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COUSINS AND STRANGERS: AMERICA, BRITAIN AND EUROPE IN A NEW CENTURY

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C O N T E N T S

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MILLER REPORTING CO., INC.
735 8th STREET, S.E.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20003-2802
(202) 546-6666

P R O C E E D I N G S

MR. TALBOTT: Good afternoon, everybody. I'm Strobe Talbott. I want to welcome you all for what promises to be I think not just a stimulating afternoon, but a fun afternoon. I want to particularly welcome Ambassador Gunnar Lund of Sweden, and Catherine Manning, who in the absence of Ambassador Manning who has had to back to the embassy is representing Her Majesty's government here this afternoon.

It's our pleasure to welcome here today Christopher Patten who I think all of you know is currently the Chancellor of Oxford University, a member of the House of Lords. Of course, before that he was a Member of Parliament, he was Minister of Development, he was the last, and I might add particularly memorable, effective and admirable British Governor in Hong Kong, and he was the European Commissioner for External Relations. He is, in short, a statesman, an architect, and I would say a visionary of what I think we can call the New Europe.

He is here today as an author. He has written a book which I can tell you is terrific. I've not only read it, I've blurbed it, or maybe in this town I should say I've not only blurbed it, but I've actually read it.

[Laughter.]

MR. TALBOTT: It is constructively tough, it is serious, it is smart, and it is very funny. It gives in its title which is Cousins and Strangers what Chris I'm sure will argue is an accurate description of the transatlantic relationship, but I assure you that the word stranger does not

accurately describe Chris himself. He is no stranger to us on this side of the Atlantic. He is a true friend, and like all true friends, he gives it to us very straight. And on that note, I would just like to welcome him again to Brookings, and Chris, cous, you're among friends.

Chris is going to talk to us for a little bit. Then he is going to take some questions and comments from you, and we want to leave a little bit of time at the end of the session for him to go out and sign some books which are on sale just outside the auditorium. Chris, once again, welcome.

[Applause.]

MR. PATTEN: Strobe, thank you very much, indeed. Thank you for those extremely kind words. There's a story told about the late Duke of Norfolk who is the premiere duke in the United Kingdom getting a letter one morning at his home at Arundel Castle from a group of parents in Zimbabwe who were very concerned about the standard of education of their daughters and wanted to start a new independent school named after Arundel. They asked him for his permission and they also asked him if they could use his family motto, the motto of the Howards, as the motto for their school. The Duke wrote back to say he was very pleased that they wanted to call their new girl's school after his own home, Arundel, but he thought that they might want to have second thoughts about using his family motto since roughly translated from the Latin it read, Pregnant with Honor.

[Laughter.]

MR. PATTEN: It's an honor for me today to speak in this tremendous institute, tremendous foundation, of which I've enjoyed visiting over the years, and I'm delighted to come here for a second time to talk about a book that I've written. Groucho Marx, you may recall, said outside of a dog, a book is a man's best friend, and inside of a dark it's too dark to read.

[Laughter.]

MR. PATTEN: I'm a dog owner, but I can tell you I'm even fonder of my books than I am of my terriers, so I'm delighted to be here today. Let me start with three brief and unrelated anecdotes which perhaps provide a sort of intellectual infrastructure for what I want to say to you.

The first international political event that I remember because my father thought that it might lead to a world war was the British and French invasion of Egypt in 1956. The last throw of the dice by the old Colonial powers who hadn't quite trigged that the game for them was over, an invasion of Egypt in order to get rid of what Harold Macmillan in his diaries referred to as an Asiatic Mussolini, Colonel Nasser. Could they get away with it? Well, they thought so. Macmillan, again, said when asked how the United States would behave, said, I know Ike. He'll lie doggo. But he didn't. Concerned along with John Foster Dulles at the impact of opinion in the Arab world of the invasion of an

Arab country by two old European powers, Ike, President Eisenhower and his Secretary of State took the issue to the U.N., and just for good measure, threatened to pull the plug on the British economy. And surprise, surprise, Britain and France pulled out. As President Chirac might say, were he with us today.

Second, I remember in my second year at Oxford at Balliol College the former Primer Minister whom I've just mentioned, Harold Macmillan, coming to speak at the annual college feast. It was a year after he'd left No. 10 on the advice of his doctors. He subsequently thought the wrong-headed advice like most political leaders; he thought he should have been able to go on doing the job forever. But that evening the old boy delivered a speech which I was subsequently to hear on several other occasions, and there's no reason in my view why for if a politician has got a very good speech he shouldn't repeat it from time to time. How many times have we heard Pavarotti sing "Nessun Dorma?" This is worth it.

Macmillan's speech was about the way in which his youth had shaped his political views. He talked about the long, hot summer of 1914 and his colleagues at Balliol studying Thucydides, reading the Classics, and then going off to put on khaki and to fight in the Gethsemane of Flanders and Picatee [?]. It was an extremely moving speech, the point of which was never again. The point of which was we shouldn't have any more civil wars. And for Macmillan, part of the

horror was I think quite simply this, looking at the figures of those who served from my old college in the First World War, 800 young men went into the armed forces, over 200 of them were killed. There were three V.C.'s, two posthumous, and two Iron Crosses.

My wife's father was killed shortly before she was born. A Cambridge athlete just post the Chariots of Fire generation. He ran in the 1936 Olympics, came fifth in the high hurdles to Jesse Owen. He was a Seafroth Highlander, fought all the way up through the Middle East and Italy, and was killed in the battle of the Falaise Gap. On his war memorial slab at Pembrook again you see the names of Brits and Americans and what we quaintly call Dominion, Canadian, New Zealand and Australian scholars, and German. What was the obscenity for Harold Macmillan, my predecessor of Chancellor of Oxford but one, and Roy Jenkins, my immediate predecessor who fought in the Second World War, was the thought of those young men going out from what Cardinal Newman [?] called the umbrageous groves, when Roy Jenkins used to use the phrase is was umbrageous groves, of Oxford, the temples of the humanities, coming together with other Europeans to study the humanities and then going back to their own countries to learn to kill one another?

The third anecdote is I became an M.P. in 1979 and that summer with a group of three other M.P.'s I went on my first freebie trip. I went on a trip to Hong Kong and China, and we were taken up to the

frontier at Lo Woo [?] and looked across the barbed wire of the little village on the other side of Chun Zun [?], a willow pattern plate scene, slow-moving barges, duck ponds, peasants in the rice paddies. We then went on from Hong Kong to Shanghai and I was very keen to hear the even then elderly jazz band in the Peace Hotel on the Bund [?] in Shanghai. I recall an evening picking our way along the Bund literally from one electric light to another. Chun Zun and Shanghai aren't like that today; Chun Zun, an extraordinary urban explosion, Adam Smith out of Hieronymus Bosch. And Shanghai, not just a few electric lights, but all that neon dazzle of the pudong [?].

Let me go back to the first point, the first anecdote. I guess that that Suez experience was my first recognition of the Pax Americana. I got another idea of the Pax Americana every Friday evening when my dad took us all to the local cinema to see whatever the latest Hollywood flick was, a Pax Americana which served the world quite astonishingly well for the second half of the 20th century. I suppose it's true to say that its godfather was Woodrow Wilson, the famous Fourteen Points, the best conceivable answer to Comrade Lenin. Unfortunately, he wasn't able for reasons which had something to do with his own personality and something to do with his political opponents to implement his own notions of global governance after the First World War.

But after yet another generation of young Americans had gone to Europe to save Europe from the excesses of 19th century

nationalism, Wilsonianism stuck, and with a generation of extraordinarily, farsighted visionary political leaders, Harry Truman, George C. Marshall, I think incomparably one of the greatest men of the last century, Dean Acheson, they put together a world order which by and large kept the peace and made us a great deal more prosperous in the second half of the last century, created the United Nations, the Bretton Woods institutions, campaigned for the U.N. Declaration of Human Rights, even in a sense put in train the process which was eventually to lead not with much American enthusiasm to the creation of the International Criminal Court.

It was an approach to global governance which was based on a number of simple principles. First, that we needed a rule-based system for running the world's affairs and that those rules which would very often bear above all an American imprint, should usually apply to America as well. Not always. There have been some occasions when you haven't wanted them to apply to you, for example, the Genocide Convention for reasons which escape me, but by and large the rules should apply to everyone, including the world's only superpower.

Second, the way in which you thought society should best be run, open markets, participative government, rule of law, that that should be promoted, but as George C. Marshall said, it's very difficult to persuade people of the merits of democracy and the rule of law when they've got empty stomachs, and that was, of course, the foundation of

his own extraordinarily generous initiative, your extraordinarily generous initiative, in 1947. The other proposition on which this approach was based was the recognition that if you were to work with partners, you had to accept that from time to time those partners would develop opinions of their own.

The relationship wasn't always easy and wasn't always harmonious, and there was always, always, a seam of anti-Americanism in European attitudes to the United States. You see it in literature with Graham Greene prescient as he was on Vietnam with that fathead Simone De Beauvoir on the right with novelists like Evelyn Waugh; you see it in not just French attitudes to American generosity, but European attitudes. A recent very good history of modern France talked about the French petulant ingratitude, not knowing whether they should resent more the fact that they were receiving assistance, or the fact that the assistance wasn't greater. There's a line in Confucius when somebody is being difficult with the Master and Confucius replies, why are you so cross with me? I haven't done you any favors.

There was also, which was a particular British approach, condescension masquerading as sophistication. The Macmillan line that we would play Greece to your Rome, that you were wonderful chaps, muscular, vigorous, but pretty innocent about the world, and it's interesting the Greeks in the Roman Empire were slaves, that we would play the Greek role, be if not the spear carrier, at least the adviser on

spear carrying to the Emperor and his legions. So there were always underlying European attitudes which could legitimately have made you extremely crotchety, but by and large, the relationship worked and the world that you created worked. Rows about Vietnam, rows about Central America, a tendency in the Cold War years to see the world in simplistically Manichean terms, but overall a huge success. The Cold War ended without going hot. We saw the establishment of the universal validity of human rights and democracy in the Helsinki Accords. We saw people becoming more prosperous, a sixfold increase in world output in those 50 years, and by the end of the century as President Clinton pointed out at the Millennium, more than half the world's population living in democracies.

It was a terrific world order for the rest of us, and it was pretty good for you as well because what it did was to legitimize your power and to shield your power from the world's envy and fear. At the height of the power of the British Empire shortly before we lost you, Edmund Burke said, I dread above all to be dreaded, and you weren't dreaded during the second half of that century even though you were more powerful than any other country has ever been before. Indeed, you still were able to exercise alongside your unquestioned and unchallenged hard power that soft power which went with still being admired as the City on a Hill.

I'm not quite sure what I understand what has persuaded some in the United States that that way of doing business was mistaken. There is obviously a debate in this country and has been for some years between the assertive nationalists, the neocons and others about the extent to which simply exercising what you regard as your own sovereignty is not only the best way of pursuing your national interest but morally correct as well. It's an argument in which Europeans and your friends around the world have an interest which is why presume on these issues. Secretary Baker once said of the Balkans when arguing against American involvement, we don't have a dog in that fight. Well, in the discussion about the future of American foreign policy, we in Europe do have a dog in the fight and I think it's quite important for us to do a little bit of barking ourselves without becoming tiresome.

Let me make one linguistic excursion. In my experience, whenever you see the word neo in front of a noun, or an adjective for that matter, it means "not."

[Laughter.]

MR. PATTEN: So neoliberals are invariably profoundly illiberal, neointellectuals never open a book, and neoconservatives are not conservative, because the conservative thing to do is to conserve an order which has looked after America's interests and everybody else's very well. I think that argument was obviously shredded in the run-up to and during the Iraq War. I don't want to add to the acrimony which still

surrounds that issue, I had strong views on it at the time, but I accept what the President says, that whatever we thought before, we're now all in it together and have to cope with the consequences. I do just worry a little that one of the consequences is likely to be that the next time democracies are asked in Europe or perhaps in America, too, to preempt a threat which can be described but not seen through the use of force, they may just be a little more reticent to give their government the benefit of the doubt.

And it may be that after all that experience now that we're all trapped in what Winston Churchill called, and he should know, the thankless deserts of Mesopotamia, that things have taken a turn for the better and that we've seen a move back to a more traditional way of doing business. I very much hope so. There are still one or two things which strain our belief. I think many in Europe, like me, were keen to think the best when those stories came up about extraordinary rendition. It wasn't very helpful when at the same time we were reading reports in the press about the Vice President fighting legislators in order to ensure that American public officials could enjoy outside the Geneva Convention the right to put people's heads in buckets of water. But I hope we will now find a more traditional way of working together in dealing with the real threat of Iran becoming a military nuclear power, in trying to put together again the pieces in Palestine, in completing the work that we've done extremely successfully together in the Balkans, in dealing with

Afghanistan where I have to say I'm extremely nervous about the prospects not least faced by NATO forces in the south of the country, and I hope even, and better I think to be hopeful than pessimistic, that we may find some way in which we can work together to save our planet, because that's probably the toughest and biggest issue we face.

How can Europe help, the Europe that was put together to prevent another European civil war, the Europe that didn't simply come together itself in the years after the war? There's a conventional view that NATO was America's idea and the Common Market and the European Union were Europe's idea. It's not quite true to say that it's almost exactly the reverse of the truth, but it's not much of an exaggeration to say that. Europeans wanted America to stay behind after the Second World War and give us the shield of American security against Soviet Communism, but the price which you insisted on quite properly was that Europe shouldn't return to those 19th century dog fights which had produced so much disaster in the past. European political and economic integration was a geostrategic objective of the United States from 1944-1945 onwards. Monet and Schumann were better received in Washington than they were in London.

And that European integration has been an astonishing success. We, of course, have created out of the crooked timber of humanity an imperfect set of institutions. We, of course, see yawning gaps between our rhetoric and reality. But the wonder is not that we face

crises with spectacular regularity, the wonder is that we do so much together and that so much works, because the European Union really does represent a unique endeavor in sovereignty sharing at levels that nobody has ever tried before. We've created our own single market, single trade policy, single environment policy, and 12 member states have created a single currency. We face demographic problems; we face economic problems, though not perhaps of the exaggerated sort that people sometimes suggest. But it has been with American support an extraordinary success, and it's worth recalling, there's a very good book by Pascal Winnan [?], it's worth remembering that when America pressed European integration, an objective was to have somebody who would help share the responsibility of global leadership. That is what Europe should be seeking to do with the United States, not offering itself as a rival, not wishing to play the part of a super sniper, but wishing to be a partner both economic and political and in security terms as well.

There are many ways in which we can do that, for example, by continuing the process of enlargement which has been itself the most successful foreign policy pursued by the European Union ensuring stability and democracy across most of our continent, and the prospect now that we can bring that stability and democracy to the Balkans as well as Central and Eastern Europe. I would like to see the process of enlargement encompass as well Ukraine, Moldova and Turkey, but that is perhaps a bigger issue for questions if you would like that. We do need

to recognize as Europeans that virtually all the things that we want to achieve we're more likely to be able to do if we can work with the United States. It's almost as true to say that a lot of the things that America wants to achieve, it's more likely to be able to do if it can work with Europe.

The relationship between America and Europe is so important to both sides of the Atlantic and so important to the world that I find it difficult to believe that we've actually witnessed in the last years, to borrow that geological cliché, a real shifting of the tectonic plates under the Atlantic. I think myself that we've simply found ourselves dealing on the American side with an administration which was pursuing policies that it's difficult to sell to Europeans and, indeed, I suspect difficult to sell to a lot of Americans. And that on the European side we have not, I must be careful how I say this, been blessed by titanic leadership.

[Laughter.]

MR. PATTEN: There are four reasons why it's important that we should make the relationship work. First of all, the Atlantic marketplace is of enormous importance to the whole world, $2-1/2 trillion dollars, whatever that may mean, in sales every year. Do you know in the year in which Europe and America were having the biggest ding dong about Iraq, American investment in Europe went up to $87 billion? It increased during that year when there were people I know

driving around this country with stickers on their bumpers saying "Iraq Now, France Next." There was an increase of 10 percent in American investment in France. In the last 10 years, American investment in the Netherlands has been 10 times the scale of American investment in China, and twice the size of American investment in Mexico. So we matter enormously to one another economically, and economic health matters to the world. There won't, for example, be a successful outcome to the Doha Development Round unless we work together.

Secondly, 40 years ago, Peter Drucker argued about the porous nature of national frontiers and set out the limits to what nation-states can do on their own, and all those arguments are clearly far more germane today, not least when we look at the dark side of globalization. How can even the strongest individual nation-state deal with environmental disaster, epidemic disease, organized crime, drugs, terrorism, nuclear proliferation, on its own? We need international cooperation to an unparalleled degree.

Thirdly, we have to recognize, Europe and America, that there is hardly a problem that we face that we can manage to deal with without the support and involvement of the rising Asian powers, India and China. Mr. Rumsfeld, you know better than I, has a certain way with words. I was very struck by something he said last year about the importance of trying to encourage China to join the civilized world. I thought it might have come as an interesting insight to the Chinese who

have been the largest economy in the world for eighteen out of the last twenty centuries and will be again in this century. They won't be as rich as we are because in terms of per capita GNP we're way ahead, and anyway, they will get old before they get that rich. They also have some very difficult political issues to deal with. But they're certainly going to be a hugely significant player, as are India. India and China together in 1820 represented, according to Angus Madison the great economic historian, over 50 percent of world GDP. That had gone down to about 7 or 8 percent by the middle of the last century, doubled to 16 to 17 percent by 2000, and will probably stand at about 30 percent by 2020.

India, which has been so overlooked by so many—though not, I'm happy to say, the Director of the Brookings Institution—India which has started to grow at a pretty good lick, leaving behind what used to be called the Hindu rate of growth, India which would grow even faster were it not for the fact that the Congress Government led by the wonderful Manmohan Singh depends on the Communist Party for its majority in Parliament and the Communist Party in India, unlike the Communist Party in China, still believes in Communism. But there isn't a single issue that I can think of that we can actually resolve unless we work with India and China, North Korea, Iran, Sudan, we have to persuade the Indians and Chinese to join us in making decisions. We have to persuade them to face up to their own responsibilities, and I don't think we're going about it in a very sensible way.

Two examples, one European, one American. We try to persuade the Chinese to believe in a rules-based system of economic governance, so when the multifiber agreement comes to end with consequences which were predicted and predictable, we used to run conferences in the European Commission saying what would happen at the end of the multifiber agreement. Explosion in Chinese textile exports, and when it happens, what do we do? We slap import controls in Chinese bras and T-shirts and trousers with only I think two European countries, one if which is represented here, having the integrity and the good sense to try to resist this bit of lamentable protectionism. I found myself as other Europeans will have done at the receiving end of a lecture on free trade from a Chinese official which was uncomfortable.

[Laughter.]

MR. PATTEN: And then I look at your own intervention in the case of the proposed takeover of Unocal. How on earth do you expect that any of us can have a serious discussion with the Chinese about the management of global resources in the future, the management of oil and gas, when you try to shut them out of commercial involvement on that rather modest scale? So I don't think we've handled the issues very cleverly so far, and I hope we'll manage to handle China and India better in the 21st century than we managed in the 20th.

The last point, and this I offer as, among other things, the co-chair of the International Crisis Group, counterintuitive though it may

be, we've actually got better in the last few years at preventing or managing conflict, so there have been fewer conflicts and fewer casualties as a result of conflicts. It is counterintuitive because one looks at Colombia, at Sudan, at Cote d'Ivoire, at Iraq, at Afghanistan, at Sri Lanka. I know all those stories. But the basic point is true and that it's a demonstration of how capable we are when we put our minds to it of actually running the world a bit better.

Very last thought, it's another cliché to think of the world in relation to one country owning a particular century, so unless you're French you might subscribe to the view that the 19th century was British.

[Laughter.]

MR. PATTEN: Most of us accept that the 20th century was American. And the conventional assumption is that the 21st century will see American hegemony challenged by China and that we'll see a standoff or even a conflict between the two. I think that's an incredibly depressing and old-fashioned way of looking at history, and I simply don't believe it. I think that if we play our cards right, the next few years, the next decades, should be dominated by the ideas which we share in Europe and North America and the ideas which you have always embodied with such spectacular success, open markets, the rule of law, due process, participative democracy, and today, giving women a fair deal in our world. I say again, if we play things right, I hope that the world will be shaped by those ideas rather than by conventional notions

of balance of power. But whether or not that's the case is entirely in our hands. That's Cousins and Strangers for you. Thank you.

[Applause.]

MR. PATTEN: Any questions, or did I carry you all with me?

MR. MILLIKEN: I'm Al Milliken, affiliated with Washington Independent Writers. Since you oversaw the hand-over, return of Hong Kong to China, how would you evaluate the way America and Britain has considered the citizens of Hong Kong? Would you describe that as admirable or shameful or some other way?

MR. PATTEN: I have to say that both covering the period when I was the last Colonial oppressor and in the last, how many years is it, eight years, I have absolutely no criticism of the United States. When I was Governor of Hong Kong I had more active support from the State Department than from any European foreign ministry, I had more support from the American Chamber of Commerce than from any other group of businessmen, and I had more support from American professional associations like the American Bar Association than from any Europeans. So as far as I'm concerned, a succession of consul generals in Hong Kong had heroic status and I would have wished that everybody had been quite as robust and intellectually honest in supporting Hong Kong's sense of citizenship as Americans were.

I hope that my own country will recognize that the Joint Declaration lasts for 50 years after 1997 and gives the United Kingdom legitimate for occasionally expressing its views about what is happening in Hong Kong, on which let me offer briefly the following. There was a very distinguished American political scientist at Oxford called Sammy Finer who produced a three-volume history of government in which he categorized all the different systems of government that there had ever been. He has one chapter on societies which are liberal but not democratic, and the only example he could think of, the only example he was able to put in that category, was Hong Kong. Fareed Zakaria in his book Illiberal Democracy makes the point that democracy is not just about elections. Hong Kong had all the furniture and fittings of a liberal democracy except elections. So I think today that even though it lacks participative government, Hong Kong is as liberal a society certainly as I've encountered in East Asia.

The fact that Hong Kong is not yet democratic is a political aberration; that it will become democratic sooner or later I have no doubt; that standing in the way of it becoming democratic is itself destabilizing, I have no doubt. So I'm a huge admirer in Hong Kong which, as I said a moment or two ago, has in unusually strong form a real sense of citizenship, a really strong and decent civil society, and a legal system which is pretty robust, a civil service and police who are still clean, and professions who still speak out for professional standards.

I thought a good test of Hong Kong was the WTO meetings in December when, for example, not only did Hong Kong civil servants manage the whole meeting, a difficult meeting extremely well, but the police dealt on the streets with those, how can I put it, slightly grumpy Korean farmers very sensitively. I would have been very proud of a European police force which handled difficult and violent demonstrations as well as that. So I think Hong Kong is a terrific success story, I just wish that Chinese leadership would recognize that it is not a threat for Hong Kong to become properly democratic.

MR. PIERRE: Thank you. Andrew Pierre, Georgetown University. I congratulate you and thank you for not dwelling too long on Iraq, but you did say that we're all now, Europeans and Americans, somewhat in the same boat facing the problems ahead. I'm wondering, if you look down 5 to 10 years, do you see the possibility of a significant tightening up or bringing together of Europe and the United States in the reconstruction of Iraq and the region or in dealing with whatever we have in Iraq? And more broadly, would you comment a bit about American views and European views as you see them with regard to the general problem of the Middle East, not only the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, but also the question of Islamic fundamentalism?

MR. PATTEN: Wow. Iraq first. What I said was that whatever our views about the invasion, it didn't help to say I told you so because we all have to deal with the consequences, and I suppose the best

we can hope for is the Iraq polity not flying apart if in 2 or 3 years' time there is a government which more or less holds the north, the south, Sunni areas together which has convinced the Sunni and others that it's distributing oil revenues successfully, that has maintained the territorial integrity of Iraq. If that is the situation in 2 or 3 years' time, I think we can all heave a huge sigh of relief.

My worry has always been, always, always, right from 1991 when I heard the first President Bush make more or less this point, that the price for getting rid of a wicked dictator would be the implosion of the country that he ruled with such savagery, and I think that is still a worry. But if Iraq holds together, then it can look I hope towards an extension of the trade and political preferences which the European Union has negotiated with other countries in the region, and I very much hope that with, who knows, a satisfied Kurdish community it won't make life more difficult for the process of Turkey's accession to the European Union, but there's an awful lot of prayer that goes into those remarks.

On physical reconstruction, I think I'm happy to leave that to Halliburton.

[Laughter.]

MR. PATTEN: As clearly are others.

[Laughter.]

MR. PATTEN: Just two other general points. First, on Palestine-Israel. I was for some years a member of the quartet or as Amr Moussa, the Secretary General of the Arab League rightly used to refer to it, the quartet sans trois. And the road map which was actually drafted not here but in Copenhagen by the Danish Presidency of the European Union by and large put together all the things which will be required if there is ever to be a peaceful settlement of the dispute between Israel and the Palestinians. They're all there in the road map, they're all in there in the Geneva Peace Initiative, they were all there and almost achieved at Camp David and Taba. We know what they are but we seem to rather a long way away from achieving them, and I think the lack of a political prospect in Palestine is plainly one of the main reasons for the success of Hamas.

Over the region as a whole, I think that we in Europe have been seriously and culpably half-baked about two issues. The first is our intentions to promote a free-trade area around the Mediterranean. We are very good in Europe about talking about free-trade areas, we're rather less good about promoting free trade, and the simple truth is, that unless we take Morocco's tomatoes and Egypt's strawberries and cut flowers, we'll fetch up taking boat loads of illegal immigrants from those countries.

We've also been much too flexible about the way we pursue the promotion of human rights, the rule of law and participative

government in those countries. I would like to see a much larger proportion of our budget, which is considerable, it's 3-1/2 billion euro, grant and loan, applied on the basis of positive conditionality to political reform in the area, rather than negative conditionality. That is rather than say we'll take money away unless you stop hanging people from the rafters by their thumbs, we actually give more money to people who introduce legislation about women's rights and hold free and fair elections and so on. It seems to me that it's a much better way of proceeding.

I'd just say one thing about Islam of which I think our understanding is still extremely shaky. I could answer some more questions if you'd like later. But it doesn't help for us to give the impression that we think that there is something inherently hostile in Islam to democracy and decency. I was talking earlier about the extraordinarily interesting survey done by the Zogby Group on opinion in the Arab world which was brought together in a pamphlet called What Arabs Think, in which it seems pretty clear that most countries in the Arab League, and of course there are 900 million Muslims living in Asia, most of them in democracies, that most of the people in Arab League countries actually rather share our values, it's our policies they don't like. Life would be much more difficult if it was the other way around. So I don't think that lumping all Islam into the jihadist basket is anything other than counterproductive.

MR. HAROLD: Scott Harold, Brookings. Thank you, Mr. Patten, for your remarks today.

Apropos of that and particularly in light of the recent Danish cartoons that have been causing such a ruckus across the region, can you comment on Europe's responsibility to incorporate people from North Africa, the Middle East and South Asia into the polity and into its citizenship in a way that makes them feel that they are brought into the project and treated fairly?

MR. PATTEN: I thought just starting with the cartoons, I thought that the cartoons, and I've only read descriptions of them, were in extremely poor taste, just as a Christian as a practicing Catholic, there was an odd expression as a youth, bounce a ball against a wall at night, but I've always found the use of the Crucifix in cartoons or horror shows exceptionally tasteless. But I believe in freedom of speech and I think it was entirely right and proper for Peter Mandelson, the European Trade Commissioner, to summon the Saudi Assistant Trade Minister the other day to make it clear that if Saudi Arabia and anybody else went ahead with a boycott of Danish goods because of that cartoon appearing in a Danish newspaper first, then we would take the issue straight away to the dispute settlement machinery of the WTO because it would be an attack on Europe, not just an attack on Denmark.

What should Europe stand for above all else? I disagree with what Pope Benedict said when he was Cardinal Ratzinger and with what

President Giscard says. I don't think that in the 21st century we should define Europe in terms of our Christian roots or Christian values. I think we should define Europe in terms of our ability to institutionalize tolerance and our ability to ensure that a union which is comprised of minorities can manage its affairs as decently as possible.

Europe which is made up of Islamic-Judaic culture as well as Christian culture has managed to do that at its best. It does of course involve making it absolutely plain that even though we're prepared to honor and respect other people's cultural traditions and other people's way of life, we are not prepared as the price for doing that to subvert our own notion of tolerance.

Much is made of the difference between French attitudes to ethnicity and British, and I think that was an exaggerated way of trying to explain the riots in and around Paris, and we've had riots not quite on that scale, but we've had riots in parts of the Northwest of England by young Muslims. We've had riots in London by young white kids after football games. For me, the most persuasive explanation of what happened in France wasn't sociological, it was economic. The most persuasive explanation is that there is 10 percent unemployment in France. There is 20 percent, if you're called Pierre when you leave school without any qualifications at 15 or 16, and 45 percent if you're called Ishmael if and you leave school at 15 or 16.

[End Side A. Begin Side B.]

MR. PATTEN: [In progress] —more to do with economic opportunity than other factors.

Today in my own country, more Muslims visit their mosque on Friday than members of the Church of England go to church on Sunday. Today in Britain, which provoked a crisis in the European Union over our addition to beef, the favorite dish is Chicken Tikka Masala. What do those things say about us as a society? The same as you could describe in the United States. We can't anymore think of ourselves I don't believe in single, blooded, narrow loyalty castes. We've all mixed up. Half of my blood is Irish, potato famine, and I was the last British Colonial Governor. Explain that. And one day will doubtless be true when our former European Commissioner and Conservative Party Chairman stands up here who is a Muslim.

MR. MITCHELL: Gary Mitchell from The Mitchell Report. At a meeting of the flock the weekend before last, the godfather of American neoconservatism, Irving Kristol, said power corrupts. That's the glory of it. I wanted to ask how you think we have been doing, the United States, with its relatively unmatched, unbridled power in the last decade or decade and a half.

MR. PATTEN: I'm tempted to ask you to read my book.

[Laughter.]

MR. PATTEN: I'll just mention two things. I think it was George Kennan who said the best way of testing yourself, the best way of

determining whether you are behaving reasonably, was to ask yourself whether you had lived up to your own best idea of how you should behave. He said that was a pretty fair test, and I think it's a test that you always used to pass, usually used to pass with flying colors, and that's why soft power, what Joe Nye says about soft power, is so true.

If I had to as a huge admirer and friend of the United States, as somebody who is more critical about my own country and continent than I am about the United States, I think if I had to express one worry, it's that I sometimes think you've lost some of your sense of moral outrage and that I think is something we would all suffer from if it were true. Thank you.

[Applause.]

MR. TALBOTT: That's a long applause by Brookings standards, by the way.

I'm not just tempted but compelled to suggest and indeed instruct all of you to read his book, but you can't do that unless you buy it. And I also want to give Chris a chance to do something that's much more fun than writing a book which is signing copies.

In closing, I'm going to give myself the last word which is to say, Chris, I know you well enough, and now everybody in the room knows you well enough, I'm not about to give you the right of rebuttal. A favorite indoor sport and sometimes an outdoor sport in Washington is name calling, so I'm going to call you a name that occurred to me while

listening to you speak. You're a triple-neo-neo, by which I mean you are a genuine intellectual, a genuine conservative, and a genuine liberal, and than you for showing us that you can be all three, particularly the last two.

Thanks everybody. The book is out at the back door.

[Applause.]

[END OF RECORDED SEGMENT.]