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BRIEFING

TROUBLED PARTNERSHIP:

WHAT'S NEXT FOR THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE

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THIS IS AN UNCORRECTED TRANSCRIPT.

P R O C E E D I N G S

MR. LINDBERG: Good morning, everyone. Welcome to the Brookings Institution for an event jointly sponsored by Brookings and the Hoover Institution. I'm Tod Lindberg. I'm a fellow at the Institution. I'm the editor of Policy Review, also.

What brings us today is a discussion, "Troubled Partnership: What's Next for the United States and Europe." "Troubled Partnership" comes from the subtitle of a book that I have edited, four of whose contributors are before you today. "Beyond Paradise and Power" is the main title, and you may recognize the main title as an echo of a best-selling New York Times book by Robert Kagan a year and a half or so ago, "Of Paradise and Power," which in turn was an outgrowth of an article called, "Power and Weakness," that I published in Policy Review, which subsequently went on to attract a certain amount of attention, shall we say, both in Europe, the United States and elsewhere and even earning comparisons to certain other famous articles. One called, "The End of History," comes to mind.

In this, Kagan laid out, I think, a rather provocative and original assessment of what was causing the structural cause of the drift between the United States and Europe. Kagan made, in essence, two arguments: One was that the amount of power that you have determines how you feel about power and its use, which is to say strong powers act like strong powers, and that's different from the ways in which weaker powers act--for example, European powers. The strong prefer freedom of action. The prefer rule-based systems in which they are treated more as equals. That was half the argument.

The other half of the argument, which I think was the more provocative, and more compelling part and the one that I think caused the article to have sufficient resonance to turn itself into a best-selling book and then to lead, in turn, to this volume was the second half, which was that your ideas about power, and what to do with power and how effective power is and how much utility it has in the world, as against other things, will, in turn, affect how you think about how much power you should pursue and acquire. That difference between the United States and Europe, I think, was being appreciated, in a way, for the first time.

But enough of the structural theory. We have also recently had a presidential election. We have had the return of the Bush administration, and we have what I think, by general agreement, is some fairly serious and significant trouble in our partnership. The question of the Atlantic Alliance and its future is before us. The question is whether we have deep structural fraying or dismantling that's been going on or whether, indeed, this has been largely a matter of the difficulties between the personalities involved or, indeed, whether there is a possibility that with a different set of attitudes, we might repair these kinds of relations, et cetera.

So I think our task today will be to figure out where we are and, by way of having done that, maybe we'll be able to say something about where exactly it is we will be going.

We have, of course, a very distinguished panel--Ivo Daalder, senior fellow at the Brookings Institution; Walter Russell Mead, senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations; Frank Fukuyama, professor at the Nitze School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University. I will spare you further introductions--those are in your materials--so that we can have as much time as possible.

We'll begin with short presentations from our three panelists, and then we'll open up for discussion, questions and answers back and forth. We'll do this in alphabetical order, and I'll turn to Ivo Daalder now to get us going.

MR. DAALDER: Thanks, Tod. Thank you all for joining us today. I want to congratulate Tod at putting together what is really an excellent little volume on the future of U.S.-European relations and persuading such distinguished co-authors, one excepted, myself, to be part of this volume. I think there are books on sale just on the outside. I believe in selling books, for some reason, because mine don't get sold as much as my co-authors' are.

[Laughter.]

MR. DAALDER: Let me talk about what I think is the future of U.S.-European relations and divide the short term from the long term.

In the short term, I'm a pessimist, and I think it's very difficult to be anything else besides a pessimist about U.S.-European relations in the short term. But in the long term, I'm an optimist. I was just in Europe earlier this week, in which the notion of being optimistic is, almost by definition, excluded and makes me an American, even though I was born and raised in Europe, but I am optimistic for reasons that, in fact, have very much to do with the short term.

So let me explain that. Why am I pessimistic in the short term? Well, there are really three reasons:

One is that, for all the rhetoric we are hearing, even emanating from Republican circles, I think American foreign policy in the next four years is going to be exactly what John Kerry said it would be--more of the same; that is, we're not going to see a grand strategic change. We're not even going to see a grand tactical change.

Frankly, I don't think we're even going to see a grand rhetorical change in American foreign policy in the next four years.

I think we're going to see exactly what we saw in the previous three and a half, actually four, years, which is an American foreign policy run by a very confident president, convinced of the power that the United States has and the purity at the motives that the United States has and that the combination of that power and purity allows the United States, basically, to do what it needs to do, and wants to do and have others follow it or not as they want.

I thought it was remarkable, and anybody who saw the president's press conference last Thursday, when he was asked what he would do to repair America's image in the world, he basically said, "You know what? I had to make some tough decisions. They were the right decisions. People disagreed with them. That's their right to disagree, but I really am not going to change my view," and he became more emphatic as the answer went along, ultimately, explaining that he would reach out to other people in order to "explain my decisions."

It's not that kind of reaching out, I think, that people in Europe are looking for because they already knew his decisions, and they knew his explanation. So I don't think there's going to be a lot of change in American foreign policy. And to the extent that American foreign policy is at least, in part, a reason for the problems that we have in U.S.-European relations, as I would argue it does, the continuation of the trouble that we have seen in the past few years will likely continue. That's point one.

Point two is that I think that the Europeans will have looked, and are looking, at the outcome of this election in the same way that the punditocracy has tended to look at this election, which is that this was an affirmation of a particularly "red

America's" views of the values of America, that, in fact, America is "red America," in the European view, that God, guns and gays is what matters to Americans, is what matters in the decision to vote in the way that they did. It is how Karl Rove continues to explain the outcome of the election. I believe, actually, that is a fundamentally flawed explanation of what happened, but that doesn't matter.

I think the European elite, and certainly the European public, has bought into the notion that the way Americans look at the world and the way Europeans look at the world is fundamentally different from a perspective of what drives the individual policies and what drives politics, what drives the society, what drives the essence of the two nations.

I noted that Karsten Voight, who is the German Foreign Ministry's representative for U.S.-German relations immediately went out and gave an interview to the International Herald Tribune, in which he wanted to reassure his American friends that Germany, too, had many religious people in their Parliament, and in fact there were more theologians in the German Bundestag than there were in the U.S. Congress. So, please, we can talk to each other. The notion that somehow because you have studied theology you could therefore have something to talk about with Americans tells you a lot, it seems to me, about how Europeans are looking at the election and the desperation there is in some European circles to find something to talk about.

Finally, I would say that the rejectionists, France and Germany, in particular, will look at this election as a validation of their view of the United States, that, in fact, there was a reason to believe that not following the United States was a good thing because the U.S. was just very different from how Europeans were pursuing their interests in their foreign policy, and this just proves it, and that therefore the reality

will be that France and Germany will have less no matter what Mr. Barnier says in the Wall Street Journal or, indeed, Jean-David Levitte on C-SPAN or what needs to be said. The reality is that the dominant view in France and Germany is we really can't work with the United States in the way we have done in the past because we are too different.

The third fundamental reason why I am pessimistic is because of the structural issues that Tod talked about, but I put them slightly differently. I think the way in which the United States and Europe have come to view the world is so different that the ability of them to get together and develop join strategies has become so much more problematic.

I'd say that the dominant American view, which Jim Lindsey and I have called a hegemonist point of view, a belief that what matters in international politics is power and states in order to deal with the fundamental dangers of terrorism, weapons of mass destruction that are out there and that because power matters, because states matter, international institutions, indeed, even international law does not matter. That has now been reaffirmed, and particularly with the re-election of President Bush, a reaffirmed American view of how the world works and how you need to engage in the world.

The European view is very different. It's what we call a globalist point of view, a belief that the major elements in international society, what drives international politics isn't power, but is, in fact, globalization, that it is the transnational forces of disease, of poverty, of weapons of mass destruction, technology that really are driving international politics and that because those are the driving forces, the way you deal with it is through international cooperation, international institutions, in particular, as the means for cooperation.

It's a normative approach that tries to figure out what are the rules of the game, how can we enforce those rules within an institutional structure so that you have, on one hand, a state-based, power-based world view and the others then a normative, institutionalized world view, which is driven by the fact that what makes the world tick is determined by different forces.

So those are three pretty fundamental reasons for being pessimistic about the future of U.S.-European relations. Why then think about the possibility of being optimists?

Well, in the long term, I'm optimistic because the reality is that even Europe will have to come appreciate that the world may be slightly different than the way it has looked at it up to this point. In fact, Europe will come to realize that if it wants to get anything done in the world, it will have to become a stronger power. It will have to come, in order to become stronger, a more united path. It will have to cooperate more, that in order to get anything done, and not just in Europe, but, more importantly, outside of Europe, to deal with China, to deal with what's happening in Africa, let alone to deal with what's happening in the Middle East, it can no longer rely on the United States. It doesn't want to rely on the United States. It will then have to do it itself. It will have to do it on its own.

And there's a realization, it seems to me, emerging in Europe that only a strong Europe, only a united Europe can have the kind of voice in international policy, including here in Washington, that is necessary and that, therefore, the urge to unification, the urge to put apart the kind of differences that have marked intra-European debate may well be pushed aside because of the differences with the United States.

I note that even a country like Norway is now restarting the debate about whether their future doesn't lie in Europe rather than in the trans-Atlantic or in the partnership with the United States. I'm not predicting that Norway is going to join the EU any time soon, but the fact that this is now becoming an issue just points to the realization in Europe that working together is becoming much more important because of the differences between the United States that have emerged in the last few years and that are likely to deepen, and that the big debate within Europe is the debate that Timothy Garton Ash and the Euro Atlantacist and the Euro goalist; that is, are we trying to build a stronger Europe in order to be a good partner with the United States to deal with the problems in the world or are we going to be a stronger Europe in order to be a counterweight to the United States?

And that is a big debate. It is a debate that pits France and Britain as the two major poles, and it pits lots of the smaller European countries on the British side, with a few of the larger countries on the French side. And the key, it seems to me, the key to the outcome of that debate is, as always, Germany. It will depend on where Germany ends up. Germany has, in the last three, four years, pursued a foreign policy that frankly is not, to put it bluntly, one that a major power should be pursuing. It has not followed its own interests. It has followed weakly and meekly in the step of a Euro goalist foreign policy with, I think, disastrous results for Germany, but that's for it to decide.

Germany will have to come face-to-face with the fact that it can very well decide whether Europe unites in a direction that makes it a partner of the United States or whether Europe tries to unite in a way that it makes it a counterweight, which I predict will not work because too many European countries are not willing to go into

that direction, which leads me to recommend, finally, a change in American policy towards Europe.

My recommendations to this administration are unlikely to be any more successful than my recommendations to the Kerry campaign, but let me try--

[Laughter.]

MR. DAALDER: --which is to say we can help the process of what happens in Europe by, once and for all, stating unequivocally what we want Europe to be, which is rather than being divided and weak, we want a strong and united Europe. And even if that Europe at times will disagree with us, it is much better to have a Europe that is strong and united rather than weak and divided.

And one of the decisions that this administration will have to face is whether the policy it has pursued in the past few years of divide and rule, of keeping Europe weak by picking out and cherry-picking its partners in order to build these coalitions of the willing, whether in the long term that is really in America's interests.

I don't believe it's in America's interests. I don't even believe it is in America's interests if you take the perspective of foreign policy that this administration pursues and that therefore it is incumbent on the administration to come out strong and quickly to argue that we want a Europe that is united, we want a Europe that is strong, and we understand that a united, strong Europe may, at times, disagree with us, but that's okay because, in the end, we are confident that a united and strong Europe is more often going to be a partner rather than a counterweight and that, therefore, that is what we need to pursue.

Whether, in fact, Europe will unite and whether, in fact, this administration will put European unity front and center is, I think, one of the questions

that will determine whether my short-term pessimism can, in fact, become long-term optimism.

MR. LINDBERG: Thank you very much, Ivo.

Let me turn to Frank Fukuyama.

MR. FUKUYAMA: Well, I guess I'm the opposite of you. I'm a short-term optimist and a long-term pessimist, but I do think that we need to pay a debt of gratitude to Bob Kagan. I think that in his book he didn't get everything right. I mean, there are things left out and things aren't quite correct, but I do think he did touch off a very important debate and now actually allows us to get beyond paradise and power and to see the differences between Europe and America more clearly.

I am of the school that says that the differences actually are deep and abiding and are not going to be papered over by decisions that political leaders take in the short term, and I think that that's really been clarified in a lot of the things that have happened in the last few years. And I think, really, as a result of part of this Kagan debate, we actually can point quite precisely to the areas where these differences exist.

I think one of the most useful summaries of them was the manifesto that was written by Juergen Habermas and Jacques Derrida in the year prior to the Iraq war, where they talked about a kind of manifesto for the new Europe and pointed to how Europe is different. They had six points, but I would boil them down to really four.

Europeans like the welfare state. They believe in social solidarity. Whereas, Americans really have very mixed feelings about social welfare.

Europeans believe that they are transcending sovereignty. Whereas, I think Americans very much believe that legitimacy comes from a democratic, sovereign

nation state, and this leads to very different views about international organizations, the U.N., and so forth. I think that's become quite familiar.

A third point, use of military force. In the American national story, military power has been used for redeeming moral purposes. This goes all the way back to the American Revolution. It includes the Civil War that led to the abolition of slavery. It includes World War II that liberated Europe from Nazism, and it goes up through the Cold War, which liberated Europe again from the threat of Soviet communism.

I think in Europe the really central event in their modern history was the first World War, in which military power really served to undermine the very fabric of European civilization, and I think neither of these views is correct. It is in accord with the historical experiences of people on both sides of the Atlantic, but it does really I think serve as an underpinning for Kagan's famous quip about Europeans being from Venus and Americans from Mars.

The final issue is religion. Europeans, Habermas and Derrida say that we live in a continent where we don't like the president getting up every morning and beginning with a prayer and saying that, overtly, that he has been inspired by God.

Now, to this, I think we can add some other issues, very different perceptions about the Middle East, about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the general sources of instability in that region and I think very large differences in perception of the threat that's been posed since September 11th. I think Americans think this is a cataclysmic threat of Islamism combined with weapons of mass destruction, and Europeans think that this is something that they're familiar with in terms of their earlier experience of terrorism from Bader-Meinhof or from the IRA and so forth.

And I think that's what really important is that European identity is being built on this "not America" basis. Dominique Strauss-Kahn, the former French socialist prime minister, on February 15th, 2003, a month before the beginning of the Iraq war, when demonstrations erupted all over Europe, against the American-led war, he said that this is the birth of the European nation, so quite explicitly tying European identity to something that is not the United States.

Now, I think that all of this, in a way, is the fruition of trends that have been underway for some time. Anyone familiar, for example, with the whole literature on American exceptionalism will understand that these have been deep and abiding differences for some time. It's just that during the Cold War it didn't really make all that much difference politically. I mean, basically, the American exceptionalism literature really begins by asking why America has no socialists, and that's a true characterization of American politics in the last century. So America is a land largely free of socialists. Europe is a land largely free of Republicans--

[Laughter.]

MR. FUKUYAMA: And the overlap is the political space occupied by Timothy Garton Ash's Euro Atlanticists, on the one hand, and American Democrats on the other.

In the Cold War all three of those legs could actually agree on a common policy, but now the common strategy has got to rest on the overlap between the left wing of the American body politic and the right wing of the European body politic, and I think that that's not a very stable platform over the long run--the right wing not meaning the far right in Europe, but really what the Europeans call the center right.

And I think that the election doesn't, I mean, all that does is confirm, in the minds of many Europeans, as Ivo said, that they can't just blame President Bush for somehow having hijacked the country. It is really the American people that are the problem, and I think you're going to see a lot of that kind of analysis in the near future.

I don't want to talk about--I really do want to move beyond "Paradise and Power" because I think there is a different common agenda of a rather different sort that really has to do with immigration, multiculturalism and identity politics, where actually Americans and Europeans have very similar kinds of issues and where I think there may be room for a bit more of a common agenda.

One of the characteristics of the world now is multiculturalism, for better and worse. There's a very positive side to it which has to do with global integration, the ability of technology, and companies and people to work together productively in ways that bring together talent from all over the world, exemplified by America's Silicon Valley. And there's a negative side to multiculturalism, which has to do with the rise of intolerance and the reaction, in a sense, to that kind of globalization that is felt in many parts of the world.

And I think that, in general, although you get this common European perception of the United States as a land of Bible-thumping, gun-toting, intolerant bigots, by and large, the United States has been much better in dealing with identity politics than Europe has in quite a lot of ways. This is the week, I mean, this got drowned out because of the American election, but this week saw the murder of Theo van Gogh in Holland, who was a filmmaker--a Dutch filmmaker--that had done some fairly films talking about Muslims in ways that went way beyond the boundaries of the

previous Dutch discourse on this subject, and it led to a cycle of violence in Holland that I think the Dutch had really not seen for some time.

And there's a certain sense in which I think the United States, and we've got plenty of problems with identity politics ourselves, but in a way we've been able to deal with this issue better than the Europeans over time. I have an Irish friend who actually grew up in Scotland. He's got an extremely Irish Catholic name, and Scotland is still a place where Protestants and Catholics, they were murdering each other quite viciously 400 years ago and a lot of that still remains.

And he said that when he went to school in St. Andrews as a kid, every morning he was beaten up, basically, because of his Irish identity. He now lives in Silicon Valley, and he says he can never be happier, and that's the kind of world that he wants his children to grow up in.

And so I think that there is, you know, something that we are all going to have to deal with in the future, particularly Europe, because I think they've got the bigger problem with identity assimilation. There's a big hole in liberal political theory as to how you deal with the whole question of communities rather than individuals that assert cultural rights. And there is not a clear answer to this because, in some sense, a liberal society has to be dedicated to common principles of openness, tolerance, pluralism but, on the other hand, it's clear that you don't have a community unless you have certain common shared values that people cannot communicate if they don't agree on the basic rules of the game.

And I would say that, in Europe, especially the parties of the center right that should be bearing the torch on this issue, have really been, in a sense, deterred by a

kind of stifling political correctness and talking about this whole set of issues having to do with identity.

It's a very weird situation because this is a continent where there is practically no practicing Christians any more, and yet you get these Christian democratic parties that will get up and assert that this is a Christian civilization, and so the identity is, in a way, formerly weaker, but in many ways has personally felt stronger.

And so there has to be, I think, the beginning of a dialogue there, and I think that this is an area where Europeans may actually have something to learn from Americans, who have dealt both with the positive side of multiculturalism, making that work as a kind of positive force for growth and change and also dealing with the negative side of multiculturalism, you know, inability of America's I think long-term ability to assimilate people from very different cultural backgrounds.

It's also an area where I think we've got to watch it because we can do a lot of things that will either greatly exacerbate this problem or help it. I mean, the positive agenda I've kind of laid out. The negative one, you know, Americans and Europeans can say a lot of unhelpful things on this particular issue in the category of unhelpful you know, too much American advice on whether to take Turkey into the EU I think will probably not be appreciated. It's a little bit like Europeans advising us to open our border with Mexico.

The reactions to the head scarf ban in France I thought were a little bit strange on our part because, after having attacked them from the right, we suddenly attack them from the left for being too intolerant and so forth.

But it is an area where the threat is really quite common. I think that in many ways Europeans are threatened internally by radical Islam in a much more severe

way than Americans are in terms of their external threat. And the threat to the common values of democracy, in the long run I think will be quite serious, and it's something where I think we really need to sit down and talk a little bit about our experience with different strategies in dealing with this set of problems.

Thank you.

MR. LINDBERG: Thanks, Frank.

Walter?

MR. MEAD: It's good to be here. It's also great to see so many students either taking an interest or being dragooned by their teachers into pretending to take an interest in this subject.

I don't know whether I'm an optimist or a pessimist. The definition of an optimist, they say, is that things are about as good as they could possibly be, and a pessimist is someone who is afraid the optimist is right.

[Laughter.]

MR. MEAD: So maybe that's where I am.

As I look at Europe and the United States moving into the future, what I see are two societies that are sort of like characters in a Preuss novel, they're chasing illusions. Both the Americans and the Europeans are basically wrong about where the world is going, but these beliefs are leading them to behave in a way I think at the end of the day we're both going to be very disappointed by the 21st century and what kind of a world we live in, and we'll sort of be forced to kind of work out some kind of a relationship. We'll be unhappy with each other, we'll be unhappy with the rest of the world, but like a married couple who realizes that they can't afford to divorce, we're

going to still be sort of condemned to a not particularly happy relationship, but a close relationship.

What do I mean by this? Well, it's probably better manners to start by talking about what it is that we Americans, where we go wrong when we look at the world, and that is that Americans, because of our sunny optimism and so on, and also because of our tremendous self-esteem and self-regard, tend to think that American power, we're the good guys, the more powerful we are, the weaker the bad guys are and therefore the better the world is going to be and that the rise of American power prefigures for the 21st century a Pax Americana, the triumph of American ideas in the Cold War, triumph of market economics are going to make for a world of stable, peaceful, democracy, and so, in general, all we have to do is persevere and deal with problems as they arise, but things are moving forward in a good way.

I'd actually argue the relationship between American success and the rest of the world is more complex, that, to some degree, American society is based on further development of capitalism, which is the most revolutionary force for change in the history of the world--change in technology, change in the economy, change in social arrangements.

And the better we are at being American capitalists, the freer our markets are, the more flexible our labor markets are, the faster and smarter our economy is at reacting to new developments in new technology and moving forward, the faster we change as a society. And, by the way, if you look back at how American society, our economy and our society have changed in the last 30 or 40 year, we have changed at breathtaking speed. To somebody my age, the fact that people are even debating gay marriage is so revolutionary. I grew up in a segregated South. I grew up in a society

where, and I don't like to think of myself as that old, women were essentially barred from all serious professions. When my mother applied to a graduate school program at the University of North Carolina, she was told, "You're a married woman. We don't accept you, people like you, into this state university system," and that was it. There was no appeal, and people thought that was normal.

We had a regulated economy. We didn't have anything like the kinds of capital markets. We have changed enormously. And as we have changed, competition is tougher. We all have to kind of fight harder to stay where we are. Our GDP is moving ahead. Our way of life is changing in all kinds of amazing ways, but the rest of the world has to react to this whether they like it or not business suddenly American companies are in your face with these revolutionary techniques, these tremendously effective ways of organizing, and managing and managing money, and you know "cutting to the chase," as they say in Hollywood, getting rid of all the extraneous stuff and focusing right on that bottom line.

And other countries, other economies, other companies have to adjust to this or fall behind. Europe doesn't like this kind of pressure. The Middle East doesn't like this kind of pressure. Africa, to some degree, can't cope at all. The world is changing, and as those changes happen, it creates--disturbances come in the international system. A movement like al Qaeda or more generally the fanatical Islam is, in part, a reaction to the sense of a society in danger, of traditional ways of life being overturned.

So American success does not necessarily lead to a peaceful, quiet world. It leads to a revolutionary world. But in another way, our success in technology leads to new problems in that the whole WMD proliferation issue is partly so serious today

because it's getting easier and cheaper to make nuclear weapons and other forms of weapons of mass destruction.

Back in the day when the United States developed atom bombs, you had to have a consortium of scientists, the leading scientists from all over the world and spend boatloads of money on this. You had to have Albert Einstein helping you. Today, you can be kind of a third-rate country that can't even educate your own kids and use a team of scientists, not one of whom could get tenure at Stanford or something like that, and you can build these things, and you can do it in a way that's undetectable by international monitors, and this is only going to get more difficult, and particularly perhaps as biological WMD become more and more available.

But success in technology is one of the things that capitalism is all about in that it accelerates, it gets resources to people with new technologies, it turns more money to research and development and so on. So our very success is creating a more tumultuous world that will be more difficult for us to get some of the things that we want in it.

So what I would say is that Americans are going to be facing a paradox of success in the 21st century, and life will not be getting easier for us, even as we do better and better at the things we think should make life easier for us.

The Europeans, on the other hand, I think also have a sort of a false narrative that they believe in, which is the narrative of European recovery and sort of regaining the high ground in world politics and influence. If we look at it, probably the best-established single trend in world politics today is the decline of Europe. It's about a century old, that Europe has been sort of losing influence, political military influence around the world throughout the 20th century. Europeans diagnosed the cause of this as

European disunity; i.e., the two world wars, and divided efforts and so on. And now they're saying, now that we are overcoming the disunity and now that we're having unity, Europe will now recover, and Europeans really often speak as if the destiny of a successful European Union is to be the counterweight or partner of the United States. There will be two pillars in the world of roughly equal, though not identical, strength and composition--one on one side of the Atlantic and one on the other side of the Atlantic--and between them these two pillars will rule the world; in other words, white people are going to rule the world in the 21st century, although Europeans very seldom express the dream in quite those terms.

That's probably not what's going to happen. Americans, looking at Europe, and me and others looking at Europe, tend to kind of look and say there are five things we would need to see happening in Europe before we could believe that the European dream was coming true. One of these is radical economic reform.

From an American standpoint, you look at what's going on in Europe, and what you see is people standing by the side of a cold swimming pool, and they dip a toe into the water of economic reform, and they say, "Oh, this is so cold," and they sort of agonize and agonize and then like stick another toe in, you know, "Oh, it's still so cold."

We just say, "Jump in the pool, swim. Just jump in," because, to some degree, the process of European economic reform is so slow that they're not keeping pace with what they need to do to keep even. They may be falling further behind even as they reform. So "Thatcherize" or "Reaganize," to use an even uglier word for European economies, and do it quick, quick, quick. That would be the first thing. And I think that, to some degree, is an objective thing they have to do. They can do it in their own way, and so on, not exactly the way we did it or the British, but it needs to be done.

The second thing is spend money on defense, a lot of money. The U.S. is moving toward about 4 percent of GDP. Europe, we've got to understand that Europe is going to be a less-efficient military spender than the United States or than other countries. There are so many different languages.

There are also so many different politicians from so many different countries, each of whom is going to divert some of that money into pork-barrel spending rather than really effective defense spending, that, in fact, Europe will actually have to spend more money, more bucks for the same bang. In fact, it's likely to be spending less money, less bucks, and get even less bang because, if you look at the European demographic projections and the unfunded pension and welfare liabilities of European governments, they dwarf anything that we're facing, and we're facing some tremendous problems along those lines.

The third thing that you would need to see is bring Turkey into the European Union, and I'm glad to see they're moving in that direction, but too slowly and too grudgingly. This is not something, you know, Europeans hear Americans talking about Turkey and the European Union think it's some kind of evil plot to further divide the European Union, and probably there are some Americans who think that.

But a serious European concerned about power politics would see that the potential to detach Turkey from Washington and bind it into Europe, there is no other single thing Europe could do that would force the United States to take Europe much more seriously in the Middle East, and also in terms of remedying some of Europe's military weakness, Turkey is a huge, glittering, beautiful geopolitical prize for Europe, and yet European public opinion is horrified by the thought of getting maybe the biggest opportunity that Europe faces, which is a suggestion to Americans that, to some degree,

Bob Kagan has got it right. Europeans care about other things more than they do about power, in a conventional sense, but really this is something that, if Europe were serious about power, they would be moving very, very rapidly to engage the Turks.

The fourth thing Europeans have just got to do is make babies. I tell Europeans there are a lot of Americans who would be happy to give them some technical assistance in this matter, and they have only to call upon our assistance, but, in fact, the demographics of Europe are appalling. I've seen some projections that France could have a Muslim majority on present tends well before the end of this century, but the fact that the non-Muslim Europeans are failing to have babies, and we're facing falling populations, aging populations, falling labor forces, and therefore also slowing or even receding economic growth down the road.

I've seen figures from the European Commission that project, by the year 2050, the U.S. share of global GDP will rise from 23 percent to 26 percent of GDP, while the European share will fall from 18 percent to 10 percent I think of GDP. That is remarkable, and it is largely driven by demography. So they've got to make babies.

The other thing they've got to learn to do is either assimilate the kind of immigrants they're getting or stop getting those immigrants and start getting some immigrants they can assimilate; that, if you look at the polarization and alienation--and Frank has touched on this already, so I'm not going to go into too much detail--it's clear that Europe is failing to reproduce its culture, to maintain any kind of identity, to manage a sort of basic, you know, the question one has to ask sometimes is does Europe have the biological and the cultural will to live?

And until Europe addresses these five issues, a lot of Americans are going to think that the process of European unification is not so much the grand

emergence of a new superpower as it looks like the passengers on the Titanic huddling closer and closer together as the ship sinks.

Now, I would say, again, that that kind of hyper American-Euro pessimism that I've been describing, that's taking it too far, and things are not necessarily going to work out in exactly that way. But I will say that those who think that Europe, with its present values and orientation, is going to successfully forge a superpower are wrong. Europe may slow its international decline, perhaps temporarily stop it, but is unlikely to seriously reverse that decline for the long term.

What that is going to lead, though, to is an America and a Europe both facing the kind of somewhat unpleasant 21st century world that I talked about when I talked about the problems of the American dream for the 21st century, a world in which there is going to be tremendous social, cultural, economic, political dislocation and unhappiness throughout the non-American, non-European world, in which weapons of mass destruction are going to be getting cheaper and easier to make, and there are going to be more and more people who are kind of angry and discontented and have a willingness to make and to use them.

So the United States and Europe are going to, like it or not, have a common agenda and, to some degree, the common agenda is going to be shaped by the fact that our two mutual dreams are no coming true, rather than by the success of our two dreams.

So is that optimistic? Is that pessimistic? You tell me, but I think that's more or less where we're headed.

Thank you.

MR. LINDBERG: Thanks, Walter.

I think that gives you an illustration of the richness of the intellectual contribution that you'll find within the pages of the book that I had the pleasure of editing.

I assigned myself, as editor, in the role of moderator today, but in addition to editing "Beyond Paradise and Power," I also contributed a chapter to it. In fact, I assigned myself the last chapter, which is the prerogative of the editor. That's not to suggest that I think I've got the last word, by any stretch of the imagination, but it does mean, I think, I have something that I want to say and that I also want to put on the table here, exceeding the prerogative of the moderator, and it is this. The disagreement between the United States and Europe over policy matters and other matters strikes me as fundamentally a bounded disagreement. It is not a disagreement that will ever result in armed conflict as between the United States and Europe nor, for that matter, is it plausible that nations within Europe will go to war with each other again.

Now, when one says such a thing, one usually gets a kind of nod as if this were somehow a banality, and it is, in fact, banal because its truth is so obvious. However, it's not banal. It is, in fact, profound because there has been no time in history when you could make such a statement about a similar group of nations. So that says to me that there is some kind of elemental tie that continues or disputes about such issues, use of force, are actually about the extension of the norms that exist within this community, which I have called without great originality the Atlanticist community, the extension of those norms beyond its boundaries.

The other contentious issue within a community is precisely the point that's been raised by Frank and Walter, and that pertains to the integration and assimilation of immigrants. On the one hand, there is the question of the outside

stranger. There is, on the other hand, the question of the in-dwelling stranger and whether he turns into a friend or, in fact, continues to exert a different kind of influence.

I think Walter has well framed the question. The question of Europe going forward is, in large measure, in this century also a question of whether the Muslim population of Europe will become European, and therefore the basis of this community will continue and be expanded.

But I want to probe a little bit first with Ivo. What I would like a little more from you on, Ivo, is what Euro goalism look like? What would an effort to be a counterweight look like? I believe we are in agreement on the essential piece question. So, therefore, it seems unlikely that we will decide that we will fight proxy wars in Asia or Africa or Central America. So, in the absence of that, what does counterweight look like?

And then I want to turn to Frank and Walter briefly and have them respond to that.

MR. DAALDER: In theory, Euro goalism is a Europe that does all the thing that Walter says it should do in order to become a serious, strong power, and that would oppose the United States probably short of the use of force. I think your insight on the profound, historically unique nature of the U.S.-European relationship, barring its change because of immigration, which is a good footnote, is true; that is, I think it is, in the 21st century, as impossible to conceive of a situation in which the United States and Europe would settle disagreements with the use of force as it was in the second half of the 20th century, and that is a profound, unique change, which makes the United States and Europe a different kind of entity than they are with any other part of the world.

But what it would mean is a strong Europe that would actively oppose the United States, wherever it could, in order to achieve advantage of power--a normal balance of power relationship done in political, diplomatic, and economic and probably short of military force. That's the theory.

I think the practice because, in fact, of the essential, historically changed nature of the relationship between Americans and Europeans means that Euro goalism is more of the same of what we have today--a deeply divided, essentially weak Europe that may rhetorically try to oppose the United States, but won't be, in fact, able to be in opposition of the United States.

In other words, I'm a strong believer that European unity is possible only if it is based on the concept of partnership, as opposed to as a concept of counterweight, because the differences within Europe on that essential question of whether the one is a counterweight, tries to balance or wants to be a partner will prevent the counterweight ever from coming about. Whereas, I think the prospect for--the adherence of counterweight Europe, of Euro goalist Europe, are essentially one or two countries. Actually, in fact, one country, and will be, and as long as it is opposed by the Germans, which is why I think that Germany is the key to whether Europe will unite or will remain divided, will determine the outcome of that.

MR. LINDBERG: Walter, can I turn to you?

MR. MEAD: I want to agree that I think Germany holds the key to the future of Europe, and I think I want to underline that German foreign policy in recent years I think really during the life of this SPD government has been disastrous. In fact, we can go a little bit further and say, since unification, Germany, which had been the country in Europe that was the most successful in managing foreign policy of all the

European countries has been roughly the least successful at dealing both with its internal problems, which would be unification with the East, but also reform and restructuring of its economy. Germany is failing on both of those important grounds, and partly as a result, it is failing as a European country. It's also failing trans-Atlantically.

To some degree, by the way, the fact that the French are so eager to cooperate closely with the Germans these days is one way to measure France's contempt for the German government in the sense that at the time of unification, Mitterrand and the French establishment were terrified that this united Germany would be a juggernaut that would marginalize France and press it to the side. And so there was some Atlanticism in France at that point.

France has now concluded we can stop worrying about Germany, folks. There is no problem here. These people, and I don't know what word they use instead of people, but they probably have some very idiomatic and colorful expression, can't manage what they've got on their hands.

Meanwhile, what you see is I think in Germany a very unhappy recapitulation of sort of the Wilhelm the Second foreign policy; that is to say, just as Germany, at that time, was unable to resolve its domestic problems and kind of sought prestige, victories in international relations as a way to paper over internal problems and win support for its government, it's now embarked on a course of seeking prestige. Again, this is not just vis-à-vis the U.S. At the Nice Summit, the Germans insisted on more members of the European Parliament than the French had. This is something they never would have done back when they knew what they were doing.

The insistence now over Italian and Spanish objections against Germany pursuing a permanent seat on the Security Council, Germany is going to pursue this

outside of a European context, in violation of the will of its European partners. That is something the old Germany would never have done.

Some of the ways of the relations with Poland and some of the way the pro-Atlantic countries were handled in the war of words in Europe over the war in Iraq were in cautious and even, at times, bullying in a way that I don't think the Bonn Republic would have done.

And what is happening, to some degree, is that Germany is slowly in a process of forfeiting the trust of some of its partners, who may agree with it on particular stands, but who regret this and worry about this kind of instability in its foreign policy. Germany has enormous constraints. They're not really related to World War II and that sort of thing, which is the kind of way people often think about them, but they have a lot to do with Germany's size, influence, the fact that it has so many neighbors with such different interests. It's I think impossible for Europe to succeed when Germany is failing, and that would be true economically, as well as diplomatically. It gives me no pleasure at all to say that I think that's the situation that we have today. And I hope very much that the Germans, who have an enormous historical role to play, not only in terms of the trans-Atlantic alliance, but in terms of the future of Europe, manage to sort of recapture their balance.

MR. LINDBERG: Frank, thoughts on Euro goalism?

MR. FUKUYAMA: Well, I guess Euro goalism would look pretty much as Ivo described, but I would say not to worry because the idea that you'll have a strong, unified Euro-goalist Europe I would say is extremely small because the Europeans just have these really crippling collective action problems. If you think about how large political entities get put together, they are almost always put together as a result of

military power on the part of the largest of the unifying entities. That's how Germany got unified. That's how Italy got unified.

Our country became the United States of America as a result of a very bloody Civil War. The Europeans are trying to put together a collective action system based on consensus, and I think it just leads to these crippling weaknesses in their decision-making capacities. And you watch this in negotiations over the European Constitution. The enlargement to 25 just makes that problem all the more worrisome.

And you talk about adding Turkey and other countries beyond the 25, I think it just becomes, I mean, Walter if you think Turkey is actually going to add to European power, but I think in respect to its ability to act collectively, it's going to lead to a tremendous weakening of an already weak system. So I would say that's one particular nightmare we probably don't have to worry terribly much about.

MR. LINDBERG: I want to open it up to discussion from the floor. If you could be so kind as to wait for a microphone to arrive.

Yes, sir, you are first, and please identify yourself.

QUESTIONER: Hassan Azar [ph] at Turkey Daily.

How does Turkey's EU membership process affect EU and U.S. relations?

MR. : Well, I think that Turkey's interest in EU membership and the application process has led to some strain in U.S.-EU relations because of a perception that the United States is trying to push Turkey down the throat of Europe. I would submit, despite Frank's caution, in my view, that's done with a desire to be helpful to Europe, as well as to be helpful to Turkey.

It is strongly, in any case, in the American interests to be a strong, steadfast supporter of Turkish membership in the European Union. And I think at every point in that process the United States is going to make clear that while the particular details of accession, and the timing of accession and so on are purely of concern to Turkey and its European partners. From the U.S. point of view, it really is extremely important that this process go forward and certainly that Turkey not feel that it's being treated unjustly or being discriminated against or that its membership is being put off indefinitely for no good reason.

MR. : Let me add I think the question of what the United States should do is really past. We are now at a point where the decision is Europe's, and it is in the hands of Turkey, what it does.

It seems to me this is one of those few times in history when you have a win-win situation on your hands for both sides. Clearly, what has happened inside Turkey, over the past few years, as it has moved closer to the prospect of membership, it can only be supported by everybody, including in Europe, and it has been supported in Europe by what's happening in Turkey and by us. The transformation of Turkey, in response to the desire to become part of the EU, has been extraordinary, is an example for, frankly, the rest of the world to look at, and it needs to be fed and continued by the prospect not only of membership, but actual talks that will then--

MR. : It's also the great example of the soft power that Europeans talk about as being so important.

MR. : Absolutely. Solana, the High Representative, comes to the United States frequently in order to argue that the greatest force of regime change is the

European Union. It has changed more regimes in Eastern Europe and, in many ways, that is true. It is exactly as Walter said.

But it is, also, it seems to me, a win for Europe not just in the way that Walter put it, but in the way that both Walter and Frank talked about, the need to start thinking about how you deal with the Muslim population.

You have, with Turkey, an influx of a Muslim country into the European Union, and dealing with that issue is one way which gives you an incentive, in fact, the need, to start dealing with your own Muslim population and, first, to realize that not every Muslim who comes to live in your country is, by definition, a fundamentalist and an extremist. In fact, the vast, vast majority are not. And dealing with that integration, both of a Muslim Turkey into and have Muslim into your own society is a win. Because if we don't do it, if the Europeans fail in this experiment as, frankly, up to this point we see they are not succeeding--they haven't yet failed, but they're certainly not succeeding--the future for European societies are as dramatic as both Walter and Frank were talking about earlier.

MR. LINDBERG: Frank, did you want to come in on this point?

MR. FUKUYAMA: Just briefly, because when I've said things about Turkey in the past, I have a lot of Turkish people that pay attention to what I say, and I want to make really clear I am really in favor of Turkey coming into the EU for all of the geostrategic reasons. I just think that there is a huge domestic European dimension to this that we Americans do not have to deal with, and therefore we've got to be a little bit careful about how we express ourselves.

MR. LINDBERG: Let me just add a point or a footnote about Solana and the European Union as a force for regime change reform, et cetera, in Central and Eastern Europe.

I think that is absolutely true and undeniably true. But there is a part of the story that Solana doesn't usually tell, and that is that the first door through which those countries walked was the NATO door. It was the security aspect of it. Once those issues were settled--and that, by the way, entailed some fairly significant reform on its own. You're not allowed to join NATO if you have an active dispute over borders with your neighbors.

So we cleared away a lot of the underbrush for what I do think then became very much a tremendously successful European project.

Yes, in the back, please. Right behind you. Thank you. Yes.

QUESTIONER: Dimitri [?], Georgetown University Security Studies Program.

I just kind of want to stay with the peripheral actor piece. If you could speak a little bit about Russia playing into the calculus. Are they a spoiler? Do they straddle or do they join Europe? How do they play into it?

MR. LINDBERG: Just clarify the question, here. I don't think Russia is a problem in U.S.-European relations. Russia is a problem, and the U.S. and Europe are not dealing with it. That's how I--

QUESTIONER: In the context of the globalization argument with the problems that they have and their tendency to join with Europe on counter-U.S. policy and that sort of thing.

MR. LINDBERG: We don't talk much about Russia these days. Is that a mistake?

MR. : Yes, it's a huge mistake. What's happening in Russia is the one example, it seems to me, of where regime change is moving in the wrong direction, and I think there is a shameful European-American conspiracy, at the elite level, to hide it.

We have a president here who refuses to talk about what is happening, in any real way, inside Russia. We have prime ministers, and chancellors, and presidents in Europe from Berlusconi, to Blair, to Schroeder, to Chirac, who refuse to talk about what it is happening in Russia.

And what is happening in Russia is very, very serious, which is to say, in a country that is moving in a direction of fundamental change on which the internal change in that country was what precipitated, in fact, the very discussion that allows us to sit here, the change that we have seen in the world, for all the better, that that change is moving in the wrong direction.

Mr. Putin is using an internal civil war, which has become blown up and tied to terrorism, as a fundamental reason for turning back every possible democratic change that has been happening inside that country, not to the benefit of the Russian people, not to the benefit of fighting the war on terror, not to the benefit of the people in Chechnya, not to the benefit of Europe or the United States.

And for our leaders, collectively, this is one thing the United States and Europe agree on, and they are, frankly, fundamentally wrong about it, to ignore that is I think shameful, and we ought to start dealing with Putin as the autocratic leader that he is turning out to be.

MR. : Well, there is also this other part of the agenda. We may be getting to the point where it's more productive not to deal with Russia because, in a way, that's a lost cause, but to deal with places like Ukraine or Georgia, where there is actually some return to democratic governance. And I would add that to the conspiracy of silence that neither Europeans nor Americans have paid any attention to.

Russians have intervened massively in this Ukrainian presidential election in a way that would be totally unacceptable. If an American president went to Mexico City and campaigned on behalf of one of the candidates or if, you know, the French president did that in Germany, it violates every democratic norm, and yet basically no complaint about that.

MR. : I would say that, to some degree, I think we lost the battle for Russia, if that's what you want to call it, in the 1990s, and in a sense thinking that the wholesale theft of the Russian national patrimony by a people with corrupt ties of various kinds either to the old regime or the Yeltsin government, to tell ourselves that this could be the enduring foundation of a society of law, and institutions and private property, when there is, essentially, no moral claim of legitimacy to the ownership of a lot of the large resources in Russia has put us in a tough position.

I think the time to have engaged seriously with Russia was 10 years ago and 12 years ago, when of course a lot of our advice proved spectacularly unsuccessful and that now I think we're in the process of reaping a bitter harvest of what was sowed in the past, and the harvest is far more bitter for the people living in Russia than it is for people elsewhere.

In terms of Russia's attempt to sort of play off the European, play off old Europe and the United States and try to win some diplomatic leverage for this, there is

definitely sort of a Russian desire to be a great power doing great power things and playing great power games. And in its history this has more than once gotten the Russians into a lot of trouble. I'm thinking of the Balkans in the first 20 years of this century and then again at the close.

But I think there's a kind of a boundary on Russia in the sense on how aggressively Russia can play this game in that it faces the problem, it sort of faces two big problems--one of them demographic of just quite rapid decline, but even more rapid decline in the Russian Far East, in a corner of the world where the Russian part is getting emptier and emptier, but other parts are getting fuller and more dynamic. And then you have the sort of Islamic issues that Russia faces throughout its kind of southern fringe.

And those suggest that Russia can't alienate the United States too far in its quest for a multi-polar world. They suggest some limit on the distance and the aggressiveness with which Russia can play an anti-American card. And I think the fact that Europe is essentially irrelevant to Russia's future, where those two vital issues and a sense of survival are concerned, limits or helps shape the kind of game that Russia can afford to play.

MR. LINDBERG: Yes, in the second row, please.

QUESTIONER: Thanks. I'm Helga Flores. I'm heading the Henrich Boll Foundation, which is the think tank of the German Green Party. So I have two comments.

First of all, on Euro goalism, I agree with Frank Fukuyama, I don't think this is a real threat. It is impossible to thank that you will have a united Europe under that umbrella not only because the new democracies, like Poland, will never accept it,

but even also Germany, the majority of the people will not go along with that. That means with the concept of Europe being a Europe against the U.S.

But, secondly, since you identified Germany as one of the key actors for what will happen next, I think it's important to also really describe what has been happening in Germany in the past years because it's been dramatic changes.

And what you described as the Bonn Republic, this costly place that Germany had under the umbrella of the Cold War was really a lack of foreign policy. You only start having foreign policy--Germany's role in the world since really this coalition, in 1998. And since then, Germany having gone from not having any role around the world on conflicts or military forces around, et cetera, has gone to have, you know, military forces in Kosovo, Macedonia, Bosnia, and Afghanistan, and this government really risked also, the chancellor risked his government, to go about to Afghanistan. And so I think it's important because these changes note that it's very--it's been a very rapid change in German policy. Certainly, the last two years have been unclear regarding where Germany is going to go vis-à-vis the trans-Atlantic relations and maybe following too close behind France, but I think you will see that separate itself--again, Joschka Fischer coming out and supporting the Great Middle East Initiative of the Bush administration I think was already one signal.

Let me just ask one question because one of the main problems that we are going to be confronting very, very soon is Iran, and there's, for the first time, some initiative in Europe,

whether you think it's going to be successful or not, and it seems to me that still in the U.S. there is not clarity where the U.S. policy vis-à-vis Iran will go.

MR. LINDBERG: Does anyone want to step up to Iran?

MR. MEAD: Sure. Just on Iran, I think the U.S. is waiting to see what the agreement will be like, and I think virtually everyone in the United States hopes that what we're going to get is a good agreement out of that, and the devil is in the details, and we don't know what that is yet. But to get to your sort of underlying question, I think actually the most dangerous idea in Germany today is that the Bonn Republic didn't have a foreign policy or that Conrad Adenauer was sort of a weak man who wasn't actually a player.

It's actually interesting that really from the time Winston Churchill left office until I would say the time Margaret Thatcher established herself, it was the chancellor of Germany far more than the prime minister of Britain who was the single non-American, who American presidents and American foreign policy opinion, listened to most, cared most about what they thought.

Germany's place in Washington, in the Bonn years, which contemporary Germans do tend to think, well, that's when we weren't emancipated, that's when we didn't really have a functioning in the world, the respect for Germany was enormous in this country, and it was a respect for Germany's ability to play this incredibly constructive role in Europe. It was phenomenal, as well as Germany's sort of sober assessment of the international situation.

And from our point of view, the U.S. point of view, what we've seen since unification is, first of all, of course, the disaster economic and social of German efforts. I think they've spent over a trillion dollars on the 17 million people of East Germany. I wish I were East German. And they haven't produced an economic recovery in East Germany, but there is also an enormous collapse of confidence among

ordinary Germans in the sort of intellectual and political capacities of their elite because the failure is so conspicuous.

It also means that Germany simply doesn't have the money to underwrite the kind of European foreign policy that it used to have.

You look at things like the unilateral recognition of Croatia, which Americans still continue to believe is what caused the Balkan wars and those terrible disasters, followed by Germany's inability--

MR. : Some Americans.

MR. MEAD: Some Americans, but I'd say a lot, actually--a lot--including most of those who really know a lot about it.

[Laughter.]

MR. MEAD: Among whom I don't necessarily count myself.

MR. LINDBERG: This is not a difference of opinion, apparently.

[Laughter.]

MR. LINDBERG: It's rather a fact, facts which are known to Walter.

MR. MEAD: But in any case, it's sort of been one thing after another from a U.S. point of view, and at this point, the collapse in German prestige in Washington is I think one of the most important changes in the European-American relations, and it's not a good one.

MR. : Let me add to this because I think Walter is exactly right, except on the Croatia issue, which was a disastrous decision, but didn't cause the war, which would have happened even without it.

MR. MEAD: Sorry.

MR. : But, frankly, to argue that German foreign policy is now really vibrant because it has deployed troops in the Balkans and Afghanistan just demonstrates the poverty of German foreign policy. It is German foreign policy, and foreign policy isn't about contributing a bunch of troops to a mission that, frankly, other people designed for you, and you contributed. That's fine. That's great. But that means that that's not the kind of foreign policy a country as strong as significant as Germany should pin its hopes on.

What is Germany's interest? I mean, Germany's prestige has not only fallen in Washington. It's, unfortunately, fallen everywhere in Europe, too, except in Paris. I mean, I don't see the British looking towards Germany as the partner in the way that you would have hoped to. I don't see Poland or the Dutch or the Danes looking at Germany as the motor of figuring out what a new European policy is towards anything.

It's that failure, it's the failure to be a power, in a very real and fundamental sense, of saying what it is that it wants to do. What we see, what I see is a Germany that follows Chirac around or a Germany that says no. What other great power, aspiring to a permanent seat on the U.N. Security Council, comes out and says whatever the U.N. Security Council decides, we ain't going to be part of it? That's great power? That's what it means to have a responsible foreign policy? That's not the kind of foreign policy that I think is going to find Germany a lot friends.

And it is that issue--what is it that Germany wants, how is Germany going to protect its interests, how is it going to promote its interests together with other people, other than finding a way to join another prestige--and I think Walter was right. This is prestige foreign policy. Why should Germany get a permanent seat on the U.N. Security Council, other than the fact that it was the second-largest contributor to the

U.N. in terms of money? What is its vision for that U.N., in terms of dealing with the problems that we face day-to-day that should make it a member of the U.N. Security Council?

Until we talk about content, rather than prestige, we're losing it.

MR. LINDBERG: Frank, would you like a turn to be sharply critical of Germany or shall we move on?

[Laughter.]

MR. LINDBERG: Thank you. In the back?

One moment, please. I propose, since we're running out of time, we're going to collect some comments from the audience, and then we'll give each of our panelists a minute to reply selectively. Go ahead.

QUESTIONER: My name is [?] Tusha [ph]. I'm an AU student.

It's interesting that you haven't been mentioning a lot about the role of Britain in establishing the link between America and Europe. Now, do you think that they will play a significant role in doing that or will their policy shift, considering the unrest in the Labor Party and the British society in just following American policy?

MR. LINDBERG: Thank you.

Yes, ma'am?

QUESTIONER: [Inaudible] National Public Radio.

I want to just ask a short-term question business Blair is coming here tomorrow. The NATO secretary is here today. Powell is talking about going to Europe and reaching out, building bridges.

How seriously do you see an effort by this new Bush administration to repair relations? Is it going to be worth it? And can the Europeans take I seriously given that Powell is unlikely to stick around?

QUESTIONER: Thanks. Gary Mitchell, from the Mitchell Report.

I want to ask a question that is mostly triggered by the question about Russia because, when we talk about Russia, what we're really talking about is Putin and oil. The discussion today, when we talk about Europe, is sort of sociological and cultural. The question is what's the likelihood that there might emerge, in one or more European countries, new, strong political leadership with a point of view that doesn't hold to the Kagan theory and how might that change the equation in the U.S.-European relationship?

MR. LINDBERG: Yes, sir?

QUESTIONER: Ben Nosdorf [ph], Business Executives for National Security.

I was wondering if any of you thought that the current issue over airline subsidies, if they'd be able to have some sort of consensus on that in the near future or if you thought this was an issue that was going to continue and even potentially widen the divide.

MR. LINDBERG: Thanks. All the way in the back by the door.

QUESTIONER: Thank you. Nicola [?] from GW.

I would like to bring some old Europe perspective because you are explaining that Europe will have a lot of trouble, but I think there's a problem with your analysis of time sequence. You are comparing a country, a teenage crisis in the U.S. with a baby, Europe, as such. I would like to know, regarding the whole opinions in

Europe regarding U.S. position in Germany, France, Italy, is it good for Europe to be an ally of U.S. when you look at the strategic partnership that Europe is building with China and India, for instance?

MR. LINDBERG: Thank you. Yes, please, second row.

QUESTIONER: Chris Hennessey [ph], from the [inaudible] School of International Affairs.

I was wondering if you thought that NATO still had a role to play in the world and if there was any political will on either side of the Atlantic to restructure and redesign the alliance.

MR. LINDBERG: Thanks.

Well, we have questions about the special relationship, Blair's visit and Powell's proposed outreach tour, Russia and Putin and oil versus the sociological and cultural discussion that takes place. We've got airline subsidies. We've got the utility of the United States as an ally for European countries, and finally we have the question of NATO.

I think we will reverse the order, and so we'll start with Walter, if you can give us, just briefly, a minute in response to any or all of the above.

MR. MEAD: If Europe now feels that the United States is too immoral and sovereign to be its partner, then, yes, go to China and help China suppress Tibet and celebrate your moral triumph in that.

I think, on the ideological dimension, in spite of the serious differences between us, there basically is that that's still the dimension where there is clearly an inescapable closeness between the Americans and the Europeans. The Europeans may imagine that China is a partner. I doubt it can go very far. China is probably even more

focused on military power, on all of the things that Europe doesn't like about the United States are even more significant in the Chinese perspective.

Maybe making an alliance with Russia, the Europeans would break the bonds, in a sense, with the United States and sort of with Putin's oil try to get some kind of a new, in a sense, refight the Cold War with part of Europe in a free alliance with Russia rather than as satellites.

I imagine that Central Europe would have a lot to say about that. I think, in Poland, there's a sense that when the Germans fly over Poland and meet the Russians, Poland has a habit of getting smaller, and that it would be very difficult to forge a united Europe on a pro-Russian, anti-American basis.

MR. LINDBERG: Frank?

MR. FUKUYAMA: Well, on the question of the British special relationship, I think it may be that this is the last time that a Labor prime minister will behave the way Blair did. I mean, Blair has been put in this really awkward position. He's been accused of lying, and what he's really lying about is that his primary motive was really to protect the American relationship and to try to influence the United States from the inside. That's just, you know, he just couldn't say that quite openly that that was his chief priority, and he's now been put in this very difficult position where he didn't really exert all that much influence, having been America's ally, as opposed to an opponent.

And so I think that a future British politician in his position is going to have to think twice about that reflexive defense of the special relationship. I'm not saying it won't happen, but it's going to be, given the political cost that Blair has paid for this in his own party, I think that's going to be much more problematic.

MR. LINDBERG: Thanks, Frank.

Ivo?

MR. DAALDER: Just on the issue of the immediate question of whether the United States and Europe are starting anew, in some sense, because we have all of this travel going on and all of the meetings going on.

Looking at Europe, there was a sense of a deflating balloon when the election returns came in. There was a lot of hope that the ouster of Bush and an incoming Kerry administration would make a real difference, that you could build a partnership basically on a pre-9/11 kind of framework, and we could just forget about those four years, the nightmare that it was, and we can just get on with life. And there's now a realization that, in fact, the nightmare continues or, in fact, the nightmare, we wake up, and it's true, and it's real.

And so you find a lot of Europeans saying a lot of nice things, and Mr. Chirac writes a wonderful letter to the president, "French phrase," but we all know what, you know, there's a real disappointment in Europe. And I think the United States is going through the motions, too, and it's not doing a very good job at it, frankly, because the reality is that they're not going to change. When you win an election, you think that you're validated. When you have a mandate, why change? And that's true even for Colin Powell. I thought his interview with the Financial Times, two days ago, was his best attempt to demonstrate that he's tough. We're going to have an aggressive foreign policy. I think he was still trying to maintain his job in the new administration, and there just was a sign that the notion that we're going to have a fundamentally different foreign policy towards Europe or, indeed, towards the world, I don't see it happening. I don't see where it was coming from.

I think the president was crystal clear last Thursday when he said that his role was to meet with other people so he could explain his decisions. I think that tells you about all you need to know. And what you find is an attempt by Europeans--Mr. Blair, Mr. Chirac, et al.--to try to figure out how they can still maintain some semblance of a relationship that, as I said in my remarks, in the short term, is bound to be more difficult, and more contentious than one would like to have.

MR. LINDBERG: Thanks, Ivo.

When I set about putting "Beyond Paradise and Power" together, I wanted to make sure that I included some European voices here. Of course, being in Europe, they weren't able to be on this panel tonight, but there's some interesting contributions from [?], the director of policy planning [?], from Wolfgang Ishinger, the German ambassador to the United States, from Timothy Garton Ash, as well as Kalypso Nicolaidis, both of Oxford. I think it's important that this not just be a discussion among Americans about what the future of the United States and Europe is.

The other thing that I specifically decided not to do in putting together the volume was to include people whose agenda was more or less the blow up the trans-Atlantic relationship. There are folks like that around Washington, and, alas, there are I think some folks in Europe who are also of that view. But that is not my view. I don't think it's the view of any of the people sitting on this panel or, indeed, the contributors to "Beyond Paradise and Power."

Our view, I think, at risk of generalizing, is the structural considerations notwithstanding, the relationship, the trans-Atlantic relationship is, in large measure, what we make of it, and perhaps we should try to make more of it rather than less of it.

My thanks to Ivo Daalder, Walter Mead, Frank Fukuyama for being here today. Thank you all for coming. For those of you watching, thanks again.

[Applause.]

[Whereupon, the proceedings were adjourned.]