THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION

THE CHICAGO COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

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RELEASE OF THE CHICAGO COUNCIL'S

2004 GLOBAL VIEWS STUDY

Overview and Discussion of the 2004 Findings

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9:00 a.m.

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(TRANSCRIPT PREPARED FROM A TAPE RECORDING.)

Introduction:
Marshall Bouton, President, The Chicago Council on Foreign Relations

Findings:
Benjamin I. Page, Professor of Political Science, Northwestern University
Christopher Whitney, The Chicago Council on Foreign Relations

Comments:
James Steinberg, The Brookings Institution
Shanto Iyengar, The Hoover Institution

THIS IS AN UNCORRECTED TRANSCRIPT.

P R O C E E D I N G S

MR. BOUTON: [In progress] -- the Brookings Institution and the Hoover Institution. I want to welcome you to this discussion around the release of the findings of the Chicago Council's 2004 public opinion study.

I want to thank you all for coming. I want to thank the Brookings Institution and, in particular, Strobe Talbott and Jim Steinberg for their cooperation in arranging this meeting, and John Razien (ph) and David Brady of the Hoover Institution as well for its cooperation in organizing this discussion.

We at the Chicago Council were eager that at a point very soon before the elections we would have an opportunity to have as full as possible a discussion of the results and their implications for U.S. foreign policy, especially as we look toward a new U.S. administration, be it a Bush administration or a Kerry administration.

I also want to take this opportunity to thank our partners in Mexico and Korea. Although our discussion this morning is about the U.S. results, as many of you are aware, this year the Chicago Council also carried out parallel studies in Mexico and in South Korea in collaboration, in Mexico, with the Mexican Council on Foreign Relations and CIDE, a research institution in Mexico City, and, in Korea, with the East Asia Institute.

Finally, and most importantly, for my part I want to express enormous appreciation to the team that carried out this study, designed and carried out this study on behalf of the Chicago Council, my colleagues on that team, Benjamin Page, Steven Kull, Bob Shapiro--who could not be with us today--Chris Whitney, Kathy Hugg, and Jenny Taylor. As you will see, I think, as we move through the morning, the study was a

very extensive one and multifaceted one, and it could not have been done without this kind of collaborative effort.

Many of you are aware that the Chicago Council has been carrying out studies of American public attitudes on international issues and U.S. foreign policy for now almost exactly 30 years. Those studies have until this year, however, been quadrennial, have taken place every four years. For the first time ever in the history of the Chicago Council study, we elected this year to carry out a study after only two years for perhaps the obvious reason that in this U.S. presidential election year, for the first time certainly since the late 1960s, since 1968, this is an election in which foreign policy issues are right at the top of the agenda. One could reasonably argue whether they're just above or just below economic issues, but they are certainly a much higher place in the debate than they are in most U.S. presidential elections.

Additionally, we had an opportunity at the Council this year, as I've described, to work on parallel studies in Korea and Mexico that we thought would be valuable, especially coming on the heals of the comparative study we did with the German Marshall Fund in 2002 of European public opinion. We thought that looking at our neighbor to the South and one of our longest established allies in East Asia as opposed to Europe would provide some interesting points of comparison.

One further distinguishing factor about the 2004 study is that we decided to focus much of our effort, most of the questions, or at least certainly half of the questions, on what we call rules of the game or the cognitive framework which Americans bring to their attitudes on international issues and U.S. foreign policy. The hypothesis was that 9/11 and the war in Iraq and, with those events, the arguments that have been made, the propositions that have been put out by the administration and by

others in response to the administration's arguments about rules of the game may well have caused some shift in American thinking about what those rules of the game ought to be, particularly as they relate to state behavior and the use of force, although we also go into rules of the game with respect to economic matters.

Now, I wanted to also underscore something that has come up just in the last few days in response to some questions we have gotten from the media. Again, those of you who are familiar with the Chicago Council study know that our objective never has been--and it certainly was not this year--to attempt to do a snapshot of changing public attitudes on the performance of the administration in any particular respect, on the performance or views or propositions of Candidate Kerry, or in general on the shifting winds of the campaign. Our focus has always been to try to reach beneath the surface of those waves, even in a presidential year like this, and try to understand the deeper structure of American thinking about the world and our role in it. And that's an important distinction, I think, to bear in mind.

You will see in looking at the data that the words "Bush" and "Kerry" and "Republican" and "Democrat" do not appear anywhere in the questions and really even in the report--I don't think we actually used those terms in the report--because that's not what this is about.

That is not to say that the results do not, of course, have relevance for the election, for the campaign that's now fiercely underway, and, of course, for the next administration. And so we do want in this morning's discussion--and that is why we're fortunate to have our colleagues from Brookings and the Hoover Institution and AEI with us this morning to help us understand and discuss, fathom the policy implications of the results.

I do want to underscore, too, that this is truly a rollout because the results are being released and discussed in a series of conversations this week in Washington, beginning with this morning. You will find at your places a sheet which describes the other events tomorrow: a release of the findings of what is really the first ever national public study--study of public attitudes in Mexico on international affairs, and the comparison of U.S. and Mexican attitudes that we have done with COMEXI and CIDE at the Wilson Center; on Thursday morning, a similar release and discussion of the U.S.-South Korean comparisons; and on Friday, a discussion of the perceptions and misperceptions of leaders of public attitudes. This is a particularly--is a new aspect of the Chicago Council study this year where we have attempted to gauge how accurately or not leaders, including leaders in government both in legislative and executive branches, perceive the attitudes of the public on a variety of important issues. And that has been made possible in particular by the participation of Steve Kull and his institute, the Program on Institutional Policy Attitudes, in our study and their own work on these matters, and that will take place on Friday morning. This is all listed in the sheet at your place.

With that, I'd now like to turn to--we're going to organize this in two parts. First, Ben Page and Chris Whitney are going to very rapidly give you an overview of the findings. We've got a lot of material to cover. And then we're going to have comments on the overall findings from Jim Steinberg of the Brookings Institution and Shanto Iyengar of the Hoover Institution.

Ben?

MR. PAGE: Thanks, Marshall. The key word there is "rapidly." We have a lot of data, and so we're going to just zip through this and trust you to ask some

questions later or look up details in the report. So I'll be going through a number of slides in rapid-fire order, assuming I can make this machine work properly.

First of all, we asked a question about a series of possible threats to the vital interest of the United States, and people were asked whether a given possible threat was a critical threat, an important but not a critical threat, or not a threat at all. And what you have up here is the percentage of the public saying that international terrorism was a critical threat, 75 percent, a pretty high number; and, obviously, as you look up at the top there, the biggest threats are related to terrorism, those top three: international terrorism, chemical and biological weapons, unfriendly countries becoming nuclear powers.

But two qualifications to that. One is you notice that, if you look at the right-hand column, those are percentage point changes. There's a drop in virtually everything, that is, the public since the summer of 2002 seems to feel less threatened, less concerned. And the second point is you notice as you go down the list only a little ways, you see some domestically oriented threats, like AIDS, immigration, and so forth. And there are hints in this table that the Middle East is not such a top priority to Americans as it was two years ago.

Then we asked a series of questions about what the goals of American foreign policy should be, and, again, there's a long list. People were asked whether this should be a very important goal, a somewhat important goal, or not an important goal at all. And here, again, we have the percentage of people saying it should be a very important goal, that 73 percent up there is saying preventing the spread of nuclear weapons to unfriendly countries should be very important goal of U.S. foreign policy. And that's a big number; likewise, combating terrorism; likewise, both leaders and

public--you notice in this graph our leadership sample is also included. And both groups say these are really important, but, again, there's a drop since 2002. And as you look at the bottom there, superior military power, only about half the public thinks that should be a very important goal of U.S. foreign policy. And protecting weaker nations from foreign aggression is not a very highly salient goal at all.

This is the rest of the list, and you notice if you compare the previous one, this 78 percent compared to the 73 for the spread of nuclear weapons, protecting the jobs of American workers is actually now seen as a very important goal by more Americans than any other topic on this list.

Stopping drugs is way up there; reducing immigration; and even improving the global environment is about equal to having superior military power.

Then we asked a series of questions about whether particular programs, Federal Government programs, should be expanded, cut back, or kept about the same. And on this you can see that the public and leaders both tend to want to expand homeland security spending; that 51 percent in the dark on the right is much bigger than the 11-percent cutback on the left; likewise, gathering intelligence. But when it gets down to defense spending, people seem to be hovering around the status quo point. And, in fact, leaders lean toward cutting it. And economic aid, there's a sharp divergence between the two: the public is mostly opposed, and leaders are in favor. That's a little theme we'll see some more of. Military aid everybody is pretty negative about at this point.

Again, contrasting foreign and domestic programs, you can see that the sentiment for expanding these domestic programs is really huge, much bigger than for, in general those foreign policy programs that we just looked at, especially health care,

aid to education, and social security. Farm subsidies have never been particularly popular.

Military bases. Now, at least when it comes to these traditional longstanding bases abroad, most Americans, both public and leaders, say, yeah, we should have these bases, although you notice the leaders are equally divided on Guantanamo, which is interesting. But there's quite a contrast between these sort of well-established bases and bases in the Middle East and Muslim countries, where if you go down the should versus should-nots, you notice that there's sort of bare public majority in favor of bases in Saudi Arabia. Presumably, more leaders than members of the public are aware that we've actually left.

But after Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan, about evenly balances; Turkey, about evenly balances for the public; Iraq, the public leans against having long-term military bases in Iraq; Pakistan, definitely against; and Uzbekistan, definitely against. And the trends from the previous survey are somewhat down on this as well. You notice that the leaders, too, are not wild about having bases in Iraq, Pakistan, or Uzbekistan.

Then when it comes to responding to the views of people in countries where we have bases, it appears that the public generally does not want to have American troops in places where they aren't wanted. And that's probably the main explanation for the previous slide. But when you look at these explicit questions, most Americans say the U.S. should remove its military presence from the Middle East if a majority of people there want it to, and they say the same thing about Iraq. You notice the leaders tend to disagree with that proposition on the Middle East, but they also agree on Iraq.

And this one was a surprise to me and very curious. On the one hand, the public says, yeah, let's have a democratic government in Iraq before withdrawal, although it is necessary to have--when you ask a question like that, it's hard to know how seriously to take it, especially given the earlier point that presumably if most Iraqis wanted us out, even if they didn't have a democratic government, people are saying we should go.

But the one that surprised me was this mild question about should we put greater pressure on countries in the Middle East to become more democratic. Really, greater pressure? What does that mean? You'd think that's a softball. Sure, why not? And most Americans are saying no to that, and I think an important theme in our findings is that this idea of bringing democracy to the world is not a very popular idea among the public.

I should have emphasized when we look at the goals, some of you may have caught the very lowest goal, something like only 14 percent of the public saying it should be a very important goal of foreign policy--maybe it was 18 percent--was bringing democracy to people abroad, to other countries.

And as far as the Marshall Plan for the Middle East idea goes, the public is strongly opposed to that. Leaders like the idea. And, again, there's a longstanding difference between ordinary citizens and sort of foreign policy elites on aid-related questions. The leaders tend to be thinking at this point, Hmm, problems of terrorism and so forth may have to do with poverty in the world, and it may be that we ought to be making the environment of people in the Middle East better as best we can. The general public is skeptical about spending a lot of money on aid, especially strategic aid, in the

first place, although it favors humanitarian aid; and in the second place, is a little gun-shy about the Middle East at this point.

Then we asked various long and complicated questions that I won't repeat in detail, except to point out this first one is an ancient and honorable survey question that has been asked ever since World War II, whether people think it would be best for the future of the country if the United States took an active part in world affairs or whether it would be better to stay out of world affairs. And again and again it comes out somewhere around 67 percent. It dropped a little lower around the Vietnam War. It's bumped and down some. But, basically, that's constant.

And then there's the sort of ambivalent, what we're calling engaged but not dominant role that seems to be the preferred role for most people. Working together with other countries is a tremendously popular idea. On the other hand, making active efforts to ensure no other country becomes a superpower, a majority of the public also approves. And they don't like the world policeman idea at all.

Along that same line, when we asked about the lessons of September 11th, the primary lesson that people drew, both public and leaders, was it's a good idea to work more closely with other countries rather than acting on our own more.

At the same time, when you ask specific questions about dealing with terrorism, there's a fair amount, really quite a lot of support for certain kinds of military actions, when threats are imminent, when terrorism is clearly involved and so forth. And these air strikes against terrorist training camps, you can see a very large majority of the public and of leaders favor the idea of these air strikes and, indeed, favor the idea of ground troops. There's a traditional difference between those two. There's almost always less public support for ground troops, which are, after all, people's brothers and

sons and husbands and so forth. Air strikes always get more support, and so in some ways that 76 percent ground troops against terrorist training camps is remarkable.

And you notice there's also a fair amount of support for assassination of individual terrorist leaders, 68 percent.

A couple of points about this, though--and we don't have the change figures on there, but, in fact, there's been a drop in all four of those that I just mentioned in the last four years, a sort of 8-, 9-percentage-point drop, nothing enormous, but nonetheless it fits in with this picture of a little bit less perception of threat, a little bit of pulling back.

You notice at the bottom of this one that even though people are willing to assassinate terrorist leaders, they're not willing to torture to extract information. And racial profiling is also very unpopular.

And these are essentially in the same battery of questions about--this starts out: In order to combat terrorism, do you favor or oppose the following...? And that, of course, sets people up to be somewhat favorable. But notice that these diplomatic measures against terrorism get as large or larger responses as most of the use-of-force questions, working through the UN, which in general--and if any of you are able to come to a later session, you're going to learn a lot about U.S. attitudes toward the United Nations and multilateralism, which are very strongly positive. Actually, the later session is not much later.

Okay. So large majorities in favor of working through the UN to strengthen international law; trying terrorists in the ICC; and this is one where you get some public support for aid when it's put in the context of terrorism. Notice the evenhandedness question about the Middle East. That appears to be an idea that has

struck home both with the public and with leaders, that that's one way to deal with terrorism, is to appear to be evenhanded between Israel and the Palestinians.

And when people were asked specifically what should be emphasized more or less, you get a tilt in the direction of the diplomatic rather than the military; that is, the way to think about this kind of question is that middle line shows the status quo, the balance is about right. And if you compare the size of the dark to the right, that's putting more emphasis on diplomatic and economic methods. That's bigger than a change to the left, more emphasis on military methods.

And, actually, let me go back because this next one belongs to Christopher. He's going to discuss economic-related policies.

MR. WHITNEY: Okay. I'm going to take you through the remainder of the presentation, which deals with trade issues, a little bit more on aid, and attitudes towards immigration.

As you can see from this slide, Americans generally have a very positive attitude about globalization. Both the leaders and the public think it has been mostly good for the United States, with the leaders even more than the public saying this. Both of these numbers, 64 percent of the public who say it's mostly good and 87 percent of leaders who say this, are up compared to 2002. However, attitudes among the public are a little bit more mixed on the impact of international trade. They tend to see it as being good for consumers and the standard of living and for the U.S. economy, but are pretty consistent in their view that it's bad for job security and creating jobs. You get majorities of 56 percent saying it's bad for creating jobs and 64 percent saying it's bad for job security.

Additionally, Americans tend to have a very high degree of comfort with their trade relations with countries in the developed world. Only 14 percent say that economic competition from Europe is a critical threat to the United States. Additionally, large majorities think that our bilateral trade relationship with Canada, the countries of the EU, and Japan are fair. These numbers--in particular for the EU and Japan, you get 60 percent saying the countries of the EU practice fair trade with the United States and 52 percent saying that for Japan--are up very dramatically over the past totals. Ten years ago, only 17 percent said this about Japan. Now you get a majority who say it. And for the EU it was 32 percent. So there has been a pretty dramatic shift there.

However, China, which has been the subject of a lot of concern recently in terms of its trade relationship with the United States, is seen by a majority of 51 percent as practicing unfair trade with the United States. This is related to concerns Americans have about trade inequities. As we saw earlier, you get majorities of the public saying international trade is bad for job security and for creating jobs. Additionally, 35 percent of the public think that economic competition from low-wage countries is a critical threat. They also see outsourcing as mostly bad. You get 72 percent of the public saying outsourcing is mostly bad for the United States because American workers lose their jobs to people in other countries. This is part of a two-way question that gives the positives and minuses of outsourcing. Leaders are going to in the opposite direction: 56 percent say it's mostly good because it results in lower prices which helps stimulate the economy. However, in terms of inequities, the American public see it going both ways. They think people in developing countries are also not always receiving the same level of protection as they should; 65 percent of the public

and 66 percent of leaders disagree with the statement that rich countries are playing fair in trade negotiations with poor countries.

Despite these concerns about trade inequalities, Americans are pretty uniform in endorsing the international trading system and U.S. compliance with decisions made by international economic institutions. Here we have two questions related to compliance. The first one on the left here talks about international economic institutions and whether or not decisions should always be made by a majority, or whether the United States should have the right to have a veto. You get almost 70 percent of the public saying that decisions should be made by a majority always and only 27 percent saying the United States should be able to veto a majority decision.

On the right, you get very strong support from both the public and leaders for U.S. compliance with adverse World Trade Organization decisions; 69 percent of the public and 85 percent of leaders say this.

In terms of attitudes toward the trade, they're very much colored by the public's perception that workers need to be taken care of. You get support for free trade as long as displaced workers are taken care of. Forty-eight percent, which is a plurality, support favoring agreements to lower trade barriers; if those programs are in place, 10 percent favor agreements to lower trade barriers without any government programs. So you're getting almost 60 percent favoring lowering trade barriers in one form or another and only 34 percent oppose agreements to lower trade barriers.

Another way to mitigate the effects of inequalities in trade is to institute minimum standards for working condition and the environment. And you see overwhelming support from the public and leaders for this, in the mid- to low 90s percentiles for both of these. These are largely seen as ways of making American labor

more competitive. There's also--in terms of working conditions and altruistic dimension to this, obviously people want to ensure that workers in other countries are not being exploited. And you saw earlier, protecting the environment is considered a very important goal; 61 percent of leaders said improving the condition of the environment should be a very important goal, and 47 percent, I believe, of the public agreed with that.

One of the big issues that has been separated developed countries from developing countries in recent years has been farm subsidies. As Ben mentioned earlier, Americans are--there's a plurality of Americans, 46 or 47 percent, who support keeping farm subsidies at their current level, and the balance is divided between the two. In order to get a more--between the two items of either increasing it or decreasing it, in order to get a more nuanced understanding of attitudes on this, we asked a few additional questions related to small farmer and large farmers and the frequency and conditions for farm subsidies. And you get some interesting results.

You get a majority of 71 percent of the public and 50 percent, a plurality of leaders, who support giving subsidies to small farmers, defined as those who farm less than 500 acres. However, only 31 percent of the public and 18 percent of leaders think that small farmers should get these on a regular annual basis. The remainder think either we should not give farm subsidies to small farmers at all, or they should only be given in bad years. Support for large farmers is much lower; only 27 percent of the public and 9 percent of leaders think that we should give large farmers subsidies at all. And in terms of regular annual basis, only 9 percent of the public and 3 percent of leaders think we should give those. So it's virtually none, no support at all.

As Ben mentioned earlier, there seems to be a difference between the public and leaders in attitudes on aid. Overall, the public wants to cut aid spending: 64 percent want to cut it -- [tape ends].

-- However, we have seen in previous CCFR studies--and this has also been seen in other studies--the public tends to very dramatically overestimate the amount of money the United States spends on aid. In 2002, we asked the public to give an estimate of what percentage of the U.S. federal budget was spent on aid, and they said 20 percent as the mean response. We additionally asked what percentage should be spent on aid, and they said 10 percent. The actual figures were less than 1 percent of the federal budget, so they're estimating we're spending over 20 times what we were spending in 2002 and wanted us to spend 10 times.

Clearly, the public does support aid, and you see this as well as with a series of items here on the right. We have four different types of developmental aid, and you're getting very strong support ranging from 82 percent to 70 percent for these forms of aid, some of which are controversial in the United States, such as birth control in poor countries and prevention and treatment of AIDS in poor countries.

Leaders differ very strongly. They see aid as a strategic tool: 61 percent want to increase economic aid; 64 percent think improving the standard of living in developing countries should be a very important foreign policy goal. That is up 22 percentage points from two years ago. It's a very dramatic increase. It's probably related to the events of the past two years. Sixty-seven percent of leaders think combating world hunger should be a very important foreign policy goal. We've got majority support for a Marshall Plan for the Middle East where the United States would spent billions of dollars to help develop countries in the region and democratize them. Sixty-

four percent of leaders supported that, and yet a majority of the public was opposed. So clearly there's a very significant difference between public and leaders on this.

Turning to regional trade agreements, you get very mixed attitudes towards NAFTA. Both the public and leaders think that it's primarily good for Mexico. The top two responses are for the Mexican economy and creating jobs in Mexico. About 70 percent of the public think it's good for both of those, and about 78, 79 percent of leaders think it's good for those.

A small majority of the public thinks it's good for consumers and your own standard of living. However, a plurality of the public thinks that NAFTA is bad for the U.S. economy, 43 percent compared to 42 percent who think it's good. And you get majorities who think it's bad for creating jobs and job security, just like we saw for international trade.

The interesting thing in terms of attitudes of the public here is that they're much more negative about NAFTA than they were about international trade. These figures for the economy and companies and consumers are substantially down an average 10 to 15 percentage points compared to the percentage given for international trade. So they see international trade as being better almost across the board.

Leaders are much more enthusiastic about NAFTA. There are huge gaps between them and the public on the impact it has had on American companies in the U.S. company. The 33-percentage-point gap, American companies, 84 percent of the leaders think it's good for American companies versus 50 percent of the public. And the U.S. economy, a 32-percentage-point gap, 74 percent of leaders think it's good for the economy, and 42 percent of the public agrees.

In terms of immigration, continuing a longstanding trend, the public is very concerned about immigration: 52 percent think immigrants and refugees coming into the United States is a critical threat. You get 54 percent of the public who wants to decrease legal immigration to this country, and 76 percent who think that restricting immigration should be used as a way of combating terror.

Leaders are very different in their attitudes. You get 88 percent who want to either keep immigration at its current level or increase it; 58 percent of leaders oppose restricting immigration as a way of combating terror; and only twenty--I think it's 26 percent of leaders--or 21 percent of leaders think combating illegal immigration should be a very important foreign policy goal. That compared to 58 percent of the public who said this.

Despite the public's concerns about immigration, there is a willingness to work together with Mexico on a bilateral deal that would result in larger numbers of legal immigration. We asked a trade-off question whereby the United States would provide greater opportunities for Mexicans to work legally in the United States; in return, Mexico would undertake efforts to decrease illegal immigration and drug trafficking. And you get 64 percent of the public saying yes to this, even though it would result in more immigrants coming into the country. Eighty-nine percent of leaders agree as well.

However, a unilateral U.S. initiative is not seen as favorably. On the right, we have a question that's very similar to what the President was proposing in January whereby the United States would allow foreigners who have jobs that are staying here illegally to apply for legal temporary worker status. Only 44 percent of the

public agrees with that; 52 percent oppose it. Leaders are much more enthusiastic: 71 percent are in favor of it.

MR. BOUTON: Thank you, Chris.

We have provided you now with an overview of a large portion of the study, not all of it. You will hear about a very important additional segment of the study on norms and the use of force in the next session. But we thought we would give you this overview of these other issues first and then invite comment, first from Jim Steinberg and then from Shanto Iyengar.

MR. STEINBERG: Well, thank you, Marshall, and thanks to the Chicago Council for this really extraordinary and very important and timely study. It's a contribution the Chicago Council has made over the years and I think has had an enormous impact both for policymakers and for analysts of foreign policy to try to understand better what Americans' thinking has been on these important issues. And the fact that you have been doing it for such a long time allows us to see changes in trends. And I think that's especially important in the current context because I think, to my mind, what is most important about the study today is how it allows us to understand the impact of the attacks of 9/11 on American foreign policy and American people's attitudes.

Your last study was in 2002, in the immediate shadow of those attacks, and now we've had two more years to look both at how things have changed in Americans' attitudes but also what remains important both in terms of how Americans see the threat and what strategies they think are the appropriate ones to pursue in dealing with it, and particularly what the role of the United States ought to be in this new environment.

And I think trying to put it all together after these really terrific presentations by both Ben and Chris, I would say that my sort of bottom-line takeaway is that the American public basically disagrees with two, what I would cal the more extreme right and more extreme left views about how to understand what the United States response should be post-9/11.

On the one hand--and I use right and left in a very caricatured sense. On the one hand, the American people are clearly skeptical about the more extreme versions of a unilateral U.S. American foreign policy primarily based on the use of force as a way to deal with the new threats. But at the same time, they're skeptical about what I would call the left version of how to deal with this problem, which is the ability to deal with the so-called root causes of lack of democracy and economic deprivation that some have argued ought to be at the core of a U.S. strategy; that is to say, the Americans on the one hand want more international cooperation, more working with others, more use of non-military tools, but also very skeptical about our ability or the desirability of trying to focus on the very complex problems of bringing democracy and economic opportunity to the rest of the world. It's not a pure black-and-white, but I think--and I'll try to point to some of the specific results that lead me to this conclusion.

First, as Ben in particular noted, the American people have an extremely limited appetite for an aggressive strategy of democratization to deal with the changes in the world. As Ben noted, of all the foreign policy goals surveyed here, the goal which received the least support was the idea of bringing democracy to countries that did not have it. And the support for providing democratization has dropped significantly since 2002, so it also suggests that not only is this low, but it's also something that's declining in the emphasis that the American people put on it.

As Ben noted, and it's really a remarkable result, by 57 to 35 percent the American people did not believe we should put pressure on governments in the Middle East to be more democratic. Sixty-three percent say no to unilaterally installing democratic governments. When it comes to restoring a democratic government that's been overthrown, the American people believe that it's okay for the UN to do it or for the United States support it in connection with the UN, but not the United States unilaterally. The public, as opposed to the leaders, do not believe in a Marshall Plan for dealing with the Middle East. They want to cut back on economic aid to others.

There are a few results that are slightly in a different direction. They do believe that in dealing with terrorism that helping developing economies is a useful tool, but in general, I think it's fair to say that on most kinds of sort of soft strategies--democratization, economic assistance--there's a deep skepticism. So, as I say, in terms of the strategies that some of those who would advocate for a more social roots-caused basis strategy, there's a lot of skepticism.

At the same time, there's deep, deep distrust on strategies that rely on unfettered U.S. unilateral action to deal with the problems. Only 8 percent of the American public think that the United States should be preeminent in the world, as opposed to 78 percent saying the United States should do its share in solving the world's problems. Only 20 percent in favor of the United States being the world's policeman, 80 percent thinking we're doing too much. By 72 to 23--and I think, again, probably one of the two or three most remarkable results of this study--the American people believe that the lesson of 9/11 is a need to work together rather than act on our own. And I think that really frames this part of the discussion very nicely.

The American people believe that we should accept policies that are not our first choice in order to work with the UN and work with others. The American people believe that we should not have a veto in the UN when--if there is unanimity among other members of the Security Council. They accept majority decisionmaking in the World Trade Organization. They accept the idea of accepting World Court decisions. In a very specific case, they say that they would not support the use of force against North Korea to destroy its nuclear facilities without UN Security Council authorization. And so, interestingly, the only set of circumstances in which there is strong support for unilateral action by the United States are humanitarian. That is the top of the list for the circumstances under which the American people believe that it would justify the use of troops--genocide and humanitarian crises being part of an international peacekeeping force in Afghanistan.

So, again, on the side of the question of how do Americans feel about the need to have a more unconstrained and more military approach to dealing with the challenges that we face today, there's clearly great doubt.

More specifically, there's also, I think, a certain amount of skepticism about the effectiveness of the use of force by the United States. As Marshall pointed out, I think that the one area where there is still strong support is in the area of combating terrorism, but there is still a very strong emphasis on other tools, including economic and diplomatic means.

Finally, I think that one of the most interesting questions that we have to ask is: What produces this result? Why, on the one hand, are Americans skeptical about unilateralism in the use of force, in particular, but also skeptical about democratization? And how much does this reflect the judgment about what works and their own instincts

about what kinds of strategies are effective in dealing with these kinds of problems? And how much is this a reflection of American attitudes about burden sharing? How much is there a sense that the United States is carrying too great a burden for dealing with the world's problems, and that it's interest in cooperation is not simply because they think it's a more--it's a smarter strategy, but one which the United States does not have to shoulder all the burden?

There are some hints in the study that suggest that burden sharing is an extremely important underlying element. I would hope as we go forward that this is something that we can find ways to look at more carefully because I do think, as was just pointed out in the last part by Chris, the fact that Americans overestimate to such a great degree the amount of economic assistance we provide to the rest of the world may suggest that part of what colors this balance that the American people are advocating is a sense of the United States being--having too much responsibility on its shoulders and the need for others to help solve these problems.

But I think the bottom line is I think this really teaches us a lot about how to think about strategy going forward, and I'm sure this is going to be something that is much debated here in Washington, not to mention on the campaigns.

MR. BOUTON: Thank you, Jim.

Shanto Iyengar?

MR. IYENGAR: Well, I have the disadvantage of going second. Jim has mentioned two of the points that I was going to make, so let me step back and try and places the results in a more general framework. So rather than talking about any specific question or any specific results, I'm going to try and provide an interpretation of these findings from the perspective of someone who might be interested in the election.

The most striking result, it seems to me, of this survey and one that I actually found quite astonishing was the level of public approval for multilateralism, for the idea that no matter which indicator you might choose, working through the UN, not going it alone--and I believe there was even one question which asked about the role of world opinion in influencing American foreign policy, and as I recall, a majority of the public felt that we should take world opinion into account. So no matter how you cut it, there seems to be a pretty big gulf between the median voter on the question of unilateralism versus multilateralism and the Bush administration.

Now, why did I say that this was astonishing? Well, in most cases, foreign policy opinion tends to fit the model of sort of elite leadership. That is to say, most Americans are not deeply engaged in questions of what should we do overseas, and so there's this idea that the administration might propose a course of action, and then after that fact, public opinion will pretty much defer to the administration.

So what we have here is clearly a failure of opinion leadership. We do not see the American public rallying to the side of unilateralism. So it seems to me perhaps that gives us an insight into the strategy of the Kerry-Edwards campaign. Why have they been so willing to engage on the question of Iraq and the war on terror? Perhaps their own focus groups have led them to the same conclusion, namely, that the administration is, in fact, vulnerable on this question of unilateralism.

The alternative explanation, of course--and I'm sure Ben and his colleagues are looking into this. The alternative explanation might well be something that Jim referred to. Perhaps it's more of an instrumental kind of a calculation, support for unilateralism. Perhaps people have observed unilateralism in action, and they've looked at the results, and they've simply reached the conclusion that it doesn't work.

That, of course, would assume, however, that ordinary citizens are capable of engaging in that kind of cost-effective cost/benefit analysis, and most of the evidence, I would submit, would run in the other direction.

Okay. So on this whole question of unilateralism versus multilateralism, it seems to me there is a vulnerability for the administration.

The second point I would make about the electoral implications of these results is quite intuitive. No one here, I'm sure, will find this surprising, that on the issue of trade, and particularly the issue of outsourcing, there is a huge advantage for the Democrats. The American public seems to be hugely concerned with the loss of jobs, and free trade seems to be a problem as far as public opinion is concerned. And so on that score, without any doubt it's an opportunity for the Democrats to push that agenda in the campaign.

The third theme that I see running through these results--and, once again, it's been referred to by Jim and others--is this idea that the military dimension of foreign policy versus the economic or sort of the development dimension, American public opinion seems to be very enthusiastic, at least with respect to the war on terrorism, in dealing with sort of punitive treatments for the problem, so attacking terrorist bases and doing what one can to sort of put them down, similar to the sort of approach we used with crime, three strikes and you're out, as opposed to American elite opinion, which, as Ben and others have pointed out, seems to be more long term in perspective and is arguing for sort of dealing with the core structural problems that might give rise to terrorism in the first place. So things like economic assistance, development aid, those are much higher on the elite agenda than they are on the public agenda. So in that respect, the whole question of military versus economic approaches to terrorism, public

opinion would seem to be closer to the administration. So perhaps we will end up with a wash when you take multilateralism and then this question of how do we deal with terrorism into account.

There are a couple of small points that I wanted to make very briefly which struck me, as a resident of California, at least, as being especially interesting. These have to do with public opinion towards immigration. There are two questions in this survey--they're very imaginative questions. They get at kind of the public's sort of stereotype of Mexican immigrants. One of the questions--I'm not sure if you had them up on your slides earlier. One of the questions is do they attempt to learn English, and the other question, as I recall, is--correct me if I'm wrong, Ben--are they law-abiding, in general?

MR. PAGE: Yes.

MR. IYENGAR: Something like that. And on both those questions, at least on one of them for sure, on the law-abiding question, there's a majority that give the racist response, and on the speaking English it's pretty close. So these two questions strike me as especially impressive given the social--everyone knows that it's politically incorrect to say things like that. But despite that kind of response pressure, we get this level of anti-immigrant sentiment.

And, finally, the last comment I want to make, I was mentioning to Ben earlier, at the end of the survey there is a whole range of these questions that social scientists call feeling thermometers, where we give the public a scale in which we say if you don't like this person, you give them a score of zero, which indicates you have a very cold feeling about that person or country or group. And then if you are really enthusiastic and in love with this person, give that person a score of 100.

This gets back to my point earlier about some problems with the elite leadership model. Consider the case of France. If there was anyone singled out as a villain in the whole run-up to the war on Iraq and in the aftermath of the war, it would be France. And so if there's anyone from the French consulate here, they ought to take considerable comfort from the fact that the median response for the feeling thermometer in this survey is 50. So Americans are ambivalent. They're by no means negative towards France.

MR. BOUTON: Thank you, Shanto.

I'm going to invite Ben and Chris to just respond very briefly to any points that either Jim or Shanto made, then Chris to do the same, and then we're going to open it up to all of you. Ben?

MR. PAGE: First, I just want to mention that if some of you are mystified about findings that the discussants referred to that had not been up on slides, the reason is that a bunch of them about multilateralism, the UN, and so forth will be coming up in the next session. That, as Marshall pointed out, is close to half the study. So there's a lot still to come on that. And then tomorrow at the Wilson Center, we'll learn a great deal more about the Mexico phase of the study. There are really quite a few questions that have to do with U.S. relations with Mexico and some rather surprising results.

Just one substantive comment and a mild disagreement with Shanto, which won't surprise him in the slightest. I once co-authored a book called "The Rational Public," and I'm a great exponent of the ordinary citizens' surprising skills at being able to figure things out. And I think it's not surprise to me at all that people do do some cost/benefit analysis. That is, they look around--and I'm afraid most Americans at

this point do not think the Iraq operation has been a great success. They may be wrong, but that's what they're thinking now. And I do believe that some of the increased support for multilateralism and decreased support for unilateralism has to do with learning from that experience.

At the same time, you'll see next time that this multilateralism in the American public actually has been around for a long time. Support for the UN, for example, has always been very strong. So that's my only comment.

MR. WHITNEY: I'll keep this pretty brief because I know some people probably have some questions. I generally agree with virtually everything that was said. One minor point that was made related to the use of force and how it related to humanitarian goals. I think it's important to keep in consideration the fact that while Americans are willing to use force for those purposes, they're also still quite willing to use force to respond to terrorist threats. And that is still very much at the forefront of where they are willing to use force. In virtually every other area, they're down compared to where they were two years ago, and you will see a little bit more about this in the next session when Steve Kull presents some very, very interesting findings related to when countries can go to war and who gets to authorize that decision.

But I just want to make sure that everyone is clear that it's not that Americans are unwilling to use force. They are--they just need to perceive the threat as being imminent and very harmful to the United States.

MR. BOUTON: All right. We're now going to open this to your questions and comments. If there are comments, I would appreciate your keeping them brief so that we can get around the room. There are portable mikes around, so when you're recognized, if you would please wait to get the mike. And then if you prefer to

address your question to anyone on the panel, do so; otherwise, just throw it out here, and we'll figure out how to deal with it. Let's start back here, please.

MR. : Thank you. Stefan (?) , Embassy of Italy. Many questions, but I'll just focus on one. The gap which is in various areas between the leaders and the public, namely, for instance, on economic aid or immigration, is that due to a misperception, sort of lack of information for the public, for instance, with regard to economic aid, or as more, if I can use the phrase, root causes? Thank you.

MR. BOUTON: Ben?

MR. PAGE: Well, a quick comment on that. It turns out that the Friday conference is going to be very much about that kind of question. Steve Kull is one of the world's leading experts in this issue of gaps between the citizens and leaders, and he has some remarkable new data about leaders' misperceptions of what the public thinks and the public's misperceptions of what leaders are doing and so forth. That's a large and complicated subject, and I hope you'll be able to come on Friday.

MR. BOUTON: Anybody else want to comment on that? Chris?

MR. WHITNEY: In addition to that, with regard to economic aid, there's very clearly a misperception on the part of the public on how much we spend, and when they have a good idea of how much is spent, they are very supportive of it. They are also very supportive of specific types of developmental aid, as we saw. So much of the negativity surrounding aid is driven by just not knowing the actual facts.

Regarding immigration, I think the gap there is more substantive. The public has a pretty good understanding of what immigration is about because it impacts on their daily lives, and a lot of it is driven by economics. Presumably, a member of the public is much more likely to lose his or her job than a Member of Congress or a

business leader in this country, and they don't perceive it as being a threat, and immigration is seen by leaders as being much more of an economic benefit to the United States at the macro level.

MR. BOUTON: Yes, Jim?

MR. STEINBERG: Just to come back to a point I made in my remarks, you always--whenever you get one of these surveys, there's always the questions you wish they'd asked but they didn't. And on this one, I really do think one of the important questions it would have been nice to have the answer to is to ask the American people how effective do you think economic aid is, how effective do you think democracy--because as I say, my instinct is the same as Chris' and a lot of this has to do with just the sense that Americans are carrying an unfair or disproportionate burden. And it's not so much that they're against it. It's that they don't think it's consistent with the right level of responsibility of the United States. And that's where all these world policeman questions and the like come. But we don't know that for sure from looking at the answers.

MR. : If I could just quickly pick up on that, I think it's absolutely right. There's a lot of evidence that the public dislikes military aid most of all, and strategic aid it dislikes. And so existing aid programs are perceived as going in sort of the wrong direction and as being ineffective and not as getting to people who need the aid. So that then when you ask clear humanitarian questions--do you want to help prevent AIDS? Do you want to help with birth control in developing countries? Even do you want to help countries develop their economies?--you get much more positive responses.

MR. BOUTON: I would say there's actually a quite clear indirect evidence for the effectiveness argument because of the very sharp differences between high levels of support for broadly humanitarian assistance. You know, there's not a stinginess, if you will, that cuts across the board, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, economic assistance which is designed to rearrange societies. That Americans are much more skeptical of.

Yes, over here, please, the blue shirt, yellow tie.

MR. MITCHELL: Thank you. Gary Mitchell from the Mitchell Report. In order to put what we're going to hear--what we have already heard and are going to hear this morning into context, I wonder if you could take a couple of minutes to talk about the Knowledge Networks Internet-based process itself so that we get some sense of the composition of the audience that was being polled. Just in the same way that Jim Steinberg says there are striking results in this panel on issues like multilateralism, I'm struck by how--the way the public feels in this poll and the way the public feels in other venues. There feels like a gap, and I just wonder if you could talk about the sampling process.

MR. PAGE: This is an important question because, as you have presumably seen in the report, this is the first time the Chicago Council study was done via the Internet using Knowledge Networks. And there are interesting and important questions about what difference that makes.

I was a skeptic of any kind of Internet poll process for a long time for the obvious reason that ownership of computers is very unequal and access to the Internet is very unequal, and if you simply do a survey on the Internet, you get crazy results. It still happens from time to time. People try to do this.

Knowledge Networks has developed a very clever system in which, in effect, they start out with a random sample of people instead of starting out with who's got a computer. They start -- [tape ends].

-- telephone is running into problems with call-backs--with call waiting, excuse me, and with cell phones and so forth and so forth. And face-to-face interviewing has become horrendously expensive.

So I'm now convinced that this is an excellent way to go, and if you look at all the standard attributes of people to make sure you're getting a random sample, it works quite well. There's a waiting scheme, as there is usually with telephones, to make sure on certain characteristics that they are, in fact, represented in proportion to the population.

Now, that leaves another questions, which is, well, what happens when you change survey methods from one survey to the next? And we've wrestled with this now for four years because Chicago Council surveys used to be all face-to-face interviews, and that simply became impossible in 2002. So we did mostly a telephone survey through Harris, and fortunately, at that time there was a lot of thought about mode effects, about what difference it would make. And so actually three surveys were done that year: one face-to-face, one telephone, and one Internet. A bunch of questions were asked all three ways, and so we were able to tell what comes out differently and what doesn't. We also have a base of comparison, and the percentage changes that we put up here are only between surveys of the same kind, that is, it's not comparing two surveys that were done in different ways. It's comparing the 2002 Internet survey with the 2004 Internet, or, in addition, we did a little telephone survey this year just so that we could make clear comparisons on some other questions between 2002 and 2004.

So my bottom line on this is that this is actually excellent survey technology. I think the sample is every bit as good as any other. I think also that you have to be careful about change because there are some differences between modes.

I wonder if--Steve Kull is kind of our resident--

MR. BOUTON: Yes, could we get a microphone?

MR. PAGE: Maybe Steve will say another word about this. It is an important issue.

MR. KULL: Ben covered the main points, but it is important to note that on the Internet, people actually pay more attention, and it's generally found that the quality of the responses is better. People can look at it as long as they want. People have what we call more differentiated responses. Also, there's less of a social desirability effect because there's not somebody at the other end of the line listening to them. They're less concerned about somebody going, "You think what?" So it appears that the answers are less conditioned by what they think somebody else might want.

Obviously, there's a lot of research going on in this field right now looking at--because there's a major transition going on here to see if there are these mode effects. And there are certain kinds of questions where--very few, but there are some where there does appear to be a mode effect. And that's why we were very careful to cover those so that we had comparable findings.

The last time we had Internet as well as telephone and face-to-face. This time we had some telephone as well as Internet. So we did a lot of work to kind of cover this splice, so to say. You know, overall it seems that this is the direction that it's going, and you can have confidence that in anything where we say that there is some trend going on here, we really made sure that this was not attributable to a mode effect.

MR. BOUTON: I might say, as someone who also began, though a lay person, unlike Ben and Steve, but responsible ultimately for the quality of this study, began as a skeptic and was similarly convinced. In fact, I would--and I can perhaps as a lay person afford to make this prediction and not put my professional reputation on the line. I would predict that within five years we'll see most surveying being done by Internet. Telephone is becoming extremely difficult for the reasons that Ben has mentioned.

You know, even though surveys, at least of the sort we're doing, are not covered by the "do not call" legislation and lists, what happens, just to take one example, is that people get a call from a survey--to respond to a survey, and they immediately interpret it as a telemarketing operation and respond negatively. This happened in my household just three days ago. My wife got one of these, you know, and so you have high refusal rates. There's the whole problem with cell phones. So telephone is becoming increasingly difficult.

But let me just ask--this is a very important subject. We knew it would come up. We're glad it's come up. We want to address it as fully as possible. And so if I could just ask if there's anybody else in the audience who is not satisfied with the explanations that have been given or has a further question about the methodology, if we could deal with that now, we'd be happy to try to do so. Yes, please, right here.

MR. : Hi, Andreas Cougar(ph). I'm very happy with the answers. I just have an additional question. Given the amount of people asked, it's probably impossible to have regional findings, like saying, well, people in the South would do something more like this, or people in the North would prefer it like this. I guess with a sample of 1,100-something people this is not an option.

MR. BOUTON: Ben?

MR. PAGE: I guess what I would say is it probably is feasible. We just haven't done it yet. And I would assume we will.

It has turned out in recent years that regional differences are less important than one might guess, and that, in fact, the red states and the blue states, the populations are not nearly as different as one would imagine. But we will--we'll try.

MR. : We have done a lot of analysis [inaudible] effects on foreign policy questions, and it's amazing how homogeneous the country is. We've really gone looking for them, and they're really insignificant.

MR. BOUTON: Any other questions on methodology? In the back, please. Can we stay on methodology? Any more on methodology? Way in the back there, please, either of you. Right there, this gentleman right here, and then we'll--methodology?

MR. : Thank you. (?) . I don't know if you (?) already about the definition of the leaders. How were they chosen? Who are they, in comparison to the public? Thank you.

MR. BOUTON: Who wants to do that?

MR. PAGE: I have to laugh about that because that's a sore subject in this group, actually. Who knows how you would ever pick a sample of leaders? But this is done--it's been done consistently in pretty much the same way since 1974, and so nobody wants to stop, because it's interesting to compare from one year to the next.

This includes a lot of political figures, people from the House, the Senate, and this year in particular, very interesting over-samples of Congress people, which we treat separately. And Steve will have some things to say about it on Friday. It includes

people in the executive branch. It includes scholars and experts and so forth on foreign relations. It also includes business leaders, quite a few international vice presidents of large firms, some labor leaders, a few religious leaders, a lot of media people. And you could argue endlessly about how many of each kind of person you really should have in some sort of leadership sample, and people do argue endlessly. But I think--I find it an interesting touchstone because this sample tends to come out with fairly similar results that other efforts to study leaders do, foreign policy-oriented studies. And more important, you can break them down and actually say something about Congress people and about the executive branch and so forth.

MR. BOUTON: Ben, do you want to say something about how individual leaders are selected within those different sectors?

MR. PAGE: Within those categories, they're chosen essentially randomly from lists in the usual way so that there's some substantial representativeness there.

MR. BOUTON: Anything else on methodology? And then we'll move on. One more on methodology. This gentleman in the back--or woman.

MS. : Yes, I have a question. This may be a little bit down (?) because I recognize we're talking about a subject--I mean, foreign policy is not--when you're talking about the public. I'm just curious to know. You said that while you're doing some of the questioning on the Internet, how do you go about choosing the sample of people--you know, like you said, it's going to skew the data, people that do have Internet access versus don't. How do you go about choosing people that don't have access? And how do you go about providing that access?

MR. : I guess I didn't--I probably wasn't clear enough in describing what Knowledge Networks does. They start out in the same way that any survey would,

essentially trying to pick a random sample of people in the U.S. population; that is, a set of people who are just as diverse and share every characteristic that sort of the whole American population does. That's what you always try for in survey research. And what they were really clever about was they contact these people by telephone, whether or not they have computers, whether or not they have Internet access. They put together their sample, and then they get people to sort of sign up and do some surveys over a period of a month or two. And one of the things they promise them is if they don't have Internet access, they give it to them. They give them a machine. So the result of it is that this is a representative group of average Americans, in my view just as representative as the best surveys done by other methods and, in fact, probably better than a lot of them.

One other point that you mentioned in connection there, and we won't get into it in great detail. There is conventional wisdom that the average person doesn't know or care a thing about foreign policy, and I think that conventional wisdom is out of date, if it was ever true. Americans are paying a surprising amount of attention, and there are coherent patterns to the way they think about foreign affairs. Their attitudes hang together in logically consistent ways and so forth. But that will be a subject for another conference.

MR. BOUTON: Let me just make this final comment, and then we're going to move on from the methodology issue. The first gentleman asked about, you know, comparability between our findings and those of other studies done with different methodologies. I would just cite one recent one. Some of you may have seen the results of the Pew Center's study which was released about three weeks ago or a month ago at the most, and it was done by telephone. And in the areas in which our study and the Pew study overlap, there's remarkable similarity, not just in the trends and direction of

attitudes, but in the numbers. I mean, the numbers come very close considering that they were done at different points of time and using, you know, different houses. There's also a house effect and all that sort of thing.

So there is also the comfort, if you will, of that kind of finding, and I'd like to say, too, that--I want to remind all of you that what we're looking at here, and especially look at in the Chicago Council study, attempt to tap by the way we--by the questions we choose and the way we frame the questions is kind of underlying attitudes and opinion structures of Americans. We're not trying to take snapshots. And the kinds of attitudes that we're, therefore, attempting to focus on are typically not those that change daily or weekly or even monthly. It takes major events and developments to cause shifts in these deeper attitude structures that people hold onto.

You can see that if you go to the time series data of the Chicago Council study over now three decades. It's a really remarkable consistency. And you see ups and you see downs. But what's more compelling really is the continuity. It is precisely because we've now had two sort of tectonic events in the last three years in the world that we thought it was worthwhile looking at whether that's still the case, that continuity is still there.

Okay. Let me move on now, and if there are other--yes, this gentleman here has been waiting. Please wait for the microphone.

MR. : You talked about using force of United States abroad, but you didn't touch the Taiwan issue. My name is Chin. I'm from SAIS(?). Due to the sea change situation in Taiwan and the DPP ruling party is accelerating its process toward independence, maybe in 2006 or 2008, so China intensified its military preparation to take over or attack Taiwan. According--to comply with the Taiwan Act, I think it is--the

possibility of U.S. military involvement in Taiwan Strait cannot be excluded. So the important thing is that how could the American people accept this military action of the United States, because China in recent years closely watch their reaction, reflection of U.S.--Americans on the military use abroad of the United States in Somalia, Afghanistan, and Iraq. If they think--estimate that the American people cannot accept the huge casualties, maybe more than in Iraq, (?) , then they will not support U.S. Government military involvement. Then that will be a reason, a background, policymaking reason to launch a war against Taiwan's independence.

So my question is: How do you estimate the possibility of the military involvement? And to what extent the American people will accept it? Thank you.

MR. BOUTON: Jim?

MR. STEINBERG: That's actually--because of shortness of time, I didn't get into this in my remarks, but it is something that I noticed very much. This is one of those areas where there's a significant difference between opinion leaders and the public in terms of the attitude towards whether we should use force if China invades Taiwan.

Now, the question--I assume that the version we have is how it was answered, which is if China invades Taiwan. It doesn't get into any of the nuance of whether it was provoked or unprovoked, in response to a declaration of independence. But it is clear that the American public by a substantial difference between the American public, which is very reluctant to use force--or to commit troops, I think is the words that were used, if China invades Taiwan, and a small majority of the leaders who favor using force if China invades Taiwan.

So here's one of these questions where, as Shanto suggested, the question of how much of a leadership effect there would be is quite important because you do

have a fairly significant favorability in the elites for this, but a very deep reluctance of the American people. And I think that historically the polling evidence has tended to support that, that there has not been deep public support for military defense of Taiwan, but, on the other hand, a more substantial leadership support for it.

But the problem, again, with these polls is that because there's no context, it's very hard to predict from asking these generic questions whether the American people under a set of circumstances--I suspect that the numbers would be different, for example, if the question had been, Do you favor the use of troops in response to an unprovoked attack by China? Or, you know, something that gave more context.

On the second point, your point about casualties, I suspect--and there's some polling data to support it, and others may be able to speak to it--that this question of casualty averseness has been overestimated; that in the right set of circumstances, the American public is prepared to support significant casualties and that it really does depend on the context. So I would not draw the conclusions either from Iraq or from any other military exercise that we know the level of tolerance that the American people have for casualties as a generic matter, as opposed to whether they would be prepared to take those risks in a specific case.

MR. BOUTON: Does anybody want to add on that?

[No response.]

MR. BOUTON: I would just say that, if memory serves, the public support for use of U.S. troops in that contingency, China invading Taiwan, as the question was indeed asked, was 31 percent--

MR. : Thirty-three.

MR. BOUTON: Thirty-three, and there is greater leadership support, but it's barely a majority of leaders, it's 51. I agree entirely with Jim that context will be extremely important should that event happen, eventuality occur. However, I think what it does say to us is that the--it's going to be an uphill struggle for the leadership of the United States, starting with the President of the United States, whoever is to be so unfortunate at that time to be our President, to persuade Americans that U.S. troops should be put in harm's way to protect Taiwan. And it's also, among the three invasion scenarios we put in front of the public--North Korea invading South Korea, Arab forces invading Israel, and China invading Taiwan--it was the last that got the least public support for commitment of U.S. troops. And, furthermore, I think it's down slightly from 2002. So I think it's fair to say that there's probably slipping public support, gradually slipping public support for the use of U.S. troops in that contingency. And then we just have to know what the particularities are, and hopefully we won't know them.

Yes, please, the woman on the aisle back here.

MS. : Hi, Janine Zacaria (ph) with the Jerusalem Post. I have two questions.

The poll seems to reject everything--a lot of what the Bush administration foreign policy stands for, rejecting unilateralism, people love the UN, and while Jim Steinberg grouped democratization in the Middle East as the left idea, it's a cornerstone of the Bush administration's Middle East policy. So how do you square this with the fact that Bush just kills Kerry in foreign policy surveys? Does it mean that Americans are not voting based on foreign policy? Does it mean it's just about image? That's my first question.

My second question is if somebody on the Council can give some context on the response about the U.S. being evenhanded in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, 64 percent favored that. Is that a consistent number?

Thank you.

MR. BOUTON: Jim and Shanto, do you want to take on that?

MR. STEINBERG: I'm a little reluctant on some--because I try to observe the nonpartisan tradition of Brookings and not try to get into judgments about the politics of the campaign. But I would guess I would say, first of all, there is a big difference in the polls, in the campaigns about when asked about how the President and Senator Kerry perform on terrorism and national security on the one hand and foreign policy on the other, and Senator Kerry's remarks are much higher on foreign policy than they are on fighting the war against terrorism and on national security or defense. And so I think a lot of the issues that might seem to favor positions that Senator Kerry takes here are things that the American people think of more in the foreign policy domain. And so I think that provides a certain amount of context for this.

I think that it's also--I mean, my own instinct is that the implication of part of your question is that at the end of the day, when it comes to presidential elections, it's not about specific positions on specific foreign policy issues but, rather, a broader judgment about the character and leadership of the individual that tends to dominate how Americans make their judgment about selecting a President.

MR. BOUTON: Shanto?

MR. IYENGAR: Well, it's difficult to go after Jim because he says everything I was going to say. So I will concur with the questioner, however. I agree with you that the conventional wisdom is certainly that Bush owns terrorism. By

ownership, I mean, you know, the stereotypic conception in the court of public opinion is that the country is better off with Bush. And that's why when I was addressing some of the results, I was curious about the decision by the Kerry campaign to quite deliberately challenge the administration on terrorism and Iraq. And I was, quite frankly, a bit befuddled by that decision.

But having looked at the survey results, I had one of these "Aha" moments. Perhaps this is what the Democrats have in mind, that the unilateralism versus multilateralism dimension gives them a kind of an edge. They are closer to the median voter, as I said.

So perhaps that is sufficiently politicizable between now and election day, but I would be a bit cynical--or pessimistic on that score.

MR. BOUTON: I'll respond briefly on the question about the evenhandedness on the Israeli-Palestinian issue. We looked back at 2002, and it's--now, that was a telephone--we did not ask that question by Internet in 2002. We asked it by telephone. So it's a cross-mode comparison, so you have to take that into account. But they're about the same, 64 percent or 66 percent, Chris? Sixty-six percent wanted an evenhanded approach in 2002; 64 percent of the public now.

The general impact of the Internet mode seems to be to actually push things down a little bit in certain kinds of questions. So my guess is that they're right about the same. Pretty close to two-thirds of the American public prefer an evenhanded approach, and if memory serves, that's--and leaders 88 in 2002. So we're pretty much level. This is not a new phenomenon, not a huge change either up or down.

Ladies and gentlemen, we're going to take a break now, a brief break, 15 minutes. Grab yourselves a cup of coffee. Be back here promptly at 11:00. Some of the

most important and startling results are yet to come, and we look forward to continuing with you.

[Recess.]