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WHO WILL LEAD THE WORLD? SHIFTING ALIGNMENTS IN WORLD PUBLIC OPINION

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P R O C E E D I N G S

MR. STEINBERG: Why don't we get started? Good morning and welcome to Brookings.

Today we're fortunate to have as always a very distinguished group of analysts to talk about one of the most important issues facing our country which is American's standing in the world.

As you know, many of us have been talking for a number of years about the importance of what our good friend Joe Nye (ph) calls soft power and to which the United States is seen as a positive force in the world, as a force multiplier in our ability to achieve our national objectives. There has been a considerable debate over the last 4 years about how U.S. foreign policy has affected either positively or adversely that soft power.

We've seen a lot of debate about unilateralism, multilateralism and the U.S. role in the world, and there have been a number of polls over the past several years over this question, and nobody has contributed more to that debate I think than Steve Kull, our neighbor next door, and the director of Center on Policy Attitudes in the Program on International Attitudes at the University of Maryland. Steve is going to share with us today the results of his new poll looking at some of these questions about how the United States stands in the world and how we've stacked up against other important national players.

For those of you who read your "Washington Post" this morning, it's clearly a timely policy issue. Al Kamen has told us that the issue about the whole question of U.S. public diplomacy is going to be an important one and we now have Karen Hughes appointed to the position of being in charge of public diplomacy at the state department. So the results that Steve is going to be reviewing with us today are going to be an important part of the challenge that Karen Hughes and others are going to be facing in the president's second term.

As we were talking just coming up here, I think it's fair to note that this poll was taken right after the election but before the administration's latest charm initiative and we'll have a chance perhaps to reflect on the question of whether recent news by the administration might have any impact on the results that we're going to hear about today.

After Steve presents the results of the poll we're going to look at the perceptions from two very different parts of the world. First of all, from Europe where we have Phil Gordon, the director of our Center on Europe here at Brookings. And then from the perspective of East Asia, I'm happy to welcome for the first in a semi-official capacity Jeff Bader who is the new director of our China Initiative here at Brookings, a Senior Fellow in the Foreign Policy Studies Program and perhaps one of the most astute and keenest observers of China and East Asia through an extraordinary career in public service in the state department abroad and in his last position at the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative. So I'm glad to have Jeff here and look forward to many more briefings with him as we go forward.

So let me without further ado turn it over to Steve.

MR. KULL: As you've probably heard, there has been polling suggesting that there has been a decline in positive attitudes toward the U.S. in world public opinion. There have been a number of polls that have explored this. Pew early last year did some questions that were previously asked by the U.S. State Department and found a rather sharp downward movement in favorability ratings toward the U.S., and while in the United Kingdom in 1999 to 2000, 83

percent said they have a favorable attitude toward the U.S., this dropped to 58 percent, in Germany from 78 to 38, Morocco from 77 to 27, France 62 to 37, and Turkey, Russia and so on, Russia being one exception.

We conducted a study, we being the Program on International Policy Attitudes and the International Polling firm GlobeScan which has been polling internationally for some years, and we tried to find out more about whether these feelings toward the U.S. have persisted, how people are feeling about other major powers around the world, whether there might be some kind of realignments in attitudes in world public opinion in terms of leadership in the world.

All of this information, by the way, is in the handout materials so some of it is going to go by quickly. You obviously aren't going to be able to absorb everything that's up here.

We polled in 23 countries mostly in December through early January. The poll included questions that were done for the BBC World Service, some of which have been previously released, but the key findings that I'm going to be showing you today and being released for the first time.

First, we did find that there was a continuing negative feeling toward the U.S. Asked to evaluate a series of countries in terms of whether they were having a mainly positive or mainly negative influence in the world, we found that overall on average across the 23 countries, 47 percent said mainly negative, 38 percent mainly positive.

Fifteen countries had a majority or plurality expressing this negative perception, one was divided and at least six were positive.

Looking through the different regions, in North America, it's not surprising that Americans felt pretty good, but our neighbors Canada and Mexico are actually some of the most negative in terms of the perceptions of the U.S. Attitudes in South America are also quite cool.

In the Asia Pacific region it varies a lot. The Philippines is the most positive and India in various polls that we've done, both the Philippines and India are on the positive side. South Korea is fairly positive as well.

China is roughly divided, Australia leans negative, Indonesia leans negative. This was before the tsunami and there is some indication that there has been some warming since the tsunami. Japan lean negative but it somewhat noncommittal.

Europe is the region where we find the most negativity with the consistent exception of Poland. Poland has in various polls shown a positive attitude about the U.S. But Germany, Spain, France and so on lean clearly in the negative. France is not overwhelmingly negative. Actually, attitudes of the French toward the U.S. and the attitudes of Americans toward the French are pretty much the same.

Turkey and Russia are quite negative. Lebanon leans negative. But South Africa leans positive. In earlier polling that we've done, we found more positive attitudes toward the U.S. in Africa than in other regions.

Again to fill out this picture to give it more context, we asked the same question that you see here in relation to the five permanent members of the Security Council and to Europe as a whole. What we find here is that Europe gets overwhelmingly positive ratings, in 22 countries a plurality or in most cases a majority expresses a positive feeling.

The most popular country is France followed by Britain and then China, and then the U.S. and Russia are down there at the bottom. The U.S. lies slightly more on the negative, Russia has slightly fewer on the positive.

This is the country count. If you put it in terms of the average percent, on average 68 percent view Europe positively, 58 the French, 50 percent the British, 48 percent the China, 38 percent the U.S., 35 Russia. If you take the European countries out it only drops down a little bit to 63 percent on the positive toward Europe.

Here is what I think is probably the most significant question that we asked. We're going to go look in a little more detail at some of these specific countries in a little bit. First, the European influence, you can see that across the board you've got very numbers. Only India is down there at the bottom divided. Japan leans positive but somewhat noncommittal, but India was the only country that didn't have a clear positive direction or attitude toward Europe.

We asked about a number of possible future trends and asked please tell me if you see it mainly positive or mainly negative for Europe to become more influential than the United States in world affairs. This seemed like a really key question. Overall worldwide, 58 percent said that they would see it as mainly positive. If you take the Europeans out it's 53 percent. But 20 out of the 23 countries said that they would see it as positive. The U.S. and the Philippines were the only ones where you found a majority thinking that it would be mainly negative.

Going through the regions again, once again our neighbors Mexico and Canada particularly stand out as countries that would like to see Europe become more influential, 66 percent in Mexico, 63 percent in Canada.

Positive feelings about that prospect in South America. Generally throughout the Asia Pacific region China stands out in particular. Again the Philippines is a majority negative on that idea, and the Indians are divided.

Not surprisingly, the Europeans are pretty positive about the idea, even the Polish. The Russians are positive. The Turks lean positive, the Lebanese. And though the South Africans are not negative toward the U.S., they actually would prefer to see Europe be more influential.

We looked at educational variations on this question. People with higher levels of education were more prone to have this view that it would be good for Europe to be more influential.

We also looked at income. That followed basically the same pattern, those with higher levels of income were more likely to see that as a positive trend. And young people were considerably more likely than older people to see that as a positive trend.

The country that won the popularity contest was France. We pulled France out and that's true in all of these cases. On average, 58 percent saw France as positive. It was seen as positive in 21 countries. In the U.S., 52 percent see it as mainly negative.

Britain also does rather well. Eighteen countries see Britain as having a positive influence, on average 50 percent. The U.S. is right up there on the top on that.

Turning to China which I think is an interesting question because China obviously is another potential major power, and we found that overall views of China are pretty benign. Forty-eight percent see the influence of China as mainly positive. Fourteen countries view China

as having a positive influence in the world. In no case does a majority have a negative view of China.

Something that I think is particularly interesting is to see how China's neighbors in the Asia Pacific region view it and basically they view it quite positively. The Philippines while enthusiastic toward the U.S. is also quite positive toward China. Indonesia is positive. Even India its long-time competitor views it in positive terms. Australia views it positively. South Korea is divided. Japan, again, somewhat noncommittal.

The Europeans are not quite as enthusiastic about China, though they're generally not negative with the exception of Germany and to a slight extent Poland.

The key question I think is this one, do you see it as a positive future trend for China to become significantly more powerful economically than it is today? There was a fairly benign view of that prospect. Forty-nine percent see it as mainly positive. What's interesting, too, is that again India sees it as positive, and you do not seem to see a lot of fear out there of Chinese economic power. There is not a single country where a majority sees it as a negative possible future trend for China to continue to grow economically.

When asked about China becoming more powerful militarily, you get quite a different picture. Fifty-nine percent on average see it as mainly negative, that prospect. So there is really a very clear theme here, a real clear message to China which is we like you, we like your economic growth, we like being engaged with you, but don't even think of going there in terms of trying to make yourself a world power militarily.

This positive attitude toward soft power and a negative toward hard power is also reflected in the really poor ratings that Russia generally gets, overwhelmingly negative, but fairly low. Only five countries viewed it positively, 14 viewed it negatively.

One other player in the world picture that we did ask about was the United Nations. Arguably it's becoming a larger influence in world affairs, a bigger player, and the United Nations does extremely well. Basically every country thinks that it's having a mainly positive influence in the world, though on a percent basis it's 66 percent.

And when asked about the possible future trend of the United Nations becoming significantly more powerful in world affairs, we see very positive attitudes about that prospect, 64 percent endorsing that. In a poll of other questions that we asked that we released just recently we found very strong support for having new permanent members added to the Security Council. Perhaps most interesting, very strong support for giving the U.N. Security Council the power to override the veto of a permanent member. Both of these developments would enhance the power of the United Nations.

Interestingly, too, Americans endorsed this idea of giving the U.N. Security Council this override capacity even when it was pointed out explicitly that this would mean that the U.S. could be overridden.

So in summary, it does seem that not only is there right now a fairly negative feeling toward the U.S. historically in that direction, moving in that direction, it's historically high, but that there are correspondingly positive feelings appearing toward Europe, apparently more to Europe as a center of leadership. Also fairly positive feelings toward China. And again this theme of countries or regions or clusters that engage the world through soft power, through trade,

being viewed as a positive influence. So trade seems to buy you love, but not military power. Thank you.

MR. STEINBERG: Thank you, Steve. That's a fascinating portrait of a complex situation, and now to try to look behind the numbers to give some analysis about what it means we have two Senior Fellows here. Obviously the standing of Europe being very high, you must be well received in Europe and consistent with their own view about their expanding role in the world. How do you see this?

MR. GORDON: I'm sure it will be well received in Europe. I, like you, Jim, thought these numbers were fascinating. Striking I would say, but not surprising.

Striking, one has to admit. The numbers on France, I think a lot of Americans and in particular the administration will be struck that almost every country out there wants France to be more influential in the world than the United States, and only Americans viewed France negatively.

We're all obviously aware of the trends against the United States' popularity and role in the world, but to put it in such concrete terms I think will open a lot of eyes here, and that's what's particularly important about this.

Striking, yes. Surprising, no. Because I think as Steve said, this has been the trend. You mentioned the Pew polls. The German Marshall Fund Polls on Transatlantic Trends last year were similar. On "do you support a leadership role for the United States in the world?", in all of the main European countries at least that fell by more than 20 percent from 2002 to 2004. In the case of Germany, it fell by almost 30 points, do you support a strong leadership role for the United States.

So that has been the trend and I think these numbers only push it forward and hopefully to the extent that Americans really—the degree to which, it's no longer a given that United States leadership in the world is a good thing.

The reasons for this seem to me quite straightforward. It seems to me a mix of structural and stylistic things.

On the structural side it seems obvious. There is always resentment of power, and there is particularly resentment of great and unilateral power, and it so happens that the United States is the greatest and most unilateral power the world has seen for a very long time.

In military terms we all know the numbers of the U.S. spending more than everyone else put together and that number only goes up. But diplomatically, culturally, economically, it creates resentment, and the structural role of the United States as sole superpower responsible for all of these difficult things around the world in many cases lets other countries off the hook including in Europe and puts the United States in a position of having to deal with them sometimes in a manner that creates resentment.

Therefore I think a lot of people answer these questions on feeling. They're not scientifically examining the entire situation. It's a gut instinct when you answer a question. Immediately in people's minds I suspect the United States gets associated with especially at the time of the question we're occupying Iraq with military power, invasion, occupation, unilateralism, containment, sanction. This is what people think of and naturally that doesn't inspire in them a great desire to support U.S. leadership.

Whereas Europe in particular is associated with much more soft power that Jim referred to, integration, promoting democracy in Ukraine, development aid. And when people instinctively answer this question I think there is naturally a bias against the United States, and that's partly a result of just the way the international system is structured today.

I would acknowledge (if that's the right word) or say that it's more than that. It's also stylistic. It's not just the U.S. power in the world, but the way in which we've wielded it in recent years. I think the Bush Administration came to office with a particular style of leadership based on the power that said that we were going to be assertive. When they came to office they specifically distinguished themselves from the Clinton Administration which they argued was too deferential to allies, that the Clinton Administration was always wringing its hands and trying to put together coalitions and going to the U.N., and that was too hard, especially in a post-9/11 world.

So Bush came in and decided we weren't going to do war by committee like in Kosovo, we were going to set out our course of action, do it based on our power and expect others to follow. And we can debate the merits of the problems with that form of leadership, but we can probably agree that it does not necessarily leave those allies very happy.

I think that has been the case here. Bush policies, not just the resentment of U.S. power, but policies on abandoning the Kyoto climate change treaty, on refusing to join the International Criminal Court, unilateral sanctions, and obviously Iraq, that has left people with this feeling that we don't like that style of leadership and we would prefer a European style of leadership. Even if that's unfair given our responsibilities, I think that's the way people answer such questions.

I would add that I think it's relevant to discuss the point Jim made earlier about the timing of this poll, and I would at least wonder whether it might not be a bit better if the question were asked today than a couple of months ago. Again, if I'm right that people answer these—and Steve can tell us—he's more expert than I am about the way people handle polls—but if I'm right at all that it's sort of instinctive and what you're thinking about at the time back in November-December, there was still an awful lot of uncertainty in Iraq. The security situation was worse than it is today. We hadn't had the elections, and it wasn't clear we were going to have the elections. There was a debate about whether to even have them or to withdraw. It was a lot more negativity about Bush and American foreign policy than there might be today after the Iraqi elections went better than most people thought and after some other positive developments in the Middle East—elections in the Palestinian Authority, some positive political change in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon. Maybe the feelings about U.S. leadership would be a little bit better now than then, and also on the point again that Jim referred to about the charm offensive of the Bush Administration; the trip to Europe by Secretary Rice and the President and what seemed to be a sincere desire to reach out, put the past differences behind us, and work together.

I had been—still am—a little bit skeptical about that. Indeed, I was I think sitting in this chair on the day before the Bush trip saying that diplomacy is fine, but you have to do more, and you have to follow it up with policies, and nice words aren't going to nearly do enough to change the impressions of the United States. I still think that, but I think we have to acknowledge that this charm offensive has been substantive. It has been apparently sincere. The trip was well welcomed.

The Administration has also gotten lucky maybe with some positive developments around the trip, but they've also done a few things to show that they're sincere. I mean just, for

example, on the Iran issue, where I think we were all skeptical at the time they were going to go to Europe, but they weren't going to do anything that the Europeans wanted, what happened there seemed to be a genuine desire to show a new willingness to listen. Bush went to Europe saying we're not going to do anything different about Iran. We're right, and we're not going to reward bad behavior.

Then he came back. They talked about it. He was apparently impressed by the arguments he heard in Europe, and they changed the policy. Again, we can say it's just tactics. They're not sincere, but it sure looked like an attempt to soften the image of the United States and give the impression that we were willing to listen.

Similar with the International Criminal Court. The U.N. just passed a Sudan resolution with a reference to the International Criminal Court, which we have been fighting ideologically for four years. Now, you can say well, that's just obvious and they should have done it a long time ago, but the point is still that probably softens our image or at least leaves it neutral compared to if we had put our foot down and blocked a resolution that referred to the ICC.

So I do wonder at least, and I hope we'll talk a bit about this, maybe some of the recent—most recent—developments would take a bit of the edge off of the numbers here, though probably not really change the trend. By the way, you know, there are always ups and downs in these things. I think after the Kosovo War, support for U.S. leadership or maybe I should say during the Kosovo War, support for U.S. leadership also declined. People weren't happy we were associated with bombing, casualties, unilateralism, but then after things turned a bit better, Milosevic fell, and it worked out all right. The numbers went back up again, so naturally it depends. There's an ebb and flow here. Maybe this poll was taken at the worst possible time for the United States, and that's reflected.

That slight caveat aside, it seems to me the trend is quite clear and this only underscores how bad it really is in the world.

I'll just add one further point on this trend, at the anecdotal level. I have my own sort of unscientific poll. It's not nearly as professional as this, but I think it's quite relevant to this discussion.

I have, for a number of years, more than 10 in fact, taught a course on international politics at NSEAD, this business school outside of Paris. And the interesting thing about that is that the participants come from all over the world—China, India, Japan, Latin America, Europe, United States, Canada. And it's like a hundred and fifty people. And when we talk about U.S. power, as we have over the years, there's always a trend in the discussion where I ask how much people resent the United States. Is the U.S. too strong? And the instinctive answer, even years ago, was always yes. The U.S. is a bully. It's too strong. The world will be better for more multilateral. That's always the first answer, and all the hands go up like that.

Then you start the discussion, and if I would ask, well that's fair enough, but if you think about it compared to other historical powers that have had the power of the United States, how does the United States rate in terms of how it manages the world? And they acknowledge that maybe the U.S. is better than past colonial powers.

And then you say well, what other country in the world would you want to have the power that the U.S. has today? I mean how would you feel in the world if today other countries

were as powerful as the United States? Would they wield that power as benignly as the U.S.? Would you want China to be that powerful? Would you want Germany to be it? France?

And in the course of the discussion, they come around to acknowledge that, maybe for a country as powerful as the United States, it's not so bad or threatening after all. That has been the pattern for the past 10 years.

Well, I asked that same question or had that same discussion this year, in January, and I have to say it was a very different discussion. It started the same way, with resentment of U.S. power and hegemony and domination, but then when I would turn to the bit that was supposed to change their mind and say, well, you know, which other country in the world would you want to be as powerful as the United States? China? And they would say, yeah, we'd take China. Germany? Yeah, Germany would be good. Germany is fine. France? Yeah, that would be good. And really it was almost to the point that they didn't even get the exercise, where they were supposed to realize that we're actually pretty nice for a big power. They were just looking at me, like, well, of course, we'd rather have those countries more powerful than the United States.

So, again, that's not very scientific, but I left that feeling or being even more sure, and we all have our own anecdotal experiences, that there really is a trend going on.

Last point on simply why it matters. It matters because, you know, in international relations theory terms, people always talk about balancing the great power or bandwagoning with the great power. What do other countries do when you're powerful? Do they get on board and follow your power, as I think we have long hoped and expected, or do they try to balance you?

And I think we now have to start worrying about balancing. This doesn't matter. These poll numbers don't matter, because we want people to like us and it's better to be liked. You know, on balance, we'd probably prefer that. But that doesn't really matter. It matters because you want people to join you and support you and add legitimacy to what you do and give material resources and all of that. And that's where I think we have to worry if the trend continues. I think you already see a little bit of it in Europe. If the Bush assumption in 2001 was that we were powerful. We were just going to act and they were going to follow along, I think there's been a little bit of balancing there. On, you know, climate change, we said the treaty was dead. They went and ratified and implemented it.

International Criminal Court. We said get rid of it. They put it into being, and now it exists today.

Iraq. We said we're doing it. You're going to come along. A lot of them said no, we're not coming along or not in great degree.

Iran. We said isolate them, cut them off, don't talk to these guys. They started a diplomatic negotiation that we've been obliged to follow along.

China arms embargo. We said this is a terrible idea. They said we're doing it.

There just seems to be a trend even on policies where, because we're unpopular, it's hard for democratic leaders, even if those leaders might appreciate our leadership, to get on board. When their populations, to the degree that we saw in this poll, don't welcome U.S. leadership, it just makes it hard for these leaders to back the United States. And even the trend in the leaders—three or four years ago, we had more friends. Aznar in Spain. Now we have the

opposite situation in Spain. It's harder for Blair to back us now then it was before. It's harder for Berlusconi, and so on and so on.

So it matters not just because you'd rather be liked than not liked. It matters because if the trend continues, it will be much more difficult for the United States to win friends and allies in the world, and that, to pull it back to the beginning, is what I think the Bush Administration has realized and explains why it's going much more out of its way now to try to change these trends than it was before.

MR. STEINBERG: Jeff?

AMBASSADOR BADER: Thank you, Jim. I think I'll talk about—I won't go through the numbers, which Steve has done very thoroughly and very well. But let me give you some impressions about what they mean.

First let me start with China and the view of China that emerges in these numbers.

As Steve says, the view is generally of a benign and positive China, with the exception of I think the U.S., Japan, and Germany are the ones that leap out as not viewing China benignly. There are some real surprises. I think India. I think the single most stunning number in this poll. Indonesia is a country with historic resentments of China. Philippines just had incidents at sea with China in the last few years.

Why are the attitudes in Asia seemingly positive? I think there are a number of factors. The first one, the most important one, as Steve alluded to, is China's economic rise. If you look at the countries in the region, there are—something that Americans are not so much focused on is the degree to which the region is now economically integrated. The economies of Korea, of Japan, of Taiwan, of Southeast Asia are all tied thoroughly, tightly with China. China has become the biggest export market for many of these countries. And so the, you know, that is the main factor contributing to positive attitude towards China.

China has been negotiating free trade agreements with all the countries in the region, with Southeast Asia. They've had an increasingly deft diplomacy, both politically and economically with the countries in the region.

They've taken steps to resolve all their border disputes with Russia, with India, with Vietnam, with everyone except Japan. I'll come back to Japan later.

The historic fear of the Chinese in the region—historic fear based on the notion that the Chinese, ethnic Chinese, are fifth column in countries in Southeast Asia or the Chinese, ethnic Chinese dominant the economy, in Southeast Asia. The Chinese have taken major steps in the last couple decades to diminish that concern, diminish that fear to acknowledge that Chinese, wherever they are, are citizens of the country where they happen to be and by not using Chinese as fifth columns they were under Mao in the Mao period.

Finally, I think comparing China with the United States, the United States has always been something of a missionary power. We have interests. We also have values. And we seek to project and export both. At the moment, the values part of the equation is higher since President Bush's inaugural speech.

The Chinese do not seek to export values. They have not done so—or their culture, frankly. I mean in the—you have to go back many dynasties to a period when China sought to export its culture and its values. China has a—how should I say—a value neutral approach to

countries around the world. And while, from our perspective, we see the Chinese going—strengthening relations with countries like Burma, with the Sudan, with Zimbabwe, and we see this as immoral, if not amoral. In much of the world, that is viewed as respect for differing social systems.

One other factor I'd like to just mention on the Asian reaction to China. It was quite striking the positive numbers in India, Indonesia, and the Philippines, where one would not have expected it.

In addition to the economic factor, I think also we're beginning to see the rise of the kind of incipient I guess I'd call pan-Asianism, which, a few years ago, scholars would tell us did not exist. The distinction between Europe and Asia in the minds of many analysts before was the, if you will, the common culture on the common institutions that Europe had developed in the last 50 years; whereas, Asia was viewed as a series of distinct and separate countries that had nothing in common and lot to divide them.

But I think in the last few years, I think that these numbers may reflect a sense of kind of a pan-Asian pride. I wouldn't overdo this. I think it's still limited, but I think it is real, particularly with a lot of the institutions that have been developed in the region. You now have this so-called ASEAN Plus Three grouping, where the 10 countries of ASEAN, plus the heads of state of Korea, Japan, and China, meet every year. As I say, you've got these at the summit level, at the head of state level, you have these free trade agreements proliferating all over the region. You have China playing a larger role diplomatically in things like the Korea talks. So I think you do have this sense of kind of a common Asian heritage.

A second observation is the Chinese view of the United States, and that number was I think accurately reflects the reality. The numbers were pretty evenly divided. Interestingly, they kind of mirror imaged each other. I guess our view of China is slightly more negative, but they're in the same ballpark.

I think fundamentally, at the core, China is not an anti-American country. If you spend any time in China, you go around China, talk to average Chinese, you don't get the sense of hostility to the United States that you run into in many parts of the world. I think that the negative number here is not a profoundly deep one. It does not represent kind of intense feeling.

The reasons for the negative views I think are number one is Taiwan. The U.S. is viewed as the chief obstacle to reunification of China. This, of course, is not new. This has been ongoing since 1950.

Secondly, a related sense that the U.S. is the principal factor constraining China's rise to great and China's rise as a power, and they have a lot of evidence they can point to just in the last few months to feed that theory, which I think actually does—is very extensively believed in China. They can just look at the U.S. attempt to postpone the lifting of the EU arms embargo. They point to the U.S. agreement with Japan to express concern over the future means of resolution to the Taiwan issue. So there is that sense.

On the positive side, I think that China and the average Chinese—this sounds somewhat paradoxical perhaps—but I think that China and the U.S. share a tremendous amount culturally and in terms of their vision of the future of their countries. Both the United States and China—Americans and Chinese have tremendous confidence in science, technology, progress, education—a sense that the future belongs to our countries so long as we continue working hard

and educating ourselves. I think that—one issue that's always struck me—it's kind of the biotechnology issue, where you have a tremendous divide between U.S. and Europe. You don't have any such divide between Americans and Chinese, where there is a basic feeling of confidence.

Globalization generally. The Chinese have benefited more from globalization than any country in the world arguably, except perhaps the United States. There's a great comfort with globalization. You don't have the kind of globalization debate going on in China that you have absolutely in the Islamic world and I think even more intensely in Europe than you have in the United States.

Third observation on China. I'll segue to the rest of Asia in just a moment. But the numbers on attitudes towards Europe. I don't think that there was really fundamentally a deep and profound admiration, respect and warmth towards Europe in China. I think that number really reflects a desire of China to see U.S. power in the world counterbalanced by something. And Europe is the most likely possibility aside from China itself. So I think if one saw Europe rising, I think that that number would be lower.

The closest thing to an exception in Chinese attitudes towards Europe I noticed was unsurprisingly their attitude towards Britain, which was much more mixed. And that's largely a function of the historic role of Britain, particularly in Hong Kong, but also elsewhere and concessions in China.

One brief word about polling in China, which I think is probably a surprise to many of us, the fact that there are even polls in China. In the last 15 years, polling has become more extensive in China. Gallup is in China. Some of the universities are conducting polls. Some of the newspapers are conducting polls.

I think it all started—the cutting edge in this was basically business and market—interest in marketing information, and that's how it kind of—polling got its nose onto the tent in China. Companies were allowed to conduct marketing surveys about whether you like brand X or brand Y; whether you like foreign products or domestic products. And gradually the orbit of what can be polled has expanded to more and more political subjects.

That said, you know, polling is still a more—is newer to China. The Chinese I think are, because of their political system, are wary—are somewhat wary about pollsters, and I'm not sure that the Chinese yet are prepared to use polls the way Americans do, which is to make a statement of anger, resentment, hostility to this or that. The numbers in the Chinese polls I know tend to be somewhat high across the board, because I think a sense on the part of average Chinese that yes, tends to be a good answer to pretty much any question.

Finally, Asian views of the United States that emerge in this poll.

It's very striking that India and the Philippines had highly positive views of the United States, unlike countries in Europe or even Australia. I think that those two it's clearly a reflection of the War on Terror and a sense in both countries that they are under threat from Islamist terrorism. In India, the problems in Kashmir. The attack on the Parliament. The tensions with Pakistan. In the case of the Philippines, Abu Sayef and Al-Qaeda activities and decades long fighting of an Islamic insurgency.

The Indonesian negative views about the United States are not at all surprising. In fact, the numbers are somewhat better than the Pew numbers, which a year or two ago, which were

really appalling. That obviously is largely a function of—it's not so much a function of U.S. policy towards Indonesia or the region. It has do with U.S. policy in the Middle East, the Israel-Palestine issue that has stagnated for some time or at least until recently, the U.S. intervention in Iraq, Indonesia is the largest Islamic country in the world. And Islamic issues from other parts of the world are, as it were, imported into Indonesia, and the Indonesian reaction is largely to that.

The numbers in South Korea, I noticed were somewhat mixed, but slightly positive towards the U.S. I think that reflects a generally closely divided electorate in South Korea in a country that is basically a fairly mature democracy at this point. There's unease about U.S. policy towards North Korea and whether the U.S. is showing sufficient flexibility in trying to resolve the nuclear issue.

On the other hand, there is concern about their neighbors to the North and I think that those two concerns put you in either one camp or the other in South Korea, and the numbers to the U.S. largely reflect that.

Last observation on the Asian numbers and Asian attitudes towards the United States. There's this kind of a dichotomy. On the one hand, Asians I think are concerned that they see a U.S. policy that in the last few years that's been in their view excessively focused on the Middle East, you know, in particular the Iraq situation.

They don't—Asians generally want to see the United States engaged in their region, at a minimum, as a balance to historic powers in the region, like Japan and China. They don't like our policies in the Middle East. They want us to be more engaged in Asia, and I think the numbers reflect that in a curious way.

Let's see. One other. Well, I think I'll stop right here.

MR. STEINBERG: Thanks, Dr. Bader. Let me just add a few observations and a couple of questions before we turn to the audience.

First, I would say if there's a Karen Hughes in China, she is looking at these polls and saying peaceful rise is probably a pretty good slogan for China in its development. I was very struck, Steve, by the very, very broad willingness to take a rise in China as long as it's not a military China, and Jeff commented on that. The fact that this is what we intended to see as sort of a threatening economic development in many cases is not seen that way, particularly in Asia. Although surprisingly not heavily seen that in the United States, either. I think that was one of the striking things in your poll is that there was perhaps more support and more willingness than I would have expected in the U.S. to see to China playing a greater economic role.

On the United States, I thought that the most striking number in this whole poll since Doug was here talking about the United States is the fact that 34 percent of Americans want Europe to be more influential than the United States. I'd be curious, Steve, if you have any observations about that. I am not surprised that Americans have a—at least a third of Americans have a positive view about Europe, but I guess I thought American nationalism would have given an extremely low number to the answer, thinking that other countries should be more influential than us in the world, and I'd be curious if you have any thoughts about whether that's just a kind of an unusual statistical phenomenon or whether it represents something significant in the American public itself. It's more than just residual isolationism that you always find a certain small percent of Americans who want us to follow in more John Adams-ish foreign policy.

On India, just a few words, because I've just come back from India. I'm actually a little less surprised than my colleagues about the positive views in India towards China for a number of reasons.

First, although there obviously has been conflict, including military conflict in recent times, I think that there is—that we underestimate a little bit about the sense of solidarity, particularly among sort of ordinary Indians as a kind of two developing countries in the face of the developed world in the sense that India and China can rise together. And I think there's been skillful diplomacy by leaders in both India and China to nurture that.

Right after the Indian nuclear tests, when the Indian Defense Minister basically tried to blame it on China, it had no traction at all in India. And that argument was dropped. The principal negative feelings about China and India now have to do with China's support for Pakistan, which is I think still relevant. But I think there is a real sense that India and China are basically trying to tread the same path together, and that there is a sense of solidarity there.

What is slightly more surprising to me on a positive note is the positive view towards the United States, which I think has grown significantly in recent years; that the sense of the United States now being supportive of India's rise is growing in India, and so you have this very I think good phenomenon in terms of long-term policy for the region of the Indians feeling positive both towards China and the United States, which I think is the ideal situation for long-term stability in the region.

On Europe, I think it's also striking the relatively cool attitudes towards China compared to the rest of the world. And as the Europeans struggle with the issue of the arms embargo, it's probably not an accident that the European Parliament, for example, has been more negative about lifting the arms embargo than European leaders. And I do think it reflects greater wariness in the European public about China than the rather enthusiastic pursuit of China that its leaders have been showing.

And finally, just a word on Japan and a question about Japan. What was striking to me about this, and maybe both Steve and Jeff can comment, is the Japanese seem quite indecisive about most of these things, and I don't whether that's a function of how polls operate in Japan. But on one thing, they weren't indecisive, which was China's military rise, where you got—so it's not like people just didn't want to play. I mean you had 81 percent of people having an opinion on that or 80 some percent, with obviously an overwhelming Japanese negative view about China's military rise.

But because of the indecisiveness, it' hard to know what to make of it, but the attitudes towards the United States were quite lukewarm in this poll, quite lukewarm for a lot of things in Japan, but I thought that was particularly striking that the numbers, at least for people who responded, were actually slightly less positive than in South Korea, which also surprised me. Obviously, Iraq is a factor, but I would not have expected it to be quite that much of a factor.

So let me invite my colleagues to reflect on any of those comments, and then we'll turn to the audience.

MR. KULL: Well, just a few comments. One on the question of stability of these attitudes. There's sometimes a tendency to assume that these attitudes just go up and down, and Condi Rice seems kind of nice, so I think my view of America is going to change now. And, while all of those things contribute a bit, they don't move that easily. They move more

gradually. Overall, public opinion is considerably more stable than people assume, and there are a lot of factors that enter into it. So I wouldn't expect to see dramatic shifts in the short run.

About the 34 percent of Americans who thought it would be good for Europe to be more influential, well, I think to some extent, it reflects a division in the American public about the Bush foreign policy, and we are right now a very divided country along partisan lines. So there's a—those who are uncomfortable with our current foreign policy may say, you know, let's see what Europe can do.

There's another aspect. There's a strong feeling in the general public, not just some minority, that the U.S. plays the role of world policeman more than it should be; that the U.S. has been the hegemon too much. And there's an element of burden in that. Why are we always out front? Why are we always carrying the burden? And also there are questions about whether it's legitimate, and so the idea that large majorities of the public are always drawn to the idea of a more multilateral approach, working together with other countries, the U.S. doing it's part, together with other countries and so on. And do the idea of Europe becoming more powerful is something that polls have shown for some time that Americans feel pretty positively about. So you present, yeah, the notion of Europe becoming even more powerful than the U.S. Some people feel so strongly about that there going to say, yeah, even if it's more powerful, I'm going to push that button because I really want to see that happen. Again, moving toward—because they like the idea of a new equilibrium. They think that the balancing dynamic is probably a good thing—more burden sharing, more legitimacy.

The Japanese remember there have been all the incidents with the U.S. servicemen that have had pretty significant impact. I don't know for sure that that's had a—that that is completely generalized to U.S. influence in the world, but I think there are lot of—when something like that happens, it enhances a certain image of the U.S. as something of a bully and so that is very present in the Japanese public and in these incidents have enhanced that.

AMBASSADOR BADER: You know, okay, Jim, three points that you mentioned. India attitudes toward U.S.; India-China; and Japan. Just take them one at a time.

India-U.S. I think why the numbers were as high as they were I think it's two things. Number one, as I mentioned, I think the sense that we're on the same side in the War on Terror and secondly, you know, the end of the Cold War. If you had taken these same polls 15 years ago, you would have seen the U.S. numbers much, much different, much more negative because the U.S. was seen as aligned with China, Pakistan against a Russia-India axis. That's gone. That's history. And that seems to be fading from Indian consciousness.

On India-China, I am struck by the number frankly. I mean I—my last act in government, I was involved in China's succession to the World Trade Organization, and, although it appeared that the United States was the last hold out. In fact, we were not. It was the Indians who were doing frankly everything they could to try to slow down China's entry, in part because they were concerned about Chinese economic competition, in part because I think they were concerned about the appearance of Chinese competition for leadership of the non-aligned movement of the group of 77, and so China is a threat in that regard.

I remember at the time, I guess when Prime Minister Rajpa [ph.] visited the U.S. and spent his entire time when he met with the President complaining about China, about Chinese companies selling cheap goods into India, Chinese companies unwilling to invest in China—in

India, excuse me. I think that again these numbers probably looked different a few years ago, and I think it's quite striking how positive they are now, and I think it attests to the—both to the deftness of Chinese diplomacy and to the tremendous rising economic interdependence and Indian exports to China, which are a surprise to many Indians.

I think on Japan—I should have mentioned that earlier. That is certainly one of the most striking numbers, I think that it was an 81 to three number about attitudes about China's military rise. I was in Japan a couple of months ago at the time when this Chinese submarine appeared in Japanese waters. The Chinese expressed regret, said it was an accident. No one in Japan believed it was an accident. It came after a series of episodes along the midline and the East China Sea where Chinese and Japanese ships exploring for energy deposits nearly bumped into each other and were shadowed by naval vessels from the respective sides. The feeling—Chinese have. If you took polls in China about Japan for the last 50 years, you'd see terrible numbers pretty consistently. They wouldn't vary.

But the numbers in Japan I think are changing, and attitudes in Japan are changing significantly in a negative direction in the last few years. And what I heard over and over in Japan was the relationship is warm economically, cold politically. And I think that accounts for some of them ambivalence that Jim referred to—a sense that Japan has gotten out of its 10-year economic slump in large part because of China and because of Japanese investments in the mainland that has helped boom—helped its economic recovery.

But more generally, there is considerable unease about China's rise in Japan that produces these kinds of numbers.

MR. GORDON: Yeah, just one quick point on the question of stability of numbers and the policy relevance. Steve is obviously right that people aren't waiting for the six o'clock news before they decide what they think of America that day. And even a trip by the President is probably unlikely to have a significant effect.

The thing that I was trying to point to that I think could be more significant over time is the question of whether Bush policies are leading in the long run to a more positive outcome. And I think it's worth noting that Europeans seem over the past two months to at least be willing to entertain that idea. There have been a spate of articles in Europe under the vague headline, you know, was Bush right after all. There has been a spate of articles here on that, too.

But, you know, De Spiegel in Germany did a whole long piece on, you know, after these elections—Afghanistan, Iraq, Palestine, and other developments in the Middle East—saying, you know, maybe he actually had it right. Even Le Monde had an editorial with the same sort of headline—was Bush right? Not conceding, but starting to say well, maybe this is going to be right in the long run.

That's the sort of—and that feeds back into our policy process because that's precisely the assumption of if you want to call them the unilateralists, where you don't judge whether you should pursue a policy based on the reaction to it, you know, in Europe or anywhere else. You know you're right. You pursue it to the end. That, looking backward, is a vision of the Cold War and how we won it. In the '80s, we didn't waiver and we didn't say boy, the Europeans are protesting. They don't like us. Maybe we should change our policies. We stayed the course, and ultimately they came around. And that was the logic going into Iraq, too. It doesn't matter if they don't like it. We're right. We'll prove we're right. And they'll come around.

And so on one hand, I think the Bush Administration is thinking boy, we really need to do more to please these people because we're so unpopular we're not getting help. On the other hand, as they see them start to waiver and maybe our policies are going to work, it pushes them to just move forward and do it the way we planned to do it in the first place.

MR. STEINBERG: Okay. Let's turn to you all. And I think there's a microphone. Yes, there is. So I'll start all the way in the back with Adriana.

MS. Albuquerque: Hi. Adriana—oh, I'm sorry. Adriana Albuquerque, and I'm with the Brookings Institution. Thanks for a very excellent presentation. I have two questions to Mr. Kull about methodology. First of all, how did you pick your 23 countries that you did the polling in? And second how do you explain—what's the implication on the sample sizes of each country, because I noticed that, for instance, you interviewed 1,000 people in India and also 1,000 in Lebanon, and obviously the populations in those countries are very different. Thank you.

MR. KULL: On the last one, that has to do with the vagaries of sampling. You tend to think that a large country needs a bigger sample than a small country, but that's not really how sampling works. The margin of error is really very—pretty much the same, depending upon the size of the country.

As for the choice of the countries, there was an effort to get all the major countries and then beyond that, it's a function of whether we felt we had a good capacity in that country, whether we had a good partner. GlobeScan has developed a kind of network of partners working in countries over the years, and you need to, you know, have confidence in who you're working with. And so it's a, you know, a combination of those factors. Nothing terribly systematic except again trying to get all of them—the countries and at least one country in each region.

MR. STEINBERG: Steve, let me just ask you a little further on that, and perhaps the answer is you didn't want to compete with our good friend and fellow Brookingsite, Shibley Telhami, but the one region which is sort of conspicuously not present is the Middle East. And we know the difficulties of polling in the Middle East, but Shibley obviously has done a lot, and I just wondered what was your thinking in terms of not going into more—I mean, Lebanon is not exactly reflective of any of the significant Middle Eastern Arab or Islamic countries.

MR. KULL: Right. That's a function of again the network that GlobeScan had developed. It is an area that we're going to be working in more in the future. In fact, we have a rather large project in front of us that will be looking at all of these questions. But for this poll, we were not—it wasn't set up in a way that we were able to do that. I agree it would be nice if we had more information there. If we did, all those numbers would be—the average numbers would even look more negative and even more pronounced than those.

MR. STEINBERG: And as I said, Shibley has obviously done some, but one would be one is confident that the numbers towards the United States would be negative. It would be interesting on France and Europe how this is perceived.

MR. KULL: Right. Right.

MR. STEINBERG: Could you just wait for your microphone?

MR. RUKHOLDER: I want to thank you for doing this. I just have a 30-second brief for polling. My name is Richard Rukholder [ph.], and I'm Director of International Polling at

Gallup, and for the last 15 years we've been polling in China. And I want to underscore what Ambassador Bader said and even—I've got here. I was reading—having breakfast in Beijing two weeks ago and picked up your poll, which was in the local press. So polls are becoming part of the—and I have it with me. Not only are polls becoming part of the landscape there, and they get into that little slippery slope that you mentioned precisely through market research, but what I've seen since our polling there in '94 has been a real increase in candor in the responses we've got from respondents on sensitive issues. We now ask satisfaction with various aspects of life. Fourteen or fifteen areas. Okay. I'll keep this brief. And what we see is coincident with an actual rise in affluence and with people's real standards of living, we see a greater willingness to express dissatisfaction with certain aspects of life in the poll. When we first asked the question, we had a five-point scale, which was are you very satisfied, somewhat satisfied, neither, nor, and so on down line, we found everybody went for that soft option. So the second time, in '97, when we did it, we kicked out the soft option and lo and behold we saw there are probably five of the 13 measures where people are preponderantly dissatisfied in some points with regard to their own savings and their own education if they're older folks. Overwhelming numbers are dissatisfied, highly dissatisfied.

And finally, in the verbatims, when you ask them what's the most important thing that could improve your life, I just finished writing up 10,000 verbatims—I mean a compendium of those. And the themes that come out. The number of expressions of dissatisfaction with local government, not national government, but my house is going to be destroyed, and I'm not going to be compensated. The local officials tax our peasants too much. We're not able to live on our own land. We don't have any property. I was stunned by the candor in the verbatims.

One guy's response was what's the single best thing you could do to improve your life? He said kill all the corrupt officials.

Now, the fact that someone would say that in a poll is a sign of tremendous change. And clearly, he's talking about local officials. So anyway, that's just my brief on polling. Congratulations for doing this, and, as I said, I first learned of it when I read it in Beijing in the local press, and there were three other articles in the paper that day of polls done by Chinese entities that were being reported in the press as well. So that's not a question, but thank you.

MR. STEINBERG: Jeff, you have any comments on that?

AMBASSADOR BADER: Well, I mean that's tremendously interesting. That's—

MR. KULL: I would just say that if our colleague, Carol Graham [ph.] were here, she would probably attribute those results in part to increased candor, but in part to her own research on the politics of happiness, which suggests that precisely that in these circumstances that dissatisfaction tends to go up.

MR. RUKHOLDER: And the expectations are rising even faster. If you say, where do you expect to be, it's just going up.

MR. STEINBERG: Why don't we just keep it over here?

MR. : I'm from China Radio International, and I totally agree with your judgments and views—like the Chinese views and American views upon each country, upon each other.

One more point probably like if you ask a question like of the Chinese people which country, which people you like most? You give them a list, like Americans, Japanese, and the Europeans. Probably Americans will top the list. We're that top choice.

I think one reason is that like they have the influence of the Hollywood movies and Microsoft and Wal-Mart. And also Chinese people are clearly understanding that the U.S. is the only country that never invaded China like at the end of the Tseng [ph.] Dynasty, more than 100 years ago. Most of the western powers have invaded China, and left us a very poor impression actually.

But my question is, however, there is increasing insecurity about like in the Chinese mind. I mean, they are thinking about whether the United States is taking China as another enemy, like they treated the Soviet Union, former Soviet Union; whether the United States is pursuing a policy of containment against China, like you have an increasing alliance with Japan, and you have expressed your concern about the Taiwan issue, and also Dr. Rice has been to India, you know, trying to help India to become a global leader. Well, this is not something concerning the Chinese mind, but the aim is to counterbalance China's influence. That's really a very bad influence. I mean the Chinese people are worried, and the Chinese media. If you have read the Chinese articles, they are much concerned about the U.S. policy now. It was a comment to Mr. Bader.

AMBASSADOR BADER: I think you've summarized the factors and the attitudes very well. I mean in the mid 1990s, there was a large literature in China and in the U.S. to the effect that the U.S. was seeking to contain China. That I think was clearly not our policy at the time, because China—there wasn't much reason to contain China. It was not very strong. It didn't look to be a significant factor in the global scene for some years to come. I mean that's changed dramatically in the last seven or eight years. Go back to the 1970s, when they started dealing with China. One of our—I think it was Vice President Mondale said that we favored the development of a strong China. You wouldn't hear an American official use that term now because China is now strong. Growing military expenditures increasing 10 to 15 percent a year. I think you've cited exactly the right signs out there that the Chinese are connecting the dots on—the U.S.-Japan agreement on peaceful resolution of Taiwan, the arms embargo, Condi Rice's visit to India. Look, I mean, the United States frankly is looking to develop and shore up its relations throughout the region and to persuade the countries of the region that we're going to continue to be a major player in Asia and part of that has to do with China. There's no question. I think that's something short of endorsement of a policy of containment. The Administration has not articulated such a policy, but, you know, certainly since 1995, 1996, since the Taiwan Strait tensions, there has been more and more—how shall we say—robust scenario planning in the Pentagon about possible contingencies there. It was regarded as impossible before 1995, and now it's regarded as a real possibility. So one understands the attitudes that you're reflecting. I wouldn't say that there is a settled view in the United States that China is a rising power that must be cut down to size. That is not I would say a consensus view in the United States. But I think you are going to see in the next 10 years the debate on China revolve around two issues—China's increasing military strength and China's increased economic power. And these two things are going to come together in a lot of people's minds, and it's a debate that's unresolved frankly.

MR. KULL: On this issue about feelings toward the American people, there is data showing that people around the world tend to feel better toward the American people than

toward the American government or the U.S. foreign policy. There are some signs recently, though, that that may be eroding; that the American people are, to some extent, being blamed. After all, they reelected President Bush, and so they have some responsibility for the foreign policy.

There's also a positive feeling about U.S. technology, an admiration of American technology. Somewhat an ambivalence about American cultural products, though. I mean, intrigued by them, but also feeling dominated by them. So all of those go into the mix. I think the numbers that we're looking at today, though, are primarily about U.S. influence, the action of the U.S. government.

I think it's also important to remember that when we talk about other countries and the polling numbers that governments are not always reflective of public opinion; that there are tremendous number of discrepancies in the U.S. between American public opinion and U.S. foreign policy across administrations. So even in democracies, we don't have a direct correspondence and might have less so in other countries.

In general, governments tend to approach problems more from a nation-state perspective in terms of the interests of the nation-state, while publics are not as attuned to that goal. The whole notion of national interests is not necessarily as compelling a framework to general publics.

So you could have a conflict between India and China over trade issues that really kind of polarize the response, but ask the people how they feel about each other and find a fair amount of warmth. That wouldn't really be contradictory.

MR. STEINBERG: Stay right here.

MR. TANNER: Hello. I'm Scott Tanner. I'm a China analyst at the Rand Corporation. I had a question for Ambassador Bader about some of the data regarding South Korean attitudes on the rise of China, particularly the military—China's military rise to follow on these questions here.

I wasn't at all surprised at the relatively equal split on China's rise generally. I was a little bit surprised that there wasn't more of a negative feeling regarding China's military rise, and just to put it in perspective. Yes—by the way, I don't have the data. I seem to recall it was about a 55-35 negative split, which is negative. But it isn't even in the ballpark with the numbers on Japan. And I wanted to ask you a couple of questions about that.

AMBASSADOR BADER: India was even positive about it. That was one of the most remarkable findings.

MR. TANNER: Yeah. I wanted to ask you to what you attribute that only moderate concern, which certainly there's a gap between the attitudes in Japan and a gap with the attitudes in a lot of the current administration. Do you attribute that to shortcomings in American diplomacy? A South Korean concern—greater concern over a possible rise of Japan? The overall improvement in their relationship, both culturally and in terms of trade? How do you see that?

AMBASSADOR BADER: Well, it is a mixture of factors on both sides. I was actually expecting slightly more positive attitudes towards China in the Korean numbers than we saw. And I think those numbers might have been more positive a year ago before this recent publicity

over the dispute over the status of the Cogorio [ph.] Kingdom in Tang Dynasty. For those of you who haven't been following this rather obscure arcane academic debate, the Chinese Academy of Social Science has published a map of the Cogorio Kingdom in—I don't know—in the early Tang Dynasty, seventh, eighth century, showing it as a tributary state or as a part of China. And this got enormous publicity in Korea—highly negative, of course. And it even triggered Pyongyang to make some nasty statements about the Chinese.

I think that that—I think there was a fairly uniformly positive feeling about China before that in terms of its role in facilitating the—as convener of the six-party talks and its—the overwhelming economic interdependence that the two countries have developed in the last decade. I think that that served as kind of a reminder to Korea that they do have some historic problems with China that could come back. I think you're right to single out the Japan peace. I think that Korea has traditionally, you know, has tilted toward—you know, they find themselves in between these two giants, a place where countries, you know, it's akin to Poland one would say—a place where countries don't like to be. And they have tended to tilt towards China as the defense against Japan. And that may account for some of the split in the numbers.

I would just reiterate what I said earlier that I think that U.S. policy has probably—washes over to all the numbers, including the number towards China. I think there is very substantial unease about U.S. policy towards North Korea, and whether we are seeking ultimately a confrontation, regime change, implosion in the North that would—in South Korea's view be enormously dangerous to its future. And I think that that—I think that's driving all the numbers.

MR. STEINBERG: Okay. There's a woman in the middle there. Right there. Yeah. There you go.

MS. DOLHEIM: Hello. My name is Ingrid Dolheim [ph.] with a Dutch think tank, as a China specialist, the Klingauer [ph.] Institute, and I have a question for Ambassador Bader.

And it is don't you think that the benign view of China in the world, and especially in Asia, goes to show that China is very successful in the realm of public diplomacy? It's a fairly new field for the Chinese, but it seems to me that they are able to create a very positive image of themselves and draw the attention away of their problematic areas. I would like to hear your view on that.

AMBASSADOR BADER: I think that they have been projecting a very benign attitude towards the whole region. They're basically saying we want to trade with you. We're not here to threaten you. We've resolved our border disputes.

You know there's now talk of the creation of an East Asia Economic Community that would be China focused and would include all of the countries of the East Asian region and would specifically not include the United States. This idea surfaced I don't know about 13 years ago I think during Bush one administration, and led by Secretary of State Baker, we laid down the law and said, you know, you cannot—this cannot be done. And we leaned on the Japanese and others not to support such an organization.

Well, now, what I'm hearing talking to Asians generally, it's going to happen. I mean it's not going to happen immediately, but it will happen. And even the Japanese are going to, with some unease, accept the notion of an East Asian Economic Community, which, you know, they

don't want to see it draw a line in the middle of the Pacific, but they—this reflects the realization of all the countries in the region about China's central role in the new Asia.

And the Chinese, as I say, have done this—have projected just the parts of their society that they need to in order to gain this kind of acceptance. They're not—you know, the only place where I think they've been a failure is frankly is in their relationship with Japan—Japan-Taiwan related. But that's the only—and the numbers reflect it—that's the only place where China is viewed as threatening and as hostile.

MR. STEINBERG: On the side.

MR. DEPONTE: Thank you. Phillipe Deponte [ph.] from the Eurasia Group. My question is what kinds of foreign policy initiatives, particularly realistic ones for this administration might make a dent in these negative views, for example, in the context of the G8 or some other opportunity?

MR. GORDON: Sure. I mean I think the best way to think about it is to think about what are the policies that have led to these views and see if there's any possible changes in that area. And I think that—you know, doing that gives you a sense of how hard it is, because as Steve or others have suggested, you know, you can't deal with numbers like these on the margins. It's not a tweak here, or there, or a better speech by Karen Hughes that's going to change the fundamental perceptions of the United States. As I said before, there are certain structural factors that we simply can't get around of—our power and our role in Asian security, Middle Eastern security and all the rest. But that said, I've long thought—and I think the administration is starting to come around to the view—that there are things you can do to make a difference.

I mean you mentioned G8. I don't think specifically G8, but the G8 evokes the notion—I mean what Tony Blair is trying to do with the British presidency is associate his policies with Africa, poverty, development. Unfortunately, for the United States, we are not associated with such public goods. We're associated with using military force and projecting power and all the things I mentioned before.

We need to make an effort to associate ourselves more with those things that people are going to see us more positively. So I do think there's an agenda there that would help at least on the margins.

And then when you go back through all of the key issues that have led to where we are in the world, and some of them we mentioned already—ideological opposition to the Criminal Court, our position on climate change—and we've mentioned that in her before. In Europe, the fact that the United States—Europeans take this very seriously. They see it as a hugely important issue to their own wellbeing, and say the United States' attitude was not interested. It would hurt our economy. We're not doing it. You know, these things get accumulated and lead to where we are today.

So, you know, there's no simple agenda, but I do think that we have at least crossed one threshold, which is the administration take seriously the question, because I do think that three years ago, before all of this, or four years ago, the attitude really was it just doesn't matter that much. We don't need the allies that much anyway, so what we do and say about Iraq, Iran, the Criminal Court, Kyoto, the United Nations doesn't matter. And anyway, even to the extent we need them, we're powerful. We're going to act, and they'll come around to our view. I don't

think that view is really sustainable anymore, and I think they know it, which has led to a lot more diplomacy, outreach, and efforts at least to avoid the greatest level of perception that we're a bully and a hegemon and don't care about their views. You can't fundamentally change the U.S. role in the world and our policies, but you can do more and I think that they're reaching that conclusion themselves.

AMBASSADOR BADER: I would just add a phrase, reassurance, here. I think we have trouble understanding the extent to which countries perceive the U.S. as having the capacity to make choices, to use military force in a wide range of spheres. To some extent, that may be an intention to have created that perception, but when you create that perception, you also create anxiety. If there was a person here in the room who was holding an Uzi and would say, don't worry. I have no rational reason to use this. We would still feel nervous. Right?

So we can from the perspective of U.S. for policy, we can think that people should not feel anxiety about U.S. military power. But, nonetheless, they do, just by the fact of it being there. Therefore, there are things that the U.S. has to do to mitigate that anxiety more. And the more the U.S. uses power, the more that anxiety grows. It's just inherent to the situation. So we have to make extra efforts and not assume that they necessarily see our good intentions.

MR. STEINBERG: Well, I want to thank you, all, for a terrific session, a fascinating study, and you can be sure that Steve will be doing more in the future. And we look forward to it.

MR. KULL: If you'd like copies of the presentation, the PowerPoint, give us your business card, and we'll send it to you.

[Applause.]

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