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# THE 2004 ELECTION RESULTS:

# HOW WILL THEY AFFECT POLITICS AND POLICYMAKING?

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[TRANSCRIPT PRODUCED FROM A TAPE RECORDING]

**P R O C E E D I N G S**

MR. MANN: Good morning. I'm Tom Mann, a senior fellow here at Brookings. I'm pleased to welcome you to the 47th briefing on the election results. You all are gluttons for punishment, aren't you?

Listen, we are now in the midst of a fascinating period of politics. We move in a matter of hours and days from--first of all, from getting the exit polls that tell us what's going to happen, then getting the election results that demonstrate that the exit polls were incorrect, then to--a poor man here almost choked on his coffee. I'll explain that in a minute. Then moving to an instant analysis of the meaning of those election results, and then moving to arguments about the election mandate. I say "arguments" about the election mandate because there is no objective reality to mandates. Mandates are stories. They're subjective tales told by the winning team and accepted by everyone else. And the battle to define an election mandate is one of the most important battles that occur in politics.

But as it turns out, next Friday we will have the fifth and last in the series of election seminars we've been cosponsoring with Princeton's Woodrow Wilson School on mandates and governance, at which we will draw on the scholarship that's been done to try to make some measured judgments about the pattern of governance that lies ahead. That doesn't mean that you all can't ask questions about that. We'd be happy to entertain it. I just wanted to give you a preview of what is coming a week hence.

I'm delighted to be joined by my colleagues in the Governance Studies Program. Tony Corrado, on my right, who is a professor of government at Colby College but has spent this entire year with us at Brookings as a visiting fellow. Tony knows as much, or more, about money and campaigns in American elections as anyone

in this city or country. And I'm delighted he's been with us this year. And Michael McDonald, on my left. Michael teaches political science at George Mason University. He, too, has been a visiting fellow with us here at Brookings. He knows more about turnout, I believe, than anyone else in this country. Michael was also a part of the team, with Warren Mitofsky, working the desk in New Jersey and organizing the exit polls and the surveys of early voters and analyzing those materials and sending them on to others. You will not be surprised that my colleagues will initially draw on their experiences and their knowledge in making some initial remarks about this election.

Let me just say our goal today is to understand, really, what happened and why. It seems like a straightforward matter to answer those questions. It turns out it's not at all. It's an intensely complicated matter. Reading marginal frequencies or even simple cross-tabs in exit polls isn't enough to reach definitive conclusions. My guess is we're going to be poring over survey and aggregate data and doing more sophisticated analyses for some time to come.

The other point I would ask you to keep in mind is what are we trying to explain? If we're trying to explain what moved a majority of voters, that's pretty easy, but not very interesting because it doesn't tell us what happened at the margin to produce the outcome that occurred. And so we have to always keep our eyes on the prize: what is it we're trying to understand? Is the important fact the Republican victory, the president winning, the swing from the last presidential election and the changes in the House and Senate, why they occurred; or is it trying to explain a majority of votes?

When you look at the exit polls, it's easy. One prominent public pollster was very unimpressed with the fact that a plurality of voters chose moral values as the most important factor, arguing that 78 percent didn't and therefore it wasn't important.

Well, that's hardly an answer. If in fact this somehow represents or explains the shift that occurred, then this is enormously important. Even if by some measures 75 percent of the electorate has nontraditional religious values, it still could be the case that the activation, mobilization of traditional-values voters explains the outcome of the election. More on that later.

The first thing I want to do, and I hope you will indulge me for a moment, is to acknowledge at the outset how wrong I was about this election, how very publicly wrong I was about the election. On the other hand, I was both consistent and transparent in my reasoning. I looked at a highly polarized electorate and I saw what I thought was more energy on the Democratic side as a result of the unhappiness with Iraq and the economy and the 2000 election, and believed that the marginal advantage Democrats still had in partisan identification and their increased motivation to participate would provide an advantage for the challenger in this case. Secondly, that based on a negative referendum of the performance of the president on Iraq and the economy. And thirdly, the acceptability of the Democratic alternative as a plausible occupant of the White House--not as a charismatic, inspiring campaigner or politician, but as someone who seemed to be an adult and responsible and, in the debates, I felt, sort of emerged as that credible alternative.

My notion was a simple one, that elections are a most basic form of democratic accountability, and when the public believes the country's moving in the wrong direction, they will hold the administration in power responsible.

Now, I obviously got it wrong, and we will be looking through the entrails of this election to try to understand it. But one of the things I think I didn't fully appreciate is that some people felt the country was off on the wrong track, felt it for

different reasons than the referendum that I had seen--Iraq and the economy. They felt it was off on the wrong track in part because their notion of what's appropriate and right for their families and their communities and their religious beliefs was offended by an increasing social liberalization that came to the fore, I think, with the visibility of the same-sex marriage in Massachusetts and San Francisco and then brought to the focus with a constitutional amendment.

That's one factor. We will be discussing this over the course of time. And there may be some differences among us as to whether the mobilization effort, both by framing the issue in reaction to real-world events that occurred and the ground game that tried to take advantage of that, proved the increment that accounts for the result itself.

What I want to say is this was clearly a victory for the president and for the Republican Party. But I also want to suggest that it was an election with an enormous amount of stability as well as change. As you know, in the presidential race there were changes in only three states from one party to the other. The Democrats gained New Hampshire and the Republicans New Mexico and Iowa, assuming those results hold up.

There was a sort of net shift, if you will, in the margin of victory, from a half a million Gore victory to a 3.5-million-vote Bush victory. That's 4 million votes. That's not insignificant, but nor is it huge. The president won a very large number of votes. There were more eligible voters this time. Usually those numbers increase.

And there turned out to be no significant third party candidate. Ralph Nader did barely better at 0.3 percent than the Libertarian candidate.

If you look at the House, it was a sea of stability, an election that looked very much like two years ago and four years ago. It's breathtaking how little change actually occurred. There are some runoffs still in Louisiana, but we estimate that the Republicans will pick up four seats. All of that is accounted for by the mid-decade Texas gerrymander, where four Democratic incumbents went down--four of the total of seven incumbents who lost in the election, two other Republicans, one Democrat. Without that additional gerrymander, the odds are we would have had the smallest number of incumbent defeats in American history.

And if you look at the changes of party control of seats, from the open seats, where members retired, it was again breathtaking to see how little change has occurred. We have squeezed out of our elections for the House of Representatives any capacity for major change in one direction or another. We knew there were only three dozen competitive seats coming in, out of 435, but God, how amazing to be actually confronted with that reality.

In the Senate it was a dramatic evening. That was my beat on election night. All of the six challenged Democratic seats fell into Republican hands, but there was a pickup of two on the Democratic side, so a net shift of four. If you go inside and look at that, what I think you will conclude is that the Democrats lost because they had to fight in Republican territory, that with the exception of Florida--which ended up going Republican but is more competitive--all of the other seats were in strong Republican states, making it very difficult for the candidates to overcome the advantage that George Bush provided the Republicans. Tom Daschle, of course, was the perfect example of that.

Final point on this is it's sort of interesting to realize that we had federal elections--the president, the Congress--but we also had some state elections--governorships, state legislatures. And there, we saw basically no change in the governorships, no net change in control of state legislative bodies. We had some movement back and forth--modest Democratic gains in the total number of state legislative seats, with Republicans now holding an advantage of about two dozen nationally. It's as balanced at 50-50 as you can possibly get.

And a series of initiatives and referendums that cut very much, many of them--setting aside the same-sex marriage prohibition amendments in the 11 states, if you look at the others you will find a sort of very different pattern. The funding of stem cell research, the willingness to support bond issues for new medical facilities and education, it was really--defeat of caps on taxes in the state of Maine, I believe it was, Tony.

So it turns out to be certainly a more mixed picture, all of which, in my mind, says the Republicans are now in control of the federal government, clearly. Their ranks are strengthened, they're immensely ambitious, they intend to try to achieve substantial things. They have achieved the first requisite, which is to win the election, to increase their strength in government in Washington. Next comes the enactment of policies that begin to solidify and expand the base. And third come the real-world conditions while they are in office--the state of the economy, the state of Iraq and national security--to see if they are going to be in a position both to enact their policies and to realize the political gains they're going to have, to profit from the underlying conditions.

Enough by way of initial remarks from me. Now I would like to ask Mike to pin down the turnout story. There's been a lot of conflicting information about what happened there. Let's get the story straight from the expert. Mike?

MR. McDONALD: Well, first I'd like to defend the exit polls, because they've been much maligned--

MR. MANN: I knew you would.

MR. McDONALD: --before I move on to turnout. But there's a little something to be said there, too.

So, as everybody knows, the exit polls showed a pro-Democratic bias early on in the afternoon. That was leaked to many people, and as a result the perception was that the Democrats were going to win the election and they looked like they were very well-positioned in the Senate as well.

Now, about early afternoon, mid-afternoon, we started looking at those numbers and realized that the women were much overrepresented in our sample. And this was across the entire country. At one point Warren sat down and he said somebody's got to be trying to play a prank on us and is trying to manipulate the exit polls. It didn't seem that that was possible on such a large scale because it was happening everywhere, that we were getting more women in our sample than men.

So we alerted the networks that there was this issue. We started re-weighting the sample down to be a much more reasonable distribution of men and women. And as it turned out, as the afternoon progressed and as we approached the close and we got the last waves of the exit polls in, the numbers bounced back out a little bit and we were--you know, we were still overrepresented, if you didn't do the weighting, at the very end right as we were moving on to the election, but it was more

reasonable than it was early on in the afternoon, when we saw a large shift towards the Democrats. It just didn't look reasonable.

Now, I say all this--I mean, why do we know this? I mean, we have some prior information about the election. And so we were able to look at previous election returns, just our basic knowledge of the electorate, and parse out that some strange things were going on. We would not have called the election the way in which it was laid out to us based solely on the exit polls. We would never do that anyway; that's not the methodology of the exit polls. We use the exit polls to help call elections in states that are overwhelming majorities, but in any of the close states we supplement that with actual election returns and, as the night goes on, we take a look and we make sure the election returns are confirming what's in the exit polls. And then, once we're certain of that, then we're able to call the election. There are very sophisticated statistical models that are underpinning all of that in order to make those calls.

So a state like Florida, and Ohio, we weren't going to make those calls based on the exit polls because they were--well, first of all, they were within the margin of error of the exit polls being able to make the call. But what did happen, if anything, with the exit polls was that because there was the shift, and then it shifted back towards the Republican direction, there were states, like New Hampshire and Pennsylvania, that we probably should have called earlier. But we didn't because we were concerned about the quality of the exit polls and we wanted to get, like, the Philadelphia suburbs in, which were reporting late.

So all in all, the whole system worked. If anything, it prevented us from calling the Democratic states earlier than we should have. We were just being super-careful in making our calls.

MR. MANN: Michael, let me just--we're on this, and I'd like to pin down a couple of points on this just so we all understand. One is, at what point, if ever, did you factor in earlier surveys you had done, pre-election surveys, on those voters who cast their ballots early, either by absentee, by mail, or by going to early-voting places? And to what extent are those individuals represented in the exit polls that are now available in the newspaper? What are we looking at? Are we looking at the whole electorate? This is really important because we'd like to know if we're reading the internals of the entire electorate or only those who showed up on election day.

And secondly, is it the fact that the final release basically weights everything to account for the actual votes in these states? So that's my second question.

MR. McDONALD: Yeah. So the first question, we did a poll of seven states that have a high degree of early voting. And we used those polls of early voters, solely early voters, to shift the actual exit polls and the election-day results back in whatever direction those polls showed us. And those polls are indeed included in the national sample of exit polls. In states where we did not do this early-voting polling, we're missing those voters. So this was not done nationally. It was only done in states that had--like California, Washington, Oregon, Tennessee--that have a high degree of early voting that's going on.

MR. MANN: Did that include any of the battleground states? Was Florida, for example, included?

MR. McDONALD: Well, New Mexico and Nevada would be on that list--I'm not sure about New Mexico. Nevada would be on that list for sure. I wasn't responsible for calling these states, so I can't off the top of my head remember every one of them. And Iowa was another one of the states.

And we did use other polls that not only were we doing absentee voting or early voting, but we looked at other polls to inform us as to what the likely outcome in a give state was. We had a prior believe as to the outcome. And when we did see--I mean, this is all part of the whole process and it's like reading tea leaves before the tea is empty when you're trying to figure out these exit polls, but we did use those priors. And if things were not as they seemed to be in accordance with the priors, we weren't going to call the election as well.

So one of the things that came out, for example, was that the Iowa early voting seemed very, very heavily Kerry, so we actually weighted it back down to the Iowa poll that had been released and showed still a heavy Democratic bias in the--or advantage, I guess, not bias--because that's what happened in 2000 as well; more Democrats voted early in Iowa than Republicans. And that's why, although we're talking about Iowa, we still have to count those ballots in Iowa to be certain that Bush won that state. I think that's why most news organizations still have Iowa colored white. It's possible that those early votes will come in in favor of Kerry and--well, it doesn't really matter at this point except, you know, we get to call another state.

So anyway, those are the answers to your questions.

Now, turnout. I've given you guys a sheet of paper--I've got two sheets; I think there's front and back copies. Hopefully, everybody got them. These are the estimates that I have of turnout rates, using the eligible population and comparing that with the 2000 election. This is something different than using the voting-age population.

I've mentioned it before--hopefully, you were at last week's forum--but in a nutshell, what I do is I take the voting-age population estimate, which is everybody age 18 and older in the United States; I subtract out the non-citizens; I subtract out the

ineligible felons, depending on state law; and I add back in, at least nationally, the overseas citizens--can't do that in the states. So that's the estimate of those who are eligible to vote and their turnout rates. It's better than the voting-age population because the voting-age population is now almost 10 percent ineligible for some reason or another. That percentage has been growing over time. It used to be in '72, it was about 2 percent; now it's 10 percent--you know, nearing 10 percent; not quite. And that entirely explains the declining turnout rate since 1972. In fact, this election--and we're going to get into it--suggests that we've broken the trend and perhaps, you know, turnout's actually up-ticking a bit. And we can see that on the top-line number, the national turnout.

And while we're doing mea culpas, I can do my own. I predicted 118 to 122 million people would vote. And right now, we have about 115.5 million ballots that have been counted so far for president. There are some outstanding ballots, particularly in California, which may up that number. I'm guessing around 117 million. It could go a little higher, probably won't go too much lower, but somewhere around 117, maybe 118. So I overestimated turnout. It would be nice if I reached the lower end of my range. It might still happen, so maybe I don't have that much of a mea culpa. But the numbers that Curtis Gans is reporting I think are a little optimistic, about 120 million votes.

And one other caution we note about Curtis Gans's numbers that he's reporting to the media is that, as far as I can tell, he's using voting-age population for previous elections and is comparing it to eligible population in this election, which gives you a false sense that turnout was really very much up in this election over previous elections. In fact, he's claiming that 1968 was the last election we had with this high a

turnout. We're not going to reach the turnout rate in 1992--I'm very confident in saying that--in this election among eligibles. So, you know, take all those numbers with a grain of salt. We still have a long way to go in terms of counting the total number ballots.

But I think we can pull out some trends from the data that we're already seeing at the state level. And yet again, keep in mind that these numbers aren't final numbers by any means, because we do have this issue of outstanding ballots out there.

So if we look at the national turnout, we were 57.5 percent. That's an increase of 3.2 percentage points from the 2000 election. When you look at the battleground states--and I'm going to break out the battleground states between those states that had the gay marriage amendment on the ballot versus those that were pure battleground states.

When we do that, we see that the battleground states without gay marriage, we saw an overall turnout rate of 65.2 percent. These are the same battleground states, for the most part, as 2000. So it is remarkable, then, that nearly a 6.9 percentage point average increase among these states from the 2000 election. People were much more mobilized in these battleground states this time around. And that's primarily where we're seeing the increase in turnout over the 2000 election.

But in terms of what impact the gay marriage amendment would have, particularly on a state like Ohio, it looks like it might have had a small increase in turnout. But when we look across Michigan, Ohio, and Oregon, all battleground states with gay marriage amendment on the ballot, we saw only an increase of 6.6 percentage points.

There seems to be, though, if we do a comparison of the battleground versus the battleground states--trying to compare apples and apples--with gay marriage

as the one variable that we're varying here, we see pretty much not much of a difference between the battleground and non-battleground states. Where gay marriage was important was in non-battleground states where it showed up on the ballot. You can see that list is the next row down on that table. The average turnout there was 57 percent, and that was an increase of 4.5 percentage points over the 2000 election.

So that means that gay marriage was clearly pulling people out even higher than the national increase in turnout, and it tells you where people weren't turning out to vote. If you look at the non-battleground states without gay marriage on the ballot, we only see an average of 58.5 percent, but it's only an increase of 1.6 percentage points from the 2000 election. So comparing, again, apples to apples, we see that turnout rates were higher in states that were not battleground states, with gay marriage amendment on the ballot. And perhaps Bunning owes his victory in Kentucky to the presence of the gay marriage constitutional on the Kentucky ballots.

And just to note one other thing here as we're comparing apples to apples, I'm not including Alaska, California, and Washington. Those are the states that have the largest number of outstanding ballots at this point. It's potentially true that that 1.6 percent may actually come down a little bit, because I'm not entirely confident that California will reach a much greater turnout rate than the 2000 election.

Another striking thing about this, looking at battlegrounds versus battlegrounds, is that it really tells you what the electoral college is doing to our electorate. Those people in the non-battleground states, unless they had that gay marriage amendment to pull them to the polls, really had no reason to go vote because they already knew the outcome of the election. Where we saw turnout increases was located in those battleground states.

Now, a couple of other interesting things. We'll skip over Florida and Ohio. If you look at the mail-in ballot, which a lot people--that's Oregon, that does their entire ballot by mail--the turnout rate there was 70.1 percent, which was an increase of 5.2 percentage points over the 2000 election. So mail-in balloting. It was also a battleground state that also has a very high turnout rate to start with versus the other the other battleground states. But you can see that it does seem to promote higher turnout rates.

And then if you look at the election day registration, you see that turnout rate in those states, which were also battleground states as well, they also saw a higher turnout rate than other states. They were at an average of 72.5 percent.

So these sorts of reforms are out there. They are conflated with the battleground status of the states. But perhaps one of the structural ways to change turnout or increase turnout in the United States is through these sorts of reforms that provide greater access to the ballot for voters.

One other interesting thing, I think, to take from this, when we think about the mandate that is being claimed by Bush at this time, is that I believe that this was really a red state mandate; it wasn't a red, white, and blue state mandate. The turnout increase, especially among the battleground states--Texas, by the way, which I should have put on here, had an increase of 4.5 percentage points--those moral issues seemed to drive people in the red states particularly to turn out to vote, while we did not see comparable increases in turnout in large states like New York. I think at the end of the day we'll find the same is true with California and some of those other Northeastern states up in the blue part of the country.

So the additional millions of votes that Bush received are primarily coming from energized people in states that had the gay marriage amendment on the ballot plus those states that were also like Texas, which felt, I guess, some need to make that symbolic vote in favor of the president that went beyond just thinking, you know, some sort of rational way about will my vote count in this election, because they felt there was some need, some moral need to cast that ballot.

Now, on the back side of the handout--I hope it's a one-page handout--we can see that--I looked at Ohio particularly, trying to understand what happened in Ohio. If I'd had time, I would have looked at Florida as well but there was a lot of data entry I had to do last night. So what we have here is a scatterplot--that middle one is a scatterplot of the percent share of the vote for the Democratic candidate in the 2000 election versus the 2004 election. And as Tom said earlier, this was actually a very consistent election. There wasn't a lot of change. Look how that scatterplot pretty much falls in line with a 45 degree line, which suggests that counties in Ohio, that their share of vote for Gore in 2000 was approximately the same as the share for Kerry in 2004. There's not a lot of change. The only real deviations that we see in this trend line are in the lower left-hand corner. Those would be the most Republican areas of the state, and we see that they became more Republican.

We're trying to parse out what's going on with these counties. If you look at the figure below that, I've plotted out the turnout ratio from 2000 to 2004. Now understand, this is not turnout rate; this is the total number of votes that were cast within that county. I still haven't gotten around to calculating eligible population within the counties of Ohio, so I don't have that number. But what we can see here, though, is that the counties that have the largest increase in the total vote were counties that were

primarily strong Republican counties. And you can see that those were the counties, too, where the vote share moved in a pro-Bush direction.

So I think the--and you can see that basically everywhere else, if you just break out those counties, it's pretty much an even scatterplot. Turnout was up all across the state of Ohio. Where we really saw large increases in the number of voters was in these really heavily Republican counties.

MR. MANN: So this is the Democratic vote for president, on the horizontal axis?

MR. McDONALD: Yes. Yes. So the left-hand--correct. Correct. I did not label that as well as I should have.

So, where are these counties located? Because I think that will illuminate what really happened in Ohio and will illuminate probably also where the Republicans are doing well--once we can look at all the counties in the country--relative to the Democrats.

These are the suburban ring counties around Cincinnati and Columbus. They saw the largest growth in population; they had the largest increase in overall number of votes as a consequence of the increase in their population. Bush increased his performance in these counties. So as Democrats move forward and try and think about--you know, they'll pull the whips out and flagellate themselves about what went wrong in this election, I think they really need to look at these voters in these suburbs surrounding the metropolitan areas. As people are moving out further from the counties, the city core is into these ring counties, these voters, for whatever reason, the Democratic Party is not connecting with these voters and in fact the Republican Party is doing a better job.

So I think at this point I can hand it off and we can ruminate about this as we go forward.

MR. MANN: Mike, thank you very much. That was very helpful.

Let's turn to Tony now and have him move from this and focus on the ground game of the two parties and candidates and their allied groups as a way of giving some meaning to this. Tony?

MR. CORRADO: Well, there are a couple of things that strike me in what has been said so far. Tom talks about the stability we saw in this election, Michael talks about the fact that turnout is probably not going to exceed 92, in part because of the narrowing effect of the electoral college. And I think it brings to the fore not just the partisan divide in this country which we hear so much about in our discussions of politics nowadays, but the real political divide that we have created in this country.

We are basically now in a nation where, for all intents and purposes, elections are conducted in one-third of the nation. We have a situation now where two-thirds of the states are no longer really relevant in the presidential race. We basically start with 18 and work down from there. In the Senate elections this year, we had maybe 12 contests out of the 34 that gathered much enthusiasm--maybe spread it out a bit if we include the Pennsylvania primary and some others. In the House races there is basically no competition left at all. We have completely squeezed it out.

In fact, I was looking at a release from the Center for Responsive Politics that noted two striking things. First, 137 of the incumbents who ran in the general election this year didn't even have a financial opponent-- their opponents haven't filed any reports, which leads us to believe that they probably haven't even raised the $5,000

needed to file a report. Second, in 83 percent of the House races, those who won won by 20 points or more. So, in most cases, it's not even much of a race.

As a result, you have a situation where American politics has become this tale of two cities. In battlegrounds and open seats and competitive contests, there is anenormous amount of activity, surging participation, great increases in the financial participation, lots of activity and very intensive mobilization and turnout operations, while the rest of the country goes unattended.

And it was clearly the case that, in this election, turnout and mobilization efforts more or less reached a whole new level in American politics. Both sides conducted the most sophisticated operations that we have ever seen. Tammany Hall had nothing on the Democrats or Republicans of the 2004 era in that they knew more about these voters than anyone in the past ever has, in some cases running as many as 200 different bits of information on an individual prospective turnout candidate.

What strikes me about all of that is a couple of things. One is how extremely well-funded elections are in these battleground situations. You know, one of the things most striking about this election is how well the candidates and the parties have adapted to the new rules and to the new fund-raising environment, despite all of the chatter and interest in these 527s that we tend to get here inside the Beltway.

The candidates raised dramatic amounts of money. In the presidential race, Bush and Kerry will spend over--or at least they raised over $600 million, as compared to $310 million for Gore and Bush last time. The general election candidates in the congressional elections have raised over $75 million more than their counterparts in 2000, and House candidates are up 16 percent compared to two years ago. The candidates raised a lot of money.

The parties are the missing story, as far as I'm concerned, in all of the coverage about the structure of the elections this year. The national party committees raised over a billion dollars, despite the ban on soft money. That's $100 million more than they raised in hard and soft money combined four years ago. And that figure is deceptive, because many components of the party money in 2000, such as the Republican Governors Association and some of the other Democratic associations, have separated out from the parties and are now in the 527 column because they operate as 527 entities now. Therefore the surge in party funding is even greater than the numbers suggest.

The parties played an extraordinarily important role in this election. For all the emphasis on ACT and Swift Boat Veterans and on these 527s--you know, I wouldn't diminish their importance in the race and the different ways they affected the dynamics, but one of the things that no one's focused on is the fact that, if we just look at the independent expenditures and coordinated spending the parties have been doing in this race, the national parties have already expended somewhere in the area of $320 million just on independent advertising and coordinated expenditures alone.

The parties have done more than $200 million in advertising in the presidential race. The parties outspent the candidates in the general election. And that compares to the best data we have available that suggests that the parties did roughly $81 million in hard- and soft-money advertising from June through election day four years ago. The role of the parties in the presidential campaign has been dramatic. Even more dramatic has been the role of the parties in congressional races, where there wasn't nearly the type of outside-group activity that existed in the presidential race.

Look at the small number of districts Tom talked about that are competitive. Just to give you an example, the Republican Congressional Campaign Committee, the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee--and the Campaign Finance Institute is releasing a press release on this this morning, with detailed analysis--spent $82 million on independent expenditures in House races this year. And they only spent money in 47 contests. They were both involved in 39 contests. And in a number of contests the parties spent more than a million dollars on each side to affect these House races. That gives some idea of the intensity of competition that was going on underneath all the red and blue states that Michael talked about. In fact, the national party committees spent 61 percent as much as the candidates in those races. It's just remarkable the amount of money that was flowing down into these contests.

As for the 527s, there was a lot of talk about the advertising, but it looks to me like the advertising dollars that they're going to spend is not going to match what the parties spent in the presidential race. In fact, the last numbers I saw suggested that the groups active in the presidential race had spent around $146 million so far, and that included lots of electioneering communications that were reported to the Federal Election Commission under the new law. And if that ends up being somewhere around where the number is, that's not going to match what the parties did and it's nowhere near what the candidates spent in the race. So you have to keep a lot of that in perspective.

Section 527 committees clearly played a major role in the ground war, particularly on the Democratic side. But we also have to remember that the parties weren't pushovers either in the get-out-the-vote operation. The reported amounts, which I haven't been able to verify yet, are that the Democrats had about a $60 million voter mobilization and turnout effort. That would be about three times the budget they had in

2000. Bush and the Republican National Committee are reporting a $125 million operation. So there was an enormous amount of money being spent.

One aspect of the commentary in the last day or two that has surprised me is this focus on the component of the electorate that describes itself as evangelical, and the fact that Bush won the popular vote, which is combining to form this growing conventional wisdom thatthe Republican turnout and the Karl Rove machine really worked and that the Democrats didn't deliver, they didn't get their vote out. It seems to me that there is nothing further from the truth. If you look at the get-out-the-vote operations that the Democrats had planned and you look at the state votes, it seems to me that the Democrats not only hit but they exceeded their targets, and that what was remarkable was just the surge of voting on both sides in these battleground states.

Let me offer two examples. Florida. As you all know, last time around in Florida, we saw an election where Al Gore received about 2.91 million votes. There were about 5.96 million votes cast, about 6 million votes cast. The Democrats assumed a big surge in turnout. And let's remember, all the battlegrounds this time were the same as the battlegrounds last time, so most of these states were pounded in 2000 with voter turnout efforts. So, they we're building from an elevated base. Now the parties are going to pound them again, find even more folks.

And one of the things that surprised me was that the Democrats set out a target beginning with the fact that Al Gore took 2.91 million votes; they projected that they weregoing to need to get at least 3.31 million votes in Florida in 2004. So they set this very ambitious goal of basically turning out another 400,000 to 450,000 people in Florida alone. They met that goal. In fact, John Kerry received 3.53 million votes. He received 600,000 more votes than Al Gore did in Florida. The problem is that the Bush

side also had increased turnout as a result of their operation and the intensity of the election, the interest people had in the race, so that as a result they produced 3.9 million votes.

Similarly in Ohio, the Democrats exceeded their target number based on their expectations for elevated turnout. In Ohio Kerry received 500,000 more votes than Al Gore did. But George Bush received 450,000 more votes than he received last time.

So both sides were successful. And one of the issues is not going to be whether or not these turnout systems work. There's a lot of evidence that can be taken on both sides to reinforce the notion that these person-to-person, high-contact, targeted campaigns really do move vote and do help expand your voting base. Everything that the parties learned out of 2000 and 2002 has been reinforced by the 2004 experience.

The question is really going to be, I think on a number of levels, one, did the Republicans do a better job of targeting, and was the notion of focusing on the base and evangelical voters a better strategy than the strategy of trying to expand out into new registrants and more marginal voting. We'll probably see a lot of debate about that. In thinking about these questions there's a number of factors you have to consider, because it's not simply the mechanics of these campaigns. As Michael noted, there are important shifts in population growth and in the mobility of the population that have to be considered in assessing this vote.

Second, I think it's very important that we keep in mind the fact that there may have been a lot of underestimating of what the Republicans did in advance of the 2002 mid-term elections in their ongoing registration and mobilization efforts. There was so much focus on the most recent numbers from this year. In some of these states, it appeared that the Democrats had so many more registrants than the Republicans, so

many new registrants, that if they just turned them out the Democrats were going to win. That assumption didn't factor in what had been going on for some time. That the Republicans only registered 10,000 new people in some of these suburbs may have meant thatmost of them were already registered. There weren't too many more Republicans to find.

Finally, on the evangelical vote, it would be instructive for many of us to look at some of the research that John Green has done on the 2004 election and on the religious landscape in American politics. John has done a lot of work looking at the complexity of faith communities. And this really is an interesting election because there are certain worship groups or faith communities that tend to see political activity as much more in line with their religious practice and consider it much more important to exercise their religious views in the political arena. There are great differences between more traditional evangelicals and modernist evangelicals on this matter. There are big differences between Latino Catholics and other Catholics on this issue. Latino Catholics feel much more strongly about using the political arena as part of the process of expressing their views on religious issues.

So part of this evangelical component relates to the different ways different faith communities see the political arena in relationship to their religious thinking.As a result there may be greater turnout in these communities not just because Karl Rove did such a good job of targeting them, but because within their communities of worship and church there is a reinforcing mechanism that encourages that type of civic participation.

MR. MANN: Tony, thank you very much. I'm going to make one straightforward observation and then we're going to turn to your questions. We've got a half-hour more to respond to what you have in mind.

Just to summarize, if we're not a 50-50 nation anymore, we're a 51-49, 48 nation; our politics remains evenly balanced between the parties and polarized; that most of the battles occur in a limited territory, especially in the House and, as the campaign for the presidency wound down, a limited number of states there as well.

One of the elements of the exit polls, Mike, that I was most struck by was the relationship between "most important issue in making your decision in voting" and the vote for Bush and Kerry. It was like we have seen on a whole range of other matters. We live in two worlds. In some ways, we've become tribes. It takes on a meaning beyond the particular perception of how things are going. We see the world as we think we should see it because of our tribal commitments and our loyalties.

Those people who felt Iraq was the most important issue in their decision voted 74-to-25 for Kerry. So to the extent there was a referendum on Iraq, it was very much a negative referendum. On the other hand, those who saw terrorism defined more broadly voted 86-to-14 for Bush. It's just striking. It's the question of linkage or no linkage. And it's fascinating because, of course, that is what the president was doing in his campaign, which was to call attention to his role in the war against terrorism more broadly.

If you look at the economy, if that was the most important, by 80-to-18 percent they went for Kerry. Those people who were really motivated on the basis of the economy picked Kerry. Those people motivated by "moral values," 79-to-18 for Bush.

Now, we've got two-way causation going on here. This is not all a matter of being moved by "moral issues" or moved by concern about Iraq and voting accordingly. I'm sure the other direction is much more powerful; that is, people begin with loyalties and psychological attachments and tribal instincts, and see the world accordingly. It's an interaction between the two, but it reminds us of how different the worlds are of those people who identify as Democrats and those as Republicans.

What will be fascinating to see, as our political leaders now begin to try to define and shape an agenda and move policies in accord with them, is when they take--and Democrats did that for years--sort of unwieldy, contradictory coalitions with opposing interests and pursue one element of that that seems at odds with the other element. It makes for very tricky governing, but also holds in abeyance, I think, any definitive conclusions about whether we are on the verge of breaking out of this 50-50 world and moving into, in this case, a long-term Republican majority. There's little sign in the election that we have broken this partisan divide. It will now take actions in government and supporting conditions in the economy and the world to make that possible.

With that, let's turn to your agenda.

QUESTION: I'm wondering if you can talk about how you think George Bush will govern in his second term, particularly with respect to whether you think he's actually going to try to reach across the aisle and reach out to the people who didn't vote for him, or whether it's going to be a presidency focused mostly on his base.

MR. MANN: Let me start. I think we saw a signal yesterday and the day before. To me it looks like the president will not listen. In 2000, having lost the popular vote and won the White House after the Court 5-4 stopped the statewide recount, he

proved to be a very ambitious leader and in no way trimmed back his agenda. I like to say he accomplished more with less than any president in contemporary history. Can you imagine him now moving back from his ambitious agenda for an ownership society which entails restructuring social insurance and transforming the tax code? Can you imagine that? He said as much yesterday: "I welcome the participation of Democrats in support of my agenda." That's what he has in mind. And the signals, the words, the gestures, the tones were all consistent with that.

So I think the president's going to propose a very ambitious agenda. The problem is all of these issues involve very difficult tradeoffs. They create winners and losers. The public, attracted to the notion of voluntary personal accounts with part of the Social Security payroll, hasn't yet realized the $2 trillion transition cost and the fact that anyone who partakes of that option has dramatically reduced guaranteed social security benefits upon retirement. So it's a risk and a gamble. The same is true when we move to the tax arena, when we move to Medicare.

I'm not saying nothing will happen at all. What I'm suggesting is the president will aim high, and my guess is that, seeing this election, the Democrats, in spite of their depleted ranks, will not simply get out of the way but will engage where they think they have a majority sentiment in the country behind them, and some moderate Republicans will get a little uneasy with the ambition of this president.

Would you all like to add anything to that?

MR. CORRADO: The only thing I would add--I agree with Tom--I think the president did say what he meant yesterday, that if you're a Democrat willing to work with us--or we look forward to working with those who want to help us in our objectives--that what strikes me is how they seem to have a very clear sense of the

timing of presidential administrations. In considering most of the effort in presidential administrations, it's generally thought that the best time for a president to act is right at the start of the second term. The administration is not involved in all of this replacement and building a White House staff, it has a clear sense of what to do, and an experienced White House that knows how to work with Capitol Hill.

The only real question seems to be what is going to be the big pitch? I mean, what is the issue the administration is going to concentrate on? It seems that they've got tax cuts off the board now; they basically have most of the tax cuts they want. They've got some items like the budget politics, the intelligence bill that are going to have to be dealt with. Social Security is clearly the biggest thing he might focus on. And they'll have to make an assessment of whether that will bog them down too much and whether they want to do a couple of other things first.

What's really going to affect the dynamics of the operation is whether this becomes a case where the president's pursuing his agenda, or reacting to events--they don't get elections in Iraq, there are more problems in foreign policy that intensify the divide that's now clear between the Democrats and Republicans on foreign policy, and there is a Supreme Court nomination where the politics of Capitol Hill just revolves around that and everything else becomes a secondary matter.

So I think part of it is going to be the extent to which the President can control his agenda and pick which issue he wants to use as the basis for trading off on other issues.

QUESTION: Mary Mullen. I'm a little bit concerned about all that money. I just wonder if that's democratic, that we have to spend so much money on elections. I know that before I've asked about the British caps that they have on their

elections and the Americans respond with horror, you know, why should we have elections like the British do. But I was wondering, is this democratic? Can someone that doesn't have that money or the ability to get some much money, can they become president? I mean, as a teacher I used to tell my children, well, gee, you can become president of the United States. Well, it looks like now you'd have to come with a lot of people with money or you'd have to have a lot of money yourself.

I was wondering if you could speak about that and maybe why we couldn't have caps on the spending.

MR. CORRADO: The reason why we can't have caps on spending is simple. The Supreme Court has ruled that spending caps are unconstitutional, unless a candidate is receiving public funds in return for a voluntary agreement to cap spending. This is one of the reasons why so many advocates for reform are promoting some form of public funding as a means of getting the caps. It clearly is more and more of a problem, the problem of money serving as a financial barrier to candidates participating.

The good news in this election is that the financing of this campaign has been more democratic than any other election that I have studied in my 20-something years of looking at this. The most remarkable thing about this election to me is the dramatic surge in participation that we have seen from small donors, and that much of what was driving the cost of the presidential campaign, much of what has provided the parties with the money needed to replace the soft money, is the fact that we have had literally millions of Americans give money--$25, $15, over the Internet, in the mail, and by phone--who had never given before. We had over 500,000 to a million new donors in the presidential race. The parties have added somewhere in the area of 3 to 4 million new donors to their rolls.

As a result, just to give you one example, the presidential candidates raised $157 million from individuals who gave less than $200. In 2000, the two candidates raised $21 million from individuals who gave less than $200. The parties as of the end of June, which was the last time I looked, had raised $175 million more in gifts from individuals who gave less than $200. There is through the Internet now this dramatic democratization of the financing that I think is going to continue out in the future. When the University of Michigan puts out its post-election survey, I wouldn't be surprised to see that some 15 percent of the population reports having made a contribution to a candidate or party or a political group in this election, which is an extraordinary change from, say, 10 years ago.

MR. MANN: So I think we ought to separate the overall amount of money, concerns about how it's raised, from how it's distributed, especially in congressional races and state legislative races. I think the first two are not problematic, but the third is; that is, where we have so many contests where there is no challenger, no competition. And we need to do a lot of thinking about how we can get resources in the hands of those to provide some genuine competition. It's a complicated story, and certainly gerrymandering is part of the problem. It's hard to raise money in a seat that has been drawn to make it virtually impossible for the opposition party to win.

But don't understate the importance of the changes, the really positive changes that occurred this year in our elections. One was this dramatic increase in the number of small donors. Secondly was a dramatic increase in the effort by the parties and other groups to actually reach out to individuals, to engage in person-to-person campaigning and pull people into the political process. I think that's a very healthy sign.

QUESTION: My question is for Mr. McDonald. You said in your exit polls you factor in early votes. How do you factor in late votes? This was the first election where voters were given provisional ballots. We still don't know how many provisional ballots are out there. By some estimates, there are a million; in Ohio alone, over 100,000. So how do you factor in late votes?

And related to that, in your Ohio results you have 100 percent, but there are still anywhere from a hundred and--maybe as many as 250,000 provisional votes in Ohio yet to be counted.

MR. McDONALD: Well, those people who are exiting the polling place are going to be surveyed regardless of whether or not they cast a provisional ballot or cast a regular ballot within the polling place. So they would be picked up as they come out the doors, regardless of how they cast their ballot.

I mentioned this earlier. I said be aware that these numbers are not final numbers. And we won't know the true final numbers until maybe two, two and a half weeks from now. It's unfortunate, though, that everybody wants to get the number now rather than wait for everything to--all the dust to settle. And already, you know, some of my colleagues, my contemporaries, I guess--trying to put a nice name on them--are jumping the gun and trying to get out turnout projections and are really looking at these numbers, I think, without all of those cautionary statements and qualifiers that you need to put on this to understand, really, where turnout will be at the end of the day. It's possible, though not very likely, that Bush could slip under 50 percent--with all those outstanding ballots in California, for example, and Washington.

So, preliminary. It's just 100 percent of the vote that's been counted so far.

QUESTION: Andres Kreuger [ph]. I'm a little skeptical about this notion of these two tribes, since whenever I travel around the country, especially before the election, and, you know, you talk to people, stay in bed-and-breakfasts, as you talk with people, and I met a lot of people who said, well, I voted for Gore last time, I'm going to vote for Bush-Cheney this time; or the other way around. So have any of your data really covered this kind of shift underneath, between--you know, from blue to red, from red to blue, instead of only kind of concentrating on the absolute numbers of turnout and percentage?

MR. MANN: It's about 10 percent switch both ways. That is to say, Bush voters in 2000 who voted for Kerry are about 10 percent, and Gore voters who supported Bush this time around were 10 percent of Gore voters last time.

I remember--it tells you something about your peer group and where you live--I would travel around here and give talks in New York and Boston and people would tell me, you know, I haven't met a single Gore voter in 2000 who intends to vote for Bush but I've met hundreds of Bush voters who are going to vote for Kerry. Well, they probably weren't in New York or Massachusetts, but in some other parts of the country.

So, yes. Listen, it's not universal, it's not 100 percent sticking there again and again, but 90 percent is quite a bit. And when we look at these numbers and see this degree of sort of parties of loyalty, when we see it shape values, policies, perceptions of reality, we think it's significant. Is it universal? No. There remain some weak partisans and some independents who are certainly capable of moving back and forth depending on the referenda and depending on the basis of their concern that the country might be moving in the wrong direction. The intensity of the tribalism is certainly felt more at the

activist level and at the level of elected officials. But more and more over time, Americans have sorted themselves into parties by ideology, and that has tended to reinforce what occurs at the activist level.

MR. McDONALD: I just wanted to add to that. One of the things we've seen, though, while the number of partisan appears to be increasing, when you look at voter registrations, the largest numbers are actually among independents. They weren't registering with one of the two parties. Though among those group of independents are people who are leaners, and they actually tend to vote more partisan than the weak party IDers.

And one other thing about--I think much maligned in this election were people who were undecided up to the very end of the election. For people who have high levels of information, like opinion leaders like ourselves in this room, we know how we're going to vote in the election, we know what the issues are, and we're very certain on how all of these things add up. But when you talk to voters, they are genuinely voters out there who thought that terrorism was a very important issue and the economy was a very important issue, and these people were conflicted, so they were undecided. And they were really making up their mind at the very last minute how they were going to vote, not because they didn't understand the issues that were out there, but more the fact that they were just conflicted over the issues.

So I think that, unfortunately, these voters were derided as being stupid or ignorant about their vote choice when in fact it was that they didn't really have a clear vote choice between the candidates of the two parties that were being offered to them.

QUESTION: Thank you very much. Two questions. Maybe to Mr. Corrado first, about somehow a follow-up. Statistically, as far as United States history is

concerned, which president is more successful--a first-term president, or a second-term president?

And a more specific question maybe to all the panel. Is there somehow some parallel, some comparison between Ronald Reagan in 1984 and George W. Bush of 2004?

Thank you.

MR. CORRADO: Statistically, I'm not sure whether first-term or second-term presidents are more successful. I think generally the research would probably find that first-term presidents tend to get more done than second-term presidents, largely because the agenda has been expended in the first term. An administration came in, did what it wanted to do, made its policy change. The President is reelected, but there is no big burning thing left undone.

So you'd have to look at presidents who come into a second term who have some other major policy or some major initiatives they want to pursue. And in the study of that situation, it's found thatin the second term the President has the highest political capital at the very start, measured by the new mandate, the same staff, and its experience, but generally has less of an issue agenda than when he first came in.

In this second Bush administration, it seems that they're claiming high political capital; at the same time, they have a clear issue agenda they still want to pursue. There are many who argue that Clinton was in the same position; however, other factors led to the dissembling of his political capital and focus on a second-term agenda.

In terms of Bush comparing to Reagan, Tom is probably best able to speak on that, although I see no signs of what we saw with Reagan in '84, where he was

willing to pursue some of these initiatives, in part, at the end of the cold war and some of these strategic agreements because they thought that this was a way to further promote his legacy. I get no sense whatsoever that there's anything in this election to lead the Bush administration to change its current approach to foreign policy.

MR. MANN: Let me just add briefly, there certainly have been landmark pieces of legislation passed in the second terms of presidents. I mentioned earlier, I think, the Tax Reform Act of 1986. This is true of some achievements under Clinton, when he negotiated with Republicans in Congress. The same is true of Eisenhower.

So it is possible. But overall, second terms tended to be characterized by hubris, scandal, fatigue, and the six-year itch, which is both at second mid-term election, which tends to deplete the president's supporters on Capitol Hill and which signals the opening round of the presidential selection process for the upcoming presidency.

QUESTION: How important was the 18-to-24-year-old vote? There are some Kerry followers who think if we could have just gotten more young people out, especially in Ohio and Florida, things might have been different. I wonder if that's grasping at straws.

MR. CORRADO: Well, it seems to me that the 18-to-24-year-old vote was very important for Kerry. He did very well with that vote. There's been this emphasis on the fact thatthey only made up 17 percent of the electorate or roughly the same share as last time and therefore they didn't play the role they should have played in this election. But with this expanded electorate we had, at the base that would mean that millions more came out to vote.

What was surprising is that, at least as far as I can tell, they didn't vote as strongly for Kerry as some thought. People basically assumed that, if you're young,

you're going to be much more for Kerry than for Bush. They underestimated the fact that there is a generation of young people out there who are in many ways more attuned to Republicans than what older generations tend to see as how 18-to-24-year-olds should vote. I've noticed this some of my older colleagues--certainly no one on this panel, Tom--who, having not spent--

[Laughter.]

MR. CORRADO: --the day in the classroom every day, have this sense that somehow the college students now are the same people they went to college with, and don't understand the effects of a generation that has come out of an era where all they really knew was Clinton and Bush and have much more preference for Bush than people would assume.

MR. MANN: The exit polls that I have are only reporting 18-to-29, so we don't have that pure youngest cohort. And what we're seeing nationally is they represent 17 percent of the electorate, which, as I recall but I don't have with me, is pretty close to what it was in 2000. In some of the battleground states it's higher, like Ohio, it was up to 21 percent. And certainly there was a 10 percent Kerry advantage in the larger group nationally, and it got up to 14 percent in Ohio. So the answer is yes, it would have helped Kerry a lot had turnout been higher among this group.

MR. McDONALD: And one other thing to say about this youth vote on colleges, there are enormous barriers that are placed in the way for college students to vote. Most of the localities don't view them as permanent residents of their locality, so they're for the most part discouraged or even prevented from registering to vote in their community. In fact, we saw down at William and Marry College over in Virginia that several of the registrations were never processed, for some reason, by the local electoral

board for the people who were registering to vote there. And that's actually been an ongoing problem that college has had with their electoral board over the last two years. So that's just another, this barrier of registering where they go to school. Then they have to cast absentee ballots. It's not easy for a student to navigate and find out exactly how to get an absentee for their state or register to vote in the proper state that they need to register in.

So if we could do, I think--and one of the things that we haven't discussed yet, but I think we need to think about reforming as we move forward from this election in the system, is some sort of national voter registration that would clear up the registrations for young people, all these challenges that were being made at the polling place. There's a lot of deadwood on these registration rolls as people move from place to place and then people aren't voting in the right precinct. If we somehow just cleared up the whole mess and were able to properly tell people where they needed to go in order to vote and had national tracking on where people were moving around, a lot of the problems and a lot of the legal wrangling that we saw in this last election would have been cleared up.

MR. MANN: Listen, we dodged a bullet. If Kerry had gotten 50,000-70,000 more votes in Ohio, this election would not yet be conceded and we would be in litigation over the provisional ballots, among many other factors. So we've got a lot of work to do on the whole election administration front. And one of the big challenges for various nonprofit groups, including those like ACLU and others who've been adamantly opposed to a national ID of any form, if we're going to clear up this problem, we're going to have national registration and it's going to have to entail some kind of national identification.

QUESTION: Yes, I was wondering if you could tell me what kind of leadership you expect from Harry Reid in the Senate.

MR. MANN: What I expect is that Harry Reid will be less visible as a Democratic leader in the Senate than Tom Daschle was and will not move to assert himself as the leader of the national Democratic Party. There are many people competing for that title and many visible Democrats who will fill the chair opposite Tim Russert on Meet the Press. But Harry Reid will do it infrequently. He's a very savvy student of Senate rules. He's indefatigable in working on behalf of his colleagues in overseeing the floor, pursuing interests. He will be a great trench warrior for the Democratic Party as they seek to look for their opportunities to actually influence legislation through negotiation and compromise, to stop legislation that they believe is harmful and there's no willingness on the part of Republicans to negotiate with them, and to promote other ideas, alternatives in the voice of Democrats other than Harry Reid.

QUESTION: Thank you very much. My question is do we have--I talked to a couple of people from the Democratic 527s that were involved in get-out-the-vote. Indeed, they did say that they hit their targets and went over their targets. But they also said that their targets weren't high enough. So my question is do we have any more thorough information about the Republican get-out-the-vote effort--what was done, who they targeted, and what actually did to increase their vote by such a dramatic margin after an election they essentially lost in 2000?

MR. CORRADO: We don't have more specific information about thespecific internals of it, other than the fact that they took the view that their base vote, increasing just the turnout amongst the hard-core Bush loyalists, was one of the keys. In

addition, there was the feeling that there was a number of evangelicals who didn't go to the polls last time.

Having done a lot of these voter-turnout operations over the years, before I got religion and went into academics and said now I don't have to stay up all night for the week before the election, and, judging these turnout targets, I think probably in retrospect you would find that there was an underestimation of something you couldn't really estimate up front, which is the levels of intensity in feelings about this election.

You know, as you looked, as you got into September and October, the The percentage of people saying this election really matters, this is one of the most important elections in my life, and the increasing tension and divide over the war in Iraq in terms of whether Americans approved or disapproved of it, clearly grew over the course of the election. If you look at the poll question "Do you think it was the right decision to go to war?" there are stark differences between Bush and Kerry voters. "Do you think it's going well or badly over there?" There are increasingly stark differences in perception amongst the Bush and Kerry voters. And I think a lot of that intensity of feelings really revved up in the latter six weeks of the campaign.

The other factor we might underestimate is related to the significant amount of attention given to ACT and the parties. Remember, there were 1,400 organizations working on voter registration and turnout in the United States this year. Everyone from the League of Women Voters to corporations were doing much more to get their members and their shareholders to participate in this election. When you put that cumulative effort together, I think you'll find there's a lot of vote there that came not from the Democrats or Republicans or ACT or the churches, but came from the activities

of all these other independent groups and civic organizations who are also adding to the great din that occurred in the weeks leading up to this vote.

MR. McDONALD: I would also say that at this point we really can't answer the question whether it was mobilization or motivation that was driving people to the polls. We're going to have to look at some of the post-election surveys to try and tease out the separate effects from this. So although it's undoubtedly the mobilization had a component, we also know that the motivation had a component. And we can't answer that question right now, even though I know most people want to know the answer at the moment.

MR. MANN: I think, though, pre-election we probably underestimated the level of motivation, especially in this core Republican constituency, figuring that most of the anger was on the Democratic side and not really appreciating the extent to which other Americans felt their own sort of--the whole nature of their belief systems and faith and lifestyles were being threatened, and this was an opportunity to act on that. I think Rove understood that. He used issues to help magnify it, and he put together a ground operation that facilitated getting those people to the polls.

I'm afraid we've run out of time. I want to thank my colleagues Tony and Mike, and thank you all for coming.

[Applause.]

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