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GLOBAL POVERTY AND GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT:

IS THE UNITED STATES DOING ITS PART?

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THIS IS AN UNCORRECTED TRANSCRIPT.

P R O C E E D I N G S

MS. FLORINI: I'm Ann Florini. I'm a senior fellow here at Brookings. And we're here today to launch a new report and to talk about America's role as it relates to some of the things in that report. The report is the Global Governance Initiative 2004--this thing--which there are copies of out there for all of you.

In addition to being a senior fellow at Brookings, I also direct the Global Governance Initiative on behalf of the World Economic Forum. What I'd like to do is take just a few minutes to talk about what this report is about, what the project is about, and then turn it over to my colleagues to get into some of the details on how America's role relates.

What the Global Governance Initiative attempts to do is to assess how hard the world is trying to achieve its global goals. It started off with a number of us who looked at documents like the United Nations Millennium Declaration, the Johannesburg Summit, the whole range of agreements in which the world's governments have over and over and over again set out a global agenda for what it is the world ought to be trying to achieve.

If you look at documents like the Millennium Declaration, it's actually a pretty reasonable set of goals. It's a pretty reasonable global agenda. It's not utopian, it's not pie-in-the-sky. It calls for halving the proportion of people living in global poverty between 1990 and 2015, which means reducing the number from something like 1.3 billion to 900 million people living on $1 a day or less. That still leaves 900 million people living on $1 a day or less--it's not like trying to wipe out the problem altogether--but it's a reasonable start in the right direction.

There's a number of goals in other issue areas, from peace and security to environment to human rights to education, health, hunger. And we looked at all of these goals across the board and said, are we actually trying to achieve this agenda? What is it that the world is trying to do to make this come about?

We did this in part because there's a broad sense that this is all rhetoric, the world's governments don't really mean it. But nobody had ever sat down and looked systematically at what kind of initiatives are going on, what is it governments are trying to do, what are other actors trying to do. And we decided to do that.

We set up a set of seven expert groups from around the world, drawing on the best people we could find--and we found very good people--to do that assessment. And they were tasked with the following: They were asked to look at what are governments, inter-governmental organizations, the private sector, and civil society all doing in each of these seven issue areas, as compared to a subjective assessment of what you think they ought to be doing if they were serious about achieving these goals. And the expert groups then gave the world a grade on a 0-10 scale, with 0 representing the world is messing it up so badly that everything you did actually took us in the wrong direction, to 10 being the world is doing what it ought to be doing to be on track to achieve the goals. What number would you give the world?

These groups all worked very independently. There were only a couple of us who went to all of their meetings. And yet, there were a couple of very surprising findings that came out of this.

The first surprising finding is that, essentially, everybody gets the same grade. For these seven very different issue areas, the world is doing roughly a third of what it ought to be doing if it were serious about trying to achieve this limited basic

global agenda. That's pretty dire findings, because what that means is that for all of these issue areas, we are desperately failing. What we are doing as a world, as an international community is very far below what the world needs to be doing if it wants to be on track.

But the good news is that we also found quite a number of success stories. You can look at things like China's progress on reducing poverty, Uganda's progress on reversing the AIDS epidemic, Latin America's progress on achieving close to universal primary basic education. And when you look at those success stories and what went into achieving them, what it makes clear is that these are in fact achievable goals. That makes the gap that currently exists between aspiration and action that much harder to bear.

We came up with several examples of that kind for each of these actors in each of these areas, and they're all spelled out in great detail in the report, along with the scores, so I won't go into them in much detail. There is one thing, though, that I want to emphasize that's really different about this assessment. There are lots of people who have tried ranking governments, looking at the role of the rich donor countries, et cetera, as they apply to how hard we're trying to achieve global goals. But all of those focus only on governments.

We look much more widely. We look as well at the private sector and at the role of civil society, NGOs. Because even though the responsibility for achieving these goals clearly lies primarily with governments--after all, they're the ones who signed on to the goals in the first place, they're the ones with the taxing authority, the resources, all of the things that are required to achieve the goals--it's also very clear that they cannot do this alone, that if we are go get on track to achieve the world's agenda, it's

going to require a much broader commitment that involves the private sector and involves civil society. And there are number of stories throughout the report that focus on those actors as well.

Today, however, in this event to launch the report, we're really only going to focus on one--that's the role of the United States--for the fairly obvious reason that if you're going to focus on any one actor in the international system, it has to be the United States. It's by far the dominant single actor in the international system.

And I am very pleased to be joined today by three colleagues from Brookings who are going to talk about different aspects of America's role in the world, what are America's responsibilities, what is right and wrong with what it is doing, what might it do differently, and how much of a contribution is it that the United States could make.

First of all, to turn to Susan Rice, who is a senior fellow in governance and in foreign policy studies here at Brookings, who will be talking largely on the security side. Then to Nigel Purvis, who is a senior fellow in all three government programs at Brookings--governance, economic studies, and foreign policy, who will be talking mostly about the environmental issues. And then finally to Lael Brainard, who is a senior fellow in economic studies and foreign policy studies, who will be looking at the poverty issues.

Susan?

MS. RICE: Good afternoon. Thank you for joining us.

Before I get into examining where the United States is on the spectrum with respect to peace and security, I'd like to just step back a second and think about why it is that all of this matters.

For most people in this city, they've not heard of the Millennium Declaration or the Millennium Goals and the United States' commitment to helping to meet them. Many people, even if they know about them, don't really care about them. And this should not be the case. These goals and the declaration represent for the United States more than an expression of high moral commitment, or a measure of whether we keep our word or not, or a measure of how humane and decent we are. Their achievement is integrally linked to our own national security. And that, I think, is not sufficiently well understood in this town.

We are not safe, as even our president has said and Jim Wolfensohn of the World Bank has said, in a world in which half the population lives on less than $2 a day. Let's think about why that might be the case.

The threats we face are increasingly transnational in nature; in other words, threats that know no geographic borders. Threats such as terrorism, proliferation, disease, environmental degradation prevail. These are not threats that we can adequately combat on our own or even with a handful of hand-picked allies. By necessity, dealing with these threats, by their very nature, requires that we have the cooperation and support of countries all over the world in every different region.

Solutions to these threats and problems depend to a large extent on both the will and the ability of other peoples and other governments to cooperate with us towards our shared goals. And where this will or capacity is lacking, we, therefore, have weaker partners than we need and can afford to have to deal with these threats around the world. Where governments are poor, where their people are poor, where they are weak and don't control their territory, where they face conflict, where there is repression--these are not countries that are suited to being strong, capable, and willing

partners of the United States. On the contrary, we need peaceful, democratic, capable, and favorably disposed partners around the world to maximize the effectiveness of cooperation globally on these transnational threats.

The alternative is really a vicious nexus of neglect. It would be poverty and conflict and disease and environmental degradation, terror and failed states all feeding and fueling one another in a mix that really in no fashion serves our long-term national security interests. So that is why I would suggest that these issues matter above and beyond the obvious need to do our part on behalf of humanity and abide by our word.

So if you look at the report that has come out, in the realm of peace and security you'll see that the international community has been given a grade of 3, which, as Ann pointed out, is not very good. It suggests we're doing no more than a third of what is required to meet our goals on this element of the indices. The four areas on which the report focuses with respect to peace and security are conflict, including prevention and resolution; terrorism; proliferation; and small arms proliferation.

Now, I would argue that even the 3 that the international community is given on this dimension of peace and security in the year 2003 is probably representing a little bit of grade inflation. One of the things the report points to in giving them the grade of the 3 rather than something less is the fact that no new civil conflicts broke out in the year 2003. I would suggest that that is a function more of blind, dumb luck than of any enhanced capacity on the part of the international community. And witness the fact that, just after 2003 ended, we saw new civil conflict break out again in Haiti, for instance. We see a massive humanitarian crisis in the Darfur region of Sudan. And the

question of What is new? also bears consideration, because if a conflict reignites in an area where it had been extinguished before, is that a new conflict or not?

In any case, I think the fact is, the reality is 10 years after the Rwandan genocide, the international community is no better equipped to respond rapidly and effectively to grave humanitarian crises, to genocides, to conflicts, should that kind of response be required. The reality is, really, on three countries on the plant possess the capability to move quickly in rapid response to that kind of crisis: the United States, France, and the United Kingdom. And should, as in 1994, they choose not to or lack the political will to do so, the international community has not built the capacity and the infrastructure to have in place credible alternatives.

So looking precisely at the U.S. role for a few minutes, let me touch briefly on each of the four areas--conflict prevention and resolution, proliferation, terrorism, and small arms. And I'd like to spend the most time on conflict prevention and resolution because I think, in many respects, that's the area of great importance that gets relatively little attention. It's obviously a multifaceted area. But when you look at the U.S. role, you have to look at several dimensions, starting, for instance, with diplomacy. What has been the nature of U.S. engagement around the world in conflict and crisis situations with respect to preventive diplomacy or active U.S. leadership in trying to negotiate a peaceful end to conflict and crisis?

I would suggest, if you scratch your head and think about it, that our engagement in this sort of activity around the world is remarkably limited at present. Where are we actively engaged? Well, we can say that the United States, along with others in Europe and especially partners in East Africa, has been actively and, we hope, ultimately effectively engaged in trying to broker a peace in the civil conflict in Sudan.

Back in 2002, the U.S. was very actively engaged for a brief spate when it seemed that war--nuclear war, even--might break out between India and Pakistan.

But beyond this, if you look at the map of civil and inter-state conflict around the world, it is striking the extent to which the United States over the last few years has been remarkably absent. Sri Lanka; Zimbabwe; the Middle East peace process; Cyprus, which we have handed over to the U.N.; Central Africa; Ethiopia and Eritrea, which are in a very fragile peace; much of the arc of crisis in West Africa; and even, arguably, in places like North Korea and Haiti, where our involvement has been late, tepid, or, arguably, half-hearted.

Next, what has been the nature of the U.S. response to humanitarian crises and the imperative for humanitarian intervention? I think at best--again, perhaps, suffering from grade inflation--we can say that that response has been mixed. You look at Liberia. The United States, after raising expectations in the international community on the eve of the president's trip to Africa, ended up sending in about 250 troops for 14 days. They never left Monrovia, and later sat offshore on ships for several months while the humanitarian suffering continued. We did intervene in Haiti, albeit belatedly, albeit after the departure of President Aristide under a veil of some controversy, and after having signaled to the rebels that the United States had no intention of intervening if Aristide didn't leave--in other words, giving the rebels potentially a green light to march on Port-au-Prince.

We have not acted in other crisis situations, such as Cote d'Ivoire, where fortunately the French and the countries of West Africa have taken the lead, and we continue to do not much more than remonstrate with respect to the crisis in Darfur in Sudan.

On capacity building--building capacity in the international community to respond more effectively to these sorts of crises and contingencies--until a few days ago I would have given the United States a relatively low grade. But I think if the president's initiative, as unveiled prematurely in the Washington Post, is in fact implemented--this new Global Peace Operations Initiative--it will be a substantial and important increase in U.S. efforts and resources devoted to building capacity in parts of the world such as Africa, but not limited to Africa, where that peace operations humanitarian intervention capacity has been limited.

But it will be critical to see whether or not there is sufficient emphasis on giving countries the ability to respond rapidly to crisis, i.e., to deal with the sort of contingency that we saw in Liberia or 10 years ago in Rwanda, and whether these countries as they are trained are given the wherewithal to be inter-operable, to work with one another in response to a crisis at hand. It's no good if we go around the world training 20 different battalions with different equipment, different communications, that can't talk to each other and can't come together to perform a task. They have to be inter-operable, and I think it remains to be seen whether that will be the case.

Nation building. Well, we've heard a lot of discussion about that. We've certainly had some hard-fought and hard-[inaudible] experience in that recently. But we haven't learned from the experiences of the 1990s, and we of course have major unfinished business in places from Afghanistan to Iraq to Haiti.

Failed states. Much has been made of the statements in the president's national security strategy in 2002 that pointed to weak and failed states as significant threats to U.S. national security. But almost two years after the issuance of that strategy, the U.S. government has no strategy, no new resources, no new approach to dealing with

the problems posed by weak and failed states. This remains a significant gap, both in our preventive capacity and in our response capacity.

And so, on the overall question of conflict prevention and resolution, I think we have a great deal more to do.

What about proliferation? Well, I won't go in detail through this. The situation in North Korea remains very dangerous with each passing day. Their capacity to produce and disseminate weapons of mass destruction becomes greater. In Iran, we are struggling to find a way to tend to what seems to be an increasingly worrisome problem. We have had some positive success in Libya. I think important credit is due as well to our British partners in that respect. And then there is the Proliferation Security Initiative which the administration launched, an effort with 11 countries to interdict cargo on the seas that may be bearing weapons of mass destruction. I think that's a useful step, but hardly sufficient, because if we're at the point trying to catch ships on the sea, we're looking for a needle in a haystack and arguably the big animals are out of the barn.

And then, of course, there's Iraq. Iraq was the poster child for our efforts to control WMD getting in the hands of our worst adversaries. I think at best we can look at Iraq as a diversion from the larger challenge of grabbing hold of and containing the spread of WMD, and at worst as a contributor to the problem. Recall that there were a number of unsecured facilities in Iraq with equipment, with low-grade yellow cake uranium that never were properly locked down and protected, and now there is reason to be concerned that that has found its way out of Iraq into various parts of the world.

On counterterrorism, again, I think a mixed U.S. record. Iraq, far from being a notch in our belt in the war on terrorism at present, I think is teetering on the

verge of becoming a failed state, in part of our own creation, which in the worst case could be not just a magnet for terrorists but a playground for terrorists of all stripes in a strategic region of the world, with all the resources that Iraq has at its disposal. In Afghanistan, our business is far from done. In the Sahil region of Africa and in the Horn of Africa, I think the United States deserves good credit for having begun efforts and partnerships with the governments in the region to get a better grip on how their territories are being used by potential terrorist organizations.

But the fact is, al Qaeda continues to operate in some estimated 60 countries around the world. In some of them we are paying a lot of attention; in others, we are doing relatively little and not even giving willing partners an enhanced capacity to work with us.

And finally with respect to terrorism, it can be argued that our approach is heavily oriented on the military and security side and perhaps lacking adequate balance with respect to the political, the economic, and the social aspects of winning the war on terrorism.

Finally, with respect to small arms, I won't dwell on this. It simply needs to be noted that the United States remains the world's largest exporter of small arms. And we have far from come into line with the rest of the international community when it comes to land mines.

So where do we go from here, if this is the record? Very briefly, it's clear that we need to enhance our conflict resolution and conflict prevention capabilities. The United States is the world's leading superpower. There's no reason why we can't again be actively engaged in diplomacy and conflict prevention and crisis response efforts in all of the major conflicts and crises around the globe. There was a time a very short few

years ago when we were actively engaged, from Northern Ireland to Haiti to Cyprus to Indonesia. That is no longer the case.

We can also do more with respect to giving the U.N. the ability to engage effectively in preventive diplomacy, and that in part means being more willing to share intelligence with the U.N. and be more forthcoming about giving them the ability to anticipate crises before they occur.

We can pursue the president's Global Peace Operations Initiative and work to see it fully funded by Congress. And we can do more than talk about humanitarian intervention in crisis situations, but be more consistent in our response or at least not aggravate the situation by raising expectations of U.S. involvement that may not be forthcoming.

We can put in place a genuine strategy with accompanying resources to deal with failed states. We can also take seriously the task of post-conflict reconstruction. Instead of passing the hat on an ad hoc basis every time we have a post-conflict situation, from Liberia to Haiti to Sudan, we could be part of a U.N. system of assessment so that the costs of these operations are borne on a predictable scale, as we do now with U.N. peacekeeping missions, so that every operation is funded on a steady stream.

And finally, we can move beyond the Proliferation Security Initiative and invest in increasing funds available to the former Soviet Union and other parts of the world for what is colloquially called the Nunn-Lugar program, and do more with respect to broadening and deepening our approach to fighting terrorism. Yes, focus on the military to the extent that that's necessary and important, but don't neglect the other tools in our arsenal.

Thank you.

MS. FLORINI: Thank you, Susan.

For those who are in the back, there are some seats up in the front if anybody would care to sit down.

Susan, thank you very much for that remarkable assessment of the state of the world in a very short time.

Nigel?

MR. PURVIS: Thank you very much, Ann. I'm delighted to be here, and I congratulate you on putting together this report. Let me just make clear that, while I think it's an absolutely excellent report and does a fabulous job in just a few pages of crystallizing the global commitments on the environment and the state of play on those issues, I had very little to do with that, in fact nothing. And so I'm here today to provide a somewhat independent perspective and to, as Ann has invited us to do, to comment on the U.S. role and opportunities for enhanced leadership on environmental issues by the United States.

Let me follow the outline that Susan provided, which is to talk a little bit initially about why we should care about the global environment and how it fits into a broader U.S. interest, and then move quickly to a review of the commitments that have been made and then U.S. performance regarding those commitments and the global situation, ending with some very specific recommendations about what more the United States can do to help meet global environmental commitments.

The report talks about global environmental commitments, recognizing that the environment is an incredibly complex and diverse subject. It's very hard to crystallize in a very short amount of time what's actually happening. And the device that

the report used is, I think, very effective, and I'm going to mimic it here in my remarks, which is to focus on three of the largest if not the biggest challenges that we face. And that's the challenge of dealing with global warming, the tremendous difficulties we have in stopping the loss of biological diversity or the extinction of species, and the challenge of giving people of the world access to safe water and sanitation. These are three challenges that are incredibly difficult to meet and have a particularly hard impact on developing nations and poor countries, where the impacts of these environmental challenges are most severely felt.

So where do we stand globally on these three issues of climate change, biodiversity, and water? And the answer is that there's significant reason for concern. Global emissions of greenhouse gases which contribute to global warming are increasing rapidly, and there's really no end in sight. In order to stop climate change, we're going to need to get to a point where the global economy has absolutely zero emissions, because as long as emissions are positive, temperatures will continue to rise. So while we have to get to zero, our emissions are actually still climbing. We haven't even begun to turn the corner where one can say that we're making progress.

With regard to biodiversity, scientists increasingly believe we're now facing the highest rate of extinction of species that we have seen on this planet at any time since the age of the dinosaurs. And if we look at some of the critical ecosystems where those species live, there's really enormous reason for alarm. The world's oceans are incredibly stressed. Over 70 percent of the fish stocks are categorized as severely stressed and in danger of collapse. The forest cover of the forests that contain the most abundant biological diversity, particularly tropical forests, is diminishing rapidly even as

we see some moderate increase in forest cover in northern climates that are less biologically diverse.

And 1.5 billion people on the planet lack access to safe water, and half of the hospital beds in the world are occupied by people who contracted their illness as a result of the access to unsafe water or contact with poor sanitation.

So there is a fairly negative and alarming trend on the global environment, and that's why it's understandable that, as a result of public concern and leadership by some in the international community, that states and corporations and NGOs have come together to develop some fairly concrete commitments to make progress in these areas. So let me quickly review what's outlined in the report.

On climate change, in 1992, nations agreed that by the year 2000 they would return global emissions to 1990 levels. And when that didn't occur and in fact emissions were markedly higher at the new millennium, nations agreed to negotiate a new treaty, called the Kyoto Protocol, which set out to reduce emissions in industrialized nations by 5 percent below 1990 levels by the year 2012. In biodiversity the goal was set by year 2010 that we would achieve a significant reduction in the rate of extinctions. And on the issue of clean water and sanitation, as part of the Millennium Development Goals, the nations agreed to achieve a reduction by half of the proportion of people without access to safe water and sanitation. So in roughly a decade or two, some significant goals were elaborated for achieving some remarkable progress in these areas.

So, in fact, how are we doing? And here, the report suggests that, as in the other area that Susan addressed, here we deserved a grade of a 3 on a scale of 0-10. I probably wouldn't be quite so generous. On climate change, global emissions are more than 30 percent above where they--excuse me, by 2015 they'll be 30 percent above

where the nations of the world expected them to be. On biodiversity we see very little change in the rate of extinctions. In fact, some scientists believe that our continued logging and encroachment on critical ecosystem areas is in fact continuing to accelerate the rate of biodiversity loss. And on progress towards clean water, we see that we're on a business-as-usual trajectory that is achieving some progress, but mainly as a result of continued economic growth in developing countries as a result of enhanced international cooperation.

So our actual performance suggests that we're not in fact taking these global goals as seriously as we ought to and that significantly more action is required.

So what is the role of the United States in this process? How are we contributing, or not, to these solutions, and what more could the U.S. do? Why are we having such difficulties making progress? Let me just reflect for a few moments on those questions.

Well, when it comes to climate change, the United States is the largest emitter of greenhouse gases in the world. We are responsible for over a quarter of global emissions. If you look historically at all emissions that have ever been released into the atmosphere since the burning of fossil fuels began in the beginning of the Industrial Revolution, the United States is responsible for an even larger share--some say roughly 40 percent--of global cumulative emissions to date and our emissions continue to rise. So that's what's happening at home.

Internationally, we have withdrawn from the Kyoto Protocol process, the international effort to negotiate legally binding commitments to reduce those emissions, and we have not presented an international alternative to take its place. Domestically we have no national consensus about the idea of regulating greenhouse emissions, of

controlling our carbon emissions. While there are some increasing soundings on the Hill and in fact a recent voting in Congress where 44 senators voted in favor of carbon controls, we're far from adopting that legislation and there's very limited support in the House and no support in the White House.

So on climate change I'd say we're still in the midst of a process of figuring out whether we think the issue is serious and how best to go about it.

On biodiversity, we have for quite some time had quite extensive controls on species extension and protection of critical habitat in the United States. The United States was the first country to have a national park system. Our endangered species law was one of the first to be adopted. But you have to say that there hasn't been significant improvement in our legal structure or in our funding for these issues domestically in recent years, and at the international level we're doing relatively little to change the negative trend of species extinction.

I would say that the Bush administration has pursued a number of programs that are really quite commendable in this area, and the problem is not what is being done but rather the scale on which it's being done. Let me just mention a few issues.

The administration is currently supporting ratification of the Law of the Sea Convention, which has significant environmental benefits for the oceans. It has pursued a tropical forest conservation program, with Secretary Powell's leadership, in the Gabon and elsewhere in Central Africa that is turning large tracts of unspoiled tropical forests into national parklands, with U.S. support. And it's launching--I think even as we speak the members of the government are discussing how to share advanced satellite and data information that the United States has through NASA with other

countries so that they can get a better sense of what's happening within their own borders on the environment, monitoring illegal logging and other damaging economic activity. So there's a lot of interesting things happening on biodiversity, but they're nowhere near the scale that is needed in order to meet the global environmental challenges.

On water, of course, our water, while there are continuing concerns about lead, including in this city, about arsenic and other problems with our water quality, the overall picture in the United States is in fact quite positive. Our water, just as our air, is getting much cleaner. It's been that way for over 30 years. The problem is more in developing countries and at the international level and the absence of any really significant U.S. plan to deal with the problem. We have not put forward any specific proposal for enhanced international cooperation on water quality, we don't have an ambitious action plan or funding mechanism, such as the Global Fund for HIV/AIDS, which we proposed for that challenge. And so there's an absence of vision about how to deal with the water problem here in the United States.

So why don't we have more U.S. leadership and what are the obstacles to making more progress? Well, I would say that, quite frankly, we have to recognize that we have limited political will on these issues. When it comes to the environment, we're somewhat schizophrenic in this country. We think that there's a tension between environmental quality and economic growth. As a consequence, there's significant concern about emphasizing the environment for fear of loss of jobs and competitiveness and somehow harming our economic lifestyle.

Similarly, there are real concerns about whether these global challenges, which are the challenges that are of greatest interest to people in developing countries, are really American priorities. We tend to be much more focused on what's happening

closer to home. We're concerned about air and water and other aspects like the release of toxic chemicals and Superfund cleanup and things that strike more closely to us in our local communities. And there's just less interest in dealing with problems that are distant in a couple of different dimensions--they're both far away physically, they're happening elsewhere; but they're also distant in that the impacts tend to be felt over time, such as in climate change, where the real impact is generations after the emissions are released into the atmosphere. So that there are these constructual problems about distance and the inability to capture public imagination on these issues that is limiting our political will here at home.

But I'd have to say that we're not the only ones who are not particularly focused on these issues. There is also, I would say, a diminished international interest in environmental cooperation. We have to admit that over the last 30 years environmental diplomacy has been probably the fastest growing area of international law and of international cooperation. We've gone from a situation where there were almost environmental treaties to a position where we have over 500 in the global system. And while it's commonly thought that the United States doesn't really ratify environmental treaties, in fact we're a party to over 175.

So the United States has been a very active participant in the international process of building a cooperative regime on the environment, but at the same time, cutting in the other direction, there is increased emphasis on other priorities, including some of the issues that are in the report. Pursuing economic development, addressing poverty have risen as priorities globally, and we see that--when we look at the global environmental conferences, just as a quick snapshot of an indication of the level of

interest internationally on the environment, we can see a marked diminishment in the emphasis attached to the environment itself.

The first big global environmental conference was in 1972, in Stockholm. The title was "On the Global Environment." So if you look at the environmental content, you'd have to say that was 100 percent. But 20 years later, we had the Rio conference in 1992, where the title of the conference was "The Global Conference on Environment and Development." So the focus on environment had dropped to about 50 percent. Five years later, in the mid-term review of the Rio conference, they had the Copenhagen conference, which added social development to economic developments and so the environmental component had dropped to about 33 percent. And then just recently at the World Conference on sustainable Development in Johannesburg, which was the 30-year anniversary of Stockholm. The conference had been renamed to have equal emphasis on poverty and on social development and economic development and environment. So the environmental component had dropped to about 16.5 percent.

Now, that's a little facile, but I offer it as kind of a quick story of how environment itself is not the major focus of diplomacy, even environmental diplomacy.

So what should we do, and how can the United States be more active? Let me first offer a reason why we have a strong stake in making sure that we are leaders and active in this area. The United States has gone from the position as being seen as the world environmental leader, where we were the first nation, as I said, to have strong environmental laws and clean air, clean water, endangered species, the first country to remove lead from gasoline, the first to create a comprehensive protected area system with extensive national parks to now a country that is seen as the nation that is among those that is most resistant to environmental progress--our withdrawal from the Kyoto

Protocol process on climate change, our enormous disproportionate consumption of natural resources, our extensive use and reliance on oil, we're the largest timber consumer in the world, we have a disproportionate share of consumption of the resources from the world's oceans, and where we were a leader, we are now seen as irresponsible consumers. And probably nothing symbolizes that for Europeans who drive small cars as our romance with the SUV.

So there's a broader issue of America's role in the world and how we're seeing that the absence of strong leadership on the environment has turned us from the people in the white hats to the people in the black hats. And I would argue that as we build and redefine America's role in the world, one of the ways that we can do that is to have strong, engaging, responsible environmental proposals.

Let me just offer three that I think are worthy of attention. On the issue of climate change, the number one thing that we can do is to act more forcefully at home. It's not so much engaging in the international diplomacy as it is getting our own emissions under control. The kind of legislation that's being considered in the Congress is an example of how we could adopt responsible climate legislation that would control our emissions while protecting our economy.

When it comes to biodiversity, it's not that we're doing the wrong things, it's just that we're not doing enough of them. We need to scale up our resources and our engagement in the emphasis that we give to biodiversity issues and our diplomacy in order to meet the challenge.

And when it comes to water, we need to offer some vision. Right now, we don't have the kind of vision that we showed when it came to HIV/AIDS and the establishment of the global fund. If we're serious about the goal of reducing by half the

proportion of people without access to clean water, and if we think that 1.5 billion people who don't have access to clean water is intolerable, we need to act like it and we need to suggest a legal mechanism and a financing mechanism that would be up to the challenge. With water, it's not, as it is with climate change where we need a whole new generation of technologies, where we don't know how to run our economy without oil, without coal, without other natural resources--when it comes to clean water, the problem is money. We know how to make water clean. The technology's not particularly difficult or even expensive on a per-person basis. We just need to get serious about it.

Thank you.

MS. FLORINI: Thank you, Nigel.

Lael?

MS. BRAINARD: Well, first let me just say kudos Ann and to her collaborator in Geneva who used to work with me at the White House, Rick Sammons [ph]. This is a really interesting report. I just actually read it myself, and I think it's well worth your time taking a look at it. Also, the timing's quite good, coming as it does just before all of the economic financial development officials converge for their spring meetings, for their spring pow-wow to talk about the state of the global economy.

I'm going to talk briefly about that piece of it, the economics piece, the poverty, education, health piece of it. The bottom line from the report is that the international community is barely getting a passing grade on the goals that were embodied in the Millennium Development Goals of the U.N. that we passed barely four years ago. I'd say they translate to maybe a C- on poverty reduction and health and a D on education.

That assessment is at a very broad level, the international community writ large. What Ann asked us to talk about a little bit is how does that translate at the U.S. level. First of all, how important is the U.S. to achievement of those international goals, and secondly, how are we actually doing? My guess is that the U.S. would actually--probably is pulling that average down a little bit, is my guess, and that if we go across issue-by-issue, that the U.S. government in particular is not taking as seriously as the rest of the world would hope we should the signatures on documents that we've been doing over the last few years.

So first of all, on poverty and foreign assistance. For those poorest nations, foreign flows, coming partly from the official sector, are going to be critical in getting out of the poverty trap and on to sustainable growth. And the U.S. has unarguably a critical role to play, either, if you think about it, as accounting for a third of global income or for 40 percent of donor income.

Now, in the last few years there have been very impressive increases within the U.S. context on foreign assistance. And if you look at percentage increases, it looks pretty good. If you look between fiscal 2000 and fiscal 2004, for instance, foreign affairs budget authority has grown by something like $3 billion, to something like $26.6 billion. That's an increase of roughly one-eighth. Of course, if you add in the supplemental budget, the increase is a breathtaking $24.9 billion.

But of course that gives you the sort of kernel of why that increase is not all against the goals that the international community has adopted. A lot of that is security related. And a much smaller percentage of the increase is actually directed at health, education, and development in the traditional sense, and a very tiny amount of that will get to the poorest countries at the end of the day.

One of the most important developments on the poverty front in foreign assistance, of course, was the president's announcement at a conference in Monterey that was focused on the U.N. Millennium Development Goals, a conference that was focused on an internationally derived estimate of how much it was going to cost to get from here to there, the U.S. contribution to that effort was the Millennium Challenge Account.

And in March of 2002, President Bush promised a cumulative increase of $10 million over three years, which most believed to be a sort of linear expansion which would get us to $5 billion by the third year and then in perpetuity. Well, the reality is that we're significantly under that. We're both a day late and a dollar short. The money's about a billion this year, which is substantially short of what the anticipation was. But then, if you look at the budget request, $1 billion this year, requests for $2.5 in five, most people think we can't even begin to get from here to there because we're just--we haven't even seen any disbursement of the money two years later. Basically we're going to have to spend the billion dollars in a year to convince Congress that we're going to need to increase it to 2.5. But if you add up the numbers--and I'm not that good at math, but, you know, 8.5 billion is probably what you're going to get over three, as opposed to 10.

So already we're anticipating being short. And then the other thing that is a little bit interesting, or surprising, is that the Millennium Challenge Account initially made no reference to the Millennium Development Goals, and in fact was an attempt to move away from the poverty reduction framework and to put the emphasis squarely on growth. Now, I'm for growth. I mean, we're all for growth. But the Millennium Development Goals were created; they were an internationally developed set of

commitments. The U.S. was there at the table. We were an important part of this. We signed on the dotted line, and here our contribution makes no reference to that.

What's also kind of interesting about is there's very little reference to any of the other things the international community has been doing. There's very little reference to the whole poverty reduction strategy papers process that has been the international community's primary vehicle for moving towards more balanced and more sustained efforts at growth.

And the other thing that's interesting is the way this account is set up, which is generally well informed by research and economic theory, et cetera. It has very transparent, accountable, quantifiable criteria for eligibility, and that's by and large a good thing. But when you run the numbers, it turns out that less than 10 percent of the population of the poorest countries in Africa are likely to be eligible. Now, we don't know that for sure because in a month's time the administration's actually going to do their own run and tell us who the eligible countries are. But because of the way the criteria are set up, it means that it will only reach a tiny, tiny layer of the poorest.

There's nothing wrong with that as long as we are increasing development assistance through our other accounts that will reach those countries. Because the need isn't going away just because we have changed the criteria for getting it. So what's going on with those numbers? Well, that's not a very good story, either. Development assistance, which is the primary mechanism by which we would normally reach those countries, is actually slated to decline by 3.5 percent this year. And if you look over a five-year budget request basis, there's a 12 percent decline in that account in nominal terms, which is actually more like a one-fifth, 20 percent. So that surely cannot be a passing grade or even a good grade on this issue of poverty alleviation more generally.

The second point is trade. Trade is a central piece of poverty alleviation. And when you get into the emerging markets, especially, and some of the transition economies, these poverty programs are really not the primary mechanism. It is really primarily going to be through market access, through engaging in the international commercial system.

So how are we doing on that? Well, if people claimed that the decade of the '90s was one of trade-not-aid, I think for the first half of this decade you could legitimately claim that this decade, or this half-decade, is one of aid and not trade because big market opening initiatives have virtually come to a standstill in this first five years. If you look at the '90s, you had the Uruguay Round, which was a massive global undertaking; you had NAFTA; you had the African Growth and Opportunity Act; you had the expansion of the Caribbean Basin/Central America trade preferences; and you had China WTO. In terms of reach into poverty, those initiatives were a huge, huge cumulative effort.

If you look at this first five years, what we've accomplished on trade so far--and it's for a variety of reasons--what you see is a handful of fairly idiosyncratic bilateral trade deals that the U.S. has pursued, certainly not based on poverty or economics but primarily based on foreign policy reasons.

Secondly, most economists would say that if you had to choose one area or maybe two areas of trade that are going to be most meaningful for the poor in the world, you would choose A) agriculture and B) apparel. You'll notice that in none of those bilateral trade initiatives do we scratch the surface of agriculture. And it's for obvious reasons. It's because it is very difficult to dismantle the U.S. system of subsidies on--you choose your favorite crop--cotton for one country. It doesn't work.

And so none of these bilateral free trade agreements are going to get us from here to there on trade in agriculture.

Now, in terms of the "why does it matter?" the U.S. has to lead. I mean, trade is not going to happen, we are not going to have a Doha Agreement on development, we're not going to have a free trade area of the Americas in the absence of U.S. leadership.

The third area that I just should touch on briefly is--this report doesn't just look at governments, it does look at the private sector. If you look at the private sector, the U.S. private sector is extraordinarily active, and through investment, flows through trade, through remittances provides enormous stimulus, enormous stimulus to the international economy. That continues to be true. The one exception to that is on the trade deficit where, because of our burgeoning fiscal deficit, we're actually absorbing tremendous flows of savings from abroad rather than investing them abroad.

But one misconception in the debate which I think is very important, there was a recent paper by Carol Adelman and also a chapter in a USAID report that said, Hey, don't worry, be happy, the U.S. is doing great, in fact we're doing a heck of a lot more foreign aid than you think we are because look at our numbers on remittances--$18.5 billion; that more than doubles the amount of foreign assistance we're doing.

Remittances are really important. Remittances are, essentially, immigrants come to this country, they work, they make money, they send it home. But it's very important not to confuse remittances, which are similar to trade and similar to investment, they are private-sector flows--they are not charity. And so whenever we're having these discussions, it's extremely important to be very clear. Foreign aid is

government assistance. Remittances are earnings. They are earnings. They are not charity.

The last point, brief point, is simply to reflect on the larger exercise that Ann has undertaken here, which is essentially to say let's take a bunch of global agreements that countries have signed up to and let's see whether they're actually implementing them. The answer: no.

And so that raises the question, well, how seriously do we take these international agreements? And when I say "we," we're really talking about the U.S. How much does global governance, how much do global agreements in the economic, poverty, trade realm really influence U.S. policies?

Now, clearly, when it comes to the trade realm, when we sign a WTO agreement there are arbitration mechanisms, dispute settlement, et cetera; when we go to a U.N. General Assembly and sort of say we're for the Millennium Development Goals--two completely different categories of commitments. And it's a very interesting and, I think, important and revealing question to be asking how much does the U.S. then come back and say, well, what are we doing against these goals?

And even if you look at a single issue like HIV/AIDS, where I think arguably the U.S. is doing extraordinarily well, interestingly, even there, we created the global fund--it came out of a series of G8 meetings and the special session that was held at the U.N.--we created a global mechanism for dealing with HIV/AIDS and, two years later, essentially took all our money and put it into bilateral programs.

So what's interesting, I think, in this exercise thinking about the U.S., is our own ambivalence towards acting, even in this realm, unilaterally versus within an international umbrella. And a closing thought is we have an opportunity this year to

chair, to host the G8, and it will be in Sea Island and it's a very, you know, important moment for the coming together of the major donors of the world. And the question that I think will be interesting is to what extent will U.S. priorities be international priorities? To what extent are we going to see follow-up on the commitments we've made in previous years to Africa, to global poverty, to HIV/AIDS, the holding accountable to the kinds of goals that Ann's exercises is looking at versus a U.S. agenda and an attempt to get international support behind a largely U.S. agenda? I can tell you what my guess is, but I'll leave it till June to find out.

MS. FLORINI: Thank you, Lael. Thanks to all three of my colleagues for a fascinating series of presentations. Before I throw it open to comments and questions from the floor, I just want to make a couple of points. One is on Lael's reference to the grades being C- or D's. In fact, the way we had thought about it is that a 10 is a passing grade, because a 10 simply means the world is doing what it needs to be doing to be on track to achieve its fairly limited set of goals. Anything less than a 10 is just a different degree of failing grade. And the 3's and 4's mean not just that we're failing, but that we're failing atrociously.

So in keeping with the fairly pessimistic mood of this set of comments--

The focus here today has been very much on the role of the United States, and I'm very grateful to my colleagues for their insights on that. But this report is being released simultaneously around the world. We are overseen by an international steering committee in countries as varied as China and Thailand and pretty much any place you can think of in the world, and members of our steering committee are today talking with media in their home countries about this set of global goals and what it means to for them and what their roles and responsibilities are. This is our major launch event, for

the fairly obvious reason, as I said at the beginning, that if there's any single actor that matters most in the international system right now, it is the United States.

With that, let me throw it open for comments and questions.

QUESTION: [Inaudible], Embassy of Belarus. Thank you very much for your presentation. And if possible, there are two questions. One question to Miss or Mrs., I don't know, Dr. Rice. What would you prefer in terms of realpolitik, to fight against poverty, diseases, and other troubles and, in the course of the struggle to make the U.S. partners peaceful and democratic; or would you prefer at first to make the U.S. partners peaceful and democratic and only then to fight against poverty?

And the other question, maybe again, preferably, to Dr. Rice, but to other distinguished members of the panel. One of the pivotal ideas of Leo Tolstoy in his novel "War and Peace" is that when a person is pursuing one's selfish goals, very often he does much more public and social service than a person who is pursuing, or trying to pursue, social and public goals. So in this connection, would it be one part of the solution for the United States and its Western European partners, first of all, to be more clear about their national, albeit selfish, goals and, in so doing, to render some more real public and global service?

Thank you very much.

MS. RICE: If I might try to take the second part of your question first. I think that what we're talking about here is very much a question of realpolitik in U.S. national self-interest, which is why I set up my comments as I did at the outset. I think it is also very much in our moral and humanitarian interests and consistent with American values to be concerned about the circumstances and the plight of people around the

world. But if ever there were an instance where these two things need not be conceived of, and in fact should not be conceived of, as mutually exclusive, I think it is now.

And I think, whether it helps us or not to communicate internationally in terms of our commitment to these issues on the basis of self-interest, I think it matters a great deal when we're talking about priorities and resources and attention here in Washington that we cast this not only as something that is nice to do, but something that is necessary to do in our national self-interest.

On your question, if I understood it correctly, of the sequencing, in effect, between poverty, peace, and democratization on the one hand, and which is the chicken and which is the egg, my short answer to that is we don't have the luxury of picking and choosing anymore. The world in the wake of the Cold War has been to a substantial extent in a simultaneous rush towards globalization and to a substantial extent democratization. In many parts of the world, for instance Africa, these forces are converging simultaneously, sometimes to beneficial effect and sometimes to, at least initially, detrimental effect.

I think the reality is we're going to have to take the world as it is, and countries are approaching the future from very different vantage points with very different strengths and weaknesses. Some are further along with respect to poverty alleviation and growth and maybe lagging on democratization--China, for example. Others are moving forward on both--India, for example. And others in Africa may be very much a mixed bag when you look country-to-country. So I don't think we can generalize and I don't think it behooves us to have a view as to which comes first. The point is we have to manage to the maximal extent possible all of these forces simultaneously and harness each to reinforce the other.

QUESTION: My name is Erna Steiner. I do philanthropy research. And of course I'm delighted to have this report and am anxious to read it. My question, really, is you mentioned that the players, the people who were involved in the assessment, came from the different sectors of society, and you mentioned civil society as NGO. There's been a tremendous amount of money put forward by individual philanthropists and foundations in these or many of these issues, and they're a catalyst for encouraging solution to the problem. So I wondered if their voice has been incorporated or could be, or is it not important at this point?

MS. FLORINI: In terms of doing the assessment, we very much did look at the role of basically anybody who was making a significant contribution to making progress on any of the goals, which very substantially does include in a few cases individuals and foundations. For example, you can't talk about what's happening on the health care front around the world without talking about, specifically, the Gates Foundation, which has had an extraordinary impact in really transforming the degree of attention that is being paid to global public health and in solving some quite specific problems.

There are only a few other cases where you can point to philanthropy making that same kind of significant, systemic impact. The Green Revolution from the Rockefeller Foundation a few decades ago you could also have pointed to. There are a few other cases like that. But if you're looking across the board at these broad kinds of issue areas, you can see that impact only, really, in a few isolated examples. It is not the case that we can turn to the world's rich individuals or rich foundations to step in to do what it is that governments are not doing.

MR. PURVIS: I just wanted to add that I agree with that completely. And in the environmental area, the one area where individual philanthropy is really making a difference is on the protection of the world's last great wild places. And there are a few individuals, like Gordon Moore, one of the co-founders of Intel, who have promised--have commitments for approximately a billion dollars of private philanthropy to help developing nations, particularly in the very biologically rich tropical areas, to create national park systems. And a billion dollars for that is going to go a very long way.

So that there are tremendous contributions that individuals can make, that foundations can make and that private philanthropy has in fact changed the landscape. Gordon Moore's contributions have made an organization called Conservation International one of the largest, highest-profile, well-funded NGOs in this area. So that in addition to just funding, it can actually change the mix of players in civil society. So there's an enormous role there.

That said, even all of Gordon Moore's money and other people like him are not going to do what is needed in order to change the patterns of consumption and behavior that are going to be needed in order to deal with these broad problems. And I'm speaking about whether it's environment or hunger or health care or anything else. So there's a very important role for governments. And at least in the area that I'm most familiar with, environment, we have yet to see where the private philanthropy has really sparked a massive change in the way that government policy has developed and the way that societies behave. So that there's, I think, a leadership role there that some individuals are playing, but we have yet to see the governments come up to be the full partners that they need to be.

MS. FLORINI: Just one other comment that I had meant to mention earlier, which is that in looking at--because we are looking at all sorts of different actors in the international system, including the private sector, civil society, the inter-governmental organizations, the project has really been struggling with the question of what standard do you hold them to? It is very clear to say governments are responsible for doing this and they're not doing it--and that's much of what we heard about today. We are hoping to focus increasingly in the future on how is it that you think about what responsibilities the private sector in particular has, given the growing demands for corporate social responsibility, and what kind of role should civil society and individual philanthropists have. As Nigel said, it hasn't been all that great to date, but to what extent should we be holding them responsible for doing more? It's an open question.

QUESTION: Hi. Philippe du Pontain [sp], TeleBridge. Not to inject politics into an election year, but my question is how might a Democratic alternative at the executive level make a difference on some of these issues that have been outlined, and, you know, would such changes be politically viable given Congress and public opinion? So I guess the question is, in what areas that have been prioritized is there real possibility for a policy shift, if there's a change?

MS. BRAINARD: Well, it's a good question. There's a very different scenario, I suppose, if you have--depending on what happens in Congress as well as the White House, because Congress is a very important partner, certainly in the areas that I was talking about, both on trade and on foreign aid. Let me just talk about trade for a second.

What's interesting about the trade area is it's very hard to imagine either candidate coming out of this election with a resounding mandate to do anything but try

to walk backward in the global trade talks. And that is for a variety of reasons. Among others, obviously we're coming out of a very difficult economic period, but I would say that none of the domestic policies that are necessary to support a more aggressive and open stance in international trade talks have been undertaken, either. So, for instance, what am I talking about?

There's the fight over whether to extend unemployment insurance when all of the data will tell you that unemployment spells have lengthened quite considerably and job creation statistics are out of whack with any previous recovery. There has been a huge loss of financing for retraining programs, again at a moment in our economy where all the job statistics would suggest that there's a big structural shift going on that's sort of overlaid on top of the cyclical recovery. At a time when, if you look at the labor share of income relative to the profits share of income, profits are way up relative to previous recoveries and labor share is further down relative to the same two-year periods in previous recoveries, suggesting there are some distributive questions out there, and yet the tax policies that have been taken so far and that are on the agenda, at least on the Republican side of the ledger, would push further in that redistributive direction.

Now, we know about trade, that economists will tell you two things about trade. Without looking at the particulars, they'll tell you two things. One, there are going to be overall--overall--economic gains, and two, there's going to be redistribution. And if you look at the kinds of pressures we've been seeing in the last few years on trade, the redistribution has been very clear. The pressure's coming on labor. It first came on manufacturing and now, within the services sector, we're starting to see greater competition with people at very different wage scales through the phenomenon of off-shoring--both things that the U.S. can easily accommodate and, at the end of the day, do

much better overall economically. But you need to take seriously those redistributive pressures or risk an enormous political backlash, which I think is what we're living with right now.

The only other thing I'll say is that we don't hear a lot of rousing speeches from the White House as to why we should be engaged in the international economy. I think there is a presumption that the president's for free trade, but I can't remember the last time I heard him explain to the American people why it was a very important policy. And so in that sense, I don't see, really, the predicate being laid for Americans to really understand why agricultural subsidies are very problematic from an international point of view, why we need to take wage insurance, trade adjustment assistance, and a whole variety of other policies, R&D, tax credits, education at the K-12 science and engineering levels much more seriously than we're doing right now in order to have that kind of broad public support that we need.

MS. RICE: Well, Philippe, I think this is, as Lael said, it's a very difficult question because it's not just a question of the direction that a new Democratic administration might like to go in, it's a question also of the extent to which it will have the will and the wherewithal to get there. And I think it's instructive to look back and think about how a Republican Congress has responded to some of President Bush's more creative and enlightened initiatives and compare it to how they responded when President Clinton tried to do similar things on a far more modest scale.

I think it's virtually inconceivable, for instance, that the very same Congress would have supported President Clinton's request for the substantial quantity of resources that President Bush has said he will seek for HIV/AIDS. The Clinton administration faced strong opposition from such influential quarters as Senator Helms,

who later had something of a change of heart, but I don't think even his individual change of heart would have been sufficient to push for the billions of dollars that have now been requested and begun to be appropriated, say, four years ago.

Similarly, I'll give you a very interesting example. I think it will be instructive to watch what Congress does to this Global Peace Operations Initiative that I mentioned in my remarks and that was announced in the Washington Post yesterday. The Clinton administration launched a very similar program in 1996, called the African Crisis Response Initiative, on a much smaller scale, at about $20- to $25 million a year, as opposed to a little more than $100 million, which it seems the administration is going to seek for this purpose on an annual basis.

We fought tooth and nail to get even that $20- to $25 million out of Congress. We constantly had to justify it. It was constantly cut. And indeed, the first thing the Bush administration did on this account when it came into office was to cut from $20- to $25- back down to less than $15-. And now they're going to take it up to over $100-. We'll see what happens. I think, again, it's one of these cases where if Senator Kerry, and perhaps in the future, President Kerry, were to ask for similar resources for comparable initiatives, it's not entirely clear that they would meet with the same response.

So my sense is that the instincts and the orientation of a Democratic administration would be largely favorable with respect to things like global poverty reduction, adherence to the Millennium Declaration--I'll let Nigel speak to the environment--building international capacity for peace operations and peace and security. But whether or not they have the will and the ability to deliver is quite another question.

There is one area I will say, that I touched on earlier, that doesn't require, at least in the most obvious sense, the resources and acquiescence of Congress, and that is the way in which the administration employs its diplomatic resources and the degree to which it is active or not active in regional conflict prevention and resolution. And here, I think, the facts are quite telling. If you look at the number of conflicts and crises in which the United States was engaged actively diplomatically in 1999 or 2000, and now look at it in comparison to today, I think--and not just the most obvious places, like the Middle East and Northern Ireland and North Korea, but all over the globe, you'll see a substantial diminution. That, I think, could well change with greater emphasis on diplomacy and greater willingness on the part of the United States to take risks for peace, even in places where our immediate interests are not necessarily obviously at stake.

MR. PURVIS: I agree with that answer. Just on the--before saying a few words about the environment, I think George Bush is a reluctant multilateralist. I think John Kerry is a more open-minded multilateralist. George Bush does not believe that poverty is as great a source or contributing factor in terrorism as I think that John Kerry would believe. He would see the linkages being more strong than the current administration would suggest. So I would expect that achieving global goals on this whole range of development and security issues would be a higher priority for a Kerry administration than for a Bush administration in the second term.

On environment specifically, the League of Conservation Voters ranks John Kerry as the greenest--out of 100, the greenest environmental senator. And I would suspect that while George Bush is not against the environment, I think it's also fair to say it's not one of his top priorities. And, you know, John Kerry is talking about

the environment in his campaign speeches and trying, it would appear, to use it for political advantage, but also to create a mandate for action in that area. And so there, I think, will be a significant question, the question that Susan identified, what would a Kerry administration want to achieve? I think in the area of environment it would want to achieve a great deal more than the Bush administration has set out to achieve. But what would it be able to deliver? I think, for the reason that Susan suggested, even in that area, it's likely to be not as much as one might think. In fact, we saw with Al Gore that his association with global warming in particular, but with the environment generally, was so strong that Newt Gingrich used it as an example of an issue that the Republican Party could distinguish themselves from the Clinton-Gore administration. And one might see in a Kerry administration, were we to have one, that same kind of reaction from the Republican Congress, if we assume the Republicans will continue to control the Congress, which it looks likely, at least particularly in the House, that there would be an effort to define the Republican Party in a way that's quite different on the environment than Kerry. So I would suspect that there would be significant differences in their views, although in terms of U.S. policy, the differences may not be as great as they might appear.

MS. FLORINI: We have time for a couple more questions.

QUESTION: Thanks. Gary Mitchell from The Mitchell Report. I'd just make the observation that we might be selling George Bush short on his commitment to the environment. It seems to me he's spending a lot of time trying to improve it on his ranch in Texas. [Laughter.]

I want to start with an observation from Nigel's comments and then move to a question which I suspect is probably for Ann, but anybody who wants to respond.

I understand the spirit in which you made your remarks about the changing titles of conferences from Stockholm to Rio to Johannesburg. But by the same token, it seems to me, the change in those titles reflects a very conscious strategic impulse on the part of the environmental movement, which is to establish linkages with and build bridges to other concerns. I know that's been a pretty conscious strategy on the part of the environmental community to do that.

And that leads me to a question about this report. As I listened to the three presentations today and was looking through the book, what my mind wanted to do was to look at an exhibit that lays out the primary strategic goals in each of those seven content areas, and sort of look at it as one picture and say what does this picture show us in terms of relationships, synergies, and perhaps in some cases contradictions or conflicts in the primary strategic goals in each of these seven arenas? That's sort of Part A of the question.

Part B is, is it fair to say that this, in your terms, does this report and do the goals in this report pass a sort of reality test? Is this an attempt to get from A to Z, as opposed to getting, you know, from A to M?

MS. FLORINI: A very good pair of questions. I very strongly agree with you that there needs to be much more of a focus than we have been able to do to date on the linkages across the issue areas. In this first report, what we were trying to do, and one of the reasons that this one is fairly long, is that for each of the issue areas we tried to provide some in-depth trend analysis, give people a sense, really, of what are these issues and where are they going. Which did not leave us an opportunity to spend a lot of time talking about what are the connections among them. We are planning on changing the process by which we do our evaluation during this current year so that we have much

more of a focus on what are the connections across the issue areas, because I think that very clearly is needed.

This is intended to be an evolving project. It is a very ambitious undertaking to evaluate what the world is doing in all of its most important issue areas. We realized taking it on that it was extremely ambitious, and we realized, once we had taken it on, why nobody else had done so. We are very much open to suggestions and looking for help as we go forward on this.

We also want to make it very clear that this is a subjective assessment. We are not saying there's any rigorous social science behind this. We're not saying that these numbers are independently meaningful. But they're pretty good subjective assessments based on some pretty good analyses of what's going on in the world. But you're absolutely right that there has to be more of a focus on linkages.

To give just one example, if you look at the Maldives, which is beginning to watch its territory sink below the ocean waves, thanks to climate change, there's not a whole lot that they can do on poverty reduction if they're actually going to lose their territory.

On the second question of do the goals pass a reality test, that was something we spent a lot of time thinking about. And we were fairly careful in trying to take on not every conceivable part of the broad global agenda, because there's been a declaration on almost any issue you can imagine calling for almost anything you can imagine. We tried to take the areas where there really seemed to be some consensus, that were high priorities, and where there was reason to believe that there was quite a lot more that could be done compared to what is being done.

If you look specifically at, say, education, the goal is universal primary education. That means putting 104 million school-age children into school who aren't there now. That would take about $5- or $6 billion a year more than is currently being spent in education assistance, plus some somewhat better educational planning from developing countries. That's clearly not a utopian goal. That is a very achievable goal. Latin America has already largely achieved it. There is no reason the rest of the world cannot do as well.

For some of the other goals, where the targets are not quite so quantitative and time-bound, they are not utopian; they are more difficult. As Nigel said on climate change, you're talking about a pretty systemic transformation in the way it is we run our societies. But again, there are reasons to believe that we could be doing a whole lot better than we are now.

So I don't think we're trying to go from A to Z in one step. We are trying to say we have already decided that we need to go from A to G, and we haven't even made it to B yet. We have a long way to go. Last question?

QUESTION: Jim Riker [sp] with the Democracy Collaborative, the University of Maryland. As I was listening to all of you, I realized that one of the things I wanted to come away with if you're talking about global governance in all of its forms was, yeah, is there a vision in that sector, are there sufficient resources, and--the real critical issue--is there an institutional capacity? Does this report, then, in each of these areas assess whether the existing global governance institutions are sufficient or whether new institutions are required to address those needs? Nigel certainly identified that in the case of water, clean water. But does that provide that same kind of question as we talk about 50 years is enough here this week in Washington, D.C.?

MS. FLORINI: The answer about are we doing an institutional assessment is yes, if you use the very broad definition of "institutions," which is looking at the whole range of actors in all that they do as opposed to focusing on only the formal inter-governmental organizations.

For example, if you look at the health chapter, there's quite a long discussion in there on who are the various actors and what are they doing and where are the shortfalls. Not all of the chapters do that in the same depth, and I think one of the things that we want to do for coming reports is to make sure that they do so. But very much the idea is--and the reason we call it a global governance report as opposed to Status Report on the World's Problems, is that we really are trying to get a focus on how is it we are going to do better?

This is intended as a call for action--and I'd actually like to end the panel with this. The idea is not that we're going to make everybody feel gloomy about the fact that we aren't achieving our goals. We all pretty much knew that before we started this. What we want to do is, by making it clear where it is that the shortfalls are--who is doing well, who is doing badly, where the big gaps are--that gives us some guideposts as to where we can go from here. I think my colleagues did an extraordinary job, in a very short time, of providing that kind of analysis within the U.S. context. The report and the other people involved in this project are trying to do the same kind of assessment on a global scale.

We have run out of time, and I want to end with just one comment, which is to say this is an annual report. We hope to see you back here in about a year's time, and we hope to report that the world has substantially improved its grades.

Let me ask you to join me in thanking the panelists.

[Applause.]