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UNITED NATIONS REFORM AND THE U.S.

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P R O C E E D I N G S

MR. DAALDER: Good morning. Thank you all for coming out on what's actually going to turn out to be a nice morning here.

The United Nations is fast becoming many people's favorite whipping boy once again in this town. We have of course the problem of Iraq that has beset us now for more than two years. We have the oil-for-food scandal, if I can put the "scandal" in quotation marks since nothing that we know now we didn't know before. We have the inaction with regard to the genocide in Darfur and various human rights and other abuses that are besetting the institution from its top officials to its lowest peacekeepers.

Realizing this, the Secretary General over a year ago, a year and a half ago, called for a reexamination of the United Nations to take the United Nations from what is a pre-Cold War institution into the post-Cold War world. And he put together a High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change September before last and asked them to examine what the world looked like, how the threats had changed in the world, and to come up with ideas about how the United Nations ought to respond to that and necessarily be changed.

It was a distinguished panel with many distinguished members, including a former foreign minister of Russia, a former foreign minister of China, and of course General Brent Scowcroft, who was not America's representative, but an American representative. That is to say, this was an independent panel. This does not represent the governments. It represented and reported only to the Secretary General.

Anyone who's spent any time trying to write a report at the United Nations—let alone a consensus report at the United Nations, as I had some 15 years ago the honor to do—knows that it is not easy to say anything controversial, let alone anything forward-looking. What this report, "A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility," that came out in early December did is exactly that. It was forward-looking. It was straightforward in the analysis and the language that it used about the failings as well as the good things that the United Nations was doing. It laid out a new framework for thinking about international security that I think is extraordinarily useful not only for academics but also for policymakers. It came up with a definition of terrorism, something that the international community has not been able to do up to this point.

So it is an extraordinary report. It would be an extraordinary report if it was written by one person, but this is written by a commission of very, very different people representing very, very different points of view. I am very pleased to have General Scowcroft here to share with us his views about where the report came from, about what work went into it, and how we move forward now that the report is done.

General Scowcroft needs no introduction in Washington. In fact, he needs no introduction anywhere. He's the only person who has served two presidents as national security

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advisor; in fact, he is also the only person who's served two presidents as deputy national security advisor, something I hadn't figured until recently. He has chaired and/or been a commissioner on numerous government and non-government commissions, helping to solve tricky problems that are out there, serving most recently as the chairman of the President's, President Bush's, International Advisory Board. General Scowcroft is a person who calls it like he sees it. Sometimes he gets into trouble, but he has assured me that today, while he will call it like he sees it, nothing will get him into trouble.

Thank you very much for coming here.

[Applause.]

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: Thank you very much, Ivo, for that generous introduction in all respects. There's really not much left for me to say.

I'm very happy to be here with you this morning. I'm going to talk, really, mostly about the major areas of interest in the report. There are 101 recommendations. I will not go through 101 recommendations. But it was quite an experience. It took a year for us to do this. It reminds me of the story of the doctor who got a call from the chairman of the local women's group and asked him if he'd come and lecture to the women's club on sex. So he said sure, he'd do that. The day came and he was getting ready to go, and his wife asked him where he was going and he said he was going to lecture the women's club. She said on what? Well, he felt a little uneasy to say "sex," so he said "sailing." So he went, gave the lecture. About a week later, his wife was walking down the street and ran into the chairman of the women's club, who was just effusive and said, “Your husband gave us the best lecture we think we have ever had.” And his wife said, “Well, I certainly don't know why. He's only done it twice. The first time he threw up, and the second time he lost his hat.”

[Laughter.]

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: So with that, let me say a little bit about the 16-member panel. I believe that the Secretary General managed to get every point of view of the United Nations embodied in that panel. They were people from all over the world representing every conceivable point of view—not countries, but points of view.

After the first meeting, I thought what am I ever doing here? This is hopeless, because the first meeting was largely talking at each other, not discussion with each other. But surprisingly enough, over the six meetings we had, we came together in what was, frankly, to me, an amazing way. Besides our six formal meetings, we, or some of us attended countless numbers of U.N. reform groups meetings held in various regions, in some countries, and so on and so forth, over and over and over again. So we got the benefit of inputs from, oh, I would say half the members of the U.N., and all of the regional groups held meetings to tell us what they think we ought to do. So it was a pretty comprehensive review of what people think the U.N. ought to be, ought to do, and isn't doing.

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One of the other things that's surprising to me is the degree of support for the U.S. view of security. Given its makeup, I think the United States should be very comforted by the recognition of the security problems we face and how to deal with them.

The report begins by pointing out, as Ivo said, how much different the world is today than it was when the U.N. was founded. When it was founded, it had 51 members and they were relatively similar states. This was before decolonization, and much of the world was still in colonial status. So there were states having a similar outlook, similar makeup, similar problems, and so on, and who viewed security largely in terms of interstate conflict. The Security Council was designed to represent power in the world—some geographical distribution, but primarily power in the world. And it did—power in the world in 1945, minus the defeated Axis powers Germany and Japan.

Now the U.N. has gone from 51 members to 191 members and from a relatively homogenous outlook on the problems of the world to an extremely diverse outlook. The threats have moved from primarily interstate conflict to internal conflict, and for many of these new states the security threat is that of its very existence—problems of poverty, problems of disease, problems of environment. These are, for much of this new world, security threats, not just natural everyday threats. So it is a very different kind of a world and the U.N. is not fully reflective of that world.

In addition, the nature of the world today, responding as it has to the fact of globalization, is such that many of the problems facing the world—security and otherwise—require cooperation. They're no longer able to be handled by the nation state itself. And so that puts an additional burden on the U.N.

Going to the threats we looked at, we categorized them in six groups. The first, the general issues of poverty, disease, and environment; then interstate conflict, internal conflict, weapons of mass destruction, terror, and transnational organized crime.

The report points out in looking at these threats that the U.N. is only as good as its members want it to be—if they want it to operate, it will operate; if they don't, it won't—and additionally, that if the developed states, especially the 51 founding states, want support within the U.N. for the security issues that they face, then they have to recognize and give support to the problems of the developing world, that is, those basic problems of disease, poverty, and so on.

Now, the U.N. has something of an internal contradiction. It is based on the sovereign independence of its members. Indeed, the charter says that the U.N. cannot interfere in matters essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of its members, and that is the principle on which it's founded. But it has moved into areas, starting with genocide, for example, which have evolved into what's generally termed a responsibility to protect; that is, under cases of egregious failure, inability, or unwillingness of states to care for their populations, the U.N. has a responsibility to intervene. Now, these two are in some state of tension. I think that the report, in looking at the threats and how to handle them, dealt about as well as one can when you look at this tension.

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And of course, different states look at different aspects of it. China, for example, is very jealous of any hope to intervene in its domestic affairs. Other states put a lot of emphasis on doing precisely that with states that are negligent or malign.

Now, let me turn to the way the report deals with conflict, starting with interstate conflict, or with Article 51. The panel did not change the definition of Article 51, that is, the right of the state to defend itself under attack without recourse to the U.N. We debated that for some period of time and decided it wasn't really possible to improve on the language of the report and trying to would probably cause more problems than it would solve.

But what the report does do is recognize the changed nature of modern warfare by specifically addressing the issue of preemptive use of force. That is, under conditions of modern warfare, especially the possible use of nuclear weapons and so on, a state cannot under all circumstances wait for an attack in order to defend itself. So that under conditions—and precise definitions are not possible here, but under conditions where a state is under immediate threat and there are no alternatives, preemptive response is acceptable, but not preventive response.

Now, what's the difference between preemption and prevention? Some people think that was obscured a bit in our Iraq conflict. But the difference is the timeliness with which one has to act. If there is no time for other measures, for negotiation for this or that or the other, then preemption is a viable option. If there is time, however, then there are obviously other options which could be pursued, including, importantly, resort to the Security Council and the possibility of collective action. I think, while this doesn't solve all the problems, it's a big step forward. To me it's an amazing step forward, because some of the discussion was, you know, a state has no right to use force without the sanction of the Security Council under any circumstances. Well, that, of course, was unacceptable, or would have been unacceptable to the United States.

I think this is a very responsible and serious step forward. While it doesn't solve all the problems, it's a big step forward. I guess what you can say is that the panel considers the role of the Security Council in approving the use of force inversely proportional to the immediacy of the threat.

Next issue: weapons of mass destruction. And here, I think, the panel was really quite forward-looking. It in effect disaggregates that wonderful term "weapons of mass destruction" into its constituent parts—nuclear, chemical, biological, and radiological—and deals with each one separately. Because they're different by nature, they're different in their effects, they differ in the means of manufacture. They're lumped together only as a convenience, in the sense that they're all horrible and unusual weapons.

I'm going to concentrate on the nuclear aspect, which is where the greatest departure is made. But there's a very interesting point that the report makes in considering biological attacks, and that is the similarity between what one has to do for a biological attack, terrorist or otherwise, and what one has to do in case of an epidemic. The management is remarkably the same. Therefore, the notion that what one needs to do to handle both is to set up around the

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world something like our Centers for Disease Control so that you have a hotline around the world, and when anything suspicious happens, you immediately can focus on it—à la SARS a couple of years ago, that we did in sort of an ad hoc way. So I think that was fairly promising.

But the most innovative, as I said, is the handling of nuclear proliferation. In this case, there is a real weakness in the nonproliferation treaty. When the treaty was written, the assumption was that the most difficult part in acquiring a nuclear capability was the building of the nuclear device itself. Therefore, the NPT bars that, but it says all other nuclear activity, so long as they're peaceful in intent, can go forward. That gives every state the right, for example, to enrich uranium to weapons purity or to reprocess spent fuel rods to extract plutonium, as long as it's for peaceful purposes. But how do you know it's for peaceful purposes? And once that is done, that is the most difficult part of the process. Enriching uranium, to set up a process to do it, can take years, and not quite so long for reprocessing plutonium. But those are the big barriers to nuclear weapons, and the NPT does not get a handle on that.

The report proposes that instead of allowing states to enrich uranium for their own nuclear power plants or to reprocess fuel from those power plants, that the International Atomic Energy Agency would instead guarantee a supply of that from nuclear weapons suppliers, the nuclear states—guarantee a fuel supply, take away the spent fuel, thus safeguarding the major elements that go into the making of a nuclear weapon. And while this is being negotiated, the report suggests that all states suspend any enrichment and reprocessing activities. Now, the states in question—well, first of all, North Korea. The cat may be out of the bag on that one. Our major problem at the moment with Iran is exactly over the issue of uranium enrichment. And Brazil itself has announced plans to go forward. So whatever happens to this, this is a major step forward in trying to get a handle on the issue of nuclear proliferation.

As Ivo mentioned, on terrorism the panel made a breakthrough in arriving at a definition of terror which separates those in the argument that one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter, and it bars any attack on civilians or noncombatants intended to terrorize a population or a government into making concessions.

Moving down to the lower levels of conflict, which are the most numerous now, the report looks at the area of conflict in the developing world as a continuum, going from failing states—although we don't use that term; we have a more euphemistic term—but states that are in danger of failing, states in conflict, and states emerging from conflict that need reconstruction, and so on. And while these are all different in many respects, there is a continuum here, there's a thread that goes through that sort of common management of them would represent a great step forward in dealing with them.

Okay, I was going to add something. I will skip it. If you have a question, I'll deal with it.

Now, this is pretty much—I'm not going to talk about international crime—this is pretty much the way the report suggested dealing with conflict.

Now, on the last, this continuation of conflict, the U.N. is not very well set up for it. While the Security Council is responsible for peace and security, it has little machinery to plan, to implement, or to monitor its decisions. Indeed, instead most of them go over to the Secretariat and there is a big gap between the decision-making and the ability to implement.

The report proposes three organizational fixes to deal with this problem. First, a peace-building commission set up by the Security Council, whose job is to manage aid, assistance, help, what have you to states anywhere in this continuum of conflict. It would be small, smaller than the Security Council, rotating over a period of time, with the chairman always a member of the Security Council. To support that in the Secretariat, we propose a small peace-building support office to do the purely administrative part of it. And to oversee the whole thing, giving the Secretary General a new deputy who would concentrate on peacekeeping, peace-building matters. A couple of years ago, or a little more than that, the Secretary General did get a deputy who handles mostly issues of development, economic development, and so on—humanitarian things. This would give him another deputy focusing on the principal mission of the Security Council, that is, peacekeeping.

There are also recommendations for the strengthening of the control of the Secretary General over the Secretariat. In my opinion, this is one area where we failed. I think the Secretary General has so little control over the Secretariat that it makes it very difficult for him to carry out his responsibilities. We took a crack at it but not, I think, satisfactorily.

Well, finally, a few words about reform of the Security Council itself. We didn't really want to take up this issue, as being so divisive. The Secretary General asked us to make recommendations on it. So we came up with two possible alternatives. There was no way we could have agreed on one alternative. You know, of the large powers who think they probably ought to be permanent members of the Security Council—Germany, Japan, India, Brazil—with the exception of Germany, there was a member on the panel from each one of those states, and also others, who didn't want those states to become permanent members because they were competitors and so on. So it was a very difficult issue.

As I say, we came up with two models, both of them expanding the Security Council to 24 members. To do this, we took the regions of the Security Council and sort of re-jiggered them a little bit. There were some protests on us doing that, but it was the only way we could make it come out right. The U.N. Charter says that the Security Council should look at two things. It should not be representative of all the members of the U.N. That's the General Assembly. Instead, it ought to represent, first, power in the world, those who can contribute most to the maintenance of peace and security; and second, some notion of regional representation. So we added nine seats and divided them so that each area—Asia Pacific, Europe, the Americas, and Africa—would have a total of six seats.

Now, Model A proposes six new permanent seats; in other words, six more permanent members of the Security Council—not with the veto. We did not recommend expanding the veto at all. Now, these six permanent seats are one more for each of the regions except Africa—

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giving Africa two—giving each of the regions two permanent seats, and then three additional seats for two years, nonrenewable, the way they are now.

Model B added no permanent members but instead added eight new four-year renewable terms. In other words, instead of the two years, the way they are now, the term would last for four years and they could be reelected. This was to provide for Germany, Japan, India, Brazil being reelected time after time but without freezing you into another permanent model. Now, in order to increase the chances that the elections would elect the members that we thought, we proposed that there be a criterion for electing these four-year-term members: that to be eligible, a state should be in the top three of one of three categories—either assessments to the U.N., to the budget; voluntary contributions to peacekeeping; or troop contributions. Now, if you add all those permutations and combinations, you just happen to get all of the big states in pretty well.

I am skeptical that this or anything else will fly in terms of modifying the Security Council, because for every state that you add, there are many more who think you shouldn't add them, but some other state. I think that's likely to be not possible. But I think the interesting thing is that there were some attempts—I shouldn't say "attempts." There was some discussion about eliminating the veto, but early on it became obvious that that was simply a non-starter in terms of maintaining a United Nations at all. But equally interesting is the fact that there was no suggestion about expanding the use of the veto to initial members.

Well, that's about the size of it. It's three or four very interesting proposals. I think it's a modest step forward. Kofi Annan has not divulged his entire plans for what to do with this report, but I think what's likely to happen is he will package this together with other reports from the Millennium Project which has been going on—package them all and just submit them to the General Assembly for the fall session this year.

Well, that's my report. I'll be happy to deal with any questions that I can. Do we have time for questions?

MR. DAALDER: Absolutely. Do you want to stay up there?

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: No, I'll come sit down.

MR. DAALDER: Thank you very much for that overview—full and rich, as the report is itself.

Let me ask you one issue—in fact, there are a number of issues that are raised. You're right to say that, particularly on the nuclear side, you've made major steps forward given the kinds of countries, again, that you had as representative. And the notion of saying the real problem is enrichment and reprocessing, possession of those capabilities is akin to having nuclear weapons, therefore we need to have a new bargain and the new bargain is the guaranteed supply of fuel for foregoing the right to produce the fuel.

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If I'm Iran and I look at that possibility, and I really only have peaceful intentions but I want to have guaranteed access to nuclear fuel because I don't know what the oil market is going to be, how are you going to create a system that in fact guarantees to Iran that, no matter what happens on the human rights front or on other non-associated issues, that they will have the guaranteed supply?

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: We propose doing that by putting it in the hands of the IAEA. In other words, IAEA would not turn into a fuel-**enricher or** anything, but the IAEA, as long as the member complied with all of the IAEA requirements, would guarantee that fuel would be supplied by one of the nuclear fuel states at market rates or—I would say that we ought to get together and even provide fuel, maybe even free, as an additional inducement. Because Iran, for example, would never rely on us to provide it, or Britain or anybody else, because if we didn't like what Iran was doing, then we'd cut the fuel off. But putting it in the hands of the IAEA is about as good a guarantee as you could have.

MR. DAALDER: One other issue that you didn't raise, I think, is the recommendation that at least caught my eye, which was that the way we're going to resolve the problems that the U.N. Human Rights Commission has, which is that it has members whose protection of human rights is not stellar, to use U.N. euphemisms. The way we're going to resolve that is to make everybody a member. All 191 countries are going to be members of the U.N. Human Rights Commission. That one, contrary to many other of the recommendations, had all the makings of, well, we really can't agree on this issue, so let's go and do it that way. Is that a fair interpretation? Or is there in fact a different way in which we can look at the recommendations to suggest that the way one deals with a human rights violator, as members to the commission, is to put them on, but make sure that all human rights violators are on.

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: Well, yeah. It was a combination of those. And it sounds like a ridiculous recommendation and it may be. But, you know, it's been skewed around so that countries can trade votes and so on and you end up with Libya as chairman of the Human Rights Commission, which is ridiculous. But the convoluted process we did by making everybody a member and some other devices reduced the chances that that kind of log rolling can produce the effect that it has.

There wasn't any perfect way. We looked at a whole bunch of different devices like, for example, setting up a record—to be chairman, you had to have A-B-C-D and so on. There's some of that in there, but it's coupled with making everybody a member.

MR. DAALDER: Thanks. Let me open it up for Q&A.

QUESTION: Susan Rice, the Brookings Institution.

Thank you, General Scowcroft. Two questions, if I might. The first is if you could give us your typically unvarnished assessment of the likelihood of the administration taking up any or all of these proposed packages of reforms. The president, I thought, very interestingly in his speech in Halifax said that one of the hallmarks of his second term would be to strengthen

multilateral institutions. And I think, as your report indicates, there are some very useful, actionable recommendations now on the table. It's the 60th anniversary of the U.N. Do you see any reasonable prospect that the administration will take these up in a constructive vein?

The second question has to do with U.N. Security Council reform. I think you rightly pointed out that the odds of movement on this issue are slim to none. Having said that, I'm curious about your sense, having been part of this panel and interacted with these representatives from around the world and in fact, I'm sure, heard from regular citizens around the world as to whether without reform over the medium to long term the U.N. can maintain its legitimacy on a global basis, whether without reform the rest of the world will go along with the status quo for another 50 or 60 years and we can brush it under the rug.

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: Well, to take the first one, I think the administration ought to be very pleased because, as I said, in the crucial areas where we are concerned, it's a definite step forward, especially on the nonproliferation thing. We could just climb onboard this and say to Iran, look, this is what the world wants. I think as a practical matter the U.N. and U.N. reform is not at the top of the U.S. agenda right now. You know, this came out and we're still in a time when we are consumed with concern about Iraq and what to do about Iraq and so on. This just does not have the immediacy. Now, exactly what will happen, it's hard to say. I think there was a collective sigh of relief that there was nothing in the report which threatened to take the veto away from the United States or gave them some problems that they would have had to deal with.

The Security Council issue is not much of an issue for most of the membership. It's an issue primarily for the four countries who want to be permanent members and for the other 4-times-4 countries who don't want them to be permanent members because then they would be moved down a notch. So I think it doesn't have a great deal to do with the effectiveness. One of the real issues is the states in this tier who might be moved up include states who are spending disproportionately making contributions to peacekeeping efforts and so on, and if they are thwarted in their hopes to get more responsibility to go with their contributions, the contributions may suffer. But I don't think for most of the members this is that much of a burning issue, because for most of the members it would not change the way they vote that much. I would hope it would break up some of the regional voting patterns which are a form of log-rolling I think is unfortunate.

QUESTION: Nicolai Zieman [ph], Russian weekly magazine [inaudible].

Mr. Scowcroft, the report is ready, everybody can read it on the U.N. site. But the question is, what next? For instance, how soon should we expect that Security Council membership will be enlarged? Thank you.

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: Well, how about 50 years?

[Laughter.]

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GENERAL SCOWCROFT: I don't know. You know, I can't rule it out, because I didn't think we would be able to agree on any kind of scheme. The fact that we did agree—well, there was a minor dissent on it, but we did agree to put forward two alternatives—was pretty amazing to me, because the emotion among small numbers is quite high. You know, Italy, for example, is not happy at the prospect of Germany being a member because then Italy would be the only sort of larger member of Europe not a member of the Security Council and, you know, that's a painful prospect. And that is replicated—you know, India—Pakistan would be unhappy if India was a member. And then you have Brazil, Canada, all of those make it a most difficult proposition.

QUESTION: Nick Berry, Foreign Policy Forum.

General, is it fair to say that the commission's rejection of preventive attacks was an implicit criticism of the United States for its preventive attack on Iraq and a warning to Israel and the United States not to do the same towards Iran?

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: No, I think that's an exaggeration. What we tried to do was to generalize the issue rather than to look at particular cases. You know, the administration says its act was preemption, not prevention. Quite clearly they said that.

QUESTION: That doesn't make it true.

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: Oh, of course it doesn't make it true. And of course, what I tried to say is the line between these two is something that you can't draw with all that much precision. There's also in there a checklist of things you should do or think about when you're considering the use of force, and it's a very useful checklist. But, you know—

No, it was an attempt to move forward in this miasma of definitions of terms and what they mean and so on and so forth, to lay out a spectrum starting with Article 51 and clear self-defense, moving to, for example, U.N. intervention in cases of genocide or something like that. That's the whole spectrum here. And you get not only into states defining things a little differently, but you get into attitudes of when is it right or legal to intervene in the internal affairs of a state because they're behaving so egregiously. This is sort of a legal framework in gestation. It's not there yet. Does that mean that the use of force is whatever is legal whenever the U.N. Security Council says it's legal or not? Not necessarily. But, you know, we're moving here. And this is a step. I think it's a definite step forward, but it's not the final step.

MR. DAALDER: If I may add, the way I read the language, in fact, is that the language comes much closer to where the administration is than where one would have expected the language to be. It in fact, while not endorsing, recognizes that preventive use of force is something that may under certain circumstances be justified. That's an extraordinary admission from a U.N. panel. So far from arguing that it is a critique, it's a recognition in fact that there's something real here that needs to be dealt with. That's why I think General Scowcroft is exactly right. The administration should embrace this as not a critique of its position but in fact a recognition that the problem that it's trying to put forward is a real one. And now you have a U.N. panel agreeing with that. That's a major issue.

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GENERAL SCOWCROFT: That part is quite remarkable, that the majority of the panel for whom preemption is not a realistic process and these circumstances would nonetheless recognize that it's a real issue and agree to have it included.

QUESTION: Dmitri Sidorov, Kommersant, a Russian business and political daily.

Will you talk a little bit more about how productive was the Russian representative position, especially when discussing the U.N. Security Council expansion, the IAEA role, and the preemptive strikes issues. Thank you.

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: No, I don't think I'll comment on the role of any particular member of the panel. But what I will say is this, that while—as I said, at the beginning we were talking at each other; by about halfway through, we were engaged in serious discussions. And were there points of view? Of course there were points of view. But I was enormously gratified at the statesmanship with which the panel members approached the problems.

QUESTION: Thank you very much. I'm from a Nikkei newspaper, Japanese Press.

I have a question about the U.N. Security Council reform, which the Japanese government is very much interested in. I remember that General Scowcroft made a comment that you personally support no expansion of the permanent seats and you're inclined to support non-permanent seats, eight seats, which is the option B you mentioned. Could you elaborate the reason why you support option B, and does it represent the U.S. government position?

Secondly, do you think that the Japanese peaceful constitution, which prevents Japan to commit military action, is a big constraint for Japan to be a permanent member? Thank you.

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: Why do I support no more permanent members? I think in a way one of the problems with the Security Council is the rigidity that was introduced by the way the Security Council was set up. And by adding more permanent members, one simply adds a new rigidity. How do you know who will be the principal powers 30 years from now? Do you want to change it? So I think the more flexibility you can have while recognizing the responsibility to have those with the power engaged in the use of power, that you ought to do it with the greatest amount of flexibility. And the difference between Model A and Model B, if you follow the criteria we set forward, is really minimal. But it does leave it open that if something drastic should happen in the constellation of states, you wouldn't have to go through this agony again.

MR. DAALDER: The other question is whether your position represented the U.S. government's position.

I think General Scowcroft was an independent member of the commission.

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: My position did not—if it represented the U.S. government position, it was coincidence. No. We were appointed by the Secretary General, not by our

government. Did I consult? Yes, I consulted both the State Department and the National Security Council and so on. I was very interested in their views, interested in what their hopes were, what their red lines were, and so on, but I took that into my thinking as to what kind of report we ought to do.

QUESTION: Ann Florini from Brookings.

General, I have two questions. The first is what the reaction from countries outside the U.S. government has been to the wording of the panel report that is relatively favorable to the U.S. definition of how to think about security now. I've seen some statements coming out of the General Assembly where other countries have rather strongly objected to that language and said that the panel report in general gives too much deference to U.S. views on security and does not pay sufficient attention to the poverty and other kinds of concerns that are of particular interest to many of the U.N.'s member countries.

The second question is your—you made a quick comment that some of the recommendations having to do with the Secretariat and the Secretary General's ability to control the Secretariat are not among the stronger part of the panel report. And I think that's true. I'm curious as to why that was the case. Was this simply a low priority for the panel? Was it despair over engaging in U.N. bureaucratic politics? Was it a feeling that not much can be done?

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: Well, to take the first one, I think there are a variety of reactions to the report, some of them that there was inadequate attention to issues of poverty, disease, and those concerns.

I think the way the report handled it was just right because the Security Council is designed to deal with peace and security and the instructions that the Secretary General gave to the panel was how do you improve the operation of the Security Council in issues of peace and security. And what we did was say peace and security is not just war fighting; peace and security, for much of the world, also includes these things that have a security aspect. So that's the way we did it, and I think it was a useful way to do it.

The second one I've already forgotten.

MR. DAALDER: The Secretariat.

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: Oh. Oh, well, it was near the end. We looked at some measures to do it. It was controversial in the sense that, you know, a lot of the Secretariat is sort of signed out to different countries. They have squatting rights for different positions and so on. And in the end, it just kind of fell through the cracks.

QUESTION: Stefano Stefani, Embassy of Italy. And I do not have a question on the Security Council reform. Anyway, General Scowcroft seemed very familiar with our concern.

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If you imagine a fence between the U.N. and American public opinion, at least some American public opinion—I don't think Brookings is much representative of this particular American public opinion—but there is a barrier. And you're being exposed to both sides, General Scowcroft. You pointed out how the panel has been doing extraordinary work, you know, beyond expectations, both in bringing together different world views on the U.N. and also achieving some meat in its proposal. Now one view which we've been hearing the last couple of weeks is that none of this has come to pass, or none of this proposal can even be taken up by the U.N. seriously until the issue of what people call "the scandal" of the oil-for-food has been solved.

So we find ourselves in a situation where the Volker report, not to mention there will be an American Senate report, might—important as it is, because I'm certainly not underestimating the importance of the oil-for-food scandal, but might sort of supersede, especially in the United States, the High Panel Report, which would be a pity. Since you're familiar with the — support of the American administration and the American Congress and public opinion and the U.N., what do you think is going to happen?

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: I think the report came out at an unfortunate time, when the oil-for-food issue hit the press. I'm not an expert on that. I have talked to Paul Volker about the general issue. I think the reports of it were pretty badly confused. You know, there were issues of the tens of billions of dollars which were missing. In fact, there was an agglomeration of two different things. One was what happened in the oil-for-food program; the other was smuggling of oil, which was by far the greatest.

In neither one was the Secretary General intimately involved. The oil-for-food program was a Security Council program, not an Secretary General program, and the Security Council monitored it. The United States, of course, is a member of the Security Council, and I believe we scrutinized virtually every contract—maybe not for the right things, but there's a lot of confusion about this whole thing, and I think by the time the Volker report comes out, it will be somewhat assuaged.

In broader terms of public opinion, I think, certainly in the United States and probably in other countries, when things don't go right on some foreign policy issues, it's awfully convenient to blame the U.N., and virtually every American administration has done that to some extent. It's a fact of life. It's one of the values of the U.N. for countries to use. But we do pay a penalty for that in terms of, especially, congressional skepticism about the value of the U.N. and therefore appropriations to U.N. activities.

QUESTION: [Inaudible] Dutch Radio.

Did the panel address the question of state terrorism? I don't mean only state-supported terrorist groups, but states directly using terrorism as means of—for political purposes against a civilian population?

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GENERAL SCOWCROFT: Well, I think the state use of terrorism comes under the general heading of the kind of issue that is broadly described by "genocide" and those kinds of things, and state behavior egregiously apart from the norm is an appropriate issue for U.N. action. And, you know, law and practice have not advanced much beyond that. And, you know, if you look at the issue of Darfur, for example, it's not that nothing could be done about Darfur, but there's enough divided interest and counsel and so on in the Security Council that nothing in fact is being done seriously about Darfur. It's a problem that could be solved. It's not easy to get to, the African Union, which has troops that could be used, need aircraft to get the troops there, need supplies — it's a complicated problem, but I think it illustrates the vagueness of that responsibility to protect.

QUESTION: Coralie Bryant from Columbia University—your alma mater.

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: Yes.

QUESTION: I want to return to Susan Rice's question, or a part of it, and ask what the strategy is for public education in this country about this report. It actually has gotten practically nothing in the way of press attention, although other things, like the Volker thing, have gotten a great deal of attention. And it's relatively more difficult to come by than it really ought to be, and without more public education there's no chance that it could ever be moved up a little bit on the U.S. agenda, perhaps.

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: The United Nations Association is pushing it. The—what's the Ted Turner—

MR. DAALDER: The U.N. Foundation.

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: —U.N. Foundation is pushing it. It's getting in specialized circles, given the nature of the report itself, it's getting reasonably wide distribution. And I think, for its nature, it's a fairly readable report. It's relatively short and succinct.

Could we have had a better campaign? Very likely. But that's where we are.

MR. DAALDER: It's a great college textbook.

QUESTION: My name is Dick Rowson. I'm with the Council for a Community of Democracies.

General, what do you see as the relevance to the report and to reform of the U.N. of groups like the Community of Democracies, like the recommendation that comes from the chairman today of grouping like-minded democracies to take action where action in the U.N. is not possible, or even those of the American Enterprise Institute, which is to constitute a force of such nations who would act in case there is not compliance with human rights and democracy?

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GENERAL SCOWCROFT: I am agnostic about the association of democracies to take action where the U.N. can't take action. I, in a cursory evaluation of when that actually might happen, I don't see one being much easier to operate than another. And, you know, take Darfur as an example, I'm not sure that a collection of democracies would move any faster than the U.N. If the United States or maybe the United States and Britain or the United States and France were determined, we'd have troops in Darfur.

I think we have the U.N.—imperfect as it is, when we really try hard, we know how to use it reasonably effectively. And to start over again with a group of like-minded countries, thus driving out countries that are not like-minded but we have to convince to make this a better world, doesn't seem to me to advance the problem all that much. But that's a very personal view.

MR. DAALDER: With that, General, thank you very much for—

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: Thank you. Enjoyed being with you.

[Applause.]

[END OF TAPED RECORDING.]

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