. Then the third leader is a man named Khalil Ibrahim with the JEM, and he has a slightly different agenda. His agenda is one that is more oriented
towards a series of national Islamic causes. He and his people are very, very sharp. They are very active in the negotiations. Whether they have forces on the ground in the same degree I think is a question mark, and I believe we can bring them along if we can bring the other two along in the process.

Again, we have some good support from some of the other African Union leaders. In the course of the past week, President Sassou-Nguesso, the Chair now of the African Union, came from the Republic of Congo-Brazzaville. Also President Obasanjo of Nigeria came. This is how we are going to try to get this done. As the resolutions have said, they are going to try to get this done during the month of April. Of course, that is ambitious. I do believe this is possible to get done in the near future, and, indeed, I believe it is critical to get done, because if you are not able to reach a peace accord, these elements on the ground that continue to add danger I think will only expand.

There are four key areas of this negotiation: power sharing, wealth sharing, and the security arrangements, and something called the Darfur-Darfur dialogue. The power sharing, the wealth sharing, and the security are analogous to what they were in the Comprehensive Peace Accord. To make this fit in the constitutional framework, they need to have that connection. The Darfur-Darfur dialogue is also something important, but it does involve risk, and let me spend a moment on why it is significant.

There has been a point made by many parties throughout the process that the rebels may or may not represent all the people in Darfur. You have tribal
groups that, frankly, have not engaged. They have stayed on the outside. While one has to put forward a peace agreement of the parties at the table, one cannot forget the different constituencies and tribal groups in Darfur. There will be a need in terms of trying to reach some of the decisions to bring this country back together, and also to implement this, to draw in the tribal leaders in a reconciliation process in Darfur. One has to be very careful about this because at times the government in Khartoum has proposed such a process in a way that leads people to think that it would supersede the peace process. It has been our view, and I think one shared by the African Union, that such a peace accord needs to open the way to such a Darfur-Darfur dialogue, but to be safe, it probably better to be chaired by someone who is a major African Union figure to try to bring cohesion to the overall process.

In terms of the status of that negotiation, after the meetings we had in Europe, President Salim put forward an Enhanced Humanitarian Cease-Fire, one dimension of the security arrangement. The good news was it really triggered a much deeper discussion about the full range of security issues. Frankly, my sense is that the wealth-sharing portion could come together. In the power sharing there are some knotty issues, but, again, I think that could come together. And the critical aspect is going to be the security arrangements, because if you can think about it, it is not only how do you deal with peace today, but how do you deal with demobilization, and while you are dealing with the demobilization, where are the
troops, when are they disarmed, how do you offer protection, how do you integrate these units into an overall Sudanese force, or find other livelihoods for them?

One last aspect of this, and that is, whatever one accomplishes in a peace agreement, one has to recognize it is only one more step in that road, because it will need to be supplemented by the Darfur-Darfur dialogue, any security arrangements are going to have be implemented, and that will not be easy. That is one reason why you want to have a bigger U.N. force there. And I also want to draw attention to the critical development needs, because just as we are committed to trying to help the South in terms of the peace accord and development, so we will have to do something in Darfur. Given all the blood, all the pain, all the tragedy, if we are able to reach this accord, we and others in the world are going to have to give these people a chance to get back on their feet, because the conditions, and I know many of you have had a chance to be in the region, are very, very difficult. Existence just hangs by a thread for many families, and under these conditions, that thread has been broken and to reestablish it, one is going to need the help of the outside community.

One last point. After Darfur, we cannot stop. There is also going to be a need with the Beja in the East. There has been some reconciliation in the North, but to come back to that vision where I started, the goal here is to try to create a comprehensive peace, a new political framework that leads to democracy and some chance for development for all the people of Sudan.
I appreciate your interest. I apologize if I went on a little bit long, I wanted to give you, because I know many of you are deeply involved, both the sense of the context, but also there is a lot going on as you can see day by day. If I had given this last week, I would not have been able to give some of the updates of some of the things that have happened. And I appreciate your efforts, Carlos, and those of your panel for sharing additional ideas with us.

[Applause.]

MR. PASCUAL: As they are miking you up, let me say thank you for what really was a tremendous presentation that really did help everybody here understand the complexity of the issues that are being dealt with, the complexities internally within the country, the complexities internationally, the complexities with international law, with peacekeeping capabilities, the interconnections with the long-term development issues, and I think you really did give us an excellent expose on how those pieces are interlinked and the difficulty of keeping them moving together.

MR. ZOELLICK: It's like one of Carlos's when he took over this new job, you get these endless charts of things you have to do and it kind of staggers you.

MR. PASCUAL: One of the things that we would like to do now is to give you an opportunity to ask additional questions of the Deputy Secretary. What I will do is take three questions at a time so that he can perhaps group answers to
all three of those and that way give us more of an opportunity to get through a few more issues. Questions, please.

MR. FREEMAN: Deputy Secretary, my name is Lawrence Freeman from Executive Intelligence Review magazine. The question I had is that you mentioned at one point in your report that if the government of Sudan did not agree, then the alternative is invasion. That is the first time I have heard that mentioned publicly. I was wondering if you could say something about maybe what the criteria would be for an invasion. Would that be the U.N.? Would that be the U.S.? Are there plans for this? If you could inform us some more, I would appreciate it.

MR. PASCUAL: Another question?

MR. ARNOLD: Tom Arnold. I am head of Concern which is an organization working in Darfur and South Sudan. Again, a wonderful presentation illustrating the complexities.

There is one further complexity which is arising at the moment, and it is the possibility of outbreak of violence with Chad. I am told even this morning there is heavy shelling going on around Al Geneina, and what is your perspective on that, and how much further of a complication is that?

MR. PASCUAL: One additional question here.

QUESTION: Jemera Rone from Human Rights Watch. I, too, would like an update on the situation in Chad, and I would be interested to know if the U.S. government is going to call on the parties, particularly on the rebels if they
take power, to refrain from retaliating against particular ethnic groups, particularly the Zaghawa who are the ethnic group of President Deby, and if the U.S. will also call on President Deby in the event he is successful to treat prisoners according to international standards and to allow full inspection of his jails by international organizations such as the International Committee for the Red Cross, Human Rights Watch and others.

MR. ZOELLICK: On the first one, what I was trying to outline was the challenge of intervention in this context. My point was trying to emphasize that all this works a lot better if you can bring the government of Sudan along, and that while that might seem extremely difficult and extremely frustrating, I believe it is possible if we work cooperatively together with many other international players. I was citing the fact that you did have acceptance by the government of Sudan to bring in the African Union mission, you have the government of Sudan accepting a U.N. force in the South, you have the government of Sudan accepting NATO support for the African Union mission, and I believe it is vital to try to continue to press them so as to allow us to strengthen the African Union mission including with NATO operations if necessary, but also to bring in the U.N. force. As I said to you and as I have explained to senior leaders in the Sudanese government, this is in their interests.

The reason I am emphasizing this is that some people get impatient and they say why don't you just go in and bring in this force or that force. What I was trying to highlight was to say that if you can create a context where you can
bring the parties along, then you have a totally different situation in terms of the type of military intervention. The key to that, however, and this is the ongoing diplomatic challenge, is that there are those in Khartoum who want to resist this, and so they will actually take advantage against prospects of intervention to try to undermine support not only within Sudan but others in Africa or in the Arab League.

What I am calling for is what we have had, frankly, as good support with the European Union as I have ever dealt with on an issue, and I have dealt with a lot of issues. We are really lined up very well and non-E.U. members like Norway have been critical partners in this. We are in regular contact with the U.N., which, of course, has different aspects. The U.N. Secretary General's Office has been very interested in this and has been trying to work with the Peacekeeping Office and the Humanitarian Affairs Office. But then also I think critical players will be the African Union and the Arab League. Indeed, we have tried to be in touch with a number of those players in advance of the Arab League summit and the African Union summit. I met, as I said, the Algerian Foreign Minister yesterday, and Algeria is very helpful in terms of trying to support the African Union Transition Force.

So my point of emphasis is—I believe we can do this and there is a way where it is in the interests of the government of Sudan, including the Government of National Unity, to bring these forces in, and that's a lot better than an invasion. That is my point.
On the issue of Chad, I think as both of your questions mentioned, there are number of dimensions to this. I would highlight maybe four.

First, we have to try to make sure that the people who are in the refugee camps are safe and meet their basic needs. So on a couple of my trips, including to Paris, I met with the French military as well people in the LSA and the Quai d'Orsay to try to see if we could be stitched up, because, as you know, there are approximately 1,200 French forces and their primary mission is the protection of those camps. So we are in touch with them and UNHCR about meeting the basic needs of the camps, and this is a part of the world where the information network gets a little rudimentary, but the information I have is that that situation is stable and is okay. That's one element.

The second part is to try to stop the conflict, and here, again as we are meeting and I am talking to you, the U.N. Security Council has had an urgent briefing that we, Congo and others requested, and is going to be trying to issue a statement to try to follow-up on some earlier actions to try to make sure that if there is outside intervention of the parties, that that is stopped. And to call on the rebel groups to stop the violence and to stop the government's actions against the violence. We are simultaneously working with the African Union on that. Tomorrow, coincidentally, I am going to meet President Konare, and I talked with him about a week or two ago. He had gone to Chad and tried to discuss some of these same issues. So I think at that level it has to also be how do you calm the situation.
And if I could, I guess this is your third point, I hope we are not in a situation where you have a coup and an overthrow of a government, but if you do, certainly whoever triumphs in that, you want to have humane treatment, but I do not want to accept that as a result. And I do not necessarily think, you get very mixed reports, that that has to be a result.

That comes to the fourth point which is equally critical. There is a dimension of this that has been related to Sudan as we have talked about, but we have to recognize there is a dimension that is very much related to the internals of Chad. The Deby regime has its own fragility. As I think some of the reports that you have seen have referred to, there were elections that were scheduled in early May, and at least some of the beliefs of some of the rebel operations have been driven in part by the fact that they do not consider it to be a fair and free election. Despite our efforts and that of the French and that of the African Union, there has not been a satisfactory coming together of the Deby regime and some of the opposition for either a fair election or some inclusive political process.

I think the reality of Chad is, and this is its own turbulent history and you know the connection of this with some of the problems the World Bank has had with the oil issues, is that that regime is also going to have to have a series of reforms.

So I am not underestimating the potential danger of overflow of conflict. As many of you know, you have some tribal interconnections here that complicate it. You mentioned one, Zaghawa, but there are others. But we also
have to keep in mind that on Chad's own terms there is going to have to be a different political process here if one is going to avoid these sorts of dangers and risks, and we certainly do not want to do anything that creates further fuel for a fire of rebel action or desertion leading to rebel action.

MR. PASCUAL: Two more questions.

QUESTION: [Off mike] with Al-Arabia. Why are the U.S. government and the international community consulting the Sudanese government on its accepting the mission to be transferred to the U.N. or not? The estimate of the deaths is between 50 to 100 people a day. That is going to be like 3,000 people are dying every month. Don't you think this situation is requiring a sense of urgency to stop the killing right now? And the other element of this, you are talking about sanctions for those who are responsible for this. Don't you think sanctions is not enough for people who have no account, have no money in the U.S., have no money; everybody does not travel. Don't you think a sort of international tribunal for this would be better than sanctions? Thank you.

MR. ZOELLICK: On your first question, I do have a feeling of urgency, and if it were up to me, I would have just gone and applied for the visas to bring the people in. But as you may have noticed, we don't always run the U.N. This week or last week I was in touch with some of the very senior people saying that I would urge you to press ahead and not allow obstacles so that you can bring in that assessment mission, and at least I believe I received some agreement, but
you always have to see how these things work out, that if there is an obstacle, that they will forge ahead in any event.

But having said that, I want to be fair. These are very difficult questions, and right now as we speak, Mr. Anabe [ph] of the U.N. Peacekeeping Mission was going to Addis Ababa to make sure that he had strong African Union support for this, and then will go to Khartoum.

Coming back to the earlier question, I know, and believe you me, I share the frustrations about trying to move with greater urgency and dispatch on this, to bring more players along will help us ultimately in the process. I see Mr. Bader here who is a specialist on China. In my dealings with the Chinese, I talk a lot about Sudan and Darfur, and I think we can bring along Chinese support in the U.N. Security Council where they are a member if we have African Union support. So that is how these pieces interconnect. Yes, I share the sense of urgency, and I am glad you gave me a chance to reiterate it.

The second point, please see the sanctions point within a broader context. I did not mention that there is a second process under the International Criminal Court which is also related to accountability, but as you probably know, that is an autonomous process. The United States accepted that process and, indeed, under our domestic law, if they ask for information and help, we try to provide that help.

But I think one needs to see those steps within the context of the larger steps. You do want the threat of action against people who have done
horrible things, and I hope that will press others to cooperate with the process. At the same time, I want to try to reach a peace accord and create some chance for these people to go back and secure conditions. So it is a combination of how these events fit together, and that was reflected in the U.N. Resolutions. Remember, there were three U.N. Resolutions that started this process. One was peacekeeping for North and South, one was the International Criminal Court, the other was the sanctions system. What we have now started to do is build on the extension of the peacekeeping resolution for the South in an effort to try to create that peacekeeping resolution for Darfur.

MR. PASCUAL: Two more questions here.

MS. NWAZOTA: My name is Kristina Nwazota from the NewsHour with Jim Lehrer. In November, Vice President Cheney appeared on our program and was asked whether the U.S. was doing enough in Darfur and both times he said yes. In January, President Bush came out with calls for more troops or more NATO forces in Darfur, saying enough was not being done. Was there a shift in policy between November and January? If so, what was it?

Also you mentioned that there may not be enough money to finish out the funding in Darfur for the rest of this year, but you also said that there are long-term plans for development. What plans do you have to secure funding for those long-term development plans?

MR. ZOELLICK: On the first question, I tried to give you a sense of context as the circumstances change. What we have tried to do in terms of
supporting the African Union mission, how in 2005 we brought in some NATO support with the acceptance of the government of Sudan, but also why we drew the conclusions that we needed to further strengthen AMIS’ work and with the African Union, but also move--

[End Side A Tape 1, begin Side B.]

[In progress] --and I guess I leave it to others to judge, you know, whether that's enough. I mean, for those of you that I think follow this closely, whether it's on the humanitarian side, the security side, I could give you more than you want to hear about the peace negotiations process.

I think we're sort of a pretty active player. Another way of asking the question is do we continue to be dissatisfied? Yes, we are, I mean, and that's why we're trying to expedite all different elements of this process.

So what you hear in President Bush's statements--and I've spent a lot of time with him on this issue--is he feels extremely strongly about it, and he wants to try to, through U.S. contributions, try to move this, in the diplomatic words of Carlos, "complex process" as we're going forward.

So that's the best way I can answer the first one.

On the second one, in terms of money, just to be clear, since I know we have a lot of supporters of this cause here, if you can help me make sure we get the money from the Congress, more power to us. I think we're now in a situation where, in the supplemental appropriations bill, there is funding for the support we
provide to the African Union Mission, that should take us at least through the end of the year, and, indeed, Congress added a little bit to that.

But recognize that that's in the range of 123- to 173 million dollars, because that's just for the African Union force. But consider the other numbers I gave you. And we're spending about $1.3 billion a year for Sudan. So that's food supplies, that's helping the South in reconstruction, that's help for a whole series of things.

And so what I was referring to is we're going to need to have an ongoing effort like that to help the South and to help Darfur, and my other reference was the fact that as part of the North-South agreement, there was an overall assessment mission that took place that said: With this agreement, what sort of international support would you need for development? And what I was suggesting is that if we can reach an Abuja accord, and I hope we can, I would like my government to be able to work with other governments, to have a similar assessment mission and see what development aids one needs.

Now keep in mind, the United States has been a pretty generous player in that. I hope you took note of the fact that we've been providing about 85 percent of the food. So if your show is seen overseas, I hope we can get some others to contribute.

MR. PASCUAL: [whispered comment about the time]

MR. ZOELLICK: Yeah. I've got an 11:30 meeting, so I'll do one more.
MR. PASCUAL: One more question. Over here.

QUESTION: Secretary Zoellick, my name is Jeffrey Milstein. Previously, the speaker spoke about the urgency, and you have spoken very eloquently about the diplomatic efforts and economic development efforts that are underway or are planned. But in terms of urgency, it seems that the U.S. approach lacks the mindset that would hasten, and that is that more sticks, as well as carrots, are needed.

It seems to me that the U.S. Government needs to treat these genocidal terrorists who are the leaders and commanders, who are making the decisions, as the terrorists that they are, and therefore, why are we not treating the people who were named in the U.N. Darfur panel, Security Council panel, the 51 names, the 17 names, the four names that you referred to this morning, as the international terrorists, the genocidal terrorists that they are?

For example, cutting off revenues from the international oil companies. They're flowing to those people which in fact are funding much of the arms and Janjaweed militias, and why not treat these people as the genocidal terrorists that they are.

MR. ZOELLICK: All I can tell you is there—as a general point but let me go to specifics—is we do share a sense of urgency. I hope I've conveyed to you that there are a lot of steps here, and the best way is if you can bring a variety of parties along and find out how a particular option helps the people in Darfur.

Now take each part of this. The international criminal court. As I
mentioned, the international criminal court is autonomous. I don't know the state of its investigation. But we will fully cooperate with it and pursue those actions as related to the genocide in Darfur.

The second one was sort of the sanctions issue. Here, there is a challenge in that if part of your goal is to be able to perhaps get people's financial assets, you don't want to reveal the names before you take the action but you have to get identifier information.

You have to get information on bank accounts, if you're going to stop people--under our domestic law, we are restricted from implementing these steps unless we can identify who the people are, and that means, for some of these individuals who have been named, I don't know whether they've ever been out of Sudan.

They don't necessarily have passports. So I mean, it's a question of how do you identify them to be able to take the action and this is something we work very closely with the Treasury Department and the Justice Department. Different countries have different legal systems on how they try to do that.

Ours, under U.S. law, requires us to be able, because of dealing with the rights of individuals, to be able to particularize it with individuals. We're trying to do whatever we can in those dimensions.

And this really does kind of connect with the other question. It's important to demonstrate that there won't be impunity, that there will be accountability. At the same time, you do have players in Khartoum that we're
trying to work with to expand the African Union force, to negotiate a peace accord, and to bring in whatever sort of U.N. forces.

And so that is the challenge of working with regimes that we don't like, is how do you get that combination moving forward, and how do you try to put pressure on them to take the right steps?

I mean, another way of phrasing your question would be to say you had a 21-year-old civil war, you had some of these same people in Khartoum, who we found detestable. Should we have not encouraged an agreement between North and South? I think that would have been a mistake.

We need to try to achieve the same in Darfur. So I'm glad you asked the question. I know from a lot of people there's a sense of frustration about what more one can do. Well, maybe you can come up with some other ideas in the next panel. But I've tried to give you a sense of the range of actions on the humanitarian side, security and peace negotiating side, give you a sense of how these are interconnected, and also kind of the ongoing stick.

Now you mentioned oil companies. We've got sanctions layered on top of sanctions on oil companies. I mean, there's not a U.S. oil company that can do a darn thing in Sudan.

But I will point out, and this shows the complexity of it, we've been working with the Congress on a new set of sanctions and steps, most of which were taken already, but one of the elements that I wish we could work with them on a little bit more effectively is we'd like to help the South. All these restrictions on
dealing with Sudan, remember, it's one country, our hands are tied in terms of some of the things we can do with the government of Southern Sudan because of some of the sanctions.

So this is part of the challenge. If you don't want oil companies, how about oil companies that deal with the South, because I think most of the people in this room would like to try to help the South develop.

So that gives you a sense, even on an issue that might seem simple, like sanctions, how you need to have a little flexibility here to be able to support what is a changing process and you're trying to bring people to some sense of peace, security, development and hope.

But I assure you that doesn't remove the full efforts to try to follow through on the actions dealing with accountability.

MR. PASCUAL: You've been extraordinarily generous with your time. We need to thank you very much for the thoughts you've put on the table, for demonstrating the energy and the creativity with which you're pursuing these issues. Your passion for it is obviously evident and I know how much of your time it's taking on a day-to-day basis.

I think you left us, certainly, with the importance of the sense of urgency, that the time for action is now, that there's a critical period by the end of April to try to bring the closure of the Abuja process, to sustain the kind of intensive engagement at the U.N. to build up the U.N. capacities to get involved and deploy effectively in Darfur, and a very clear statement to the government of
Sudan, of the importance of why it's in its interests to in fact open itself up to an international mission to the United States and how that could actually help the overall situation.

So thanks very much for everything that you've put on the table with us and taking the time.

MR. ZOELLICK: Thank you.

[Applause]

MR. PASCUAL: Let me invite the panelists to come up and join me.

Okay. I would like to move quickly into the second part of our discussion with the panel that we have before us and thank you for continuing to stay with us, and thank you to the panelists for their patience. I know we're moving on to this piece a little bit late.

In advance, let me just also recognize that I know Francis Deng will have to leave a little bit early, so I know you want to be with us as long as you can but I'm going to turn to you in a second and ask you to go first, since I know that you have some particular time constraints.

I won't take long to introduce the panel because I think all of you prefer to hear from them and have their questions. I think it's important just to recognize, for a second, that we've got tremendous talent before us.

Francis Deng, as many of you know, was a former minister of state for foreign affairs in Sudan and Sudan's former ambassador to the U.S.
So he brings that perspective. In the past he has been a fellow and a non-resident fellow here at the Brookings Institution and he's a former representative of the U.N. Secretary General on internally displaced persons, so he brings a very personal perspective from Sudan as well as a broader intellectual and academic and policy practitioner's perspective.

Ken Bacon is the president of Refugees International. As many of you know, he was also the former assistant secretary of defense for public affairs and the Pentagon spokesman for many years, from 1994 to 2001.

So Ken, again, comes to this set of issues from a practical perspective as a practitioner as well as from a U.S. policy perspective.

And then Bill O'Neill who's an international lawyer and serves as a consultant to the Brookings-Bern Project on Internal Displacement.

In particular, I just want to note that Bill is a co-author of the 2005 report on “Protecting Two Million Internally Displaced: The Successes and Shortcomings of the African Union in Darfur,” and so will have a perspective to comment very specifically on the AU's capability as well as from his personal perspective where he participated in training human rights officers in Darfur in 2005.

So let me begin with Francis, and Francis, you might have some general comments that you might want to make on the deputy secretary's talk. But also given the role that you have played in Sudan, you might want to give us a few
particular thoughts on the interrelationship between the events in Darfur and the
comprehensive peace agreement as well.

MR. DENG: Well, thank you very much.

Let me begin by expressing my profound appreciation to Brookings
and to the IDP project at Brookings for organizing this. As a Sudanese, it's a
reflection of the concerns that Americans have on what's happening in the Sudan.

I should also say that I always find it very impressive when I listen to
Deputy Secretary Zoellick, because he really does have a very profound and
comprehensive view of the situation.

What I will say is simply to underscore some of the things he did say.
Sudan, as he said, is a paradoxical situation. We have a peace agreement that
ended, literally half a century of warfare in the South, with only ten years interim,
and then we have wars in the North, the worst of which is now in Darfur, but also
in the east. These things are interconnected and I think there's a causal connection
that is important to point out.

It is true that doing that makes the situation seem so complex but
complexity is not an inhibition to action. It is to get the picture properly, so that
action is tailored to the nature of the problem.

Now Sudan is a country that is suffering from an acute crisis of
identity, and I'll elaborate, quickly, what I mean by that.

This identity crisis has two dimensions.
One is that the way people who are in power and who have dominated Sudanese politics since independence, the way they perceive themselves, they identify themselves as Arabs, is in sharp contradiction or has a discrepancy with what they really are, when you look at them.

And these are people whose ancestors came from Arabia or some Arab countries, without women, and they came and intermarried with Africans and produced a hybrid race, that when you look at them, if you don't know the details and you're casually looking with them, you can't tell who is an African, who is an Arab. I had the same problem in Darfur. I mean, I would go there, and some look browner than others, some darker, but by and large, you couldn't tell.

It's like going to Burundi and asking the foreign minister, I saw some people look very Tutsi, as we were told they were, some looked very Hutu, and many in between that I couldn't tell.

So I asked the foreign minister, Can you understand a Tutsi from a Hutu? And he said yes, you can, but with a margin of error of 35 percent.

[Laughter]

MR. DENG: Now when I raised this question in the Sudanese context, I was told that the margin of error is 65 percent. The other aspect of the crisis is that this self-perception that does not reflect the realities of the people themselves, is then imposed on the whole nation to define the nation as an Arab, then Islamic country, and the two go hand in hand.
In Sudan, Arabism as a race or ethnicity, Arabic and Islam, constitute the identity that you would call the Arabic Islamic identity.

Now because of lack of time, this complexity that we have in the Sudan was reduced into a dualism, called the North Arab Islamic North and the South African South.

Even though you have elements in the North, as we now hear in Darfur, but of course among the Nuba mountains, in southern Blue Nile, in the Beja region, all of these were subsumed under the rubric of the northern Arab Islamic identity.

And the South was again seen as primarily African animists, and now with Christianity coming in.

The crisis comes not because of differences but because of the implications in the sharing of power and wealth and the status of citizenship.

So what happened was the British ruled these two parts as one country in two. They developed the North, the South was by and large neglected, except for introducing missionaries to bring Christianity. This was the case until literally the dawn of independence, when the British simply just exited and allowed the country to become a unitary system.

That unitary system was dominated by the North, which then saw itself literally as successors to the colonial rulers, and so they became colonial rulers of the South. The South, even before independence, by a few months, saw
this coming and they started a rebellion in 1955, which went on until 1972, when it was settled by a compromise that gave the South autonomy.

The war was secessionist. Secession in Africa was obviously unpopular, even globally. So they had to settle for a compromise. Ten years later, that agreement was abrogated. The new movement that came up, led by John Garang, Sudan People's Liberation Movement, surprised Africa and the world by saying we are not fighting for secession. We are fighting to correct the distortions in the country, to make the Sudan become what it really is, not the distorted country called an Arab Muslim country where you have the majority of the people are non-Arabs, whether you're talking of the South or even areas of the North.

And therefore their argument was to create a new Sudan where there would be no discrimination based on race, ethnicity, religion, culture, even gender.

Now that vision, initially not believed by many, including the South, which came to accept it as a clever ploy to allay the fears of those who are against separation, but knew that what they really were fighting for was to take their country back and become independent.

The Northerners either dismissed it as utopian and unrealistic, or with time, found it offensive. How can these people, whom they look down upon, come to want to liberate the whole country? From what?

But with time, and with the strength of the SPLM, especially with the support from a number of African countries, in particular Mengistu's Ethiopia,
which is one of the things that Africans give to Mengistu, is that whatever else he did wrong, this one thing he is remembered for and praised for.

SPLM became such a credible force, that the North began--by the North I mean those in power--began to be apprehensive that this was a threat to the established identity of the Sudan as an Arab country, Arab Muslim country.

And I believe, and I think there's reason to believe this, the rise of Islamic fundamentalism in the Sudan can be related to the fear that the non-Arabs in the country were going to take over, and especially when the people of the Nuba Mountains got the message of the new Sudan, and joined the SPLM. The people of Southern Blue Nile joined in the '80s. The Beja were already sort of fighting their little rebellion, and then in 1991, the Darfurians, working with the SPLM in the South, staged a rebellion that was totally crushed. It took them another ten years to come back with the rebellion that is now going on in the area.

And the process is going on, so that the people of Nubia, up there, are going back to their pride in ancient Nubia, which Africa's proud of. We have not even heard from Darfur yet. So what I'm trying to say is that this proliferation of conflicts that have something in common--when you ask people in the Sudan, What are all these wars about? The one word that summarizes it is marginalization; marginalization by an Arab Islamic core in the center against the periphery, which is mostly non-Arab, in not just the South but also in the North.

I think it's very important to know, because when we tailor the solutions, to see Darfur in isolation would, I think, miss the core of the crisis.
We're talking about a history where, if you were a Muslim, and you were Arabic speaking, and you were culturally Arabized, and you imagine that you have Arab blood in you, you are elevated. And people began to pass as Arabs.

Now, with the leadership of the South, these sort of assimilated groups, some of whom have remained authentically African, are rising up and questioning, not only their self-identification, including those who had passed as Arabs, but also and, in particular, the identification of the country in a way that puts the Arabs and Muslims at a higher level, in contrast to if you remain African and black, and particularly if you are heathen, you are either a slave or legitimately enslaveable.

We are talking about a new Sudan that would be restructured fundamentally, and John Garang was the real brain and power behind that vision.

And when he came to Khartoum to be sworn in, the numbers that came to receive him, estimated in the millions, were mostly from the North.

He captured the imagination of the country, and the more this new vision of Sudan becomes credible, the more those who are entrenched in power in the old system become resistant to the change. And so you're talking about even the peace in the South, which is a peace in which two opposite visions have come together as a result of international pressure, and yet the implementation of the peace agreement is confronted with the zero sum vision of identity of the country.

And that's why, without Garang, who was forcing the agenda on the North, the vision of the South is falling back into their own Southern agenda, and
in the end, is going to be a struggle where we don't know what the outcome will be.

I believe that the new Sudan is going to be inevitable, and even if the South votes in six years, now remaining five years, to secede, the North will never remain the same again.

I don't think we can expect--and I'm going to end because I know time is very short. I don't think we can expect the government to cooperate fully in dealing with the Darfur situation, because what they see there is a threat that had started in the South, gone into the Nuba Mountains, southern Blue Nile, spreading to Darfur, and that if they lose there, then the end is accelerated. The next time, another region will come up with the same agenda.

So I think we have to focus on the humanitarian agenda, as the deputy said. The question of security and the protection of civilians. But we have to emphasize the urgency of a peace agreement.

The principles, or the foundation has already been laid in the CPA agreement, but the CPA did not come lightly. It came as a result of tremendous pressure in which the United States played a key role, and I believe the war against terror worked effectively in that the government, which had already been sanctioned, as involved in terrorism, did not want to antagonize the United States, in fact wanted to be on the right side of the U.N.

So they bent over backwards to cooperate. SPLM, although it has many friends here, was accepted as a legitimate movement, could not risk losing
the United States and so both sides had a vested interest in cooperating with the
United States to bring peace about.

Now in the implementation, unfortunately, the fear that the
government had, which made peace possible, is being used in the war against
terrorism and is producing opposite results, because Khartoum has suddenly
become an ally in the war against terror, and knowing what it is because they have
been connected with that, they are proving to be valuable.

Therefore, the kind of pressure which was exerted to bring peace in
the South may not be as strong in Darfur as it was in the South. But without
pressure from the international community, the crisis of identity that we are
dealing with cannot be easily resolved voluntarily by the parties. It would have to
get sustained international involvement to force the parties to conclude an
agreement that would be truly comprehensive. To have a little agreement on the
side, Darfur, without putting the big picture in, is not going to end the problems of
the Sudan.

I'll stop there.

MR. PASCUAL: Francis, thank you.

I know you have to leave shortly, and so if you don't mind, and with
the indulgence of the other panelists, what I'd like to do is just take quickly two
questions from the audience that you might be able to address, and I'm going to
invite you to stay for as long as you can, but at least having had the opportunity to
ask you a couple questions, that would be helpful.
So let me begin up front. Please.

QUESTION: My name is Ibrahim Sover [ph]. I'm a former U.N. human rights observer in Darfur.

The secretary talked about the need for a Darfur dialogue, and your Excellency, you mentioned that there's an urgency for a peace agreement to be signed soon in Darfur. But we keep hearing about a Darfur-Darfur agreement. We don't hear much about a Sudan-Darfur dialogue. And we don't hear much about a Sudan-Sudan dialogue, and one of the criticisms that has been leveled after the signing of the North-South agreement was that a lot of political parties were ignored or marginalized.

MR. PASCUAL: One other question. Over here.

QUESTION: Fidel Mayor [ph], Church [inaudible]. My question is on the CPA process. Do you foresee the role of civil society from Darfur or from Sudan? Because in Naivasha, the civil society of Sudan was excluded, particularly, in the process. Do you see that Darfur can be a correction of that mistake?

MR. DENG: Both are good questions. I think the point you are making is a vitally important one. People had to compromise or to be pragmatic, practical. If you were to include all the parties in the Naivasha negotiations, you might never have gone anywhere, because first of all, most of the political parties that were in the opposition were primarily targeting the regime as narrow based,
extremist, fundamentalist, and they would have been obsessed with doing away with the regime.

Now let's be clear. The regime is truly an Islamist, extremist regime, but it is an extreme version of what has been true throughout the independence period.

We have constantly been debating whether the Sudan should be run by an Islamic constitution or by a secular constitution. All the other major political parties are sectarian parties. They have Islam as the base of their power and their agenda is almost the same when it comes to the South.

Their differences are among themselves, and it would have complicated the picture. But having said that, and people wanted to move forward with dealing with the situation in the South first, those who were the ones fighting were the ones needed to bring peace, but bearing in mind that they were laying a foundation for what could become a comprehensive settlement.

As the secretary said, the constitution of the Sudan, the interim constitution, and even the principles of the CPA, anticipate that what has applied to the Nuba Mountains and southern Blue Nile could be applied to the Beja region and maybe even to Darfur, and that's why I think the foundation is there and we can move forward quickly.

With that foundation, you can then move vigorously to bring a national consensus in which those who have been excluded could be included with a sense of genuine balance, because as it is now, the minorities are having the
lion's share of the power, the minorities in power, and the political parties, which, if there were free and fair elections today, could possibly win, not because it is genuine democracy. There's a dictatorship of numbers and these people have loyalties based on religious devotion that will automatically vote for them. But that is your democracy and that's why I think that democracy has to be seen as more than just elections, at least in the case of the Sudan, where people are acutely divided.

On the issue of the role of civil society, it is true that they were excluded in the formal talks, but, you know, civil society played a very important role in the Southern Sudan, in bringing peace from the grassroots level, because the conflict in the South was not just North and South. It was also intra-South, with various factions within the South, particularly tribal.

And some of the horrors of the war actually occurred in this internecine warfare within the South itself.

Besides, and if we apply this to the case of Darfur, you know, there is here a possibility of manipulation of wanting to broaden the talks.

Now it's not everybody who takes up arms to fight. It's a small group that becomes angry enough to fight in the name of the larger population. If you are to say that everybody should come into the talks, the agendas would be so complicated, you couldn't easily do it.

But there's a way in which the civilian role, particularly at the community level, to try to facilitate a grassroots kind of peace movement is very
important. One of the reasons why Darfur is what it is is that whereas tribal
differences used to be mediated by tribal leaders who developed their own
conventional ways of managing these, and there are customary laws that deal with
this, the intervention of the central government, the negative penetration of the
central government, taking sides in tribal warfares, is what has complicated the
picture and rendered tribal leaders almost powerless, and no longer able to use the
methods by which they have maintained peace in the South.

MR. PASCUAL: Francis, thank you for a very interesting concept.

Ken, let me turn to you and ask you, in particular, as you make your
comments, to perhaps address the refugee situation in Chad, any comments you
want to make about the cross-border situation, and also any points you want to
make about the situation for humanitarian workers.

MR. BACON: Sure, thanks.

First of all, I want to thank Roberta Cohen and Carlos and Brookings
for organizing and hosting this.

I think we were all very impressed by Secretary Zoellick's
presentation, but I was haunted throughout by the fact that things are getting
worse, not better.

We have a program, we're following that program, and yet the
humanitarian situation is getting worse, the security situation is declining, and
those two of course are related.
The great triumph of U.S. and Western involvement in Darfur has been that we have prevented dramatic humanitarian disasters, in that we've gotten people into camps and fed them. We prevented dramatic outbreaks of disease. But that can only happen in a secure context, and to the extent that it's harder and harder, according to the U.N. Jan Egeland just came back, they're having a harder time reaching vast areas of Darfur. It's also becoming more difficult to get food and other goods to people in Chad now along the border.

So the humanitarian side I think risks getting worse, and clearly the security side is getting worse.

I think that we have to ask the question of whether our policy's working, because it seems to me we are going in the wrong direction, and if the policy isn't working, what are the alternatives?

I'm not in the State Department and I'm not a diplomat, I never made policies, but it seems to me in one respect we have failed to follow up on one of the many good issues that Francis raised, and that is putting more pressure on this regime to reach a settlement.

Our policy has been conflicted and I think very unclear toward the regime, because we have cooperated them in one respect, about intelligence and anti-terrorism, while trying to condemn them from being genocidists on the other side, and it's a message that allows them to sort of wiggle through the middle, and to think that we really don't condemn genocide as much as we say, and we're saying this just for domestic political reasons.
And I'll give you just a couple of data points. The first is that the African Union held its summit in Khartoum and this was an embrace by the African nations, an embrace of respectability to the regime. Second, the Arab League just held its summit in Khartoum, another embrace of respectability.

We should be leaning very hard on other countries, both Arab and African, to condemn and spurn the regime, but we're not.

A third point is that anybody who's been to Khartoum recently, and I haven't been there for about ten months, but over the years have noticed just an incredible building boom. Khartoum is like Tyson's Corner. There are new buildings going up all over the place. Streets are being paved, not with gold, but it's becoming a much more prosperous country. So while people are starving and dying in Darfur, and development is going very, very slowly in the South, and there are rebellions breaking out in Beja and other places, Khartoum is like a boom town.

So, clearly, it seems to me there's the possibility of doing more with economic sanctions.

And, finally, another data point. Secretary Zoellick mentioned the Security Council resolution 1591, which calls for sanctions. That was passed on March 29th of last year.

We're just now beginning to identify people and to press for sanctions against them, more than a year later, and there's no guarantee that any sanctions will be imposed, given the politics of the Security Council.
So what I'm suggesting is we have to look for diplomatic ways to put much more pressure on the government in Khartoum, to isolate them as the genocidal regime that it is, and to make it clear that we can't deal with them sensibly, on the one hand, and then condemn them on the other hand. I think there has to be much more pressure and condemnation against them.

Now that's a long-winded way to answer your question, Carlos, which I will address. Part of this is that there's a lot of evidence--I mean, I don't think we know precisely what's happening in Chad and who's backing the rebel groups, but there are reports that the rebel groups, at least some of the rebel groups--and their coalitions keep changing in Chad, but there have been reports that the government of Sudan has been supporting the United Front for Democratic Change, which is now the major coalition of rebels in Chad.

If that's true, we have to find a way to condemn this and to put more pressure on them to stop doing this.

They also clearly have supported the Lord's Resistance Army in northern Uganda, and sheltered Joseph Kony, whose base of operations has been around Juba for some time. They have allowed him to stay there and operate out of Sudan or at least to move back and forth, to and from Sudan.

So there are a lot of ways I think we need to put pressure on the regime. The humanitarian side is getting worse, as I said, because security's getting worse, and there are a lot of signs that the government is not interested--at
one point, starting in mid 2004, they began to be quite open to humanitarian assistance and workers. That has stopped.

They've thrown out the Norwegian Refugee Council from the largest camp, Kalma camp, they didn't let Jan Egeland go to Darfur. They have passed a new law that governs nonprofit organizations and agencies working on the ground in Darfur tell me that their workers are subject to greater harassment than before, that it's more difficult for them to do their job, and that it's becoming much more difficult for them to reach dispersed, displaced populations within Darfur.

So I think we're going to see, after a long period of improving humanitarian conditions, we now risk seeing a deterioration of humanitarian conditions, and that would be a tragedy.

MR. PASCUAL: Thank you, Ken.

Bill, let me turn to you and ask you if you could share some of your insights of both work that you've done with the AU forces on the ground, lessons that should be extracted from that, and trying to sustain peace on the ground, what it's going to take to be able to do that effectively, and any specific comments that you might have made, that you might make based on your observations of working with human rights workers on the ground, and what some of the abuses are, and what some of the key issues might be that the international community needs to stay focused on.

MR. O'NEILL: Thank you, and I'll join also in thanking Brookings for organizing this. I'll try to answer those and also react to a couple of points
that came up earlier, both in the secretary's speech and your questions. One is the word urgency has been mentioned several times by a lot of people in the room and by Ken and Francis, and I would just like to join that notion, that things are really urgent, and just thinking back on October 10th, Ambassador Bolton said at the time--we don't need any more briefings on Darfur, we need to talk about what to do.

And that was October and now we're in April, and we're still talking about what to do, and that's extremely frustrating for many people.

And time is not on our side, and time is certainly not on the side of the people in Darfur. Time just means--more time passing means more deaths.

As for the African Union and security, a couple a points here. One is I think the African Union was given a mission impossible and I think they did quite a good job for quite some time, but basically we're now at the point where I think everybody has to be honest and face facts, that the African Union, as currently constituted, and as likely to be constituted in the near term, cannot fulfill its own limited mandate now, and certainly could not fulfill the broader mandate that's required, which is protection of civilians.

The reports we have from some of the people serving in the African Union indicate, one, that morale is slipping, and it's not a surprise, given how difficult the circumstances are, that now African Union troops have been shot at, killed, taken hostage, and they don't have enough firepower to respond.
Two is that not only is morale slipping but initiative; and patrolling, to take a concrete example, is slipping. We have information that there is now actually a fair amount of fuel, and as we noted, the 105 vehicles from Canada finally got through.

But statistics show that on some days, the African Union troops are doing one-fifth the number of patrols they could do, given the amount of fuel they have on hand, and the vehicles and the troops.

So I think we really do have to now "bite the bullet" and say the African Union did a pretty good job, our report showed that, other reports I think might have been a little more critical of them than the Brookings report was, but I think they had the motivation, they had the desire and the troops on the ground had the will for about a year. But in these last few months, as the situation has deteriorated, I think the African Union's own limited capacities have also slipped quite a bit.

We also see Refugees International just came out with a statement, I think this week, about sexual abuse and sexual exploitation, alleged, by African Union troops. This is a first. Again, that was something that was a reassuring sign in the first phase of the African Union's deployment, that this kind of thing was not happening but now it seems like things are slipping in that way too. So this is very worrying. What to do? The U.N., if there is going to be a "rehabbing," it's going to take time. I mean, the U.N., right now, is at about 80
percent of its capacity in the South, mandated capacity in terms of soldiers and police, and it's taken them about a year to get there.

Now there may be some troops freed up in Burundi as that mission draws down, or some of them are going to the DRC, but it's going to be difficult and take some time for the U.N. to come up with significant numbers of troops to buttress the less than minimal, barely 7,000 African Union troops that are there now.

The call for NATO advisers I think is a very important step, and again, you might have seen that story, I think it was Monday's Washington Post, and almost immediately, in NATO headquarters there was a kind of backtracking. "Well, we didn't really mean many, or there are certainly not going to be ground troops."

But I think to pick up on Ken's point--I'm not a diplomat either--but I think that if the government of Khartoum starts to see that we really are serious, we, being the United States, or the U.K., or NATO, or the EU, that there's serious consideration now of sending in--you might call them advisers--but in significant numbers that are really going to try to help the African Union do its job better until the reinforcements come from the U.N., maybe that's the kind of message they will take seriously, because it's--my experience in Sudan.

I was just in the South, and just briefly on that--I think the situation in the South is very fragile I was staying in one of these tent camps, where you
tend to stay when you go to Juba, and I was with a lot of SPLA, former SPLA commanders. They are very angry, they are very frustrated with their own leadership, with very few visible signs of any peace dividend in more than a year for them and their people in the South, and they're very angry, as you would expect, with the North, and they're convinced the North is cheating them out of oil revenues.

And so the North-South issue is quite dicey. But it's clear, that the only reason we got that CPA was because of concerted, enormous pressure, as several speakers have noted already, and particularly from the United States, and I think that the government in Khartoum, if they sense weakness, if they sense division, if they sense a complete lack of resolve, they will string this along, and again I come back to the point I started out with, that time is the enemy here. Time really is the enemy for protecting people in Darfur, and that's what we really have to address, that huge problem.

MR. PASCUAL: Ken, Bill, thank you, very good statements. Let me turn to the audience for questions. We'll begin over here.

QUESTION: Good morning. Richard Hellman, the Middle East Research Center.

In light of what we've heard today about the need for security and the urgency of the matter, and such analyses as the article on the editorial page of The Wall Street Journal today, to the effect, "Never Again--Again" and since the president wrote on the margin of a paper with regard to the action, or rather,
inaction with respect to a previous genocide, back before 9/11, quote, "Not on my watch," close quotes, and today, clearly, genocide, as identified by the United States, is occurring not only on the president's watch but on the watch of each of us, and since we're treated weekly--and I don't mean this in a negative sense--to the recitation on the Military Channel and the History Channel and History International, of how, within a month or two, the United States put Special Operations troops, with other helpers, into Afghanistan, and ended the regime of the Taliban, why could we not, as a modest proposal for what to do in this case, why could we not think so much about more numbers of troops but the right kinds of troops, and shall we say, quietly lend such forces as were active in Afghanistan, and successful, to the African Union force or to a NATO force, and put an end to this genocide in Darfur?

MR. PASCUAL: Two more questions. Yes? In the middle, right here.

QUESTION: Jim Clipton [ph] from the Gallop Poll. Ken, I was wondering about, I was encouraged when you talked about some economy developing in Khartoum. I mean, if a dream came true and the place got locked down and there was some law and order, is there any prospect for an economy and jobs, and things like that?

MR. PASCUAL: And one more question. In the back.

QUESTION: Pete Fydynsky [ph], Voice of America. Two questions about Khartoum. Who or what is funding the building boom in that city? And
second, if Khartoum is an ally in the war on terror, then presumably it serves the U.S. interest. What is it about the U.S. interest that presumably, once again, trumps the lives and welfare of people in Darfur?

MR. BACON: Sure. Well, in answer to the first question, I guess any one of us could answer that. I think we should be more assertive militarily. The one thing I would recommend doing is something that's been suggested both by the U.N. Security Council and by Congress, which is the imposition of the "no fly zone" over Darfur. It would be actually quite difficult and expensive to do but I think it could be done. It could be very effective. It would be difficult and expensive because the distances are so vast. It's not like patrolling Kosovo. The distances are much greater.

But I do think that military force should be part of the equation, increased military force, and I don't think we should wait to be invited because if we are, if we wait to be invited, it's clear this regime will never invite us.

In terms of Khartoum, Sudan is developing greater and greater oil reserves, and what's fueling the building boom in Khartoum is mainly oil. You know, a large part of Sudan is desert but there's also a part of it that's quite swampy. Both branches of the Nile go through Sudan and they meet in Khartoum, so there is the possibility of having extensive irrigation and growing food in Sudan.

I think it could be a very prosperous, self-sustaining, export-oriented country, if it could ever stop fighting and organize itself to do that. And in answer
to the final question, I think I've given you part of the answer, the oil revenues I think are largely fueling the building boom in Khartoum.

But the whole issue, as Francis Deng pointed out so well, is that while the center's getting rich, the margins are still very poor and the periphery is poor and the center's rich, and there is really no commitment to using the increased oil wealth to develop throughout the country.

Bill mentioned the lack of development in the South. There has been a war there for 21 years, really, you know, 40 out of the last 50 years. But Darfur is enormously undeveloped as well and I haven't been to Beja in the east, but I assume that that's largely true except for the city, Port Sudan, and other urban areas.

But there really has been no commitment to using the money to develop the rest of the country and some of that may be exactly the racial divide, or identity crisis that Francis spoke about.

MR. PASCUAL: Bill, do you want to answer that?

MR. O'NEILL: Sure. Just quickly. I also want to mention the human rights question that you raise because I think it feeds in. The types of violations, I think, you know, many people in this room are probably familiar with, in Darfur--murder, rape, disappearances, torture, you know, the whole gamut of the most serious and systematic violations committed not only by militias but also by people implicated in official positions in the government.
Now that leads into the second point, though, about the military and the type of presence, because I think sometimes you see resistance. I saw, there was some editorial, I think in the Guardian last week, arguing against going outside the African Union and bringing in troops because it might look as a-I think the term the author used was white faces in Africa and in Islamic Muslim Africa.

I think it's important to remember that the victims of the human rights violations and the atrocities in Darfur are Muslims, first and foremost, and two, if you were to expand the military participation in Darfur, through whatever mechanism, if you were able to bring in Muslim, and I take Francis's point but I have to add the non-Arab Muslim, troop contributing countries like Pakistan, Bangladesh, Turkey, Malaysia, this would be I think quite good, quite effective, these are experienced peacekeepers, and also there is some distrust, even of the African Union countries that are Arab countries in Darfur.

Example: Egyptian civilian police officers working in El Fasher. They have absolutely no trust from the population. The population sees the Egyptian police as hat in hand with the government of Sudan's police. They just don't trust them.

So this is another kind of wrinkle to who would be seen how in this complex area.

MR. PASCUAL: Just two very brief comments. Ken, a comment on one thing you said which I don't think you would disagree with. It's not so much a question of the center getting rich. It's some individuals and groups in the center
getting rich because the amount of poverty in the center still is absolutely phenomenal.

The other point which I feel obliged to add, just from my experience when I was working within the U.S. Government. I personally never found a situation where there was a tradeoff between being tough on the government of Sudan because of the war on terror versus addressing the needs of the people of Darfur.

What I did find was a constant issue that would come up, a recognition that in order to address the situation in Darfur, and also sustain the comprehensive peace agreement, there needed to be the engagement and the involvement of the government of Sudan.

And I think what Deputy Secretary Zoellick was trying to do was to illustrate the difficult of actually managing that balance, of engaging with them in a way that sustains their involvement and cooperation, of maintaining the peace agreement in the South and making it viable, because certainly the North can completely disrupt the peace process in the South by either its stance on legal issues, on transfer of revenues, on policing issues, the role it takes on security issues.

So how do you maintain their engagement in a constructive way and at the same time encourage them to be involved in the peace process in Darfur?

I don't want to make the argument, one way or the other, of whether the level of pressure that has been applied to the North has been adequate, whether
we have achieved, as a country, whether we have achieved that right balance, but I think the key issue, really, here, has not been so much the war on terror, and I've heard this raised a number of times, and I just feel obliged, from a perspective, as somebody who's been involved in the policy process, and somebody who cares a great deal about the situation in Darfur, to say that I have not felt that the tradeoff was really with the role of the government of Sudan in the war on terror.

MR. BACON: Just one point. I think that bringing Salah Gosh, the security chief, in a CIA plane, for meetings with the CIA, apparently without the State Department's knowledge, I've been told, and knowing that Salah Gosh is probably one of the people who could be indicted for crimes against humanity, I think sent the wrong signal, and it was a signal that, from my reading of the Sudanese press, suggests that was mistaken by the Sudanese government. They said to themselves, and there have been statements about this in the Sudanese press, how mad can they be at us if they flew Salah Gosh to Washington to have private meetings with the CIA?

That's the only example I can cite as a gloss on what you said.

MR. PASCUAL: I'm aware of that situation. Just factually, I think it's correct but we should go back and take a look at it. That visit took place before the list of individuals who were being sanctioned had ever been drawn up.

MR. BACON: That is true.

MR. PASCUAL: So it did take place some time ago. Another round of questions. In the back.
QUESTION: I wanted to follow up on this conversation, I was going to ask about the Salah Gosh, but the U.S. has--sorry, Michele Kelemen with National Public Radio.

The U.S. helped whittle down this list to four. You heard what the deputy secretary had to say.

Is the U.S. protecting its interlocutors in this Sudan government and do you think that's a wise policy choice?

MR. O'NEILL: I can't answer that question.

MR. PASCUAL: I think you put the panel in an awkward situation, because I certainly can no longer speak for the U.S. administration and don't have, actually, the details to even comment on that. My fellow panelists I don't think are in a position to do that either.

What I would say is that this whole situation has really underscored a tremendously complex dilemma, which is that in the end, one needs to have a government that is involved in a series of conflicts internally and essentially involved as a partner in a peace process, to actually take that commitment to the peace process seriously and to be true to its commitments in the peace process.

And so on the one hand, there's pressure to stay engaged with that government and to show that there's a benefit of being engaged and to sustain support for the peace process, and, on the other hand, there's a recognition that there have been phenomenal atrocities that have been committed, and have been
committed with support, in some way or another, of that government, and therefore it needs to be held accountable.

And in order to do this effectively, it cannot just be one individual country which is involved in this, because obviously the United States is a key player and we have to be involved, but the international system has to be involved.

And we have reached a situation where the international system is very much broken. It is difficult to be able to get strong United Nations Security Council action on these issues, in particular because of the veto power of individual countries.

There are some countries such as China that have very specific financial interests in Sudan. There is Russia that has a concern about how it votes on any of these questions because of the precedent that it creates for scrutiny of internal conflicts, and so hence you've got a very complex situation where your main vehicle for international action, the U.N. Security Council, feels internal tensions and pressures.

Individual countries that are working on these issues are torn between how to work with the government of Sudan and how to maintain pressure at the same time, and at the same time you have to keep the government of Sudan moving forward in some form of constructive way.

It is an extraordinarily difficult situation. I think it is correct that one has to be absolutely clear about the importance of maintaining international pressure and making that pressure strong but then the flip side of that equation has
to be can you actually act on it? Can you bring that pressure to bear in a way which is credible? That is what the international community hasn't been able to do because of the slowness of acting on some of these sanctions issues, and because of the slowness it's demonstrated, even in the U.N. mission in the South, the difficulty it's had in deploying troops, and the troops in the South, that deployment was supposed to be completed at first in November, and then December, and then in February, and it's still only about 80 percent complete.

Now add on top of that a potential deployment of, say, 20,000 in Darfur. How long is that going to take?

And this really illustrates the difficulty of this kind of situation, and the room for maneuverability that it continues to give the government of Sudan, and how hard it is to bring this to an effective conclusion.

MR. PASCUAL: Two more questions.

QUESTION: [inaudible] Universal Human Rights Network. How would you characterize the role of the Libyan government? Have they been constructive in trying to solve this problem or have there been more problems than successes there?

MR. PASCUAL: And let me take one other question. Over here.

QUESTION: Thank you. I was interested in getting some clarification on the Sudanese government's political reaction to the African Union's mission in the Sudan, and the U.N. coming in as a strengthening of the
African Union, or separate from that--how the Sudanese government politically sees that move.

And also, if you could talk a little bit more about why China has been used in the political negotiating process.

MR. PASCUAL: Could you introduce yourself, please.

QUESTION: Sure. Elizabeth, and I'm interning with Human Rights First, but also a student at Georgetown Law Center.

MR. PASCUAL: And let me then turn to the panelists and ask Ken, I will turn to you first, then Bill, and if you can address those questions and any other final comments that you want to make, and I'll just say a few points, and we'll bring our panel to a close.

MR. BACON: The first question was on Libya. Libya recently convened some peace talks and Secretary Zoellick

[End of Tape 1, side A, begin Tape 2.]

MR. BACON: [In progress] -- some rebel groups, Libya has long had interests in Darfur and Chad. There is actually a very good new book out on Darfur that goes into some of the Libyan engagement in that area.

On the one hand they have tried to convene peace talks, on the other hand, they have been supplying some of the rebel groups with weapons. You may know more about that, Bill, but that is all I can really say.

In terms of the African Union, the government invited the African Union in, but the government has had sort of an arms-length relationship with
them. They sometimes have limited where they can go, limited their movement within Darfur. They have blocked the provision of equipment such as the 105 Canadian armed personnel carriers they delayed for months and months before they could come in. So while the government on the one hand has welcomed the AU, they have done their best to emasculate it and keep it weak.

I think that Secretary Zoellick was right, if you could convince the government that it was in their best interests to have an effective peacekeeping force, it would be very helpful, but so far I don't think they believe it's in their best interests.

Second, the U.N—they have said they won't allow the U.N. force in. In fact, there was just a statement by President Bashir I think yesterday or the day before to that effect. Whether in fact that is true, they say a lot of things and then change their mind over time. So I really think this is an area where pressure from us and from other countries, China and Russia among them, could have an impact on the government of Sudan.

China is the largest buyer of Sudanese oil. It runs a lot of the oil fields and has helped develop some of the oil fields. I have seen shells in Darfur with Russian markings on them, and I have seen shells with Chinese markings on them, so I have to assume that both of them at least in the past and maybe still are supplying weaponry to the government of Sudan. They have extensive economic interests, and they have been reluctant to do anything that would compromise those economic interests.
Finally, just let me say two things. One, I really don't think our government is doing enough. I think it's good that we called this genocide, it's bad that we're not doing more to stop it. Having said that, I have a lot of respect for Secretary Zoellick. I think the President would really like to stop this if he could find a cost-free way to do it. I think Kofi Annan has worked very hard on this to press the world forward, but it is a very difficult cast of characters to move forward, not just the Security Council, but there are many, many problems. I appreciate the fact that it is not easy.

But I also think this is an area where pressure from the public is having an impact on what our government is doing, and the fact that students are forcing their boards of trustees at universities to divest stocks, the fact that students have raised money to support the African Union force, the fact that religious congregations, Christian and Jewish, all across the country have mobilized against genocide in Darfur, has had a big impact. And you can have an opportunity to make an impact on April 30th by marching up and down the Mall in support of ending the genocide in Darfur, and the idea is to get a million people to sign petitions in the march, and you can be a part of that movement, and an important part, so I urge you to do that.

MR. O'NEILL: I would just maybe add a point or two. I think Ken has really answered the questions. One interesting fact is that the government of Sudan has taken to painting some of its vehicles white to resemble the African
Union's which is a violation I believe of the Geneva Conventions and just shows the kinds of lengths they will go to fulfill their agenda. Let me put it that way.

But I think they do see the African Union as the lesser of other possible evils, and to the extent they could keep it a weak, small, largely ineffective operation, that's their goal probably, and that's why you hear them saying they will never let in the U.N.

One African Union soldier told me, it was interesting, he saw the exact same banner in an anti-U.N. rally in Khartoum in January, 2 months later in Fasher. So you do wonder are these crowds for hire and to what extent there really is a deep sentiment against this. If you ask the people, of course, in Darfur, about more international troops, whatever country they come from, except as I said a few reservations about Arab countries, they would be very happy with that.

I just want to again join in on Ken's comments about the issue and how it seems to have swept across the country, and I couldn't agree more. I was on a panel at Columbia about a week ago, and I expected 10 or 20 students to show up, there were more than a hundred kids in the room. And they are really fired up. It reminds me, and those of you who are old enough to remember, the anti-apartheid college movements of 20 to 25 years ago. These Columbia students are going to replicate a refugee camp on the steps of the library, they're going to fast for a day, and they're coming down here on the 30th. They're going to push for divestment, and that is just one university. And as Ken mentioned, there are
synagogues and churches all across the country. I do think that the administration, I can't speak for them, but I think they are starting to feel the heat on this one.

Lastly, the World Summit in September at the U.N. General Assembly unanimously approved a principle called the Right to Protect, or Responsibility, sorry, to Protect. That basically says that in cases of genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, sovereignty is overridden and there is an obligation on the part of the international community to stop these horrible events. I think this is really the first test case to see if the Responsibility to Protect is going to mean something, or is it going to be this century's version of Never Again? I think that that is our challenge, to make sure that it really does mean something and does not become an empty phrase.

MR. PASCUAL: Thank you, Bill. I think it is important to end the session on trying to recap some of the things that have been stated on things that can be done and in particular from a U.S. perspective on things that can be done, because I think internal pressure within the United States and internal advocacy is important, and let me just recap these things.

First of all, support for the African Union peacekeeping force. Regardless of what its limitations might be, if it is not strengthened and if it is not there, the situation is going to be worse. They are under a major funding gap with supplementals before the Hill. That needs to be passed and those resources need to be moved forward.
Second is the U.S. role with the United Nations and funding for the United Nations mission. If indeed it moves to a U.N. mission, resources are needed to be made available extensively and very quickly. This will come at a particularly complex time. I think that many of you are aware that the U.S. dues to the United Nations are only provided on a 6-month basis, and that the critical point will come in June. So regardless of what the United States is doing more broadly in its position vis-à-vis the U.N., that cannot and should not be used as a barrier to obstructing and slowing down U.S. funding for a U.N. peacekeeping mission in Sudan and in Darfur. If that happens, it will be in effect actually allowing the atrocities to go on because it will not give us the capacity to put on the ground the kinds of peacekeepers that are necessary to try to keep at least to a minimum the level of violence.

Another issue related to the United Nations I think that is important to underscore is this Responsibility to Protect. There is legal authority already within the U.N. to be able to act on this using Chapter VII peacekeeping resolutions. This does not need a new legal authority within the U.N. Hence, the U.N. has the capacity to mobilize itself and show the political will to act on the responsibility to protect using a Chapter VII resolution.

Another point is the role that NATO can play. It has been underscored before, but if the United States wants NATO to be a serious support in planning and logistical activities where there is an absolutely crucial need, the United States is going to have to be willing and able to put some of its own troops
on the ground in support of that NATO mission. Otherwise, we will simply be calling on the other countries of NATO to act on our behalf, and it will not be credible. So as we continue to work this issue, we not only have to make the moral exhortations, we have to show that we are willing to support that with resources and with troops as well.

The need for U.S. humanitarian assistance is obviously tremendous. As Deputy Secretary Zoellick indicated, we are supplying 86 percent of the World Food Program's pledge, and only about 85 percent of the pledge is actually being met. So to do the math, somewhere about 65 percent of the needs are actually being met, so 35 percent of the needs are simply being unmet, and those are not exactly lush rations. So there is a huge need to sustain the pressure for addressing those humanitarian needs.

In addition to that, I think it is absolutely critical that the public keep on pressing Congress, the Administration, and the international community to be thinking ahead to the future, because the only way that you are going to have a sustainable situation in Darfur is if some of the root causes that were there that led to the conflict to begin with, in particular, increased environmental degradation, the tension between nomadic herders and sedentary farmers, problems with water, issues that existed in Darfur for the last 50 years and have been getting much worse over time, those issues are not being addressed and the resources are not being put in place to actually address these kinds of questions. We are going to
revisit this again in 5 or 10 years, it is going to happen again, so we have to put
those resources on the table.

I think it is particularly important that we also keep thinking about the
situation in the South, and ironically, some of the sanctions that we have in place
are now precluding the international financial institutions, particularly the World
Bank, combined with Sudan's debt, from actually playing a role in addressing the
very vast infrastructure needs in the South. The U.N. is playing a role in the
management of trust funds that bilaterals are putting together, but it is not actually
able to lend World Bank money in order to address some of the vast needs in the
South, and this is an issue that can be tackled with creativity.

Finally, I think it is worth noting that Hu Jintao will be in town in
about a week, and China obviously has been a very key player in the situation in
Sudan. It is a principal investor and the principal consumer of oil resources, and
this is one of those opportunities where it is absolutely critical for the leaders of
our country and the Congress to ensure that the issues of Sudan and Darfur are on
the agenda.

You have all been very patient and extremely productive in
participating in the discussion. I want to thank you on behalf of the Brookings
Institution for making this time and for your interest in addressing this situation in
Sudan and in Darfur. Thank you very much to all of you and to our panelists.

[Applause.]