PANEL 2: The Future of the ROK-U.S. Alliance

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KIM KYUNG-WON: My name is Kim Kyung-Won. I am the moderator for the second session this morning. I looked up the meaning of "moderator" in the dictionary, and the dictionary that I consulted told me that the moderator has to make sure that there are no immoderate views that dominate the discussion. So I will make sure that immoderate views are excluded from the discussion this morning, particularly with regard to the future of the ROK-U.S. alliance. Recently, I feel that immoderate views have been expressed rather freely, and I would be pleased to see us concentrate on the range of views that are not immoderate views. But I'm not, however, committing myself to the view that certain views should not be expressed. You are free to say whatever you want. It's particularly the case for the panelists.

We have four excellent panelists this morning: Kim-Sung-han, Lim Wonhyuk, Michael O'Hanlon, and Wu Xinbo from Fudan University. I will not bother with the biographical details since I will assume that you have looked at the bios provided in the conference packets. I will simply go ahead and introduce the speakers themselves.

First we have Professor Kim Sung-han who will give us a Korean perspective on the future of the ROK-U.S. alliance.

KIM SUNG-HAN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I hope I will be able to present moderate views about the future of the ROK-U.S. alliance.

My presentation consists of three parts. The first part is about the challenges the ROK-U.S. alliance faces at the moment, the second part is about the future of the alliance, and the last part will set forth some tasks ahead with respect to envisioning the ROK-U.S. alliance.

Let me start with the strengths. The strength of a security alliance depends upon how much each partner believes that the benefits outweigh the costs. If each believes that the benefits outweigh the costs and if the mass distribution of the costs and the benefits is supported politically, then the alliance is likely to endure. However, if the costs become predominant over the benefits, then joint interests may diverge and the alliance might be dissolved.

At the moment, important factors continue to tie the ROK and the U.S. together. First of all, the crisis over North Korea's nuclear program demonstrates that a U.S. military presence remains necessary to defend the integrity of the Republic of Korea. The two countries also share a commitment to liberal democracy, open economic markets, human rights, a free press, and the rule of law. In addition to that, the United States and the Republic of Korea enjoy extensive economic ties. Finally, there are cultural ties. One example is that almost 2 million Koreans have emigrated to the United States and the number continues to grow.

At the same time, the ROK-U.S. alliance is coping with several challenges. The most immediate challenge is the North Korean nuclear problem. But other challenges
include, first, the policy and perception gap between the United States and Republic of Korea over how to deal with North Korea. The second, the emergence of nationalism in South Korea. Third, the U.S. policy after September 11th, which has fueled concerns over U.S. unilateralism and apparent devaluation of traditional alliances. Fourth, China's growing influence on the Korean Peninsula. And lastly, uncertainties about the future of Japan.

In dealing with the North Korean nuclear problem in particular, Seoul and Washington's positions will become very important from now on because of the specific discussions which will emerge on how to realize the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and how to establish a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula. To this end, South Korea and the United States should be mindful of the following two things.

First, a linkage between the issue of a peace regime and the issue of denuclearization should be prevented. In my view, a peace regime on the Korean peninsula should be treated as an outcome rather than a catalyst for the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula.

Secondly, South Korea and the United States should design a vision for the ROK-U.S. alliance on the premise that the North Korean nuclear problem is resolved. When the two allies have a blueprint for the bilateral alliance, we can cooperate with each other to build a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula. From this point on, the ROK and the United States should seek the ultimate resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue on the basis of a bigger and broader strategic picture.

Under the circumstances, we can contemplate four scenarios for the direction of the ROK-U.S. security alliance. We can think of four scenarios.

The first scenario is that the current alliance should remain intact for the primary purpose of continuing to serve as a deterrent against North Korea. But once the threat from North Korea is removed or is diminished, then the ROK-U.S. security alliance would automatically lose its raison d'être.

The second scenario involves the development of a strategic partnership, and not a military alliance, between Seoul and Washington. Under this second scenario, the United States would withdraw most of its troops from Korea where the threat from North Korea is almost eliminated, abandon the combined defense system, and the conduct only occasional military maneuvers with Korea.

A third scenario is to transform the current alliance into a comprehensive alliance. Rather than solely focusing upon security threats, this comprehensive alliance system would enable the two countries to share the values of a democracy and a market economy. Such a comprehensive alliance would address 21st century security challenges, such as terrorism, drug trafficking, environmental degradation, illegal migration, piracy, et cetera.
Lastly, under the four scenarios, multilateral security cooperation for Northeast Asia would be pursued. I believe there are two sub-scenarios. One I call the multilateral-plus scenario. In other words, multilateral security cooperation is playing a role as a supplementary mechanism for the ROK-U.S. alliance: the U.S.-ROK alliance continues to play the role of a central axis, and the multilateral security cooperation in Northeast Asia plays the role of a supplementary mechanism. Another sub-scenario is the multilateral-minus scenario, which means a multilateral security cooperation mechanism replaces the ROK-U.S. alliance.

So under these four scenarios, we need to think about where to take the alliance in the future. In the long term, I believe a redefined ROK-U.S. alliance, which I hope will be a comprehensive alliance, would rest upon three legs.

The first leg is a new security agenda. The focus of the new security relationship would be deterring attack, if necessary, but also preserving stability and preventing provocative power projection by others in the region. And in keeping with its interest in becoming a more prominent actor in the region, South Korea should play a more active role in peacekeeping, counterterrorism, piracy, drug smuggling operations, and combating the spread of weapons of mass destruction.

The second leg consists of common values and human security. In this context, both countries, the ROK and the United States, should support and promote the advancement of human security in the Asia Pacific region.

And the third leg would be the deepening of economic ties and the development of regional cooperation.

So against this backdrop, let me conclude by presenting some suggestions. The first suggestion is to use the current nuclear crisis to demonstrate a commitment to a peaceful coexistence, multilateral cooperation, and strengthening of the alliance. A negotiated solution, as you know, that eliminates the nuclear threat probably represents the best possible outcome for the future of the alliance.

Second, we need to plan for inter-Korean reconciliation while maintaining preparedness for the failure of negotiations. If the six-party talks succeed, the United States should offer strong support for inter-Korean reconciliation. But preparedness for failure will help us to avoid another perception and policy gap between Seoul and Washington.

Third, we need to issue a joint vision of the ROK-U.S. alliance in the 21st century. The ROK-U.S. Security Policy Initiative, so-called SPI, is now working on envisioning the alliance and it is expected to agree upon the joint vision probably in the latter half of next year. So the joint vision could be announced in the form of a declaration in the forthcoming summit meeting between ROK and the United States.
Fourth, with the cooperation of the United States, we need to enhance the ROK's primary role in its own defense. The resilience of the alliance will depend upon earnest steps by the Republic of Korea to enhance its own defense capabilities. Maybe Washington can provide assistance by supplying key networking technologies in this process.

Finally, we need to formulate a political agenda based upon common values and human security. This will help promote the notion that the U.S.-ROK alliance has a deeper relationship than the ties between most other nations. So this agenda will require maintaining cultural ties, however U.S. visa regulations, I would say, dramatically restrict those ties. So South Korea, I hope, should be granted a waiver from these procedures, like Japan and countries in Western Europe.

Working together, the United States and South Korea should also pool resources to conduct sub-power diplomacy and to promote democratic development and human security in the region.

Thank you very much.

KIM KYUNG-WON: Thank you. We will continue with Mr. Lim Wonhyuk.

LIM WONHYUK: Thank you, Ambassador Kim. The title of my talk is "Transforming an Asymmetric Cold War Alliance: Psychological and Strategic Challenges for the ROK and the United States." Since the end of the Korean War, an asymmetric alliance in which the client sacrificed part of its autonomy in exchange for the security provided by the patron has defined the relationship between the ROK and the United States. In my talk, I'd like to analyze psychological and strategic challenges the ROK and the United States are facing as they attempt to transform this asymmetric Cold War alliance into a more equal partnership better designed to promote peace in Northeast Asia and around the world.

Despite repeated government assurances to the contrary, the ROK-U.S. alliance is adrift. No one is taking ownership of the alliance issue to articulate its vision and prescribe necessary adjustments in the same way as Joseph Nye and others did when the U.S.-Japan alliance was in trouble in the mid-1990s. Incidentally, Dr. Funabashi Yoichi wrote a book titled "Alliance Adrift" on this episode, and in fact, when he gave me a copy of his book, for a second I thought he had written a book on the current status of the U.S.-ROK alliance. Rather than pretending there's nothing wrong or letting uncoordinated solutions to technical problems redefine the alliance, it would be better to acknowledge the existing problems and reformulate the rationale for the alliance.

Ironically, the current trouble in the alliance is in many ways a product of its own success. The alliance deterred communist aggression and helped to provide South Korea a secure environment for its rapid economic and political development. In fact, the alliance was so successful that by the end of the 1990s, South Korea had grown increasingly uncomfortable with its original premise. The U.S.-Soviet rivalry had ended,
South Korea had normalized relations with Russia and China, inter-Korean rapprochement had begun, and South Korea had become a democratic market economy with increasing self-confidence.

Alliance transformation, or the adjustment of an alliance to a changed environment, is nothing new in geopolitics. In fact, important lessons can be drawn from the transformation of U.S. alliances with Western Europe and Japan after the perceived common threat of communist aggression disappeared. However, I think alliance transformation in the ROK-U.S. case is rather unique in two respects.

First, atypical of U.S. client states—and, for that matter, rare among underdeveloped countries in general—South Korea has achieved something close to a middle-power status through industrialization and democratization. These internal changes have rendered obsolete some of the basic premises underpinning the asymmetric alliance. Simply put, South Korea can now afford to take up greater security responsibilities and it would like to deal with the United States on more equal terms.

Such alliance transformation would require psychological as well as technical adjustments in the terms of interaction between the two sides. Although cases like the Philippines and Taiwan can be thought of as possible benchmarks, I don't think they are quite the right type.

And also, I'd like to add that, you know, from a comparative perspective, the U.S. bilateral alliances with Germany and Japan, the two defeated powers, were quite different as well because these alliances were designed not only to address perceived common threats but also to bottle-cap their remilitarization. Also, as Germany and Japan had attained a great-power status before World War II, the amount of psychological adjustment needed to acknowledge and accept their resurgence was relatively small.

The second difference is that, unlike in Europe, the transformation of U.S. alliances in Northeast Asia is taking place even as the vestiges of the Cold War remain. For instance, the transformation of the U.S.-FRG (Federal Republic of Germany) alliance took place after the end of the Cold War and the reunification of Germany. By contrast, the transformation of the ROK-U.S. alliance is taking place against the backdrop of partial normalization of relations and inter-Korean rapprochement. This unsettled state of affairs in Northeast Asia forms the background of noticeable divergences in threat perception among allies, as they have yet to craft a common strategic vision for the region.

And to highlight the nature of these challenges, I'd like to look at the state of the U.S.-ROK alliance along the following four dimensions: 1) perceived threats, 2) economic interests, 3) values, and 4) residual factors, including something called goodwill. These are typically regarded as four binding forces in alliance politics.

Now, first, I'd like to look at perceived threats regarding North Korea, China, and militant fundamentalism, closely associated with terrorism.
In recent years, a number of scholars and practitioners have noted that divergent perspectives on the perceived threat from North Korea represent the biggest challenge to the ROK-U.S. alliance. Although some observers blame the sunshine policy and the inter-Korean summit in 2000 for this divergence, its origins seem to have more to do with stark realities such as the humanitarian crisis and food crisis in North Korea, rather than any particular line of policy toward North Korea. For example, the horrific images of undernourished children and other reminders of North Korea's economic decline appear to have a significant impact on popular views of North Korea since the mid-1990s.

However, it would be an exaggeration to claim that South Korea no longer regards North Korea as a threat. If that were really the case, there would not be so much nervousness or uneasiness in South Korea about major changes in the U.S.-ROK alliance in general and in redeployment of the USFK in particular. Instead of asserting South Korea's threat perception is clouded by naïveté and wishful thinking, it may be more productive to analyze the two allies' divergent perspectives on perceived threats.

The first issue is deterrence. North Korea already has long-range artillery tubes aimed at South Korea, and as a consequence, the marginal threat from North Korea's nuclear weapons is not big for South Korea. Whereas for the United States, the incremental threat from North Korea's nuclear weapons is rather large, especially if the weapons wind up in the hands of terrorist organizations. People like Marcus Noland have made this point.

Now, let's go one step further. By threatening a preemptive strike against North Korea, the United States can raise South Korea's perceived marginal threat from North Korea's nuclear weapons in a roundabout way. But this kind of approach risks a nationalist backlash from South Korea. As was the case in the days of mutually assured destruction, deterrence may not be a completely reassuring proposition, but realistically there may be no better option.

Another bone of contention between the two allies is a seeming contradiction in South Korea's position between North Korea not being allowed to develop nuclear weapons on the one hand, and military options being off the table on the other. But from South Korea's perspective, military measures designed to destroy North Korea's nuclear capability is likely to lead to a full-blown conflict on the Korean Peninsula. The cure is worse than the disease itself.

In this regard, an analogy may be drawn with the West Germans' opposition to the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons in their homeland in the early 1980s. Deterring Soviet aggression might be a noble cause, but the outbreak of a nuclear war on German soil would make the whole exercise a futile one—at least for the Germans, most of whom thought greater inter-German exchanges and detente offered better prospects for peace and security.
In short, the United States and South Korea, and to some extent China, share common interests in preventing the production and spread of nuclear weapons and fissile material from North Korea. But they are not on the same page when it comes to taking military measures to destroy North Korea's nuclear capability. And this obviously has implications for a credible red line on the nuclear issue.

More fundamentally, North Korea is much more than just a threat or a foreign entity to South Korea, unlike the way the Soviet Union had been to the United States. This kind of dual nature of the inter-Korean relationship can be highlighted in responding to Congressman Henry Hyde's pointed appeal, “If you need our help, please tell us who your enemy is.” A simple answer to that would be that North Korea, as a monolith, is our enemy. But a more sophisticated answer would be that the North Korean regime is different from the North Korean people, and we should not confuse the two in the same way. An even more nuanced answer would be to give the North Korean regime a chance to make their changes. And that kind of fundamental difference in the way South Korea views North Korea has to be understood by American policymakers if the two allies are going to be on the same page regarding North Korea policy.

As for China, in recent years, impressed by relative economic and political gains China has made in its interaction with South Korea, some American observers have begun to talk about the possibility of a Korean shift from the United States to China. In fact, even in the worst case, the ROK would probably find it in its interest to foster cooperation in East Asia and prevent a U.S.-China confrontation, which would likely have a very negative effect on the Korean peninsula. But the picture is not so simple, especially in the wake of the Koguryo controversy, as Professor Chung mentioned in the previous session. And I'd like to add that there is also a bit of strategic anxiety regarding China's increasing influence on North Korea and South Korea.

So although, simplistically, some may argue that South Korea and the United States have rather different perspectives on China, maybe the difference is not as large as it may first appear. This may be said about the Taiwan Strait issue as well. The Taiwan Strait crisis is a topic that is more discussed in the United States than in South Korea, but this topic is discussed in the context of strategic flexibility in the ROK, for the USFK. The nightmare scenario that's often talked about is the possibility of the ROK being dragged into an unwanted war because the USFK would be sent to the Taiwan Strait if a crisis erupts and there is natural inclination on the part of South Koreans to oppose this kind of entrapment.

But in many ways, this perspective is like making a mountain out of a molehill. By this I mean, the United States and the ROK basically share the same policy on Taiwan, which is that they both support a peaceful resolution of the problem and they are both opposed by unilateral action being taken by either side, either China or Taiwan. Technically, even if there's something in the Taiwan Strait, it is likely that it's not the USFK but rather U.S. forces in Guam and Okinawa that would be sent to the Strait to resolve the crisis. So this kind of divergence in perspective needs to be talked about to
really get at the root of the problem, because in many ways the differences may not be as large as they first appear.

As for the third perceived threat, militant fundamentalism, as Professor Lee showed, I think the ROK and the United States are pretty much on the same page regarding this. One thing that I might add is that, from the Korean perspective, over-reliance on military measures to address the terrorist threat might have a limited effect. Something like the Marshall Plan for the Middle East, where the social and economic problems—unemployment and so on—would be addressed, might be an important complement to a war on terror.

As for economic interests, a lot of people have talked about the economic development of South Korea and the increasing relative importance of China, so I'm not going to go into that. I just want to add that a close look at South Korea's economic performance and policy suggests that there's no simple causal relationship between South Korea's economic position and its attitude toward the United States. There's no compelling reason why South Korea's economic development or the declining relative importance of the United States should generate anti-American sentiments in South Korea, to say nothing of fluctuations in them. No-longer-one-sided economic interaction between the two countries could provide the basis for a solid bilateral relationship.

The third binding force in alliance politics is values. I'd like to note that many discussions on the future of the U.S.-ROK alliance these days conclude by saying that we are both democracies and market economies, and therefore we should form a value alliance, or something like that. I'm being somewhat simplistic about it, but that's the conclusion.

I think we need to dig deeper than to just say that democracy and market economy attributes are going to be the binding force for the alliance, because although the values the United States and ROK are pursuing are quite similar, the policy tools implemented to realize these values are rather different. Under the second Bush administration, democracy promotion is emerging as sort of a foreign policy doctrine, but if you're not careful about the use of the democracy-peace hypothesis in democracy promotion, there's a chance that this kind of exercise - that is, waging war to create democracies to secure peace - may actually lead to an outburst of nationalism, as such a military venture may be perceived as a thinly veiled imperialist exercise. And there's a limit to how much a country like South Korea would go along with that kind of exercise.

By contrast, I'd like to note the ROK's experience with regard to East Timor, where South Korea sent combat troops. At that time, South Korea had domestic support, local support from the people of East Timor, as well as international support in the form of a U.N. peacekeeping force—that kind of approach, where the objectives as well as the tools through which these objectives are pursued are clear, has to be brought into the debate over values.
Finally, I will talk about goodwill and residual factors. I think here the challenge is for the ROK to overcome its periphery complex and parochialism and begin to act and behave like a middle power, and for the United States to accept ROK as something of a middle power. That's the psychological challenge involved in the transformation. Accompanying technical adjustments will have to be made regarding operational control, SOFA, and the structure of Combined Forces Command, et cetera.

In addition, I'd like to note that there's an element of changing domestic politics playing a major role in the U.S.-ROK alliance. A lot of people have noted that while the United States and Japan are becoming more conservative, the ROK is becoming more progressive. But I think it's more profound than a simple swing of political sentiment that you are witnessing in South Korea. It's actually an expansion of the political spectrum—restoration of the political left in Korea, if you will. Not only communists, but social democrats were purged in the wake of the Korean War in South Korea, and now this restoration is taking place. There's going to be a lot of revisionist history and taboo-breaking, and there's a chance that greater publicity for new, iconoclastic views would generate negative publicity for the U.S.-ROK alliance.

But I think it's important to realize this is part of democratization and the United States would have to learn to accept the new realities in South Korea.

Thank you very much.

KIM KYUNG-WON: Thank you. As some of you may have guessed, Dr. Lim represents the so-called younger generation, and his views are certainly fresh and quite unfamiliar to a large number of Koreans who belong to the older generations. I allowed Dr. Lim to have more time precisely for that reason; I wanted to give others exposure to your kind of reasoning. I'm sure many of you will have many questions. But before we do that, let's go to Dr. Michael O'Hanlon and get an American perspective on things.

MICHAEL O'HANLON: Thank you, Ambassador. And I'll join everyone else who's spoken in thanking the Seoul Forum and Brookings, Richard Bush and Strobe, Ambassador Han Sung-Joo, and everyone who's made this event possible. It's a great honor to be part of it.

I want to begin by saying it's also a great honor to speak about the U.S.-ROK alliance because, to me, this is in many ways the most impressive alliance we have in the United States. I'm going to explain what I mean by that in just a second. Let me first say my talk is primarily oriented towards a longer-term vision of the U.S.-ROK alliance, just as previous speakers have emphasized. I'll say a couple of words at the end about the six-party process and the current challenges that face us. But I want to think more in broad terms and get beyond the immediate threat and even imagine what the alliance would be like after the DPRK threat is gone forever, if we can hope that someday that will occur.

But let me say why I think the U.S.-ROK alliance is so impressive. We have a lot of slogans and nicknames for the various alliances we have in the United States. The
U.S.-Japan alliance, or at least the U.S.-Japan relationship—going back to Ambassador Mansfield—is famously described as "the most important, bar none." The U.S.-Britain alliance is "the closest, bar none," and that's evidenced in everything that we do in so many different crises and other activities. You could go down the list. The U.S.-France alliance is our most nettlesome, to put it politely. The U.S.-Taiwan alliance is our most important non-alliance, or maybe the U.S.-Israel relationship joins that rank as well.

You could go through a lot of slogans and a lot of nicknames that describe many of our alliances. And admittedly, we haven't gotten around to naming the U.S.-ROK alliance with quite as catchy a nickname. I would acknowledge, as an American, we don't spend enough time thinking about Korea in the United States. And I take the point from Professor Lim that we do need to think more about it. I think we respect Korea a great deal, but we don't think about it enough in the United States.

But I would propose that we should think of this alliance as the most impressive that we have. Why do I say that? Well, first of all, look at how often we have cooperated around the world, including the much-appreciated help that the ROK now provides the United States in Iraq, where I think it's the third-largest troop contributor and, even after the downsizing next year, will continue to play an important role. This is obviously not the first time. The ROK was very heavily involved in the Vietnam War, and has been very supportive of the United States in a number of other operations.

Secondly, look what Koreans have done with your country in the 50 years that we've been allies. It's incredible. It's never been done in the history of the planet. The only countries that come close are perhaps China and Japan in terms of how far they've come in 50 years. But for Americans, I think, to have been a part of this is, frankly, a thrill and an honor. We hope that we've contributed, and certainly previous generations of Americans and previous generations of Koreans have contributed with their blood and their sacrifice. I think it's really a very important piece of reaffirming evidence of what American foreign policy can contribute when it emphasizes certain values and stays loyal to allies, just as you've remained loyal to us in some of these recent crises.

Finally, this is an alliance that transcends race, transcends religion—we do have a fair amount of common religion—but we actually are from two different parts of the world. And yet, we are really in many ways a symmetrical alliance. The U.S.-Japan alliance is also an inter-ethnic, inter-continental alliance, but it's an asymmetric alliance. The Japanese have never, obviously, been contributors to overseas missions in the way that Koreans have. The fact that we have already had a fairly symmetrical relationship in some ways, in certain missions already is very impressive testament to what this alliance has become and just what an incredible accomplishment it is in the history of all alliances around the world. For two countries so far apart geographically, and so different historically, to have been allies for so long is something special.

Moving on from the lofty rhetoric, I will now get into a little bit more direct language about why I think the alliance is in our interest and in your interest. I will go
down a list with a couple of examples for each and then try to talk briefly about the six-party process before wrapping up.

First, let me be direct and speak as an American and say why it is good for us. Leaving aside the North Korean issue for the moment, we like to think of ourselves, clearly, as a global leader that has a lot of important allies that share values with us. And to be able to have this global alliance system in which we play a certain leadership role but are also part of a broader community, we need to have important allies in several different parts of the world. We obviously have a number in Europe. We have a number of nominal allies in Latin America, although we're not typically all that active in operations with them. We don't have as many in East Asia, and frankly, even having two alliances—U.S.-Japan and U.S.-Korea—is very important in this case to make this global community make sense.

I think you may hear more about this later this afternoon from Ivo Daalder and from others who have also been talking about a community of democracies. Ivo might not put it quite the same way I will, but I would emphasize it's very important for a country that aspires to see a spreading global community of democracies to have very strong alliances in several different parts of the world. Maybe over time, these bilateral alliances will change into something broader and more community-like, but I don't think you would give up the alliance to get there. You would keep the alliance and you gradually modify it.

That's the reason why it's good for us. In a more narrow sense, it's good for us because we don't want to depend exclusively on the U.S.-Japan alliance. If we were to withdraw U.S. forces from Korea and no longer have an alliance with your country, we would be putting all of our marbles, in terms of our role in East Asia, essentially in the U.S.-Japan alliance. That would put a lot more pressure on Japanese politics, and issues like Okinawa and the alleged excess of American presence on that island, issues of accidents and crimes, and other things that always come up because we live in the real world and the real people who wear the uniforms of our different countries would become even more of a strain. Japan would resent why we have to keep bases on that small country's territory. It would be a more difficult alliance-management proposition with the U.S.-Japan alliance if we did not have the U.S.-Korea alliance. And of course, we would lose one of our most important allies, in terms of fighting shoulder-by-shoulder, that we've ever had—the ROK.

So these are many reasons why the alliance is important for us. By the way, I'm conflating and using almost interchangeably "alliance" and "presence" because I think meaningfully to have one in this case you need the other. I'll say a little bit more about that in just a second.

That's why the alliance is good for us and will remain good for us indefinitely and why I think Americans will want to have a continued U.S.-ROK alliance well into the future.
Why is it good for Koreans? Well, I'll let you answer that question. Some of our colleagues already have done so earlier. But when I look at this region, I don't think you have to view China as a certain future threat to recognize that Korea benefits from having a distant ally as well as some local friends. Obviously, there are complicated tensions and histories in your relationship with Japan, even in your relationship with China. And though I doubt that China would ever be an overland threat to Korea, there are a number of interesting and contentious sea-bed issues and other such matters in this region that I think Korea can benefit from having an ally.

Now, it helps that the ally in question is also the strongest military power on the face of the earth, but I think having a powerful ally, whoever it might be, is useful to you. And we happen to be willing to do it and we've got an alliance that works. I would therefore suggest that for Korea there's going to be a benefit to keeping that alive. Now obviously, we have to always compare the benefit of that security guarantee, or that friend and ally willing to come to your aid, against the danger of being allied. Furthermore, I realize that in the North Korean context, many Koreans now see the danger as exceeding the benefit. I'll come back to that in just a minute. But I think if we can handle the North Korea question in a fair way, it will be beneficial to you to maintain the alliance.

Let me really drive home the following, however. It builds to some extent on Professor Lim's comments, but to some extent I also disagree with him. I would like to add a little bit of constructive tension to the conversation that I hope we can pursue later on. It's about Taiwan. If there were a Taiwan crisis, I am not convinced that your interests would be the same as ours. In fact, I think there's a very high chance that Korea would want to stay out of it and Korea would feel that it would have to stay out as a matter of long-term national interest. And frankly, I think we as Americans need to be ready to accept that and to be prepared to do military operations in the vicinity of Taiwan without any help from Korea or U.S. forces stationed on the peninsula.

The good news is historically that's exactly what we have done with allies. Historically, we always take no for an answer in crises, at least if you look in the cases of modern Europe and modern Middle East history. Maybe others can think of an exception or two to my rule—we may occasionally strong-arm people, we obviously try hard to convince people that we should be allowed to use their bases.

In thinking back to 1986, when we decided we wanted to bomb Libya in retaliation for previous terrorist actions, France said we can't fly over their air space, so we flew around the European continent. And in 1973, in the Mideast War, most European countries did not even want us to re-supply Israel, so we used the Azores Islands of Portugal's possession as our only European base of any substantial importance in ferrying supplies to Israel during that crisis.

In the recent invasion of Iraq, Turkey said, “You cannot send the 4th Infantry Division through our territory,” so we said okay. We're not very happy about it, but we obviously accept, and have no way to do anything but accept that refusal.
Saudi Arabia said, “Don't fly combat sorties from our territory” throughout much of the last dozen years, and we've said okay.

Go down the list. The United States doesn't like it when allies tell us no, but in terms of military operations, we take “no” for an answer. And I think this is a set of historical lessons that Koreans and Japanese should study more because it may help you to reassure yourselves that we're not going to be able to pull you into a fight that you don't want. All you do is say no when the crisis arrives, if and when it does -- and I hope it doesn't -- and we will have to respect your sovereign right to say so.

So that “maybe” is not so much a reason to have the alliance, but it is a reason not to worry so much about being dragged into a fight over Taiwan.

I'm already starting to push my time limit. So instead of going through a more detailed presentation on several points, let me just make two other comments in closing.

One, I think we also have, as Professor Kim has mentioned, an important future security agenda that we can and must define -- it includes issues such as counterterrorism, counter-piracy, counter-crime, peacekeeping, and stabilization missions. And again, we have two of the best militaries in the world, two of the best infantry forces in the world, and a proven track record of cooperating together. And in this sense, the U.S.-ROK alliance, in my mind, is more impressive than almost any other alliance we have -- here I'm using "impressive" in the narrow, military sense. We don't have many European allies that can send 3,000 forces to Iraq. We certainly don't have many that would send 3,000 forces to Iraq. Even if you look at the Afghanistan mission and at the number of allies that have been able to send 2,000 or more troops to that less-controversial operation, there are only two or three that have been willing to step up to that extent.

So I think Korea is in an elite half-dozen in terms of important American allies for cooperating together. That's something that we're going to want to retain on both sides for dealing with a host of potential security challenges in the future -- not so much any contentious wars such as the invasion of Iraq, but more like the East Timor stabilization mission. And I can go down a list of others in the discussion, if you like.

Finally, let me add a couple of points on the six-party talks. All of this language about long-term visions for the alliance is not going to do much good if we break it in the short-term. And Jack Pritchard has given an excellent account of where we stand today and the difficulties of the talks -- a much more pessimistic assessment than, I'm sure, he would have hoped to give a month or two ago and that most of us would have hoped to hear a month or two ago, but nonetheless, it's a reality. This means we are facing the same kind of tensions that have plagued this alliance for the last half-decade and we're going to have to deal with them again.

I'm just going to say a couple of brief words. One, obviously, is that in the United States I think we need to figure out what our policy is and I hope very much that it's in
the “Chris Hill” direction, not the “Bob Joseph” direction. But Jack has said much more eloquently what we need to think about in American politics than I have.

But let me suggest to our Korean friends that I think also it's unlikely, in my mind, that North Korea will denuclearize as long as it sees the likelihood of getting major benefits from South Korea and China, irrespective of what it does. Now obviously the electricity idea was a very creative one; I admire it greatly and am very grateful for that Korean initiative. But I also think that Kim Jong Il probably believes that most of what you would offer him, he can get no matter what he does, barring an act of blatant aggression. And I would submit to you that just as we in the United States -- and this is my own opinion -- need to try to push our political process in the “Chris Hill” direction, you may need to find a way to make some elements of your sunshine policy and your détente policy a little more conditional on North Korean behavior and be able to send that message to them clearly. Otherwise, North Korea's negotiating behavior is going to be about dividing and conquering. They're pretty good at it, and I would predict they may have success, given the track record and the trajectory that we're on right now.

So I look forward to more discussion on that as well later on. Thank you.

KIM KYUNG-WON: Thank you for suggesting what we may have to do to make things happen the way that we believe that they should happen. I was thinking who I would have to convince how North Korean policy [sound difficulties, inaudible].

Now, you have made a number of references to China. The time has come to take a look at China's perspective. To help us do that, we have Professor Wu Xinbo from Shanghai.

WU XINBO: Thank you, Ambassador Kim. I want to start by thanking Richard Bush and Professor Han for inviting me here. I have missed the last two years' CNAPS annual conferences, for understandable reasons. I really needed to be present at this year's gathering to show my loyalty to the Brookings Institution and to CNAPS.

When I think about the future of the U.S.-ROK alliance, I try to take a historical perspective. The U.S. alliance arrangements in East Asia were all the products of the Cold War. So as the Cold War receded into history and efforts have been made to eliminate its vestiges, these alliances have needed to be transformed and adjusted. Actually, with the exception of the U.S.-Japan alliance, which has been extended and expanded in the last decade, the U.S. alliances with four other countries in this region--Thailand, the Philippines, Australia, and the ROK have loosened up one way or the other.

For the U.S.-Thailand ties, I don't see much substance to it, except for the regular joint training and exercises. For U.S.-Philippines security relations, the U.S. left its major military bases in the Philippines in the early 1990s. Security ties with Australia have also loosened; its leaders have repeatedly emphasized recently that if there is conflict in the Taiwan Strait and if the U.S. is going to get involved, Australia will stay out.
In the case of the U.S.-ROK alliance, I think that they are verging on acceptance of and policy inclinations toward North Korea. The different perspectives about the rise of China and ROK's new concept about its regional goals have all combined to strain Washington-Seoul ties and brought this alliance to a new trajectory of development.

So looking ahead, I see the future of the alliance will manifest most, if not all, of the following features: One, I think the structure of the alliance will become more equal, with the ROK playing an increasingly important role in it. This is partly because of the growing self-confidence on the part of Korea and also the growing self-pride -- some would call it nationalism -- in Korea, especially with regard to peninsular affairs. If we look at the current trajectory of the six-party talks over the nuclear issue, I think gradually ROK will exercise a central role, while the U.S. role will decline.

We had a discussion with our American counterparts about why the Bush administration didn't invade North Korea two years ago to solve the nuclear problem. Then my American friends told me it was not because of China, it was because of the ROK. I took that as the reason, partially.

Second, as the nature of the alliance will shift from one of military deterrence to one of security assurance, for Korea to value the alliance in the future is to help shape a feasible security environment in Northeast Asia rather than to deal with a security threat per se. That means, as the concern about the North Korean military threat substantively declines, the value of the alliance to Korea will be to help shape a broad security environment in this troubled region rather than to deal with a specific security challenge.

Third, the military function of the alliance will be less prominent while the alliance will stand as an embodiment of the special relationship between the U.S. and ROK. Some of the Korean presenters have mentioned future scenarios for the alliance, that it could be either a comprehensive one, which means you will cover a wide range of security concerns going beyond the narrow concerns, or it would be something based on common values -- democracy and a market economy. I believe that in a classic sense, countries enter into alliances mainly because of their common interests, not because of their common values.

Finally, the importance of the alliance in Korea's overall national security calculus will no longer be the most important pillar for its national security, as it was in the past several decades, but rather one of the several key variables in its security equation. Such variables will include ROK's independent security perception, defense posture, a strong and growing military capability, a reduction of tension in North-South relations and developments in their relations, active security cooperation with neighboring countries in Northeast Asia, and so on. So I think Korea has been trying to maximize its security investment to make sure that the alliance with the United States will not be the only pillar to its national security interests.
I have some comments about the above developments. First, I think the changing attitude on the part of the ROK toward the alliance reflects its aspiration and determination to eliminate the vestiges of the Cold War on the peninsula, to achieve its national reconciliation, and, in the long term, to realize national reunification. From a Chinese perspective, we understand that national reconciliation and unification is a core value to both the North and the South, while it may be somewhat more difficult for the U.S. to understand because the U.S. deals with the Korean issue from a quite different perspective, namely, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, ideological and political differences with North Korea, and also its own perception about regional order in this part of the world.

Second, a shift in the orientation of the ROK's foreign policy from a U.S.-centered pattern to a region-centered pattern, or a peninsula-centered pattern, will help promote its growth in regional affairs. In fact, as Seoul tries to play the role as a balancer in Northeast Asian security and an initiator in East Asian economic cooperation, the ROK will exercise a unique influence in regional affairs.

I understand that the concept of a balancer in Northeast Asia is still very controversial and there's a reason to be quite silent on this topic. But from a Chinese perspective, I try to understand this idea in the sense that Korea could become a useful soft balancer, rather than hard balancer, in those situations. This means you will not use your hard power, but your soft power; that is, your active diplomacy to try to mediate among the various players in Northeast Asia. Also, that is an opinion that many of my colleagues in China share with me, that this is a way the ROK can really play a unique role in regional affairs. This, in turn, will promote regional stability and integration in a time when this region is really under pressure from either geopolitics or geoeconomics. To relieve such pressure, you really need a country who can bridge between two options.

Finally, the ROK's changing attitude toward its alliance with the United States, its pragmatic approach to a rising China, and its conception of its role in regional affairs will help promote its relations with China. The interaction between our two countries and a growing common ground in regional affairs contributes to a comprehensive cooperational partnership, which has been set as a goal.

While the political, economic, and social ties between our two countries have become strong, the security relations between our two countries have yet to develop. The potential in this regard is great. In 2002, we had the fourth round of diplomatic and security -- [flip tape] -- sensitive to the concerns of the respective partners, namely Pyongyang and Washington. Secure ties between them will grow steadily and even institutionalized in the future.

Finally, I want to mention briefly some future tests of the U.S.-ROK alliance. I think in this regard there will be at least three distinct tests. One is still how to deal with the North Korean issue. It's not just the nuclear issue. There are many other related issues which will come later. Some have been mentioned -- the human rights issue and also the pace of improvement in North-South relations. Down the road, you still have the
problem of how to build a new peace mechanism on the Korean Peninsula. All of these issues will continue to test the U.S.-ROK alliance.

Second, on China policy, basically the ROK and the U.S. are taking different perspectives. As was said before, the ROK attempts to view the rise of China as more of an opportunity than a challenge, especially in the economic sense. Someone mentioned that Korea has been receptive and favorable to the rise of China, not only because one does not have much choice in dealing with the rise of China and in trying to accommodate it, but also because you see you see your national interests served by a rising China. But for the United States, I think the real concern is how the rise of China challenges the U.S. hegemonic position in this part of the world. So in that sense, the rise of China provides both challenges and opportunities. There is always a divergence of policy inclinations between Seoul and Washington.

The third test is about regional policy. I think we are going to talk about this issue in the afternoon. It's a very timely issue. But briefly, I think the U.S. still prefers a kind of U.S.-centered regional order in this part of the world, while for the ROK, it will help to take a more liberal concept about regional order to emerge. It has been trying to promote integration economically, and it has been trying to promote regional political and security cooperation. It envisions the region as a community in the future. This certainly differs from the U.S. vision in this regard. From time to time, this kind of discrepancy in the respective visions will also cause strains on the U.S.-ROK alliance.

With that, I will stop here. Thank you.

KIM KYUNG-WON: Thank you. Now it's time for questions. I think I will follow the pattern set by the first panel. That is to say, instead of my reading from your notes, I will call upon the person who presented us with a question to make a presentation of the question. I would appreciate it if you would make it brief.

Mr. Gerard Hammond?

QUESTION: I'd like to address my question to Dr. Lim. I believe that President Roh Moo-hyun has said that North Koreans are brothers and Americans are friends. It seems there's a perception that the South Korean government giving aid to North Korea would ask for some transparency. They should maybe have more concern for their brothers, who are refugees from the North -- concern for giving humanitarian aid without any condition. Does that undermine the United Nations or World Health Organization or other programs that are in North Korea? They should perhaps be concerned for separated families? Also, the perception given from the North, when one speaks with the North, is that they would have great concern that they might end up being the new migrant workers for the South. The South Korean government doesn't seem to perceive or be concerned much about human rights or for some sort of religious freedom as an objective of their policy.

Thank you.
KIM KYUNG-WON: The question was addressed to whom?

QUESTION: Lim Wonhyuk.

LIM WONHYUK: Shall I respond right away?

KIM KYUNG-WON: Yes, right away. Make it brief, though.

LIM WONHYUK: Ambassador Don Gregg once said South Korea's perception of North Korea has changed from a menace to a brother who picked up some bad habits along the way. That reminds me of that, when you refer to President Roh's comment.

But turning to your questions, I'd like to first speak about humanitarian aid without conditions, does that undermine U.N. efforts, and so on. If you look at the food crisis in more detail, it really broke in the mid- to late 1990s. And what Pyongyang authorities basically did was to give up on about 30 percent of the population and save the other 70 percent, the more privileged, elite groups in the society. Given the nonlinearities in food intake and so on, it would actually cause more problems if you cut rations across the board the same way. They basically did triage.

What's interesting is that, if you take the fact that North Korea's food crisis is based on availability, i.e. a total availability crisis rather than a distribution crisis, this transparency in distribution and so on is somewhat of a red herring issue.

Now, I appreciate the value of creating more contact with North Korean officials, North Korean workers, and so on, so it would be good to have a lot of contacts between international aid workers, Korean aid workers, Chinese aid workers, and North Korean workers. And in fact, the ROK government has actually increased its demand for transparency over the past five years or so. Rather than just giving food right away, we do inspect the stuff. It's not as intrusive as the WFP inspections.

But the flip side of this practice is that the North Korean regime is very paranoid and it tends to regard this kind of contact as a possible Trojan horse in the society. So there's a limit to how much we can realistically achieve in terms of transparency when we try to save the lives of the North Korean people. Sometimes we have to make a decision between transparency and saving people.

In fact, if you are interested in humanitarian efforts toward North Korea, I'd like to urge you to urge the U.S. government to try to normalize relations with North Korea so that the roots of the problem can be addressed.

As for human rights in North Korea, there is a lot of discussion within South Korea about what's the effective way to address this problem. I think a useful analogy might be China after Nixon visited Beijing in the early 1970s. At the time, the PRC was not a bastion of liberty or, you know, a great human rights-practicing country at all. And
in fact, I would doubt the United States would vote against the human rights practices in China if some other nation had raised the human rights issue in the mid-1970s, for instance -- for strategic reasons. And within South Korea, there's a debate as to which way is more effective, quiet diplomacy or sort of the bull-horn approach, where you condemn and shame the regime. So far, the government has taken the view that quiet diplomacy is the better approach in this area.

KIM KYUNG-WON: Mr. Erich Shih, from TVBS News Network.

QUESTION: Yes, Erich Shih [ph] with the Washington Bureau of the TVBS News Network from Taiwan. This question is directed primarily to Dr. O'Hanlon and also to Dr. Wu.

It is entirely plausible that the ROK would want to stay out of a military contingency involving Taiwan and Mainland China. Given the complex relationship and histories and everything that Japan has with the People’s Republic as well as with Taiwan, do you think that [inaudible] governments really want to stay out of it, should the confrontation actually take place?

MICHAEL O'HANLON: Great question, Erich. I'll be brief because it's going to be conjectural and there are other people in this room who know more about the likelihood of Japanese cooperation with the United States than I, in any case. But I would suggest to you I think it is -- depending on how the crisis develops -- it is more likely than not that Japan would at least let the United States use military facilities on its territory and provide support to those facilities. Whether Japan would become directly involved in combat operations itself with its formidable antisubmarine warfare and surface navy capabilities, I don't know. And I think, again, that would depend in part on whether China then attacked bases on Japan to try to slow down the American role in the conflicts. So we're getting into a very conjectural zone.

But I would say that, if I had to guess, I bet Japan would play at least some role, at least a passive role, but depending on circumstances.

WU XINBO: I don't have much to say that is different from the comment made by Mike. In China we noticed Japan's movement in that direction in recent years. That means to get prepared to be involved in a Taiwan Strait contingency is driven both by the policy of the Bush administration as well as by Japan's changing domestic politics, including its China policy.

But I think the question is really to what extent Japan will get involved. So this is a big question mark. I must say I tend to look beyond the Koizumi decision and believe that Japan will make a wise decision, if this issue comes up, for its long-term interest in relations with China. I'm not alarmed by the position.

KIM KYUNG-WON: Professor Lee Nae-Young of Korea University has a couple of questions. I invite him to speak.
QUESTION: The first question I'd like to ask Professor Kim Sung-han. In your paper you mentioned, in scenario number 4, that the OECD formula would be advisable. What do you think of, instead of the OECD European formula, a Southeast Asia Treaty Organization SEATO-type of formula? The reason I'm asking is that already ASEAN ten countries plus three -- Japan, China, Korea -- made the Chiang Mai agreement; that is, central banks swapped agreements that, as of the 15th of November, totaled $50 billion. That is 220 percent of what Korea received from the IMF back in 1998.

The second question is to Dr. Michael O'Hanlon. I read your book Crisis on the Korean Peninsula with very much interest. What do you think, if U.S. troops and allied troops had evacuated German territory before 1989, would the German reunification be expedited or lag behind 1989? That is my question.

KIM SUNG-HAN: Let me respond to your first question about multilateral security cooperation in Northeast Asia, whether we need to take as our benchmark the NATO type of -- OSCE type of cooperation or SEATO or ASEAN+3 type of cooperation.

The reason why I emphasized we need to follow the OSCE type is that the ASEAN+3 type is the formula in which the role of the United States is missing. In light of very realistic security circumstances in this part of the region, it is really unthinkable to remove the United States’ role in making our security architecture safer and more cooperative. So in that sense, I would say, in terms of the type of regionalism, we need to follow Asia Pacific regionalism rather than just a Northeast Asian or East Asian regionalism, even though we need to start from Northeast Asia.

However, in that sense we need to invite some other members from outside this region, such as the EU or some other countries, so that we can talk to each other and think about the ways and means to promote multilateral security cooperation.

MICHAEL O'HANLON: Sir, I'm going to borrow a page from our friend Richard Holbrooke and say I don't understand the question, but then answer it anyway.

I don't understand the question in the sense that there's nothing in my book that advocates withdrawal of U.S. military forces from the Korean Peninsula. Mike Mochizuki and I favor considering a “conventional forces in Korea” concept, which would demand by far the greatest cuts from North Korea, some significant cuts from South Korea, and at this point, given the drawdown that's already occurring, only a continuation of that process. As you know, we've had 37,000 U.S. forces in Korea for a couple of decades. That number is now about 30,000, headed to 25,000 by the end of this decade, and I think that's appropriate. In fact, the long-term vision that I was discussing in my paper, even beyond the North Korean threat, I would still envision, if Korea were willing, to have anywhere from 10,000 to 25,000 U.S. military forces on the Peninsula thereafter.
So the basic idea of our book, in one sentence, is to force North Korea to choose whether it wants to reform along the Vietnam and China model or face an increasingly hostile and coercive response from the international community if it keeps its nuclear weapons. Try to make that choice very stark. I think right now we are not making that choice stark because essentially we're being too hard-line in the United States, and South Korea and China are being too soft-line, and North Korea has the opportunity to divide the groups from each other.

KIM KYUNG-WON: We have five minutes left, and for that time I would like to allow panelists to comment on each other's presentations, if there is a question that you want to address.

In that regard, I would like to ask one question of Dr. Lim. It's a minor point. You made reference to the issue of tactical nuclear weapons being deployed, whether to deploy them on German territory. If I recall correctly, they were deployed despite fierce domestic opposition. And for that, German leadership was congratulated by a number of people who knew what the score was.

Alliance demands a certain willingness to be accommodating to the wishes of your partner. It does not mean you're going to have your way 100 times. The impression that I gained from listening to your presentation was that you felt that, until now, in the past and throughout the Cold War era, we were being treated as certainly a junior partner, a minor figure, and were never considered to be equal to the U.S., and that South Korea had accepted this relationship without protest, without efforts to rise to equal status.

I doubt that, very frankly. Empirically I doubt that. Throughout these five decades of U.S.-Korean relations, Koreans sometimes protested, disagreed, sabotaged, and deceived -- we did all kinds of things to survive as a partner to the U.S. Really, I think it is a gross misrepresentation to think of Korean diplomacy as historically subservient to the U.S. attitude.

I would say, however, this -- I had the impression when I visited Beijing and I told my American friends that one major difference between the Chinese and the Americans, when it comes to dealing with peripheral states, is that the Chinese have a superb understanding of the psychological needs of the peripheral peoples. And they do take care of that psychological need. Visitors from the Korean peninsula were treated as if they came from a big empire and went through all the formal rituals. The steps that they had to climb -- keeping their heads low -- have given them tremendous respect for the Chinese scale of things. And then, after that ceremony, they were probably taken to someplace to wine and dine.

Compared to the warmth with which the Chinese played host to the visitors, the American government tends to be -- how should I put it? –

[Laughter.]
KIM KYUNG-WON: Cold. Matter-of-fact. One prominent Southeast Asian diplomat, whose identity will not be revealed, who comes from a small island country in Southeast Asia -- he's a tremendously articulate and has spoken out against the West -- I asked him, what made you turn against the West? He told me he was pro-American until he had a semester at Harvard. He went up to Harvard, nobody noticed him -- I mean, nobody gave him any attention. He was completely left alone, ignored. And I told him, that's Harvard. I'm sure they were like that to you, but they were like that to others, including other American colleagues who come there. That's Harvard.

What I am saying is that this question of how the United States treats us is a question that is not going to go away. That will be there all the time. We have to look at it with a sense of proportion. What we need to get out of the U.S. has to be taken seriously and not simply as a matter of certain stylistic or ritualistic aspects of the bilateral relationship.

I have violated one of the rules of the game, which is for the moderator not to say anything.

[Laughter.]

KIM KYUNG-WON: Thank you very much. I think we have had a good discussion.

QUESTION: Mr. Chairman, I have a question.

KIM KYUNG-WON: Yes, since it's an emergency.

[Laughter.]

KIM KYUNG-WON: From a former prime minister.

QUESTION: I think this is a very proper time for me to present a small, minor question. It's a very important question for the Korean people.

I remember right after the Russian-Japanese War in 1905, in May of 1905, I think. After that, about two months later, there was one conference. This was called a "secret executive conference" or something like that. And at that conference, the American government told the Japanese government, “we are going to develop our powers on the Philippines area.” So the Japanese government said, “please don't intervene in our foreign policy.”

So two months later, the Japanese actually sent Ito Hirobumi as a government advisor. Actually, in reality I think they took over Korean sovereignty. In 1910, as you know, Korea was to become a colony of the Japanese government.
Right then, the Japanese government suddenly claimed the territoriality of Dokdo Island. For 400 years it belonged to the Korean people and the Korean government and the Japanese government started their claim only in 1905. Why did the Japanese government suddenly renew this demand and the territoriality of Dokdo Island? I don't know.

So if the American government is aware of this and possibly just think it's better to keep silent, I don't know. But the Korean people are very angry, I think -- why is this kind of thing is happening again?

So I thought this was a proper time. The old famous Brookings Institution is very concerned about American foreign policy matters, so here are so many distinguished members of the Brookings Institution. I don't know. What is your idea on these matters? The Korean people are so mad at the Japanese claim on the territoriality of this, a 100-year claim. That is Korean territory.

I'm terribly sorry. It just seems a very small, minor problem, probably, from the international point of view, but for the Korean people it's a very important point. Thank you.

KIM KYUNG-WON: Thank you. I'm sure that is very deeply felt, the question, and we should treat it as such. I propose that we deal with that question at the lunch. Thank you.