THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION

A Brookings Institution Policy Briefing

with International Crisis Group

LESSONS LEARNED IN ANTICIPATING, PREVENTING, AND RESPONDING TO CONFLICT

Tuesday, February 28, 2006

2:00 p.m. - 4:00 p.m.

Stein Room
1775 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C.

[TRANSCRIPT PREPARED FROM A TAPE RECORDING.]

MILLER REPORTING CO., INC.
735 8th STREET, S.E.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20003-2802
(202) 546-6666

P R O C E E D I N G S

MS. RICE: There are extra seats up here in the front section, and since this looks a little bit like a wind tunnel, we thought we might encourage people to move to the front if they could.

Let me begin by welcoming you all and thanking you for coming. I'm Susan Rice, Senior Fellow in Foreign Policy Studies and Global Economy and Development here at the Brookings Institution. I'm very excited to be able to introduce to you an extremely distinguished panel of scholars and experts who really need very little introduction.

Let me begin by saying that the topic that brings us here today is one of long-standing importance to the United States and other international actors. Yet, it is arguably a subject of increasing importance, that is: the challenge of anticipating, preventing and resolving conflicts, of which there seem to be no shortage at present. I think recent experience underscores that we have a great deal to learn still in this regard--how best to see conflicts before they become crises, how to respond after they become crises? Whether we're looking at recent experience in Iraq, Afghanistan or innumerable parts of Africa and elsewhere, the challenges seem to never cease.

Yet, at the same time there have been some interesting and, I think, important changes in the United States' own capacity and orientation to begin to tackle these issues more effectively, as well as the international community's. Within the U.S. government we've seen the

establishment in the last year and a half of the State Department Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization; you've seen, I think, a fascinating new directive out of the Defense Department on stabilization operations, once known as peace operations or peacekeeping. Then at the international level we've seen some limited but important progress in trying to move towards a Peace-Building Commission at the United Nations as well as the enshrinement, albeit it with some caveats, of the responsibility to protect. Yet as I said earlier, from Haiti to Kosovo to Africa and parts of the Middle East, the challenges on the ground persist.

We will take a look at these issues and ask the question what have we learned in the international community through the enormous good work of the International Crisis Group, now 11 years old, and through the prism of the cumulative experience of the U.S. government about best practices in anticipating, preventing and responding to conflict?

I'm really pleased to be able to introduce Gareth Evans who needs no introduction. He is the President and CEO of the International Crisis Group based in Brussels. As you all know, ICG is doing among the best work of any nongovernmental entity in the world in giving policy makers at all levels insights into the complexities of the conflict situations and best recommendations for how to approach them. Gareth has had a long and distinguished career. He is the author of eight books.

He was a member of Australia's Parliament for many, many years. He held four Cabinet positions. Is that correct?

MR. EVANS: Yes.

MS. RICE: Most notably as Foreign Minister for 8 years. In addition to his responsibilities at Crisis Group, he served with Ambassador Sahnoun as co-author of what is now a seminal work on The Responsibility to Protect, and more recently on the Secretary General's High-Level Panel. So we're very, very happy to have you here. Thank you.

Of course, I am pleased also to introduce Carlos Pascual who is the new Vice President of Foreign Policy Studies here at the Brookings Institution and my new boss. He has, prior to that, had a long and distinguished career as a career Foreign Service officer at USAID, at the White House and State Department. He served as the founding State Department Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization from August 2000 until just last month. Prior to that he was the coordinator for assistance to the countries of the former Soviet Union. He served as Ambassador to Ukraine and as Senior Director and Director on the National Security Council staff for Russia, Ukraine and Eurasia, and before that, a long and distinguished career in the field at USAID primarily working on Africa. So it's also a great pleasure to have Carlos with us, and I think you will hear enormous and valuable insights from them both. With that I'll turn it over to Gareth. Thank you.

MR. EVANS: Thank you very much, Susan, for that very generous introduction. It's always nice to be told you don't need any introduction, but I'm always pathetically grateful for whatever I can get, and thank you for that.

[Laughter.]

MR. EVANS: It's also an enormous pleasure to be sharing a platform with the newly clean-shaven Carlos Pascual who really is a great diplomat at the thoughtful end of that particular spectrum. A huge of loss of course to the Office of Reconstruction and Stabilization, but a huge gain for Brookings and the nongovernment policy community. So it's great to see you in this role and fabulous to be sharing a platform with you.

MR. PASCUAL: Thank you.

MR. EVANS: As Susan began by intimating, the world as we see it around us doesn't immediately suggest that we've learned very much about conflict prevention, conflict management, whether it's Iraq or Israel or Sri Lanka or Nepal or Darfur or the Eastern Congo or Colombia or the Caucasus or violent extremism in London and Bali. We are served with a constant flow of news about war, potential war, violent extremism which seems depressingly endless.

We could manifestly do very much better than we have done at all stages of the conflict cycle whether we're talking about long-term prevention, short-term prevention, peacemaking response in the form of

diplomatic negotiation, peacemaking response in the form of forcible peace enforcement action, post-action peacekeeping, and then longer-term peace-building to come around to the top of the cycle again and get you back into the long-term prevention mode. At all stages of that now familiar cycle we know very well we could do a hell of a lot better than we have, but it's worthwhile making a slightly more positive point right at the very outset of what I want to say about lessons learned. That is that as lousy as the situation seems to be from so many perspectives, we really have learned an awful lot over the last 10 or 15 years particularly in this period since the end of the Cold War and we are doing very much better at conflict prevention and conflict resolution than most people intuitively suspect. The story is by no means a totally bleak one. There are reasons for optimism about the utility of putting a shoulder to the wheel in a number of these strategies.

That reality has been very well documented recently, this counterintuitive reality, by the Human Security Report which still hasn't yet got very wide circulation; certainly not I think the circulation it deserves. This is a five-country initiative run out of the University of British Columbia by a little human security unit run by Andrew Mack, formerly among other things adviser to Kofi Annan over the last few years. What they did was to really systematically pull together a massive amount of data which hitherto has not been in any national or international organization publications, has been to some extent in some

of the think tank community in Uppsala and SIPRI and places like that, but not in any very systematic way.

What the Human Security Report tells us, published just at the end of last year, are some really quite remarkable things. First of all, that the actual numbers of armed conflicts has really dramatically declined since the early 1990s by some 80 percent in the case of more serious conflicts defined as those involving a thousand or more battle deaths each year, by 40 percent if you bring into account those conflicts that had lesser number of direct casualties, and that's huge. The second point that's made and very well documented is that paralleling the decline in the number of conflicts, the number of battle deaths is also dramatically both in absolute numbers as you'd expect paralleling to decline in overall conflicts, but also in terms of the deadliness of each individual conflict, whereas, back in the 1950s and for three decades or so thereafter, the average number of battle deaths, violent deaths per conflict was of the order of 30- to 40,000 a year. By the early 2000s, this number was down to around 600, reflecting the shift from high-intensity to low-intensity conflict, also a geographical shift from Asia to Africa.

Of course, violent battle deaths are only a very small part of the whole story of the misery of war. As many as 90 percent of war-related deaths are due to disease and malnutrition rather than direct violence, and we certainly see that for example in The Congo and Darfur today where the huge mortality rates that are occurring much more to do

with those incidents of war, malnutrition and disease, rather than direct conflict. But the trend declined in battle deaths, violent deaths, is a very significant and highly encouraging story.

The third point that's made coming out of this along with many others is that there has been commensurately a dramatic increase in the number of conflicts which have been actually resolved by active peacemaking involving diplomatic negotiation and international mediation and the like. The high-level panel reporting to the Secretary General early last year in fact documented this equally graphically by saying that there had been more civil wars resolved by negotiation in the last 15 years than in the previous 200 years, and that's an intriguing figure and something I think justifies us being quite self-congratulatory about.

The only unequivocally bad news is the dramatic increases that have occurred in high-casualty terrorist attacks since 9/11, though even here the annual death toll from terrorist incidents with an international component remains of course only a very small fraction of the annual war death toll, so far anyway. Things would be obviously different if terrorists were able to manage a nuclear attack or something of that kind.

If one wants to try and explore the reasons contributing to these turnarounds in figures, they include obviously in a macro sense the end of the era of decolonization which generated around two-thirds or

more of all the wars that occurred from the 1950s to the 1980s, and of course, the end of the Cold War which meant no more proxy wars being fueled by either Washington or Moscow. Also over time, the end of the Cold war meant the demise of a number of authoritarian governments which had generated internal resentment and resistance, governments that each side of the Cold War had been propping up.

As the authors of the Human Security Report argue, the best explanation is the one that really stares us in the face even if a great many people don't particularly like accepting it at face value, and that is the huge increase in the level of activity in international preventive diplomacy, diplomatic peacemaking, peacekeeping and peace-building operations for the most part authorized by or mounted by the United Nations, a huge increase in that degree of activity, a sixfold increase in U.N.-preventive diplomacy missions, a fourfold increase in peace operations, and an elevenfold increase in the number of states subject to U.N. sanctions, although they got pretty problematic impact from time to time in some cases. It's this that I think is the point that needs to be made at the threshold, that this sort of activity for all its faults and all that's gone wrong, a lot has gone right and it's very important to be aware of that and build on it rather than to be in a condition of congenital depression about the state of international conflict.

Of course, the U.N. itself has not been the only player. Regional intergovernmental organizations, international financial

institutions to some extent, and certainly a number of individual states have been absolutely critical players. Also in a development, which I would say this wouldn't I, but a development which I think needs more attention than it's received is the much increased role of civil society and certain NGOs in this whole peace and security area. The International Crisis Group, for example, didn't exist a decade ago. It was created very specifically in the aftermath of Rwanda, Srebrenica, Somalia; those horrifying series of instances in the early to mid-1990s when the international community either failed completely to anticipate these critical situations or failed equally comprehensively in their response to them. And our organization was formed basically with the objective of getting governments to think about things they didn't want to think about and do things they didn't want to do, and I think with an increasing degree of success over the last decade we played that stimulatory prodding role, the provision of unavoidable data or unneglectable data, and lots of policy ideas and so on which have helped channel some of these responses that I'm referring to.

Enough of all that. Let's move on to what we have learned in more precise terms over the last 10 or 15 years from this experience. Let me say something under the three broad headings. First of all, preventing conflict outbreak; secondly, preventing the continuation of conflict or conflict resolution properly so-called; and thirdly, preventing the recurrence of conflict, the whole issue of post-conflict peace-building.

I want to identify about five lessons learned under each of these headings. There are probably many more lessons than that, but these are the ones that I wish to emphasize from my own organizations experience and I think the common experience of many others.

The first rule for preventing deadly conflict is, of course, not to start it in the first place, a message that the United States is certainly now pondering after the spectacular success of the war in Iraq and I hope pondering even more closely in the context of the current debate about what to do about Iran. The one further point other than that obvious one that I'd make in this context is that it was extremely disappointing that one of the many casualties of last year's World Summit was an attempt to bid down and get agreement about a set of prudential principles governing the use of military force. That was recommended by the high-level panel and recommended by Kofi Annan himself in the report that went forward, and had it been adopted would have I think done a great deal to concentrate the minds of the Security Council and other decision makers on the kinds of considerations that really do have to be taken very carefully into account before you take that plunge. It's not just a matter of the degree of seriousness of the threat to peace or humanity that's involved in the particular issue in question, it's also prudential considerations like last resort proportionality and the question as to the balance of good versus evil that will be done, the balance of consequences in actually carrying out the military operation. I won't go

into that in any more detail. It's an issue that for all practical purposes is dead at the moment because the P-5 countries in particular on the Security Council simply don't want any constraints of that kind, and certainly those who are tutoring themselves for possible Secretary General candidacies at the moment are learning not to even begin to talk about anything as remotely controversial as this, but it is very important if we're not to make some terrible mistakes in the future to focus a little bit more sharply on trying to get consensus in advance about these sorts of guidelines.

The second rule of conflict prevention is to understand the causal factors which are at work: political, economic, social, cultural, and personal, in each particular risk situation. There's a little bit of a tendency in international debate about these things for there to be fads and fashions about conflict causation usually paralleling the latest thesis of Paul Collier who comes up with a new one about every 9 months on these sorts of issues. I think it's very important to draw nourishment from these overarching theories about what it is that causes conflict, whether it's greed or grievance or other sorts of factors of that kind, but what is absolutely critical is detailed, case-by-case, context-specific analysis, not making assumptions on the basis of experience elsewhere, but looking at what is very directly under one's nose.

I just sort of think among all the myriad of situations that my organization is dealing with at the moment of the situation in Southern

Thailand in particular where there has been an almost automatic sort of rush to assume that this must be the product of the worldwide phenomenon of Islamism and Islamic militancy and that the conflict should be looked at in those terms. In fact, when you explore it, there are a whole series of local issues going back in history a very long time but linked with the behavior and misbehavior of local officials, the degree of sensitivity that's demonstrated or lack of it by the central government to various aspirations for degrees of self-governance and so on which have got very, very little to do with religion as such and nothing at all to do with militant Islam even though the neighborhood is showing signs of that phenomenon being at work in other ways. That's just one example of a myriad of one could reproduce at that time. So be very careful to explore the details of each given situation.

The third rule of conflict convention which we've all learned I think is to fully understand and be prepared to apply flexibly as circumstances change the full components of the conflict prevention toolbox, the range of possible measures both long-term structural, short-term operational, that can be deployed to deal with high-risk situations. Broadly speaking, we know the compartments in that toolbox, there are political and diplomatic tools, legal and constitutional ones, economic, military, both of the short-term and the long-term kind, and all of them need to be carefully, systematically considered. We know a hell of a lot more about what works and what doesn't in this respect than we did even

just 10 or 15 years ago, and that is one of the lessons learned, but it's very important of course that we have within our government and intergovernmental organization arrangements ways of systematically both referring to and bringing to bear that particular knowledge, and I could talk about the application of those tools to a myriad of different conflict situations, but for the moment let me just make the point in general and pass on.

The fourth rule is to be prepared obviously to put in the necessary government and intergovernmental resources where and when they're needed particularly at the early prevention stage. Of course, by early prevention stage, we also mean at the post-conflict peace-building stage where the cycle comes all the way around and you're once again back at the business of looking at long-term solutions to stop something breaking out again which you've worked laboriously hard to resolve. The resource question speaks for itself. It's the constant bane of policy makers. If the resources are not available, I'm sure Carlos will have some words about that in terms of his United States experience.

I think the most critical general point I would make from my own experience is just how important it is within national governments for there to be a whole of government joined up approach to working at the application of resources and, indeed, general conflict prevention strategies. The Brits have probably gone further than anyone else in bringing together the Foreign Office, the aid organization DFID and the

Ministry of Defense into a common sort of organizational framework with pooled funds, pooled resources that are able to be devoted to these things. That's thought to be happening here in the States with the creation of Carlos's former office and some other things that are going on in the system, but one has a sense that this is at best a pretty much a gleam in the eye and there's a long, long way to go before there's a genuinely joined up approach to this, but very important that that be the case because by and large there is no one-to-one relationship between those with the sort of policy expertise in recognizing and dealing with these problems and those with the real hefty resources and you've got to be somehow able to mix and meld and bring those resources together.

The final and final point I'd make about conflict prevention is the necessity for governments to leverage those resources by using again all the extraordinary capability that is now available from nongovernmental organizations and civil society generally. That's a very familiar message for governments in the context of disaster relief and humanitarian operations where they and intergovernmental organizations have long been familiar with utilizing as partners the myriad of NGOs that are operating in this area. It's a much more recently acquired message or lessons in the context of nonhumanitarian context, but I think nonetheless a very important one, and it really is quite dramatic the increased role and I think professional credibility that NGOs have around

the place on these issues and it's important that government learn that lesson and apply it.

Let me move to conflict resolution and the lessons to be derived about that when prevention fails and you've got a full-blown conflict in front of you. There are a number of things that I think can be said about what it is that makes a successful peace accord. I'm talking here about conflict resolution in the context of diplomatic resolution rather than resolution at the end of a gun which may become necessary as we all know in particular extreme situations, but by and large, what all of us want to see is better conflict management, conflict resolution through diplomatic strategies.

What is it that makes a successful diplomatic strategy a successful negotiated accord? The first lesson is that a peace accord is not so much an event as a process and signing an agreement is not the end of it. The critical need is to generate ownership, a sense of commitment to that process of a really extreme kind by the warring parties so that the commitments are not just internalized so they will in fact stick. I think to get to that stage requires an awful lot of sophistication and hands-on commitment by those who are involved in mediating or otherwise assisting that negotiation, and that's been a very conspicuously variable quality in recent years and one that we should be placing more attention on developing.

The North-South Sudan negotiations I think are an example of a process of this kind at it best. The Kenyan mediator, General Sumbeiywo, a much unheralded figure in the resolution of the Sudan North-South conflict, played an extraordinarily hands-on, focused, thoughtful role over a very long period in bringing that together. Without naming names, it was a fairly obvious contrast between the rather benighted fashion in which the current FUOR [?] negotiations, alleged negotiations, are proceeding. There are dynamics at work which are making it very difficult for any mediator to negotiate and to bring people to together, but one has the sense that we're not seeing the real professionalism and real commitment that's necessary to make that process work and get the buy-in that's necessary.

A second lesson about peace accords is that any such accord has to really deal with all the fundamentals of the dispute, all the issues which have to be resolved if normality is to return. Sometimes, just sometimes, you can do this on a sequential, phased piecemeal basis with confidence-building measures now and postponing the resolution and leave some of the hard issues to later on. Negotiations are underway about Nagorno-Karabakh, for example, in the Southern Caucasus may well be an example and it's an approach which we ourselves have recommended in that particular context. But rather more often, and I guess the failed Oslo Process for the Israel-Palestine peace shows how risky that kind of approach can be where each stage of the so-called

confidence-building process becomes really a prisoner of the last extremist standing on either side and you can get yourself in terrible difficulties of the kind that we've seen.

The third lesson is that any successful peace accord has to get the balance right between peace and justice. The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission muddled with its amnesties for the perpetrators of even serious crimes but based on their acknowledgement of what they'd done is very widely admired, but it is the case that in other circumstances, sustainable peace just won't be possible without a significant element of actual retributive justice. But the point that I'd make and make very strongly from again our own experience of these things is that you just have to take a deep breath and leave it up to the people of the country themselves to work out which place on this spectrum, all the way from truth and reconciliation to retribution and way stations in between is the right place for them. I just find it rather tacky to have external commentators lamenting the absence of will whether it's of the Cambodians or the East Timor leadership to get in there and start stringing people up. If the locals have made a decision and if you can be confident that they've made decision on a majority basis and freely not to go that way but to just live and let live and put the horrible past behind them, that's something I think we ought to be very much prepared to accept and not, again, try and apply any routine formulae to these situations.

A fourth lesson about conflict resolution is the terms of any accord and the method of its enforcement and implementation just has to be sufficiently resilient to deal with spoilers, those who would seek to undermine or overturn it. The role of spoilers in making a mess of peace negotiations is really only now beginning to be fully appreciated and recognized. I was just over at USIP, interestingly, a few minutes ago and there's a working group of the great and the good from the Washington policy establishment right now working on the subject of spoilers, who they are and what are the best strategies for dealing with them, whether by way of co-option embrace, addressing grievance, or zapping as the case may be, and there was a variety of responses that are appropriate depending on the particular circumstances, but that's a critical issue.

The fifth and final point about conflict resolution is, and this follows really from the last point, that a peace accord to be successful must have the necessary degree of international support with all the guarantees and commitment of resources that are necessary to make it stick. All too many of these things have fallen apart in the past simply because of that absence of commitment, and that's the biggest lesson of all I think to learn, which brings us into the final stage of this which is preventing recurrence, post-conflict peace-building. I think the biggest lesson of all about the handling of conflict that we've learned in recent years is the critical necessity of post-conflict peace-building because, as we know all too well, the best indicator of future conflict is past conflict,

and if you don't deal with all the dimensions of the past conflict, wrap it up at both the transitional peacekeeping stage and then at the longer-term peace-building stage, you buy yourself real problems.

The wanton genocide of 1994 followed let's remember the Arusha peace deal just a year before, but an Arusha peace deal that was not followed-up in any effective systematic way by the wider international community. The Angolan civil war that continued for another decade after the Bicesse Agreement of 1991: again, well-intentioned but failed effort to consolidate peace. So you've really got to get this stuff right, and Haiti is the other classic demonstration, Afghanistan the other classic demonstration, and it may be proving to be a demonstration all over again, Afghanistan, a case study well worth looking at in this context. But you've just got to get it right.

What do you have to do to post-conflict peace-building right? Again, five quick lessons. First, sort out who should do what and when immediately over a medium period of transition in the longer-term; allocate the roles, coordinate them effectively both internationally and on the ground; coordinate them within governments, coordinate them within intergovernmental organizations, coordinate all the interfaces. This of course is the primary role that the Peace-Building Commission has been established to fill, there having been a huge gap in the past in terms of any kind of institution anywhere in the system able with credibility to play this sort of role. It's particularly critical that the Peace-Building

Commission be primarily responsive at least in the early stage of its operations in any given country to the U.N. Security Council rather than just to AKESOC [?], and mercifully that's almost accepted in the way the negotiations have finally worked out because unless you got the full executive authority of the Security Council standing behind you, a lot of these coordination efforts are likely to run into the stand. That's the first point.

The second one is obviously again that the necessary resources have to be committed and sustained over time. This is another critical role for the Peace-Building Commission given the long and very lamentable history of ad hoc donors' conferences as being the only real vehicle for ensuring that sustained commitment and of course, not producing anything in the nature of sustained commitment at all, rather a classic sort of curve with a very big bump at one end of it and then tailing out quite dramatically rather than being sustained once the immediate crisis is over. Darfur at the moment in military terms, Afghanistan at the moment in military terms as well as in economic terms, are classic examples of the need for that sort of sustained follow-through commitment, and hopefully the Peace-Building Commission will play a substantial role in that respect.

A third lesson, a very obvious one, understand the local political dynamics, understand for God's sake the limits of what outsiders can do. Iraq I guess is the current unhappiest example of how much can

go wrong when that understanding is conspicuously lacking, but we really should try hard to learn from that experience.

A fourth general point, do recognize that multiple objectives in peace-building have to be pursued simultaneously, physical security may always be the first priority but it can't be the only priority, and rule of law and justice issues and economic governance and anticorruption measures really deserve much higher priority than they've usually been given. In fact, of all the lessons learned that I think we've come to acknowledge most forcibly in my own organization is the absolute centrality of these justice and rule of law issues which unfortunately have been rather neglected in all too many of these transitional scenarios.

Finally, all intrusive peace operations need some kind of exit strategy, if not an exit timetable, and an exit strategy that's not just devoted to holding elections as soon as possible as important as it obviously is to vest real authority and responsibility in the people of the country being rebuilt, every peace-building situation has its own dynamic, but many of the worst peace-building mistakes of the last decade have had more to do with leaving too soon or doing too little rather than staying too long or trying to do too much. This is a classic dilemma. Of course, in Iraq at the moment, an exit strategy has certainly been identified, i.e., getting the government in place hopefully with a revised constitution to work with and security forces in place that can handle the job presently being done by the internationals, and there has

been no willingness at all to identify a timetable but, rather, just that strategy, one of the real debates that's still in the process of unwinding is whether it is good enough just to have a strategy or whether you need a timetable as well to reinforce that. I won't jump into that debate, but just to say that this is the sort of issue that we do constantly need to embrace.

Let me just say last of all that it's really important to appreciate how far we have come in the last 10 or 15 years. When I sort of talk this sort of talk now I can't help but think to myself how much of this sounds pretty banal and pretty obvious to any of us who are in this business, but then I think back to what it was like just a decade ago or 15 years ago when I was Foreign Minister and trying to write books and energize the U.N. system and others about the necessity for a much more at the time that Boutros Ghali was producing his Agenda for Peace and so on, to really focus on the detailed dimensions of all these strategies and how much of this then was just absolutely new. It wasn't part of anybody's thinking, and certainly not part of anyone's operational response to these situations. So if it does all sound a bit banal, at least it's a recognition that we have learned something along the way. But the truth of the matter is, very last word, that for all that we have learned and for all that goes right and for all of those statistics I mentioned at the outset speak for themselves, we do still have a lot more work to do and a great deal more resources to put in to ensuring that these things work successfully.

So leadership, political will, that usual, inevitable missing ingredient, is absolutely critical at the political level if that's to happen, and it is extremely important if in turn that's to be mobilized, but in the wider policy community, these issues for all their banality or all their obviousness do get totally internalized and do get part of really an ongoing campaign and ongoing pressure in the political environment because without that, a lot of this stuff which we know what we should be doing unfortunately won't get done.

MS. RICE: Thank you so much, Gareth, for what was an absolutely excellent and I think extremely comprehensive overview of lessons learned. And thank you also for the historical perspective and injecting a note of optimism into our analysis here.

I'm going to turn to Carlos, but before I do, let me point out for those of you standing in the back, long-suffering souls, there are at least two seats here in the first two rows. And if others who are sitting next to empty seats would be kind enough to raise their hands, I think it would help at least those in heels if not everyone. Thank you. Carlos?

MR. PASCUAL: Susan, thanks very much. Gareth, I really appreciate you joining us today despite you're not feeling well being willing to make the presentation because this really has been a transforming issue for the international community and there really has been no organization that has been more transforming than the International Crisis Group, frankly. You've been ubiquitous throughout

the world and the fact that you have been on the ground and have become an early warning system for the entire international community is, one, a testimony to your tremendous conviction and drive, but the tremendous conviction and drive of the organization as a whole, and the conviction of the people that you have on the ground and their ability to establish relationships and get back information which is fast and reliable. We all know that it's always impossible to be perfectly accurate all the time, but you've got people who understand how to balance information that is timely with at the same time being responsible in the way that you report it, and I think the fact that so many people have come to depend on ICG as their early warning mechanism for what's actually going on around the world is a testimony to the work that you've done, so you should feel very, very proud of that.

Susan, thanks for moderating this panel, and it's great having you here because you bring your perspective where you've been looking at transnational issues and their impact on stability and security threats and how those interrelate to one another, but you've also got a tremendous amount of government experience both in the White House and as Assistant Secretary for Africa, and so getting your perspective here is terrific for us.

I just want to add a couple of things to the context and then say a few things about prevention and planning and things that we've learned, lessons that we've learned there, and then response capacity and

particularly to focus on the U.S. dimension of this. I think Gareth did a terrific job of actually outlining the broader lessons on the international arena, and I can only second what you write out. On all three of those issue areas I think you hit on exactly the right points.

From a U.S. perspective, this issue has been evolutionary just it has been with the international community, and when we think about where we were a few years ago including with planning and implementation of the campaigns for Iraq and Afghanistan and where we are today and where we are today and where we're moving in creating a greater U.S. government capacity to handle these issues, I think it's light years in difference and I'll try to outline that and demonstrate it in some ways.

Yet at the same time what we've also come to realize and understand is that if you don't get the planning and the analysis right up front, it makes the job three times harder as you go on down the road, and it reinforces the importance of what we're trying to do and build the capacity to understand and prevent it when you can, to plan for conflict when you have to be prepared for it and then to be able to respond capably.

I've said this many times and I think it's worth repeating again; it's going to be an evolutionary process to make this change. For me it was instructive in my previous job as Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization when I'd discuss these issues with

Secretary Powell when we were starting and we reflected on the Goldwater-Nickels legislation and the importance that that had with the military in creating a joint operations capability. As Secretary Powell reflected, even with that legislation, it still took the military 15 years to develop an effective joint operations capability. In a sense what we're trying to do now on issues related to conflict is to create a joint operations capability among civilian agencies and between civilian agencies and the military to both prevent conflict and respond to conflict. We're doing that without legislation, we're doing that without the same level of resources, we're doing that without the kind of military hierarchy that you would have that informs the way the people within the services actually responded and performed on these kinds of issues, so it is going to take time.

But I think it's worth highlighting some of the elements of progress that have been achieved. There is a draft Planning Framework that the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization is circulating for comment along with Joint Forces Command among the military and among civilian agencies where as before there never was a common framework that could be used for planning purposes. There's an essential tasks list of key issues of transition that is built on the work that CSIS and the Association of the U.S. Army have done. There are new authorities that have been put in place. Susan mentioned one of them, a Department of Defense Directive on Stability Operations. But

even more broadly than that, the President issued a Presidential Directive which made absolutely clear that it is the responsibility of the Secretary of State to play the lead role for the U.S. government in planning for stabilization and reconstruction activities and coordinating the interagency community, and that is, frankly, a change from where policy had been. And within that broader umbrella, the Department of Defensive directive actually fits in and puts them as a contributor to the broader U.S. government efforts which are coordinated by the State Department rather than having the Department of Defense as lead, I think another very important development.

There are models that have been developed for operations between the civilian world and the military world, combat commands in the field with advanced civilian teams, in Washington on how to coordinate more effectively. I think that there are good ideas that have been put on the table for funding mechanisms for the kinds of skills that are necessary for stabilization and reconstruction, for coordination with the international community and engagement with the nongovernmental world. I would stress many of those are proposals that still have not been funded and operationalized.

I think there's a solid base there, and a question that we have to face is how to build from that. That's going to depend on political will, it's going to depend on resources, on the ability to actually learn and adapt those lessons into practice, and finally, the capacity to

transcend bureaucratic boxes which is not always simple for any bureaucracy or any government.

But we have to remember now if we put this back in the military context and we think about joint operations, that has become the lexicon for how the military operates. In the mid 1980s, jointness was a nasty word. It was simply not adhered to by the military. Nobody wanted to pursue it and it had to be an absolute mind frame change in the way the military operated, and we have to keep thinking about this when we bring this back to issues of civilian cooperation on issues related to conflict.

Let me say a few words on prevention and planning and talk about three key areas in which lessons have been learned. The first is that there has really been a convergence in the literature and in the Executive Branch that the threat of failed and weak states is one of the greatest threats that we face today, but there still is a lack of capacity to act on that and a lack of consensus on how to do it. Gareth and ICG and others have done a tremendous job on early warning, and there are a whole range of other early warning mechanisms that have been put out there and are known publicly.

If we look at the National Security Strategy, it starts off by saying that America is now threatened less by conquering states than we are by failing ones. If we look at Secretary Rice's op-ed that came out in The Washington Post on December 11, 2005, it says that the greatest

threats to our security are defined more by the dynamics within weak and failing states than by the borders between strong and aggressive ones. So the next logical point that one would think is if there is that consensus, then what are the greatest threats, and is there a strategy to prevent them, and that is where we get into the shortfalls because there is no consensus on what the greatest threats are.

The Presidential Directive that was recently issued gives the Secretary of State the lead role for this responsibility, but there are still activities that are being pursued on the part of the Department of Defense in an exercise that they call the Ungoverned Areas Exercise. AID is involved in activities related to fragile states and developing their own list of areas for potential concern. And as of now, there is not one single process to bring all of these together to achieve consensus on the principal threats and then to develop a preventive strategy.

The process I would hold is not that complicated. If we were just to think about the articles that we're seen in the newspapers over the last 2 weeks and ask ourselves the question where have there been massive riots over the now-infamous cartoons and where there may be significant implications for the United States? What are some of the major oil suppliers in the world? What are some of the countries that would have a massive impact on regional security and U.S. presence and investment? It wouldn't take long, for example, to at least come up with

a three-country list of Pakistan, Egypt and Nigeria as three countries that we should be paying a lot of attention to.

So the next logical question would be if in fact democracy is an underlying theme of U.S. foreign policy right now, how would an increased devolution or increased spread of democratic forces in those environments actually influence stability in those countries if we were to look ahead for a period of 12 months or a couple of years? And in those environments how would you manage that increased democratic process with ethnic and religious tensions and with inequalities or suppression of moderate parties that may have occurred? The irony of it is that the situation in the Palestinian Territory and with Hamas and the surprise that everybody felt should have taught us that we absolutely have to put issues like this on the front burner because if we don't think about them in advance and think about potential solutions in advance, it becomes all the harder to manage them when you're in the middle of the crisis situation.

If nothing else, one of the things that would be important to do particularly related to the issue of democracy is to try to reach a consensus that can be developed with regional organizations and international organizations on what is necessary to participate in a competitive political process. For example, that you renounce violence, that you put aside militias, that you accept political and cultural pluralism, that you accept political succession on the basis of a vote as

the basis for the succession of political power. If those issues had would argue been discussed a year ago in relationship to the Palestinian Territory and had been agreed upon in advance, the dialogue and the debate that we would have today would be much different.

In addition to that, there are simply practical things that can be done within the U.S. government, creating one process that leads to a consensus on where those principal threats are in the international community. To use the National Security Council and the Deputies Committee processes necessary to be able to facilitate that consensus so that there can be a common view across the U.S. government on how to focus resource. To be able to game some of the possibilities in advance, and Gareth, I think you made a very important point, that that gaming of what could happen has to be put in a country-specific context. But particularly we have to look at how as you again said use all of those items in the toolbox in specific cases, and in particular those toughest cases that can have a destabilizing impact.

For those of us in the nongovernmental world, I think it's a challenge because given some of the problems that government faces with these issues, I think it's incumbent for us to take up some of these problems in the nongovernmental dialogue. Ironically, the most sensitive cases are the hardest to work on because you can imagine that if it simply leaked that the U.S. government was concerned about the stability and the fragility in country X, Y or Z, and that it was popularized that there

was a process in the U.S. government to actually look at those cases, it could in and of itself become a political crisis which can make it all the more difficult to deal with these issues. So this is something where I think the nongovernmental community has something particularly to offer.

A second issue area on prevention, which is to plan based on the goals that we seek to achieve or promote in a given country. Some people have called these goals the attainment of sustainable peace, others have used the words viable peace, others have called it sustainable stability, my previous office started to call it locally led nation peace. Whatever the words you want to use, it comes out to two basic issues. One is that you have to build up the capacity of institutions in a country to be able to lead that country so that it's not dependent on the international community for stability and defining a course for the future, and until you do that and get some local ownership and consensus on a strategy forward, it is extraordinarily difficult to succeed. Secondly, you have to work on bringing down the drivers of conflict, those things that can bring a society to war, and if you ignore those very factors that led you into a conflict to begin with, whether they be corruption or ethnic or religious tensions or political exclusion or income inequalities or, as in the case of Darfur for example, access to land and water, if you don't deal with some of those fundamental issues, you will revisit that conflict and so you have to incorporate that into your planning process.

I think the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization has developed an effective planning framework that helps deal with these issues, and I think that planning framework will get stronger as it goes through consultations with the military and the government and with the nongovernmental community. Implementing it is going to be a tremendous challenge and has in some cases I think almost proven a near impossible task. It took 6 months of applying this framework to just get a strategy together on Sudan and Haiti that looked at the broader set of issues that were being confronted in each of those countries. In effect, what's happened is that because the budgetary process in the United States is broken down into 19 separate, different budgetary accounts, and that's simply on the foreign operations side, what you end up getting is that individual agencies will tell you what their goals are for economic support funds or development assistance or child survival money or HIV/AIDS money or international narcotics money or peacekeeping money or disaster assistance money, but ask the question of what is it that is the right thing to do in a given country, what is it that will most advance U.S. interests in that given country, and it's almost impossible to get an answer. It is truly like pulling teeth.

In addition to that, it's more complicated by the way that budgets are maintained. In the State Department there is generally an orientation to maintain country-level budgets, in AID, they get their budgetary information on the basis of accounts, and so you try cross-

walking these things in a way that actually makes sense and brings you back to the same strategy, and it's almost impossible to do.

So some very basic things that I think need to be considered, one is the importance of eliminating the current account structure and moving to some form of an account structure that it's based on the performance of countries, performing countries such as those eligible for the Millennium Challenge Corporation, developing countries that are the bulk of the development assistance portfolio, and those countries that are either in a fragile state or building state capacity state that are in an upward movement, so that you can deal with them as a whole and your budget is allocated on the basis of those countries and it gives you the flexibility to actually ask in a given country if your budget is $150 million, how do you use that most effectively to advance U.S. interests, rather than having to sit back in a country and say my gosh, here we are, there are 19 accounts out there, how can I cobble something together in this country that might actually make sense. If you can change those budgetary incentives, we can actually end up with better policy.

That's going to be difficult to do. The administration had considered that as part of its foreign aid reform program and has not put that forward yet formally. At a minimum, one of the things I think that needs to get established is the creation of a conflict response fund that would at least provide the resources available, whether it's $100 million to $200 million, to give the flexibility of those that are coordinating the

planning process to be able to get agencies the incentive to come together and look beyond their individual budgetary interests and what is the right to do and if we outline the right things, to have some sense of confidence that there can be some budgetary resources to jump-start those activities.

A very simple thing that I think needs to be considered with AID and the State Department to unify their budget processes. You have an Office of Program and Policy Coordination in AID, you have a Resource Management Office in the State Department, they deal essentially with the same sets of issues, they look at their budgets in different ways, they're all supposedly operating under the authority of the Secretary of State, there shouldn't be different offices, it shouldn't be based on different accounts, it should be brought together in one unitary office looking at the management of U.S. government resources.

Finally, I think another key lessons on this whole planning process is that once a plan is developed and resources are put against it, one has to have the reality check of going back and asking the question, can you actually achieve your goals based on the strategy that you outlined and the resources that are available, because too often we get ourselves in the situation that we get stuck on the lofty and the rhetorical and we don't make the effort of actually linking that back to who's going to do it and what are the resources they're going to do it with and how fast they can do it and whether they can sustain the effort over time.

The third basket of issues is I think it's critical to build a U.S. and international civilian planning capacity and to be able to interlink that with the military. Let me give you an example on Afghanistan. Many people have hailed the Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan as a real success story, though there are many NGOs that have not liked it. In some ways, both pieces of the picture are true. If one thinks about 2004 and the introduction of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams particularly in rural parts—

[End Side A. Begin Side B.]

MR. PASCUAL: [In progress] —thinking about the rule of law, they at least created the semblance of order and stability that gave people a feeling that they can participate in a state, and I do think that the Provincial Reconstruction Teams made an important contribution to, particularly, the successful national elections that took place in October 2004.

They are not a recipe for development or are they an exit strategy for achieving success in a country. They are simply a military mechanism of establishing a presence on the ground where development was done by opportunity. Patrols were made, a well was broken, you fix the well, you fix a school, you fix a health clinic, but it's not a recipe for success. Eventually, if you're going to change this, there needs to be civilian capabilities who are brought in who can begin to work with provincial officials on provincial strategies that are tied in to a national

strategy that can bring in the NGO world and can bring in the private sector, and if you can't make that transition, you don't continue to achieve success. The point of this is that this kind of joint civilian-military planning needs to take place up front and if we look at how NATO has deployed these PRTs for the most part, they've simply gone in every single circumstance and started with principally a military and security mission with minimal attention to the broader transitional requirements in order to achieve success. As a result of that, a year and a half down the road, everybody stops and says my gosh, if we don't actually change the way that we're organized and increase and change the capabilities that we have on the ground and change the way that resources are allocated, we're not going to have a way out of here and we're not going to have success. That doesn't need to happen if we can build that planning capability between civilians and the military up front.

It will not be simply to do. Look at this in perspective of the numbers. Just think of Iraq, for example, where we have 150,000 or so military on the ground, in Afghanistan, 20,000 military. There are 6,000 U.S. Foreign Service officers total around the world. Let's just say as a proxy that the principal planners that exist are those who are in the Office of Stabilization and Reconstruction and the Policy Planning staff in the State Department. At best you're looking at 75 to 80 people who have a planning function or capacity in the State Department world. AID has about 1,500 Foreign Service officers right now, probably more in

planning capability, but the number of people it has to actually deploy is absolutely minuscule.

We certainly have different cultures at play between the State Department where there has been a tradition of looking at plans as something that constrains your ability to act, rather than something that helps you look at the future and how you game out different options on how you might be able to operate. So there needs to be still a massive change on how we approach planning, but it's only going to happen if we have the personnel to make it possible.

I think the model that has been put out there again by the administration makes a lot of sense. In the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, the vision has been to eventually have 80 people; an Active Response Corps of quick-response capability spread across the State Department that can be quickly mobilized to manage activities on the ground proposed initially at about 100 people. Initially there was discussion about creating a Technical Response Crops across U.S. government agencies and particularly drawing from USAID, the Department of Justice, and Department of the Treasury. If you just take moderate estimates of how much it costs to sustain somebody in the U.S. government for one given year and take those numbers of 80, 100 and 100, that's about $56 million right there. If you take some moderate percentage for training these people, say another $5 million, let's just say roughly $60 million of what it would take to sustain something like this.

Currently, the amount that the administration is seeking including the amount that the administration is allocating through its detailed staff is about $16 million, a significant gap between the two of them.

Let me move into a few issues on response capabilities, and let me just touch on these points quickly and then get into the question and answers.

I would second what Gareth said about the importance of stability, order and transition to a rule of law. If you don't get this part of the transition right, you never get to any other part of it, and it is one part that over time we still have not been able to mobilize sufficient resources and capabilities. In Iraq we saw what happened early on when there was lack of clarity on who had the responsibility to maintain stability and order and we saw that if you don't up front establish a monopoly on who can use force, then you enter into a chaotic situation and it's much harder to obtain control later on.

In Afghanistan we saw a very different kind of problem where, ironically, the budgetary window that was available to work with became the principal factor that was defining the early proposed solutions on the part of the U.S. government. Let me be specific about that. Policing activities in the U.S. government are funded in the Foreign Operations Account through the International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Office. Because of the budgetary window that they operate with, when the Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement

went into Afghanistan, they essentially asked the question, if we have potentially $100 million available over 6 or 7 years, how do we structure a program for that amount of money that will make sense, and I think they actually developed a pretty logical program within those constraints of $100 million.

Two years later the U.S. military comes back and looks at it and says, my God, if that's what we have as a program and if we look at the broader international community and we look at the through-put in developing local policing capabilities, it's going to be 12 years before we have sufficient police that are trained who can actually maintain stability and order. We can't do that. In addition to that, it's costing us several billion dollars a year to maintain the U.S. military, so why don't we invest more resources. One of the ironies where there this is the difference between the two accounts with the savings and the defense budget are not necessarily translated as to how you can use that money more effectively in the foreign operations account. As a result of that, what's ended up happening is it's pushed more and more of these activities toward the defense budget, whereas they should in fact come out of the civilian budgets and be run by civilians because they're essentially civilian functions.

The numbers that we have are absolutely minuscule. In Haiti we need 1,700 police, in Kosovo when we started I think we had about

5,000, but still the capacity to mobilize those numbers out of the U.S. and the international community has been extremely strained.

Some of the lessons on this that are important, I think one is that we should look at jointly funding these activities out of civilian and defense budgets but with civilian administration. Take the example of foreign military financing. It is financed actually in the Foreign Operations Account of the State Department. The money is transferred to the Department of Defense for implementation. If this in fact is an area that is of direct interest to the Department of Defense and the deployment of U.S. troops abroad, then I think there is a rationale of actually deploying money in the Defense Department and transferring it to the State Department for management and for administration.

A second key issue is going to be the development of some form of civilian reserve corps for the deployment of police, police trainers and rule of law experts. Right now most of these capabilities are deployed through contractual mechanisms. As a result of that, there is on capacity to have a common doctrine, to train in advance, to exercise in advance, and so people are being put on the ground cold. In order to maintain a reserve corps of about 3,000 people and sustain it over time would be a recurrent cost of about $50 million. The administration this year has asked for $25 million to begin the process of creating it. If we in fact are serious about having that capacity to mobilize and move

quickly, it's going to take an investment of resources. It's not just simply going to happen because we think it's a good idea.

A second area here is the need for rapid response funds. The costs that I just mentioned for a civilian reserve capability, for example, do not include any kind of deployment costs. What we have learned painfully over time is that we have a window of necessity in transition where you need to get on the ground quickly and demonstrate a difference both on the security side and to begin to deliver services and benefits to the population to sustain their interest in a process of peace. You can only do that if you have untied funds to be able to move them quickly.

When the U.S. Congress appropriates money, it's for a particular purpose. If you have to go back and undo that money to begin with, you're going to lose 3 to 6 months, and by the time you actually move it to the people who can utilize it and you get the people on the ground, you've lost a year. You need to have that money freed up and separated.

One of the things that I think would be interesting is if you can finally get appropriators to start having a dialogue and debate about these questions. There has been a tremendous amount of sympathy on the authorizing committees in the House and the Senate. The Armed Services Committees have begun to demonstrate in these capabilities. And it would be interesting if we can get, for example, the Foreign Operations

Subcommittee on Appropriations, the Defense Subcommittee on Appropriations, to actually hold a joint hearing to look at how the appropriation of these funds would provide a savings overall for the U.S. government and provide savings on lives rather than looking at it from the narrow perspective of the foreign operations budget or the defense budget.

Finally, the thing that I would stress is the importance from a U.S. standpoint of developing a capability to work with the private sector, with the NGO community and international partners. We cannot leave that out of our lexicon. The principal skills to be able to address most of these issues on the ground, not necessarily to manage the programs, the responsibility which the U.S. government has, but the skills to actually deliver security, law enforcement, economic recovery, justice, political transition, are going to come from the private and nongovernmental world. So we have to have a better understanding of how to tap into those databases and those skill bases. We have to I think have a capability of having pre-competed contracts. The concept of indefinite quantity contracts is now new to the U.S. government, but it's something that the Congress generally doesn't like because it doesn't tell you in advance when a contract is issued how it might be used on the ground. The problem is that if we don't have that capacity up front, by the time that you go through the U.S. government's competitive

contracting processes and select someone to deploy to the field, again, you've lost a 9-month period and your window of opportunity.

In terms of coordination, I think that there is a huge opportunity to engage in a stronger dialogue with NATO and the European Union. There is a landmark development at NATO that took place at the end of the year. They incorporated into their comprehensive political guidance which is the mechanism that they use to support or guide the ongoing transformation of NATO, instructions that say that NATO should look at how it should coordinate with civilian entities that are responsible for stabilization and reconstruction and incorporate that into their military planning process. It may seem pretty benign, but it's basically saying to NATO as a military operation that if in their military plans they aren't talking with the U.N., the E.U., bilateral donors, the NGO world in understanding how those civilian reconstruction capabilities are going to be brought to bear in a given country's circumstance, that they don't have an exit strategy and, therefore, they're going to stuck there for an indefinite period of time. Hence, the opportunity to work more closely with NATO on the one hand to help them understand how to build that capability but, secondly, I think to start forging a dialogue between NATO and the E.U. on how they can work more constructively on conflict response.

The situation that we saw in Darfur a few months ago on the deployment of African Union troops to the ground was indicative of the

need to have a better way to address this because neither NATO had a full capability nor the E.U. had a full capability to actually get this done, and so why in the world did they have to get into a fight over who was going to have the lead role and how to make this happen? But in effect, what it ended up doing was delaying for months the capacity to actually deploy those troops. There needs to be a better mechanism up front to undertake these kinds of activities.

If you put together the various things that I've talked about here, the $60 million for personnel, $50 million to sustain some form of a Civilian Response Corps, a conflict response fund which I would say would logically be in the order of $200 million perhaps jointly funded between the foreign operations budget and the defense budget, still we're talking about $310 million, $300 million. In the overall scheme of things, especially in the overall scheme of the defense budget of $450 billion, this is absolutely minuscule. The administration has been putting out its proposals for fiscal year '06. It asks for $121.4 million. The amount that it's going to actually have to be able to work with is about $16 million. For '07 the administration is asking for $20 million in operational costs and another $75 million in conflict response funds, still I think probably about a third of what's necessary to start to begin to become effective.

We have this danger of getting ourselves in an unvirtuous cycle, and this is potentially going to happen in the United States and

internationally as well, where within the administration people keep asking what is it that the Congress will potentially fund, and let's actually then make our proposals within the context of what the Congress will fund. Within the Congress we get those who are saying, you know, this is an interesting issue, but we don't exactly understand it and if the administration really wants it they can reallocate funds from within their budget to actually do it. So you get this negative cycle that starts occurring where the money just keeps getting ratcheted and ratcheted further down and in the end you just can't achieve what you want to do if you don't step back from it and say, no, let's go back and look at the goals that we set out, let's think about how important this is, let's think about the national security strategy and what the President said which is that America is now threatened less by conquering states than we are by failing ones, and if we believe that, then let's allocate the resources to it that are necessary to achieve success.

MS. RICE: Thank you so much, Carlos. That was incredibly thoughtful and I think a very, very practical set of insights and recommendations. The bottom line is always the money, and I think you put that very forcefully and very effectively. I know you all are eager to begin to ask questions. I hope we have microphones handy.

I just want to start with one opening question to Gareth which picks up on something that Carlos pointed to in his talk. He quoted from Secretary Rice and alluded to the fact that the administration

has put a great deal of emphasis for many good reasons on democracy promotion as the best long-term antidote to instability, to terrorism, to conflict. I wanted to ask you, Gareth, to what extent your experience through ICG and as Foreign Minister would lead you to support that notion? And how would you weigh in relative terms the importance of democracy promotion, development, eliminating disparities and inequalities, fighting corruption, as critical aspects over the long-term of preventing potentially weaker, fragile states from devolving into conflict and posing a whole range of other problems for the international community?

MR. EVANS: A small question to start with. I'm glad you said long-term because it's pretty clear in recent events that are shoved at right in our face that in the short-term the huge enthusiasm for democracy in the context in which the ground has been not very well prepared can be unhappily a destabilizing factor, but that should not inhibit us in any way from pursuing with huge enthusiasm the achievement of democratic outcomes.

What we've learned over and over again is that the only way you can ensure that democracy will take hold and produce genuinely representative outcomes and ones that are especially hair raising at the same time for policy makers elsewhere is to prepare the ground for it by creating a strong civil society and creating the environment in which many political doors are open. If you do what a number of countries

have done and steadfastly over a long period of time squash all forms of moderate political dissent and inhibit all forms of civil society institution building and all forms of the beginnings of developing institutions through which votes can ultimately be channeled, you buy yourself a heap of problems in Islamic societies very often in these environments. The only door that's left open is that of the mosque, and it's hardly surprising under those circumstances that dissent and unhappiness takes an increasingly Islamic kind of a guise and a one-dimensional guise in the transitional phase.

It's fantastically important to hang in there on this and to bring to bear strategies which do genuinely work not just at the superficial business of having an election as soon as possible to create in a transitional situation some government that has some reasonable claim to credibility as compared with an unelected government, you've got to do more than that.

But in the context of a country like Pakistan which we have spent a long of time analyzing this phenomenon of democracy and its strengths and weaknesses where you're constantly dealing with the argument that the democratic forces have let the country down on successive occasions and you've got to be very, very careful indeed about embracing the great principles we all like to talk about, my organization has got a very, very strong view that the only solution for a weak democracy or democratic failures in the past is to have more democracy

in the future. There is no alternative but to create an environment, an open society environment, in which you let all these dynamics flourish and out of that eventually some sense will emerge and certainly some real credibility and vibrancy will emerge. It's not a matter of stepping back; it's a matter of stepping forward to recognize that if the groundwork has not been done over a long period, there are bound to be some perceived short-term problems but not to let that stand in the way of that strategy being adopted.

In terms of the relative importance of democracy versus all the other sorts of strategies, rules of law and so on and economic development, it's very difficult to say other than that all of these things have to be pursued simultaneously, that ultimately none of them are really all that much more important than the others because they all feed together and bounce off each other and are interdependent. If anything though, if it does come to a hierarchy of immediate objectives in dealing with these fragile-state situations, post-conflict situations, our money is on the rule of law stuff rather than creating the architecture of a democracy which may well lack substance because there hasn't been the amount of preparation time that's gone into it. I hope that doesn't sound like any willingness to go along for a totalitarian ride or an authoritarian ride for some indefinite period, au contraire, but it does mean that the real necessity is getting these foundational institutions, security and everything that goes with it, in place before getting too carried away

because very often very often if you do just embrace this rather superficial view of the importance of having democratic elections and so on, all you find is a rather unrepresentative new governmental structure emerging which is formally vested with authority and carries greater authority than the real authority it has in the minds and the hearts of the people that have elected it either because that government is the only alternative that sort of exists that people know about and can have any sort of sense of knowing what they're doing, or for whatever reason, I think you've just got to be very careful about the way in which you juggle that but not at the expense of abandoning the aspiration.

MS. RICE: Thank you. I'd like to turn it to you for questions. If you could please identify yourself and direct your question to one of the panelists.

MR. LEITENBERG: I guess it's to Gareth Evans. My name is Milton Leitenberg, Center for International Security Studies at the University of Maryland. I was responsible for SIPRI 20 years ago or 25 years ago starting those numbers and I had a small, minuscule input to when the ICG was formed. But it was formed in fact—I think the numbers you began with were very, very misleading because of the business of a thousand battle deaths. When the ICG was formed, it was formed precisely for the cases you mentioned which were Rwanda, Somalia, Bosnia, the very large numbers.

In both presentations I thought there was one thing missing, I know it's a short-term one always, I don't want to denigrate anything that was said at all, but only in one sentence of Carlos's presentation was there the mention of the need for another mechanism for rapid deployment of troops. I was present in Stockholm at the meeting that you were part of, an important part of, that the Swedish government did for the U.N. 2-1/2 years ago and that focused on genocide. You mentioned the two cases that we've had in the last half-dozen years, the Congo and Darfur. You fiercely still argued for the main theme of the responsibility to protect, that force was the last resort, and Kofi Annan's speech at the same meeting repeated that. I think that's a mistake and I think nothing could have shown better than the Darfur example we're going through. It's 3 years on, Secretary Powell was there, and Kofi Annan was there. The international community has been inept, your reports are superb and show it better than anybody else, but this has not been anything the international community can deal with and I think I would be happy if both of you devoted a little to that.

Is this really always to be only considered as the last, last, last resort? And Rwanda which Susan Rice was involved in was the epitome of that.

MR. EVANS: Let me say immediately that the International Crisis Group is at the nonwimpish end of the NGO spectrum, and if a situation cries out for military intervention as for example we thought

Kosovo did in 1999 even though that was controversial and even though there are all the problems of legality with the Security Council veto and so on, we will be very strongly advocating that because there are circumstances in which diplomacy proves ineffectual, when there is a degree of real urgency about a situation deteriorating before your eyes and which you just do have to have rapid action. The fact that I didn't mention that in my list of lessons learned was in no sense because I dismiss it. I expressly said when I was talking about conflict resolution I was going to confine my remarks to diplomatic peacemaking, what we've learned about what works and what doesn't work in that context, but if diplomatic peacemaking fails then you've got to move to military action.

When we say last resort and the criterion of last resort is one that—have insisted on in all the contexts in which I've written about this, the Responsibility to Protect report, the high-level panel and everything else, it's never been in the often-misunderstood sense of meaning that you have to wait around and successively actually apply one strategy after another while people are dying in order to demonstrate ultimately that so many people have died but those strategies are unsuccessful. Last resort simply means satisfaction to the police makers on reasonable grounds that no alternatives other than the forcible military one will produce the desired result, last resort in that sense. So it's an intellectual process, it's a policy process, and it is one that would be capable of application by the Security Council ideally. We all have to agonize always what you do if

the Security Council doesn't deliver in these situations, but there is no argument about that.

What I would strongly argue, however, is because of the risk of the last resort becoming a first resort and over exuberant enthusiasm for military action in circumstances which don't justify it, what I would argue for is that there be this set of criteria, and they've all been articulated, five of them, basically the seriousness of the issue, the issue of right intent, the issue of proportionality, the issue of last resort, and the issue of balance of consequences. None of these are push-button precision criteria, but they are all capable of being weighed and balanced in a rational decision-making process and some circumstances will cry out for the application of force looked at from one or two or three of those criteria, but from the point of view of another two or three of the criteria, force makes no sense at all.

In the context of Darfur, finally, when you mentioned as you've gracefully acknowledged no organization I think with the possible exception of Human Rights Watch has argued as fiercely and as strongly and for as long as we have about the criticality of that situation and the need for heavy-duty international efforts to resolve it and a heavy-duty international presence. We have not, however, at any stage argued for coercive intervention against the expressed will and acquiescence at least of the Khartoum government simply because of the application of the fifth of those prudential criteria I mentioned, balance of consequences.

It's a bit like going into East Timor, had Indonesia actually resisted that back a few years ago, there were some circumstances where, frankly, the odds are just so much against you in terms of the forces you're going to confront, the area of territory you have to sort of deal with in Darfur, the size of France or the size of Texas as the case may be, it just makes the coercive application of military force likely to be not only unproductive, but counterproductive, so you've got to struggle under those situations for other ways through in these dilemmas.

But please don't underestimate my strong commitment to military action, and that raises finally the issue of who's going to do it. For ages there's been this argument around started I think by Brian Urquhart about 15 years ago about an international rapid-reaction capability. There was a long debate about this which I won't try and summarize now, but I think the real problem is just making that workable and deliverable or having a volunteer force, for example, on permanent standby, problems about teeth to tail ratio, problems about a country's willingness to vest authority in the SGE or the Security Council or anybody else just make it unworkable. But what we can do a hell of a lot better than what we have done is having a standby capability of earmarked, allocated forces that are not just notionally available to be brought to bear if the appropriate requests and processes and followed and taking 3 months to do, but real standby capacity, real troops on the ground with go fly in 24 hours' or 48 hours' notice. We really have to get

our act together with that, and there has been a lot of lip service paid to that in E.U. countries and in the African Union itself, but we're a very, very long way away from having that capability. But it's critical that we do because I for one do take that view that Romeo Dallaire articulated so strongly that had the international community been prepared just to put 4,000 or 5,000 troops on the ground in the first days of the Rwandan catastrophe, it would have made a gigantic difference. The demonstration effect of a few people being zapped immediately as they started doing what they did would have had a huge impact, and I think anyone who denies that has got some other agenda. It's very, very necessary to have that capability.

MS. RICE: Carlos?

MR. PASCUAL: I very much agree with what Gareth has just said. Let me make a supplementary comment not directly on this point, but right now the military has just gone through the Quadrennial Defense Review and one of the questions that it has to ask itself not necessarily on issues like responsibility to protect is in conflict situations in which the U.S. military has been involved, who has the responsibility to maintain stability and order. One of the difficulties that we face is that even if it should be a civilian responsibility in the long-term to maintain stability and order, if you've just been through a military conflict and you're in an environment where police haven't been able to deploy, civilians haven't been able to deploy and the only ones that are

there are the U.S. military, if the U.S. military doesn't maintain stability and order it's not going to happen. So it's going to present a new set of challenges, a different set of challenges that the military has to think about how to organize itself for.

I know that the U.S. Army has been doing some creative work on how to approach this, but again it's a fundamental structural piece that we've come to see very painfully that if we don't explicitly address this issue in our military mission up front and don't assign responsibility for it up front and don't bear the capability to actually do it, then we're going to pay for it in an extraordinarily painful way which is not just money but in, frankly, lost lives.

MS. RICE: Let me just add that in the particular case of genocide as we saw in Rwanda and we're now seeing in Darfur, I think I would argue that one of the lessons we ought to have learned is that in a number of instances force may be the only resort whether first or last which is not to differ from your clarification about what last resort means, but the failure to apply force whether in the first instance in Rwanda which was a fast-moving genocide or effectively more recently in the Darfur instance where the African Union has made a noble effort but predictable given its size, given its capacity and all of the constraints on it did not have and does not have the capacity to do what's necessary to save civilian lives in a sufficiently large area. We need this international capacity to go in, but we need more than a capacity. We're

beginning to build the capacity theoretically in the context of NATO with its rapid reaction capability and theoretically in the E.U. practically but very slowly in the context of the African Union, but even once we build all that capacity, what we've learned I would argue is that without the will to use that capacity when the balloon goes up, we're going to continue to have genocide after genocide and it doesn't matter whether it happens in 3 months or 3 years, without that will we're not going to get anywhere. So I think as we step back and think about what we have gleaned from the last 10 to 15 years, that has to be part of it.

And I would also argue that we have to be prepared to apply force coercively if in fact we're dealing with a specific case of genocide or mass crimes against humanity because by definition the perpetrators are not going to welcome those who aim to stop the genocide with open arms, and no doubt the balance of consequences can often be quite frightening as in the case of Darfur, but if we're committed to ending genocide then I think we have to face those consequences squarely.

QUESTION: [Inaudible] I'm the Assistant Military Attaché at the French Embassy. Just a first comment that you mentioned the theoretical E.U. capability to act. It was not only theoretical during the E.U. operation in the Congo, it was a very good example of what could be achieved.

But my question was that Ambassador Pascual mentioned both the need for a better civilian planning capability more in line, if you

will, with what the military is doing as far as we understand planning, but at the same time you know that many NGOs and especially in Western Europe are very reluctant to go into anything that is close to what is military planning and working with the military. So how do you reconcile this need for better planning and at the same time trying to engage the NGO in the other process?

MR. PASCUAL: The experience that I've personally had is that there is a great deal of concern on the part of the NGO community about the military encroaching on civilian functions, and in particular creating confusion about who is military and who are NGOs, and as a result of that, affecting traditional means that NGOs have used to protect themselves on neutrality and impartiality. So as a result of that, many NGOs have been extremely concerned about the presence of military on the ground interacting in complex transitional environments.

The experience we've also had, and a number of people who've participated in these sessions are here in this room, is that the NGO community has really embraced having a dialogue with the U.S. military and in fact engaging in exercises that work through some of these problems and begin to look at how to plan for the future so that these problems can be reduced or eliminated or at least controlled as effectively as possible because there are going to be confusing future situations.

There's also I think a recognition on the part of the NGO world and the military world that the kind of conflicts that are being addressed today are in many cases very different from the kinds of traditional conflicts where the Red Cross first developed these principles of impartiality and neutrality. If you're dealing with terrorist operations in a country, it doesn't matter whether you are establishing yourself as neutral and impartial, from the perspective of that terrorist organization or that insurgent group you're an outside organization and they don't like you no matter what, so they're still going to come after you and that poses a whole 'nother set of issues. In fact, in some of the exercises that my colleagues in the State Department has been sponsoring in facilitating with the NGO community, the U.S. Institute of Peace and groups such as the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterrey, I think a lot of progress has been made about putting these issues on the table, getting a constructive dialogue going and working through practical problems. It's still going to take time to translate that into operational practice on the ground, but I am not pessimistic about the willingness of all of the parties to sit down and try to work this through.

MR. SMITH: I'm J.T. Smith of the law firm of Covington & Burling. I recognize this question might get us off the track, but it's been running through my mind throughout the discussion.

Gareth Evans talked about an analysis of sustainability as part of his approach and toolbox or whatever, and I'm struck looking at

the countries mentioned in ICG's annual report, how many of them are the result of either aggregation or disaggregation in an imperial context. Many of them are countries that don't have a long history behind them, and the failure profile of at least some of these countries might suggest that in a perfect world they wouldn't be countries. If you accept any of that premise, the question is would this international conflict resolution process have within its toolbox at some point a recognition that trying to sustain a country that's irrational because of historical, ethnic, et cetera, is the wrong thing to do. And I'm struck by the fact that a co-chairman of your organization, Les Gelb, has I think in writing suggested that Iraq as an artifact of Churchillian planning might be better off as a loose federation of three different parts, so I just want to throw that question into the mix.

MR. EVANS: You're absolutely right to say that the phenomenon of disaggregation of the former Yugoslavia and the former Soviet Union is one of the very visible conflict drivers or creators of an environment in which conflict occurred and I think it was a pretty pathological and transient situation and we've just about seen that now working its way through. If you try and generalize from that to talk about the larger problems of imperialism, colonialism and inherently irrational boundaries and so on, I do think you can find particular illustrations where that has rubbed the wrong people up against each other or whatever, but you'll find many more situations where

notwithstanding the objective irrationality through Western eyes of some of those or maybe even through local eyes, nonetheless the country has been quite a reasonable success story with quite a degree of national pride and sustainability. So I don't think if you tried to analyze that and take that factor out you would find it as in any way a systematic causal variable, and even if you did find it to be a systematic causal variable, I'm not sure what follows from that in terms of the solutions because I think we have to be very, very cautious in terms of breaking up these boundary lines for all the familiar reasons associated with ethnic cleansing and so on. If you try and create purer states to get rid of this stuff, you will still end up with minorities and then minorities within minorities as you go on salami slicing, and not only is that very tacky in principle, it's not very workable in practice.

That was part of the problem with Les Gelb's and Peter Galbraith's enthusiasm for dividing Gaul or Iraq into three parts. That's neat enough when it comes to the Kurds, we all know what that means, although it doesn't solve all your problems in Kirkuk where there is one of the arguments that would follow as to who gets that, but it makes no particular sense at all in terms of the middle of the country which is very, very mixed as between Shiites and Sunnis and so on and any attempt to have a predominantly sort of ethnically driven division of that kind would, frankly, be buying up a hell of a lot more problems than it's solving and the only way through it is a smaller unit of disaggregation

around the provinces or the regions or whatever and just sort of weaving your way through that and I think that part of the constitutional thing has not been too badly addressed.

Over and over again these situations arise. In the Balkan situation, Montenegro and Serbia is a manifestly dysfunctional marriage which the European Javier Solano has been determined to sort of sustain against odds over a long period of time and, frankly, it's just not something that has large-scale implications if that particular breakup were to occur. Similarly, I think even though the historical divisions between Kosovo and Serbia were not nearly as clear as those between Serbia and Montenegro, it wasn't one of the [inaudible] republic divisions. Nonetheless, in the particular circumstances of that case and all the recent history of it, it is a severance that could be managed without seriously adverse consequences elsewhere.

In Africa you could probably manage the severance of Somaliland from the rest of Somalia even though that generates a lot of emotion because the whole embrace of Somaliland with the other parts of Somalia was itself a bit of an artificial construct late in the colonial game rather than something that had any long imperative. So you've got to look at a lot of these things case by case and not be too quick to draw generalizations.

But by and large, even though there are exceptions to it and variations, and I've mentioned some of them, the basic rule I think has to

be work with what you've got in terms of boundaries because almost certainly any attempt to rewrite boundaries other than on an entirely consensual basis by everyone relevant is likely to buy you a hell of a lot more trouble than you have already and just not to be the way to go.

MR. THIER: I'm Alex Thier, the Senior Rule of Law Adviser at the U.S. Institute of Peace. One of the reasons it seems that NATO is being increasingly eyed to step into the breach in Afghanistan and Sudan and would have been in Iraq if they had agreed to it is because it is the probably lone example of a truly joined up international existing capacity that can be deployed and that is operational. So picking up on something I think that you both raised and that Ambassador Pascual addressed specifically, what do you think the prospects are for creating a NATO-like civilian capacity to do the sorts of work that you're talking about on the civilian side? I particularly think of the rule of law capacity because rule of law capacity is something that I think exists at a fairly minimal level in many of the countries that we're talking about that provide this kind of assistance, although if they were joined up both in terms of operational capacity and in terms of strategy, they would have a much greater potential to actually have some impact as opposed to what is the situation on the ground now in most contexts where you have very small rule of law capacities, very un-joined up and each of them doing their own thing. I wonder what the potential for creating a civilian NATO to do these kinds of things might be in the future.

MR. EVANS: I'll leave it to Carlos to talk about the civilian component of it. Let me just say about NATO itself in terms of the basic military capability, I'm a huge fan of giving the organization something relevant and useful to do given that it's lost its original rationale manifestly and is in search of a mission and is on the face of it delivering these missions worldwide. There are several problems, however, in the real world that you confront when you try and translate this into reality and may no doubt be replicated in the civilian context as well. The first is that the organization is not nearly as coherent in terms of operational deliverability as we'd like it to be. As you know, Alex, from the experience in Afghanistan and the recent efforts to build a coherent NATO presence running the ISF operation, you've still got all sorts of problems about national variations and perceptions about what the rules of engagement and the actual nature of the mission are, huge degrees of difference in the willingness to get in and mix it in various difficult circumstances. So even with all the institutional imperatives and history of working together in the big context, applying it in the smaller situations is not proving nearly as easy as we had hoped.

Secondly, there's the problem of gaining acquiescence within NATO itself for these adventures, and our French colleague here would be only too willing I guess to testify about some of the problems that can arise in that respect. By the way, I do applaud mightily what you did with Operation Artemis. I think it was a classic example of very good,

swift rapid reaction of the kind that I'd like to see NATO actually being able to do a bit more often itself.

The third problem is actually getting other people to not have hysterics at the prospect of NATO coming in and playing a helpful role, and that's a huge problem at the moment in the context of NATO playing a role in Darfur which Crisis Group has been arguing for when it was very unfashionable to do. Six or eight or nine months ago I think we first made the case saying that looking around we frankly couldn't see that capability, coherent proper command and control and so on, coming from anywhere else except NATO, not even the Europeans, although some individual countries were capable of doing it, and certainly not within the African Union. But in order to get NATO there, as Washington is telling me every time I engage in blandishments on the subject, doesn't mean a request flowing from the A.U. or from the region unless you're talking about a coercive mission which nobody wants to think about. So there are huge problems in the way. Just the whole concept of NATO freaks out an awful lot of potential beneficiaries from a NATO presence. So these are just some of the rather real-world constraints in trying to make this concept operational which I wholly agree with.

MR. PASCUAL: In my comments I have very consciously tried to phase things particularly when referring to the comprehensive political guidance of NATO that it authorize NATO to develop the

capability to work with civilian entities and to incorporate their capabilities into NATO's military planning. I personally think that that's the right way to go for two reasons. One is that the kinds of functions that are being discussed are fundamentally civilian functions when we get into rule of law issues, democratization, economic development, humanitarian issues. That doesn't mean that militaries shouldn't have the capacity to perform some emergency functions, but I think those are fundamentally civilian functions and should be carried out by civilian entities.

If we succumb to the temptation to build up NATO capabilities to do something like this, I think we succumb to the same temptations that we have here in the United States, that because the defense budget is so much greater than our foreign operations budget, we often try to put more on the Department of Defense and onto the military than is necessarily justified by the military's role, function and expertise. Over time what I've found is in terms of the greatest support in the United States for the buildup of civilian capabilities to address issues such as the rule of law has come from the U.S. military. It's come not because they are enamored of somebody else undertaking a function that affects their success because they would certainly want to incorporate within themselves the capability of controlling all those things that affect their success, but because the skill areas are really out in the civilian world and they've recognized that it's better to build up that civilian

capability where you at least have the foundations for the capacity than to start from scratch within the military.

There is also a practical reason for this, which I think if you introduce the idea of building up a civilian capacity within NATO to undertake things like the rule of law, it would blow up NATO. Already there are so many tensions where there are some within NATO, the biggest tensions have been with France, with Belgium, a couple of others, where there's been a concern, and I think unfounded, but a concern that the United States has been using NATO to undertake a broader range of military and transitional missions and to in effect drag the civilian parts of international institutions into conflict situations by beginning with a military activity and if you in fact then start linking civilian capabilities into NATO, I think the concern is going to be even greater that the United States is simply trying to use NATO as a way of replacing the U.N., the E.U., and other civilian entities in undertaking transitional functions and stabilization and reconstruction. I frankly don't think that either on substantive grounds or on bureaucratic grounds that there's a strong rationale to go this route.

MS. RICE: We have time for one last question. I want to go to the back to the corner there.

MR. BEERS: Randy Beers, President of the Valley Force Initiative. A comment and a question. Carlos, you talked about all of the reserve requirements that are necessary and the funding that's necessary

for that as an analog to what you see as the ability of a military plan. The military plan in my own view is a result of the fact that when a noncommissioned officer or an officer in the military enters upon their first position, they are taught on the first day about the planning function and at the beginning it's called a five paragraph order, then they go to Command and General Staff School, and then they go to the War College. We don't have that requirement in that way for the planning function that you're talking about on the civilian side because those individuals both get that training and then the exercise on a regular basis so that we don't throw people into the midst of a crisis and it's the first time they've ever had to think about that kind of an issue. Even if they're an expert at police training or something like that, if they don't have sort of a basic doctrine and sense of how to proceed so that people who come together for the first time, come together with some semblance of being a team as opposed to being a group of individuals who are thrown into the breach. That's my comment.

My question is really for both of you. You both talked about the problems of political mobilization and getting people to pay attention. Carlos, you talked about it in the context of a process within the U.S. government to identify points of crisis, but you also said that sometimes that's a difficulty if there is no political will to even look at an issue because of the political sensitivity. And Gareth, you talked about the context of using NGOs to try to develop a sense of the need to

deal with crises. I'm still stuck with the fact that how do you get people in the context of all of the problems that political leaders have to deal with when there is usually a fire burning that they're supposed to be attending to, to look at things that aren't quite burning yet but that a little prevention or a little early intervention might save from becoming a bigger fire.

MR. PASCUAL: A couple of things, Randy. First on your comment, let me respond to it by saying, yes, that is exactly an issue and it's one of the issues that I think is in the process of being addressed, but it's going to take time. The reason this planning framework that I mentioned earlier was developed was because there was a recognition that there was a need to provide the military and civilians a common language and framework to be able to actually look at a problem jointly and come up with complementary solutions. And it's one of the reasons why it's being circulated by Joint Forces Command to all the combatant commands, and it's being used in the civilian world with USAID, with other civilian agencies, obviously with the State Department and being tested in Sudan and Haiti.

The intent is, and a few of the people who are sitting right behind you are at the centerpiece of actually coordinating this, to be able to get feedback and comments and then bring that back to the NSC, get it approved in principle and then have it established as doctrine, and then integrate it into the NDU and their training programs, integrate it into the

Foreign Service Institute and training programs there, having greater commonality of training and people going across programs and courses. I think all of the things that you point to are exactly right and I think there is an awareness of that, but it's going to still take an ongoing drive and effort to be able to do it and it's going to take from the leadership of the State Department clarity with the people within State that this is an important function and that when we talk about transformational diplomacy that these are core issues to transformational diplomacy, that if you don't this that you haven't transformed. So I agree with your comment.

The positive side is that things are being done. The question mark is that there is still a long way to go.

In terms of fires burning and getting adequate attention to some of these issues, there are two ways to think about some of these questions. One is if nothing else, just reading the newspapers over the last 3 weeks around the cartoon issues as I mentioned earlier, the countries where these riots have been, the implications for political transition within those countries, what might happen in the future, one huge red flag going up saying that these are huge transitional questions that need to be thought of, these are fires, but if you don't deal with these fires right now and start thinking through what forces are at play and the impact that they might have for the future, then we're only hurting ourselves because this is going to become more complicated to deal with

when it blows up and all those pent-up frustrations are out there in an uncontrolled environment.

The second point that I would make is that if one wants to effectively deal with issues like conflict prevention, you have to draw it much more into the mainstream part of the policy process. I think that there is a greater awareness of the need to make that happen; it's a hard thing to do exactly for the kinds of reasons that you mentioned, people are busy. But if you don't even at the level of embassies and country teams get them asking questions like what are the vulnerabilities and fragilities in this country, what can we do to prevent them, how can we incorporate that into our strategies and into our budgets, and if we don't get that flowing from the bottom up from the people who are closest to the ground, then it's going to be very difficult to succeed on the broader policy basis back in Washington.

The reason ICG works, the reason they have an impact, is they have a team of people on the ground all over the world who are infused with the philosophy that understanding the nature of problems that can break is an important thing to do and that they need to get that information out and that they need to act on it. It's not a crazy thing for us to think that that is an important thing that we should be doing within the U.S. government as a mainstream part of the functions that we undertake.

MR. EVANS: Getting action out of politicians on prevention is about the hardest thing on this planet. Doing something which if it succeeds will mean that nothing happens and therefore nobody notices, to get a politician to embrace that is like trying to bath a dog, it's just not easy, it's not part of the mindset, but you have to recognize that constraint and work at it. Part of it is an institutional answer to ensure that within the political process you've got formal structures that are bouncing this stuff up through the system so there it is not as easy it might otherwise be to avoid having to confront these decisions as part of the normal governmental process. But at the end of the day, it is a matter of effective political argument coming from organizations like mine and yours and everyone else that cares about these issues, and really it's not just a matter of lamenting the absence of political will, it's all our responsibility to try to do something to generate it. But to generate it is a matter of, first of all, supplying information that can't be objectively ignored even though subjectively it's likely to be, but then actually adding layer upon layer of political argument because political decision makers really only understand political arguments and there are at least four kinds of argument that are usually quite relevant. One is a moral argument, that you ought to be doing it for the sheer decency involved. Politicians are very rarely driven directly by that, but they can be driven by the sense of shame that can be hung around them if they're ignoring something which will have a wider sort of resonance, but that's not

enough by itself. You need be able to dress it up secondly in somehow national interest terms and that's getting a lot easier I think these days because these fragile-state related sorts of issues are no longer so easily characterizable as they used to be about problems in small faraway countries about which we know nothing and care less. The truth of the matter is we now know how significant those countries can be in terms of harboring terrorists and being a source for pandemics and God knows what else. So that kind of argument is easier to make these days and always has to be made.

The third argument is a financial argument particularly for prevention. Prevention is always going to be cheaper than cure. As much as know this now from God knows how many decades of hundreds of years of experience, that doesn't make it all that much easier for people in Carlos's position to get the appropriations for preventative purposes but, nonetheless, it's a powerful argument that if you don't do it now, the situation is going to deteriorate and—

[END OF TAPED RECORDING.]

- - -