THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION

A Brookings Briefing

THE U.S. AND U.N. ROLES IN NATION-BUILDING: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

Friday, February 18, 2005

****UNCORRECTED TRANSCRIPT****

Falk Auditorium
The Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C.

[TRANSCRIPT PREPARED FROM A TAPE RECORDING.]

P R O C E E D I N G S

MR. STEINBERG: Well good morning and welcome to Brookings. We're here this morning to discuss a new and important piece of analysis done by our good friend Ambassador James Dobbins on the U.N.'s role in peace building and cross-conflict stabilization which is an important issue given the many challenges that we're facing around the world today.

And there's nobody better qualified to talk about and think about and to suggest to us approaches of how to move forward on this than Ambassador Dobbins, who has perhaps the most distinguished and extensive record and set of experiences in the United States or indeed anywhere in the world in coping with these challenges.

I had the privilege to work with Jim on a number of these over the years, and it is a tribute to both his willingness to take on the daunting on almost every opportunity that's been presented to him, and the fact that he's be able to now step back and reflect on both the way the United States deals with the problems of reconstruction and now the U.N. that we're here today.

We're joined by a group that I have the honor to say at least at one point or another, there's always been—have been colleagues of mine in different capacities over the years. Frank Fukuyama, a Professor at SEIS, also both a scholar and practitioner, who spent some time at the policy planning staff and who at least overlapped briefly with me when he was at RAND.

Bill Nash, who's now at the Center for Conflict Prevention at the Council on Foreign Relations, and who also has a truly distinguished career in dealing with some of these very difficult problems and particularly in working with the U.N., as we he did in the Balkans. And I think Bill is still trying to decide whether he wants to forgive Jim Dobbins and I for sending him there, but we'll perhaps hear a little more about that.

And finally, Susan Rice, former Assistant Secretary of State and a senior member of the NSC staff, now a senior fellow here at Brookings who's dealt extensively with the U.N. and the whole question of the U.N.'s role in peacekeeping and reconstruction.

So we're going to begin with Jim talking a little bit about the conclusions from his work, and then we'll get some comments from the members of our panel. So, Jim.

DR. DOBBINS: Well, thank you, Jim. And I'd like to thank both you and Brookings for giving us the opportunity to launch this second volume in our nation-building series.

I think it's fashionable today to talk about and to regard the post-Cold War as we call it the New World Disorder, and to look back on the Cold War with some degree of nostalgia as a period which if somewhat tense was also stable and comparatively peaceful.

In fact, the reverse is the case. The Cold War period was an exceptionally violent period. By the end of the Cold War, there were more than 70 civil wars going on at some point around the world.

In the last 15 years, international interventions of a political, economic, or military sort have reduced—have cut the number of ongoing civil wars going on in and around the world in half; and reduced the number of deaths as a result of those civil wars on an annual basis by as much as five-fold.

In the past 15 years, we've seen a gigantic growth in military interventions designed to stabilize and reconstruct war-torn societies. This is true both for the United States and for the United Nations.

During the Cold War, America sent its troops abroad to a new country on the average of once every 10 years. During the Clinton Administration that went down to once every two years. The U.N. launched a total of 14 peacekeeping operations in its first four

decades, and then launched over 40 operations in the decade that came after the end of the Cold War.

Nation-building indeed became a highly controversial subject in the 1990s, as the pace of these operations continued. Congress was reluctant to fund this increased pace of U.N. activism and there was a good deal of controversy about America's participation in these missions.

Now the current administration, in fact, came into office pledging that it was going to discontinue the use of American armed forces in nation-building missions. In fact, circumstances have caused the current administration to launch three new operations in its first three years—Afghanistan, Iraq, and back into Haiti—while the United Nations is currently at a high, with a total of 17 ongoing peacekeeping operations around the world, employing some 70,000 troops.

Now not all of these interventions have been successful. Quite the contrary, there have been some fairly spectacular failures. In the U.S. case, the U.S. has led the six largest interventions in the post-Cold War era, and I'd have to say that the success rate for the U.S. is two qualified successes—Bosnia and Kosovo; two unqualified failures—Somalia and Haiti; and two, which one would have to say are too close to call—Iraq and Afghanistan—where in neither case have we yet been able to halt the fighting.

The U.N. has also had its failures, some of them also fairly spectacular, but it has had a larger number of successes. In this volume, we looked at eight cases in which the U.N. was the lead actor, where the basic decisions on the structuring and management of the operation were being made in New York, not in Washington. And those cases were—go back to the early '60s with the Belgian Congo, and then in the post-Cold War era, Namibia, Mozambique, Cambodia, El Salvador, Eastern Slavonia, East Timor, and Sierra Leone.

And we evaluate the U.N. success rate in these operations. Now we defined success using two criteria—pretty simple criteria. One is the place still peaceful today? Has the war broken out again or not? And secondly, is it democratic today? And we used standard sources for that. Freedom House, the University of Maryland Polity Project to gauge whether or not the countries concerned could be put in a democratic or not democratic camp.

The U.N. success rate for the eight operations I've mentioned on the peace criterion is seven out of eight. That is, seven of those places are peaceful today. There are no civil wars, no ongoing at the moment. One of them isn't—the Congo. But the Congo stayed more or less peaceful for 30 years after the U.N. left. So it wasn't a complete failure.

On the democracy, the result was rather surprising. The result is that six out of those eight are still democratic today, which, given the kinds of places the U.N. goes to, is not a bad record.

Now I think there's several reasons why the U.N. has a relatively high success rate, and a success rate which by some measures may be called higher than that of the U.S. One is the cases chosen. We chose eight U.S. cases. We chose eight U.N. cases. We didn't choose them because they were successes or failures. We chose because they were the most emblematic of the process, and the most important. But you could choose different cases and get different results.

The second reason is that the American cases were harder. They were bigger. They were more difficult. They were peace enforcement rather than peacekeeping. In several cases, they were instances in which the U.N. had already failed, and then the U.S. had to step in.

But there's a third reason, and I think it's one that also requires some reflection, and that is that the U.N. has been more successful at institutionalizing its experiences, at learning

lessons, at creating an ongoing doctrine, and building a cadre of professional nation builders, if you will, who move from one operation to the next.

Whereas, the U.S., until recently, treated each of these operations as if it was the first that it had ever done, and assembled completely new teams, and addressed the problem as if it was sui generis.

More importantly, the U.S. treated each of these operations as if it was the last it was ever going to do, and it dissipated all of its expertise and all of the lessons as soon as the operation was over rather than create an institutionalized process of learning those lessons and creating personnel structures which would allow people to be used repeatedly in these kinds of situations once they gained experience.

The last point I'd make is that we look at whether or not peacekeeping was a cost-effective way of dealing with conflict, and found that it was not only reasonably cost effective, but it was the only cost effective means of dealing with these. In most cases, societies in conflict are societies that have been repetitively in conflict in the past. In most cases, societies emerging from conflict will in the absence of an international intervention return to conflict. The chances of returning to conflict are better than 50-50 in most societies emerging from conflict.

Of all of the types of intervention looked at—political, economic, or military—the only one that had a reliable and reasonably high success was peacekeeping interventions.

In societies emerging from conflict, if peacekeepers are inserted at that moment when the combatants are exhausted and prepared for at least a temporary truce, those societies do not, as a rule go back into conflict. And if there is not such an intervention, they do.

Finally, among the various organizations that do this kind of thing the NATO, the European Union, the U.N., other regional organizations or U.S-led coalitions of the willing, the U.N. is, by far, less expensive than American-led coalitions or NATO- or EU-led coalitions, and

it's far more effective than any other regional organization. So, all in all, it is the most cost-effective of the international arrangements for these kinds of missions, provided it's a mission that's within the U.N.'s capacity. And the U.N. doesn't do invasions, and it has never deployed more than 20,000 troops. So if you're going to need forced entry as part of the operation or if you going to require more than 20,000 troops, then the U.N. probably isn't the institution of choice. But if those criteria aren't met, then it quite likely is.

The U.N. is currently running 17 operations, 70,000 troops, at a cost of about $4 billion a year. That's less than the cost of one month's operations in Iraq. And since the U.S. pays only a quarter of the U.N. bill, it's less than the cost of one week's operations in the Iraq for the United States.

Now that's not to suggest that the U.N. could do a better job or a cheaper job than the U.S. in Iraq. It couldn't do it at all. It's not an alternative. But it is suggesting that for a relatively modest sum, the United States is helping take care of 17 other situations where it probably won't have to intervene because the U.N. probably will succeed in stabilizing the situation.

So I'll stop there.

MR. STEINBERG: Thanks, Jim. Before I turn it to our other panelists, let me just ask you one question, which is you said until recently the United States hadn't really sort of followed the lead of the U.N. in terms of trying to create an ongoing capacity and learn lessons. We now have an office at the State Department that's doing this.

What's you assessment of how that's going and how much are they looking to the U.N. experience as a template for future U.S. activities?

DR. DOBBINS: Well, I think it's a long overdue step, to actually create an institutional capacity within the State Department to both plan for future operations and to

evaluate past operations; and also to consciously create a cadre of people who express an interest in doing these things and put them in a personnel structure which will reward from doing it and making them available when the next contingency arises.

I think there's a reasonably serious commitment to this. Much will depend on whether OMB and the Congress provide adequate funds, but this has the backing not only of the State Department but of the Defense Department and of the White House. It was an initiative that really arose not in the White House, not in the State Department. And I think now that Rice has moved to the State Department, one can assume that they'll continue to embrace it there. And the Defense Department which sought responsibility for the civil elements of reconstruction in Iraq has concluded that it did them rather poorly and does not want to do them again. And so the Defense Department is also backing this, all of which I think argues for a relatively degree of optimism.

MR. STEINBERG: Bill, you've been there. You've worked very closely with the U.N. Jim has given a fairly upbeat assessment of general the capacity of the U.N. to do this and specifically put the Balkans in the qualified success category. I'd be interested in your reflections on his conclusions and your own experience.

MAJOR GEN. NASH: Well, thanks, Jim. And as Jim mentioned, the only reason I know anything about this is because the two Jims here to my left sent me off to the Balkans, once to work with NATO and the U.N., and one time to work for the U.N. So it's all their fault that I've got—I've learned experience through many mistakes.

In the spring of 1996, when I was the commander of the American division in northeast Bosnia, at least one member of the audience was working with us there, one of my brigade commanders, in fact, the one that Ivana Howard [ph] worked with, Colonel Greg Fontaneau [ph], handed me a report. It was like in February and March. We had been there but

three or four months. He slipped me this report. He says, you ought to take a look at this. It's kind of interesting.

And it was a report, an assessment of the political situation in northeastern Bosnia, made by a political officer of the United Nations who had been floating around since just prior to our arrival in the Dayton Peace Accords.

And so I was riding back from Greg's headquarters in my Humvee, I just kind of flipped through it, and I was astounded at the depth of analysis, the characterizations of the personalities, all of whom I had been dealing with for three or four months, but the degree of sophistication of the analysis was overwhelming to me and intuitively it seemed right on the mark.

And, frankly, by April or so of—March-April timeframe of 1996, after being there three or four months, I was deeply frustrated by the lack of civilian implementation and civilian efforts in parallel with the overwhelming support that we had gotten from NATO and the military aspects to it. And this is a subject that we can talk about in great detail. But I kind of came to the conclusion at the time that we had thrown out the U.N. baby with the [inaudible] bathwater, when NATO took over, following the Dayton Peace Accords. And there was just a tremendous political, and, oh, by the way, economic social capacity that the NATO military forces had failed to take advantage of in our arrogance of coming in—so, okay, we're putting a stop to this war and taking over.

And so I started inviting a lot of people to dinner that I hadn't been inviting to dinner before, and started getting the crowd—the U.N. crowd in there—and it was to my advantage. Now, we had a problem because of the relationship vis-à-vis OHR, and all that kind of stuff.

But my point is that there was a great capacity—and some of these U.S. successes, qualified or unqualified I might add—U.N.—heavy U.N. presence—Bosnia, Kosovo—has been a contributor to that. Bosnia more later after the first year or two than recently.

So I came back, and then because of Jim and Jim, I got sent off to Kosovo after I retired as a U.N. regional administrator to work for the U.N. I mean, I had the passport and everything. And as a civil administrator and my—and I had to work with those guys in NATO that were the military occupiers of the country at the same time. And they did to me what I had done to everybody years earlier.

But I found the U.N. to be very, very dedicated. I tell people they were as committed, you know, to dealing with hardship as any soldier, and they were as receptive to leadership as any soldier that I can say.

And I don't mean grand and glorious McArthur type leadership. I'm just talking about basic organization and basic direction and stuff like that.

But the vast majority of the people I worked with in my regional headquarters in northern Kosovo, and many of the people that I dealt with in Pristina—with the U.N.—were not the U.N. They were all people like me on short-term contract and the like.

And so the U.N. professional corps was very thin, and frankly in some cases uneven. But they were supplemented by a lot of people either hijacked, as in my case, or volunteered to come in and work.

And I found it a very interesting mix of people. That is you spend a little time trying to capitalize on their individual strengths. You could really create a pretty good outfit and assign stuff.

So there's a great potential. And there was, as Jim has noted, a commitment to learning, to learning both in New York and in Pristina and I would say in Mitrovitsa, as well, because we were working that.

And there was a broad understanding of the political, economic, and social issues in addition to the security issues that you deal with in these post-conflict areas that I think is the long pole in the tent, and if you're successful in them all will be much better.

A complicator [sic] in all of this, of course, is if it were just the U.N. versus the United States in doing various missions that would be one issue. The fact of the matter is it's not that simple.

It's the U.N. plus the EU plus all the U.N. agencies, which just because the acronym begins with U.N. doesn't mean they all stem from the same source of direction or resources and the like, and that's very complicated. And I think that needs—one of the areas to face.

And I would just add one other thing. I think the United States would be well served—you talked about the new office in the State Department. One of the things—anytime you want to fix anything around this town these days, everybody brings up the Goldwater-Nichols bill that how the military was fixed, and that's all in quotes, because the Goldwater-Nichols bill and associated with the joint operations. Okay? And I would just offer to—and one of the keys to the Goldwater-Nichols bill was the fact that in order to be an army general, you needed to work in a joint job. In other words, you had to work off on a joint assignment.

What if, in order to be an ambassador, you had to work for the U.N.? Had to have a tour in the U.N.? Mm.

MS. : That's radical.

MAJOR GEN. NASH: Radical. My point being is that the United States foreign service, the United States national security, and United States foreign policy would be well served if part of the professional development of our operators in the international arena were required as they grow up in the system over their 30-, 40-year career, to participate in the multilateral business and have assignments either in the U.N. or OSCE or other multilateral organizations that would then us a greater capacity to deal in that arena. And with that, Jim, I'll stop.

MR. STEINBERG: Thanks, Bill. Let me ask you one. You focused a lot on the U.N.'s role on the civilian side—the economic and social—I'd be interested in your perspective as a military officer on how the U.N. does in the military side of these stabilization missions. Jim has sort of drawn a distinction between the kind of coming in when the parties are exhausted as opposed to forced entry, but what's our assessment of the military capabilities under the current structures that the U.N. uses and what, if any, changes would you see that would be necessary in that regard?

MAJOR GEN. NASH: Well, the fact of the matter is that many of the armies that are ready to commit to U.N. missions are not of the professional quality that some of the western oriented or the NATO-level forces that we've talked about at the high end, and the list is much longer than just one—the United States. There are many other countries with that.

But the lack of a unified leadership and the cohesion that comes with a professional military force that has trained and grown up together, and I mean I'm a guy at NATO. I am very comfortable with German forces on my flank and, you know, French forces—dealing with French forces. And the British are no different than the American forces as far as operating together.

But that's not the case when you bring a lot of disparate organizations together at the U.N. In the security field, I mean, how can you expect the U.N. Police. I mean, you bring 500 individual policemen from 35 countries to the point of operations and put them to work policing. Okay. How do you expect that to work? How do you expect 500 individuals to show up—you know, it's tantamount to organizing a battalion for the attack at the line of departure with 34 different countries providing the soldiers, the commander coming from the 35th, and you cross the attack to go seize Hill 101. You're never going to do it. You're never going to have a cohesive operation if you don't bring people together, prepare them, organize them, and then give them the leadership and the wherewithal to do it. And so a U.N. force will always be limited in its ability to accomplish military missions.

MR. STEINBERG: Susan, you've been a practitioner in this as well, both in your U.N. role at the White House and your Africa role at the State Department and now looking at those things from more of a distance here from Brookings. Your perspective on the U.N.'s capacity to carry these things out and how it should think about its role in the future?

DR. RICE: Well, do you want me to go ahead and say my piece now and do the?

MR. STEINBERG: Sure.

DR. RICE: Okay. 'Cause I was going to touch on that.

I really want to touch on three things. One comment briefly on Jim Dobbins' broad conclusions. Secondly, to touch on the point your just raised, which is, you know, how is the U.N. faring these days? What capacity does it actually have? And then to actually spend a brief amount of time assessing how the U.S. capacity has evolved over time, not only the U.S. capacity to engage in these sorts of efforts on our own, but more importantly our capacity to support the U.N.

But I want to start, Jim, by congratulating you, and your colleagues at RAND for what is a very helpful, very thoughtful comparative analysis, and your case studies are really quite succinct and quite valuable. And it's rare that you see that, and so thank you for all of it.

And I want to just say that your broad conclusions I think are spot on. You've heard Jim highlight several of them there. There are others that he didn't have a chance to touch on that are I think also worthy. The fact that both the United States and the United Nations have a great deal more to do with respect to the challenge of learning lessons from these operations; that while both have improved, we're far from being where we need to be. And secondly, that the United States and, in fact, other developed countries ought to be doing much more to strengthen the U.N.'s capacity to conduct peacekeeping effectively, and we ought to be participating at a much greater rate and at a higher level than, in fact, we are.

When you looked at criteria for success, Jim, you also pointed out something I think is very important and I think often overlooked, which is success depends to a remarkable extent on the degree to which the neighboring countries to the operation are on board and prepared to play a constructive role.

And another one of our conclusions I think that bears mentioning is that when the U.S. does do these sorts of missions—and, as Jim pointed out, that ought to be largely only when forced entry is required and large number of forces—over 20,000—are necessary—that we ought to go back to the notion, a la the Powell Doctrine, of supersizing those missions; that by undersourcing them in Afghanistan and Iraq, we've actually complicated our task and made the effort somewhat harder than it needed to be.

But I think, as Jim pointed out, you know, we've had over—no, we've had almost exactly now 60 U.N. peacekeeping operations of one sort or another since the inception of the U.N. Jim was only able to focus on eight of those. And as he acknowledged, had he focused on

a different set of cases, he might have come up with a less comparatively optimistic view of the U.N.'s success rate relative, say, to the United States.

Among the cases that he didn't have an opportunity to look were the U.N.'s four missions in Angola, for example, which were to a greater extent or a lesser extent, real nation-building endeavors that didn't succeed, not largely through the fault of the U.N., but through the fault of the lack of the political will of the parties, and one in particular.

He didn't have a chance to analyze the first failed Sierra Leone mission, which was the, in fact, precipitating factor for the more successful subsequent one.

But I think more importantly, we need to recall that the jury is out today as we speak on a number of the most ambitious and complicated nation-building operations that the U.N. has embarked on. We are having an explosion over the last two or three years in the quantity and the complexity of U.N. missions, comparable to what we saw in the early 1990s. And so in Congo and Liberia and Burundi and Haiti and Cote d'Ivoire and about to be in Sudan, we have very large, complicated full-up nation-building operations underway, and it really remains to be seen how the U.N. performs in those ultimately and whether they succeed, and so, Jim, that's a plea for you to do volume two in about—

DR. DOBBINS: Volume three.

DR. RICE: Volume three—volume two on the U.N. in a couple of years. But I think if we were to look at those cases, the good news for Jim is that his broad conclusions would hold up. You would still see the crucial role of the neighbors as bearing very importantly on success or failure. The extent to whether the mission is right-sized is crucially important. We've seen under-manning of missions in places like the Congo, and in the first effort in Sierra Leone, and that has contributed to a great deal of complication and lack of success.

Jim pointed out that the quality of the forces matter, and we see that again and again; and that often it's crucially important for what I call the big three—the United States, France, and the U.K.—to step up and give these missions muscle and enable them to succeed. Without the British in Sierra Leone, that mission never would have succeeded. Without the French, we wouldn't even be talking about Cote d'Ivoire right now, for better or for worse. Without the Europeans in eastern Congo, that would have been again out of the realm of the conceivable and the jury wouldn't even still be out on that. And, of course, the U.S. role, along with others, in Haiti.

And so there is a crucial contribution that must be made often outside of the U.N. command structure, by the big three or other capable militaries, such as the Australians in the case of East Timor. And without that, the U.N. can't succeed.

So where is the U.N. now with its current capability? Well, clearly, if you were to compare where the U.N. is today to 10 or 15 years ago, they've made enormous strides. Fifteen years ago, the U.N. had no clue what it had done in its prior missions. They had no capacity for recording lessons, for keeping track of records. No ability to learn from one mission to another. They had no situation center, no ability to monitor current operations and respond to crises. As Jim pointed out in his book, when the Namibia operation was launched on day one and all went to hell in a hand basket, there was nobody to answer the phone at U.N. headquarters because it was a weekend. And the mission was almost lost.

We're past that point. And because of the work, quite frankly of this Secretary General and the United States and other countries who have lent help going back to the 1990s, because of the good work that Lakhdar Brahimi and his commission did, the capacity of the U.N. is much enhanced, but there's still very critical gaps. And Jim pointed to a number of them.

The U.N. still lacks the capacity to deploy rapidly, and that's crucial. They've set themselves a goal: 30 days to deploy what they call a traditional mission; 90 days to deploy a complex mission. Well, on one level that may sound ambitious; on another, if you consider that you're coming in to deal with a fragile situation, that's quite a lot of time. It's plenty of time for things to unravel. And yet, the U.N. still doesn't have the ability in most instances to meet those two time frames.

The standby forces initiative, which is aimed at having member states not only declare to the U.N. what capacities they have to contribute on hopefully short notice to peacekeeping operations but actually to provide that capacity when asked, exists on paper, but as a matter of practice, it isn't a practical tool. And if it's true on the military side and it is very much so, it's even more true, as Jim pointed out, on the civilian side and when it comes to civilian police and civilian staff. And so there still isn't that capacity to move as swiftly as necessary.

The U.N. still lacks an intelligence gathering capacity for all sorts of obvious political reasons; and, therefore, an early warning capacity. We now know what's going on in the 17 missions in which the U.N. has personnel on the ground. But if the U.N. were required as it should be to anticipate where things may go wrong next and be in a position to provide preventive intervention or preventive diplomacy, it frankly doesn't have that ability to the extent it needs it, and it relies on the generosity and the goodwill of member states to provide what they might. The most confident member states, like our own with intelligence gathering capacity, is very reluctant to provide that to the U.N.

The U.N.'s financing system remains inadequate. We continue to have substantial arrears. We don't have a sufficient rapid start up capacity so that when a mission is voted by the

Security Council, the Secretariat can draw immediately on large quantities of sums to get it going. That's improved, but it's not what it needs to be.

And many of the crucial functions of post-conflict operations—what the U.N. calls peace-building; what Jim calls nation-building—are not at all within the U.N. assessed budget. And so it's a pick-up game as to who comes to play with what resources. And that has a great deal to do with the success ultimately of the mission. What development resources are there? What funds for demobilization and disarmament and reintegration of forces? To what extent are we building in rule of law and institutional capacity in these very fragile, weak states? All of that happens outside of the framework of the assessed contributions of the United Nations, and, you know, where the United States and others are particularly committed, there might be relatively more resources available and where we're not, it may not be. And so that is a fundamental weakness.

The U.N. High-Level Panel I think offered some useful recommendations as to how to strengthen the peace-building capacity of the U.N. They recommended the creation of a standing fund of $250 million so that governments emerging from conflict can have cash to draw on to fund their basic operations. That's crucially important and an innovation.

They've recommended a peace-building commission, which can do early warning, which can plan and intercede in a preventive capacity. It can plan post-conflict, and it can coordinate and marshal international resources. And they've recommended an institution in the Secretariat to back that up.

Now that's complicated. Whether it goes anywhere remains to be seen. But I think that it does reflect the recognition that the United Nations needs some sort of capacity that's serious, that's coordinated, that is addressing the very complex multiplicity of challenges in the post-conflict era.

And lastly, this is something that wasn't in the High-Level Panel's recommendation and our government undoubtedly would hate this idea and our Congress even more, but I think we're at the time where we ought to begin to put on the assessed budget much of the post-conflict costs. The demobilization-disarmament—that was in the High-Level Panel's recommendations -- but beyond that the economic and social and institution building that has to happen to make these operations succeed.

Where is the U.S. now? Well, it's been said that this is an administration that is loathe to admit mistakes. And if that's true, it is also an administration that may not be so quite so loathe to correct mistakes, even if it doesn't admit them. And here is an area where I think that's true.

The mistakes that the Administration made in nation-building in the first term were, first of all, to discard or un-learn the cumulative knowledge that the U.S. Government acquired during the 1990s. Now, much of that was embodied in one individual who's sitting right here. But much of it was also increasingly institutionalized in the form of the Presidential Decision Directive-56 and in other forms.

The Bush Administration was unwilling or unable to embrace that in the planning for Afghanistan and more importantly in the planning for Iraq. So we were plagued by ad hoc-ery , and, of course, we made the critical mistake of putting much of the complex nation-building effort into the Pentagon, which had no ability to manage that.

So quietly, the Administration has gone through a process over the last two years where it has reassessed that. And now they are correcting many of those things. The new office that we've discussed, of reconstruction and stabilization in the State Department recognizes first of all that the State Department ought to lead; secondly, that we need a serious institutionalized

civilian capacity to staff these operations and to support them, whether they're U.S. led or U.N. led.

And this office will do all sorts of things, from early warning to contingency planning exercises, to mobilizing civilians and liaising with the U.N., liaising with regional organizations, the Europeans, and culling lessons learned. So all of that is extraordinarily encouraging.

Also encouraging is the President's budget request for fiscal '06, in which he had three line items, which, if supported by Congress, would make a significant difference. The first was a hundred million dollars—what they've called a Conflict Response Fund, to help train and deploy the civilians to back up the capacity that is to exist ultimately in Carlos Pasqual's office in the State Department. Secondly, $325 million for what they call a Transition Initiatives Fund. This is a notion that we started back some years ago in the Clinton Administration in very small quantities that we got buried in some regional budgets, like my own in the African Affairs Bureau. I got $20 million for unforeseen contingencies after trying to convince Congress that we can't actually always anticipate everything that might come down the path.

This Administration is now going to ask for $ 325 mill. after getting less than $100 mill. last year for this purpose. That's not enough actually when you consider the huge number of transitions that we're dealing with, from Sudan to West Africa to Haiti, but it's a start, and it establishes an important principle that I hope Congress will be amenable to.

And the third line item in the budget which is important is $114 million a year for each of the next several years for the Global Peace Operations Initiative. This is a substantial expansion of something we started in the Clinton Administration that was then called the African Crisis Response Initiative. It's aimed at training capable battalions around the world, with particular emphasis on Africa, to be able to respond to U.N. or regional peacekeeping

contingencies. We were able to get Congress to fund this at about $20 million a year. If they fund it at $114 million a year, the Administration's aim is to be able to train 75,000, largely African, but foreign peacekeepers by the year 2010.

And that would be quite a substantial contribution. There's one critical part of it that's problematic and that is that we're going to train all these individual battalions, but we're not going to give them interoperability. The critical concept behind the African Crisis Response Initiative is let's make the interoperable so we can throw a battalion from Nigeria together with one from Kenya and one from Botswana—create a brigade that can talk to each other; they've got common communication, and have exercised together, and maybe, lo and behold, they can do something effective.

That is not the case, and so as a consequence there still remains a critical need for developed countries to provide the combat support, the command and control, the logistics, the lift. And here's where the U.S. Government is not doing as well. For what the State Department and the NSC seem to have learned quietly over the last two years—Bill, you may have an insight into this—the Pentagon is still largely in the dark ages in terms of recognizing its role with respect to supporting and contributing to U.N. operations. We don't train for it. We don't have the right doctrine. We almost closed the Army's Peacekeeping Institute at Carlisle, and at the last minute decided to keep it open. But we're not living in the 21st century with respect to the U.S. military contribution to peacekeeping.

The U.S. is the 28th largest contributor to U.N. peacekeeping. We've got 428 people in U.N. missions. But all but 24 of those are police. Twenty-four uniformed U.S. military now participate in U.N. operations. Now, believe it or not, that's better than a couple of years ago. And they're in some places that you might be surprised—Haiti, Liberia, Ethiopia, and Eritrea, as well as more obvious places like Kosovo and Georgia. But 24 Americans is

ridiculous. The Chinese, who never used to do peacekeeping, have a thousand U.N. peacekeepers in the field, 800 of whom are actually troops.

We are second only to the Russians among the worst of the P-5 in terms of U.N. peacekeeping contributions. And we have long way to go, and it's a crucial area of support. Our being present will bring others in. It shows we take it seriously and our willingness to contribute crucial capabilities like strategic lift, like command and control and communications make the difference between success and failure.

And I'll end by saying this—the critical missing thing remains the obvious, which is the lack of political will on the part of the United States and other major states to participate in all the instances in which our support is needed. The glaring omission as we speak is what's going on in Darfur, where the African Union is trying, but doesn't begin to have the mandate or the capability to succeed. We've thrown a few tens of millions of dollars at that, but if we, under the auspices of NATO, were willing to provide capacity in terms of command and control, communications, in-theater lift, rapid response capability, it would make the difference between genocide and ending genocide. And we haven't been willing to do it today.

MR. STEINBERG: Thank you, Susan. I'll resist the temptation to engage you in a reconstruction of the history and the whole question of U.S. force to say who has command and operational control, but there's at least I think some history to why those numbers are so low.

Frank, you've been thinking about this from the grand sweep of history and experience in state building. What's your perspective?

DR. FUKUYAMA: Well, first of all, I've read both volumes of the RAND study, cover to cover. I really highly commend them. They're really excellent studies. They fill a big gap in systematically looking at these case studies. I've already used them in my teaching. A

couple of the authors are, you know, it was a collective effort and so congratulations to the Institution for having funded and done that.

My overall reaction to Jim's conclusions or the team's conclusions on the U.N. volume was that it was a little bit too kind to the U.N. for reasons that Susan Rice has already started to outline. And I understand, you know, why it's necessary to make the case for the U.N., because in the United States there's so much, you know, casual U.N. bashing, and it's important to remind people that the U.N. is willing to go into these difficult places that the United States doesn't want to touch with a ten-foot pole and actually can do some useful things.

But it does seem to me that comparing U.N. to U.S. national building is a little bit like comparing apples to oranges, 'cause there's really four separate functions that fall under the nation-building rubric. There's peacekeeping, peace enforcement, reconstruction, and development. And I think what comes through very clearly from the cases in the second volume is that the U.N. has a structural problem in moving from peacekeeping to peace enforcement, and I think it's not just the fact that it doesn't have the forces and they're not trained together and so forth. It's a problem of collective action in the U.N.'s decision making mechanism because peace enforcement really involves taking sides in politically charged situations, and it's simply unable to do that in a lot of cases.

The Balkans was a classic case of that. You couldn't be impartial in the Balkans because there was one side that was really causing the trouble. And until you broke the power of Serbia, you wouldn't get to a fundamental solution to the problem, and, in fact, an impartial arms embargo, you know, aided the Serbians in that case.

And so that conflict could really only be addressed, you know, by some combination of the Croatian Army and the U.S. Air Force, because the U.N. was simply incapable of, you know, of rising to that occasion. And so impartiality is really not the same

thing as legitimacy. The legitimacy, you know, in these—or the—you know, that involves being actually able to identify aggressors and move much more decisively. And that's the reason why I think that, you know, we should regard the U.N. and U.S. and British and other kind of nation state roles in these operations as really complementary rather than alternative models for doing the same thing. You know, Sierra Leone was another good case of that. I mean, without the British, you know, the U.N. mission by itself simply would not have, you know, been able to solve the security part of the. The Cote d'Ivoire—I mean, a number of these have been mentioned already.

And I would say when you move to reconstruction and development, and especially the development function, then everybody's in trouble because if the question is actually outsiders helping to create, you know, a self-sustaining new institutions, political institutions that can survive, you know, the withdrawal of outside powers in the international community, you know, I don't think anyone knows how to do this particularly well. I mean none of the multilateral development agencies, bilateral donors, the U.N., the United States, I mean, we've all got a big problem with that. And it's important to everybody because that's our exit strategy. We can do reconstruction reasonably well, but the development part is something that really needs a lot more work.

I just want to make one comment on—it's actually more on volume one than on volume two. But it was mentioned by Jim and some of the other speakers. You know, volume two presents these two alternative models of approaching nation-building. The U.N. light footprint model and the—I guess this McDonald's analogy—the supersized American, you know, traditional approach, where you flood the zone with, you know, a gazillion troops and billions of dollars in resources and so forth. And the reports suggest that, you know, if you're going to not do the light footprint U.N. model, and you flip over to the other alternative, then you

really ought to supersize. And that was really the thrust of volume one and the critique of the Bush Administration, you know, for not devoting adequate resources, particularly, well, to Afghanistan and Iraq. And I think that there is a powerful logic to that in certain cases, but you can also make the case that a light footprint model in some of these nation-building exercises where it's simply matter of the unilateral or kind of U.S. led coalition doing it is something that's worth, you know, thinking long and hard about for a number of reasons. And the case where this really I think comes up is Afghanistan, because I know that a lot of people have been critical of the Bush Administration for underfunding Afghanistan. They obviously did it because, you know, they were getting read for Iraq, and, you know, they didn't want to tie down too many resources there. So the motives weren't, you know, related to Afghanistan actually but, you know, more to the global war on terrorism.

But I'm not sure that it was such a bad outcome that we didn't actually do a very heavy footprint operation in Afghanistan because there are several important downsides to the supersizing option. I mean one is just in terms of the long-term institution building if you put too much of your own resources, then you create dependence and you undermine local institutions. That's happened all over the place in other development contexts. You know, in Africa, I mean—you know, indigenous institutions all over Africa have been deteriorating over the last 30, 40 years, and I think that there's some evidence that this is actually not unrelated to, you know, the aid flows that have gone in from the outside world. And as it is, you know, the Afghans have been forced in a certain sense to go very slowly, but using their own forces, developing their own domestic institutions and moving ahead only, you know, to the extent that they've got the, you know, the domestic capacity to do that.

The other, you know, important thing has to do with the sustainability of these operations from the developed country perspective because if you say, well, if you're going to do

the heavy footprint model, you've got to do it really heavy and really supersized. Well, you're never going to do it. I mean, how many Germanys and Japans and Iraqs are, you know, is the United States ever going to contemplate if, you know, you have this requirement for, you know, tens of thousands of forces over five to 10 year period of time and tens of billions of dollars, you know, flowing into them.

And so, you know, given that there's such a broad need for this kind of function, the light footprint U.N. model—I mean, sometimes it's actually good to starve these operations', you know, resources, because it forces people to be creative and to use, you know, existing tools that are on the ground. This is not a general prescription, 'cause, you know, in fact, resources will actually fix a lot of, you know, there's another category of problems that resources will really fix.

But I do think that, you know, you need to think carefully about this in each, you know, specific case because, you know, there are pluses and minuses to both.

And then finally, I mean the conclusion about the institution building back in the home country of the nation builders I think is one that's been emphasized by all of the speakers. It's absolutely critical, you know, the fact that the United Nations got this right or more right than the United States should be a big embarrassment to the United States. I think there's certain political reasons why we've never really admitted to ourselves if we're permanently in the nation-building game that I think everybody understands. But I think we got to get over that because, in fact, you know, there's this interesting convergence of developing a democracy—I'm sorry development in foreign policy. Our interests really depend on what goes on on the insides of a lot of these weak and failing states. And unless you can reach into them and actually structure institutions and change the domestic political institutions, you're not going to satisfy your foreign policy goals, and that requires a whole different set of institutions other than the traditional

military and diplomatic ones that we typically employ. And it has a lot of implications for the—not just the way the U.S. Government is structured, but the way we train people, you know, to have, you know, awareness of kind the whole range of those functions, and so forth. So.

MR. STEINBERG: On that last note, at least you've demonstrated to us that you're not a card carrying member of the realist school of international—

DR. FUKUYAMA: That's right. That's right.

MR. STEINBERG: Jim, you want to comment on any of this before we turn to the audience?

DR. DOBBINS: Well, I mean I agreed on almost all of it. And, you know, to some degree Frank and Susan were arguing that the glass is half empty rather than half full in terms of, you know, what the U.N. has accomplished versus what it could accomplish if it did better and we applied more resources to it. And I certainly agree that a different selection of cases could produce a more negative result.

But I guess my argument is that the glass is more full than most people recognize and that's the main message of the volume. I would say on Frank's suggestion that maybe supersizing our missions isn't always the right answer, and there are virtues to a small footprint. I would certainly agree in principle that that may sometimes be the case.

In the cast of Afghanistan, the first volume, which criticized it for being under resourced was written at a time when the annual aid budget was $500 million and the total number of troops in country was 8,000. We've now got 20,000 troops and over $2 billion a year. So we've quadrupled the aid budget and doubled the troop commitment, and I think that's probably about right, given the fact that in Afghanistan we're not trying to turn it into model for Central Asia and revolutionize every neighboring country. We're co-opting the warlords. We're not challenging them. We're giving them honor and lucrative positions in the establishment.

We're not isolating them, and so we have a modest set of goals as compared to the goals we set ourselves for in Iraq. And there has to be a relationship between input and output, between commitment and goals, and that's one of the most important lessons we concluded was that if you get the relationship right, you can succeed at almost any level of commitment if you've picked the right set of desired outcomes to suit that level of commitment.

But if you go in with very ambitious—and the U.S. often does—then you do have to make a commensurately large commitments.

MR. STEINBERG: Okay. Let's turn to the audience. We have microphones so after I call you, if you would please identify yourself and then ask your question. And we'll start right here.

MS. REIF: Hi. My name is Daniel Reif [ph], and I'm with USAID. But I started my career in the peacekeeping best practices unit at the U.N. And so I found the comment that the U.N. has been more successful institutionalizing its lessons learned as a very interesting one because it's been quite a turbulent process.

And I don't think necessarily a lot of learning is absolutely happening, but it's only just starting to become institutionalized in a very practical way.

But my question has to do more with the processes of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration, and I was hoping than any of you would address the differences in style between the U.S. and the U.N. approach to that process, and in particular is the U.S. doing what it needs to be doing to achieve some of these longer term peace building and democracy building objectives?

DR. DOBBINS: Well, the difference between the U.N. and the U.S. first of all is that in most cases the U.N. is going into a situation in which there is already a degree of agreement among the major parties. In most cases, with U.N. peacekeeping missions, they have

already agreed to disarm, and the U.N. has to oversee that process, to hold them to their commitments.

Whereas, in most cases, when the U.S. goes in, they haven't agreed to disarm, because it's a peace enforcement mission in which the U.S. is taking sides in effect. So that obviously makes it more difficult.

The experience for both the U.S. and the U.N. is that we're reasonably good at demobilization. We're okay at disarmament, and we're complete failures at reintegration and that's because reintegration takes money. It means that you need to employ these people in some fashion. And when you're going into societies which have 50 or 80 percent unemployment, going in and employing only the people who've been causing problems, only the people who are, in fact, the perpetrators of the outrages that you've stepped in to stop is politically controversial, but it is necessary.

A big employment program is not a reasonable objective for most nation-building operations. You can't afford them. But the one group of people you do need to employ are the former combatants because otherwise, they're either going to take to criminality or not demobilize. And that's a politically very controversial conclusion, which both the donors and the host societies often resist.

MR. STEINBERG: Bill, you've got some experience with this?

MAJOR GEN. NASH: Well, yeah, I mean, I tell the story about Bosnia that in this same time I was talking about earlier, the spring of '96, my most serious problem was 200,000 unemployed soldiers that had—we had demilitarized and taken their weapons away.

But kind of going back to another part of it, you do have to employ them. And this kind of—I would not equate footprints to commitment of resources, necessarily, because you can have—

[TAPE FLIP.]

Print. But a heavy commitment of resources in terms of fostering reconstruction and development in a country, and I think the strategy, the means, you use to implement a variety of programs can allow you to go after a number of things, and DDR is, in my view, one of the most important. But, as Jim rightly says, the DD is easy. I mean the good thing about DD it is subject to brute force. The R is not subject to brute force. You have to be clever and innovative and conniving for the job creation, and it does take money, and it does take some sort of vision of where you kind want to go with the economic development, but don't let the economists do R, because they'll be too damned efficient. You've got to be inefficient to get the R happening. You know, you just shouldn't fool around. You should spend the money.

MR. STEINBERG: Right here.

MS. MENDELSOHN-FOREMAN: Thank you. I'm Johanna Mendelsohn-Foreman [ph] with the United Nations Foundation. Obviously, the compelling case you've just made for the U.N. as an important player in peace building is something that is also not shared by many people on Capitol Hill given the recent attacks on the U.N. as an institution. There has been a great effort in the Secretariat to advocate reforms. I think there's a great awareness that the U.N. needs to do and make certain changes. But I wondered given all of your policy experience collectively, what recommendations you would have to try and take this case, which obviously is a critical case in the peace building area, and translate it into U.S. policy that would value a relationship that I think all of us understand is critical. Thank you.

DR. DOBBINS: Well, Susan I think is following this more closely than I, so I'll cede to her on this; other than to say that obviously I hope that this particular volume will contribute to a greater recognition that there is a substantial case to be made. And I think I'll ask Susan, who's been following this more closely, to respond further.

DR. RICE: Well, first of all, let me begin by saying, Jim, I wouldn't say the glass is half empty. I would say it's half full, but I would say you were suggesting it was maybe two-thirds full. So that's the distinction I draw.

I think we've got several things going on, Johanna. We have the overall negative attitude towards the United Nations, which has been exacerbated by oil for food and all of that. We've got the horrific recent events in Congo, which I think we didn't touch on, but which I think threaten to do very untimely and significant damage to the image of U.N. peacekeeping precisely at a time when we're asking more of it, and we need it very badly in some critical contexts.

But I think that we also have to recognize that there's a fairly significant gap between public perceptions on the one hand, however negative they may be growing, perceptions on the Hill, which are rabid and increasingly irrational, and perceptions in the Administration, which are quietly increasingly rational. And, you know, there's been some interesting recent polling that Pew and PIPA and others have done on public attitudes towards a variety of things, including peacekeeping and U.S. engagement in multilateral organizations and support for the U.N. And what you find is among Democrats and Republicans in the body public at large—there's large majorities supporting U.S. engagement in the United Nations, U.S. involvement in support of the United Nations, even involvement in peacekeeping; and PIPA had a finding that the majority of Americans of both parties support U.S. intervention in Darfur, to stop genocide, which nobody in this town seems to know. So you take that and you juxtapose it with the attitudes on the Hill, which the polls find are much more polarized. And so you have this disconnect.

And I think what, you know, what's necessary is for the Administration in its second term, with the President who went to Halifax right after his election to say that one of the

top priorities of his second term would be to strengthen multilateral institutions to take that up in a serious fashion and put some meat behind it.

So, first of all, pour some cold water on those in Congress and elsewhere who want to make this a lynch mob; and, secondly, come up with, as I think it's beginning to do, as I tried to suggest in my presentation, with some concrete ways to support and strengthen the United Nations.

There's undoubtedly a great deal more the U.S. could and should be doing. But I think it has an opportunity to do it. I think this Administration is recognizing increasingly that it's in our interest to do it.

We're far more engaged than most people like to acknowledge. It's this Administration that voted for this huge expansion in U.N. peacekeeping, huge expansion in costs. One of the largest increases in the budget is for peacekeeping expenses. And so now it's a question of coming out of the closet and selling that to the American people, explaining why it's important and not letting those in Congress who are trying to make their careers out of bashing the U.N. get away with it.

MR. STEINBERG: I would just add that I think one important force—I'd be interested in Bill's view on this—is the military. I mean, as somebody observed, one of the strongest supports for this creation of this new office in the State Department was the military and the Pentagon, who understood the value really to us of not having to take on all these missions in the form that we have to take them on as U.S. interventions. And I think it would make an enormous difference in terms of validating this for both retired as Bill—but the Pentagon itself to be willing to speak up more, because both for burden sharing reasons and for operational reasons, the more there are circumstances in which the U.N. can function to prevent conflicts from becoming peace enforcement missions, the less likely we're going to have to

become involved. And as this Administration in particular, you know, accepted this idea of global interdependence and the fact that failed states and the like actually have direct threats on our security, this is an argument that I think our both civilian and military leaders at the Pentagon ought to be willing to make more explicitly to the Congress in terms of gaining support for these kinds of activities.

MAJOR GEN. NASH: I think it's also—if I could, Jim, before we become too one sided up here on this panel, and this is a role I don't normally play, but I would also point out that we've all seen the advantage that many Administration's to include some that members of this panel have been part of have found it expedient to focus on the failures of the U.N. as opposed to the failures of the Administration in the pursuit of foreign policy. And we need to make sure we don't do that too often.

MR. KEANE: Hi. Tim Keane [ph] from the Heritage Foundation. One thing I thought—Jim, also I've read your study, and really enjoyed it. Thank you. The first at least so I'll look forward to the second.

I served in the Air Force in Japan and then in Korea, and so the characterization of the U.S. military not having the institutional capacity was kind of a surprise to me. And so the research I've done just recently—about 22 percent of all troops in the last 55 years have been stationed abroad—54 countries had over 1,000 U.S. troops at one time. So I wonder if we maybe need to look beyond the trees and look at the forest and the question behind all this—and, Frank, I'd like to get your take on this as well—is is there a larger role in providing a security umbrella that benefits an entire region, because if you look at Europe and you look at Asia, where we've been heavily invested with our troops, even the countries where we haven't had troops, have done well, and frankly mainland China is a good example having not to have a

major war in the last 50 years. If we have that sort of engagement in the Middle East, can we look forward to maybe good things 50 years from now?

DR. DOBBINS: Well, first of all, I certainly agree that the military does a better job of learning lessons and institutionalizing the results and creating doctrine and building cadres of experienced professionals than does the civil elements of our government. And the criticism in both volumes on this score is largely focused on the civil elements of our government, including in particular the State Department that has the lead responsibility for the non-military aspects of this, and which has not taken it seriously until recently. I think the problem with the military's ability to deal with this over the last 15 years is that its mission keeps changing.

During the Clinton Administration and the aftermath of Somalia and the congressional criticism of nation-building, the military's role was narrowly structured. Bill tells stories about when he was being sent off to Bosnia having to pledge to Congressmen he wasn't going to do any nation-building there. And so the Clinton Administration defined the military role in nation-building as nothing but peacekeeping. Anything else—building roads or bridges or schools or political parties or even training armies or guarding local leaders—that was the State Department's job. The State Department trained the Croatian Army and the Bosnian Army, using contractors, not the Defense Department. It sent guards to protect local officials. I did all of these other things, and the military's was a very narrow mission.

Then you came to the Bush Administration, which, in Afghanistan, told U.S. troops that they could anything but peacekeeping; that they could build roads or bridges, protect local guards, train the local armed forces. But they couldn't do any peacekeeping so you had gone to nothing but peacekeeping to anything but peacekeeping—this while—and then you got to Iraq where they were suddenly told that they had to do everything, and so how can you create an ongoing body of knowledge and expertise if your mission keeps changing.

So, I mean, one of the things that I support—and Bill I think mentioned this—is some kind of legislated division of labor between State and Defense primarily—other agencies to a second degree—which gives them a sense of assurance that 5, 10, 20 years from now, they're going to have a particular slice of responsibilities that they need to start investing in now, and that some other agency will have another slice of responsibility and that agency can be counted on to perform those functions. If every president comes in and issues a new PD-56 with completely different responsibilities among agencies, the agencies are never going to invest long term in their capabilities of doing that. And I certainly agree that the United States providing a regional context in which external aggression becomes less likely creates a framework in nation-building missions are more likely to succeed.

MAJOR GEN. NASH: I would caution extrapolation of the experience of the last 50 to the next 50 on two accounts. Number one, there is an ongoing significant reduction in the number of forces overseas in the world, with one major exception. So that's taking place, and we're going to see more of that. So the overseas experience will be lessened considerably I think in the next 50 years. And in the one area where there seems to be not only a lot of forces right now, but a propensity to keep forces there for a while, I think the circumstances of their presence will be so vastly different than the circumstances of the overseas presence in the last 50 years; that is in the last 50 years it very quickly shifted from occupation to deterrence for the mutual benefit of where we were. I don't think that shift in perception from deterrence to protection will occur anytime soon in the Middle East.

DR. RICE: I think we ought to be careful to distinguish between providing this overarching security umbrella and the sort of engagements we had in places like the Korean Peninsula from what we're talking about here today, which is nation-building.

Jim, in his book, defines nation-building as the insertion of armed forces at the end of a crisis to bring about a transition to democracy. It's actually a very interesting definition. It's not an altogether obvious one.

But if you take that definition, and I think it does largely apply, that's a very different set of tasks, as we've just discussed for our own armed forces than what they've traditionally been asked to do.

And so we are learning. We've made mistakes throughout the '90s into this decade, and, as Jim said, we got to decide what it is we're really asking our armed forces to be able to do. And I'm saying that once we've decided what that is, we've got to change the way we train and prepare and the doctrine for all of that.

But the other piece of this is not only what do we do when it's a U.S.-led or U.S. heavy nation-building exercise, but how do we employ our civilian as well as military capacity to support the U.N. and regional entities when they're doing the job hopefully well enough so that we don't have to come in and pick up the mess. And there's more that I think we have to learn both on the civilian side, and I was making the point that we've made some recent progress on the civilian side. I think we really do have more thinking to do and preparation to do on the military side when it comes to figuring out how on a low-cost, low-risk basis we can maximize the chances of the U.N. and other actors succeeding in these nation-building endeavors.

DR. FUKUYAMA: Well, just, you know, if the question is do we contribute to global public goods in other ways? Sure. I think that's clear, and, you know, there are other ways of helping, you know, other than participating in nation-building.

But I think there is an important policy issue just in the nation-building part of it whether the optimal U.S. contribution is actually by putting its people under, you know, a kind of blue helmeted command structure or keeping a separate command structure that is able to

work flexibly with, you know, the U.N. and other multilateral, you know, efforts of this sort, but keeping the specific, you know, capacities that we're really good at. That's why I guess it doesn't really bother me that much what Susan said about only 24 Americans serving, you know, in that blue helmeted capacity, because it does seem to me that there are plenty of other ways that we can help the U.N. and be very cooperative and less unilateralist and, you know, and so forth that actually will build on our specific strengths.

And I don't think one of our strengths is simply, you know, contributing—there are lots of countries that really want to do this, but I don't think it's us.

MR. STEINBERG: It's a longer debate. I mean, I think the question is whether—I mean that may be prudentially correct in a sense that the cost in terms of congressional support for some of the things that we want to do is high compared to the comparative advantage that we have in contributing to the blue helmets, but I also think there's an argument on Susan's side that says, you know, if we—our unwillingness to participate has the implication of somehow suggesting that there is something troublesome or problematic about these operations that we don't feel comfortable in contributing the way we almost every other country, including those with significant military capacities also participate in. Good.

MR. MITCHELL: Thanks. Gary Mitchell [ph] from the Mitchell Report. And I just wanted to say that—I don't know whether it was Ambassador Dobbins or Susan Rice who said that there were only 24 Americans in the peacekeeping business, and I was thinking that somehow that missed Larry Sommers' list of, you know, not enough women in math and science and not enough Catholics in investment banking.

MR. STEINBERG: Is it genetic, do you think?

DR. RICE: I'm not touching that.

MR. MITCHELL: I want to—I think we're sort of—I think this question is going to hover around the one that was just asked, but let me try it anyway. And it goes to Frank Fukuyama's point about the domestic policy constraints on the U.S. being in this business.

And I am curious to know what we make of the American reluctance or the political constraints, and I'm going to use an analogy that may end this for all of us, which is that, you know, in politics it's interesting how so often people who are heavily invested in the notion of pro-life are not as heavily invested in the notion of support for those lives once they enter society; likewise, that people who are fond of invading countries are not so fond of taking care of them after it's over.

And I guess my question is this, assuming that there's some fairness to the characterization, does this help us understand what the U.S. political constraints are or reluctance to be in the peacekeeping and nation-building business really are about?

MR. STEINBERG: I'd let the panelists tread on those analogies at their own peril. Jim.

DR. DOBBINS: Yeah. I mean, I think that the larger the country, the more powerful the country, the more reluctant it's going to be to put its forces under somebody else's control. And for the United States, you know, the most powerful country in the world to actually put its forces under the command of somebody else is more difficult than it is for Denmark, who is always going to have its forces under somebody else, if they're operating anywhere outside of Denmark.

And the problem is—so I think the reluctance is natural and derived from our size and power. The problem is that we set an example which other countries are increasingly following. So 15 years ago or even 40 years ago in the Congo, large western countries were prepared to make large contributions to U.N. peacekeeping operations. That's not true anymore.

Britain doesn't put troops in U.N. operations in large numbers. France doesn't. Germany doesn't. The Netherlands don't. Progressively, western countries are not contributing to these operations and progressively there are more and more dependent than they were 10 years ago or they were 40 years ago on Third World countries.

Now that lower their costs significantly, and, in some cases that's good enough, because many of these countries have well trained forces that have done these operations repeatedly, but they don't have the level of equipment, sophisticated equipment, or other capabilities that western forces do.

So I think that the United States' unwillingness to do this, while it is understandable, has three pernicious effects.

One, it sets a bad example. Two, it denies us valuable experience. If our forces had been involved in 20 of these operations over the last decade, they would have built up a body of experience which would have been highly relevant when they went into places like Iraq. It wouldn't have solved all the problems, but it would have given you a greater degree of experiential base to have judged these kinds of situations.

And thirdly, it makes it more likely that the U.N. is going to fail, leaving us or some western organization to have to pick up the pieces.

DR. RICE: I've sort of opened this Pandora's box talking about 24. And these are, you know, 24 officers serving as military observers or in some other capacity.

I do think we ought to be doing more of that. I don't think it should be several hundred, but I do think we can do more in these blue helmeted operations.

But I think there's a far more important way the United States and the U.K. and France can contribute in the U.N. context, and it doesn't require biting the bullet that Jim was talking about, necessarily, which is putting our forces under U.N. command and control—and

that is to help with the start-up of these missions. When I talked about the lag time—the 30 to 90 days that we're not meeting—in a handful of instances in the past, and one of the most interesting being the—I think it was the third time the U.N. tried to go into Angola—the British decided that they were going to jump-start the operation by putting in about a thousand troops to start the headquarters, to be the anchor for the force.

And they said we'll come for three months at the start-up. We'll be there to get folks started, and we'll hand it off. Well, that makes a huge difference, and that's something—that's the sort of thing that the big countries can do that can make the difference between success and failure. We have unique capabilities. You know, we're not uniquely better to serve as military observers in the end, so I'd say that's more of a symbolic thing. But we do have lift. We do have command and control. We do have intelligence. We do have combat service support. We have things that other people don't that can make a meaningful difference—and not all of it—I mean, preferably under U.N. command in some circumstances, but as Jim alluded to, we've had some bad experiences with that, and there are instances where that is not desirable or even necessary.

MR. STEINBERG: Time for one more question. Right there in the middle.

MS. CANTRELL: Hi. I'm Kelly Cantrell [ph]. I'm a master's student at the Elliott School at George Washington. And I have a question for Dr. Rice. You mentioned the High-Level Panel that the U.N. did. And I was curious what you thought of this emerging norm of the responsibility to protect and whether that will mean that the U.N. and other multilateral organizations are doing more of these nation-building kinds of activities or might that mean that they put more effort into these early warning signals so that you actually don't have to do as many or as extensive of these operations? Thanks.

DR. RICE: Well, first of all, I mean, I think the doctrine of the responsibility to protect is an important conceptual and moral breakthrough. And I think it's fundamentally correct.

The problem with it is, even it were embraced—and we're a long way from seeing it embraced by the major nation states and even by the Security Council—it doesn't mean anything is going to happen when the balloon goes up.

Now it does mean, as you suggest, that that might put more of a premium on all of the preventive aspects. As you know, one of the elements of the responsibility to protect is you would go in in an intervention capacity as a last resort, having employed all of the other steps that are possible first, and that implies much better early warning and prevention capacity. And as I suggested in my comments, if the U.N. embraces some of the specific recommendations of the High-Level Panel with respect to peace building, they will be somewhat better equipped to deal with that. They still will need better early warning and better intelligence.

But, you know, for all the doctrine in the world, at the end of the day, as I tried to suggest, it all comes down to political will. And if the will doesn't exists for the international community to step up and make the African Union effective in Darfur, then genocide is going to continue and the Sudanese government will continue to get away with it.

And so, you know, doctrine is one thing, but will is another. And that's another panel discussion.

MR. STEINBERG: Well, let me first thank Dr. Dobbins for an excellent contribution to the literature by thinking about this important question, and to my colleagues on the panel, thank you, all. And thank you for joining us.

[Applause.]

Well done, Jim.