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International Rules of the Game

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(TRANSCRIPT PREPARED FROM A TAPE RECORDING.)

Introduction:
Marshall Bouton, President, The Chicago Council on Foreign Relations

Findings:
Steven Kull, Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA)

Comments:
Norman J. Ornstein, The American Enterprise Institute
Ivo Daalder, The Brookings Institution

MR. BOUTON: -- of the findings of the survey in particular with respect to, as we've called them, rules of the game, but as they're described in the report, as norms, international norms on the use of force. And I want to ask Steven Kull, who has taken particular interest in this in the survey and has expertise from much prior work in this area, to share the findings with you.

MR. KULL: One of the key questions that we wanted to answer in this poll is whether in the post-September 11th world there has been some change in the rules of the game in terms of the use of force. Historically, states have been largely limited to using military force as a form of self-defense within the context of international law and the general regime surrounding the United Nations. And in the post-September 11th period, there have been a lot of arguments made that those limits should no longer apply and that there are more circumstances under which a state should have the right to use force on a unilateral basis.

So we posed a series of questions. Number one would be: Should a state have the right to take unilateral action against a state suspected of developing weapons of mass destruction? And then another question is: Should the UN Security Council have that right? It's not entirely clear that the UN Security Council should. The nonproliferation treaty regime is entirely voluntary. Should the UN Security Council have the right to prevent a country from acquiring weapons of mass destruction?

Should a state have the right to overthrow a government that is supporting a terrorist group? Is that a causa belli? And should the UN Security Council have that power?

There's a lot of concern about genocide. There's a lot of discussion about that in regard to Sudan right now. Should states have the right to intervene in a country, into the internal affairs of a country to prevent genocide or to restore democracy?

Now, there's also questions about nuclear weapons. Traditionally, they've been framed as primarily a deterrent. We've certainly had first use as part of our arsenal of ideas. But recently there have been new ideas about small nuclear weapons, bunker busters, and things like that, ideas of using nuclear weapons in new ways in the context of the war on terrorism.

In the wake of Abu Ghraib, there has been a lot of discussion about the use of torture. Should states have the right to use torture to get information from suspected terrorists?

And then in a broader way, the question: What should the powers and capabilities of the UN be? And should the U.S. be willing to accept multilateral decisions?

So these are sort of the big questions, the big playground we were moving around in, and I'm going to show you some of the key findings, not all of them, by any means.

Okay. Should a state have the right to take military action against a state suspected of developing weapons of mass destruction? We asked: What are the conditions under which countries on their own should have the right to go to war with another country they believe may pose a threat to them? And we posed the argument that has been made, if they have strong evidence that the other country is acquiring weapons of mass destruction that could be used against them at some point in the future, that would be basically a causa belli.

Well, among the public and leaders that did not go over well. They basically took a conservative response, and only 17 percent of the public and 10 percent of the leaders embraced it.

A majority, 52 percent of the public and 61 percent of the leaders, embraced the more traditional concept only if they have strong evidence that they are in imminent danger of being attacked by the other country, which is a principle of international law. A smaller percentage said only if the other country attacks them first. So basically this proposition of kind of modifying the rules of the game to make a kind of exception for the weapons of mass destruction situation was rejected by the public. They chose a conservative stance in that sense.

Okay. What about the UN Security Council? Should the UN Security Council have the -- [tape ends].

According to Chapter 7, the UN Security Council of the UN Charter, the UN Security Council can really decide anything that it wants, so this isn't really a major deviation from international law but it a movement away from the kind of essence of the nonproliferation regime that emphasizes that it's purely voluntary.

Looking at the case of North Korea, what approval is necessary before U.S. takes military action against North Korea's nuclear capability? Is the approval of the UN Security Council necessary? 68 percent of the public says yes, as do 64 percent of the leaders.

Is the approval of most U.S. allies necessary? Even more, 74 percent of the public said that's necessary, as do 70 percent of the leaders; and 58 percent of the public and 73 percent of the leaders also say approval of the South Korean Government is necessary.

Moving on to the next question. Should a state have the right to overthrow a government that is supporting a terrorist group? We asked: When does the U.S. have the right to overthrow a government providing substantial support to a terrorist group that the U.S. thinks might pose a threat, even if it does not have UN approval?

So we pose the argument basically that has been made of when the U.S. thinks that the terrorist group may pose a threat at some point in the future, whether or not it poses such a threat now--this is basically the idea of preventive war--and only 11 percent endorse that position. Once again they take a conservative stance in terms of increasing the latitude.

58 percent say only when the U.S. has strong evidence that the terrorist group poses an imminent threat. Again, this theme of a need for an imminent threat, again, consistent with the existing norms. And 26 percent say the U.S. would always first need to get UN approval.

Should the UN Strategy Council have the right to authorize military force to stop a country from supporting terrorist groups? Overwhelming confirmation. Basically, again, the UN Security Council can decide, is seen as not constrained and that it should not be constrained, everything is on the table when it comes to the UN Security Council.

Should states have the right to use force to prevent genocide? Who should have the right to authorize or use military force to prevent severe human rights violations such as genocide?

Well, 85 percent of the public and 94 percent of the leaders say that the UN has that right, and 70 percent of the public and 73 percent of leaders say that countries have the right to use force without UN approval. So this is very interesting.

When you have this humanitarian principle of genocide, that overrides, that creates a new latitude for individual countries that goes beyond UN approval, so that's actually a new development in terms of the norm, consistent in a sense with the convention against genocide and maybe that's one of the ways that it can be accounted for, that in a sense that that convention already moved the line there, softened that line. So states can even intervene in the internal affairs of another country when we're dealing with genocide.

And what about the actual willingness to use U.S. troops for this kind of purpose? Well, among leaders 86 percent support using U.S. troops to stop a government from committing genocide and killing a large number of its own people; 75 percent of the public support using U.S. troops for this purpose; and 72 percent support the general idea of using U.S. troops to deal with the humanitarian crises.

What about restoring a democratic government? Who should have the right to restore a democratic government that has been overthrown? Well, again, clear majority, 60 percent of both public and leaders say the UN has that right. But do countries acting on their own without UN approval, then it gets quite--it basically goes against it, the public 53 percent say that countries should not have that right; 58 percent of the leaders also say that countries should not have that right without UN approval. Also when it comes to the specific instance, 63 percent of the public opposes the idea of using U.S. troops to install democratic governments in states where dictators rule.

At the same time we're seeing, not surprisingly, continuing support for the traditional right of countries to defend other countries from attack. Who should have the right to defend another country that has been attacked? Well, overwhelmingly the UN is seen as having the right to authorize such force, and 59 percent of the public and

71 percent of the leaders say countries have the right to do that even without UN approval, to defend other countries.

Now, what about specific instances? Well, pursuant to our conversation this morning, 51 percent of the leaders supported doing so if China invaded Taiwan, but only 33 percent of the public. It is important to remember that Taiwan is not a state so that this is in a different category.

If Arab forces invaded Israel, 64 percent would support using troops, U.S. troops to help protect it, but only 43 percent of the public would.

If North Korea invaded South Korea, 82 percent of the leaders would support using troops for that purpose, but only 43 percent of the public would. But wait. What if it's a UN-sponsored effort? Then it changes completely. Then it jumps up to 64 percent. This is really critical in the public's mind. We found this really actually again and again for a whole variety of scenarios, and possibly even the Taiwan one. If it's a multilateral effort then the public says yes, then we would support contributing. If everybody gets together it has the legitimacy, there's the burden sharing, and then you have a completely different picture, and as you know, on the run-up to the Iraq war that was a major consideration on the part of the public was having UN approval and multilateral participation.

Should nuclear weapons be used for purposes other than deterrence? Well, we posed three possible uses of, principles for the use of nuclear weapons by the U.S. Well, only 22 percent of the public said the U.S. should never use nuclear weapons under any circumstances, as did 25 percent of the leaders. 57 percent said the U.S. should use nuclear weapons only in response to a nuclear attack; and just 19 percent of the public and 16 percent of the leaders endorsed the idea that in certain circumstances

the U.S. should use nuclear weapons even if it has not suffered a nuclear attack. So this principle, this norm against first use of nuclear weapons seems to be still rather firmly in place.

What about changing the rules against torture? We wanted to make sure we were--you know, you saw earlier that just put on a list of approaches to terrorism it's rejected by the public, but we wanted to present the argument.

Terrorists pose such an extreme threat the government should now be allowed to use torture if it may gain information that saves innocent lives. Put up against rules against torture--again the normative concept--rules against torture should be maintained because torture is morally wrong and weakening these rules may lead to the torture of U.S. soldiers who are held prisoner abroad, emphasizing again the normative framework, the rules of the game versus the potential gain of getting information that could save innocent lives. And as you can see, among the public and the leaders they clearly went for maintaining the norm, maintaining the rules. We could get into a little more detail about this in the discussion under, you know, are there circumstances under which they might make an exception and so on. But on principle, the basic idea of modifying the rule, loosening the rule itself in the context of the war on terrorism is rejected.

Shifting gears, there's really--we alluded to this already in the morning, but here there's more to show you about the broader movement towards strong support for collective decision making in the UN and for giving the UN increasing powers.

When dealing with international problems, the U.S. should be more willing to make decisions within the UN even if this means the U.S. will sometimes have to go along with a policy that is not its first choice. You know, it's easy to say, yeah,

let's make decisions in the UN, but the real critical question is whether we would accept choices that we don't prefer. And 66 percent of the public and 78 percent of the leaders agreed that we should be willing to accept these kind of even adverse decisions within the UN.

There's also strong support for multilateral treaties and agreements. 87 percent of the public supports the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, that treaty that would prohibit nuclear weapons tests, explosions worldwide, as do 85 percent of the public. 80 percent of the public and leaders support the Land Mines Treaty. Three-quarters of the public and 70 percent of the leaders support the International Criminal Court, U.S. participation in the International Criminal Court; and 71 percent of the public and 72 percent of the leaders support U.S. participation in the Kyoto Agreement.

On Friday we're going to disaggregate this with the leaders as, you know, which leaders in Congress, in the administration, so on and so forth, and you'll be really surprised when you find out how many leaders support these things, but that's for the discussion on Friday. And on Friday we'll look at what leaders assume about the public.

Now, new steps to strengthen the UN. You know, we decided to really push the envelope here. How far is the public willing to go? And we were somewhat surprised at what we found.

We asked, what about having a standing UN peacekeeping force, selected, trained and commanded by the United Nations, basically the UN having its own military force for peacekeeping purposes? We thought that this was really going to be pushing the envelope, and yet 74 percent of the public and 67 percent of the leaders favored this idea.

Giving the UN the power to regulate the international arms trade? 57 percent of the public and 55 percent of the leaders also endorsed this idea.

Giving--this is probably the edgiest one. Giving the UN the power to fund its activities by imposing a small tax on such things as the international sale of arms or oil. Well, 49 percent of the public, a slight plurality, support the idea, while a slight plurality, 49 percent of the leaders oppose the idea. So it's sort of a divided response.

I think this is the first time this has ever been found. No poll had ever revealed this, a readiness to possibly give up the veto in the UN Security Council. We asked: As you may know, there are five permanent members of the UN Security Council and any one of them can veto any resolution. Some people have proposed that this should be changed so that if a decision was supported by all the other members, no member, not even the U.S., could veto the decision. Would you favor or oppose this change?

And 59 percent of the public endorsed it. This isn't saying we should go strictly to majority rule within the Security Council. It says that if all the other members agree, then the veto can effectively be overridden. It's important to note that it was specified that even the U.S. could be overridden.

We also asked about ICJ compulsory jurisdiction. Should the U.S. make the general commitment to accept the decisions of the World Court rather than deciding on a case-by-case basis whether we'll accept the Court's decision? As you may know, the U.S. at one point did accept ICJ compulsory jurisdiction, and then during the Reagan period reversed that, and so at this point does not have it. 57 percent of the public supports that idea, as do a plurality of 48 percent of the leaders.

Now, let me pose another kind of new and different scenario, giving international institutions new powers. Should the World Health Organization be given the authority to intervene in a country to respond to a crisis threatening world health even if that country disagrees? This is again, pushing the rules of the game in the intervention to the internal affairs of another country because they're not behaving themselves in terms of dealing with a possible epidemic or something like that. 78 percent of the public favors it.

At the same time--and this is the last point--you think, wow, they're so supportive of all these, the UN and the World Health Organization having all these powers and so on. They must love the UN. They must love the World Bank. Well, not necessarily. If you give them a thermometer scale of zero to 100, the World Health Organization gets 60 degrees. That's pretty good. That's pretty good. The United Nations 57 degrees. The World Court 50 degrees, that's not so great. The World Trade Organization 48 degrees; the World Bank 46; the International Monetary Fund 44.

So it's not that if you talk about the institution per se that they're so enthusiastic, and attitudes about the UN can kind of--these feelings about the UN can go up and down. Right after we went to war with Iraq it went down. People were disappointed that solutions weren't found within the Security Council and so on. So how people feel about the institutions, you know, this month or this quarter or something like that, doesn't necessarily tell you what they would like to see in terms of what these institutions are doing. In fact, it appears that some of the lack of enthusiasm for these institutions is because they're not doing more of the kinds of things that they would like to see these institutions do, something more active, more involved, you know, and intervene into more areas of international life.

Thanks.

MR. BOUTON: Thank you very much, Steve.

We now turn to comments, first from Norm Ornstein, resident fellow at the American Enterprise Institute.

MR. ORNSTEIN: Thanks, Marshall.

This is a fascinating survey coming out at an important and fascinating time. Just a general comment to begin with. I, like others, as the questions in the last session suggested, as I read this survey for the first time was really struck at what I see as a startling disconnect between the public's world view and the Bush administration's oft-stated world view.

If you think of it as being basically, we're the only super power in the world, and never has the gap between No. 1 and No. 2 been this great, and we will forcefully articulate our viewpoint and pursue our national interests, and the rest of the world will try and be polite, will just simply have to accommodate themselves to it. That is off the charts as far as the public is concerned.

So why then, under those circumstances, would we be seeing the kinds of views in the presidential campaign with five weeks to go that we're seeing now? Of course, one element of this is we are not measuring here the intensity of viewpoints or the primacy of these issues for voters out there, and for most voters I suspect the intensity of views here is not that great, and these are certainly not the prime issues in which people are discussing or considering their presidential choices. Nor are we able to take into account here the context right now when we're in the midst of war and the willingness of a public to defer to a commander in chief and to the structure of the commander in chief and his viewpoints, and also under those circumstances, when

troops are in danger and are being killed, to look at those who are with us and those who are against us in somewhat different terms.

Nonetheless, if these views do not necessarily represent a deep level of intensity as perhaps other issues do, I suspect they are strongly stable and that there are some opportunities here. If I were John Kerry, two days from a debate on foreign policy looking at this survey, among the things that I would be doing would not necessarily be to talk a lot about the United Nations, but I would be asking why it is that we have gone from a world that was with us to a world where they hate us. I think that, given the way Americans look at America's role in the world and America's desirable role in the world, is something that's going to leave people very intensely uncomfortable, and that we have seen clearly a sea change in attitudes over the last three years, and that we have all kinds of evidence in front of our eyes suggesting that even those who studied here, who have worked here, who've had great experience here, who have been our friends and allies in the past, have developed a level of animosity towards us, is something that Americans don't like and don't want.

Now, overall, as Steve has suggested, the high level of public support for multilateralism, the belief that Americans ought to be deeply engaged in the world but ought not to be a unilateral actor, the desire for the United States to be a team player under those circumstances itself is striking.

And that level of support for the International Criminal Court, the elimination of the veto is just remarkable. I don't think it's terribly meaningful because those issues in particular are not going to be anywhere near the top of the wish list of people, and you're not going to find many voters who will make decisions based on our positions on those issues. But the suggestion that there are rules of the game and that we

ought to participate actively in them as a team player, and even if decisions are not our first choice, abide by them, is really important and once again I think reflects the reality that we don't want to be disliked or despised abroad. We want to be a part of a world team, even if we're the largest part and the most significant part.

Within that, however, and again getting back to why we see this dysjunction in the political polls as we approach the election, undergirding a lot of this is the important distinction that people make about terrorism. When you put the term "terrorism" into the questions and make that the context, you do see a very different reaction. And it's not surprising that almost every foreign policy issue now in the presidential campaign the Bush campaign starts by trying to put it all into that larger terrorism grab bag, fits I think with the public's views at this point. We have much less accommodating attitudes if it comes to and when it comes to combating terrorism.

Just a couple of other points that struck me. There is of course also a very important distinction that Americans make when a threat is imminent than when it is not. And also, one would have perhaps thought that after September 11th that everything would have changed and that threats that may be a little bit further down the road, but that could result in a terrorist attack on us, would now be seen as much more significant to deal with at the moment. There's a little bit of: we've had three years, we haven't had an attack, we can lay back a little bit now. There is not that same sense of aggressiveness almost. There's a little bit of out of sight out of mind in that area as well.

One last point. There's a table in here that's--and there are a lot of interesting things to say about the similarities and the dysjunctions between public and leader attitudes in this area. What I found very interesting is the question of whether there's a support for use of American troops in various circumstances. In most of the

scenarios raised, whether it's stopping a government from committing genocide or being part of international peacekeeping in Afghanistan, or keeping peace between India and Pakistan, or North Korea invading South Korea, leaders are much more willing to entertain the notion of a commitment of troops than are members of the public.

There are two areas where that's reversed, interestingly. Leaders are reluctant to commit troops to ensure the oil supply, and the public is much more willing to do so. Leaders are even more averse to using troops to fight drug lords in Colombia, and mention drugs, I guess, and it raises a different level of interest in the public where a majority of the public, compared to barely more than a quarter of the leaders, are willing to use troops there.

And finally, the last item on that list is using troops to install democratic governments in states where dictators rule. And there it's more than 2 to 1 of the public indicating an unwillingness to do so. It seems clear from that and from some of the other surveys, that there are just not a lot of broad public support for the notion of taking extraordinary actions to install democracy. Democracy as a goal is of much higher interest to the elite audience than it is to the mass public.

In some of these areas, under those circumstances, the rhetoric that President Bush has used post invasion of Iraq to justify things just doesn't seem to fit the broad array of priorities or interests that the public has, but it's working.

MR. BOUTON: Thank you, Norm.

Ivo Daalder, Brookings Institution.

MR. DAALDER: I dare say, Norm, we have five weeks to figure out whether it is working.

[Laughter.]

MR. DAALDER: That said, I'm very pleased to be here. It's a great survey. As others have noted, it's a great service that the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations does every four years, and now, luckily, every two years. Hopefully we'll continue down this path, because this is a set of data that is extraordinarily important and useful for all of us who care about American foreign policy.

I think this survey is interesting also in terms of the surprises that many of the previous people at this podium have already highlighted. Certainly there are lots of surprises for me. One of the gratifying things for the rest of the world, if not perhaps for the American electorate, should be the notion that America as the quintessential rogue elephant is one that is clearly rejected by the American public and indeed by the American leadership. This is a country, contrary to the way it is often described abroad, that wants to play by the rules, and it is willing to play by those rules to an extent that is remarkable.

Indeed, I think what strikes me most is the traditionalism and the conformity of the American public and the leaders. I don't think, with regard to the essential rules of the game, there's a difference between the public and leader attitude..

There are two sets of issues I want to highlight. One is on the question of the use of force where there seems to be a general support for the traditional framework on how we ought to decide the questions of when to use force. Secondly, the overwhelming belief on the part of Americans that we're somehow better off if we are bound to international treaties and organizations than if we are unbound from those treaties and organizations, which is a direct repudiation of the essence of Mr. Bush's foreign policy, as Norm said and others have commented..

Let me talk briefly about the use of force because I think there are two ways to look at these data. One is to say that the UN is the driving force in deciding how and when one needs to use force according to Americans. The other is to say that what Americans are looking for is collective action, particularly in order to legitimize the use of force, but that doesn't necessarily mean that collective action has to be within the constructs of the UN.And I think there is an argument to be made that in fact the Americans are looking at the UN framework in a very different way than much of the rest of the world, suggesting the potential for disagreement down the road.

As you all know, the framework on the use of force that is in the UN Charter stresses that states should not use force except in self defense or if authorized by the UN Security Council. Clearly, Americans want and desire the approval of the UN Security Council, but they also want the UN Security Council to interpret its rights under Chapter 7 in the Charter far more broadly than has traditionally been the case. That is, they want the UN Security Council to authorize the preemptive use of force in case of state sponsorships of terror, in case of countries that seek to acquire nuclear weapons, and indeed, in the case of human rights violations and the overthrow of democratic governments. That is to say, they want a UN Security Council that is highly proactive with regard to the issue of the use of force and with regard to the question of sovereignty. They want the UN Security Council to override sovereignty in those cases that that occurs.

The fact that that is the case is underscored by the majority of public support for the use of unilateral force in almost all instances, with one big exception of the democratic overthrow of the states. There is a gap between public support for the use of force when the UN approves and the majorities that support unilateral use of force

in the case of state sponsorship of terrorism, in the case of an acquisition of nuclear weapons, certainly in the case of genocide and other human rights abuses. You get more support when the UN is there, but you still get a remarkable amount of support for unilateral use of force in particular cases.. What we're seeing is not grand support for the United Nations, but rather grand support for working together with others. In fact, the view that Americans have about when and how to use force is quite at odds in many ways with the dominant view around the world, particularly the notion of conditional sovereignty. One of the striking findings that Steve mentioned earlier was the intervention of the WHO to deal with an infectious disease in a case of a country that disagrees. That's a remarkable infraction of the traditional notion of sovereignty--an international organization can come into your country to deal with a disease even if you don't like it.

So I think we're seeing some very interesting modulation of what sovereignty is about here, and it suggests that while the traditional framework of gaining U.N. Security Council support is important to Americans, it also suggests to me that if the U.N. Security Council acts as it has consistently acted, which is not to grant support in those cases, it's not clear to me that the American public at that point says, no, we don't want to go it alone.

Take the case of genocide today in Sudan. If the United States were to decide that intervention is indeed warranted, and fails--as it would, in my view--to get U.N. Security Council support, I think a vast majority of the American public would support that intervention, if one uses the data that are presented in this survey. Indeed, that was the case in Kosovo and Iraq, when we did try to get U.N. support; failing that,

still got majority support--less than we would have gotten if we'd gotten the U.N. along, but nevertheless got majority support for intervention.

In other words, what we may be seeing here is really a hankering for international approval, for burden sharing, for the need to legitimize our actions by having others supporting us. I think, as Norm rightly said, we don't like the fact that people hate us. We are much more comfortable when people not only support us but love us and when we act with their concurrence. I think the measures that you're seeing in terms of supporting the U.N. framework may well be an expression of that. I'm not surprised that a large majority of the American public favors a standing U.N. peacekeeping force. If you believe that you're doing more than is necessary and that others ought to do more, then a U.N. peacekeeping force makes a lot of sense, so that the burden can be shared more than one would otherwise see.

So a president who makes the case for using force in the terms that the public will support, who demonstrates a commitment to seeking international approval and support, I think, can gain the backing of the public even if the U.N. Security Council does not approve. I think that's a finding that is consistent with what comes out of the data.

A second striking outcome of the data is the commitment to collective decision-making and international treaties that comes out of here. In some sense, of course, that should not be surprising. American foreign policy has been committed for the past 60 years to collective decision-making, to work through international institutions, to work on the basis of agreed international rules and international law. But it is clear that the American public continues to want that kind of policy. It just doesn't seem to have a president and an administration that wants that policy.

So I think if there was a political finding, it is in this particular instance, which is you have a public and, in fact, a leadership in America that embraces the notion that a bound America, an America that is part of international institutions, that works according to international rules, that works together with other countries is an America that is more effective and more secure--quite the contrary from where the Bush administration has come out. Because as we all know, for nearly four years this administration has argued that it is the combination of America's overwhelming power and the unquestioned purity of its motives that has justified America going it alone with little regard for the perspective of others. It seems to me the public's apparent commitment to collective decision-making, including the willingness to forego a veto if all 14 others in the Security Council want to go another way and the embrace of international treaties, including, remarkably, for Kyoto--70-plus percent both on the public and the leadership--underscores that it does not share the Bush administration's view with regard to how to conduct foreign policy.

Again, how real that commitment is, how deep it is, how salient it is when it comes to elections remains to be seen. But it does suggest that a foreign policy that takes account of the perspective of others, especially one's allies, that is consistent with the rule of international law, and that gains the support of major international institutions is likely to garner broad public support.

Thanks.

MR. KULL: Thank you, Ivo and Norm. Two very thoughtful interpretations of the data. I want now to open this to all of you.

QUESTION: Thank you. Nils Stouros [ph], Finnish Broadcasting Company.

Could we make a reality test of the findings here? Because when I look back at American policy for the last few years, I look at figures on page 36, I get a slight feeling that we are speaking of two different countries. When the Kyoto Protocol was up in the House of Representatives or in the Senate, it was sort of thumbs-down. Now they all say that no, thumbs-up. When we speak about the International Criminal Court--not just about the international court--you sort of show figures that, yes, this is the greatest thing mankind has come up with so far. But when you go to politicians they say, oh, forget it.

If we go to page 25, you could make the wrong assumption that the leadership is for international rules and that they need strong evidence to do something unilaterally on the international sea. But when we go to the decision about going into Iraq, they didn't need any strong evidence, they just needed a president saying we have to go or a vice president who said, yes, this is a great thing.

So what is the reality and what's the findings here? I think they are falling apart.

MR. BOUTON: Well, some of this is going to be answered on Friday. Because it is a big mystery what's going on here. One thing we found out is that leaders don't know about this level of support for multilateralism in the public. We also found that the public doesn't know that U.S. policy is not as multilateral as they think it ought to be on things like Kyoto and ICC.

In going to Iraq, it's important to remember that right up to the end the public said let's take some more time to get international support. They also said, right in the months before, if you, President Bush, decide to go without U.N. approval, we

will support you though we think you should keep trying to get international approval. When he went ahead, they did indeed support him.

Did they think it was the best decision? They're divided. Does his handling of the situation with Iraq make them more likely, less like to vote for him? They lean in the less-likely direction. Iraq has not been a big success for the president; they don't overall give him credit for it, it's not a net gain for the president. But they will say, we back him. And among those who right through--when asked, okay, do you think it was the right thing, a majority would say, yes, right thing. And then there would be a follow-on question, well, are you saying that because you think it was really the best thing to do or you're just supporting the president? And a large chunk, about 20 percent, would say, well, I'm just really supporting the president because he's the president. And the hard-core that think it was the best thing to do tended to be down around 40 percent.

So there are a lot--I understand the kind of mystery of what appear to be inconsistencies, and again, on Friday we'll be exploring them more, but those are a few thoughts that might provide some idea.

MR. DAALDER: Just a couple of points on the treaties. One, I think the treaties reflect the fact that most Americans are concerned about global warming, are opposed to war criminals and want to do something about it, are opposed to land mines, and don't like nuclear testing. The treaties reflect American values that are important. In most instances they were American-initiated efforts, including the land mine ban and the ICC. So it shouldn't be surprising that there is quite a bit of support for these treaties.

The question is, how does that translate politically when the president opposes them? If the president opposes Kyoto and the Senate Democrats vote in favor of

it you're likely to get a slightly different result. You will still probably get relative majority support for these kinds of issues, but you won't get it as strong as it is today.

And finally, there's the issue of salience. How many people out there are running around saying that Kyoto ought to be ratified? Not too many. And as a result, the fact that they support it in the abstract may not have any impact on it in practice when it comes to whether or not these ought to be ratified.

MR. ORNSTEIN: Just to add a couple of things. Steve mentioned that the politicians are unaware of these public attitudes. And he's right. If they were aware of them, would they behave any differently? No. Maybe rhetorically, just in the slightest sense. But politicians know that you don't have a core group of voters out there who are ready to vote or change their behavior on the basis of how politicians are acting on these issues. They're just not particularly on their radar screen until we put them onto their radar screen.

At the same time, do not underestimate the simple importance of rallying behind the commander in chief and deferring to the judgment of the commander in chief across a whole range of foreign policy issues. Even if we believe otherwise, we've delegated that authority, in effect, to him.

And finally, I should note that as long as we've been doing public opinion surveys, Americans beforehand oppose using American troops or force in most places. Whether it's Cambodia or Bosnia or Grenada, they don't want to do it. Once we do it, they rally around the president for a substantial period of time. Now, it changes, it can change. But generally speaking, what the public believes before you use force has little to do with what the reaction will be after the commander in chief makes that decision and Americans are committed abroad.

QUESTION: Thank you. Good morning. I'm Linda Tarr-Whelan. I served as the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations for women in the Clinton administration.

I've had a chance to mention this to Steve, but I wanted to raise it as a more general kind of issue. For people who are in fact interested in where there are pockets of support in terms of multilateralism among voting constituencies that in fact have some oomph, I think we're missing the case not to do gender disaggregation and find out what the differences are.

I've been looking at the polls over the last year or so for a major project on mobilizing American women for global engagement, and those that have reported gender differences have some very important things to draw out on multi-lateralism, on treaties. In fact, CEDA, which was not one of the treaties that was listed here in this survey, comes out extremely high both with women and men. But the Zogby poll last December showed it higher than any of the others that are on this list, perhaps because of shared values about women's human rights among the American public.

But it's the sort of thing if we don't look we won't find, and I do think that, looking at a whole lot of other polls, that this is an area where I hope in the future there will be more attention to both women and men because women are in fact a voting bloc in this country.

I'd appreciate any comments. Thank you.

MR. KULL: There are some modest differences between men and women. Women are more pro-multilateral, they show some more reluctance to use force. But when it's in a multilateral context, that reluctance tends to disappear.

There are also some other variations. It's, you know, one of those things where you can look at it as, wow, they're not very different, are they? Or you can look at it, hey, there are some differences. And both of those are true.

MR. ORNSTEIN: You know, the swing group du jour is the security moms. And we've seen, of course, in recent trial heat surveys the gender gap largely disappear, which is maybe just an artifact of the times, and if in the next five weeks the political terrain changes--we get back to where we were before the Republican convention--then we'll see probably a significant part of that be in the reemergence of a gender gap.

But it is an interesting question now because the speculation has been that the Russian terrorist attack had a significant impact on women with children, worried more acutely now about their own children seeing terrorists kill vast numbers of them in Russia. Whether that's true, whether there is a lasting impact, whether you will see women in an age of terrorism suddenly becoming just like men in a more enduring way, I'm skeptical. But certainly a lot more work in this area over time and maybe the next survey that the Chicago Council does could explore that one a little more.

QUESTION: Thanks a lot. Bob Deans with Cox Newspapers.

To Norm and Ivo, both of you have talked about--I think you've suggested that the data would indicate that Kerry should be ahead almost by a landslide if these were decisive voter issues. Ivo, you addressed the salience issue; Norm, you addressed the rally-around-the-commander-in-chief issue.

I wonder if you could tell us, though, what you think about three fundamental questions here, which are, one, how starkly are the actual differences between these two--how stark are those actual differences in their approach to the world,

how the United States should behave in the world? Two, how they've been able to draw those differences through the campaigns. And three, what opportunities, if any, do you see in the debate Thursday night for drawing those distinctions in a little more fine line?

MR. ORNSTEIN: Well, addressing the first question, I do think there's some sensitivity on the part of the president to some of this underlying structure. He does not overtly disdain the United Nations in the same fashion. Of course, to me one of the most striking moments of the last year was seeing the president at a press conference, when asked who will be the interim Iraqi government, saying, well, I don't know, I don't have any idea; it's not up to me, it's up to Mr. Brahimi. So actions seemed to speak louder than words up to that point.

At the same time, there was a vehement reaction by President Bush and his administration and his campaign team to the Kerry notion that we're going it alone, and they emphasize all the time, as the president did in his last state of the union message, the multilateral nature of our response. So they clearly are not out there now sticking a sharp thumb in the eye of a public that has the global views that we see expressed here in the survey, and in some senses they're trying to narrow those differences.

But I think there's also a wider belief that if you emphasize the war against terrorism and put everything into that context, that whatever the public's views on America as a team player, George W. Bush is going to have an advantage over John Kerry. And until John Kerry can overcome the notion that he doesn't stand for these things or anything else and that he would be tough and resolute in the face of an imminent threat, then he's not going to be able to change the context to a kind of terrain expressed here, where he would be on more favorable grounds.

MR. DAALDER: I hate to give anybody campaign advice because they usually don't take it. When they do, they end up losing.

So with that said, I agree with Norm, that on the question of multilateralism in many ways the president has in his rhetoric moved much closer to the pro-multilateral angle. I think one of the more effective lines in his acceptance speech was the notion that the coalition of the coerced and the bribed, as he called it, was indeed not coerced nor bribed, and how that was unfair to the Poles, the Brits, the Australians, and the Dutch. And he did that again in his press conference with Allawi, listing all the countries that have lost soldiers and people in Iraq--just to underscore that this is not just a U.S. effort.

On the other side, Kerry, for reasons that he will explain at some point, particularly if he loses, found it very important to emphasize that he was just as strong as George Bush, that he was just as willing to buck the world as George Bush, and that was the sense of the convention: to go against the argument that working with others, going to the U.N., somehow underscores American weakness rather than American strength. His line in his acceptance speech that he was not going to allow any country to determine whether or not America would use force, was stated in order to counter the perception of the permission-slip argument.

So I think both sides have moved towards each other in order to lessen the dangers. How you could, nevertheless, draw a distinction is--picking up one point that Norm pointed out-- that Americans care about the fact that much of the rest of the world doesn't particularly like us. And that how you move from a situation in which even the French liked us on September 12, 2001, to now everybody hating us is something that the American public doesn't particularly like. And if you then

operationalize that by saying, And as a result 95 percent of the casualties, 95 percent of the dollars, 95 percent of the soldiers in Iraq are Americans--so you play on the burden-sharing issue--then you may, in fact, get something.

And I think Kerry has tried to do that, sometimes more effectively than others. When you do it in terms of domestic spending foregone, I don't think it works as well--as he did in the Cincinnati speech, in contrast to the New York University speech where I think he made the burden-sharing argument far better by putting it in terms of security foregone both in Iraq and here. But it is that argument that operationalizes it that is more effective. But it is more difficult, because Bush has moved.

MR. KULL: Just a quick comment. Tomorrow PIPA is going to release a small poll that shows that the public overestimates how multilateral President Bush is. Also, only half the public is aware that the Bush foreign policy has moved world public opinion in a negative direction toward the U.S.

QUESTION: I am Greg Davis. I'm a retired government analyst.

I wanted to make a couple of points on the perception of how the American people feel. I think part of it is we go back to what is called the Monroe Doctrine--and that was established a long time ago, and it seems to have continued throughout our history as to what our perceptions of the U.S. public opinion is of the rest of the world. The rest of the world can go their own course, but I think pretty much the United States public feels, hey, they'll go their way, we'll go our way. And when we try to deal with people like Hitler, if you'd taken the same poll that you put out today back then, in 1936, I suspect that you'd have come up with pretty much the same results. Everybody would have said, yeah, we should do things together, but sometimes you have to act unilaterally. I don't know that there was any international condemnation of

Japan before they began their mass genocide in Asia, and there was really no condemnation of Hitler before he began taking over Europe.

Another point regarding the internationalism, or multilateralism, is the U.S. public watched the Baltic states for a number of years and waited for the United Nations to do something. And thousands and thousands of Serbs moved around the country and a lot of their enemies ended up dead. U.S. participation in that process was watching, along with the United Nations forces, watching the inhabitants being slaughtered, because their rules of engagement were that they could not engage.

Now, if you go back for the last 50 years of international opinion of the United States, everybody in the world has traditionally hated the concept of the United States. They love U.S. citizens. But if you took the poll in 1950, '60, '70, '80, or '90, the opinion of the United States as a country would have been exactly the same as it is now. That hasn't changed. But the public opinion on that is the perception of what the rest of the world thinks has changed. I believe that's a matter of the press. My comment.

MR. DAALDER: Well, first of all, opinions of the U.S. has changed dramatically in the last few years, but the public's perception of that change is very sketchy. So it's the other way around. And does the media have something to do with it? Yes. Does the public care what the rest of the world thinks? Definitely. They do care. And they've been asked in a whole variety of ways. A clear majority thinks it's quite important in terms of U.S. foreign policy what other people think about U.S. foreign policy.

And the general orientation that we see in all these polls is toward multilateralism; they're very oriented to the concept that collective action has legitimacy.

And they're very concerned about what'slegitimate and not legitimate, and collective action plays a big role in their thoughts concerning that.

QUESTION: Patricia Esparga [ph] from the Embassy of Argentina.

My question is did you include so many references to weapons of mass destruction in your past polls, or is it a consequence of the Bush administration's emphasis on this kind of new threat?

MR. ORNSTEIN : I've been told that there were lots of references to weapons of mass destruction, but I've looked and I haven't been able to find them.

[Laughter.]

MR. BOUTON: But there are still programs to create them, right?

We certainly did use the term in 2002. In 1998, I know the term "nuclear weapons" was used in that and in earlier surveys. The expression "weapons of mass destruction" sort of came into more common usage only within the last four or five years. But Ben, can you remember, in '98 was "WMD" used as a term?

MR. PAGE: No, it was used in the Iraq question in 2002.

MR. : And there's been a question about chemical and biological weapons for quite some time. Likewise, the question about nuclear weapons for some time. Of course, this "weapons of mass destruction" is a strange invention that has political purposes. It's very odd to lump all these weapons together.

MR. : And just basically, we were--there was more emphasis on it because the question is whether weapons of mass destruction, the potential for creating them changes the norms in terms of the right of states to use force, and we wanted to go into depth on that.

MR. BOUTON: I'd just like to add a comment here. Norm and Ivo have both correctly pointed out that generally speaking, these issues, especially when you begin to get down to the level of, you know, attitudes toward the U.N. or other institutions or particular preferences for policies, are not at the top of voters' minds most of the time as they enter a voting booth. They decide before entering a voting booth who they're going to vote for, whether it's for Congress or for the presidency. I think it is true this year that clearly these issues, the broad issue of national security first and foremost and then foreign policy that's related to it is highly salient, which is of course our assumption in carrying out the study this year. And what's really happened is that the campaign has been about managing or addressing the perceptions of voters as they relate to national security and in the ways that both Ivo and Norm have mentioned.

As I think Jim Steinberg said earlier in the morning, at the end of the day the election is, in a very broad and diffuse way, about which of these -- commander in chief and as president broadly, beyond foreign policy responsibilities. My own sense of the data is that even though there is a recession of threat perception, a slightly lowered sense of vulnerability--which is normal, considering that we've not, fortunately, had another attack in three years--there is still a very strong concern about, put very simply, protection. And while there is also a concern about being respected in the world, I think the right formulation is "protected, then respected."

We're going to break now for lunch. We will resume at 12:30 with the final portion of our morning in which we're going to try to look ahead, the implications of these findings for the next administration, whoever leads it, across a range of issues. And we're very fortunate to have both Thomas Mann from the Brookings Institution and Tod Lindberg from the Hoover Institution to address those issues along with me.

Thank you.

[Lunch break.]