THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION

CENTER ON THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE

RAYMOND ARON LECTURE

Inaugural Event

FORCE, LEGITIMACY, AND ORDER

SPEAKERS

JEAN-CLAUDE CASANOVA

PIERRE HASSNER

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P R O C E E D I N G S

MR. GORDON: Before I introduce the speakers, I thought I would just say a brief word about what it is we are launching here with this Raymond Aron Inaugural Lecture and the Center that I run here at Brookings.

I think most of you know we launched the Center on the U.S. and Europe last spring at a time of great change and challenge to the transatlantic relationship. It was obviously in the midst of the great crisis over Iraq; Europe was integrating, with the draft constitution having just been passed; enlargement was a month away then, to 10 new countries--all sorts of important changes going on within Europe and real questions about the future of the transatlantic relationship and alliance. So that was the idea behind expanding our work and launching the Europe Center. But as we did that, one of the things that we were very keen not to do was to lose our specificity on France that we had in the Center on the United States and France, which we had set up some five years before.

So this Aron Lecture grows out of a commitment we had to make sure that, as we expanded our reach and started doing more Europe, we weren't going to do less France. Indeed, we wanted to do more France. It was actually Gilles Andreani, the director of the policy planning staff, the Centre d'Analyse and de Prevision in Paris, who had the idea as we were talking about how can we promote dialogue and get more interaction--because clearly, between the two countries, that's one of the things we need more of--who suggested why don't we have this annual lecture where we will invite a prominent French official or scholar to come and address Americans and launch the debate about some of the big policy issues of the day. And we're really delighted that Pierre Hassner and Jean-Claude Casanova are with us to help launch this inaugural lecture.

Now, you'll notice that Stanley Hoffmann is not here on the podium as hoped and advertised. Stanley, unfortunately, is ill. He'll be okay, but he's got acute bronchitis. I spoke to him over the weekend. He was going to do everything possible to come. Those of you who know Stanley know that he was perfectly prepared to reject his doctor's orders and get out of bed and come down here even at the last minute. He tried to do that, but ultimately was prevented from doing so--obviously to our regret, but I think to his as well. He stressed that he really wished he could have been here and asked to send his regards and apologies.

But fortunately, even though we'll miss Stanley, we have what I think the Americans would call an *embarras de riches*--I'm not sure the French actually use that expression, but I think we know what it means--with two other great disciples of Raymond Aron and students and friends of Stanley with us, Pierre and Jean-Claude.

I should also add why it is we call this the Aron Lecture. It could have been any number of things. But it seemed a natural to us to name it after Aron, who was the intellectual giant of France throughout the 20th century--a philosopher, sociologist, journalist, political actor, teacher, scholar who wrote more than 40 books from the late 1930s to the early 1980s and countless articles on all sorts of subjects. So maybe it's presumptuous, or at least ambitious, on our part to invoke his name, but I think it's a scholar and political actor that we would all aspire to be like. He was a bridge between scholarship and policy and he was a bridge between France and the United States. As Stanley wrote in one of his reviews of Aron's book, he had a passion against prejudices, need for intellectual lucidity, and an attachment to liberal values. So it's an honor for us to be able to call this lecture the Raymond Aron series.

It's a cliche to say we couldn't have a better panel to speak on the subject, but it is also true that we couldn't have a better panel to speak on this subject. Jean-Claude Casanova and Pierre Hassner would be terrific speakers on this topic that we

chose--force and legitimacy--even if they had not been, like Stanley Hoffmann, disciples and students of Aron, but of course they were. They're also my former professors at Sciences-Po, so it's a particular pleasure for me to find them here. As the Cold War was ending, I was able to take a class with Pierre and Jean-Claude.

Just a brief word about each before I turn the microphone, I guess first, over to Pierre.

Jean-Claude Casanova, again, I think everybody knows. He's the editor of *Commentaire*, which happens to be the review that was started and launched by Aron himself in 1978. And also like Aron, Jean-Claude was for a number of years a columnist at *Le Figaro* and he now writes a regular column for *Le Monde*.

Pierre Hassner, I'm tempted to say, is Pierre Hassner, because I think everybody in this room knows Pierre. Instead of listing all of his many publications and positions, I'll let Aron introduce Pierre because Aron actually talks about Pierre in his memoirs. And I quote. Aron says the following: He recounts "in circumstances I don't really recall, Pierre Hassner, who sometimes came to my classes"--I wondered what the "sometimes" was referring to--"who sometimes came to my classes, made a brilliant, stunning presentation on Thucydides." This is Aron's memoirs. "I showered him with well-deserved praise. I told him that I had never heard a presentation of such high quality either from a student or a teacher.

"Then," Aron recalls, "Jean-Claude Casanova reminded me that I actually said I haven't heard such a brilliant presentation since the one Jean-Paul Sartre did on Leon Brunschwig. I think Casanova is right. In fact," Aron says, "such presentation was very promising; it wasn't dazzling.

"Then," he concludes, "the following week I also gave a talk on Thucydides, hoping to do almost as well as Pierre."

Now that, for any students who may be in the room, is pretty good praise when you're a student and Aron puts you in a league with Sartre on your presentation on Thucydides and says that he's going to try to do as well as you did.

Pierre, the floor is yours. Why don't you begin. It's a great honor and pleasure to have you here.

MR. HASSNER: Thank you very much, Phil. After your introduction, everybody can only be disappointed. I'm no longer the same Pierre Hassner as that kind. But anyway, I'll do my best.

Also, a correction. You were not really our student. You came and participated in our seminar, as David did another year, and to our very great profit.

So I'm very glad to talk about Raymond Aron in the States at a time of U.S.-French and European crisis and of polarization, if not in the American people, at least in its elites. Because I remember two occasions when Aron visited the University of Chicago and visited Cornell, and came back very proud, saying everybody was there, people who don't speak to each other, Straussians, anti-Straussians, and so on. He was very glad that he could gather everybody in honor of his presence.

And also, in 1991, we had another conference on Aron on the eve of the first Gulf war. And Stanley at that time was there. And Henry Kissinger was there, too, and he said it shows the devotion in which we all hold Raymond Aron because "in other circumstances I couldn't imagine Stanley Hoffmann and me being on the same platform."

So I think that this virtue of Aron of producing a kind of unanimity, in the States if not in France--although after he'd been very isolated, he ended in a kind of triumph--will reflect a little bit on our discussion. Because I think Aron for me--beyond the theses, the analyses, rich and deep as they were, for me he has remained above all a professor of moral and intellectual sanity, a teacher in what he was saying, the two great qualities, a respect of facts and the respect of others, of the other side.

I remember one of the first times I saw him, he was saying "I tell to Sartre and the others you are talking nonsense. They tell me you are a bastard. I think I'm the one who is [inaudible]." And this he certainly always was. And Phil, quoting Stanley, has already talked about his extraordinary qualities. I won't spend much of my precious minutes on that. But I think it was a remarkable mixture precisely of firmness and moderation; awareness of complexities and awareness nevertheless of the need for action and for choice, even when one had, as he had said already in his original thesis, a decision is always amid ignorance and uncertainty. But never to forget complexity even when one acts, and never forget the necessity for choice even when one examines the complexities.

He did waver on some issues. I think on the French nuclear deterrent, on the prospects for European integration, he wasn't very sure and changed his emphasis several times. But he made a number of basic choices which are still relevant today. He broke with his left-wing intellectual friends over the Cold War, over the fight against totalitarianism, and even before, when warning about the dangers of Germany and the need for French rearmament. And that was something which made him quite isolated, but from which he never wavered. At the same time, he broke with his friends on the right over Algeria and Suez, which he criticized; while on the other hand, a few years later, when Israel was in danger, as he saw it, in the Seven Days War, he reacted very passionately in its defense and very critically to de Gaulle's utterances at this time. So this I'll come back precisely on these two choices.

And finally, as Phil explained, the many fields in which he was active. I think to understand him, one must see at least these three Arons: the analyst and theorist of international relations; the critic of ideology, particularly of totalitarianism; and the master of historical sociology trying to give an interpretation of the evolution of society in the 20th century.

So now to the center of what gathers us here: Aron on the use of force and on legitimacy. And here I think it is very interesting and very relevant to the disputes between Americans and Europeans today. Because on the issue of legitimacy we have this view that the Europeans are converted to international law--while a little before, being rather ironical about Wilsonism and the U.N.--but [that they] think legitimacy comes from international law incarnated in institutions--the Security Council and so on. And America, at least as Robert Kagan and Frank Fukuyama have explained, see legitimacy essentially coming from the American Constitution and from the American electorate and not from the consent of other countries or, indeed, from universal principles.

It so happens that in his magnum opus, "Peace and War Among Nations," Aron, thinking what could be beyond power politics, has two parallel chapters on peace--*la paix par la loi* and *la paix par l'empire*, peace by law and peace by empire. And he criticizes both. And the originality of his position is interesting for our debates of today. In the same way, in the same book, he's against disarmament, against unilateral disarmament and not believing in general disarmament, and then against the search for military victory against the Soviet Union. All through the Cold War he believed neither as Walter Lippman and Hans Morgenthau believed--in the possibility of having a grand settlement, a grand negotiation with the Russians--nor in the Cold War ending in Armageddon or in general disaster.

So where does it leave him? We'll come to that in more detail in a moment. It's not so far from a realist position. But this is why it's important to see that he was a realist, if one has to classify him in his theory of international relations, but this realism was informed and modified by the importance he gave to political regimes and to ideology, on the one hand, and by the hopes he had for the positive evolution of an industrial society making war at least less profitable and less rational.

So first, his critique of international law. It's fairly conventional, I would say, but it's a convention which goes back to Hegel and to many others, that international law is not really law, that it's in the sphere of the [inaudible], that there is no authority, no constraint--no praetor, as he says--and hence that the U.N. Charter, that nobody really followed it. I think he would have agreed, perhaps, with the recent articles by Michael Glennon here saying it's about time to abandon this illusion because something which is honored only in the breach has not the value of a law.

So he had a fairly simple notion the states are in the state of nature, not in the civil state; international relations is defined by each state reserving the right to use force when negotiation fails. Hence he was not against the notion of preemption or prevention, which could, in certain circumstances, be indispensable.

But on the other hand, the other chapter was a critique of empire. And there, you know, his book--nobody has ever accused him of being anti-American, but he had this book on the imperial republic. He didn't shrink from speaking of an American empire--not that America wanted possessions, but having this asymmetry, that it gives the law and that what applies to others doesn't apply to itself. And he thought that, as Montesquieu thought, that the republic which is imperial endangers its own republican character. So he was against the Wilsonian crusade in the name of the law and he was just as much against political crusades. His motto was moderation and wisdom gains time--so basically, the notion of containment. In this he agreed with Kennan while being much more attentive to the need for military rearmament and to the dangers of the Soviet Union, but basically his view was essentially containment.

So in international politics with the Soviet Union, he had this formula which I think still is the best formula for the years of the Cold War: *Paix impossible, guerre improbable*--peace impossible because you can't have a real peace with an ideologically offensive totalitarian regime, war improbable because the Soviet Union has

suffered so much destruction and because of nuclear weapons and so on. Hence, containment, rearmament.

And there is an interesting chapter in "Peace and War" called "Survivre c'est vaincre"--survival is victory--in which he polemicizes with people who I think are all dead now like he is-- Strausz-Hupé, Pozsony [ph], Tintner, the trio who led the Institute for Foreign Policy Research in Philadelphia, I think--and saying that this was unrealistic and dangerous, that you could not have a crusade nowadays, but that there was a hope that the contradictions of the system would one day, if we were firm, lead to its transformation or to its collapse.

On decolonization, this is, I think, very interesting to think back today, because for many people it was the same--either Nasser was Hitler or it was essentially the communists and so on. And he emphasized very much that it was not the same struggle. He was very much for [inaudible] the Korean War. Actually, the first time in my life when I heard him was a lecture he gave just after the beginning of the Korean War after the invasion of the South, when *Le Monde* had the headline "Il est urgent d'attendre." And Aron answered, "Il est urgent d'agir." So he was all the way in the Korean War.

On the other hand, on Algeria, as I said, he broke with his friends, with the *Figaro* and so on by saying, much before most of the Left, most of the responsible Left or Left-of-center, that the Algerian War could not be won and that Algeria should be given independence.

On Vietnam, he hesitated more because it had an aspect of Korea against a communist country and an aspect of Algeria--national liberation against colonialism.

And that was his central idea, which I think is worth meditating on again today. But the problem was very different in Europe and in Asia. In Europe, it was a military problem. The populations were on the side of the West and the problem was a

Red Army. What one had was to contain or to balance the Red Army. In Asia, it was impossible to separate the communist manipulation from national liberation from decolonization. It was the importance of nationalism to which he was very open.

I could perhaps wait until the discussion because I'm afraid of being too long. But in the book, which exists in English, which was written in 1956 on war in France, [inaudible] he has a long page which I thought of reading to you about the inherent advantage of the guerrillas at the time. The European soldiers, the value of human life was different. We are able to become undistinguishable from the population. And on the plane of history, this inequality created by the overlapping of civilizations wins more powerfully than the equality of human souls before God.

This leads me to the third point--more general and more theoretical, but extremely practical and relevant at the same time--about terrorism. He had a fascinating dialogue with Carl Schmitt. I don't know how well-known Carl Schmitt is in this country. He was a great lawyer and political philosopher who also happened to have been a Nazi, to have been the head of the association of lawyers under Hitler, and then he was more or less put aside. But his basic notion--in a great book which was recently translated in English, "The Nomos of the Earth"--was that anybody who speaks of humanitarianism is a liar because humanity doesn't exist, international universe is a multiverse, not a universe, and it's only big spaces--Germany should do the same as the United States with the Monroe Doctrine, which could keep a kind of order but the order relies on the opposition between friend and foe, which is the definition of politics.

And in his late days in the '60s, Schmitt wrote a little book called *Theory of the Partisan*. In this book he was saying that maybe the partisan in this flat economic world which is dominating will bring again something of a struggle, of grandeur, and so on. He was quoting the French general Salan and so on in this direction. But on the other hand, he was saying because one no longer wants to admit real enemies, as there

was in the interstate world after Westphalia, now in the name of humanity one has absolute enemies which one wants to destroy completely.

And Aron polemicizing with him said, in the second volume in his great book on Clausewitz, Schmitt falls into the cardinal error against which Clausewitz warned, defining a fight or a fighter by a method--namely, terror or terrorism. The French colonels didn't understand that they couldn't reverse the action of the Algerian insurrection and employing the same methods of psychological war or counter-subversive war, and so on. They mistook a war of national liberation partly conducted with revolutionary methods for a revolutionary war. And this was a costly error which produced, then, the French insurrection at [inaudible].

At any rate, what he emphasizes there is the dialectic between subversion and repression, the fact that one may destroy terrorists, but their main tactic is to bring more repression in order to mobilize potential supporters. And I think the formula is not for him, but it's very relevant to the struggle against terrorism. It's what a German sociologist whom we studied, Simmel, was saying, that in any bilateral conflict there is a virtual or potential third party--either an arbiter, an umpire, or a state, or an interested spectator--so that whenever there are the people we want to destroy, the question is for the population about whom the whole struggle is, which side it will be on, and the rest of the international context, what the consequences would be. And as in his interpretation of Clausewitz, it's always the primacy of politics, of the political questions.

So this is mostly what I have to say about Aron. And now a short conclusion beyond Aron.

It seems to me, first, of course, beyond the Cold War. It so happens he died in 1983, and I'm really very sorry that he couldn't see the collapse of the Soviet Union and his ideas being confirmed. Also about the arms race, that the danger of war between America and the Soviet Union didn't come from the arms race, it came from the

nature of the Soviet regime, and when the Soviet regime collapsed, it collapsed too. But I think his formula--*paix impossible, guerre improbable*--summed up better than anyone else this period. And the whole book is centered on the bilateral relations between the two enemy brothers, and so on.

Now, of course, we are in a new kind of period and we cannot know what he could have thought. I think for 10 years peace appeared less impossible, and now we see war being less improbable. With a new kind of peace, no war within the West, the definition--I always had this same conversation with him, that if you have greater difficulty of war because of nuclear weapons and more civil wars, is it still useful to define international relations by peace and war, the fact of reserving the right of war? Can one say then that within the West there aren't international relations?

I think, of course, not. But he was quoting Max Weber, saying it's not because the situation is ambiguous that our concepts have to be confused. That's true. But what use are the concepts based on the two extreme situations if the reality is always in-between?

At any rate, it seems to me there is a new kind of peace within the West which has been discussed *ad nauseam* in American political science about the sources of the democratic peace, it's true, between mature constitutional democracies; for whatever reason, war is not conceivable as defining the relationship. And there are these new types of war, these new types of enemies--civil war, the spread of fundamentalism everywhere except, partly, in Europe--all these things which we read about, networks, uncontrollable movements, and so on.

And interestingly, Schmitt, in the last-but-one paragraph of his book, has a very troubling proposition. He says World War I started as an interstate war between normal enemies and it turned into a transnational civil war between absolute enemies in the name of the class principle. "And who will know how to prevent the appearance of an

analogous and infinitely more intense mode of new and unexpected types of hostility whose translation into action will give birth to unexpected incarnations of a new type of partisan?"

This tendency is a prophesy about al Qaeda suicide bombings and so on. And we don't know what Aron would have said about this new situation, but I'm certain of one thing: He would maintain the primacy of politics. He would see any struggle still in the context of the political objectives and consequences. But what interplay with the interstate model, what combination of action and moderation he would have analyzed and recommended, of course, I cannot say.

But I can say that, for all its value, the law's conceptual scheme is no longer very tenable, that there is an evolution which is-- He didn't have--unlike Tocqueville, who was one of his masters, he didn't have this sense of the great crisis of modern society, of the downside of globalization. I think he was a believer in progress through technological progress and through industrial society; he analyzed very much the hopes of the 19th century on this point and others, and he had something of that. He talked about the struggle against circular allegiance, but not about what to do about fanatical fundamentalist religion. And [inaudible] seeing this emerging, the prevalence of the individual on one side with human rights, the victim, the head of state who can be imprisoned, and the interests of the planet, have no real place in his theory. I think everything has been analyzed very well in his historical writings and in his articles. His theoretical thing is a little, for my taste, too dualistic.

And the same thing--he may be right about international law in the strict sense, even perhaps about the weakness of the power of international institutions, but he doesn't speak much about the undoubted evolution of norms, of what is considered normal. It seems to me that war in the classical sense--if you can't negotiate, you go to

war for the same objectives--has been de-legitimized and, on the other hand now with these new kind of opponents, the earlier version, a just war, is being re-legitimized.

So there are great [inaudible] and we are very much in need of overcoming, I think, the strict duality between the civil order inside and the state of nature-- anarchical--outside, in favor of what David, who is here, calls a semi-constitutional view of international relations; that it's not either there is a tribunal or police, a supreme authority which would be a world state--which is impossible--or it's pure anarchy. There is the need for these norms to be expressed in deliberation and dialogue and there is a need to recognize that the solution is more hybrid and more complicated than at the time of the Cold War, that we have a kind of mixed system, as the mixed regimes in antiquity with an element of monarchy, but which has to be something like a constitutional monarchy with an element of aristocracy, a concert of both things, on one hand an alliance *de facto*--I don't think it can be legislated--of democracies; on the other hand a concert of the great powers, and a much more intrusive presence both of small states and other groups and so on.

Or, to speak more simply, a coexistence of states which exist, which have their sovereignty, but which autonomy doesn't mean exclusiveness. And there are this new dimension of human rights and of the need for intervention, but which cannot be purely arbitrary, decided by one country, which has to go through a process of rethinking and reformulation. And that we do not find yet in Aron, above all because he died before the end of the Cold War and secondly because his very sharp analysis was ill at ease with these ambiguous, mixed evaluative [ph] situations.

But still--and I end on that, as I began--he is still sadly missed in the situation more complex than the Cold War. Someone who warns against the twin dangers of triumphalism and catastrophism, of adventurism and passivity, of Manichaeism and relativism is absolutely needed. We have no lack of terrible

simplifiers, to use Burckhardt's expression--which Aron liked--nor of premature synthesizers. But Aron's clarity, awareness in this combination of passion and moderation, and his awareness both of insoluble tensions and of uncertain but indispensable choices will inspire us as long as we still have politics in this world.

Thank you.

[Applause.]

MR. CASANOVA: Even after 40 years of common teaching, it's very difficult for me to speak after Pierre. But I will do my best not to decrease your attention.

Raymond Aron was much admired in the U.S. And if Stanley Hoffmann was with us this night, he would remember, as I do, the fall of '57. Dean McGeorge Bundy had invited Aron to Harvard to give three lectures on "immutable and changing France." Aron came back to Harvard in June '58 to be made Doctor *Honoris Causa* and to deliver the commencement-day lecture.

In the meantime, de Gaulle had returned to power. Aron's critical distancing of himself from de Gaulle, mingled with admiration, probably contributed to his popularity in the U.S. But it would be an insult to the Americans to think that the admiration for him was solely because, in relation to the policy of the Fifth Republic in its brushes with the U.S., he incarnated a position that could be described, at the risk of over-simplification, as more Atlanticist, more pro-American than that of most French leaders or observers.

At a more profound level, I believe we should regard him as the most lucid observer of French policy in the 20th century, especially of French foreign policy, because he was not only a specialist on France, but a master, a great historian of the 20th century with all its tragedies and complexity. If Aron understood France so well it was because he understood the world better than most of his contemporaries.

In President Kennedy's papers there is a note from Arthur Schlesinger to the president, dated 8 May '61, in which he says, "Raymond Aron will be in the U.S. later in the month. As you know, he is a man of great intelligence and charm. I would think that you would find a conversation with him immensely useful in setting the scene for the trip." Kennedy was preparing a trip to Europe. "His English is perfect." This is a warm but somewhat modest compliment, especially as Schlesinger writes on the same page that "Pierre Mendes-France is the sharpest political mind in France. His English is fluent."

I have chosen to say a few words to you on Franco-American crises or disputes as Aron saw them and on how one should interpret the present crisis in an attempt to understand what can be considered as permanent and what can be seen as a changeable in the present Franco-American misunderstanding or in the tensions between our two countries.

Let's begin with two general considerations that were noted by Aron. First, on the question of temperament stemming from the history and the relative dimension of the two countries, Aron wrote, in September '52, a view he was often to repeat later and which relates to the psychology of peoples and their leaders. I quote him:

"The policy of a country like France, of medium size on the scale of the 20th century, often consists of adjusting to situations that are easier to curse than to modify. Obliged to submit when we would prefer to decide, we simultaneously express and vent our ill humor through interminable discussions of decisions that, for the most part, are imposed by the circumstances. Controversy over the Atlantic Pact mainly reveals repressing feelings, too much fighting against necessity and with opinion, failing to understand the degree of liberty that is left to us. A second consideration regarding the ambiguity stemming from the personality of General de Gaulle--which one sometimes thinks may still be a trait of French political leaders--and whether this ambiguity

cultivated by de Gaulle, and perhaps some of his successors as well, is part of the French game and the role it intends to play, given its situation."

I quote again Aron, in May '66:

"The real reason for the crisis"--it was the Atlantic crisis--"or rather, for its impassionate violence, nevertheless lies outside the boundary of good or bad diplomatic manners, beyond myth and language. Let us be frank about this. Those whom General de Gaulle drives mad are not, like Jupiter's victims, those he wants to destroy but those he is obliged to live with. He inspires in them mixed feelings of admiration, astonishment, respect, and exasperation by means of a technique whose underlying principle is always the same: No one knows where he is trying to end up, and everyone is left wondering because he leaves it to be understood that he is pursuing a vast enterprise, what he called himself ‘un grand design,’ a great intention."

In this quotation, I liked two important features. One, the ambiguity regarding objectives. In the case of NATO, does France want to weaken it or not? In the case of Iraq, does France try to prevent the American intervention or enhance France's international status by opposing the U.S. on this point? The proclamation of a grand design, a great intention--perhaps Europe independence vis-a-vis the U.S. or, today, the triumph of international law.

Let's look more closely, if you allow me, at a true crisis in Franco-American relations, that of NATO in '66 and that of Iraq in '03, in an attempt to find common or distinguished elements.

If we are considering de Gaulle and the Atlantic crisis, we could say that de Gaulle, despite his quarrel with NATO, never broke up the Atlantic alliance. He merely [inaudible] it. Why? Fundamentally because he was reasoning in terms of traditional policy. The long-standing French policy of dividing Germany that, following Poincare or Morasse [ph], he wanted to pursue, had failed in '45. Neither the Russians

nor the Americans nor the British nor, naturally, the Germans, wanted it. If the goal of a Franco-Russian alliance to divide and weaken Germany had become a pipedream, his dream in the '60s consisted of one thing: to settle the German question among Europeans only, without the Americans. This was a great design.

Hence the idea I shall quote de Gaulle speaking to Brezhnev in June '66: "Removing the German problem from the area of dispute between the Soviet Union and the United States and placing it where it belongs, namely, as a problem to be settled in good faith among Europeans." And de Gaulle adding, "If you want security, the German problem has to be brought back inside Europe."

It was no longer a question, as in Atlanticist policy, of anchoring Germany in the West in order to face up to the Soviet Union. De Gaulle in fact resented what he called Germany's submission to the U.S. He wanted an independent European policy, and to this end he juggled with the dual hegemony of the Soviet Union and the United States. He used one to protect himself against the other, hoping that one day European independence would emerge from an American withdrawal and an agreement with Russia over Germany in exchange for this withdrawal.

The problem was that the second French policy toward Germany was just as much a pipedream as the first. The Germans were fully aware of the dangers. The other Europeans were worried. The Russians held on to what they had because they were communists first and Russian second. For them, French policy became an instrument in the strategy towards Germany and the United States. This explained the constant support given by the French Communist Party to Gaullist policy until its failure, for all to see, in '68, when Soviet tanks rolled over the Czech attempt to liberalize their regime.

Obviously, this policy, as Aron noted in May '66, has not contributed to European independence and unity. On the contrary, it has forced all the Old World countries to try to outdo each other in Atlanticism. In the end, it was history that decided.

Germany was reunified and Eastern Europe liberated. De Gaulle sincerely wanted this to come, but it was achieved by a policy that was the reverse of the one he advocated--in other words, through the maintenance and even the strengthening of the American presence in Europe, which permitted the political and ideological collapse of the Soviet Union. This clearly shows that the key was not the dividing up of Europe between traditional nation states, but between totalitarianism on the one hand and, on the other, Western democracy strengthened and sheltered by American might.

If one draws up a table of plus and minus for the Atlantic crisis orchestrated by General de Gaulle, we find on the positive side, from the French point of view, one, the enhancement of the French position; two, the development of the French nuclear force backing up this enhancement; three, the popularity acquired by France with nonaligned world opinion.

On the negative side, first, the weakening of the Atlanticist notion in French opinion--no political leader even today dares call himself Atlanticist; two, an ambiguous position within NATO, confirmed by the events of the past 40 years. Very gradually, the French nuclear force has come to be seen as, I quote, contributing to the overall dissuasive posture of the Atlantic Alliance. It was Pompidou's success. Valery Giscard d'Estaing at the Martinique Summit asked for the installation of Pershing missiles in Germany, but without making his attitude public. Francois Mitterand gave public support to this installation. On one occasion, France demanded to give to Europeans the military command of NATO in the Mediterranean; on another, it accepted and encouraged NATO intervention in Yugoslavia. On still other occasions, France has acted within NATO in ways you are aware of--sometimes [inaudible], as in Afghanistan, sometimes with reluctance or foot-dragging, as in the case of Turkey and Iraq. France is still not a member of all the NATO committees.

Now let's turn to the Iraq crisis and to Jacques Chirac. The war in Iraq has opened the breach between our two countries. Certainly the new American policy has its origins in September 11, in the exceptional military strength at the disposal of the U.S., and the situation in the Middle East. Because the Americans have considered themselves, and have become, indifferent to the Atlantic Alliance and suspicious of Europe, of all Europe, they prefer to act militarily, prepared, if necessary, to constitute the coalition needed for the missions they have set themselves. And above all, they have acted without the backing of the U.N. Security Council.

It is possible to identify the first [inaudible] of this new policy before September 11 and even before the first Bush administration. Once the Soviet Union had disappeared and the world role of the U.S. had increased as a result, and also because of its mastery of the revolution in military techniques, American power and determination became mutually reinforcing. After September 11, a new doctrine was created and a new policy applied, with the Middle East as its principal area. But it is exactly in this part of the world that France, since de Gaulle, believes it has a special role.

Let us not spend too much time on the Iraq war. Ever since General de Gaulle, France has preferred to be in opposition for the sake of its own aggrandizement. The vestiges of Gaullism and of de Gaulle are our policy. The way the United States intervened in [inaudible] the United Nations and the American desire for unilateral decision making ruled out any possibility that France might, like the United Kingdom, take the American side. The mechanism of international diplomacy and the heated rhetoric of French public statements meant that France went beyond mere abstention, showing open opposition, even hostility, and [inaudible] the political cost of the operation to the U.S.

It is this that explains the vehemence of reactions on both sides and justifies talk of a genuine crisis, the most serious since the '60s. This is especially true--

and the French opinion today is quite content to see the U.S. facing difficulties in Iraq, difficulties which in French eyes demonstrate the correctness of the position taken by France--a void war leaves Pandora's box open. Jacques Chirac said "the witch's cauldron," or something like this.

Paradoxically, the doctrinal positions have become reversed. We could have called for caution, but in fact we invoked international law, whereas General de Gaulle was an advocate of national sovereignty in opposition to all forms of Atlantic integration. Of those who dream of cooperation he said, and I quote, "I know that some poor souls want to replace force by politics. No one has ever effectively made policy after having renounced being strong."

Nor was he any kinder towards the United Nations. I quote de Gaulle again: "We do not recognize it [the U.N.] as having any right of arbitration or jurisdiction, no quality of being able to lay down the law and apply it." Jacques Chirac, on the contrary, has been talking like President Wilson, and it is George Bush who has been talking like General de Gaulle.

French doctrine is a mirror image of that put forward by Washington. We take the view, first, that it is only the respect for law that gives force its legitimacy; two, that the United Nations Security Council is the sole arbiter of law and force; three, that there is no such thing as a just war unless it is supported by the Security Council.

This doctrine has one advantage and one disadvantage. The advantage is that, because of our entitlement to a permanent seat on the Security Council and the vital rights this confers, we should be able to participate in the control of force anywhere in the world. Just like the one-time belief in the equalizing power of the atom, it is now believed that the Security Council has an equalizing power that makes France the equal of the U.S. or China.

The disadvantage is that this doctrine is questionable both in practice and in theory--in practice because NATO, including France, has already intervened militarily in Serbia without the agreement of the Security Council, since this was necessary to avoid a Russian veto. If tomorrow China were to threaten Taiwan, it is American power that could save the island and its democratic regime, and not the Security Council, because of the Chinese veto. If the Security Council cannot guarantee everywhere and at all times the rule of law, it is because of its composition and the way it operates. The fact that certain powers, not all of which are democracies, have a veto over any decision authorizing or defending the use of force opens up the possibility of arbitrariness that is quite the reverse of the rule of law.

Leaving the realm of ideas to return to reality, question must be asked concerning the causes of American intervention elsewhere in the world. The United States has three preoccupations that I'll link to three threats: terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, tyrannical regimes. These preoccupations are shared by the Europeans and by numerous countries through the world, particularly by Israel. If the threats are real or they can be guarded against, the Americans regard themselves as being in the front line because they have been direct sufferers and because they have unequaled military capacity. France and other European countries are unable to deny either the legitimacy or the objectives of the American capacity to act. What they can call into question is the manner in which the U.S. acts. This is because one can be powerful and still fail to attain one's objectives and, in fact, cause more harm than the evils one was seeking to prevent.

The principal reproach that France can address to American policy today no longer relates to the war in Iraq. The war has taken place and will be judged in the light of its consequences. There is progress towards peace between the Palestinians and Israel, thanks to the U.S. If the civil war in Iraq can be tamped down and a moderate

regime installed in Baghdad, if Iran and Syria no longer provide support for terrorist operation outside their territory, and if more use is made of the region's oil resources for its own economic development, there is no reason why France should not welcome these developments and help the Americans to achieve them.

If France has no other policy than to make soothing speeches regarding the Middle East, while at the same time secretly wanting the U.S. to fail in the hope of retrospectively justifying its -- view in the United Nations and its popularity in the Arab world, the only result will be a further worsening in its relations with America, even with the division of Europe and despair on the part of those in the Arab world who genuinely aspire to peace and democracy.

To be truthful, I see only one way of attempting to reconcile France and the United States, by trying to find a position acceptable to both sides. I find this position in the work of Montesquieu, who inspired part of the American Constitution and of whom Aron claimed to be a faithful disciple. In his "L'esprit des lois," he justified preventive war, but added: "It is a conqueror's business to repair part of the mischief he has occasioned. The right of conquest, I defend this, a necessary, lawful, but unhappy power which leaves the conqueror under a heavy obligation of repairing the injuries done to humanity."

American action in Iraq was imprudent, but it must not be allowed to end badly. By criticizing this action, France under Jacques Chirac has derived a certain prestige. But it has also created divisions within Europe and the Atlantic world. It is in everyone's interest to repair the imprudence that has been committed and to eliminate and call for an end of all divisions.

Thank you very much.

[Applause.]

MR. GORDON: Jean-Claude, Pierre, thanks, both, very much for all of those rich remarks. I'm sure you've provoked a lot of comments and questions from the room.

Let me, if I might, say a couple of things to try to frame the debate before I open it up to the floor and give you all a chance to come back to our speakers. I wanted to do that. I mentioned to Pierre that I thought it would be useful for me to try to ask some questions and frame the debate, and then was somewhat confused by Stanley not being here. Because what one thought would happen--you have two Frenchmen, Stanley comes down. If you've been reading anything Stanley's written lately, you would have expected quite a harsh critique of American foreign policy, and I thought my role could thus be to provide a sort of American response to that.

So I told Pierre I was somewhat confused by the last-minute change of events. And I just looked at him and I said what would Aron do? And Pierre explained to me that Aron would probably say, "If I was a Frenchman, I would think this, and if I was American, I would think that." And not only did that strike me as an Aronian reaction, but it, I think, does frame the debate just thinking in those terms. Because it seems to me--and Jean-Claude ended on this point about the crisis over Iraq and the divisions--that, without simplifying too much, there really is a French view of force, order, and legitimacy, and an American view. Without denying the debates that are heavily going on within each country, there are these perspectives. And I think, Pierre, you captured in the chapter of Aron's book that you mentioned, with peace by law or peace by empire. And again, without simplifying too much, the French have generally taken the view that we need to be pursuing peace by law, and the Americans pursuing peace by empire.

And I think--again, just to try to frame this, to open it up--I would never presume to speak for Stanley, but he can speak, or at least write, for himself. If you take

a look at his latest book, which is a series of interviews with Frederic Bozo on these questions, it is quite a stinging critique of recent American foreign policy, emphasizing these points that we've heard from France lately about the need for legitimacy in the world, about the way in which the Americans are moving away from legitimacy, and the dangers of empire. And Stanley uses the word "empire" in his critique and argues that if we don't set up institutions and rules that we all abide by, we're all going to be in deep trouble. That seems to me--it's not only Stanley's critique, but has largely been a French critique on one end of the spectrum.

But then, I think, there's an equally legitimate American response to that, which consists of a couple of points which I'll just mention. One is, isn't America different? And I'll give Pierre and Jean-Claude a chance to answer these questions, if they want, from their own or a French perspective. But isn't America different? The American response is it's all very well for the French to say that we should all follow the same rules and norms for everybody, but America has certain responsibilities in the world because of its power, because of its commitments in the Middle East and Asia, and because of the way it is seen by terrorists--it wasn't a coincidence that 9/11 happened here and not elsewhere. Isn't America different? And I wonder, actually, whether Aron wouldn't have been a rare Frenchman in France making these points about power and why America is different.

Secondly, I think an American would respond to this critique by asking whether we were really as multilateral in the past as the French and critics today say that we no longer are--if that makes any sense. I mean, there seem to be a lot of allusions to this glorious period of multilateralism that we've somehow walked away from. But I raise the question, did it really ever exist--I mean, other than 1990-91, when we actually used the Security Council during the Cold War? Was America really as multilateral, and

therefore its actions legitimate, as it is today, or were we not just able to get a lot of support because a lot of allies in Europe supported what we were trying to do?

And then lastly, an American perspective or question I would put out there is need for institutions and rules. Fair enough, but what institutions and what rules? And that was another strong American argument during the Iraq debate, when the French were saying, and Jean-Claude made this point, about only the United Nations Security Council can authorize force. The American question was why should a Security Council with non-democratic powers on it or small countries like Cameroon or Mexico be deciding what American policy should be in the Middle East?

So I do think that there are pretty strongly felt views on this set of questions both in France and the United States. And if we're going to get over the divisions that you ended with, Jean-Claude, it seems to me that that gap is going to be critical--it will be critical to bridge that gap.

With that--if you want to react to any of that, but otherwise I'll open it up to the floor for the comments and questions that anyone may have. Shibley.

QUESTION (Shibley Telhami): I wonder whether the juxtaposition of a French view and an American view was not a damaging oversimplification of reality, particularly applied to the Iraq war. I mean, the reality of it is France was not alone in its position on Iraq. In fact, we were far more alone in the world in terms of how we saw the Iraq issue than France was. And even here in America, our public was divided, our elites were divided. We had two views within America itself. And even now, I think it is fair to say that maybe our public even has tilted at some level on the Iraq issue. That wasn't, apparently, the key issue in our own election.

So I wonder if that is--you know, particularly the focus on the Iraq issue to make this case of contrast is really the wrong issue. Because something else is going on here other than this French saying no to America or--something else is going on here, and

it's maybe not so much related to the Security Council. I think that's an issue, obviously, but I would suppose, if we had gone alone with no Security Council resolution to Rwanda to prevent the genocide in Rwanda, I don't think we would have had the same kind of opposition.

So something else is going on here in terms of how people are testing norms. I mean, we're talking about norms. And norms are not only ones that are implicit in the decisions of the Security Council. I think the great opposition of the international community to American foreign policy, perhaps, is based on a different kind of assumption about the violation of norms than just simply not getting the U.N. And I'd like to see how Aron might have addressed that.

MR. GORDON: Thanks, Shibley. I think we should gather a few comments and questions from the audience before we come back to the panelists. Anybody else like to--Jeffrey Hart.

QUESTION [Jeffrey Hart]: Yes, I'd like to ask both of you to help me resolve a riddle. I expected that France would support the war against Saddam Hussein's Iraq, because when I think of France in the last two decades of the Cold War, it's French intellectuals, including the two of you and others, who--and Aron, of course--who made the case about totalitarianism at a time when it was unfashionable to do so among American liberals and certainly in West German intellectual life. It seemed that third-worldism trumped discussion of the totalitarian nature of Saddam's Iraq. And I found that particularly peculiar given the importance of some of the intellectual lineages that went into the Baath party that went back to France in the 1930s and '40s. But this didn't seem to be an issue in debates in France, and I was perplexed as to why that was the case and wondered if the two of you could illuminate us about that.

MR. GORDON: Thanks very much. David, did you--

QUESTION: Just a simple point, really, that maybe the need for the U.N. Security Council is too legalistic a criterion. Maybe it's a kind of metaphor for something else which the U.N. Security Council isn't, in a perfect sense, but is perhaps the best approximation. That is, you know, you might call it a consensus of civilized opinion, which you might say must always include the United States and France, but there are a few others, and that rather than put it in a strictly legal sense of the U.N. Security Council--there are obviously times when the Security Council is not appropriate and is unable to act in the way that it ought to.

MR. GORDON: Thanks. Anatole, can you hold that and maybe I'll give these guys a chance. We have three big questions out there. Pierre, do you want to begin with any of that?

MR. HASSNER: As you like. I completely agree both with Luther and with David. I was addressing myself more in a way to the style of explicit discourse and I think the two extreme positions, because I was trying to talk about the notion of legitimacy and so on. And personally, I think the two extreme positions cannot really be taken seriously--the legalistic one of the U.N. or the fact-trusters [?] because we are both good and powerful, hence being legitimate means having the approval of others. So I think indeed the real issue is not there, the issue is in-between. And we will know that France accepted and even encouraged Kosovo, encouraged Chirac, encouraged Clinton in '95 about Bosnia, and acted itself.

So I think the U.N. thing is not really the issue. The political thing, what it will do to terrorism, what it will do to the Middle East in general and so on, that of course is the issue. And this is why I think nobody is purely multilateral or purely unilateral. Madeleine Albright said multilateral when we can, unilateral when we must, and many people, including myself--I don't know who was the first--said the Bush

administration is the other way around: unilateral when we can and multilateral when we must.

But the simplest thing is the difference between the two Gulf wars. The fact that Bush's father spent six months negotiating, explaining, trying to get support of Arab states for that, trying to influence Israel, and so on. And I think very much it's a matter of style. Not that the Kyoto Protocol, for instance, was so good--I'm not an expert, but I'm ready to be persuaded that it was a lousy protocol. But the way in which it was rejected, President Bush saying the question is the well-being of the people in this country--that is, to hell with environment, to hell with the rest of the world, it's the American economy which counts, this -- the rest of the world who find this legitimate.

So I, like Jean-Claude but unlike, I think, Stanley--of the four of us, of Aron and his three pupils, I think Stanley is the only one who has more of a belief in the U.N., in international organization and so on. But the idea that there has to be this consensus and that the new norms cannot be simply dictated, that they have to emerge, there, as I said, the constitution and the monarchy, that there must be a recognition by the most powerful that there are some things which they cannot decide alone.

Now, on Jeffrey, I despair of convincing you. We had this same discussion in May, and I think I addressed with Aron on Nigeria and on terrorism. First there is a question, as you probably would agree, that North Korea is perhaps even more Stalinist than Stalinist Russia, but it's a worse regime. Would you recommend attacking North Korea? No. So the question is what is the political result, what are the possibilities, and so on.

And secondly, I think I've worked as much as anyone in this room on the notion of totalitarianism. Of course there is in common the fact of being bad and of being the most liberal and so forth and so on, but this canard about the origins of the Baath party, who cares about that? Saddam Hussein admired Stalin above all. He

imitated Stalin very consciously. But to put together the Arab fanaticism of bin Laden--almost all the Arab leaders during World War II, as is only natural since he was the opponent of the West, flirted--including [inaudible] and so on--flirted with Germans. And Peron and many people were inspired by fascism, just as in another way Saddam was popular with some of the Frenchmen. I remember a distinguished French intellectual and diplomat, who shall remain unnamed, telling me in '81 the Americans and us, we have a division of labor; the Americans are holding the hand of the traditional [inaudible] monarchies and we are holding the hand of the modernizing dictatorships.

So that was the idea, and both sides were wrong. But it was easy to identify friendly to Western democratic regimes there. But that is very simple, and I think the things I quoted and so on are [inaudible]. One doesn't have to be a third-worldist to think that the attack against Iraq, especially in the way in which it was done, aggravates the gap between the West and the Arab world, the Muslim world, the [inaudible] in general, and so on.

MR. CASANOVA: Yes, I agree with Pierre, considering the so-called totalitarian regime in the Arab world is not an issue in France. It's a moderate position, as has been said by Pierre. The extreme position in France is to say that dictators in Arab countries are modernizers and so on.

But concerning peace and war in the present situation, I think the Aron answer will be peace by law is [inaudible], peace by empire is permanent war in some ways, it's dangerous; so we need peace by politics, by more politics. And it's clear for the war and it's clear today in the Iraq situation, the U.S. needs more troops and more money, more influence in the region, more legitimacy, more support from Europe, and so on, and you cannot attain all these things only by politics, agreement, and so on. We need more and more politics -- law and empire.

MR. GORDON: We'll take another round. I know Anatole has a question or comment.

QUESTION [Anatol Lieven): Thank you, yes. Just a line from the wretched, pragmatic Anglo-Saxon corner in support of David and also Pierre and against too much concentration on legality with regard to the U.N.

I think the key difference between this Iraq war and Kosovo, for example, was the absence of regional consensus, not the absence of a U.N. vote. But the fact is in the case of the Kosovo war it was possible, admittedly through a considerable amount of pressure and, shall we say, the creation of consensus, but nonetheless to get a regional consensus, with the exception, of course, of Russia, Greece, and one or two others, but generally a European consensus behind intervention in Kosovo. It was manifestly not the case with regard to this Iraq war, but it was at the previous Iraq war.

I think that on the world stage, once again, yes, we should be very wary of attributing to the U.N. some kind of absolute legal or indeed moral status, because as an organization it just will not bear such absolutes. But I think the reason why the U.N. is greatly valued in much of the world is not because people in fact absolutely advertise it in these terms or think that it is the best organization for generating international consensus, but that in many ways it's the only one. I mean, it is, after all, the only forum on a world scale which can generate any kind of even basis for a world consensus on any major issue. And for that reason alone it deserves a certain respect.

MR. GORDON: Thank you. While you have the microphone, Norman Birnbaum is next to you.

QUESTION [Norman Birbaum]: Let me ask something of both our distinguished visitors which may seem a little bit off the impassioned if not entirely unfamiliar discussion of Iraq.

Aron for much of his life talked sociology. That is to say--and in his writings, like the famous E*ighteen Lectures on Industrial Societies*--he dealt with the structures of contemporary society and politics in an interesting way. Yes, he favored less rigidity in the French administration and in some sense, on a scale beginning with Sartre [inaudible], he could be raked as a liberal. But he certainly was a great admirer of the post-war achievement of the Western societies in attaining a socioeconomic consensus around the welfare state. And I think he assumed, for a large part of his life, that this was a buttress of indispensable element in Western democracy and that the Western democracies on both sides of the Atlantic brought this into play when acting internationally or when exerting a certain international influence.

He died in '83, the beginnings of Thatcherism and Reaganism, but in fact this basic conviction of the rightness of, let's say, the post-war welfare state consensus and his evaluation of it as something very valuable never really left him. And under these circumstances, one wonders what Aron would say about the present situation in the Western societies on both sides of the Atlantic, where the welfare state is--where social democratic and socialist parties are competing with their old antagonists to disassemble the welfare state. One wonders what consequences Aron would have seen for a larger political consensus in these societies which might enable them, in fact, to play their role on the world stage. I don't think this should be underestimated.

MR. GORDON: Thank you. I was going to say one final. I see a whole bunch of hands. We don't have time for all, but Bill Friend, and I'll get Bob [Inaudible] in there, too.

QUESTION: I'd be curious to know whether Aron ever addressed the question of power. In the Iraq situation, there is a great deal of discussion of we have the power to do this, with the implicit notion that we are justified because we're us. But what we are discovering is that military power is one thing; the power to get what you want is

quite another. But this is an inherent problem. Legitimacy is something which is supposed to address the mediation of power so that, if it doesn't work, you were nevertheless legitimate. We are now in a position where we are neither quite as powerful as we thought nor as legitimate. But that's another subject.

The problem of power is that you use it, and you then discover that it is something like your full gas tank--after using it for several hundred miles, you haven't got much anymore. It isn't self-refilling. And I wonder if he ever discussed this as a philosophical proposition.

MR. GORDON: Okay. Bob [Inaudible]?

QUESTION: Just a couple of quick observations in the long evening.

One is, one ought to be careful about generalizing Europe. The fact is that Europe even today remains divided, and even now something like 10 of the 25 EU countries actually have troops in Iraq.

Number two, again I would be wary of generalizations about utter lack of legitimacy, opposition to the U.N., and so on. After all, there is a plausible argument to be made that there was a certain international, even U.N., legality in the U.S. action in Iraq. More recent critics would argue that you could make case for legality of the U.S. action, but its wisdom was subject to opposition or dispute by those opposing the use of force.

Thirdly, just an observation about Chirac. It seems as though Chirac broke through a limitation that de Gaulle, Pompidou, Giscard, Mitterand, and others were always aware of and never went past. It was one thing to question the wisdom of what the U.S. was doing, to say it was a bad idea and one didn't support it, but it was something altogether different, in the case of Chirac, to place such an active, overt leadership role in actively opposing what the U.S. was doing. That introduces an entirely new element and seems to lack a sense of proportion [inaudible].

MR. GORDON: Thanks, Bob. That's a nice segue, I think, to Jean-Claude and then we'll give the two of you [inaudible].

MR. CASANOVA: Well, I agree with your explanation of the Chirac attitude concerning the--maybe today, for Chirac, the relation with the U.S. is his only political electoral asset, so he will be--it's important for him, so he will not change, I don't think.

But concerning Aron's explanation and the relations between societies, I think Aron was not at all a dogmatist. He was thinking there was history, the interrelation of the evolution society, the nature of politics and regime, and the international game, the pressures, wars, and so on. And [inaudible] explain--I think for him the collapse of the Soviet Union could be explained by the necessity of the economic revolution and the contradiction with political regime and the lack of force, at the end, in the ideology, and the pressure of the American and the Western political containment and economic containment of the USSR.

But I think it was not a surprise for him, in some way. If you remember, he was waiting for [inaudible] 30 years ago and [inaudible] was a necessity because the regime has to be changed and it will be changed in the evolution of the society, and it's a contradiction.

MR. HASSNER: Well, there may be a misunderstanding. I thought I was happy to leave to Jean-Claude Norman's question, because you know much more Aron's position on Western societies, which was the question that the welfare state is being dismantled and hence the West lacks legitimacy. And he was, I think, a middle-of-the-roader, as they say, very [inaudible]. I remember once he was defining himself as [inaudible] avec *une certaine nostalgie de liberalisme* in the '50s. But I'm not sure he moved, you know, that much--but I think he moved more to the right at the end in his impassioned attack against the left in '73--

MR. CASANOVA: For France.

MR. HASSNER: That's the issue about the West, whether he would think it's terrible the welfare state is being dismantled or whether he would think, as you tend to think--I think, from our--I'm trying to learn a little bit of economics through 30 years of a seminar with Jean-Claude; I still haven't learned. But I understand that you think that it's very difficult in an open society to maintain, really, the welfare state because there is the primacy of the market and the money goes away and so on. So that's the question. I don't know what he would have thought.

As for two, I am happy to take. On power. It's a very good question. He had a very amusing article called *Power, Macht, Puissance: poesie demoniaque ou prose*--I forgot how. And it's such a reversal, because he was saying the Germans had the romanticism of power, whereas for [inaudible] persons, for instance, power is like money, just something which circulates, everybody has a little bit of power, and so on. And he was mocking [inaudible]. And now we have in America people who have a romanticism of power, seen mostly as military power, which he was attributing to Germany. But he himself was of course completely in agreement with him.

And something which I have been quoting *ad nauseam* in the last two or three years is a quotation from Hegel which I first read from him--Hegel about Napoleon. He admired Napoleon enormously. He thought Napoleon was a genius of war. He said nobody did such wonderful triumphs militarily and yet he failed, demonstrating this way the Ohnmacht des Sieges, the impotence of victory, because he won and he woke up German nationalism, Russian nationalism, Spanish nationalism, and it was ultimately a political failure after having been a military triumph. So this is what Aron, obviously, would have thought.

As for Bob's question, yes, but then the countries who have sent troops have sent troops because they wanted to be--except, of course, for Tony Blair, who is a

true believer--but they wanted to be on the right side of the Americans. But if you look at the Poles, Poland is a little bit an exception, although the people are critical about the war. But they are [inaudible] to America and so on. But otherwise, in--Spain is the best example. Spain sent troops and 90 percent of the people were against. So that counts for something.

On the legality, I agree with you, one can make that case. One can make the opposite case. But I rest my [inaudible] case on the wisdom, not on legality. And on the [inaudible], you are absolutely right. But what about Suez? Did America under a Republican administration, did it simply say we disagree with Suez, or did it do what it could when, in cooperation with the Russians and in the name of the U.N. and of the different countries' force, did it stop the Suez expedition [inaudible]? So I always get it wrong, the American expression what's good for the gander is-- MR. GORDON: It's the goose first.

MR. HASSNER: --for the goose. So I use [inaudible]. So that [inaudible]--the Americans can't stop the French, the French can't stop the Americans. I think, on both cases, it would be best to have a friendly extension in disagreements rather than [inaudible]. I thought this race of Villepin to Africa to get there before Powell and so on was absolutely unseemly. But the important thing is that true allies and defenders of America--Canada, Chile, Mexico--were against it. That says something which was not created by France, but says something about the legitimacy of the expedition.

MR. GORDON: Thank you, Pierre. And let me thank everyone for coming. I hope you enjoyed it as much as I did. And particularly this last exchange reminded me so much of the class I didn't take with them, where it starts off them teaching the class and then they get into it with each for awhile, and then Pierre starts quoting philosophers in three languages. So that was, for me, at least, of particular reminiscence.

But thank you, Pierre and Jean-Claude, for doing this, and thank you all for coming.

[Applause.]

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