AGENDA

**Introduction**

Strobe Talbott
President, The Brookings Institution ........................................... 3

**Panel I: Revolution in Security Affairs**

Charles Pritchard
Visiting Fellow, The Brookings Institution ................................. 4

Muthiah Alagappa
Director, East-West Center Washington ..................................... 6

Sak Sakoda
Partner, Armitage International ................................................. 11

Ayako Doi
Editor, The Japan Digest Publications ..................................... 15

Q&A Session ............................................................................. 20

**Panel II: Views From The Region**

James Steinberg
Vice President and Director for Foreign Policy Studies
The Brookings Institution ............................................................ 24

Eric Heginbotham
Senior Fellow, Asia Studies, Council on Foreign Relations .......... 24

David Kang
Associate Professor, Government Department, Dartmouth College ...... 27

Richard Bush
Senior Fellow and CNAPS Director, The Brookings Institution ........ 31

Q&A Session ............................................................................. 34
Introduction

DR. BUSH: Ladies and gentlemen, why don't we go ahead and get started. My name is Richard Bush. I'm the director of the Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies here at Brookings, and it's my great pleasure to welcome you to our event today on Japan's emerging role in East Asia.

I think we have an outstanding program this morning. I know that we have outstanding people making presentations and moderating, and we also have an outstanding person to make a formal welcome on behalf of Brookings, and that's our president, Strobe Talbott.

MR. TALBOTT: Thanks, Richard, and good morning, everybody. And thanks also to Kevin Scott, Sarah Thompson, and Nina Palmer, who along with Richard have done such a good job in putting this conference together.

As I was driving in this morning and thinking about CNAPS, the Center for Northeast Asia Policy Studies, and this conference today, a thought came to mind. It wasn't a terribly scholarly or formal or serious thought perhaps. It may not even be entirely polite; but I thought I would share it with you anyway.

And it's a little bit in the spirit of something that Jim Steinberg, who you will be hearing from later in the day, says from time to time. He likes to compare American foreign policy to essentially two great classic American movies, *High Noon* and *Twelve Angry Men*, and perhaps when he moderates the second panel, you can get him to explain exactly how that template works and applies to 230 years of American foreign policy.

But I thought of another movie when thinking about this conference. It's a movie from the "swinging '60s" and it starred Natalie Wood, Dyan Cannon, Robert Culp, and Eliot Gould, and some of you may be of an age, and sufficiently low-brow tastes, that you will remember this movie. It was called *Bob and Carol and Ted and Alice*, and the advertising slogan that was used with that movie was "Consider the possibilities."

And CNAPS essentially is in the business of considering the possibilities of Japan and China and Taiwan and Korea and Russia and America. And those possibilities do not include a lot of geopolitical swinging.

One reason I think that this conference today is particularly timely is that virtually all of those relationships are in some degree of tension and difficulty at the moment. I'm thinking of course about the China-U.S. relationship, the China-Japan relationship, the Russia-U.S. relationship and the Korea-U.S. relationship. And of course as always, as Richard knows Better than anybody, there's also the PRC-Taiwan relationship. The only relationship that is truly strong at the moment is the U.S.-Japan relationship.
So I think it's particularly appropriate that this conference should begin with a discussion of Japan's emerging security role and a crucial factor and that is of course how Japan's American ally sees Japan's security role and intends to promote it.

Later in the day you will of course be considering other possibilities as well, and I will look forward to ducking in and out from time to time and seeing many of you at lunch.

But in the meantime, I will turn the proceedings over to Jack Pritchard, and just so that everybody is reminded that Brookings, in its independence, is also thoroughly nonpartisan and bipartisan, I did notice that Jack is wearing what must be a Republican tie this morning because it is decorated with some rather East Asian-looking elephants, but maybe he can explain that.

In any event, over to you, Jack.

AMBASSADOR PRITCHARD: Thank you very much, Strobe.

MR. TALBOTT: But there's nothing wrong with that.

Panel 1: Revolution in Security Affairs

AMBASSADOR PRITCHARD: Clearly, we are an independent research institution here, and in the spirit of East Asia, I have worn what my wife has just returned from the Jim Thompson silk shop in Bangkok, the Thai elephants along with my Cambodian silver cuff links that have elephants as well. But I did notice that during the tsunami relief, that the Republicans' symbol was doing all the heavy lifting out there. Anyway.

I'm very pleased that you're all here this morning. This is an exciting day to be talking about Japan. I personally have been cornered in my Korea cubby hole for the last nine years, and periodically, the Japan light will shine and I'll follow it out into some fresh air, and so again I'm pleased to be here. We've got a terrific panel set up this morning, with three distinguished panelists. They're going to cover a wide range of the topic we're going to take a look at.

You all know about the changes that are taking place in Japan, particularly as the Japanese are looking at their own security, their own view of themselves and the view of what role they'll play in the world to come.

And so today we're going to take a look from a multi-tiered point of view, starting at the macro level with kind of a grand strategy, a strategic overview of where things are in Japan. Then we're going to take it down a notch and take a look at some of the practical issues, the things that we see on a day to day basis, that the Japanese are tackling. Finally we will take a look at this from a Japanese perspective, from the public's point of view, and gain some insight from a person who is following this very closely.
And to help us do that today we have three distinguished panelists. Our first speaker today is Dr. Muthiah Alagappa, the director of the East-West Center here in Washington, D.C.

And, you know, coincidentally, I spent the weekend with Dr. Charles Morrison, the director of the East-West Center in Hawaii. He wasn't in Hawaii and neither was I. We were in Cheju Island in South Korea over the weekend. But it's a great pleasure to welcome Muthiah here. He received his Ph.D. in international affairs at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University. He's been a visiting professor at Columbia, and a senior fellow at the Institute of Strategic and International Studies in Malaysia. He's been editor for the Contemporary Issues in the Asia Pacific and Asia Security series which are both published by the Stanford University Press, and a member of the editorial board that covers the Pacific Review, the Australian Journal of International Affairs, the International Relations of Asia Pacific and the Journal of East Asia Studies.

He'll be followed by a very good friend of mine, Sak Sakoda, who is actually the reason why we're here today. Sak began his government service the same way I did. He's not quite as old as I am, but nonetheless, we both started as army officers, and today, as you all do know, is the 230th birthday of the Army. It's also Flag Day. So this is why Sak and I are up here today. Not quite.

Sak Sakoda is a partner in Armitage International, having just spent the last two and a half, almost three years, as executive assistant to the deputy secretary of state, Richard Armitage, at the State Department, until January of this year. Prior to that, Sak had his own consulting firm. He was also senior associate at Armitage Associates from February 1999 until he took his job at the State Department.

But I first knew and met Sak right before he ultimately became the senior director for Japan on the OSD staff. So Sak and I have worked together over the years. He was, in large measure, responsible for the work on revising the guidelines on the U.S. defense cooperation which went into effect in 1997.

And we're going to end up today with somebody you probably all know very well, Ayako Doi, who until very recently was the editor of the daily Japan Digest. You know, that's a publication that I'm sure you all had the same feeling about that I did. If you didn't get it directly, you were going down the halls to find somebody who had it, so you could read it, because it came out each and every day and was loaded with information that started your day, if you were interested in Japan, and it put you on the right track.

Ayako is currently contributing editor to one of the companies that she co-founded, the Japan Auto Digest. She previously worked as a Washington correspondent for the Japan Times and was also a reporter for Newsweek in Tokyo, Forbes magazine in New York, and the Sankei Shimbun Tokyo. Currently, she's also a member of the Council on Foreign Relations, a member of the Asia Society and the Japan-American Society.
Now with those introductions, I'm going to start with Muthiah and ask him if he'll kick us off with a look at Japan's grand strategy and, really, I'm just going to start off with one question: Is Japan confronting a defining moment that requires a new vision and strategy? Muthiah?

DR. ALAGAPPA: Thank you, Jack.

I want to begin by thanking Richard for inviting me to participate in this event. As Richard well knows, and I want to begin an admission, I'm really no Japan expert. My understanding of Japan is that of a generalist who is interested in security in Asia. I understood that a nonspecialist perspective would be useful and so here I am.

Japan is an important country that has received little attention in the last decade or so. This is in sharp contrast to the Japan of the 1980's, which was then anticipated to become number one in the world. Based on straight-line projections and certain special attributes, Japan was expected to surpass the U.S. Much commentary during that period focused on the rise of Japan and what it implied for Japan, the U.S., and the world.

Instead, the 1990's became a lost decade for Japan, and discussions about Japan virtually disappeared. Despite the fact that it continued to be the second-largest economy in the world. Intellectual attention then shifted to the supremacy of the United States. The idea that the U.S. was supposed to be in irreversible decline was soon confined to the dustbins of history, and by contrast the supremacy of the U.S. was taken for granted and still is expected to last for several more decades.

More recently, attention has focused on the rise of China and what it implies for the U.S., Asia and the world. Nearly everyone in this town is organizing a conference on China. Books, papers and op-ed pieces on China are now a staple diet.

The limited discussion about Japan today relates largely to history and nationalism issues, especially in relation to China and the Koreas and the U.S.-Japan alliance. Japan, as a power in its own right, is seldom the subject of conferences. Expertise on Japan, unlike that on China, is also confined to a relatively small group of scholars. Hopefully this will change in due course.

Japan is a major power with important implications for the balance of power, and for security and stability in East Asia, and more broadly in Asia. In addition to its economic and technological progress, Tokyo has taken a series of steps in the last decade to increase its military role and responsibilities.

This has been accompanied by the acquisition and development of new military capabilities, broadening the geographical and functional scope of the Japanese self-defense force, reexamination of the constitutional restrictions on the use of force, and strengthening the alliance relationship with the U.S.

Some have argued that Tokyo is becoming less incremental in its approach and that it is moving with uncharacteristic speed in passing successive rounds of new security legislation.
The key questions here are “For what strategic purpose?” and, “Is Japan following a grand design or strategy?”

As I began contemplating such questions, and to bring myself up to speed on recent writings on Japanese security policy, I realized how difficult a task it is to speak about Japan's grand strategy, and also how ill-prepared I am to undertake this task.

Although Japan is more transparent than China and does in fact publish several documents on its foreign, economic and security policies, these documents are ambiguous in key respects, in terms of means and ends, and they lack a central purpose and logic that coordinate and drive Japan's international behavior in the different arenas. Unlike the U.S., there is no national strategic document. It is difficult to infer a grand strategy from the official Japanese documents or practice. For several reasons, much is left unsaid, and intentionally or otherwise, left to interpretation.

Inference from practice is also made difficult by incremental and inconsistent actions both within and across sectors.

Consequently, post-World War II Japanese security policy and behavior has been characterized and explained in many different ways. Japan has been labeled, among others, as a pacific state, and anti-military state, an abnormal state, a civilian power, a reactive state, a trading state, a reluctant realist state, a post-classical realist state, a mercantile state, a "wolf in sheep's clothing," and so on.

And its strategies have been labeled as pacifism, mercantilism, buck passing, second scrap balancing, and strategies associated with defensive realism, including reassurance.

And Japanese security behavior has been explained in terms of domestic institutions, a culture of antimilitarism and pacifism, and defensive realism.

I cannot and do not propose to elaborate or evaluate these overlapping and at times contending perspectives. Instead, what I will do is to raise a number of questions and sketch possible answers as a way of stimulating a discussion.

First, and this is the question Jack raised, Is Japan confronting a defining moment that necessitates a fundamental shift in policy and strategy? I would define a “defining moment” as one that results from fundamental changes in domestic and international circumstances, resulting in a radically different national vision that requires the development of a new international strategy.

A brief historical overview would be useful here. Broadly speaking, one can identify three periods and strategies in post-1868 Japan. In the first period, from 1868 to about the turn of the century, Japan embarked on modernization, the defining conditions for a weak and feudal Japanese state confronting stronger Western powers intent upon colonizing Asia. To overcome
vulnerabilities in a feudal political system and technological weaknesses from 250 years of isolation, the central thrust of the modernizing government was industrial development and development of a rich nation and a strong army. The dominant purpose then was to catch up with the West and become a major world power and avoid any risk of colonization by Western powers.

In the second period, from the turn of the century to about 1945, Japan became a military state and imperial power intent upon dominating Asia through conquest and the creation of a Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. The military state, its grand purpose, and strategy collapsed with the defeat of Japan in the Pacific war, and the ensuing American occupation.

In the third phase, beginning about 1950, the Japanese national purpose and strategy appeared to be the product of the interplay of two competing visions. One is the formal position of a vanquished and traumatized power that renounces war as an instrument of state policy in settling disputes. The focus is on rebuilding the Japanese economy. The Yoshida doctrine best reflects this vision. Its key tenets were that Japan's economic rehabilitation and catching up with the West must be the primary national goal. Japan's economic and military security is best achieved through cooperation with the United States and the provision of military bases for that country. And third, Japan should renounce the use of force, should remain lightly armed and avoid entanglement in international political strategic issues. The last would not only free up resources to concentrate on industrial development but also avoid divisive internal struggles.

The competing vision articulated by conservatives and right-wing socialists opposed the exclusive focus on economic nationalism, and advocated the restoration of Japan as a normal nation-state with its own independent foreign policy and military capability.

Though the former vision dominated the 1960's and 1970's, the competing vision gradually gained ground, leading to articulation of a grand design in the 1980's under Prime Minister Nakasone. The key tenets of his design were that Japan should no longer be a follower nation. Japan should seek out a new path in which Japan would exercise world leadership. The second tenet was to internationalize Japan through institutional liberalization and restructuring of the Japanese economy. And the third tenet was the inculcation of self-confidence and national pride, or more broadly, the development of a new liberal nationalism that supported international leadership. The fourth and final tenet was the adoption of an active role in international strategic affairs, including an activist role in the U.S-Japan security alliance.

In contrast to the Yoshida doctrine's dependency relationship with the U.S., Nakasone articulated a vision of an active Japan playing a world leadership role. Although Nakasone himself had limited success and the former vision continued to dominate, the strong support for it has eroded. Political and public receptivity to the second vision appears to have gained ground.

The incrementalism that characterized Japanese security policy since the mid 1970's may be explained as a product of the interplay between these two competing visions.
The question now is, Does the passing of successive rounds of new security legislations to widen the geographical and functional scope of the SDF in the last decade, especially under the leadership of Prime Minister Koizumi, and the growing receptivity to amending or rewriting the constitution, especially Article 9, signify a state and a vision that is more reflective of the Nakasone design, portending a fundamental shift in purpose and strategy? Or is still more salami slicing in prospect? At what point will further salami slicing constitute a break from the past?

Before answering this question, it would be useful to summarize the present domestic and international circumstances relating to Japan.

In the domestic arena, although the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) continues to be the governing party, its character has been altered with the conservatives coming to dominate the party. However, the LDP cannot govern on its own. There's also a relatively strong opposition, which unlike the socialist left, is more mainstream.

The Japanese state is more nationalist but also more democratic. Although nationalism has gained ground, pacifism has not disappeared. This is reflected in the continued desire of most, if not all parties, and the public to retain the first sentence of Article 9. Japan has a relatively popular prime minister who seems to support several tenets of the Nakasone vision, but he himself is no Nakasone and does not seem to operate with any grand design.

In terms of material capabilities, Japan still has the second-largest economy but it has been stagnant, unable to fully reinvigorate itself for more than a decade. This has affected the self-confidence of the Japanese public and the political leadership and has negatively affected the international image of Japan as a power and as a model for emulation.

Unlike in the 1970's and 1980's, when Japan was the only leading Asian power, it now has to contend with other Asian powers, especially China, whose economy is growing rapidly and which seeks to be the premier Asian power. The rise of China, and to some degree India, is happening in the context of American dominance that appears likely to last at least for the medium term.

Japan still aspires to the major restoration goal of being a world power but seems uncertain of how to achieve this. Greatness through conquest and empire in Asia ended in defeat and humiliation. Greatness through a shiny economy, a model for emulation by the Asian states, and leadership of Asia through economic integration on Japanese terms was short-lived. Given these conditions, it appears that Japan now sees itself not as a leading power but as one of several powers in Asia and the world. This is a climb-down from the 1980's but it does not make Japan unimportant.

The above domestic and international changes are substantial but they do not constitute a sea change that requires a complex overhaul of the strategy that has been in place. There is also no political support for a radical shift in strategy. However, there's growing support for some major changes and before discussing this change, I think it would be useful to address my second question: What is Tokyo's preferred strategic situation?
Now that Tokyo no longer seeks dominance in Asia, its preferred outcome is an Asia free of domination by any other power, especially China. It'll prefer a Pax Americana to a Pax Sinica. In any case, its preference is for a global and regional order in which it plays and important economic and security role in the East Asian region.

In the pursuit of this preferred strategic situation, Japan appears to have taken several steps. One is the quest for permanent membership in the U.N. Security Council. Second is to strengthen Japanese contribute to the U.S.-Japan security alliance and develop a larger security role in the context of the alliance. Third is a revision of the constitution, or institute legislative measures to facilitate increase in the collective security responsibilities of Japan. Fourth is the development of military capabilities, including ballistic missile defense (BMD), and limited power projection capabilities in pursuit of an expanded security role. Fifth is the deployment of economic assistance in support of strategic objectives. And finally, to make Japan a central node of regional and global economic interaction.

These are all steps that Japan has or is taking in various degrees. My speculation is that these steps would continue, and they will also strengthen. Although not articulated as such, they can constitute the elements of a grand strategy.

Do these steps in fact undermine security and stability in East Asia? The short answer to this question is, “not necessarily.” Much will depend on the context and how Japan pursues the steps in advancing its international role. It will suffice to state here that I think a road befitting the world's second largest economy, and a major power, would add to rather than undermine security and stability in the region.

The accession may be controversial to some, and I'll be happy to discuss it during the Q&A. I will also like to stress here that security and stability in Asia rests on several pillars: The development of strong modern nation-states that can enter into and honor international agreements; growing acceptance of the political status quo; the development of a normative framework that facilitates the survival of even weak states; a focus on economic development that blurs the traditional hierarchy of issues; and growing economic interdependence that constrains the use of force and the declining utility of the force option.

All of these, I think, combined with the relatively stable balance of power that is undergirded by American dominance, are the pillars that undergird security and stability in East Asia.

In conclusion, certain elements of a Japanese grand strategy are discernable, although they may not yet cohere or be articulated as such. Japan, increasingly, is becoming a “normal State” but pacifism will continue to check the score and pace of this trend. In the interests of security and stability in Asia, I think it's important to facilitate Japan to become a responsible player in regional affairs.

Thank you very much.

AMBASSADOR PRITCHARD: Muthiah, thanks very much.
Let me just reestablish how we're going to do the panel. We're going to have each of the speakers make their presentation but I guarantee we're going to leave plenty of time for questions and answers. So we're going to go ahead and proceed through the speakers. But let me plant a thought for you now, so you can think about it and come back and then point a question to Muthiah.

I think casual observers will believe that, at least in a post 9/11 environment, the changes that have been occurring in the security environment that Japan finds itself in have been very rapid. At least those of us that have been watching Japan evolve relatively incrementally over the years. Muthiah's laid out really strategic tenets from the 1980's that Nakasone has put in place, described a lost decade of the 1990's, and then suggested that under Koizumi, that while he shares some of these tenets of this philosophy of grand design, he himself does not have anything. But how does that explain some of the rapid movement that we've seen lately? So I'll just lay that question out there for you to think about and hopefully you'll come back and pick Muthiah's brain.

But let me now turn attention to Sak Sakoda and, Sak, if I could get you to talk about some of the specifics of the changes that we've seen take place. Maybe you can address the constitutional issue and perhaps then talk even more about the changes that have been occurring in the self-defense forces, and whatever else that you'd like to discuss?

MR. SAKODA: Okay; thanks. Thanks to Brookings for having me here. In the run-up to this session, Jack told me that these are the areas that he wanted me to cover as he said, but he also wanted me to give kind of a response to, “What is the scope or what are the developments when it comes to Japan's roles and missions over the years? And what does it look like for the future with regard to how Japan is preparing itself?” As well as questions about the constitutional issue.

As I mull over how I'm going to deal with this, after such a scholarly presentation, you're going to get a very unscholarly presentation from me because I'm not one.

But as I also look around and take a look at the folks that have attended, it makes me wonder why the heck I'm here doing this, with some of the very qualified people that are here. I won't mention names but the initials of some of the folks are Rust Deming and Dave Straub, who are all over this issue, and know it a whole lot better than I do. But maybe we can include them in the Q&A session.

With regard to the constitutional issue—and also let me say as preface, what's coming up in Ayako's discussion is a lot of the Japanese perspectives, and of course these are Japanese domestic issues when it comes to revision or amendment to the constitution in Japan, and I think she'll discuss some of those things. But when I read the Japanese newspapers and catch the headline that says something like 70 percent of the Japanese support revision or amendment to the constitution, you know, if you stop there, then it really leaves you with the wrong impression I think, and particularly if you're focusing just on the security issue, because there are several other areas of the constitution I think that are being considered for revision.
You've got to kind a slice it into the different areas that I think are in the debate, and when I slice it through, I think there are three general areas that are being considered. One is the business of Japan's national character as it's outlined in the constitution. The second is the existence or the recognition of the self-defense force, and the third is this mysterious and broad metamorphic topic of collective self-defense, or the prohibition of collective self-defense.

And let me go through those three pretty quickly. When I say Japan's national character, when it comes to the security policies outlined in the constitution, I think of Article 9 and the first paragraph, where—and I'm paraphrasing now—Japan forswears a sovereign right to wage war or use the threat of waging war in resolving international disputes. I think that in Japan, that's recognized as a part of their national character, and hopefully Ayako can address this with a little bit more detail. My sense is that's very close to the heart in Japan and that there's very little motivation or desire to change that aspect of Japan, and I think that my personal view is that this actually adds to Japan's security posture, as others view Japan as an entity that really focuses on peace and focuses on its legacy of the post-war.

The second area, the existence of Japan's self-defense force, or maybe recognition is a better word, enjoys a lot of support. What I mean by that is what the second paragraph of Article 9 talks about: that land, sea and air forces as well as other war potential will never be maintained. Of course they have the Self-Defense Forces; it is a military, it operates and prepares to defend Japan, it goes beyond Japan's territory, and conducts peacekeeping operations, humanitarian relief and disaster relief operations. So if you look at it, you smell it, you touch it, it looks like, smells like, and feels like a military. And the debate in Japan, as I see it, is should we recognize it as such? The debate gets down to real fine points of, “Should it be recognized as a force, as an army, or as a military?” Again, as I look at the papers and see the polling statistics and things like that, there's a lot of support for recognizing the self-defense forces for what they are.

The third area is a lot more difficult and complicated, at least for me to explain, and that's the one about Japan's prohibition of collective self-defense. In order to get into describing that, I think it's worth noting that that's an interpretation, or a determination that Japan's Cabinet Legislation Bureau has made. The Cabinet Legislation Bureau is part of the executive side of the government of Japan. It's not a part of the legislative side, it's not a part of the supreme court or the judicial side. It made this determination that by considering Article 9, Japan is allowed or is authorized to do things that are in Japan's self-defense, but when it comes to collective self-defense, in other words, working with a partner, working with an ally, that it is not allowed to act.

Now forgive me a little bit but I'm going to get into some of the technical terms of what all that means, and I'll use some examples to hopefully make it a little bit easier to understand. There are three terms that get mixed up often, and they're very technical terms that get mixed up when talking about collective self-defense or the prohibition of. And those three terms are joint, combined and bilateral. And if you look at the first defense guidelines, I think from 1978, you see throughout—joint, joint, joint, joint—U.S.-Japan, joint, joint, joint, joint, joint.

And the technical meaning of “joint” is two or more services. When I say services, I mean army, navy, air force, marines, working together. Joint plans, joint operations. But it's not
two countries. It's two services. And that's why in the U.S. there's the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In Japan there's a Joint Staff Office, and it's where the army, navy, air force, or ground self-defense force, maritime, and there some defense forces plan and do operations. So that's a unilateral one country concept.

Now let's put that aside. Let's talk about “combined,” and I think the best way of doing that is to bring up the example of Korea. In Korea, we have a command that's called the Combined Forces Command, and in the Combined Forces Command, in the staff of the CFC, you'll have, as an example, a Korean air force officer sitting next to a U.S. Marine officer, sitting next to a Korean army officer, sitting next to a U.S. Marine officer. But it's fully integrated and they're inherently integrated by just being next to each other and working together on plans and when it comes to operations, executing operations. That's the meaning of combined, where the forces of two countries are integrated together and they prepare plans or they conduct operations.

Now because of Japan's prohibition on collective self-defense, we don't have that in Japan, and that's why the term “bilateral” is really key, and the arrangement that we have with our militaries, U.S. and Japan, is a bilateral arrangement where there's a Japanese command and staff, and a force structure that's purely Japanese, and then on the U.S. side there's a U.S. headquarters and staff and that's purely American, and it's headed by U.S. Forces Japan over at Yokota. But they're not integrated to do plans all the time full time, and they're not integrated to do operations all the time full time. In order to coordinate, they have elements come together, they liaise, they coordinate, share information, go back to the respective commands and then they do whatever they’ve got to do, which makes things a lot more difficult.

When we were doing the review of defense guidelines in 1996 and 1997, the discussion got down to as detailed a topic as, “If Japan provides fuel for a U.S. aircraft, will the Japan side be able to put the nozzle into the U.S. aircraft?” There was a lot of hand-wringing and nervousness, and we just plain didn't know. And that's the problem of the prohibition on collective self-defense. On the U.S. side, put yourself in the boots of the U.S. commander that's responsible for preparing plans for the defense of Japan. You're not quite sure where you can count on Japan to do whatever it's got to do to support you or to operate with you. And so the problem before the 1997 guidelines was, from a U.S. commander's perspective, “Where can I write-in Japan and where can I not count on Japan being a part of my plan?” And that is where the 1997 guidelines helped out, by bringing a little clarity to the areas of that Japan can and cannot do.

Part of the constitutional debate and the prohibition on collective self-defense, as I see it, is, “Can we, should we handle this in revising the constitution? Or is this something that the Cabinet Legislation Bureau should take a look at and make a change itself? Or should we have some kind of judicial body or court to take the place of the Cabinet Legislation Bureau as a more independent entity?” And another aspect of the collective self-defense debate is, “If Japan lifts the prohibition on collective self-defense, are we [Japan] going to be dragged into every contingency that the U.S. enters itself into?” I've got my own views on that and maybe you can talk about that during the Q&A. But that's also a part of the landscape.
Shifting to the roles and missions part. I guess you can kind of look back to the early '80s when there was a bilateral roles and missions review, and I think one of the big things that came out of that was that Japan would assume responsibility for 1000 nautical miles, pretty much south of Japan, of sea lane defense.

You fast-forward a little bit to the early '90s and I think the big development that really changed the landscape of Japan's defense, roles and mission, is when it passed legislation to assume peacekeeping operations, and the first one of which was in Cambodia, and then from Cambodia there were several others that grew from that: Goma, Golan Heights. I think you all pretty much know the list.

But then, as 9/11 changed everything, it certainly changed things in Japan, and I think in a matter of a week, maybe ten days after 9/11, Japan came out with its seven points and said this is how we're going to proceed with conducting operations in the Indian Ocean, to support forces in OEF [Operation Enduring Freedom]. Of the seven points, the one that I think is worth noting here is the first one, which pretty much says, “We're doing this because it's in Japan's interests. We're not doing this because the Americans are telling us to do. We're not doing this as a favor to the Americans,” although I think a lot of people in Japan think that. Of the prime minister's points, the first one that he lays out is that this is in Japan's interests, and that's why we're moving forward.

From there, obviously Japan's deployment and contribution to provide humanitarian assistance and logistical support in and around Samawa represent a huge step. And so from peacekeeping disaster relief, and humanitarian relief operations, to what it's doing to make direct contributions to bringing stability to the southern part of Iraq, and other contributions to stability in the Middle East, I think there's a huge, huge change in how Japan is stepping up.

Let me shift a little bit to what Japan is thinking about for its future. In speaking to that, I think there are three things in the national defense program guidelines that are worth noting. One is that Japan is moving forward with missile defense. The second is its force structure adjustments, particularly on the ground side, where it's shifting around its command to this three-star command that I think is called the CRF, contingency ready force. It’s a three-star command that will have a special forces unit, aviation unit, collectively, and a quick-reaction ground unit. That unit will be able to provide quick reaction to crises, not only domestically but also beyond Japan's borders. Then there's a third point, the national defense program guidelines.

But let me emphasize some of the points in the missile defense part. I think Japan taking on missile defense is a huge step but I think the even more significant part of Japan taking on missile defense is that it's going to make Japan's framework for dealing with crises, and becoming more joint, much more efficient. It's going to have to streamline the flow from the political level through policy to the operational level on how to deal with a missile that's screaming into Japan's territory. The authorization for that has got to be thought out, obviously, well ahead of time. And so the vertical flow of information guidance and directives will have to become much more efficient because of the challenge that they're going to have to deal with with this missile coming in.
I think that horizontally, Japan will also have to become more efficient when it comes to its joint preparations, its joint plans, its joint operations, and so I think missile defense in itself will make, again, the command and control much more efficient. Japan has made a decision that it will put more emphasis on the joint staff office, and it will not only make the joint staff and the chairman of the joint staff office the key element during wartime, but it's going to be the key element, the lead component in peacetime, which means Japan is becoming more joint, which is going to lend itself to becoming much more efficient. Let me stop here because I think I went way over my time.

AMBASSADOR PRITCHARD: That's all right.

MR. SAKODA: And we can pick up on some other topics of interest during the Q&A.

MR. PRITCHARD: Sak, thanks very much. Similarly, let me throw out a couple questions for you, the audience, to think about and to throw back at Sak a little bit later.

When Sak talked about collective security, the first thing that came to mind was that this is an evolving concept in terms of where Japan is going to go in the future. How do the Japanese justify, think about their participation in proliferation security initiative? Does that fit into their concept of collective self-defense, or not?

And secondly, what might be interesting and may help us segue into the second panel a little bit later is, What was the significance, if any, in the February “2+2” statement that talked about Taiwan and appeared to link U.S. and Japan in potential action in the Taiwan Strait? But that's just to think about as you now listen, and I think this is going to be an interesting segment.

Ayako, if I could ask you—you can either stay there or come up to the podium; whatever you would like.

MS. DOI: Am I wired?

MR. PRITCHARD: You can unwind and then rewrite yourself up there, and give us the perspective, as you see it, from the Japanese point of view.

MS. DOI: Well, I'm always asked to present Japanese point of view because I have a Japanese face and name, but I have to put a disclaimer, saying that I do not represent anybody but me. Nobody pays my salary, unfortunately.

Well, we've got a real good sort of overall, long-term view from Dr. Alagappa. If you were looking at MapQuest, for example, he gave the overall regional view, and Sak zoomed in real close to the military aspects of it, and I suppose that you can click twice on minus button and then come to a medium view of what I'll be talking about – my sense of what's been happening in the last, let's see, ten years, or a little more.
There's a new book by somebody named Masaru Sato. I don't know whether you recognize that name. He's one of the foreign ministry officials who was fired and indicted in connection with the Muneo Suzuki affair, about Japan-Russia relations.

Anyway, I haven't got the book yet, it's called National Trap. I just ordered from Amazon.com Japan and I haven't got it yet. But then I do have a synopsis, and according to the reviews, it's a real good analysis of what's been happening in the Japanese foreign policy decision making, especially in terms of what's happening in Gaimusho, the foreign ministry, in the last couple decades.

According to Sato, Gaimusho was divided into three factions after Cold War. Those who single-mindedly believed that Japan's national interest lies in deepening its security alliance with U.S. and the second faction, those who wanted to cultivate friendly relations with China, even as it maintains good security relations with the U.S.

The third faction is those who believe that it's important to strengthen relations with Russia as well, in part as a counterbalance to China's expanding presence in the region. And according to Sato, and this is consistent with my observation, the latter two factions lost out in the battle for control over foreign policy decision making in the last several years.

So you could say that Japanese foreign policy decision making is almost completely dominated by group one, which is the faction that single-mindedly believes that Japan's national interest lies with deepening its security alliance with the U.S.

It is hard to believe, to those of us who have follow Japan in the last ten or twenty years. It's very surprising, when you think about it. In the early '90s, the cliché about Japanese foreign policy debate was datsubei nyuo meaning going out of U.S. into Asia. The Asia faction was very strong, at least in the public debate. There was a lot of discussion about maybe stepping back a little from the U.S. alliance and be more friendly and cooperative and, you know, working together with Asia more.

You will remember that 1995 is the year when the Okinawa rape happened, and after that incident there were, not only in Okinawa, but many places in Japan, a lot of anti-U.S. base demonstrations, a lot of voices about getting rid of the U.S. bases, and even the alliance. You know, “the Cold War is over, the usefulness of the alliance is over” kind of thing.

We talked a lot about drift in U.S.-Japan security relations. And so, when you think about what we were seeing on the ground in Japan in the '90s, it's a sea change that today Japan is solidly anchored in the U.S. camp in terms of security and in Asia is still important economically, of course. China has just surpassed the U.S.—didn't it?—as Japan's largest trading partner. A lot of Japanese companies are invested in Asia, trading with Asia, but this is rarely discussed in terms of national security. If you remember how President Bush said, after 9/11, you're either with us or not with us, Japan certainly is very solidly with us.

So what brought about this sea change? One factor is the presence of North Korea, the threat of North Korea. North Korea's experiment – I suppose it was an experiment – of a Taepo-
Dong missile in August of 1998 really shocked Japanese people by demonstrating the notion that North Korea could strike Japan's mainland with its missiles, and these days perhaps it can, maybe put a nuclear warhead on them.

That's one factor. Another very big factor is 9/11 and the war on terrorism. Of course Japan, like any other country, is vulnerable to terrorist attacks, and as a U.S. ally, it is even more liable to such threat. So there's a fear of terrorism and if you remember the days after, shortly after 9/11, there was overwhelming sympathy for the U.S., and countries around the world came to the aid of it, and Japan was one.

[Tape change.]

MS. DOI [continuing]: Another important factor is the rise of China, which in some people's minds threatens Japan's position as the preeminent financial, economic and technological, and perhaps political leader in the region.

Prime Minister Koizumi used these factors very cleverly to realize Japan's long-term desire to be a normal nation. And also Prime Minister Koizumi's international activism, especially in terms of military contributions to worldwide operations, perfectly fit the U.S. needs to fight the war on terrorism, and the unpopular war in Iraq, and now the post-Cold War global restructuring of the U.S. forces.

In fact I think Japan's deployment of forces to the Indian Ocean to aid the Afghanistan operation and the dispatch of army troops in Iraq would not have happened if it were not for the strong, persistent, and public urging by the Bush administration, notably by Sak's boss, Rich Armitage. Mr. Armitage said several times to the Japanese media that it's important to have a Japanese flag side by side with a U.S. flag in the war against terrorism in Afghanistan, and when the focus shifted to Iraq, he said that it's very important for Japan to have boots on the ground, and so on.

You know, as Sak said, each move was done with a Japanese disclaimer, saying this is for Japan's own interest. The fact that they had to say that means that it wasn't just that. I mean, I really think that it couldn't have happened, for better or worse, without American, you might say subtle, you might say clear pressure. And so after all those incidents, Japan did send forces to the Indian Ocean and Iraq, and things got much easier in terms of the U.S.-Japan alliance.

For example, in the late '90s, Japan's response to the U.S. effort to stop the drifting of the U.S.-Japan security treaty was slow and grudging. You remember, while we were talking about the adoption of defense guidelines after the 1995 incident, there was a lot of talk in Japan about the tremendous amount of host nation support Japan pays. I think it still pays something like 75 percent of the cost of having U.S. troops in Japan. Whether it was worth it and whether it does any good to Japan were widely debated, and the voices advocating for U.S. base reduction were very widely heard.

But not any more. And so recently, things have gotten easier in terms of fixing U.S.-Japan security relations. In the last few years, Japan committed to purchase more Aegis missile
Japan agreed to move from just joint research on missile defense to deployment of it, and Japan has long sought – and America has long sought – emergency legislation in Japan. This is to give a legal framework for what Japan will or will not do in time of emergency.

The government's power to confiscate private property, the use of private property, and the laws, and things like that, have been more clearly defined. There was no law like that before last year. So several packages of emergency laws were passed in the last couple years. Now we are even talking about moving the U.S. Army's I Corps from the state of Washington to Tokyo. This is in discussion and not decided yet, but Japan seems to be solidly locked into the U.S. strategy of global military operations around the world, ready to respond to the U.S. need for logistical support in any kind of contingency, not only in the region around Japan but practically all over the world. You think about Indian Ocean and Iraq. They are not the vicinity of Japan, which was a cause for big debate just a few years ago.

So you could say that Japan has finally become the unsinkable aircraft carrier that Prime Minister Nakasone said that Japan would be in the 1980's but it never happened in his administration.

Now what's wrong with those arrangements? You know, stronger cooperation, stronger alliance between Japan and U.S., two vibrant democracies and economic powerhouses. So what's wrong? I can see at least a couple of problems. One is Japan's discord with the countries in the region, notably China; to a certain extent South Korea as well.

In fact, in my view, I don't think Japan, and particularly Prime Minister Koizumi, would so adamantly and confidently reject China's demand on Yasukuni Shrine visits, and textbooks, and apology on history, and so on and so forth, if it were not for Tokyo's rock solid security relations with the U.S. I think his confidence that the U.S. is solidly behind Japan in foreign and defense policy emboldens him and the government policy makers to be more outspoken against China.

I mean, the strange thing is that Prime Minister Nakasone was the one who started the controversy by visiting Yasukuni Shrine, but he did quit going after China and South Korea complained about it, out of his pragmatic judgment about the national security, I think, despite the fact that he had very strong relations with the Reagan administration. You remember the Ron-Yasu relations. So, you know, maybe there is something about Koizumi's personality which makes it hard for him to back down. But I do think that the U.S.-Japan security alliance, and the strengthening of the alliance, has something to do with Japan's discord with China and nations in the region.

And this rise of China, economically, militarily, politically, in almost every aspect, may in part have been a reason for strengthening the U.S.-Japan alliance too. I mean, it's sort of a circular thing, feeding it. And now the changed character of the alliance itself is fueling some hostility from China. The case in point is, as Jack mentioned, the 2+2 statement on Taiwan. This March there was a perhaps muted, but sort of hostile, reaction from China, and very instructive are Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld's remarks about China's military expansion in
Singapore, just a few weeks ago. The remarks drew a reaction from not only China, but also American scholars, observers, and others from the region.

The second issue that I see resulting from the strengthened U.S.-Japan alliance is what some see as a disconnect between Japan's foreign and defense policy and public opinion. There is certain discomfort among the Japanese people about the course that Japan is taking in terms of foreign policy direction. And the reason for that is that this current policy, you could say is almost entirely made by Koizumi, with the U.S. Bush administration's encouragement maybe.

Emergency laws, deployment to Afghanistan, Iraq, all those were, you could say almost single-handedly made by Koizumi and his people. Because there's no viable counterproposal. No one came up with a way to counter-argue and present counter alternative measures.

Richard asked me to go over the opinions or the input of Japan's opposition parties. I think the opposition parties are almost irrelevant, despite the strong showing of DPJ [Democratic Party of Japan] in the last election. It has not been able to exert any significant influence on policy making, whether it's security policy or postal reform. You know, it's just sort of out of ideas, and also the DPJ has internal differences that make it hard to come up with a solid countermeasure. In terms of security policy, I think the DPJ basically endorses or does not disagree, at least, with the direction that Japan is going, which is toward stronger U.S.-Japan relations.

But then, Japanese public overwhelmingly opposed the Iraq war and the dispatch of Japanese troops to Iraq. The U.S.-Japan security treaty still has a solid majority support of the Japanese people, but, you know, I sense some reluctance in supporting it out of a feeling that there's no alternative. You know, there's North Korea, there's China. Who do you ally with? We don't have nuclear weapons; we can't operate without the U.S. So there's sort of a reluctant majority support for the U.S.-Japan security alliance; but no enthusiasm.

The interesting thing is that the main opposition to the Koizumi foreign policy comes from the LDP. Within the LDP, there is still a strong faction that thinks that the relationship with China is important, harmonious relations with Asia are important, and that Japan should not invest all of its capital in the alliance with the U.S.; that it should cultivate good relations with China and the other Asian nations. That comes mainly from the old LDP powerhouse of the Hashimoto faction, which interestingly is branded by Koizumi people as anti-reformers in terms of government and economic reform that he is trying to do in Japan.

Also I see the younger generation versus older, old-fashioned conservative forces in the LDP. The younger generation is much more assertive as to Japan's role, much more assertive in terms of supporting a stronger U.S.-Japan alliance. And they speak clearly—on the Taiwan issue, for example. I thought it was the policy of Japan and the U.S. to make it ambiguous. You don't talk about Taiwan, in deference to China. But the 2+2 statement, you know, to most observers' minds, clearly states that Japan and the U.S. are together on this side with China on the other.
So this all happened with Koizumi's strong leadership, for better or worse. No question about it. The problem of policies, written and implemented by a strong maverick leader, is that you don't know what happens when the leader's gone, and Koizumi is going to be gone in 2007. In terms of this side of the ocean, Bush is going to go in what? two thousand—

AMBASSADOR PRITCHARD: Eight.

MS. DOI: Eight. Right. You don't know what kind of administration will come in afterward. But there have been articles in the Japanese papers in the last week or so about how people in the LDP, including former Prime Minister Nakasone, are getting very nervous about Koizumi's stance on China. What to do about the Yasukuni Shrine and what to do about China policy, according to those articles, could be key issue in choosing the successor to Koizumi.

There is a camp that says in consideration of China, the prime minister should not visit Yasukuni, and should cultivate better relations with China, and, on the other hand, there are people like Shinzo Abe, who even more strongly than Koizumi thinks that Japan should be adamant about what it wants to do, regardless of what China says.

I will stop there.

AMBASSADOR PRITCHARD: Thank you very much.

We have a few minutes left and we've got a microphone coming around. I've got some of my own questions but I'm no going to ask anymore. So go ahead, and please hand the mike. Please identify yourself, stand up and the panel would love to hear your questions, and if you'll put your mike back on.

QUESTION: My name is Mike Miyazawa. I have a comment to make about the historical perspective presentation made by Dr. Alagappa. Japan has two thousand years of recorded history, so we tend to think longer term than Americans. China has four thousand years of recorded history and therefore they seem to think even longer term.

If you look back at the history, 3900 out of 4000 years, China was the most dominant power in the region. And the period of U.S. dominance has only been 60 years. Japan's is even shorter; about 40 years.

So while Americans think are shocked by what they have recently discovered, and call it the rise of China, in the eyes of many people in the region China is on its path back to the place it deserves. Well, Ayako Doi pointed out the volatility of public opinion in Japan and I think it's very important to think long term when you make an analysis and prediction, and therefore, regardless of what the sitting LDP prime minister of Japan might say, I think it's premature or rather dangerous to say that Japan wants Pax Americana in the region.

AMBASSADOR PRITCHARD: Mike, thanks very much. Please.
QUESTION: Nick Berry, Foreign Policy Forum. After hearing the panel, is it safe to conclude that in fact Japan has no security problem, that no country is going to attack Japan?

What Japan has are major political problems, which is the question of influence, and that's why the U.S. alliance is key, because it provides two things. One is backing, as Ms. Doi mentioned, and the second thing is it provides access or participation on issues like China, North Korea, South Korea, U.N. Security Council peacekeeping, disputed islands, and that kind of thing. So therefore the military is in fact a connection link to the United States for its own political views. Is that a correct interpretation?

AMBASSADOR PRITCHARD: Sak, you want to jump on that for a second?

MR. SAKODA: I'd flip that the other way around. I wouldn't say Japan doesn't have any security problems because nobody's about to invade Japan. Japan has national interests around the globe and my view of security is, where your national interests are threatened, or where you would want to advance your national interests, that's where you have a security connection.

The days of the Cold War are over, and the thinking that the Soviet Union or Russians are going to invade Hokkaido and take over Japan—that's beyond us. But Japan has several security interests not only in the region but throughout the globe. And a part of them are what you mentioned—territorial interests, and how do you draw the line in the East China Sea for economic zones, and where can China come in to explore for energy resources, and not—you know, what are its interests when it comes to Southeast Asia and how does it play, or how does it counter, or how does it deal with China's diplomatic charm offensive in Southeast Asia? How is it going to deal with China in the future as these two powers in the region start to rub up against each other? How is Japan going to integrate India into its security thinking down the road? When I look at security issues, the military aspect is just a slice of that. There are security issues that Japan has well beyond how it would apply its military.

MR. PRITCHARD: Eric.

QUESTION: Eric McVadon, a consultant. Ms. Doi, would you characterize Japan as being more divided and polarized? Or is it shifting to the right?

MS. DOI: I would say that it's shifting to the right. You know, it's a democratic country, there are various opinions of course but—

QUESTION: Drifting or shifting?

MS. DOI: Shifting. I see that even though the pacifist voice is still there, I think the mood of the nation is very much supportive of more military and political activism around the world. In terms of opinions about China, for example, it's really a sea change, that in the 1970's and '80s, the number of people who had friendly feelings about China was like 75 percent, almost consistently. Now it's like 32 percent, or something like that. I have the figure somewhere, from the prime minister's office opinion surveys. And I think China's seen as a
threat in military terms, but also economically and as a threat to Japan's unquestioned leadership in Asia. I think that's the most important thing about China in the mind of Japanese.

And I didn't talk about constitutional revision issues. All the recent polls show that there's an overwhelming support for constitutional revision, majority support for constitutional revision. If you ask people whether the constitution should be revised or not, they will say yes. But when asked specifically if Article 9 should be revised, or about the collective defense issue, then the support becomes much lower. So there's still ambivalence but I think the public opinion is certainly going towards more assertive roles for Japan in the region and internationally, and maybe to do that we need to change the constitution. We need to say what we need to say to China, and so on.

AMBASSADOR PRITCHARD: Okay. Before we take the next question, I'm going to turn to Muthiah and let him respond to Mike's very first question.

DR. ALAGAPPA: I believe history is important and that's why I introduced history into it, but at the same time, how far does one go back in history and make it more manageable in terms of current events? It seems to me that when we talk about Asia, and you go very far back in history and compare that era with the current contacts, you now have a much more globalized world in which you have much better interaction of major powers. And so if you look at East Asia, the picture today is very different from what it was thousands of years ago.

And secondly, I think I want to correct a misperception maybe, or misunderstanding, is I said Japan's preference would be an Asia not dominated by any one power, but if it had to choose between a Pax Sinica and a Pax Americana, given the current conditions, it would actually prefer American dominance to Chinese dominance. So I just wanted to point that out. And second, I think—maybe I'll hold back the second one.

AMBASSADOR PRITCHARD: Okay; good. Let's go ahead for another question before we take our break. Over here, please.

QUESTION: Hi. I'm a former visiting fellow at Brookings and the East-West Center. One century ago Japan beat Russia and 60 years ago Japan was the only country to fight against [the allies in Asia and the Pacific]. Now our prime minister is not able to easily visit Yasukuni Shrine. My question is to Dr. Alagappa. If Japan has goals, the first one is the Japan-U.S. alliance, second is United Nations diplomacy, including joining U.N. permanent security council. The third one is Asian [inaudible] with emphasis on the importance of China and Korea.

If our Prime Minister Koizumi visits the Yasukuni Shrine by probably September, when the United Nations Security Council [inaudible], China [inaudible]. Japan is not able to get [inaudible] United Nations Security Council and Japan will be [inaudible] Asia.

My question is how can Japan achieve three goals at same time? Please describe the scenarios and [inaudible] United Nations Security Council, and to be strong in Asia and to maintain the good relationship with the United States.
AMBASSADOR PRITCHARD: In 30 seconds or less. [Laughter.]

DR. ALAGAPPA: In my presentation I said to enhance Japanese political and security role, need not necessarily undermine security and stability in East Asia, and I said much depended on the context and how Japan in fact goes about developing this expanded role.

And this sort of comes to the question that you raise. It seems to me that stronger relations with the United States need not necessarily be to the detriment of good relations with the Asian countries, and I think this attempt to link, or at least I think there was an attempt to show that the stronger U.S.-Japanese security relations in fact could work negatively towards Asia.

I don't believe that. I basically think that the strained relationship with China has much more to do with the historical issues and a perception in terms of who is the leading power, than in terms of the strengthening of the alliance relationship.

It seems to me the alliance relationship is an important relationship that actually allowed Japan to play a larger role in Asia. But in order to do that, it seems to me that Japanese diplomacy in relation with Asian countries has to improve and to address some of the core issues, and greatest objections to this really come from China and Korea, really not so much in Southeast Asia, except for Singapore, [inaudible] and so forth. But generally, there is an acceptance that Japan is going to play a larger role in Asia.

It's really the crux of how to deal with some of the core issues, like the shrine issue, the history issue, and so forth, which I think Japan has to forthrightly address in this particular case.

And also I think the tensions actually do not spell instability. I think the tensions in fact make it necessary for countries to address these issues rather than lead down the slippery slope to conflict.

AMBASSADOR PRITCHARD: I think that's a terrific place to stop, we're going to take a break, and this discussion will pick up with our next panel. If you'll take 10 minutes, there are coffee and refreshments out in the hallway and then Jim Steinberg will lead the second panel.

Thank you all. Thank our panelists for their presentations. Thank you; great job.

[Break.]
Mr. James Steinberg: Okay. Well, let's get started again. Let me join my colleagues in welcoming you all to Brookings for this terrific session on Japan's emerging security role in East Asia. You've heard the perspective on and from Japan but now we're going to turn to the question of what this all means for Japan's neighbors, for the region and the broader international community, and for this discussion we have an extraordinarily talented and well-schooled panel that can bring a lot of perspective to the issues we're going to debate today.

I won't spend a lot of time on introductions since you have bios with you, but to my right we have Eric Heginbotham. Eric, as you all know, is a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. He's had a very distinguished academic and professional career, including service in the U.S. Army Reserves and the National Guard, which gives him a certain perspective on the security problems that we're going to be talking about here today.

On my left is David Kang, who is associate professor at the Government Department at Dartmouth College, and also a well-known scholar on issues involving Korea, North Korea.

And finally, perhaps most importantly, on my right, Richard Bush, well-known to you all as the director of our Center on Northeast Asia Policy Studies.

As I said, we're going to focus now on the implications of both Japan's new role, and the debate within Japan for the region and the perspectives of key regional partners on Japan's evolution, and it seems to me that there's no better place to start than looking from the perspective of China, because obviously in terms of the public debate lately, the tremendous degree of energy that has gone on to the Sino-Japanese question has caught people's attention, and one of the things I hope we can explore with Eric is to what extent this is a transient phenomenon, to what extent this is going to be a permanent feature of the strategic landscape, to what extent are we looking at a long-term rivalry and antipathy between China and Japan, and to what extent that is a function of how Japan postures itself in a security environment.

And so Eric, maybe we could start by looking at the question of how concerned do we think China's leadership is now about the potential security role of Japan? How much does the security debate in Japan affect the perceptions of China in terms of its own bilateral relations with China and China's own sense of its own strategic role in the region?

Dr. Heginbotham: Well, certainly it's a concern. There is a perceived rivalry. I think to the extent that the security role intersects with Taiwan, it's particularly salient for them, obviously, and they reacted quite strongly to the joint [U.S.-Japan] declaration or the joint statement in February.

There are any number of issues: balance-of-power issues, points of contention, points of rivalry between the two. I don't have to rehearse them for this crowd. They're territorial issues,
energy disputes, issues of regional leadership. Those are all quite real. I think those are powerful drivers. I would, though, say that the historical issue is also quite real, just because there are the balance-of-power rivalries doesn't mean that the historical issue also isn't real and an important driver.

China of course has points of rivalry with many of its neighbors. It's been able to settle most and certainly it's been able to prevent most from spinning out of control. In some ways, its relationship with Japan is an anomaly. It's settled all of its territorial land boundary disputes, or at least it's headed towards resolving the last one with India, shortly. It's signed a code of conduct on the South China Sea. It's agreed to joint oil explorations with the Philippines and Vietnam. So the last sort of territorial issues that it has are with Japan and Taiwan. If we can call the Taiwanese issue a territorial issue.

But coming back to history for a moment, I do think that's a real issue, it's a real concern to the leadership. Yes, there's manipulation there but I also think that even though it can be difficult for us to perceive things in the same way that the Chinese do, from their perspective Japan is beginning to play a more assertive diplomatic, political, military role in the region and beyond, at the same time that perceived historical backsliding raises questions about the political direction of Japan.

Yes, Japan is a democracy, it has been a democracy for several decades. On the other hand, if you look historically on the eve of Japan's actions, such as the invasion of Manchuria, Japan was also a multi-party democracy and even by European standards of the day, at least contemporary standards, it did have a solid democracy in the 1920's. So the democracy issue may not be entirely reassuring to the Chinese.

I think there's a mix here. Yes, the rivalry's important. I don't think, apart from Taiwan, that there's any sort of unsolvable issue. Apart from, you know, if Japan becomes involved with Taiwan affairs, then there's no balance of power issue that necessarily drives this relationship towards conflict and contention. There would be rivalry but that doesn't mean that this will get worse from that perspective. I think the danger is on the historical side and on the public opinion side, as in nationalism.

MR. STEINBERG: So let me try to get you to help us disentangle this a little more. There's been some suggestions that maybe the LDP and Koizumi might revisit the question of visiting Yasukuni. It's obviously a counterfactual and hard judgment to make. But if there were gestures on the history side, is it your sense that this would make a big impact, or is history more a token for concerns about the possibility that Japan will revert to its old patterns and practices?

DR. HEGINBOTHAM: Well, the only way that we can really test the issue of course is if Koizumi or his successor doesn't in fact visit Yasukuni. Of course the standard line is that China is using the history card. That's the way it was phrased several years ago. The history card was supposedly employed to exact maximal concessions on ODA [Official Development Assistance]. Of course Japan has cut ODA dramatically, and I think shortly it will cut off ODA to China entirely, and that really hasn't had any impact at all on China's use of the history card.
So then we're on sort of fallback theories. Maybe China is using the history card for a more diffuse or broader set of reasons, and no matter what Japan does, it will continue to use the history card.

But, again, unless those visits are stopped, we can't test it. I would say that the relationship really did begin to slide downhill in 2001 with the visit to the shrine and with the first set of textbook revisions, and the proximate cause at least of the protests a couple a months ago was the third visit by Koizumi to Yasukuni and a second round of textbook revisions. So I do think that those are important drivers. It would require, I think, more than simply the LDP ceasing visits to Yasukuni or the prime minister ceasing visits to Yasukuni to sufficiently address the historical issue.

But I think that would be an important first step that would at least allow the leadership in both countries to get beyond the immediate problem, which is that they can't meet for summits until this issue is resolved.

MR. STEINBERG: Help us look into the debate within China, particularly within the leadership. Are there different viewpoints within China's leadership, in the military, the political elites, and the like, about the long-term future of Sino-Japanese relations, and what kind of future strategic landscape are they going to be facing?

DR. HEGINBOTHAM: I think the long-term picture's a bit difficult to discuss. There's certainly a debate about the short and midterm. The consensus has been that a stable relationship was absolutely necessary. For a variety of reasons, of course there are huge domestic constraints on China's behavior and on how it approaches its relationship with Japan. It's dependent on economic growth for social stability. That's sort of a baseline the leadership agrees on, and it's dependent on, at least last year, $60 billion in incoming FDI in order to achieve the rates of growth that it feels necessary to maintain social stability. Much of that, six billion dollars last year, comes from Japan so it's perhaps ten percent. The relationship of course is much more important than just FDI or trade, or the immediate bilateral economic relationship.

If the political relationship spirals out of control or gets much worse, it will have an impact on China's relationship with the United States, ASEAN, and other key partners.

So it's at least maintaining a stable relationship with Japan, which has traditionally or at least for the last 20 years been viewed as critical for China's overall foreign policy position. That has been challenged in elite circles as Japan does play a more active role, particularly on the Taiwan issue. And increasingly public opinion, which admittedly is to some extent manipulated by the government's control of education and the media, is beginning to threaten that position, I think, in very important ways.

There are surveys done in China by universities that show public perceptions of Japan, at least in local areas, are at an all-time low, at least since the surveys have been conducted. Moderates in the Chinese discussion who have published articles appealing for maintaining the status quo towards Japan and preserving a stable working relationship with Japan have been accused, in the Internet media or on Internet sites, of being racial traitors or other things.
So the “status quo” position is under a great deal of stress from nationalists, and I think to some extent also from the military.

MR. STEINBERG: As China pursues its broader regional strategy, to what extent is it looking over its shoulder, and seeing this as sort of a competition with Japan over who's going to be the Big Brother in the region?

DR. HEGINBOTHAM: Well, certainly issues of rivalry are important in its charm offensive in Southeast Asia, and elsewhere. Certainly China would like to be the lead in the ASEAN+3 arrangement. My personal view is that interests in trade investment resources and a stable international environment are more important in China’s development of, for example, a new security concept that stresses win-win relationships as illustrated its willingness to sign a code of conduct in Southeast Asia, and its willingness to sign on to the treaty of amity and cooperation with the ASEAN states.

So I think China’s own drivers are probably more important. I would say there is an increasing tendency in China, if not to pass Japan but at least to ignore Japan in its relations with other states. The other states of the region are clearly becoming more important to China. At the end of the '90s, Japan accounted for about 18 percent of China's total trade. Today it's 14 percent. So on a relative scale, that's diminishing. On FDI, Japan still has a very strong position but Korea, last year, actually surpassed Japan as a supplier of foreign direct investment.

Traditionally, the phrase for China's more important relationships with major powers in the region was [Chinese phrase] or “China, United States and Japan.” I'm told by a Chinese academic friend of mine, that when he goes to conferences now in China, or has discussions with party leaders in China, the new phrase is [Chinese phrase] or [Chinese phrase] or “Chinese, United States and the surrounding nations.” So no longer does Japan play that key role. So maybe the overall—

MR. STEINBERG: It's not just the United States that's engaged in Japan passing—

DR. HEGINBOTHAM: No, not at all. And I think they feel they're doing pretty well without the active cooperation of Japan, without an active partnership with Japan. So they can afford, to some extent, to look past Japan, even if they feel they can't really lock horns with Japan and engage in outright conflict with them on a broad set of issues.

MR. STEINBERG: David, looking at the Japan-South Korean relations, it's been a real yo-yo. You have, you know, moments of warm embrace, and it's all over, and the past is behind us, and then we turn around and it seems like it's back to the bad old days. Is this an inevitable pattern? Are there ways forward? What's the future direction that this is going to take?

DR. KANG: Well, it's not an inevitable pattern but in a way you can see that it's not surprising when it comes out, because the two never really did work out their relationship, and for domestic policy reasons, this is an easy win on both sides, particularly for Roh Moo-hyun, when he's under attack for his own attempts to find where South Korea should go.
One of the things that's a very easy win domestically is "Dokdo is our island." Everybody gets behind this sentiment, to a surprising extent, and so it wasn't surprising to see it snowball like that.

But I would put a couple points in there as well. The first one is that the whole region is in flux, and particularly for South Korea. The eternal problem has come back, which is what is Korea unified, or where does South Korea fit in with all these other large countries? And you saw the summit that they just had, where President Bush and Roh Moo-hyun tried to sort of paper over their differences. They don't really want to have to choose, but, unfortunately, the way that a number of issues are coming out, there are genuine reasons why South Korea's taking some positions that are more consonant with China than with sort of the strong, obvious U.S.-Japan-South Korea triangle.

And so South Korea's trying to figure out how to manage to sit in between all these other big countries, and within that context, one of the things that's happening with South Korea is its national identity, basically in the last decade or so, is really beginning to change and there's no clear new national identity.

Let me explain, just briefly, what I mean by that. Ever since independence in 1945, Korean identity was based on—I don't have a good phrase for this—something like "the three nots," meaning not North Korea, not Japan, and not the United States. Well, we like America but we really don't like it that much. And that was fine for the Cold War. Then, it was very clear what South Korea was going to do. It was going to cling to the U.S., grudgingly, and then deal with these other countries. China had been important historically, but now wasn't.

[buzzing sound on audio track.]

As the Cold War ended, you know, let me just continue on—

MR. STEINBERG: Very smoothly done.

DR. KANG: I've got it all set.

MR. STEINBERG: And tell NSA to turn things— [Laughter.]

DR. KANG: That's right. And as South Korea became a much more vibrant democracy, you began to see a slight shift in this.

[Hum on audio.]

DR. KANG: Maybe I should stop there. Somebody doesn't like what I'm saying.

And particularly what you've seen is this change in national identity with respect to North Korea, because it went from the 1980s, and for a long time before, attitude of North Korea bad, South Korea good. You've seen a real switch in the way they view North Korea, which is much
more as brothers, crazy uncles, or something like that, but basically as much more a part of what Korea is. You really didn't see that beforehand. Now this has led to a number of problems with the U.S., but it's a genuine shift in South Korea sentiment about who they are and what they stand for.

But you haven't seen yet any kind of updating of what Korea stands for with respect to Japan or the U.S. It still has this very shrill, negative view. There's not a whole lot of what South Korea stands for. It's still very much—"We're not Japan," so it's a very easy button to be pushed and it's a very easy button to be used, and the only way that it's going to change is with some real looking at South Korea as they try and figure out how they're going to go forward.

MR. STEINBERG: But that suggests that the reaction is almost independent of Japan's own policies. I mean, how much does the issue of Japan's own approach to security, its evolution and its security policy affect that? Or is this simply a question of posturing vis-à-vis whatever kind of Japan: more or less pacifist, more or less aggressive?

DR. KANG: I don't think that there is deep concern in South Korea about Japan's guidelines, revisions, or things like that. There's some concern, of course, but it's not like anyone in South Korea genuinely thinks that Japan is going to start invading its neighbors again. And the attitude is very much, "Okay, let's make sure that they're doing things prudently." To that extent, I don't think that it's as much based on their actions over the last couple years as it is on the unresolved last 50 or 100 years of history.

There is a more contemporary element to it, which is those islands [Dokdo]. There is a surprising level of sentiment. And from what I understand, on both sides, there is a lot of emotion involved in this.

MR. STEINBERG: And how much is that potentially affected by what would appear to be the alignment, in the context of North Korea, with Japan more and more taking a tough line, and the United States taking a tougher line, and the South Koreans appearing to be more partnered with China as part of that equation?

MR. KANG: That plays into it and that's where a lot of the frustration has come out over the last year. Ironically enough, this year is supposed to be a Japan-Korea friendship year. They had a whole bunch of things set up, and because it marks the 40th year of normalization of ties and, unfortunately, also marks the 100th anniversary of annexation. But in any case, there are real attempts to integrate these countries and to get along much better. But this goes back to the larger question of where South Korea's going to really fit, and that's not clear. Roh Moo-hyun wants to be the regional balancer, and nobody knows what that means.

But I understand where he's coming from, which is to say that South Korea can no longer say, "We're a strong ally of the U.S., we're going to ignore China. We're not going to deal with North Korea, we're going to oppose them." One thing that I see a lot more in D.C. is the feeling that South Korea is naive about North Korea. And as I said, it's a much deeper transformation. They've also seen the gains that economic engagement have worked over the last couple years. But they're ending up in a situation where China and South Korea genuinely see one path
towards resolving the North Korea issue, differently from the United States and even differently from Japan, and there's no question that that plays into the difficulties that they're trying to sort out between Japan and South Korea.

MR. STEINBERG: And any anxieties about the consequences of this de facto alignment with China?

[Tape change.]

DR. KANG: You know, it was funny because talking about the unresolved issues, Koreans like to bring up a current spat, as some of you may know. There was an ancient kingdom back before the Shilla dynasty called Koguryo, which was sort of in the middle of contemporary Korea and China. It was up to the north. And in the last year, both Korea and China have begun to claim that this is a proto-Korean or proto-Chinese kingdom. I say nobody's going to go to war over that issue from 1500 years ago. But there is rising concern in Korea about what a large China brings.

Yet there is not at all the same kind of concern that we were hearing about in the first panel, about a China-Japan conflict or butting heads. In Korea, that's simply not an option, and so the question is always, “How do you deal with this massive country that is on your border?” So there's concern about it, naturally, and at the same time what you see is Koreans increasingly investing in and trading with China. They see, inevitably, their future focused on China.

I'll give you one example of that. Actually, I'll give you two very short examples and then I'll stop. One is that a number of medium-size companies, $40 million companies, in Korea are increasingly saying they have to get into China somehow, because there's no way that they're going to be able to fight against China once China actually starts to integrate.

The second example I'll give is my cousin in Korea, who just passed an exam to get into high school and foreign language school. I said, “Of course you're going to study English.” He said, “No, no, no, I'm going to study Chinese.” So you see this sort of inevitability there.

MR. STEINBERG: Do the South Koreans see any role for themselves in trying to broker or mediate the Sino-Japanese problem?

DR. KANG: Well, this is what Roh Moo-hyun is trying to do and it’s to his credit. I know there's a lot of criticism in Korea, particularly, about Roh Moo-hyun's leadership but this is not a [name] problem, this is a problem that Korea has to face, which is what is their identity going to be? Who are they going to be and what are they going to do in the context of Japan, China, the U.S., and potentially unified Korea or collapse in North Korea? What are they going to do?

And they're trying to sort it out, and, to his credit, he's actually willing to broach these issues because we can put them off but, realistically, when China's right there, when Japan is right there, these issues need to be addressed. For 50 years we could say, “U.S.-Korea,” and that's all that really mattered. That was 90 percent of what South Korea's foreign policy was.
And those days are gone, and it's not clear how you're going to interact with the rest of the world, or particularly even the region.

MR. STEINBERG: Eric suggested that while it's not the only issue, movement on the pure history issues such as Yasukuni and textbooks could make a real impact in Sino-Japanese relations. Is there a similar gesture or are there things that the Japanese might do on the Korean side, that would have an enduring impact? Or is this more just part of the up and down we were talking about before?

DR. KANG: This is what I was talking before about, how it's a long-running process and it's going to take a lot of leadership, intellectuals, policy makers, and academics in Korea and Japan. Right now, there's a commission in Korea – actually, it's a joint Japan-Korea commission that's been around for about 20 years – that has been working on trying to get a common textbook and to resolve all these issues. They haven't made a whole lot of progress, obviously. But there is an attempt to really begin to examine how these two countries interacted with each other.

And the other thing that I would say is in terms of history, we tend to focus on the last 50 or a 100 years, right? In a way, all of history's become two words: historical memory. And it means these really negative things that have gone on. I think Muthiah alluded to this in his morning comments. The much deeper history is that if you actually compare Asia to Europe, there was far more stability during the Ming and Qing dynasties, than there was in Europe, particularly if you compare Asia to, say, the German-French relationship over the last 600 years, or any of these other countries.

And that larger historical context is still there and is still present for how Korea views what China will do, and probably how the whole region views what Japan is. Historically, Japan has only invaded when China was really weak. When China is strong, they haven't tried to go through Korea. And so there's this larger context that also informs how they're viewing the emerging region. I'm not saying it's going to look like it did 500 years ago, but there is more history than just the last century.

MR. STEINBERG: Back to the future. Richard, it's clear that at least one of the important precipitators of the current Sino-Japanese problem was the U.S.-Japan communiqué and specifically the mention of Taiwan. The Taiwanese obviously have a great stake in how Japan evolves and how its security role evolves. Is Japan's broader and more independent security role central to Taiwan's own long-term strategy?

DR. BUSH: The Taiwan reaction to the 2+2 statement is very interesting because there was a significant segment of opinion in Taiwan that believed that this represented a significant departure on Japan's part, particularly in the days leading up to the 2+2 meeting, when there was an article in the Washington Post that said United States and Japan are going to define Taiwan's security as a common strategic objective, and this was read to mean finally Japan is going to signal that it will help the United States come to Taiwan’s defense.
When the actual document was released and said that the common security objective was encouraging peaceful resolution of Taiwan issues through dialogue, there was a bit of a let-down, though people tried to regard it in the best possible terms.

But still, there has been a sense that Japan, as a fellow democracy, should be a stronger supporter of Taiwan, and that as opinion in Japan about China moves in the negative direction, that maybe Japan can be brought into a three-way alignment—Japan, the United States and Taiwan—that would be a guarantor of Taiwan’s security.

Having said that, I think there's a recognition that Japan is only in second place and the United States continues to be the primary guarantor of Taiwan security.

MR. STEINBERG: How much internal debate in Taiwan is there about this? I mean, is there a division between green and blue over the question of how much they would like to see Sino-Japanese tensions or reconciliation?

DR. BUSH: There is a definite view, and in the argument about the 2+2, this was very obvious, that people on the pan green side were saying, “Ah-ha, this shows that Japan is on our side.” People on the pan blue side were saying it doesn't mean anything of the sort.

The way that this objective was stated, it does not mean that Japan is going to come to Taiwan's defense and we shouldn't fool ourselves, that we have our own responsibility for promoting cross-strait stability, we should not believe that a U.S-Japan-Taiwan alliance is right around the corner.

MR. STEINBERG: Let's talk about the history side of the Taiwan-Japan relationship a bit. It's obviously a complicated question. One of the curious features that we've seen, at least to some degree, is on the territorial issues, particularly on the Diaoyutai islands, where it almost seems like the Taiwanese are aligned with the PRC in terms of that issue. How does the history play there? How much is Japan seen as sort of the historical wrong-doer as opposed to a source of connection from the Japanese presence in Taiwan?

DR. BUSH: Well, this is a very interesting question because Japan was colonial ruler of Taiwan, just as it was colonial ruler of Korea. Actually, it ruled Taiwan longer than it did Korea. And yet the attitude of the majority of the population in Taiwan towards that experience is rather positive. Now there is a certain element of 20/20 hindsight or seeing what you want to see. Japanese rule over Taiwan was a "mixed bag." It was pretty harsh in the early periods and it was also harsh during the wartime periods. But in the middle, Taiwan became sort of a test bed for economic development, led by Japan. One of the first green revolutions was in Taiwan.

What happened was that after the end of World War II, Japan left Taiwan and the China Nationalist army and Nationalist government came to Taiwan, and immediately embarked, or almost immediately embarked, in a set of very repressive policies, that led to this sort of authoritarian or totalitarian structure. This contrast created a Taiwan identity. It also created nostalgia for the Japan period.
The recollection of Japan and its rule was much more positive than the rule that they were experiencing, and so particularly among older Taiwanese there was a very positive feeling about Japan that continues to this day. For China and Korea, both of whom see their historical experience as one of victimization, Japan is the victimizer. For Taiwan, the victimizer was the Guomindang and its harsh rule, and Japan is really the "good guy."

MR. STEINBERG: As the Taiwanese develop their own strategy, to what extent do you see them trying to "push the envelope" in terms of encouraging a more active Japanese role and to what extent do you see them worried about provoking Beijing by being seen as kind of an actor behind the scenes, encouraging Japan in that direction?

DR. BUSH: Well, I think that this splits along political or ideological grounds. Within the pan-blue camp, there's clearly the feeling that Taiwan shouldn't "push the envelope." The main task is to improve cross-strait relations, and that's what the government should be doing.

On the pan green side, I think that there are a variety of points of view but clearly there are some who want to push the envelope here, want to create as many contacts as possible between Taiwan and Japan, and who would like to see public, perhaps symbolic manifestations of Japanese commitment.

I happen to think that Taiwan can do the best for itself by being rather low key. On the one hand, by building up its military capabilities, so that if it were attacked it could hang on for a while. And at the same time work to reassure all actors in the region: China, the United States, and Japan, that its intentions are benign. In that way, I think it can promote stability and so the question that's on everybody's mind in Taiwan—"Will Japan come to our defense?" remains a hypothetical one.

MR. STEINBERG: Speaking of contacts, we've obviously seen, in recent years, a pretty substantial increase in mil-to-mil contacts between Taiwan and the United States, all nominally under the umbrella of the abrogated alliance, but nonetheless in a variety of ways. Do you see a parallel development on the Taiwan-Japan side in terms of greater contact between the Taiwanese military and the SDF?

DR. BUSH: Yes, I do, but it's starting from a very low or narrow or nonexistent base, and so it has a lot further to go. I would say that for the near term, the interactions that are most important for Taiwan are those between the United States and Taiwan on the one hand and the United States and Japan on the other.

MR. STEINBERG: Let me just come back to you, briefly, Eric, before we turn to the audience, just to look at the China angle on this. How worried are the China about that set of developments? Obviously, they reacted strongly to the 2+2. But was that because they were genuinely concerned about deeper ties between Taiwan and Japan or was this just kind of a political shot across the bow?
DR. HEGINBOTHAM: It is hard to say, certainly. I think that they are genuinely concerned. The discussion within China is really just starting on this issue as well, again starting from a zero base, since this relationship didn’t exist before.

But I think this certainly is an issue of concern and it will probably become an issue of greater and greater concern. You know, I wasn't entirely sure how Richard felt about it as a policy matter, Japan's becoming involved in Taiwan, but I think there's certainly a number of issues for the United States to think about as we do this. It's been quite difficult for one country with a moderately unified foreign policy to deal with Taiwan and China as a triangle, but as Japan gets involved, I think that the set of relationships becomes that much less stable and less predictable.

MR. STEINBERG: Great. Well, let's turn to the audience. We have a terrific group of people here and I want to give you all a chance to share your thoughts and ask questions of the panel. We do have a microphone, so if you could, when you get the mike, identify yourself and then ask your questions. Rust.

QUESTION: Thanks. Rust Deming. First of all, I'd just make a comment about the morning presentation. Clearly, the alliance between U.S.-Japan has transformed itself over the last five years, in particular, in a very healthy way. But I do hear some of the misgivings that Ayako talked about, how grim it is. It really does depend heavily on Koizumi and Tokyo. And there are a lot of misgivings within the LDP and, more broadly, about just where this is taking Japan, particularly in the area of collective security and Japan being dragged into U.S. adventures elsewhere. So we need to be careful about [inaudible] underlying reasons.

On the second panel— one, there's another player in the region called Russia. We have a colleague here from the Russian embassy and I'd just be very interested in how Russia looks at all of these developments such as the strengthening of the U.S.-Japan alliance, the tensions between Japan and China, and to a lesser extent between Japan and the ROK. Russia's become much more of a European and less of an Asian player in recent years but there still is an interest there, and if our colleagues could comment on that.

MR. STEINBERG: Let me say my own thoughts and then we'll take advantage of having a colleague here, and I say this with due deference to our Russian colleague. I think the problem for Russia is that Russia has had a very difficult time conducting any kind of sustained foreign policy of any kind, almost anywhere. That the internal preoccupations and the need to deal with the immediate problems in its real immediate neighborhood, particularly to the south, have so preoccupied Russia policy makers, that its role, even in Europe, tends to be episodic and even more so in East Asia.

It clearly wants to be seen as part of it. There is a historic legacy in which it was important, it was critical to Russia to be seen as part of the six-party talks, and the like. Periodically, you have efforts to talk about a stronger relationship between Russia and China, or a relationship with Russia, China and India, but none of these things are sustained.
Eric was talking about a sustained Chinese policy towards East Asia which has a long-term vision and seems to be being carried out in economic and political terms, that these engagements are episodic. You have circumstances where you have high level visits of Chinese leaders to Moscow that don't go well because they're just not well-thought-through and well-planned, and so my own sense is that every now and then it sort of crosses Putin's mind to say, “Yeah, you know, we really have a stake here and we should kind of figure out how we want to orient ourselves.”

It would be interesting, since we don't have—I don't know whether it came up because I didn't hear all the other section—the Russo-Japanese piece of this, you know, where, you know, from time to time it comes across the screen and then it sort of drops off.

And so I have a hard time seeing any real kind of long-term strategic approach to the region, that you could sort of characterize as the way in which Russia is engaging. Enough of a sense to know that there are great stakes there. Look at the back and forth on the gas and oil pipelines; but there’s not a sense that there's a master plan behind it.

Let me invite our colleague to comment.

MR. AZIZOV: I was not prepared to talk of course this morning, or at the luncheon, but since we are discussing policies of Russia, I would say just a couple of points. First, the policy is evolving of course, not so much because it is unstable, but because the situation in Asia, in the Pacific itself is in a state of flux, as was indicated quite amply this morning by some of the participants.

And secondly, it is especially hard for us to evolve our policy, because a major contributing factor to the state of flux in the region is the disappearance of the Soviet Union with all the relevant implications for the region.

Therefore, there is one particular principle which guides our policies at the moment, and that is that we are in favor of a status quo ante. It means in favor of the six-party talks resolving the nuclear issue of the North Korean state. We are in favor of, you know, settling controversies around some territorial disputes in a peaceful way, not giving rise to more serious face-offs in the region.

And of course, as has been already quite amply remarked, it is our very sustained interest to have a kind of sub-region-wide economic and energy, security cooperation launch. We have taken—over the past four years, but not this year—a number of American officials, namely Assistant Secretary Kelly, at that time, was quite diligent  on the subject of turning the six-party talks, if successful, into some kind of an exercise on Northeast Asia security cooperation, on noncontroverisal issues first.

We find a lot of interesting ideas to this notion. It can be further explored down the road. But basically, again, two points. Evolving, as far as our policies are concerned, and at the same time, certain aspects are quite stable. For instance, on China, I would take issue of course with the so-called instability [inaudible]. On the contrary, we believe that our relations with China are
the best ever over the period of 300 years of written history. We have just managed to, you know, delimit, and we are going to embark on the path of demarcation, which is in itself a very serious technical issue, of the entire border with China. That's no mean achievement for the two countries.

We face major, you know, upswing in our trade and economic relations with the Chinese. So things are not as bad as they look from some capitals.

MR. STEINBERG: Thank you. Because our topic is Japan's security in the region, I'm not going to invite Eric to respond to that and get a perspective from Beijing, but it's an interesting topic that we ought to pursue in another setting.

QUESTION: Eric McVadon, a consultant. Eric—I forget my question. Well, it's escaped me completely. Please come back to me.

MR. STEINBERG: Okay.

QUESTION: Just a comment on Rust Deming's question about Korea. Russia plays a very large role in energy security. China very badly wanted a pipeline from the eastern Siberian area to come down to Daqing as that area is depleting, and Japan outbid China and got the pipeline agreement with a pipeline to go to Nakhodka, which really irritated the Chinese, who then sent a delegation to Moscow to try to persuade Russia to change its mind, and I think the jury is out at the present time, although it looks as though Japan has the edge.

MR. STEINBERG: Eric, are you ready to come back? Okay.

QUESTION: Eric, what do you think Beijing really thought about what was behind the 2+2 statement?

DR. HEGINBOTHAM: Again that's hard to say. I don't think there's anything necessarily published on it by policy makers in China. There has been some commentary in the Chinese media, which in general portrays this as yet another step in Japan's becoming a more active player in the region.

And of course denouncing Japan's increased interest in Taiwan, and of course this interest goes both ways. I believe there was a Taiwanese parliamentary delegation—you might know more about this—from Taiwan, that actually visited Yasukuni several months back, not a policy issue per se but obviously a demonstration of interest in issues that are of concern to Japan by at least the most extreme elements in the Taiwanese political spectrum.

I don't know how this has been dissected within China, but I think it's generally taken as yet another piece of evidence that Japan's playing a more assertive role.

MR. STEINBERG: Let me push you a little bit on that. To the extent that there's a judgment about it, do the Chinese perceive this more as a Japanese initiative or American initiative, to expand the explicitness about Taiwan as part of the security relationship?
DR. HEGINBOTHAM: Well, I think the Chinese are clearly concerned that the United States is pushing Japan and it's not just on this issue but also on the constitutional issue, where we've weighed in, and on a variety of other issues. So, clearly, they're quite concerned and upset that the United States is doing this, particularly in the Taiwanese context, but also more generally in a broader context. Also, we haven't weighed in on issues of concern to China, the historical issue and such. So yes, they're clearly concerned, and it's not just on this issue. It certainly is at least part coming from Japan, and I think they also see it, at least partly, as a political ploy by Koizumi to stir up support for some of his favorite policies such as constitutional reform, as they tend to view the Yasukuni visits as well.

DR. BUSH: My understanding is that sort of Chinese specialists on the Sino-Japanese relationship find it very significant that Japan was willing to sort of talk about Taiwan, explicitly, in the document, and even suggest that it was sort of Japan that was pushing this.

QUESTION: Jing Huang from the Brookings Institution. I have two questions. One is for the first panel. I did not have time. That is, China is a very important issue in U.S.-Japan relations, and also I tend to agree with Ms. Doi's point, that is, Koizumi's confidence in the U.S.-Japan relations emboldened him to take this tough stance towards China. My question is how do Japanese policy makers see U.S.-China policy, or in other words, what kind of China policy do the Japanese policy makers want to see come out of Washington, D.C.?

The second question is about the North Korean nuclear issue. We notice that China subtly but very significantly shifted its position on the North Korea nuclear issue. A couple weeks ago, China kind of acknowledged that North Korea may have nuclear weapons already. Before that China denied it or said they're not sure. But now China says maybe North Korea has this. What is South Korea's reaction to this? Thank you.

MR. STEINBERG: Does anybody want to talk about—why don't you start on that and then—

DR. BUSH: Well, I'm not sure how big a shift it was, actually. In the past, China had said that it was intolerable for North Korea to have nuclear weapons but it was also unthinkable to impose sanctions on North Korea. As North Korea moves to a more explicit position on its ownership of nuclear weapons and as deniability becomes less plausible, then of course China's in a position where to maintain its own credibility, it has to start rank-ordering some of these things.

You know, I personally wasn't 100 percent convinced that this is how it would rank-order its priorities. China is clearly annoyed at North Korea and wants it back at the table; it has certainly demonstrated its annoyance with North Korea.

Now it's forced to choose, but it could change its mind later. In any case, now that it feels a need to make a statement on this, it's expressed its clear interest in North Korea remaining a viable state over its remaining non-nuclear. So I don't think there's necessarily a major change here; it's just a statement of ordering.
MR. STEINBERG: Let me just try a little bit on your first question and invite some of our Japan experts to come in on this too.

My own sense is that for Japan, the way they view Sino-U.S. relations is sort of as a flyweight, which is that they're concerned when Sino-U.S. relations get out of balance, either way. That is to say, during the period when there were very poor relations between the United States and China, there was I think a great deal of concern in Japan that it would destabilize the region, that there might be conflict, that Japan would be caught up in it. Japan did not want to be part of that; it saw its interests in having good relations both with China and the United States.

And as U.S.-China relations began to warm up, you have this whole anxiety about Japan passing, and the like, and it was perceived that there was going to be a strategic relationship between the United States and China at Japan's expense. I see this sort of back and forth in general terms, about the relationship.

As China has a bigger and bigger role, I think that there are some voices in Japan that worry that there needs to be more of a clear alignment on the U.S. side, that the long term is such that the two big powers are going to be China and the United States, that Japan will not be an equal rival, and therefore won’t be able to balance China on its own, and so you see at least some elements, particularly within the LDP, wanting to see a more of a clear hope for a U.S. tilt towards Japan, rather than the flyweight role of counterbalancing back and forth to maintain equilibrium. But I'd welcome comments from others here who probably know Japan's situation better than I do.

Rust, do you want to say a word on it?

MR. DEMING: I think that's right. I think there is an evolution going on. But there is a tendency in Japan to try to get us more involved in Japan-China issues, whether it's the Senkakus or even Yasukuni. When I was in Tokyo, one of the LDP members suggested that we should say publicly that we endorse the prime minister's visit to Yasukuni, and suggested that even the president might visit there the next time—

[Laughter.]

MR. DEMING: A la Bitburg. So there is this desire to get us more engaged on the Japanese side of the equation.

DR. KANG: If I can just jump in here. Apparently a Korean delegation, which went recently, for the first time, is expressing the opposite interest in Yasukuni. For the first time, they're addressing the Yasukuni issue to American policy makers. Also asking the U.S. to weigh in on Yasukuni, of course on the other side so—we're in the middle.

MR. STEINBERG: Right here.
QUESTION: Thank you. My name is Andrew Cohen. I'm a recent university law school graduate and my question comes actually in two parts. Over the past six to nine months, the general population in China has had some very strong feelings using, quote, “the history card” against Japan. What is your feeling of the general population and including, I guess, Unit 731 and the biological weapons that have been left behind in China, which I believe in 2004 was more than 700,000? Do they have that right to be violently upset at certain governmental policies in Japan?

DR. HEGINBOTHAM: Well, I won't talk about the right, I'll just talk about the facts, and first of all say as far as aging is concerned, the Japanese soldiers who went to China, they were at a minimum probably 18 years old when they went. So they're what? 85 years old or something like that, today. For Chinese to remember the Japanese occupation, they need only have been about, say, four or five years old. So there's a generational difference here where the Chinese, you know, still, at the age of 60, 65, 70, have direct experience of this and memory of this.

I lived in Beijing, in Chinese housing, with a number of older folks who had experienced this. My wife is Japanese. I didn't find there to be, at least in my immediate community, any sort of extreme sentiment. I thought it was fairly balanced, that there had been bad Japanese, that there had been good Japanese, that there was certainly bad Japanese policy during the war, and concern about where Japan was headed today. I've encountered different sentiment, more extreme opinions, at other occasions such as conferences and things.

But certainly when we think about, for example, our own experience, particularly the experience of those who've been occupied in war, draw again from personal experience, but when I went to high school in the South as a Yankee, I wasn't terribly welcome; I was kicked out of the Civil War club. I think this sort of emotion in the southern part of the United States is probably dying out, but at least as far as, you know, 20 or 30 years ago, this is a 100 years after the fact, more than a 100 years after the fact, there was still a lot of sentiment that certainly surprised me as a Yankee, and I think it may be tough for most Japanese to appreciate the extent to which 60 years on, this is still a very live, very emotional issue.

QUESTION: The second part of this question relates to—I'm probably the only person in this room who has the ethnic diversity to ask this, but I'm a Chinese-American Jew, and going back to 1945, what if, at the international military tribunals in Nuremberg, the 23 doctors that were placed on trial in the medical case were given the immunity that the Japanese doctors received, who were part of Unit 731, would the Jews today, who can be that violently upset and contain that emotion, still have similar—would your stance against the Jews today be the same as the position you're taking now on the Chinese?

DR. HEGINBOTHAM: I'm not sure I completely understood the question but I guess you're asking about the Chinese—

QUESTION: The imagery and the analogy—because only two times in history have two different countries performed similar types of experimentation, and that is that time.
DR. HEGINBOTHAM: Right; sure. It is difficult for us to appreciate what happened in China. It's a little bit easier for me to appreciate it. I actually grew up largely in Indonesia where the sentiment is far from that in China. But at least when I was there in the 1970's, this was played on TV quite frequently.

There are soldiers around the world who do this even today, as we've seen at the Milosevic trial; they documented a lot of this, so the film's there and people have seen it. It's pretty horrible stuff, not on film maybe, but people were skinned alive, there were the biological experiments, a lot of horrible things happened. You know, justice was partly done after the war, that perhaps did go far to maybe placating some sentiment, but, clearly, there's an image, or the impression in China that not enough was done, and particularly in the case of Unit 731, and the failure to prosecute those cases adequately, I think that's still a point of resentment, certainly.

Ayako, I think wanted to weigh in or—

MS. DOI: Thank you. Just adding to Eric's point about the anti-Japanese feelings in China, you know, you're certainly much more China specialist than I am. But at least the interpretation or understanding in Japan is – and I think there's certain truth to this – is that what the younger Chinese generation who grew up after the war learned in school, especially after the patriotic education began in 1990's, seemed to have a lot of influence on what's happening now on the ground with the young Chinese demonstrating and so on.

I, for one, used to think that when the old generation who experienced a war dies out, the relationship will get better. But it didn't happen and the opposite seems to be happening. The emotion seems to be more intense among the younger Chinese and then that's probably because, as you said, the older generation who saw the real Japanese knew that there are some good Japanese too.

The people who learned about Japan's atrocities in schools, in Chinese textbooks, know only the bad side of Japan, and that really seems to have gotten into their mind set, and in a way, it may be harder to erase than the personal experiences.

MR. STEINBERG: It's obviously a complicated question and there's so much of an effort to try to understand the relevance and non-relevance of the European experience versus the Asian experience. There's a lot of debate—if you try to understand what happened in Europe, there is the sense that the German people took ownership, not only of the atrocities that were committed, but the responsibility for the war. And I think in the case of Japan it's more complicated, and the debate in Japan is more complicated. I can't imagine anybody, except perhaps real extremists, who defend the atrocities that were committed.

But there is more of a complexity about whether the war was forced on Japan as opposed to caused by Japan's own aggression, and whereas nobody in Germany would argue—I don't think—there are a few neo Nazis—but essentially nobody would argue that there was anything but a pure act of aggression by Germany in starting the war.
Your point is very interesting because the question then becomes, Is that a result of the fact that the Chinese are not having much exchange or interchange with Japanese now, because obviously in the case of Germany, in the context of the EU, young French and Germans see each other all the time, and so they know each other as the generation not connected to the war.

But if in fact few Chinese know Japanese now, then the danger of this kind of educational issue, and vice-versa, I mean to the extent the Japanese don't know Chinese, then the stereotyping or the educational thing is a very powerful force.

Why don't we stay in the front right here.

QUESTION: Liu Shyh-fang, Brookings. I want to ask two questions. The first one is there is some friction on territory issues between Korea and Japan, China and Japan, and Taiwan and Japan, and what would be the U.S. position in this kind of territory tension?

And my other question is about economic issues. I think it is complex: if you deal with the military-security issue, then Japan can ally with America, but if you look at the economic issue, I think that Japan's attitude is quite different from the American perspective. And what would be the U.S. position if there were any economic cooperation between Japan and China here?

DR. BUSH: Let me take the second one. First of all, there would be no formal U.S. position about the situation where, on the one hand, you have economic interdependence in all of East Asia, and on the other hand, you have political and security difficulties. But if I can guess what the general American point of view is, there would be some anxiety that you have these tensions between Japan and China, Japan and South Korea. Because we want to have good relations with everybody. We believe that Asia's stability rests on all these countries working together, as they do economically, and sometimes it seems that you have a vicious circle going on with nobody in the region saying, “Is this really in our interest, that we should become so hostile to each other?”

MR. STEINBERG: I think it's indisputably true that – and I think that was part of your question – that in the business community in Japan, there's deep anxiety about this hostility. I mean, you listen to the business associations and others, and it's clear that they are the most vocal in worrying about behavior on both sides that's exacerbating the tension, and have been most critical of Koizumi's political actions that have exacerbated the problem.

DR. HEGINBOTHAM: That's certainly true on the Japanese side, in both cases— Doyukai and Keidanren have weighed in to differing degrees and with mixed success on this issue. I think Richard's absolutely right, that there's a lot of U.S. concern about these issues, particularly since they're subject to political manipulation, since in and of themselves, certainly to the United States and I think objectively speaking, the territory at stake is not enormously valuable property. Even the natural gas under the East China Sea, that's estimated by oil folks that I know who work for major multinationals, that's the peak production, and this is based on their estimates rather than the Chinese companies that are actually involved.
It's supposed to be of very short duration. But the peak production is something like 4 BCM [billion cubic meters] per year, whereas the pipeline from Xinjiang, I think it's something like sixteen and expandable to twenty, and of course that was a much longer-duration project. It's winding down now.

One city, Shanghai, I think uses 5 BCM. So this is less than the city of Shanghai would use in a single year, and that I think is—those are the biggest stakes. You know, the smaller stakes are, say, fishing, but I think the U.S. is concerned that that politics enters into this, just to talk for a second about the Korean case.

Obviously there's a lot of sentiment about this, going back to the war, and Japan may not have played this particularly smoothly or sensitively. On the other hand, it's certainly also in President Roh's interests that we stir up the Japan-Korea issue a bit, particularly since he's pushing now for—or his party is pushing for an inquiry into wartime collaborationism and since the leader of the GNP, the opposition party, is the daughter of Park Chung Hee, and since Park Chung Hee was educated in the Japanese military system and fought for the Japanese in Manchuria.

So there's a lot of room for mischief here, and the U.S. certainly wants to take a pretty cautious attitude towards this and not contribute to the problem.

DR. KANG: This goes back to the whole historical memory thing; right? Because, you know, territorial disputes, what happened with Unit 731, what happened to the two dozen Japanese abductees. It's very interesting, if you look at where you're not emotionally involved with somebody else's things, and you say, boy, going back and proving the original sin is really difficult. Who shot first, or who's 51 percent wrong?

In their own cases, between say Korean and Japan, much of the frustration is over, for example, that Japan hasn't admitted the two, three hundred thousand comfort women, the sexual slaves, and now they're completely upset over these two dozen that North Korea won't come clean about.

And so there's real resentment on both sides. The Japanese feel unfairly victimized, etcetera, etcetera. And part of this goes back to what Eric was saying, is that there's domestic politics involved in a lot of this, in both using it and then in trying to resolve it, and said—you know, it's not a constant, historical memories, and everyone is seething with rage and bitterness, and it gets whipped up for various reasons. And it happens on both sides. You could see the sort of perfect storm coming.

I think I mentioned this originally at the beginning. On Japan's side, they really are frustrated with North Korea and what they've done about the abductees. My understanding is that for the last 30 years, it was as if you were talking about Roswell and you were abducted by aliens, because no one admitted that North Koreans actually came and grabbed these Japanese.

So when they finally admitted that that happened, there was much more sentiment in Japan, that people, our government, the North Koreans, they all lied, what's going on? There
was just an amazing focus on that; you know. So there's real frustration with North Koreans. There's these unresolved Korean relations, and on the Korean side, of course, there's frustration with the Japanese, with this whole comfort women versus North Korea and the differing perspectives about how to deal with North Korea.

And this is why I say there is an element here which is not a constant, which is where there's a political or institutional way in which you deal with these things, and as of yet, no side in the region has really made a genuine stand, no political leader has come out and said, “We're really gonna resolve this, let me try and do something dramatic.”

And what it'll take is a Korean saying it to the Koreans, it can't be a Korean saying to the Japanese, or a Japanese saying to the Korean. These things happened in the last couple months and I was talking to people in Korea, Japan, and here in the administration. Americans were saying, "I'm not getting involved."

MR. STEINBERG: I completely agree with that point. It appeared, at least during part of the time when Kim Dae Jung was president of Korea, that there was an effort to do that, and how successful was that and how that affect Korea—

DR. KANG: Well, that's why I say this is a national identity issue; right? You can't have one guy come out and say for a couple years; right? It's a much more involved process by both sides, where there has to be a sort of overall change in the way that we – academics, politicians, people in the street – view it. It can't be just one guy. But that's probably where it's got to start.

MR. STEINBERG: Just reflecting back on this discussion that we had about education and the Korean-Japanese part, how is that playing out? What we heard was quite worrisome, which is that we're actually seeing a situation where it's being ingrained and deepened in a way that makes it harder, over time. What's the situation? There's obviously a lot more contact between Koreans and Japanese?

DR. KANG: You know, interestingly enough, right up until the mid 1990’s you could go to Korea and you would never see anyone who wasn't Korean, outside the hotels or the army base. And even the Japanese, you would see them sort of huddled around the hotels, and things like that. In the last couple years, I have been amazed at the number of Japanese who are playing on college soccer teams, you know, the pickup leagues who are studying class. Literally, I think there has been a major opening of Korea, particularly to Japanese, but also there was a Thai guy that was just at this regional university.

So there is a change in terms of the interaction. In terms of the education itself, one thing that's happened, and this is where I think Roh Moo-hyun has gone too far, is like trying to dredge up what happened with the Japanese collaborators and all this kind of stuff. The sort of dirty secret is that none of these countries deal with their history very well, and in Korea, it's all Japanese collaborators, collaborating with the U.S. and Syngman Rhee, and then Kwangju and Park Chung Hee, and most of the textbooks. One of the reasons that there is such sentiment and a rush toward North Korea is that up until ten years ago the textbooks were all, “North Korea
bad, South Korea good,” nothing was—you know, this was just a pure democracy. Everybody knew it was a lie but nobody had any idea what it was.

So these countries have to deal with their own history as well as what went on with the other—and that's what I meant by it'll be a lot of pointing to yourself as well as trying to resolve it.

MR. STEINBERG: Do you think that the secular trends favor reconciliation over time, because there is a lot of interpenetration, you can now study Japanese in Korea, and all that? Or do you worry, as our Chinese colleague did, about the education in China, that we're actually looking at a situation which may get worse over time?

DR. KANG: I think it depends on the political leadership and, you know, what they decide to do with it, and if they decide to make short-term hay. Like, you know, here's how important Dokdo was, right? And people were really mad, but it was enough to—

MR. STEINBERG: Were cutting off their—

DR. KANG: Yeah, to overcome trade issues, and North Korea policy and everything else, they were like [makes sound], you know, and so if they decide to do that, we're not going to make a whole lot of progress. On the other hand, I think there's a lot to build on if you decide to deal with it.

DR. HEGINBOTHAM: I'll just weigh in here. I completely agree with that. I think it is up to the political leadership. I will say ironically, despite the way it's portrayed in the United States, and I'm not making China out here to be a saint or anything, but because China is the most vulnerable to catastrophe, in the event of a real severe downward spiral in its relations with anyone, particularly Japan, it is the most explicit or at least scholars and many policy makers in China are the most explicit about the need for politicians to weigh in, and to take responsible positions.

I'm not particularly optimistic about the general regional future, given both where public opinion is now, and its manipulation, and the tough stance that all leaders have taken. But I certainly don't want to conclude that way.

One thing I want to say is there are some hopeful signs as well. This book that was mentioned earlier, the common history, Japan, Korea, China, I haven't had a chance to look at it thoroughly yet, but actually there is text to it now. I've seen the Japanese version a bit. I've seen references to it in the Chinese media. They avoided some tough issues. Most of the touch issues are over numbers. How many people got killed in Nanjing, for example.

But they've been able to agree on qualitative statements and present ranges of numbers, and I think this kind of discussion, this kind of effort may provide some baseline for educational changes, changes in the way history is treated in the educational system in all three countries. It may validate, to an extent, the efforts of others to sort of intervene in the educational processes or at least oversee the educational processes in the others.
QUESTION: Sook-Jong Lee, a former CNAPS fellow. I just want to make one comment and ask one question. I think there's some difference between the Chinese reaction and Korean reaction at the mass level. You know, many college students in China went to launch a big demonstration. But if you look at the demonstration in Korea, most of the young generation stayed inside and were just using cyber attacks; they didn't go to the street.

The people in Korea who waged demonstrations were mainly right-wing old people or middle-aged people. That's a big difference. And I always wondered why the college kids didn't go to the street like they did in 2003, such as the candlelight protest against the USA. And one other question I have in hearing this is that, well, anti-Japanese sentiment has been replaced by anti-American sentiment among [inaudible].

But if you look at the public data, opinion survey data, actually there's no big difference between the younger Koreans in their 20's and older people over 50, namely, anti-Japanese sentiment is still quite dominantly high among the Korean populace.

So I wonder, even though all these democracy issues, and more the [inaudible] between Japan and Korea, had contributed to easing up the tension, I don't think that that adds up to the public's effort from Korea about recognizing the increasing security role of Japan, if anything happens in the Korean peninsula.

This question, [Korean word] issue, has been very sensitive. Our government didn't talk in public about whether we are going to support the Japanese bid for a Security Council seat. They didn't talk, and whether Korea will accept a Japanese contribution if there is a conflict on the peninsula again, or if North Korea collapses, is a very sensitive question. Among the security experts [inaudible] there is a kind of realistic consensus—well, we should accept.

However, if you look at the media, everything, every small move has been interpreted as by right-wing conservatives, or pointing to the emergence of militarism in Japan. So it's constantly attacked by the media and ordinary Koreans. So there is a big gap. So that can be very dangerous in the future.

And my last question is, in my opinion there is an domestic dimension, international dimension, and the history questions. In my opinion, think the history will matter in Asia, between China, Japan, and Korea, and obviously there is an international dimension, especially the role of the USA, which is related to these memory issues. But so far, what I observed is that the American position on the history issues is that, “Well, it's your countries’ problems. I don't want to be involved in it.”

Or can you be just quiet. Why is South Korea complaining about those issues? And it's damaging the U.S.-Iraq and Japan triple alliance. They are more critical about the South Korean reaction rather than Japan who created a problem.
And so I wonder if the United States can evolve from its past passive policy toward a more constructive policy to help this conflict of rivalry and reinterpretation, and this feud about history issues in Northeast Asia?

MR. STEINBERG: It's a good question and we probably ought to put it to the administration when we have a chance. Let me take advantage of that to ask you all one final question before we break. Sook-Jong’s question raised something that we haven't talked about explicitly here, which is that obviously one of the fears about North Korea's nuclear program is what impact it will have on Japan's security policy, and most explicitly, whether that might, in the long term, trigger Japan to reconsider its nuclear option.

I'd just like to ask each of you, in conclusion, how worried are the Chinese, South Koreans, potentially the Taiwanese, about the prospect of no resolution of the North Korean nuclear program, even a more explicit public demonstration and a test, et cetera, et cetera? How worried are you that that would lead Japan to reconsider its nuclear-free posture and, you know, does that affect the way they're approaching the North Korean talks? Eric, you can start.

DR. HEGINBOTHAM: Well, the U.S., the administration has raised this with the Chinese as sort of an implicit threat, that if the issue isn't resolved, then Japan may feel the need to go nuclear, and as far as I can tell, it hasn't resonated terribly deeply in China, probably because they've got a lot of other concerns that they're dealing with at the moment and they're trying to resolve the issue as best they can and within the constraints that they view as realistic for them. So maybe that's putting the cart before the horse, just thinking about those issues.

Of course if Japan did indicate it were going nuclear, I think we would see a significant reaction but—

MR. STEINBERG: But does that suggest that, your judgment now, that the Chinese think it's unlikely that the North Korean program will cause Japan to change its mind, or they're just not focused on it?

DR. HEGINBOTHAM: That's a good question and I haven't really read the Chinese Japan experts on this particular issue. My sense is they don't seem to be immediately concerned about this. In the general policy making community, I'm always surprised about how thin the knowledge base is on Japan, but at least until recently, I think they've been less concerned with some of its specific security behavior, for example, the expansion of the armed forces, and some of these issues, than it has been with its treatment of history and some of its specific aspects of its relationship with the United States, its involvement with Taiwan and other things.

So it doesn't seem like that's a major driver at the moment of China's thinking on this issue. I could be wrong.

MR. STEINBERG: David, how worried are the South Koreans about Japan going nuclear?
DR. KANG: I think it's similar to what Eric said. The U.S. ambassador to Japan just raised this and it really did sort of come across as more of a threat, to try and get South Korea to change its policies, as opposed to a genuine sort of logical sequence of events. And so that's the context within which I think that it was received. Nobody really knows what South Korea would do, because nobody really knows whether Japan would really go nuclear or not.

My own sense is that many people think that it would be a huge step for Japan to do it, and a nuclearized North Korea is probably not the actual trigger. They would have to abrogate the NPT, basically, and completely change the U.S. alliance if they were going to go nuclear. They would have to decide that they were going to engage in a long-running conflict with China, maybe not war, but certainly this would be a different thing.

And so there's a number of other steps that would have to be taken. I think that if they did go nuclear, South Korea would be nervous, but I think they think that's a number of steps away.

MR. STEINBERG: Does Taiwan see this as a positive development?

DR. BUSH: Well, this is not a question that's raised but my guess would be that the mainstream would see this as acceptable.

MR. STEINBERG: Enemy of my enemy.

DR. BUSH: Yeah; that's right.

MR. STEINBERG: Well, let me—I know there are a lot of other questions but we've already overstayd our welcome here. Let me thank the panelists and the audience for an excellent discussion and let me turn it over to Richard for some logistical—

DR. BUSH: I just want to thank you all for coming and thank you for your questions. I'm a little bit surprised at the size of the audience today for a subject which, as somebody mentioned, doesn't get a lot of attention in Washington these days. I think this reflects the fact that something is going on here, something that Brookings and other organizations need to pay more attention to.

So thank you for validating that hypothesis.

[End.]