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Brookings/CIRCLE Briefing:

GETTING OUT THE VOTE: HOW TO INCREASE TURNOUT IN 2004

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[TRANSCRIPT PREPARED FROM A TAPE RECORDING.]

**Opening Remarks:**

**William Galston**

Saul Stern Professor, School of Public Affairs, University of Maryland, Director,  
CIRCLE

**Moderator:**

**E.J. Dionne, Jr.**

Senior Fellow, Brookings Institution, Syndicated Columnist *Washington Post* Writers  
Group

**Presentations:**

**Donald P. Green**

Director, Institution for Social and Policy Studies, Yale University

**Panelists:**

**Ed Goetas**

President and CEO of The Tarrance Group Pollster, *U.S. News & World Report*

**Anna Greenberg**

Vice President, Greenberg Quinlan Rosner Research

**James Gimpel**

Professor of Government, University of Maryland

**Zephyr Teachout**

former Director, Internet Organizing and Outreach, Dean for America Campaign

**PROCEEDINGS**

MR. DIONNE: I want to welcome everyone here today. I want to give folks in the back a chance to come in. Thank you all for coming.

My name is E.J. Dionne. I am a Senior Fellow here at Brookings. I want to introduce first my friend and colleague, Bill Galston, who had the great idea of having this event, and then I want to say some very brief things about this great book, which I think is maybe the most practical book The Brookings Institution Press has ever published. And I am a great fan of the Brookings Institution Press, having published a number of less practical books with the Brookings Press.

Let me first bring up Bill Galston.

### **Opening Remarks**

MR. GALSTON: Well, thanks, E.J. As you may have guessed, I am Bill Galston.

On behalf of CIRCLE, the Center for Information and Research on Civic Learning and Engagement, I am delighted to welcome you all to this discussion of Don Green and Alan Gerber's important new book, "Getting Out the Vote," about which more in a couple of minutes.

Before I turn the podium back over to my friend, E.J., the moderator and co-host of this event, just a few words about CIRCLE. We were founded in 2001 with a generous grant from the Pew Charitable Trust. I am delighted that Toby Walker of Pew could be with us today, and Pew was later joined by Carnegie Corporation of New York.

Our mission is very straightforward. It is to conduct, sponsor, assess, and disseminate rigorous and timely research concerning the civic life of young adults in the United States.

Since our inception, less than 3 years ago, we have produced 22 fact sheets on a wide variety of civic topics, and we funded 81 research projects totalling more than \$3

million. In a relatively short period of time, CIRCLE has become a major source of information for scholars, practitioners, and the press.

We proudly display our wares on our recently renovated website, [civicyouth.org](http://civicyouth.org), and we have worked as funders and partners with most of the individuals participating on today's panel, including the authors of the newly released book we are gathered to discuss.

As you will soon see, Don Green is more than able to speak for himself, but because he is modest to a fault, let me brag for and on him just a bit.

"Getting Out the Vote," about which E.J. will have more to say in a minute, is a remarkable, perhaps unique, combination of rigorous research design, real-world experimental conditions, and practical relevance. If candidates were to take its findings as seriously as they ought to, it could dramatically transform the strategy and tactics of campaigns at every level.

I hope I have whetted your appetite. Let me conclude by thanking not only E.J. for his and Brookings' co-sponsorship of this event, but also the marvelous event-meister, Kayla Drogosz, without which none of this would have happened.

Now, E.J., it is your show.

### **Moderator Opening Comments**

MR. DIONNE: Thank you. I hope we hear more from Bill.

By the way, we should have a quiz. How many people think that the full name of CIRCLE was written without any reference to creating a brilliant acronym?

[Laughter.]

MR. DIONNE: I just want to do this right now. I don't want to forget it at the end because I think this is going to be a very exciting discussion. So I want to thank people at the beginning for putting this altogether.

I want to thank Bill for bringing up this idea and the entire CIRCLE staff. Its creative and inspiring founder and director, Deborah Demitria Asopienza [ph], and yes, thanks to Kayla Meltzer Drogosz who is an intellectual as well as an event-meister. She did a great job here. Bless you, Kayla.

We are indebted to Strobe Talbott and Carol Graham for their enthusiastic support and encouragement of this event.

I also want to thank the Brookings Communication staff and the Marketing Department for helping us pull it together.

Thank you, also, to Katherine Moore and Sierra Ferguson for their outreach effort in spreading the word.

We will have transcripts of this afternoon's discussion available on both the Brookings' website, which is [www.brookings.edu](http://www.brookings.edu), and the CIRCLE website, which is at [www.civicyouth.org](http://www.civicyouth.org), by the end of the week.

Also, if you would like to purchase a copy of "Get Out the Vote" later, the book store in the back is offering you a 20-percent discount. So you can grab it on your way out.

This is a great book. If you want to be a campaign manager, a candidate, a community organizer, this is the book for you. I loved reading this book, and I just want to give you a few selections.

The authors are not only exceedingly practical, but they also have a wonderful sense of humor, and they are very honest about their findings.

There is on page 36, a section that begins, "The message does not seem to matter much," and they are talking about door-to-door canvassing. Then they write, "We do not doubt, even without the benefit of experimental data, that running door to door in a chicken suit or mentioning your support for outlandish political causes would undermine your effectiveness, but within the range of reasonable behaviors, we do not see much evidence that what you communicate matters." I am sure we will hear more about that thought. That is for complete candor.

One of the core findings which I think is so important is at the end of that door-to-door canvassing chapter, and it is a very hopeful thought. Many non-voters need just a nudge to motivate them to vote, just a nudge, and imagine how much more political participation we could have.

They go on, "A personal invitation sometimes makes all the difference," and in many ways, at least I see this as a central theme of the book, but beware, there are certain messages that don't work, page 59, telling people to vote because one vote can make a difference is wholly ineffective when the election is expected to be a blow-out. This finding implies that at least some people are paying attention to content.

I could say when elections are decided by courts instead of voters, but I don't go there.

[Laughter.]

MR. DIONNE: There is a very interesting finding, and we are so privileged to have Zephyr Teachout with us. They are pretty tough on e-mail and electronic mail as a means of turning out the vote, but obviously, the web is a much more complicated thing than e-mail.

Finally, this is one of the few political science books I have read that has--and you will see it on page 94--a chart that summarizes virtually every finding in the book, and that is really impressive and very helpful.

So, without further ado, I want to introduce our distinguished panel, and somewhere I have the order that we have agreed on to speak, but I have lost that sheet of paper here.

Who did we decide is going to speak first? Is it Don? Don Green is going to speak.

By the way, Anna Greenberg is running late, but she will be joining--

MS. GREENBERG: I am here.

MR. DIONNE: Oh, she is there. See, when I take off my glasses to read, I can't see anything.

Welcome, Anna. Thank you.

Don Green is the A. Whitney Griswold Professor of Political Science at Yale University where he has taught since 1989. His research interests include elections, campaign finance, and party identification.

In collaboration with Alan Gerber, he has conducted this series of voter mobilization studies and written on the promise that field experimentation holds for the discipline of political science.

You can all sign up after this. Each year, these authors conduct a summer workshop on experimental methods in the social sciences topic that will be the subject of their next book. He is the director of Yale's Institution for Social and Policy Studies and a Fellow at the American Academy of Arts and Sciences.

Alan Gerber is the director of the Center for the Study of American Politics and also a professor of Political Science at Yale. He received his Ph.D. from MIT. He has been

awarded fellowships from the National Science Foundation, the Bradley Foundation, and has received the Hart-Limon [ph] Prize from Yale College.

His research concerns modelling electoral competition, American politics, campaign finance, and the historical development of election rules.

Recent publications include "Tracking Opinion Over Time: A Method for Reducing Sampling Error"--we journalists care about that--"Misperceptions about Perceptual Bias and the Effect of a Nonpartisan Get Out the Vote Drive."

James Gimpel is professor in Government and Politics Department at the University of Maryland in College Park. Prior to beginning his academic career, he worked as legislative assistant to Senator Dan Coates of Indiana. He is the author of several books and a number of articles focusing on legislative studies, public opinion, and political behavior, including the recent Brookings volume, "Cultivating Democracy, Civic Environments, and Political Socialization in America."

Anna Greenberg is vice president of Greenberg Quinlan Rosner Research. Previously, she taught at Harvard's John F. Kennedy School of Government. She was a visiting scholar at the Pew Research Center for the people in the press. She worked on the campaigns of Senators Christopher Dodd, Joe Lieberman, Rosa Deloro, as well as serving on the successful effort to win the Democratic majority in the New Jersey State Senate, and I can tell you, she worked very hard on the Jersey Senate races.

She is going to teach in Public Affairs and Advocacy Institute in the School of Public Affairs at American University in the fall, and she has agreed on a whole slew of networks, everything as far as I can tell here, except the food channel.

[Laughter.]



MR. DIONNE: Zephyr Teachout, who has become famous in the last 6 months, she was the senior Internet advisor for the Dean for America Campaign. She had worked for Governor Dean in 1994 as operations director of his reelection campaign. She also served as editor-in-chief of the Duke Law Journal, and was co-founder and executive director of the Fair Trial Initiative, a death-penalty legal fellowship program from 2000 to 2002. She attended Yale University and Duke Law School and is reportedly contemplating a run for public office herself. So this panel will be extremely helpful to Zephyr.

Finally, Ed Goeas. Welcome, Ed, and thank you. He is the president and CEO of The Tarrance Group, a Republican survey, research, and strategy team. He works in partnership with Democratic Pollster, so Linda Lake [ph] on the battleground poll, which many of you have read and read about.

Lake and Goeas also serve as pollsters for U.S. News & World Report, and they conduct an array of bipartisan issue work for organizations across the Nation. He has also served as pollster to give Republican governors, 16 Republican U.S. Senators--he is shooting for a majority--and over 40 Republican Members of Congress.

It is great to have you here. Our batting order, we will start with Don Green.

Welcome.

MR. GREEN: Thanks. It is a pleasure to be here, and I very much appreciate the warm introduction and the distinguished panel and the audience filled with friends and colleagues and some collaborators. It is a pleasure to be here.

Let me begin with a few thank you's because Alan and I wish to acknowledge the support and encouragement that we have gotten from so many sources over the years,

starting with Brookings, which has done a wonderful job to get--well, here is the book-- this book out in record time and a great deal of flair.

We are deeply indebted to Chris Kelaher and Kayla for putting on the event, but also to Janet Walker, who may or may not be here, who did a wonderful job of copy-editing.

We are also, of course, deeply indebted to CIRCLE and, in particular, Bill Galston, Peter Levine, and Mark Hugo Lopez, who have supported us unstintingly for years and who have put up with our many foibles, and not only supported our research, but supported many of the authors' research that we summarize and describe in our book.

We are grateful, of course, to many foundations and funding sources, principally the Pew Charitable Trusts, which has been so incredibly generous to us over the years, also the Smith-Richardson Foundation which got us our start, funded our first project way back in 1998, and the Institution for Social and Policy Studies at Yale.

We are finally quite deeply indebted to the campaigns, the many, many campaigns that had the courage to let pointy-headed academics meddle in their affairs and conduct randomized experimentation right under their noses because remember that we were going to provide them with a fairly clear assessment about whether their campaigns worked and to what degree. I think that requires quite a lot of courage in order to let somebody evaluate effectiveness in that way. So we are thankful to the Democratic campaigns, the Republican campaigns, Youth Vote, Acorn, PIRG, National Voter Fund, National Association of LatinoElected Officials, and many others, including several ongoing campaigns.

Finally, we are deeply indebted to the many researchers who are cited in this book who shared with us their research findings, often in preprint form, in our attempt to summarize all of the relevant research in this area.

Let me begin by saying a few things about what the book is or isn't. The book, "Get Out the Vote: How to Increase Voter Turnout," is an attempt to build a new model of political science or a political science book. It encompasses three elements.

It has to involve rigorous science, and I think that you will see after I describe it that this is a very different brand of political science from what one would ordinarily encounter in the political science journals.

Second, it has to be applied to a real-world on-the-ground problem, not a kind of abstract question, not necessarily an uninteresting theoretical question, but a question that really engages ordinary people and actual practitioners.

Third, it has to be written in a way that is accessible to a general audience. So a lot of what we have done in this paper is take technical material from journals and technical reports and present it in a way that would be meaningful to a nonspecialist.

The problem, the on-the-ground real-world problem, that this book addresses and not surprisingly is voter turnout and how to increase it. This audience is filled with people who come at that problem from a variety of different perspectives. So let me summarize three of the most common perspectives that we have encountered.

One set of perspectives encounters this problem as a social problem. They are concerned with either the problem of low voter turnout or declining voter turnout or declining voter turnout in some segment of the electorate or low voter turnout in some segment of the electorate. And they are concerned about that because the United States has the second-lowest voter turnout of any Western democracy or because, in a recent

study of declines in turnout over time, we are among 17 of 19 western democratic countries that have experienced declines in turnout over the last generation.

To others, the concern about voter turnout is not so much a social concern as a distributive concern. They are members of an interest group, and they are concerned that their members, the people that they consider part of their own community, are not sufficiently powerful by virtue of their failure to show up at the polls. So this might include interest groups that represent age cohorts or interested in minority cohorts or interested in conservative Christians. Whatever the case may be, they are interested in beefing up turnout among their sector of society.

Third and perhaps most important from the standpoint of this audience, there are those who take an interest in voter turnout because they want to win elections. They would rather win a low-turnout election than lose a high-turnout election, but the fact of the matter is they want to know how to do it. Perhaps they are attracted to this book because they want some practical instructions based on what we found works or doesn't work.

Unlike other books in political science in particular, this book on voter turnout focuses on ways to increase participation in the short run. So it is not a book that bemoans horse race journalism or the failures of civic education or the deficiencies of our single-member district system or the fact that we don't have a proportional representation legislative arrangement.

It is not about our constitutional regime or our political culture or any other aspect of society that is slow-moving. It is basically a book for those who are down to the wire. They are looking at the prospect of, say, November 2nd. They are asking, "What can I do between now and then in order to increase turnout?," knowing that they are

unlikely to fundamentally reshape the degree of internal efficacy that people feel in regard to the political system.

So what, then, do we have to offer by way of science? The science that this book is offering is properly known as randomized field experimentation. So let me tell you what that is.

It is not about focus groups. It is not a narrative case study. It is not an econometric analysis, and it is not a survey analysis. It is based on a particular kind of science that is most commonly associated with drug trials or pharmaceutical trials, but which has grown increasingly prominent throughout social science, in labor economics, in fields of education, criminology and elsewhere. It is making inroads now into political science, and we are proud to be part of the group that is spearheading this effort.

Randomized field experimentation involves three components. The first is that the units of analysis, often voters on a registration list, are randomly assigned to treatment and control conditions.

For example, we might take a list of, say, 50,000 registered voters and assign some portion of that at random to receive, say, door-to-door visits and leave the others alone. The idea is you can draw a fair unbiased comparison between the people you have contacted and the people you haven't contacted, and that is in fundamental contrast to the typical survey research that is done on this topic, whereby you ask people were you contacted and did you vote and correlate the two, perhaps controlling for some background factors and throw caution to the wind about whether the campaigns were contacting high-turnout segments of society and the relationship, in other words, could be entirely an artifact of how people were chosen to be contacted and may say little or

nothing about the effect of that contact. So we are not doing that. It is not about surveys.

I think one of the striking things about this book is that none of the studies that we report, either the ones that we conducted or the ones that were conducted by kindred researchers, none of them use self-reports of voter turnout. None of them use self-reports about whether they were contacted by a campaign.

In fact, for your amusement, you should know that when we have done surveys at the end of the election and asked people whether they were contacted--we have administrative records about whether they were contacted--there is frighteningly little correspondence between whether they were actually contacted and whether they said they were.

Most importantly, and the thing I am proudest of when I think about randomized experiments, is not only that they are rigorous and that I think they meet the gold standard of scientific research, but that they are also transparent and replicable. There is no funny business going on.

It is true that you have to take care of data manipulation issues, and we have certainly made our share of mistakes, but I think that over time, we have gotten better and better about making things a kind of rigid sequence of steps and learned a lot since we did our first experiments way back in 1998.

They are replicable in the sense that if you don't believe our results, we tell you in the book how to do your own experiments. It is a relatively simple procedure. As we say in the book, it is not some special form of sorcery known only to Yale professors. Anybody can do it, and our hope, really, is to spread the gospel of experimentation, so

that other people do, do it, especially to the extent that they are skeptical about our findings.

We would love to be disabused about things that we have gotten wrong. So, if other people have the view, say, that e-mail really works when it is a certain kind of e-mail and a certain kind of list, great. We can either lend technical advice on the experiment or cheer you on as you do your own experiment, but one way or the other, we are interested to know the results, and who knows how it will come out?

This book reports dozens of randomized field experiments, some by us and some by other researchers. Some are partisan; some are nonpartisan. Some involve the activities of interest groups where no candidates are explicitly advocated, but where the message is fairly clear between the lines. Some involve targeting a general population, and some focus on specific groups.

The aim of this book is to summarize all of the existing experimental evidence that would otherwise be consigned to technical reports.

So what sorts of elections have we studied? Well, we have tended to studies elections that fly below the radar of the mass media. So we have tended to study not the Presidential contests or the Senatorial contests, but the relatively lowly contests, the ones that involve State representatives or municipal races, school board races, some State assembly, State senatorial races in our book, an occasional congressional race. It is a kind of pastiche of different kinds of elections, but the kind of election that we are focusing on and I think the audience for this book is not so much the high-flying campaign that is going to run a heavily media-oriented appeal, but rather, the bread-and-butter campaign, where we are thinking about tens of thousands of elected officials who run for office or hold office.

We are typically talking about the candidates that don't have a lot of money to spend. That might be able to organize a credible campaign, but are going to have to rely on efficiencies, considerations of efficiency. For that reason, the book is focused on two fundamental questions, how effective are different techniques--and we summarize in each chapter one group of techniques, so we have a chapter on face-to-face canvassing and personal visits, a chapter on leafleting, a chapter on direct mail, a chapter on e-mail, and then a chapter on phone calls, which includes commercial phone calls from commercial phone banks, that is, volunteer efforts and robotic calls. So you might ask how effective are each of these techniques.

Then, the second question is how cost-effective are they. These are, of course, very different kinds of questions, having to do with the ready availability of resources, and you will see when you look at the book that the recurrent theme in this book is you have got to make an intelligent strategic decision in light of your own resources and your own special situation. You have got to read the book and then reflect on your own strategic situation to see what makes sense, especially in terms of cost effectiveness, given your own constraints.

Cost effectiveness and effectiveness. The difference between the two, of course, plays into a central theme of the book. It is not only thinking about campaigns strategically, but kind of getting your head straight thinking about votes on the margin.

A lot of the confusion that we have encountered when we have talked to campaigners tends to be about what is my base vote and how many additional votes will I get, and this book tells you about how many additional votes you can expect based on the things that you might do.



The central themes and findings of the book, I am going to list six. E.J. already mentioned one. Maybe I will skip that one in the interest of brevity.

The first is that quality matters. I think that is one of the foremost themes of this book. That visits have a fairly profound effect on voter turnout, raising turnout, for example, in the best cases, roughly 8 or 9 or 10 percentage points and some of the less-successful cases, 3, 4, 5 percentage points, but leaflets, on the other hand, might raise turnout a percentage point, and direct mail might be about a half-a-percentage point per mailing and, in some cases, less than that.

High-quality versus low-quality phone calls. A chatty, lengthy call where the caller develops a certain rapport with the respondent, that can have a profound effect. That can raise turnout by 3, 4, or 5 percentage points. Whereas, a perfunctory, mechanical call of 20-seconds duration has no detectible effect or trivial effect.

So the tradeoff is, in some sense, how many additional resources are you willing to pack in to achieve high quality. That is an especially important theme as you think ahead to November 2nd because, if present trends continue, a typical person might have 90 pieces of direct mail dumped on them. So the question, in some sense, is will you add the ninety-first piece of direct mail, or are you going to break through some other means, perhaps with a higher-quality appeal.

I would say one of the themes is score one for old-fashioned politics. This has some theoretical importance as well. It could be the case that the long-term decline in voter turnout between, say, now and the 1960's or virtually any western democracy now and the 1950's and 1960's could reflect the change in the quality of contacts with voters over time.

The second theme is the tradeoff between quantity and quality. Would that we could have high-quality contacts with everybody, but it is often impractical, and moreover, not only is it impractical, but it is occasionally the case that when a high-quality campaign strives for greater quantitative coverage, its quality deteriorates, so that you can overtax the organizational capacity of a campaign if you try to speed them up.

The third theme is while we are skeptical about the effectiveness of a variety of different kinds of appeals--for example, our chapter on e-mail finds that mass e-mails sent by an organization that was targeting students, even though many of the e-mails were opened, it had no apparent effect on voter turnout--that is a provisional finding.

I think one of the themes of this book is that we assign different levels of certitude to different findings. You will see the one-, two-, and three-star system associated with each of the findings in order to communicate to a lay audience what is ordinarily communicated in a quantitative way using the idea of standard errors.

To a nonquantitative audience, we want to give the sense that some of our findings are more provisional and flimsy than others. I think we are reasonably confident about the effects of door-to-door canvassing, having done I think 13, 14, 15 experiments all over the place, but e-mail, we have done one experiment. It is one kind of e-mail in one time and place and with one type of list, and I think that the recurrent theme of this book is if that one experiment suggests that something isn't working, that doesn't mean it is the death knell for that type of appeal. It is now incumbent on those who think creatively about these things to develop a better mousetrap, do it differently.

You can't come back to us and tell us that it did work. We know it didn't work. That is going to be the premise from which we now depart and take our next stab at it.

We learn something, but it is not as though we have reached the end of history and we are not going to learn any more about the effects of these kinds of techniques. We need more research to develop better robo-calls, better direct mail, e-mail, and whatever.

The fourth finding is that we have just now begun to scratch the surface about the systemic effects of "Get Out the Vote." Two of the more interesting findings in the book have to do with habit and spillover.

The habit findings are quite interesting. Across a range of different studies, we find that on average, for every voter mobilized this time around, you produce an extra one-third of a voter in the next election. So the cost accounting of Get Out the Vote in terms of dollars per vote has to take into account if you are, say, a political party and you have candidates in sequence of elections, the long-term consequences of your effort today.

I think that that is often lost sight of, particularly insofar as low turnout groups are cut out of campaign activity on the grounds that they are unlikely to vote. If you can produce a voter this time, you might be able to wean them into habitual voting.

With respect to spillover, what we find is that if you can have a meaningful interaction with one registered voter in a household, you will increase the turnout not only of that person, but of their roommate, their housemate whom you didn't speak with, which suggests that there is a process of communication going on in the household that spreads enthusiasm about elections.

Then, the final finding is that targets matter. It seems that these experiments show fairly convincingly that the effects of some of these interventions vary depending on whom they are targeting.

What are the new frontiers for this book? I think of this as the first edition. You are getting a classic first edition of the "Get Out the Vote" book. Get it now. Keep it in its shrink-wrap. Put it in a safe.

The classic first edition will not include the things that will be updated as more experiments come to our attention in years to come. Some of those experiments involve, for example, the mass media.

Lynn Vavreck is in the audience, professor at UCLA, and she and I are in the process of analyzing data from a public service announcement experiment that we worked on. We randomized the public service announcements that were spread over four State elections in the 2003 election, and we took, I think it was, 160 cable TV markets and randomly assigned them 80 to treatment and 80 to control and exposed the 80 cable TV markets to a series of PSA's encouraging people to vote.

That is a paradigm for what much more expensive, high-flying media campaigns could do, and I think should do, in order to get a sense of the effectiveness of their messages. An enormous amount of money is spent on those kinds of campaigns, and as far as I can tell, at least in the public domain, there is not one speck of reliable scientific evidence about whether they do or don't work.

I think that this book is likely to be misquoted as something it is not. It is not a statement that mass-media campaigns don't work. It is a statement that we are agnostic about whether they work, we have no proof about whether they work, and we ought to get some.

The second new frontier that I want to mention is what we call super treatments, extremely high-quality treatments that raise turnout not by, say, 10 percentage points,

but maybe 20 percentage points. We are going for a new line of research which involves the equivalent of the development of penicillin for voter turnout.

Here, we are thinking in terms of the kinds of contacts that are likely to be especially effective, say, contacts from close friends or contacts from co-workers, contacts from the candidate, him- or herself.

One interesting super treatment experiment that has been going on now for a year and a half, it has been conducted by my graduate student, Elizabeth Addonizio at Yale. She has been doing her dissertation project randomly assigning 18-year-old seniors to receive "the treatment," which is how to work the voting machines.

They are actually presented with voting machines. They are taught how to cast votes on those machines. She registers them to vote. She gives them a pep talk, and the turnout effects are absolutely enormous. That is the kind of thing that I think ought to require some more investigation.

[Music.]

MR. GREEN: We are breaking into classical music.

[Laughter.]

MR. GREEN: Then, surprisingly, I think that this will dismay you, and I hope it doesn't dissuade you from buying the book, but you will find that this book is completely innocent of any research on voter registration drives. It happens.

The problem, in a way, is that--yes, we just haven't gotten around to doing it--some foundations are forbidden from funding that kind of research, and there it goes, but at any rate, that remains an open question.

It remains an open question because, on the one hand, it is not our impression that, say, the Motor Voter bill produced a harvest of votes in this country, but it still is an

open question. How many votes do you actually produce when you conduct a registration drive that, say, registers 10- or 20,000 new people?

Well, since Ed is gone, I got to fill up his time. I was going to end.

MR. DIONNE: Ed is the next panelist.

MR. GREEN: That is right.

I am just going to fill in one little blank there, and that is that one of the problems that one has when one sidles into less rigorous forms of evaluation is that problems of wishful thinking start to enter into the presentation of results, and I think we try to be extremely even-handed about the presentation of results.

One of the things to guard against, for example, when you read other kinds of evaluations is a kind of process-tracing problem. There is a difference between, on the one hand, accounting versus the evaluation of your impact.

If you do an accounting study, you might find, for example, that you registered 100,000 people, and at some level, that is a wonderful achievement and you ought to be proud of yourself because it required an enormous amount of effort, but that doesn't answer the question how many people registered who would not otherwise have registered.

In order to do that, you have to do a randomized experiment where you have a registration campaign in one population and not in some equivalent other population and then compare the registration rates over the time. To the extent that they just converge, then you have what we sometimes refer to in shop as the "Two Drinking Fountain Problem."

Imagine you are doing an accounting evaluation of the effect of installing a second drinking fountain in a hall of a high school. You could count up your effectiveness by

counting up the number of drinks that were taken at that drinking fountain, but that wouldn't necessarily tell you whether you have cured thirst as a result of your drinking fountain.

And in much the same way, the question with registration is how many people would have registered anyway, how many people would have, but for your drinking fountain, taken a drink down the hall.

I think asking those hard questions about evaluation is what we hope to stimulate in this book. This book is really as much about the practice of social science as it is about voter turnout, even though you wouldn't know it from reading the prose.

The last point I want to make is it is kind of an amusing thing that since we started doing this in 1998--we probably falsely feel that we are the hidden hand of history--the sense that we have gotten from watching the parties, watching the interest groups, is that they have taken much greater interest in Get Out the Vote activities over the last 5 or 6 years, and GOTV has gained prominence as a promising political tactic.

That said, the next book of this vein is about persuasion. This book talks about how many votes you produce through a Get Out the Vote campaign, but it doesn't ask the question how many votes do you produce all together, including how many minds you change about which candidate a person might vote for.

I just want to say that Alan has taken the lead, Alan Gerber, my co-author, who unfortunately couldn't be here because he has got three little kids and he is expecting a fourth now, and so things are jumping at home. He has taken the lead on this line of research.

To summarize very briefly, it is hard to change minds, maybe harder than people realize, maybe more costly than people realize, and when you get a sense of what the

literature, the emergent literature on experiments on persuasion looks like, GOTV doesn't look so bad from the standpoint of cost effectiveness.

Let me conclude by saying that I think that this line of research affords political scientists with a new opportunity to shore up the reputation of the discipline in the world at large by providing not only high-quality evidence that could be useful to practitioners, but providing a model of social science that tries to reach out to practitioners, tries to make itself available to practitioners in a way that practitioners themselves can use and I think feed back to researchers.

This line of research in political science is sometimes criticized for slumming it, theoretically. It is just not very interesting theoretically, some say. But I think that that is an unfortunate mischaracterization of what theory should be about. We really should have theories about the conditions under which people can solve collective action problems, for example.

Why is it that people vote? They probably aren't going to cast the decisive vote in an election involving millions of people, but they vote anyway. Theory wouldn't necessarily tell you that knocking on someone's door and encouraging them to vote would increase the probability they would vote by 10 percentage points.

That is something that has to be derived empirically, and to the extent that we can do rigorous science that provides us those kinds of answers and tells us knocking on people's door has one effect, but a piece of direct mail has another effect, I think we have made an important contribution to the general project of figuring out what gets people to engage with the political system.

Thank you.

[Applause.]



MR. DIONNE: Clearly, I didn't read this book carefully enough because I had such a nice introduction of Alan Gerber in front of me that I failed to count the turnout on the panel. So I introduced him, anyway, but we are grateful to him for this book.

Two quick points, and then I want to bring up the rest of the panelists. When Don talked about super treatment for turnout, I was looking forward to his randomized experiment about how much turnout increases when you pay \$5 a vote, which is an old-fashioned method that worked rather well in some parts of our country, including where I come from.

He did mention the star system. This is the only book of political science that I ever read that looks like a great restaurant or hotel guide because, if you go through the book, what you will see is they rate their own findings on the basis of how solid they are based on the number of experiments that were performed.

They haven't gotten up to five stars yet. The next edition will start with five stars. Their highest rating is three stars.

The order from here is Ed Goeas, Anna Greenberg, James Gimpel, and Zephyr Teachout.

I really want to thank Ed for changing his schedule. He went out of his way to be here today, and I really appreciate it. Thank you.

People can come up or sit down as they see fit.

MR. GOEAS: I am going to keep my comments fairly short because the schedule change I made was flying back on the Red Eye last night so I could be back here, and I also have a 22-year-old and a 3-year-old and just found--at least this last one I think I have planned right--I have another one coming on November 5th. So, as long as it is not early, I can finish the election and go into the rest of it.

I actually started off--I want to make sure I am clear on this--started off as a Democrat in politics when I started working at 12 years old, and my first experience was actually working in a campaign. They asked me to work a precinct one day on Get Out the Vote, and they made it very clear, "Here is the stack of brochures. You hold these. You don't look at them. Certain voters are going to come up, and you give them one of these brochures, no more, no less."

I went and I handed out those brochures all day long, and at the end of the day, it was about the time they were supposed to pick me up and I didn't see any voters. So I took the rest of the brochures, and I threw them in the trash can.

So, when they came to pick me up, they said, "Where are the rest of the brochures?," and I said, "Well, I threw them away." They said, "Oh, my gosh," and they went running to the trash can and pulled it out, and there were 5-dollar bills stuck in every one of the brochures. They had been using a 12-year-old kid to kind of pay off their Get Out the Vote operation, so that nobody could get arrested. That was kind of my first experience with Get Out the Vote.

[Laughter.]

MR. GOEAS: We don't do it that way anymore, by the way, if there is any press in the room.

[Laughter.]

MR. GOEAS: A little bit about the book. I think there are some things in the book that are very, very helpful. I think there is a lot of good common sense that comes out of this, particularly when you are talking about lower-level races.

We have known for years that personal contact, having people work neighbor to neighbor, having people knocking on doors, is the best way to do it. The problem has

been in recent years that it is sometimes very hard to replicate, particularly in the larger campaigns.

I think when you get to the larger level, there are some things that I would factor in even beyond your research, not that what you found wasn't correct, but I think there is a multiplier effect perhaps that is much larger.

I look to some races. I look to the Mississippi race that just finished last year where turnout increased from 750,000 to 880,000 from 4 years earlier. That is a 17-percent increase.

We did a lot on both sides of the equation. We did a lot in terms of phone calls. We did a lot in terms of mail, in terms of e-mail, but we also had a lot of door-knocking. We had 1,300 people on top of our normal precinct organization that on Friday, on Saturday, on Sunday, on Monday, and on Tuesday went out and knocked on doors that were separate from the rest of the operation. They were shipped in, and the whole plan was to work on just those people. I think you are starting to see that even at higher-level races.

They knocked on 100,000 doors each day, Friday, Saturday, Sunday, Monday, and then 50,000, a targeted group twice on Election Day. That is where you see that kind of turnout.

In fact, if you look at our side of the equation, being Republican, almost every one of those votes that turned out different voted for our candidate. It was a difference between losing a very close election 4 years earlier and winning the election by a fairly hefty margin.

There are things that we look at. One is the environment. I have other examples where the question isn't turnout as much as getting down to those lower-level cases like dropoff.

There was a race of a good friend of mine, an African American that was running for a county commissioner in North Side Tulsa. In looking at the data, the vote split very evenly, Republican/Democrat, on statewide elections when you had a governor up or voting for President or voting even for Congress, but they dropped off as you went down the ballot, and that split between the two parties was also driven by race.

The African Americans all went down the ballot and voted down the ballot. The white voters didn't. All it took to make that a very close race, which traditionally had been about a 20-point difference, was only doing two phone calls, one from a lieutenant governor, one from J.C. Watts, and one piece of mail in the last 3 days of the election saying, "When you go vote, be sure to go down the ballot. We have a good person voting there." The race ended up being within 400 votes.

I don't know what is going to be said about the Dean campaign, but I think there is great potential in terms of the Internet. Quite frankly, the Internet has been kind of misspun since what happened to the Dean campaign.

What happened to the Dean campaign had nothing to do with what was happening on the Internet. In fact, what we have found in our polling is that those voters are shifting over with the same intensity to other candidates. So I think there are some things that you kind of have to factor in beyond that.

Efficacy is extremely important in terms of the campaign, in terms of voting, does my vote make a difference. We saw the Democrats make a mistake with the African-American vote that affected the 2002 election where they took the closeness of the

election, and Florida went into that community nationwide and tried to say, "The vote didn't count in Florida. You need to make your vote count this time around."

After a year of that campaign, we looked at the data and saw that intensity of the African-American vote was 28 points lower than the intensity of the white vote, where traditionally it ran about 8 or 10 percent less. So the Democrats had to spend a good year kind of getting back that message mistake in terms of efficacy that was there.

But overall, I think raising the question in campaigns in terms of effective versus cost is a very valid discussion in any campaign because resources are always controlled.

Now, there are a couple of things I would mention on what we have learned. First of all, there are other studies out there. I think the unfortunate thing for this book in terms of relating to that is that the studies have been internally and the parties are never going to share those internal studies, but there has been a great deal to do that, I assure you, we are going to be moving to how you kind of looked at it and how you did your segmentation and stratified your sample I think even closer.

There are some things that we know kind of matter of fact. One is that turnout increases with age. Turnout increases with education. Turnout increases with are you married or not. Turnout increases with are you married with children, even beyond being married, with one exception.

If you are married and have children and that child is between zero and 2 years old, your turnout drops below that of a single voter because you are busy kind of doing other things.

Probably most important, which will be interesting as we see the numbers of homeownership get to the highest level ever historically, is that turnout increases

tremendously when it comes to do you rent or buy. If you own a home, you are five times more likely to vote than if you are only a renter.

You also have to be extremely careful of your list. Motor Voter, we have been watching very, very closely. If you are moving from another precinct and you are just re-registering or moving from another State, this doesn't count, but first-time registrants through Motor Voter, first-time registrants vote at a 2- to 3-percent turnout rate in State after State after State that we have looked at.

The reactive versus proactive registration has a tremendous impact, do they even understand that they are registered to vote.

I also think you have to look very closely at the two factors that we find that motivate turnout. One is intensity to vote, and the other is intensity for the candidate. So we do factor in and feel like it has a great deal of impact on intensity of message and intensity of contact, and it takes a multiplier effect of both.

There is no mistake that in a Presidential year, that turnout is higher because they have that intensity of contact and intensity of message that they don't see in other years.

I also think at some point, we have to go back and study the 1992 campaign, the one blip in the decline in terms of turnout where, in fact, turnout was 10-percent higher. I think the reason why there hasn't been a great deal of interest in looking at that is that we already know a couple of specifics on 1992.

One is that turnout was 10 points higher than it had been running through the years, and that the reason why it was 10 points higher is because 18- to 30-year-olds voted at a 60-percent turnout rather than their normal Presidential year, a 31-, 32-percent turnout.

The reason why there is not as much interest in looking at it is that it appears in everything we have looked at that almost all of that extra 10 percent that was driven by

young voters, almost all of that vote went to H. Ross Perot, who spent twice as much money as either of the two candidates.

One of the things neither party has talked about much, nor the news media, is that over 50 percent of Perot's vote was 18 to 30 years old, and that the reason why he dropped from 19 percent of the vote in 1992 to only 9 percent of the vote in 1996 is all that young vote stayed away from voting 4 years later.

I also think I would highlight that there has been a very different strategic change. I think the Democrats were already there, but there has been a strategic change in terms of how Republicans approach campaigns. Both parties are much more alike now.

Republicans, up until the mid '80s, ran on a strategy of figuring out who is going to vote and developing a message and a strategy that appeals to 50 percent plus one of those voters who are going to turn out to vote.

Today, both parties have a strategy of handling it as a two-step process. The first step is run on a strategy, a strategic message that appeals to the majority of the voters, step one, and then get a higher number of your voters to turn out than the other side, step two, in terms of turnout. So there is much more of a focus on turnout. There is more of a focus on the 96-hour program, as we call it on our side in the final days of the campaign.

I think there is an acknowledgement that for most campaigns being extremely busy, you can't just work it into your all's strategy. You almost have to run a separate campaign that is geared at putting the resources and the time and the effort in to turning out those voters.

The last thing I would mention, as a key component that we watch very closely, is time of decisionmaking. I am sure you have all seen these polls that talk about 25

percent of the voters making up their mind in the last 4 days of the campaign. I believe that data is very misleading.

What it says is that 25 percent of the voters make their final decision on how they are going to vote in that last 24 hours. It doesn't mean that that is when they start watching the campaign, but there are clearly three main groups that we watch.

One is what I call attentive participants. They are the partisans on both sides. They are fairly split. They are approximately 40 percent of the electorate. They watch politics 24 hours a day, day in, day out, and they are the ones many of the campaigns they target their message to very early on, although there is not much flexibility in terms of those voters.

The second group is the non-attentive participants, about 30 percent of the electorate. They do not watch politics on a day-to-day basis, but they usually start watching about Labor Day. They are getting involved much earlier in the process than they used to. It is tending to be more in the early summer than late summer now, but in a Presidential year, the overwhelming majority of those voters participate.

The last group is probably the more difficult group, and that is the non-attentive non-participants. It is about 40 percent of the electorate. Only about 25 percent of those voters vote in a Presidential year. What makes it hard for those of us that work in campaigns is that it is not always the same 25 percent. They are the ones that are kind of worked into the process of voting based on the intensity of message specifically, but also the intensity of contact.

That is the part that I think in future studies, we might want to look at because they are the ones we are not watching on a regular basis, and not only how do you get them



to vote, but how do you get them to care about what is happening in politics I think is the second part of the equation.

Thanks.

MR. DIONNE: Thank you very, very much.

[Applause.]

MR. DIONNE: Ed has pointed to new research, a randomized experiment on the effect on turnout of providing baby-sitters for the parents of children under 2.

With that discount, think of when you buy the book, there is a 5-dollar bill in it.

[Laughter.]

MR. DIONNE: Anna Greenberg, it is great to have you. Thank you.

MS. GREENBERG: Thanks. Sorry for being late. Whenever a cab drive takes you on Mass near the Capitol, you always know you are going to sit in that traffic for a while.

It is funny, that is an old bio. I wondered what the office sent over. I think I worked for Chris Dodd in 1986, but the New Jersey State Senate sounds like a small thing, but we spent about \$3 million in one Senate race. If there was ever evidence for persuasion communication working, working for a candidate that was 30 points down and unknown and winning by about 500 votes, it is amazing what \$3 million can do.

Let me just say a few things about this book. I don't have a lot to say mainly because I am so persuaded by it, both because I am an academic as well and a political scientist and familiar with the literature on political participation and the determinants of participation and I have been a practitioner now for a number of years and watched out campaigns work, and at a kind of instinctive level, all of the conclusions seem right to me.

I actually think what is, in a way, most challenging about this book as someone who actually works for campaigns is what do you do with this information. It challenges fundamentally a lot of the things that campaigns do, and it challenges them in a way that is at a very, very practical level in terms of money because what this book shows is something that I instinctively believe is right. It is that personal contact is the most effective way to register and get people out to vote as opposed to robo-calls or direct mail, but that is significantly more expensive than all of the kinds of techniques that campaigns generally use.

So I think this book is actually a real challenge to campaigns at all levels, from the national down to the local. Even local ones where folks are better at doing canvassing, the robo-call, the phone banks, are still very cheap ways to communicate with people, and I think this is a real challenge. Having it sort of published and out there, I think it is going to be interesting to see how people grapple with it.

I do think that it has come out at an interesting time, and it is true, there has been a shift towards thinking more about field, as we call it, or Get Out the Vote. I thought it was the 72-hour plan, but 72-hour or 96-hour plan, whatever it is on the Republican side, the storied sort of new field efforts that the Republicans have been engaging in, in Mississippi and other places in 2002 and certainly we will be using in 2004, there is at least anecdotal evidence that they have been pretty effective in different places like Georgia in 2002 and in Mississippi in 2003.

Certainly, if you look at the 527's and other organizations that are going to be involved this time around on the Democratic side, there is a massive effort to do Get Out the Vote and field work and in-person contact. So this book could not come out at a better time to support that effort.

The thing that I want to talk about is message not mattering, and it may be because I am a pollster and I spent all my time thinking about message. It just sticks in my craw that message doesn't matter.

I want to talk about it a little more, knowing that I am talking from the perspective of someone who has done a lot of qualitative, not experimental research on message, and I understand all the limitations methodologically inherent in that kind of research.

I did about 15 focus groups in the last 2 months with groups of people who were unregistered because I am working on a couple of efforts, one of which I will tell you about, that are major registration efforts this year. So I spent a lot of time behind the glass, listening to people talk about why they don't vote and what would get them to vote.

It is obviously very hard because we know that there are all the social desirability effects associated with these kinds of questions. People don't want to admit that they don't vote, and they don't want to admit that they don't care about shirking their civic duty or however you want to frame it. So they are difficult conversations to have, but what is really clear to me about people who are--granted, my groups were very specific groups that I was talking to, but I think that there is some consistency across them--is two things.

First, they are deeply, deeply cynical about politics, and it puts up a wall. I mean, you try to test a negative ad in the focus groups these days, you literally have to tell people, "You are going to see a negative ad now. I want you to put aside the fact that you hate negative ads and not say anything about the fact that it is a negative ad and only talk to us about the content of the ad."

Then you show the negative ad, and they say, "God, I hate negative ads. God, it was so negative," and the moderator will say, "No, I know it is a negative ad. Please put aside the fact that it is a negative ad and just talk to us about the content."

This cynicism is not unjustified, but there is unbelievable cynicism about politics, and when it comes to voting, it is about: "The person I vote for will say one thing to get elected and then do another thing when they are in office"; "It doesn't matter if I vote for this person because there are more powerful interests than me in Washington," or in the Statehouse or whatever it is, "So, even if I vote for this person, my interests aren't going to be represented"; "You can't believe what they say," et cetera, et cetera, et cetera.

In some of the experimental work that has been on this, when we use messages that are about civic duty, we are coming up against a wall because people don't necessarily believe voting is a civic duty. They certainly don't believe that it has any impact on changing their lives. So it is not surprising to me on a certain level that a brochure or a leaflet or a message delivered at the door about how important it is to vote is sort of rejected because there is already an assumption that it actually doesn't matter whether you are voting, it is not your civic duty.

I think that there have been moments when we have seen increases in turnout which suggest that it actually matters what the message is. One of the challenges--I know you also tested partisan mail and also determined that with partisan mail that messages didn't matter, but I do think that one of the limitations has been that so much of our research has been nonpartisan and (c)(3) research that we haven't really been able to test some of the things that we think might actually sort of mobilize people, get them motivated to vote.

With a lot of these groups, you can't say "Vote because you hate George Bush" or "Vote because you hate John Kerry" or whatever it is, but we know that partisanship and the intensity of partisanship or ideological intensity is correlated with voting. It is correlated with participation. When you have a sort of deep-seated belief about things, that that is correlated with being more interested in politics and more interested in getting out and voting.

We have not been able, to a large degree, I think, to test an experimental setting those kinds of messages, but we have some evidence. Actually, the '92 election was one that I was going to mention. We have some evidence that there is increased turnout, especially among younger people, when there are people out there talking about something different.

So Clinton in '92, Jesse Ventura in Minnesota, a higher turnout, Ross Perot, a higher turnout, John McCain--I mean, we have a series. These are all kind of third-party--no, Clinton isn't, obviously, but people who say something different, they challenge authority, they challenge traditional institutions, and you actually see an increase in turnout, suggesting that there might be something that somebody says that has some content to it that actually might make people more likely to want to get out and vote.

There are two other things I want to say about this. First, I think having said all that about message, I do think there is a very simplistic--I have clients do this all the time, "What is the message? Just tell me what the message is," as if message is the only thing that matters in getting people to either vote the way you want them to vote or express the opinion you want them to express or write the letter or vote, whatever it is.

I actually think that you have to think about the multiplier fact of sustained contact over time around the things that people care about before you can actually tell if there is some impact, if the message actually has some impact.

I am actually working on a project now called A Woman's Voice is Woman's Vote, and it is a project to register unmarried women. As Ed said, people who are not married are less likely to be registered, and if they are registered, they are less likely to vote than people who are married. I think it is for all the same reasons that in-person contact is a better way of getting people out to vote than robo-call.

Personal contact with people who are voters and being with people you trust and people that give you political information makes you more likely to participate in politics. That is why people who are frequent churchgoers are more likely to participate in politics, people who are a part of voluntary associations, who have politicized workplaces and labor unions. Whatever it is, people who are in contact with other people who vote and care about politics, they become more likely to. So people who are married and married to somebody else who is a voter then are more likely to vote. So unmarried people are less likely to vote.

In this project, we actually did a lot of message research. We did about 12 focus groups and statewide surveys. I don't know if we are going to meet your rigorous standard for experimental design, but I am going to try. We will actually take the messages that we come up with and do a phone--it is a phone program, a pilot program, and it is sort of a robo-call, but you have somebody, either a local elected official or somebody famous, talking about why it is important to vote, and if you want to vote, you can hit "1" and it will patch you through to the registration office, and then you can get the registration form.

We are going to do sort of back-end validation to see how many people actually register and vary the messages and see if it matters what message people get and their likelihood of registering.

The other point is that this program won't just stop at registering. There will be, then, sustained contacts over the next 7 months around the issues that they care about because we believe it is not enough to just register someone. You have to continue to talk to them and remind them and talk to them about the issues that they care about. I think that is probably different than the one or two pieces of partisan mail, that kind of message.

I think you are right that at the very kind of superficial level, a message probably doesn't matter that much, but if you think about it as integrated into a larger program of sustained contact over time, it might.

Certainly, if you take unmarried women, it seems to me, given what I have learned about them and how marginalized they are and how cynical they are and how alone they feel, it strikes me that you better know what to talk to them about because they have a particular set of concerns that are not necessarily shared with other people.

I think I am going to stop there.

MR. DIONNE: Thank you.

[Applause.]

MR. DIONNE: Jim Gimpel.

I figure \$3 million, 500 votes, that is \$6,000 per vote in the margin.

Thank you for joining us.

Now you know why this screen was put up there.

MR. GIMPEL: I brought along a few slides that I think will underline the timeliness and importance of the Green and Gerber work.

I am especially interested in turnout among young people and turnout among the Republicans because I am at least loosely associated with Blaze Hazelwood [ph] and RNC political shop. I have been commissioned along with Darren Shaw and Brian Gaines at Illinois and David Brady and a few of the other lonely Republicans in political science to do some Gerber-and-Green-style studies, particularly of early and absentee voting programs.

One is in the bag. As an internal study, as Ed was saying, I probably am not at liberty to share a lot of the results or I might wake up with a horse's head in my bed in the morning, but I can say that the results of the '02 early and absentee voting efforts based on phone-bank calls in Nevada in '02 were tremendously successful. In New Mexico, no, not good, the results were not good. In Florida and Iowa, yes, excellent.

So the results are mixed. It depends on what kind of operation is being run, the quality of the calls. That sort of thing is all very relevant.

Just to highlight the Green and Gerber contribution, I would make a few points, about four points. I think it is no question that they have refocused attention on turnout and mobilization in Washington rather than media and persuasion.

Even though Don doesn't admit to attacking a persuasion strategy in this book, and he doesn't, in other work, he has called persuasion media efforts into question, and I think rightly so. I think his evidence is very persuasive.

Long before this event and long before this book came out, Don and Alan were down here in Washington talking to RNC and DNC political leaders, talking about the



results, and they have forced scholars and party leaders to think more critically about what works, what doesn't, and why.

There is a tremendous amount of campaign activity and work that has gone on in the last umpteen years that has gone completely unevaluated, and this is one of the first studies that has forced scholars and party leaders to think about what works.

The other thing that Green and Gerber have directed our attention toward is this notion that maybe turnout decline is actually an elite problem. It is a problem of mobilization. It is not a mass problem. Maybe it is not that there is something wrong with the voters. Gerber and Green suggest to us, "Hey, maybe the voters just simply need to be asked and asked in a right way," and that is a new perspective.

Political science is full of legions of scholars who have looked at voters and tried to figure out what is wrong with voters. I have done some of that work myself. They are saying, "Hey, maybe it is the way in which they are contacted by elites."

Then they have set this broader agenda for a lot of us. What works? What about early and absentee ballots? Do these stimulate turnout, or do early and absentee ballots simply cannibalize on traditional precinct balloting? Those are all important questions, and Green and Gerber have set an agenda for that kind of research as well because these are questions that follow direction from their field experiments.

This is a timely and pressing set of issues for us to be looking at, given the age distribution of the population. We have 99 million Americans under age 30. We have low and declining turnout of voters in that 18-to-29 bracket.

If you look at turnout decline, it has gone down steadily for everyone, but very precipitously for the 18-to-29-year-old cohort. These folks have no previous voting history. They are highly mobile and unsettled. Some are not settling into adult life

until maybe their late twenties or early thirties, and there is a sign that there is a generational effect here, not just a life-cycle effect.

So it is not just that young people are in a difficult stage of life cycle. It may well be a generational impact because their participation, that is, the participation of Generation Y folks who are entering the electorate now, is lagging about 10 to 12 points behind baby-boomers when they were at the very same stage of the life cycle. That seems to suggest that that lag could continue on through the life cycle.

At the same time, the greatest generation, which is highly participatory--that is Tom Brokaw's generation, remember--is now leaving the electorate through mortality, and they are taking their high turnout and their highly participatory ways with them.

The baby-boom generation is also beginning to exit the electorate or will be soon. The leading edge of the baby-boomers is now 54. In the next 10 to 15 years, they are going to be exiting the electorate.

So, by 2020, this generational replacement will be fully underway, and the question is will these newly arriving generations vote anything like the numbers of the generations that are leaving.

What this portends is a great turnout crash, a drop in participation, 6 to 10 points across several Presidential election cycles. It is not unreasonable to think that that could occur because, for every exiting baby-boom voter, we have to ask ourselves how many Generation Y voters will arrive to take their place. One? A half of one? A quarter of one? A tenth? This is the question that I think is looming and pressing and makes this book so timely.

Here is the zigzag in decline in turnout in on and off years. It is smooth, from '64 to 2000, very traditional graph you would find in a political science book. You can see that the decline is steady.

Well, the good news is that political leadership in Washington has been listening. There is a realization that low turnout is an affliction of both Republicans and Democrats. Now, that is something new because, for a long time, Republicans didn't think that they had a turnout problem, low turnout is just a Democratic problem of poverty, poor socialization, the deficits of inner-city neighborhoods, that sort of thing.

What we are learning is that age-related turnout deficits may disadvantage Republicans more than Democrats, and the reason for that is that Republicans and Republican locations that tend to be on the young and fast-growing end of the age distribution, places like San Bernardino, California, and Douglas, Colorado, some of the fastest-growing locations in the country, have very young age distributions. These are also heavily Republican areas. So we have every reason to believe that if these young voters are not socialized, it is going to be a turnout problem for Republicans into the future and certainly now as well.

By contrast, you have slow growth at Rust Belt locations or you have very large elderly cohorts that have established voting habits. These people have been voting for years. Their turnout can be taken for granted. They are going to show up. These are also Democratic areas, many of them, Scranton, Pennsylvania, and other economically declining locations that don't have much growth going on.

There is the map of turnout in the 2000 Presidential election. Red is hot; blue is cold. The red area is the upper Midwest there, up around the Great Lakes. Those are areas of high turnout, also in northern New England. The blue areas are areas of very

low turnout. Notice all of that blue in the South. It is as if you drew a line across one of those latitudes and everything below being low turnout. Well, we also know that those low-turnout locations are heavily GOP.

What is interesting about this particular map is if you go to the next one, it is prima facie evidence at least for how the age distribution controls the colors on the turnout map.

The red and the blue almost reverse themselves. The 18-to-29-year-old cohorts, the higher percentages or the high quantiles, are in red. It is not just a socioeconomic status problem, low turnout. It is very much a function of the age distribution.

So this is single years of age. This is the U.S. age distribution in 2000, and you see that there is a baby-boom bulge and then Generation Y or the echo boom is the bulge at the far left-hand side of the screen. You can see this little arrow down here at the bottom is retirement.

Again, 10 or 15 years, these baby-boomers are going to begin that long-term decline toward mortality. Sorry to remind you of that.

[Laughter.]

MR. GIMPEL: Here is another depiction, a generational depiction of the age distribution of citizens. It is the same graph, only blocked by generations, and again, you have these two bulges. You have got the baby-boomers, and you have the Generation Y or the echo boomers. The question is as this graph shifts to the right, again, what is going to happen to turnout when these active, highly participatory baby-boomers are not replaced with anything like the same numbers by the Generation Y voters that are following them up.

Douglas, Colorado's age distribution is fascinating. It is a heavily Republican county. The national age distribution is compared in the background. In Douglas County, about one out of every three people in that county is under age 17. There are kids, lots of kids. It is a heavily Republican county. Who is going to socialize those kids? Who is going to get them to vote?

The same with San Bernardino, California, suburban Los Angeles, well over 30 percent of the population in that county is under age 17. These are the offspring of Republican voters. Who is going to socialize them to vote? I don't think that the GOP really has serious plans to socialize these voters in the works at present, but maybe they ought to.

Summary. I don't think the great turnout crash is inevitable, but it is certainly possible that it could happen, and I would back that up by saying low turnout threatens the GOP as much as the Democrats, not just in the current Presidential election, but in the next 20 to 25 years as we see this great generational replacement occurring.

The other point that I would make in conclusion is that these local age distributions really do matter to the size of the turnout deficit that individual campaigns will confront, both in this election and in coming elections. Spending some time looking at what those age deficits look like as a consultant is probably worth your while.

Finally, I would just say Gerber and Green deserve a lot of credit for focusing our attention on this important agenda. They have really worked very, very hard to make their findings accessible.

Political science is full of articles and journals where the authors and scholars have not made any effort whatsoever to make their findings accessible. There are some pretty interesting results. I happen to edit one of these obscure political science

journals, but very few of my authors actually go out of their way to try to make the results intelligible to a non-expert audience, and they deserve a lot of credit for that.

They deserve all of this attention that they are getting. I am very happy for them. I hope their book does really well.

[Applause.]

MR. DIONNE: Thank you very much.

Bill reminded me of a story that we didn't worry quite so much about the greatest generation. It is a story told in my native New England, which was a very high turnout up there, of a gentleman that was writing his will in Springfield, Massachusetts, and asking to be buried in a district, a place in Boston. It was a place that had a very powerful political machine that often produced turnouts of over 100 percent.

Asked why he wanted to go to that particular cemetery, he replied, "I see no reason why my death should deprive me of my right to participate in the electoral process."

[Laughter.]

MR. DIONNE: Zephyr Teachout, who came all the way from Europe to be with us, thank you very, very much.

MS. TEACHOUT: Thanks. I am going to be brief, too, partly because I just got in and partly because I don't have nearly as much information as all of these people.

I used to study. Right before the campaign, I was a Ph.D. candidate in comparative studies and game theory, and one of my favorite books was on comparative political participation where I learned that upper-class, well-educated people are the most likely to lie about whether or not they voted.

[Laughter.]

MR. DIONNE: That is why she got out of the graduate degree.

MS. TEACHOUT: But I think it is a serious question as to why people vote, and even the way it has been presented here is not why people do vote, but a little bit why people don't vote. The focus groups and the studies are why, why, why, and as a good game theorist, I became quite troubled with this question, how could I as a rational actor continue to vote, and concluded finally that, although I had a 1-in-1-billion chance of affecting the outcome of the election, the importance of Al Gore being President was so great to me that it was still a rational act.

That isn't a very persuasive reason, and I think the stuff that sprung out at me in the book was also this question of message, why is it that message doesn't seem to matter and is it possible that we can find a message that matters, and is it also possible that we are going about it all the wrong way.

We talk about voting as empowerment when, in fact, the most noble part of voting is the fact that it is an act of very little power, that it is something that is shared, and that the more people vote, the better it is for everyone.

Towards the end of the campaign--I worked for Howard Dean--while he was falling out of the sky, there was this woman, Rene from Ohio, who was a commenter on our web log, and she wrote this thing that said, "My name is Rene. I live in Ohio. My vote is my voice, and I will not be silenced."

What was interesting about this is that it was picked up immediately. So, about two comments down on our web log, somebody said, "My name is Steve. I live in Massachusetts. My vote is my voice, and I will not be silenced." There are over 250 of these that showed up on our web log. In fact, I think they sent them to The Washington Post.

I am not sure if you ever got these or saw these. What is so shocking to me is that I think of voting as an act of power, and what was coming through in this particular community was that voting was an act of expression. There was something deeply resonant about thinking about that. I would be really curious to see the studies that look at voting as an expressive act as opposed to a powerful act.

The few things that came up in this panel that also sort of echo that are that Perot brought out a substantial number of voters, and Nader--I am not entirely excited about voting being an expressive act because it changes who is voted for, but it at least suggests a possible message which would be to examine the other key piece of evidence there, when voting was appealed to as an act of power in a situation where people had no power in these sort of blow-out situations. It was completely ineffective.

So I would be interested in looking at places like--why Vermont? We really don't matter that much in the Presidential campaign. Why is there a high voter turnout and a higher voter turnout during Presidential years in Vermont? Why do people continue to vote for candidates after they are no longer going to win? What is it that motivates people to vote even when it doesn't matter? If we can convince the entire country to vote when it doesn't matter, then it will matter.

I happen to believe in mandatory voting, but I don't think that is going to happen in 2004.

I think the reason I have been invited here, though, is, in fact, to talk about the Internet. So I will do that.

I think the Internet is going to change everything, of course, but in particular, it has a lot of potential to change voter turnout. The reason is the high-quality interaction.



I love the book. I thought it was fantastic and very practical and especially as a political science aspirant at one time. It was great for its clarity and the methods. Fantastic.

What the Internet does is not provide a means of telling people to go to the polls when you have them on a list, but rather identifying new messengers. He is looking at two things. One is the message, which it was said had no effect. Three things. One is the medium. Does the medium matter if you give the same message through the Internet or the phone or the door? Does it matter? Yes, it matters substantially. The third is the messenger, who is it, do you know them.

We have the opportunity with the Internet to identify tens of thousands, if not hundreds of thousands of new canvassers. In a nonscientific way, the last year has shown--I think Rove did some interesting studies on this in 2002 as well--that volunteers--that there is just this vat of latent interest in political activity in this country, that the experience of political power is really potent, that there are hundreds of thousands of people who want to be politically powerful in their own communities.

It used to be if I wanted to get out the vote in Texas, I might have to ask E.J. if he knew of anybody in Texas who would then ask somebody if they knew somebody in Houston and sort of gradually spread out. It would cost me maybe 20 hours to find a precinct captain in Harris County.

This year, with the Dean campaign, I think the same thing is possible for any political organization. This wonderful organizer named Glen Maxie [ph], using the crudest tools of the Internet, put up a list of the 8,500 precincts in Texas and said, "I want precinct captains. E-mail me."

He identified within 3 months 2,000 precinct captains. In two-thirds of those precincts, there was no Democratic Party precinct captain.

The first meeting, he said it was great because they all got together on the telephone. The first question was: What is a precinct?

[Laughter.]

MS. TEACHOUT: He had a good system. He had been involved in political campaigns before, and it was deeply steeped in traditional door-to-door campaigning. So he had the three-level system. First, you find a precinct captain, then you train them, and then you see if they are any good. At the third level, then you really count them as a true precinct captain.

Basically, within 3 months, he was able to identify 2,000 people willing to commit 10 hours a week in Texas for 9 months to organize Get Out the Vote activities. So what it changes is not the sort of core revelations of your book, but rather who can do them. So it multiplies them really quite substantially, and I think that is going to have a long-term effect.

The related change that it brings along is that it makes it profitable to organize, and I think this is really important. The incentive to get people to vote is all very well and good when you are on a political campaign, but you also want to raise a hell of a lot of money.

Rightly or wrongly, people believe that political advertising is really effective. So they want to raise money. If at the same time as you organize, you can raise money, you are a lot more likely to organize. In fact, if organizing is the most effective way to raise money, which it happened to be in our campaign, then you are going to organize the hell out of the country.

The people who contributed to the campaign at \$10, \$20, and \$50, about well over half of them had also taken some political act. In fact, they were engaged in the campaign first as political actors and second as contributors. This is going to create a whole different system of political campaigning because there will be a financial investment in the field operation, and I think this is very exciting because then it sort of creates its own growth.

In the long term, I think it is going to change political culture by making it easier for people to organize locally. The power of e-mail is not the candidate or the RNC to you. It is you to your neighbor. It is basically making it cost you 20 minutes to set up a political meeting instead of 5 hours of phone calls. So the long-term effect of changing your political culture and the repeated contacts, it is also going to have this effect of increasing voter turnout.

The last thing it is going to do is make political science studies a lot easier, which I think is really valuable because I do think this kind of study is really important.

Being part of a campaign shocked me in terms of the intuitive nature of finding one's way through who is going to be President, let alone who is going to be your county chair. If we can then test messaging, you can send the same e-mail message from five different people to a set of 20,000 for about 3 days worth of work and really see does it matter if you use an exclamation point, does it matter if you use a colon or where you put the link, does it matter who it is from, the salutation.

So we can get a really refined sense of what messages work and don't work and what timing works and doesn't work, and we will learn a lot more. In the long term, it is sort of the life of insects. The Internet mutates really quickly, and we will ultimately be able to have even more beautiful and brilliant books such as this.

Thank you.

[Applause.]

MR. DIONNE: I want to go to the audience, but I just can't resist. Zephyr, may I ask a question following up on that great talk?

It specifically goes to Iowa. This is about your whole theory about how you can organize through the Internet, which you guys clearly did a good job of.

There was this disconnect, it seems to me, in the media where the media overread the power of your organization in Iowa; that if you look at the caucuses as partly an organizational effort, you did have a formidable organization, but it wasn't as formidable certainly as, on the whole, the media portrayed it.

What lessons have you so far drawn from Iowa in terms of how much of this worked and what the shortcomings of the method might be?

MS. TEACHOUT: Does this work?

MR. DIONNE: If everybody could put on their mics. Then I am going to go straight to the audience. We do have folks with microphones, but I couldn't resist asking this question. Forgive me.

MS. TEACHOUT: We sort of think about this forever.

I think we did manage to ,in a primary, get 3,500 people to a place, 3,500 people from out of State on their own dime. I don't know whether we used them the most effectively. I am not an expert in field operations. It was people in the last 2 or 3 days.

I think that we showed that the power can be brought, and the best way to use them, we don't know yet.

You wanted to say something.

MR. : Again, I wouldn't misread what happened on the Internet, what they did on the Internet, to what happened in Iowa.

I think the perception was that Dean began coming apart in Iowa when, in fact, he began coming apart in November and December. So, by the time Iowa came, it was really the end, not the beginning of Dean. He had already come apart. He had already imploded. So a lot of the people that they had brought were going someplace else. It was very unique--no offense to your candidate, but it was very unique to Dean in that he truly imploded himself versus what the campaign did.

What you saw was because other candidates, particularly Kerry, was not perceived as bringing Dean down, you saw those people remain active and just switch to another candidate.

I think if it would have been seen as a strategic campaign that Kerry had brought him down, you would have seen those people either stand in for Dean or not participate, but there were a lot of people that got involved in the caucuses that Dean had brought in months before who were not there by that night for Dean.

MR. DIONNE: It was fascinating. I spoke to a State Senator out in Fort Dodge, who was an early Dean guy, who was very excited when he showed up at the caucus and saw lots of new people there and then discovered they weren't there for Dean. So there was this enhanced turnout effect.

Bill?

MR. GALSTON: CIRCLE assigned itself the task of monitoring the youth vote in the primaries, or at least many of those as we could get reliable from Datacorp, and I suspect if somebody had told Howard Dean a month before Iowa that four times as

many young people would show up to the caucuses in 2004 as did in 2000, he would have said, "I'm in."

The interesting thing--and this validates your point, E.J.--is that John Kerry got the same percentage of those young people that he did overall.

The other thing I would say is that there is a big distinction between a network and an organization, and the Internet is a lot better at creating a network than it is creating an organization.

There is a whole lot of evidence--and I will be blunt here--that those 3,500 people didn't have the foggiest idea of what to do when they actually got that off the ground.

MS. TEACHOUT: I want to respond.

MR. GALSTON: All right.

[Laughter.]

MS. TEACHOUT: First of all, the second point I think is the larger one, that we hadn't yet figured out as a campaign the most productive way to do them. This, I agree with in terms of the message being the most important.

There were a thousand Dean meet-ups at the end. 500 of those had steering committee meetings at least once a month. That is an organization. Those 500 organizations are organizations.

The network enabled the organization, but what we were seeking and what is possible to create is organizations. I agree with the difference, but I think the potential was there.

MR. : There was a steering wheel. Whether anybody was holding it is a different question.

MR. : But again, I wouldn't mis-analyze the data because my guess is an overwhelming majority of those young people who voted for Kerry in Iowa on caucus night, in fact, had been driven into the process by Dean months before, had been voting for Dean.

So don't misunderstand whether the campaign and what they did was right versus this was a very unique situation. It is not very often you see the candidate himself implode as opposed to the campaign just being wrong.

If he would have ended up winning in Iowa rather than imploding, all the stories would have been how great, what he did was exactly the right thing. I think that story should have still been there. It had nothing to do with what happened to Dean himself.

MR. : I love the headline on that: "Republican Pollster Praises Kerry's Candidacy and Dean's Campaign."

[Laughter.]

MR. DIONNE: Thank you, Ed.

MR. GOEAS: I was stirring that pot.

MR. DIONNE: There are distorted headlines.

Ma'am.

PARTICIPANT: I am a political scientist.

MR. DIONNE: Two things. Can people identify themselves and speak close to the mic? Thanks.

PARTICIPANT: My name is Denise Behr [ph]. I am a political scientist, and I actually did a field experiment on voter turnout in 1980. I really wanted to congratulate Professor Green and Professor Gerber for doing really a profound contribution to the literature, both in terms of experimental design and also in terms of highlighting the

importance of voter contacting in terms of its impact as a social issue and looking at different methods of contact.

There are three kinds of really profound implications of the study that I didn't hear anyone in the panel mention, and I wanted to kind of raise and ask Professor Green to comment on them.

One is investing in local races. Generally, in political science, people vote for top ticket, and it is not trivial that what you did, you did in local races because increase in turnout can have a substantial impact.

A second thing that I think is really significant is that I think, at least in terms of the study we did--we did both primary and general election turnout--that the voter contacting you looked at isn't the same as the GOTV the parties do. The 96-hour thing is ultimately, probably, a very trivial method of contacting. Whereas, if you are contacting earlier and more often, it is a quality kind of turnout that produces a much more substantial kind of impact in terms of mobilizing voter turnout for the long time.

A lot of people that do field work say it has a 3- to 5-percent impact. You are talking about a much larger kind of long-term impact in terms of voters. I am wondering if you could comment on that.

A third point, beyond just collective responsibility, what about collective contacting? I haven't heard parties mentioned once here or even group-based voter turnout. A lot of voter turnout activity is group-based among organizations, and there is a lot less funding and investment in that because a lot of the work that is done in GOTV is just an individual candidate race rather than collective contacting.

So I was wondering if you could comment on three of those implications.

MR. DIONNE: Thank you. That is very good.



Can I start with Don, who I also want to respond to some of the other discussions?

MR. GREEN: Did you say your name was Denise Behr?

PARTICIPANT: Yes.

MR. GREEN: Oh, you are Behr of Miller Bositis and Behr?

PARTICIPANT: Yes.

MR. GREEN: That is funny. You are all over our appendix.

[Laughter.]

MR. DIONNE: That sounds gruesome.

[Laughter.]

MR. GREEN: Or appendices.

Well, thank you for those comments. I think they are quite interesting.

While we are here in Washington, we are talking about all sorts of things that are very interesting to people in Washington. Much of the book is, as you mentioned in your first point, directed to the relatively local candidate. Many of our experiments focus on those kinds of races, not very different from--is it Carbondale, Illinois?

You were in Carbondale, Illinois. Well, there it is.

I think that for those people, this book has two important themes. One is that your elections are often decided by a few hundred votes, sometimes less, and so having some credible organization that can reliably deliver a few hundred votes really can make all the difference for those kinds of candidates.

With respect to the second point, multiple contacts early and often and an integrated campaign, I think you do see support for that in our book.

It is true that we think that a well-heeled, well-run, authentic door-to-door canvassing campaign can increase turnout, but on the order of 8, 9 percentage points in these local or State elections.

I should say that this has been reinforced to us by some of the experiments that were done in 2003 and came in too late for publication in this book, but will be in the next edition. These were ID campaigns coupled with GOTV campaigns, and those were, as you would expect, correspondingly bigger in their effect because, in effect, people were canvassed face to face more than once. So it had more than an 8-percentage point effect, which suggests again that quality matters.

If you are talking to somebody about the issues, you find the right parlance to communicate with them in, and then you go back to mobilize them based on that previous identification contact. You have a big effect.

What we don't know yet is, is it because you struck a relationship irrespective of the message and you have contacted somebody twice, so, yes, you are going to have more than the effect of contacting them once, or is there something special about tailoring the message to a person who has been identified in an earlier round of the campaign. So that is a very exciting line of research.

The last thing is the question about organizations, collectives mobilizing people, and I think that that remains a wide-open question.

I am very eager to either do the experiments myself or have others do experiments where they look at church groups, union groups, whatever kind of groups and find out the extent to which--say you have a bunch of cells of these groups, say a bunch of union shops or a bunch of churches, and you randomly assign them programs that try to focus on churchwide or shopwide mobilization campaigns. Do you really get more out of that

than you would simply having a kind of individualized approach where you contact people as individuals, perhaps at their home?

It is very exciting.

MR. : There are some studies the AFL-CIO has done about direct contact from shop stewards, person to person, has made a big difference in terms of getting union members to vote for the candidates endorsed by labor.

MR. : Yes. That is persuasion. Those are organization studies.

MR. DIONNE: Just a quick question, and then I want to go to somebody else, following up on that.

In the book, you make the point in passing that a candidate, say for State representative, who turns out 2- or 300 extra voters, there is a reasonable chance that those voters are then voting up the ticket for the party of that candidate.

Do we have any sense from not necessarily these studies, but other studies of how much of turnout is generated at the bottom of the ballot versus the top of the ballot? Again, coming from somewhere where there was all of this local political activity, it always struck me that some significant percentage of the vote is actually coming out for something more local and then casting a vote as a secondary effect at the top of the ticket.

MR. GREEN: First, I would like to address the whole 96-hour program. Don't be mistaken. It is not that it is only paying attention to it that last 96 hours. It is you do your normal organizing and understand you have to layer on top of that a whole additional cadre that spends their whole time for months getting ready for that last 92 hours. So it is really a combination of old-style organizing and new-style organizing.

I think the big question from the local up--and I think it is one of the reasons why I would question the whole "Does message matter?" is that when you get down to the lower races, the question is not does the message matter as much as the office you are talking about matter as much.

Going back to my Tulsa example where we increased turnout, participation at that level raised by 40 percent in that particular election. It was just reminding them that while you were out, here is a good candidate to go and vote for, and we increased the participation by that much just by those two contacts that were there.

I think there is a huge question of personal contact, and if you have personal contact that a higher-level campaign doesn't have, can you bring people out, but in large part, there is also the problem on messaging of do they even care about that particular office, city council, whatever is going on at that particular time.

One of the things that would also counter some of what is there--and it was interesting looking at the turnout maps--was that there was another factor. We saw in the Bush campaign in 2000, of the 19 States that Dole won in the earlier election in 1996, 16 of those States were not targeted by the Bush campaign with the assumption, and rightfully so, that he was going to win those States.

The Gore campaign also assumed that he was going to win those States. So Presidential campaigns which are now much more regionally driven or State-by-State driven, in those 16 States, they did not see TV. They did not hear a radio. They did not get direct mail, and the only contact, the only campaign is what those in that State kind of bubbled up.

One of the things that you see in this map, as we get 19 percent of the electorate as white conservative Christians, a large number of those people live in those States. A

large number of those States were not targeted by the campaign, and it is where I would say message does matter.

What happened from what we were watching in terms of vote intensity is when the DUI story came out the Friday before the election, that a lot of those voters, all the news media was looking for, did they switch from Bush to Gore, that is not what happened.

They had a dampening effect on their turnout, and in fact, they only comprised 14 percent of the electorate on Election Day. So that message had a real dampening effect on the turnout.

The only State where that is an exception is Texas. Texas had the lowest turnout of any State in the country, and the lowest turnout in Texas was in Midland-Odessa where George W. Bush was already from. The only reason why turnout was lower there was not only because it wasn't a target State, but everyone was assuming he was going to win. They were assuming he was going to win the State. They were assuming he was going to win the Presidency, and so there wasn't that intensity of message about turning out.

So I think you kind of have to look at both in terms of it as opposed to just the voter contact.

MR. DIONNE: Can I bring in several folks at once? The lady over here, please, and then Ton.

PARTICIPANT: Hi. My name is Brook Laraman [ph]. I haven't read your book yet. It sounds fabulous.

My first campaign was working for Paul Wellstone. So we learned all about door to door. Most recently, I was field director in Wisconsin for Howard Dean's campaign. So I would argue with your organization versus network.

I actually think in Iowa, one of the best things was how organized it was. We sent about 400 people from Wisconsin. It was very interesting.

Actually, my question, though, returns to one of the maps that you had up that had Minnesota and Wisconsin as two of the highest-turnout areas in 2000, and they also both have same-day registration. All the people that voted for Jesse Ventura registered the day of the election. So I wonder if your book addresses same-day registration at all and the importance of it.

MR. DIONNE: Thank you.

MR. GREEN: The answer is no. It is one of those things that is considered too long term for us, since you are unlikely to affect the same-day registration before November the 2nd.

I think you will find in the book that a number of our experiments have taken place in those kinds of places. We have actually been at pains to do experiments in old-style traditional places like Connecticut or New York that have "Darn it, you have to vote at the polls."

We have gone out to, say, Oregon and done experiments there where they have only vote by mail.

Some of our experiments take place in Colorado where they have this hybrid system of early voting and then day-of-the-election voting, and then virtually every kind of version in between, including a number of studies in the Twin Cities. Several of the e-mail sites were in same-day registration areas which I think causes me to be especially surprised that we didn't see effects there.

So I think that we are attentive to that, and we sense that it sure would increase turnout at least to some extent to have same-day registration, but at the same time, we

are somewhat skeptical in the book, you should know, about theories about low-voter turnout that focus on the costs of voting.

We think that the problem with voter turnout is not really the costs because, as costs have gotten lower and lower and lower for a greater and greater share of the electorate, turnout hasn't really budged very much. Rather, our focus is on the motivation to vote and shoring up the motivation.

I know there has been a lot of talk about the theme in the book that the message doesn't matter, but as you dig into the book, you will see that a number of things are going on there.

When you show up at the door--for example, Melissa Michaelson [ph] has people canvassing in a low-turnout, largely Latino, central California neighborhood. Well, they come to the door. They give either an ethnic solidarity, "Stand up for our people"-type message, or they give a civic duty message. There is no difference between the two in terms of voter turnout. They are both effective.

Why might that be? Well, it could be that the message literally doesn't matter or it could be that most of what is going on in terms of the effect of the canvasser is the signal that the canvasser is sending to the person at the door. "Wow, this election is really important. I guess this is important because this person is here walking door to door on a dusty rural road making sure that I vote. So maybe I should vote."

MR. DIONNE: Bill, you had something.

MR. GREEN: Maybe that overwhelms the other message.

MR. DIONNE: Bill had some evidence for you.

MR. GALSTON: We have funded some research comparing different--the voting rules across all the different States that does indicate--I think most political scientists

believe this--that same-day voting has an impact, and it has a particularly powerful impact for the people who might be called impulse voters, and those are just proportionately likely to be younger voters.

The structure probably matters less for the regular voters, the 65-year-olds, than it does for younger voters and people who are right at Don Green's margin where a relatively small change in the cost of voting may be enough to shift them from right below.

PARTICIPANT: In Wisconsin, almost all of the precincts, we won for Dean, and we did win some, were the college precincts, and they were all places where we had vans or there was voting booths on site, and none of the students were registered, but we took them all the same day to register. I am sure that we wouldn't have done nearly as well if we would have had to register them 3 months in advance. So I think it is very interesting.

MR. GREEN: You have to understand, you are talking chicken and egg a little bit here. If you didn't have same-day registration, once you pass that registration date, they were taken out of the equation. The campaign was no longer targeted at them.

You are talking about two States that were high targets as opposed to the other ones I just mentioned.

We have seen a lot of evidence. The one State that really stands out in terms of higher participation is really Oregon, where they truly are getting substantially higher numbers of participants. It is not just voting by mail. It is the way the whole process works in terms of informing them.



We have gone through so many other ways. Motor Voter, no impact on turnout. Early voting, no impact on turnout. It is just a certain group vote earlier that is brought down the Election Day kind of turnout.

The jury is still out in terms of same-day registration because you can't factor in if, in fact, you had targeted that group of voters at a higher level with a different registration that there would be a different reaction.

PARTICIPANT: We never try to register voters. So we didn't waste time registering people.

MR. DIONNE: Jim?

MR. GIMPEL: One reason why these institutional reforms have only a marginal impact on turnout is because they tend to be adopted in States where it is not going to be very controversial.

In other words, these early voting reforms and other institutional reforms roll through State legislatures easily when the State legislators know that it is not going to change the composition of the electorate very much. So that is why there is only a marginal impact.

If we eventually see some States like New York or California or some of these larger States with large, say, urban populations adopt some of these reforms, we could see quite a shake-up.

MR. DIONNE: Thank you.

Let me see all the hands of people who want to come in. I have Tony, here, here, and here. What I would like to do, just so we don't overstay our leave too much, is to bring everybody in now who wants to get in, and then we can have everybody on the panel have a chance to respond.

So, Tony, you are out? Everybody answered your question.

Sir, and then there is a lady on that side and two over there--three. I feel like an auctioneer.

PARTICIPANT: Thank you. My name is Andrew Klasster [ph]. I am a political consultant and a former student of Professor Gerber.

MR. DIONNE: Could you speak up just a little?

PARTICIPANT: Closer? Okay.

My question is I have been looking at the work that you and Professor Gerber have put out, and some of it involves partisan work. Much of it is nonpartisan.

My question is when you do cost and efficiency calculations and comparing, in particular, door-to-door efforts versus mail, phone, you often find that that door to door is more effective. My question is whether that is simply the case because you are looking at areas where there is a high density of voters in a partisan case of a particular party. That is, most campaigns do mail efforts or phone efforts in areas where there are few Democrats, for instance, among Democratic candidates because they can't cost effectively do door to door if only one house in three has Democratic voters, so whether you have done any studies factoring that into the equation, for instance, suburban neighborhoods, rural areas where the cost may be higher, and whether the findings that door to door is more effective hold up in those cases.

MR. DIONNE: Hang on for a second. That is a great question. Thank you.

Over here, we have a couple of folks.

PARTICIPANT: Hello. My name is Nancy Connors [ph]. I am with the League of Women Voters, and I would like to ask, Mr. Galston, if you could speak about the

project that CIRCLE is doing with the league in Montgomery County targeting voter turnout and voter education.

MR. DIONNE: Thank you.

Ma'am?

PARTICIPANT: Hello. My name is Gladisa [ph] Martinez with the National Council of La Raza, and my question is a little bit related to the first one in terms of we now and have known for a while that door to door, of course, is the most effective, but when you don't live in an ideal world where you are a non-profit and you might be able to get all the volunteers you need to go door to door or whatever the case might be, the high-density question being another very important question, particularly if you are working in emerging Latino communities, for example.

Then what becomes really important is trying to figure out what is the combination of tools or outreach strategies that lead you to the tipping point if you cannot get the substantial mass of any one of them, and in this case, do it all door to door.

So my question is without having read the book yet and also without having access to the internal studies some of you have mentioned and to the extent that you might be able to comment on what campaigns or what studies have been done of the same campaign, the same site, look at stratifying all these different strategies and figuring out the different types of combinations that achieve that tipping point, the reality is not everybody can run a campaign with thousands of volunteers or have the infrastructure necessary to get all those volunteers in place.

MR. DIONNE: Thank you.

The good news is the book actually talks about that question.

Please.

PARTICIPANT: Hi. My name is Jocelyn Reds [ph], and I am a law student.

I was just wondering. I noticed, Dr. Gimpel, if I have your name right, on your map, another correlation, it seemed like the lower turnout was in the more diverse areas of the country, more racially and ethnically diverse areas of the country, and I was wondering if you broke down the data to examine that correlation as well.

Along those same lines, Dr. Green, I was wondering if you had anything in the book that talked about the outreach in door-to-door efforts of people by the same gender or race and how significant it is to have someone of the same gender or race talking to someone door to door.

MR. DIONNE: See, that map was a test. It looked to me kind of like a map of the Civil War.

Can I just start with Bill? And we can work straight down the panel.

MR. GALSTON: Well, given the lateness of the hour, I will have to resist giving a full description, but I will give a sort of generic answer, and that is that CIRCLE as a research organization doesn't get directly involved in actual practice on the ground. There are two things that we can do in the case of League and other organizations as well are doing.

First of all, we can communicate in real time, our knowledge about the tactics that are more and less likely to be effective. The Green-Gerber work, but also a bunch of other work that we have funded, I think has produced some transferrable, usable knowledge about the sorts of strategies organizations likely can use.

Secondly, we can--and indeed we are in the business of helping these organizations--assess the effectiveness of what they have done once they have finished doing it. This can sometimes be labor- and resource-intensive activity for a research organization. So

we can't quite have an open-door policy, but the first few people who come through the door, we have been willing and indeed eager to help out.

MR. DIONNE: Anybody that wants to know more about this project should talk to you after this session is over.

MR. GALSTON: Absolutely.

MR. DIONNE: Don't?

MR. GREEN: Let me speak to, I guess, the question that was raised with respect-- well, I will take them in reverse order.

With respect to race and gender, you will see that in the book, we have a number of field experiments we have described with respect to targeting specific communities, often, not exclusively, in urban areas, areas that are very different, Columbus, Detroit, very different, Eugene, Bridgeport, very different, and so on.

You will see that there is really equivocal evidence with respect to the isomorphous between the canvasser and the canvasee. It is not really clear yet how much that matters.

There is some evidence that being of the same group did give you an extra boost, but then it turns out that maybe it just makes it easier to contact those people because you feel more comfortable in the neighborhood and know the neighborhood a little bit better.

I think it might in the case of one study, the study in North Carolina, the ill-fated Raleigh study, it was to avoid certain problems. It was a case where there was a combination of white and African-American canvassers and African-American canvassers were canvassing in a largely white neighborhood. They were accosted by residents. There were obviously problems of racial discord there. That is a different

kind of issue, but an issue that could arise depending on the contacts that you have would be interesting in canvassing.

So far, gender effects have been fairly minimal. I think there was sort of this view among professional canvassers that women were better at it because they were more likely to get the door open for them, but we looked carefully at our contact rates. We didn't see any difference between men and women.

[Side A of Tape No. 2 of 2 begins.]

MR. GREEN: [In progress]--even in that particular case.

With respect to the questions on Latino mobilization, we are strong on this one, thanks to Malayo [ph] because they had their 2002 campaign which was a combination of live volunteer phone calls, robotic calls from Univision personalities, and direct mail, some of it very professional, some very nice mail, ranging from two to four pieces.

For reasons that have to do with maybe the generic features of these tactics or maybe the specific ways in which they were executed--I am thinking more of the former--the in-person techniques were not effective, and the thing that really worked were the voluntary phone calls, doing it the old-fashioned way. Those raised turnout by 4 or 5 percentage points, some of the people who were contacted. There, the problems were organizational, just finding enough callers.

One of the things you might be interested in is in the phone-calling chapter, you will see a distinction drawn between relatively short, kind of mechanical commercial phone calls that seemed to have minimal effects and much longer and much more expensive phone calls conducted by commercial phone banks with extended scripts which were personal chatty scripts that were effective. So it might be that a way to split the difference is to develop a kind of relationship with a commercial phone bank, such that

you could have bilingual callers or whatever kind of callers who would be motivated, enthusiastic, and well supervised, well trained.

If you can really lean on the phone bank, that chapter shows that success is possible. The difficulty is it really poses a lot of supervisory costs on you. That is those two questions.

Then, with respect to population density, I would say the question with respect to population density is a good one. It can cut in both ways. You can have high-population density and still have a terrible area for canvassing, and we talk about the horror stories with respect to lock the security departments in the book. How you density does you on good in that case, but it actually provides an opportunity for a campaign that wants to organize within the building, find somebody within the building. It is locked to everybody outside the building.

With respect to ex-urban areas, suburban areas, I would say that either you run a friends-and-neighbors campaign or it would be tough to canvas, not impossible, but difficult, and in those areas, the kind of more personalized phone call might be the more effective strategy.

MR. DIONNE: Thank you.

Ed?

MR. GOEAS: I keep trying not to fall in the trap of the HBO series on K Street that you had a lot of very smart people trying not to give away their trade secrets and still sound very smart, which is why it lasted about 3 weeks in terms of being on TV.

[Laughter.]

MR. DIONNE: So just give away your secret. Anna will do the same.

MR. GOEAS: Just a couple of key points I think will go back to it, some of the key things I think is important, if you go back to what I said drove the propensity, age, education, married, married with children, all of those have one common thing. The more connected you are with your community, the more likely you are to vote.

I think one of the things you see from the door-to-door canvassing is maybe for a short period of time, you have that connection again to your community or it provides that connection to the community, and I think that is why you have the impact.

Two other things that I didn't mention in terms of young voters is that if they go to church once a week, a much higher likelihood to vote. If their parents took them to vote when they were before a voting age, a much higher likelihood to vote. So that kind of connection to the community has a great impact.

Even after reading the book--and I am not disavowing anything in the book. I think it makes some very good points, particularly for lower-level races. I still think you have to look at intensity at contact and intensity of message.

What I tell my campaigns, which tend to be a little bit more purist, and the problem campaigns get into is very often they try to use various, different ways of communicating, a little bit of mail, a little bit of Internet, a little bit of radio, a little bit of TV, and they don't saturate a message on any of them.

If given a choice, a media campaign fully saturated will beat a grass-roots campaign that all they are doing is grass roots, but a media and a grass-roots campaign will always be a media campaign. So the issue is not necessarily does the message matter as much as I think increasingly as we become more and more sophisticated, that is the kind of direction we are going.



The last thing I would say about the Internet, I am a big believer in it. I am really working hard on campaigns and have some great things we have accomplished in campaigns this year on the Internet. I think we are still learning how to use the Internet, and it will be very unique from other forms of communication and contact.

One of the most interesting things that I, again, have to question not your tests, but some other tests on the Internet is one of the most interesting things I found in some data that we did actually with CIRCLE is the things people like from the Internet is it gave them a feeling that they were coming to you. That is what they liked.

Yet, there was one thing of you going to them that they also liked, and that was being informed about Election Day, before the election.

I think the question is not is it useful. The question is has that particular campaign poisoned the well, well before they get to that day they ask them to turn out to vote by not making them feel like they have come to the Internet, and that is a skill that we have to develop, that they haven't closed that door because of other things they are doing and not that that door is not as useful on Election Day.

MR. DIONNE: That is a perfect lead-in to Zephyr who has done more creative things with the Internet than anyone up here.

MS. TEACHOUT: Do I get to not respond to any questions and just talk?

[Laughter.]

MS. TEACHOUT: Just a few things that you said that I wan to echo. We found that our most effective messaging was echoing what was going on in the world, so free media. I mean, free media by far is still the most important as far as I can tell.

So, if we are to send a message, it is echoing something out in the world, and the synapses work that way. Whether it is repeated personal contact or it is the echoing of

the free media and what is coming in your In Box, that is when you see the highest open rate and the highest responsiveness.

If you see getting out the vote also to echo what you are saying very much like raising money, the scale of most Internet operations are so small, they are not going to make a difference for getting out the vote, anyway, but when they do, if and when they do, it will be because having developed a relationship, the time comes to ask for money or for a vote. That request is then honored as the results of that relationship.

The final thing I would like to say that is sort of related to both targeting, it is more of a question, I guess, the question about the same gender and race canvassing.

We found a strong, strong, within our grass roots, fear of cross-race canvassing. There was common wisdom that this wasn't going to work and that this was going to be bad and offensive.

As a purely normative matter, I think that is really troubling. As a practical matter, it meant that--except in a few places like Washington, D.C., Ward 8, which had a fantastic operation along with some others--there was very little non-white organizing. I don't want to over-exaggerate that. I mean, there was a fair amount in a bunch of places, but that because people would sort of say they would limit themselves and you wouldn't actually get to see what would happen across races.

I am really concerned about targeting, even though it makes a lot of sense for individual campaigns. Study after study after study shows that targeting makes sense for individual campaigns.

Because targeting works means that you decrease, that every State will go to a smaller and smaller environment, and so you are targeting 65-year-olds. So you take the message about targeting. You should target with the chart, and ultimately, all your

messaging is going towards the 65-year-olds, and so you are never training or never giving the habits to young people.

So that, as a society, even as a practical matter, we have an obligation to target. As a society, we have an obligation to push away from targeting.

MR. DIONNE: Thank you.

Jim?

MR. GIMPEL: To the representative from NCLR, there are several things that we have discovered in the RNC's work on absentee and early voting that relate to you, I think.

We found that phones worked on absentee and early voting as long as the message was carefully targeted. So not everyone got a call.

In fact, our problem in New Mexico, we went to everybody, and it was really hard to even sort out, in effect, because no one was really included. I could talk to you about not everyone getting the message. I could talk to you later about that.

Not everyone needs a contact. There are some reliable early and absentee voters who are going to go and vote early or absentee based on their previous vote history, regardless of whether you contact them or not.

Similarly, there are some people on the other end who are just hopeless. They are on the registration list, but their vote history reveals that they have never shown up.

It is actually people with sort of spotty voting histories that are the ones that are really worth contacting.

The other thing that we discovered in Florida was really very interesting. It might relate to the density issue, too. The mid-sized counties, we had a much greater impact than in the very large counties, controlling for some of the usual suspects.

We had a lot of internal debate about this, and John Batrossik [ph], another lonely Republican in the field, who has a long history of consulting said that he thinks--and we haven't proven this--that in the mid-sized or medium-sized counties, the people there received less election-related stimuli over the course of the campaign. So each individual contact matters a lot more to them than in an urban area where everyone is targeted and they are bombarded and bombarded and hit again and again. So each election-related contact has less of an impact.

I don't know if that helps you at all, but I hope it didn't give away too many secrets.

On the map, yes, you usually control for education, race, ethnic diversity, population mobility, and institutions of electoral laws. We discovered that the institutions of the electoral laws had the least impact of any of the factors. Population composition matters the most.

Age actually outweighs race, which was kind of eye-popping to us. We were a little surprised by that, but it turns out that it isn't that strange a finding because, if you go back to Rosenstahl and Hanson's classic work on the subject back in 1993, they show using survey research that age trumps just about everything else. So it isn't so unusual that the age distribution should matter, but I think that since Bill Galston is here and we are on the subject of turnout and Bill is all about the youth vote, I would really play that up today because I think it is important.

I would say that it is an important issue particularly for Republicans to pay attention to because it is clear that in these really fast-growing locations, Douglas County, Colorado, for instance, and other suburbs, the populations are growing faster than the local parties and candidates can socialize it and mobilize it. These are young family-aged populations, lots of kids that are coming of age, and they are not getting on the

registration rolls. These populations are growing so fast that they are outstripping the local capacity of State and local parties and candidates to mobilize them.

That is why I say that the age deficit is especially a problem in the fast-growing prosperous GOP areas.

MR. DIONNE: I was watching Anna. Her face said, "Oh, please don't socialize these people. Just keep doing what you are doing."

[Laughter.]

MR. DIONNE: Anna Greenberg.

MS. GREENBERG: Well, because the hour is late and I have the last word, I will just say voters under 30 are the most Democratic voters in the electorate besides seniors. So, actually, I am not sure why you think it is a problem for the GOP that they are not voting because actually it is more of a problem ultimately for the Democratic Party.

MR. GOEAS: Well, it certainly is if you dis-aggregate. If you dis-aggregate and you look at the heavily Democratic locations, there are going to be more people in her camp in that 18-to-29-year-old block.

I am saying that when you look at the heavily GOP areas, the fastest-growing places in the country, not the sort of economically depressed areas that aren't growing, these are heavily Republican populations where Republicans need to socialize these folks. It is a GOP problem.

MR. DIONNE: I will only say vote early. Read this book often.

I want to thank a spectacular panel and a spectacular and high-turnout audience. Thank you very much.

[Applause.]