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**THE FUTURE OF GLOBAL GOVERNANCE**

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STROBE TALBOTT: Thank you all for being here. Welcome both to the Brookings Institution and to the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, our neighbor and partner next door. I'm Strobe Talbott, and let me say a few words to introduce the subject of this morning's discussion, and also the three colleagues who will be leading it.

Governance is a word that has become both fashionable and controversial in recent years; controversial particularly if the adjective "global" is attached to it. There are some parts of our political spectrum in this country where if you say the words global governance, people imagine blue helmets and maybe black helicopters. And there are also parts of the political spectrum where global governance has a ring of panacea and utopia about it.

Here at this institution and next door at the Endowment we take both the word governance and the phrase global governance very seriously indeed. Jessica will speak for herself on this in due course, but I think there's probably a consensus among us here that governance, while it subsumes the more common word "government," is actually much broader and has many more dimensions to it than government per se. Governance, at least in my own personal dictionary, means all those many ways in which we organize ourselves, regulate ourselves, and set up our associations in a way to make our various communities work better and also to advance the interests of individuals in a way that is compatible with the many communities of which they are a part.

When I arrived here at Brookings last July, one of the first things I did, principally with the assistance and support of my colleague, Carol Graham, who is standing in the back of the room, was to take what had been the Department of Government Studies here at Brookings and change its name, and indeed the scope of the program, to be the Department of Governance Studies. One of the next things that we did was to welcome Ann Florini here as a colleague.

Ann has been somebody whose work I have admired for a very long time indeed. I've had a chance to work with her on various ventures, including a chance occasionally to look over her shoulder while she's been working on the book that she will be introducing to us all this morning. She is also a driving force behind a fairly ambitious high-powered commission on global governance that is being run by the World Economic Forum in Davos. All of us here at Brookings are very glad to have her in our midst, and we're very proud of the work that she's done, particularly the book that is now being published.

Ann came to us from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, where she worked very closely with Jessica Matthews for a number of years. Jessica is really an intellectual leader on the subject of global governance herself, and in fact she has made it not just a theme in her own work but very much a theme in the work done by the Carnegie Endowment. Global governance was the overarching subject of an extraordinarily useful, impressive and fairly large book called "Managing Global Issues,"

which is kind of a compendium of some of the best, most practical, most hard-headed thinking about global governance and how it relates to various areas of human endeavor, ranging from security, to environment, to economics. I'm very glad that Jessica would come next door to be part of this program here this morning.

Jim Steinberg, who is a senior fellow and director and vice president of Brookings in charge of our Foreign Policy Studies, has also been grappling with this issue, both as a scholar and also as a practitioner in government. I think many of you know that he was the director of the policy planning staff at the State Department and the deputy national security adviser to the president in the previous administration. Jim has, in his time here at Brookings, made the issue of governance one of the principal dimensions of the work that the Foreign Policy Studies program does, and also of a number of projects that Jim is working on in an interdisciplinary fashion with Carol Graham and the Governance Studies department, and also Bob Light in the Economic Studies department. He's been addressing it in the context of globalization, a phenomenon that obviously has many implications for governance.

Jim and I are about to go together to Seoul to take part in a set of meetings on what's happening in that part of the world. He and another colleague are running a program here called the Center for Northeast Asia Policy Studies, and the emergence of what could be over time a transnational governance structure in Asia has been one of the many subjects that he's pursued in his own work.

Obviously governance has more than a little bit of relevance to the preoccupying issue of Iraq that Jim has spent so much time on. It relates both to the way in which the international governance system, led by the United Nations, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the European Union, has worked and has not worked during the lead-up to the war that is now underway. When that war is over, there will of course be some governance issues front and center, both local and global, as it were – local in the sense of what will be the governance mechanism put in place to set up a kind of trusteeship for Iraq, and then how will all of the nations that have an interest in Iraq work, we hope, to repair the damage that has been done to the international governance system as a result of the breakdown of diplomacy on the eve of this war.

So there is much to talk about, and without further ado I turn to Ann, who will spend a few minutes telling us about her book.

ANN FLORINI: Thanks, Strobe. Before I start talking about what I learned from the book, I just want to say that I'm really honored to be on this panel with this set of people. I think it's an extraordinary group to have this conversation with, particularly Jessica Matthews, who had been influencing my thinking on global governance issues for many years before I went to the Carnegie Endowment. And my thanks to Strobe and to Jim for fitting this into an incredibly busy schedule. They will be running out of here at 11:00 to go and catch planes, and they're giving up a few hours of Hawaiian sunshine to do so.

MR. TALBOTT: Korean sunshine in my case.

MS. FLORINI: I want to start by asking you to cast your minds beyond the issues of the moment and think a little bit more broadly about the global future. When you do that, it's fairly easy to think of some pretty depressing things. You can think about specific shocks to the global system that could lead to a very pessimistic future: a collapse of the Japanese banking system that drags down the whole global economy; climate change-induced shifts in the direction of the Gulf Stream that would cast northern Europe into an ice age. Or you can think of general patterns of decay, some of which we may be seeing now: organized crime running rampant through porous borders; fundamental breakdown of the open global economy; environmental degradation, even short of catastrophic climate change shifts, that would bring huge changes in weather patterns, fisheries, et cetera.

But you can also imagine a much brighter global future. You can imagine the essential elimination of dire poverty, the kind of poverty that has half the world living on less than \$2 a day now, thanks to freer and more open global markets. You can think of a resolution of most of the problems of environmental degradation, thanks the widespread adoption of environmentally benign technologies.

Neither of these futures is inevitable. What kind of future we're going to face is going to depend on the kinds of choice that we are all collectively making now. Those are choices that often happen to be transnational, and often in fact happen to be global. What I want to talk to you about today is why it is that those choices have to be made at such a large scale, what's wrong with the current systems for making those large-scale choices, and how we might change those decision-making processes so that we make those choices better.

First is, why? Why do we need to be talking about global governance at all? I'm not going to spend a lot of time on that for this audience. I think most people here are very familiar with it. There's the whole agenda of global transnational issues: proliferation, trade in small arms, environmental degradation, the drug trade and other organized crime, the threat of financial instability, infectious disease that we've been hearing about a great deal lately. But there are also transnational aspects to most of the other issues that the world is grappling with. If you take poverty reduction, for example, poverty reduction is usually thought of as a national responsibility, something governments have to do on their own. It is true that if national governments adopt bad policies there's not a whole lot that global governance can do to compensate. But it's also true that we've been telling developing countries for many years now that the way to develop is to participate in an open global economy. So we'd better make sure that that global economy functions in ways that actually make development possible.

That means that the solutions to poverty are not just national, they are also transnational. They include a fair free trade system, appropriate foreign direct investment, broad financial stability, and a general belief in the basic fairness of a global economic system if we want that system to stay open. And it's not just the solutions to

problems like poverty that are global, it's also the consequences of what happens if we don't solve them. I don't want to spend a lot of time on that, but there's a very evocative phrase that Allen Hammond of the World Resources Institute has come up with: "If we give the poor nothing else to export in a globalized world, they will certainly export their misery." But what's wrong with the global systems that we have in place now for dealing with all these issues is that we don't have good systems in place for making the decisions about how to deal with all these problems. Global governance right now is often ineffective. Where it's effective, it's often seen as unfair, and the existing institutions that have worked to some degree are increasingly under threat.

The whole system is based on rules that were set up more than 50 years ago, and they're based on assumptions that a handful of great powers will most of the time make the decisions for how the world is going to be run. This is quite explicit if you look at things like the voting structures of the United Nations Security Council, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank. They very explicitly say that a small number of great powers get the power. It was designed for a time when war between countries was seen as the only real threat to security, when national economies engaged in trade but otherwise functioned largely separately, and when environmental concerns were scarcely a blip on the radar screen. Obviously the world is very different now.

Is that system doing very well at coping with global issues? On many of the issues that matter most, we really don't know. Global monitoring is so poor that we don't know what is happening on a number of the issues of concern. But what we do know is often troubling. Certainly in areas like provision of basic health care and education, broad questions of security, and especially on most environmental goals it's pretty clear that we're falling far short of the mark. And there's also a widespread perception, especially outside the rich countries, that the whole system of global governance that we have is fundamentally unfair. There are far too many parts of the world where there is no meaningful capacity to participate in that system.

So what are the alternatives if you want to come up with a better way of doing global governance? I can think of five. One is to have a system that is essentially an empire, run by the United States. This is not something we should dismiss out of hand, in part because there are elements of that already in place. We can also look back to the post-World War II period when the U.S. essentially did make most of the rules, working with other countries, but it was the rule-setter. It was a pretty benevolent hegemon in that period. It showered Europe with aid under the Marshall Plan, it transformed Germany and Japan, it created international institutions to stabilize the global economy and global security, and it often opened its own markets to others who did not reciprocate, as a way of promoting development and reconstruction.

Unfortunately, I think U.S. thinking right now on its role in the world doesn't seem to reflect that kind of far-sighted vision of how you construct a global order that other people would be willing to go along with. We will soon find out whether the U.S. includes in its visions of its role in the world a sustained focus on nation-building.

Another option, if you don't want empire, is to talk about world government, taking the existing international institutions or creating new ones and building them up to the point that they take on the full range of responsibilities that we now assign to national governments. I think this would be the worst option of all. If we learned anything from the history of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, it's that extreme centralization of power is a very bad idea, and it's also politically completely unfeasible. There is no way that the world's national governments or citizens are going to cede that kind of taxing and regulatory power to supranational authorities any time in the foreseeable future, and I think that's probably good.

The third option is reverse global integration altogether. Do away with the need for global governance by doing away with globalization. Clamp down the barriers on trade flows and financial flows. I think this would also be a very bad idea. We tried this in the 1930s and the results were not good. The problems with economic integration now aren't economic integration. It's the specific rules by which economic integration is being carried out. And even if we reversed economic globalization, we'd still be left with a whole range of security and environmental issues that fall under the heading of global issues. So you can't just reverse your way out of the problem.

Another option that gets talked about a lot, especially in some circles in Washington, is forget about governance altogether and just let market forces reign, let market forces do everything. Unfortunately, just assuming away the need for collective action doesn't actually remove the need for collective action; it just means that these problems don't get solved. So if you don't want to have an empire or world government, or reversal of global integration, or assume that you can just ignore the problems of global integration, what's left?

What's left is the possibility of something that I call "the coming democracy," which is the title of the book that you saw on your way in here. It takes a bit of explaining. If you think about what a democratic system actually needs, what it needs are systems of voice and accountability, ways for people to make their voices heard and to hold their decisionmakers accountable. How people can go about making their voices heard and holding decisionmakers accountable varies, depending on technology and ideas and other things.

Right now we're at a time when changes in technology and changes in idea are making possible new ways of providing for voice and accountability at the global scale. The changes in technology are very familiar. I'm not going to spend time on them. The whole range of surveillance and information processing and communications technologies that we all know of called the information revolution. The one point I do want to make about this is: there's reason to think that a real change in information technology can have a profound effect on political systems because it's done it before.

If you look back at the impact that the printing press had 500 years ago, you can argue that it was responsible for, or at least made possible, everything from the Protestant Reformation, to the Enlightenment, to the rise of nationalism in the nation-state, to the

possibility of democratic forms of national governance. It's possible that the digital revolution that we're living through now could have similarly great implications for patterns of governance. But it won't automatically happen. After all, China had the printing press much earlier and had none of the same kinds of political upheaval as a result that Europe did. There are other things that have to happen at the same time.

There are a couple of other things happening right now in the world that make it at least plausible that this kind of information revolution can have those kinds of political effects. One is a change in an idea, and it's an idea about who has the right to know what and who's entitled to keep what secrets. There's a contest that's been going on for some time between forces favoring secrecy and forces favoring transparency. Do government officials and corporate officials and others have the right to keep secrets, or are they required to release information to the public? It's a contest that's been going on for decades, but it got especially heated in the 1990s.

In the 1990s you saw an amazing proliferation of national access to information – Freedom of Information Acts around the world, from just a handful to more than 40 now, and the numbers are still going up. In international organizations you saw a real sea change in attitude, to the degree that especially the IMF, but some others as well, are now releasing huge quantities of information they used to keep secret, and they're pressuring their member governments to do the same. Corporations are facing all sorts of pressures to release information on environmental and labor practices and other things.

This is not the kind of contest that gets won, once and for all, and we're obviously seeing a big backlash in the United States against the idea of transparency. But if you look over the last several decades, transparency is clearly winning. So we have information technology and we have a transparency norm that is helping to get information out to the public. And that, I think, has big implications for how we can do governance, but only if there is a third factor, which is somebody prepared to do something with this information. That, I think, brings us to the subject of civil society, the rise of civil society around the world.

Civil society is just the whole set of human organizations that are not governmental and are not profit-seeking. It's the everything-else category. And we see it growing just about everywhere around the world, for a whole host of reasons that I don't have time to get into. It's becoming globalized, as you saw in the antiwar protests that were coordinated across continents, to a degree that has never happened before, but the antiwar protests were just the most visible element of a whole series of transnational civil society campaigns that have been going on for some time, on everything from landmines to human rights to dam construction to almost any subject you can think of.

You take these three things together – information technology, the transparency norm, and the rise of civil society – and it makes possible a truly different approach to global governance. It's not one that's going to do away with the need for national governments, and even inter-governmental organizations, but it will change how those bodies operate, and in some cases it can replace traditional governance by government.

I am just about of time. I want to give just one example, an example Jessica has heard many times, and it comes from the environmental field, because that's the field where this whole idea of what you might call regulation by revelation is most advanced. In the mid-1980s, the U.S. Congress passed a law that required that companies that release certain quantities of toxic chemicals had to report to the Environmental Protection Agency how much they were releasing. That's all the law said. It did not tell them that they had to cut back on their emissions. But in the decade after that law went into effect, the emissions went down by close to half, even though production of those chemicals was rising. The reason was, no company who was involved in dealing with these chemicals wanted to be at the top of the public list of who was polluting the most in their area. It's an idea that rapidly spread around the world. Most of Europe has now adopted it; Japan has set up a similar kind of registry.

A number of developing countries that don't have the bureaucratic infrastructure to carry out that kind of registry have invented some pretty interesting variants on the theme. In Indonesia, for example, the environmental protection agency there started color-coding factories. If you were performing above expectations, above what the regulations required, you got gold. If you were way below what the expectations were, you got black, and there was a whole range of colors in between, sort of like the homeland security rankings we have here. The impact even in Indonesia, a developing country where there wasn't really a whole lot of environmental enforcement, was pretty striking. It wasn't that companies that were doing pretty well decided they had to do even better, but the ones that were at the very bottom of the list went to some length to get off the bottom of the list because they came under such pressure from their local communities that it changed their behavior. So this kind of transparency-based system of governance can work, can have a fairly drastic impact on behavior.

Just to wrap up, this is not at all the electoral kinds of system that we think of when we usually think about democracy. But electoral systems are not ends in themselves. They're just means to an end, and they are systems for providing accountability. Even in national democracies, elections are not enough to give you a truly democratic system. You also need ways of channeling voice and participation, like political parties and advocacy groups. Those voice and accountability functions, which we may now be able to do in these new and different ways, are the true meaning of democracy.

MR. TALBOTT: Thank you, Ann. Jessica?

JESSICA MATTHEWS: Well, it's a great pleasure to be with you all this morning, and celebrating publication of Ann's book and the culmination of many years of thinking about these issues that she's done. And I thank Strobe for putting this event together.

I feel it is true I've spent many years thinking about these issues, but I feel sort of paradoxical this morning because this event has caught me at a moment when I'm not



sure what I think any more. So I just want to share with you my sense of what the questions are again -- the confusions in my mind.

It's a very hard moment when the short-term issues seem so immense, the near-term uncertainties, when what we're really talking about is very long-term trends. To separate the two is more than I feel at least confident about doing right at this moment, but let me try to list for you what I think I know.

When I first started writing about this issue and some of the trends that Ann has just described, it seemed to me that the principal driving force was the revolution in information and communications technology, that these technologies so shifted the balance between fixed hierarchies, which is what governments necessarily are because they have to speak with a single voice -- or at least they're supposed to -- and shifting networks that are not tied to place or issue, that this was going to lead to profound political changes, and the direction of that technological change was forward, that it was not going to turn backwards. I still believe all of that.

I have to say that the political changes that I thought we would follow, we haven't seen yet, or they've been slower in coming or they're not going to come. I'm not sure which. But I do think that the technology change is of the order that Ann described. I have written elsewhere that, as she mentioned, the printing press did lead directly to the Protestant Reformation, and it did lead to a basic political change, which was eliminating the middleman between the individual and bigger issues. In the religious sense the Catholic Church put the priest in between the individual and God. The Protestant Reformation removed it; you could talk directly. And the political consequences were the same.

I saw five, six years ago a likely comparable outcome possible from this information revolution in removing the state as the middleman between the individual and global problems. I think in many respects we saw early signs of this, of which the clearest was the negotiation of the anti-personnel landmine treaty, which at the time when it was negotiated over the opposition of all five of the major powers broke all the rules of diplomacy in terms of you're not supposed to be able to negotiate in particular an arms control treaty over the opposition of all of the major powers. You're not supposed to be able to negotiate any global treaty or most anything important in 14 months, and on and on. It broke every rule and it seemed, as did some others, to suggest that those changes were coming.

As I say, I guess I leave this particular question within my mind a question mark. Are the political consequences of this information revolution going to be as big as five years ago I thought that they were? The answer is I'm not sure, but I do believe that the fundamental changes of it, the empowerment of individuals and non-fixed entities as opposed to fixed ones is real, is there, and is going to continue and move forward.

Secondly, I do believe that 9/11 was a turning point, obviously, but a very particular kind of one in that it changed the United States vastly more than it changed the

rest of the world. This has led to, excuse me, a real discontinuity in international affairs that we are uncomfortably living through. And how exactly this will play out, we'll come back to this; some words on that in a minute. But I think it's important to recognize that for the rest of the world, 9/11 was not such a big deal. Most of the rest of the world did not live in the illusion that we lived in. That space, our two grand oceans and our huge continental size, made us safe. They lived with domestic terrorism. They lived with international terrorism. It was not the shock to the system, even had it occurred elsewhere, that it was here. And this is a really important lesson to remember.

The third thing I think I know about global governance is that an important rift, a deep powerful rift was developing long before this diplomatic crisis over Iraq, and long before the Bush administration, between the United States and the European community. It was a rift I think that comes from the fact that the E.U. is an enormously important historical deviation, development, one which the United States for more than a decade had been consistently downplaying, underestimating, unappreciating. You remember that at every step along the way to the common currency, the expert consensus in the United States was that it wouldn't happen, it couldn't happen, that the next step, Maastricht, wouldn't happen, then the introduction of the currency wouldn't happen, et cetera, and it kept happening.

As Europe began an often heavily bureaucratic but, as one looks back at it now, sweeping set of regulatory harmonizations, we largely ignored it. Just to give you one example, during the decade that it took the United States to reach an agreement on acid rain legislation, which was basically an effort to balance the interests of Ohio and Vermont, Europe negotiated six long-range air pollution treaties where you were balancing the interests of Greece and Germany and much bigger differences.

But to give you a sense of the depth of that difference, there has been over the past not quite decade an enormous amount of international treaties in which the E.U. as a solid block has gone in one direction and the U.S. in another. You probably know the list, but it's worth kind of appreciating its length. There is the International Criminal Court, the climate change treaty, the landmines treaty, the biodiversity treaty, the question of negotiating a verification regime for the biological weapons treaty, the Comprehensive Test- Ban Treaty, profound difference over the fate of the ABM Treaty and over national missile defense. And then other issues that didn't come to formal votes: the question of a small arms convention, the treatment of the environment in the World Trade Organization, and the regulation of genetically modified foods -- both the last two of course still very much in process.

Many of these of course predate the Bush administration, but to give you a sense of it also, the vote on the landmines treaty was 142 to nothing with 18 abstentions; on the International Criminal Court, 120 to 7 with 21 abstentions; on Kyoto, 178 to one, et cetera. The point is that the U.S. found itself in all these cases, the three I've read and several others, not a single other democracy voted with us in opposition except Israel and India, in two cases on proliferation issues. And the countries in whose company we found ourselves were China, Cuba, Libya, Iraq and Iran.

There was clearly something happening in our sense of how global governance ought to get done that goes back before this administration that reaches to the question of national priorities as weighed against the global ones, national solutions as weighed against global ones. It goes to the question of whether treaties are a good solution even if you're doing nation state-based regulation at all, and I think that now sits as an open question.

Let me turn now to what I don't think I know at all. Let me just, if I could, read you the conclusion to the piece I wrote in 1997 called "Power Shift," and when I read it now I'm not sure exactly what I think. But you can join me in not knowing what you think. But I wrote that, "If current trends continue, the international system 50 years hence will be profoundly different. During a transition, the Westphalian system and an evolving one will exist side by side. States will set the rules by which all other actors operate, but outside forces will increasingly make decisions for them. In using business, NGO's, and international organizations to address problems they cannot or do not want to take on, states will more often than not inadvertently weaken themselves further. Thus governments" – let me skip a little bit here. "But at least for a time the transition is likely to weaken rather than bolster the world's capacity to solve its problems. If states with the overwhelming share of power, wealth and capacity can do less, less will get done."

You know, when you're talking about a 50-year transition, it's hard to know at a given moment even one that, say, began, let's take three or four years ago, and in the midst of what is I think the biggest crisis for multilateral governance that we have gone through in 50 years, I do believe that, that this moment is the United Nations, its biggest crisis since it was created.

It's hard to know whether a 50-year trend – with what we're seeing is a blip on the 50-year trend. I do think we are at a period where at least the state capacity to act multilaterally is at a very low ebb. Even thinking in terms of needed reforms at the UN, of course seems way beyond the capacity of this system to take on. The alternatives and outlined five, that four of which are clearly non-starters, one of which I think is, elements at least of it are possible, but way in the future. The United States is talking about coalitions of the willing. Well, coalitions of the willing, even when they're willing and even when they're coalitions, are crisis management systems. That's all they are. That's what they're designed as. The famous sheriff and his posse are – by definition a posse is called up when there is a bad guy to go after or a problem to solve. There is no institution building, no capacity building, no ongoing creation of capacity to deal with issues in between the crises. So coalition of the willing is at best a solution that deals only with a tiny bit of the problems that we're dealing with here.

I guess I would like to leave it there. I know this is not a very satisfactory kind of presentation, but at least it's an honest reflection of what I think is a moment of enormous consequence for us where we risk breaking something for which we have no replacement, where we seriously risk it, and where there is no visible sign of will to create a replacement.

Years ago, Harlan Cleveland had this wonderful phrase which always stuck with me, that what we needed -- and he was saying it in a much happier time -- was post-war thinking without the war. And what he meant of course was that post-World War II in this period, and even to some extent post-World War I, there was a moment of immense international and social innovation, where we created virtually the entire international system that we live with today. And it came out of the sense of blank slateness, anything possiblensness, determination to do better that came after that immense effort from World War II. And when you compare it to what we have today, you can see we don't have anything remotely like that willingness to move forward. Now we have the war, and there's the question of whether we have the post-war thinking, which I don't see yet.

MR TALBOTT: Thank you, Jessica. Jim?

JAMES STEINBERG: Thank you, Strobe. It's also a pleasure to be here with Ann to be part of celebrating a really quite remarkable book and a real contribution to all of our thinking about this. I'm grateful to Jessica for her path-breaking work in this area and her sobering thoughts this morning.

I'm going to be more down-to-earth and do the practitioner thing here. It strikes me that the two lessons you can take away from what Ann and Jessica said is that on the one hand, global governance, or at least some form of collective governance, is clearly necessary. We know the nature of the problems, but it's also very hard. It shouldn't be surprising that it's hard. We all know the problems of collection action, the public goods, and the like. There are inherent difficulties in trying to deal with challenges like this.

We're in a world in which we need to be striving for the kinds of objectives that both Ann and Jessica have been talking about, but we also, I think, have to recognize that the solutions that we're going to come up with are going to be partial and incomplete and often disappointing. The question is how do we do, if not the best, then the good in this context? And how can we understand what the experience we've been through teaches us about where we need to go?

I think what a lot of us here are doing right now is trying to do a little bit of this, just carefully picking through the experiences that we've had to understand the dimensions of the problem, the kinds of choices that we have, and trying to fit the pieces together. How do we think about the right solutions and the right strategies for different kinds of problems? The kinds of global issues, transnational issues, collective goods problems that we have are different across a lot of different challenges. The solutions that we're going to find are going to be different both because of the substantive nature of the challenge and because of the politics that go with each of the issues.

I want to talk just a little bit on the security side because it's obviously something that I've spent the most time with. I think that the challenge that you recognize from the outset is that there are sort of two dimensions of these problems, and Ann touched on them. I'll use a slightly different language, which is a legitimacy issue and an

effectiveness issue. They're not unrelated because part of what makes a solution, a strategy, effective is legitimacy, and it definitely strengthens the ability to see a problem resolved. But they have different dimensions.

Legitimacy is obviously a particularly challenging problem in the international context because we don't have sort of agreed mechanisms for decision, or even an agreement about in principle what makes things legitimate. And even in our own national context we tend to think of democracy as a legitimating factor, one person-one vote and the like, but as Ann has suggested, even that is not necessarily a perfectly legitimating question. There are differences of access, difference of money in the political system and the like. Think how much more challenging that legitimating question is on the international side.

One nation-one vote? No self-evident reason as to why that is a good answer. Why does China get only one vote for its population and the Marshall Islands gets one for its? So do we weight countries by the number of their people? But why are those collectivities the right answer? So there isn't a single answer to the question about what kind of decisional rule, procedural decisional rule would be the right one to make a decision legitimate.

Both Ann and Jessica talked about the fact that in a lot of these systems they are imposed by the great powers, or imposed by a small number of powers, the G-8 or the United States and Europe. Is that inherently illegitimate? If they are able to move the process forward, does that de-legitimize the answer?

So one of the things we're going to be looking for as we think about different answers is under what circumstances is universality the right answer? Is that the only way to legitimate a decision? In what circumstances is something less than the whole the right grouping to go for, and what should the decisional rules be? The flip side of course is effectiveness because one of the challenges that we've seen is the problem of, in many cases, where you have broadly accepted decisional rules, principles, global treaties which aren't enforced, aren't able to achieve the objective that is set out. How do we evaluate a system which has a high degree of legitimacy because it has a certain degree of universality, or whatever other test we want to use for legitimacy, but doesn't achieve its results?

When we take those two variables, how does that apply to what we do? Well, first of all, we do have -- as Jessica suggested, we have treaties. We have formal universal arrangements that try to establish norms, and in some cases mechanisms for seeing those norms put into action. We have treaties like the nonproliferation treaty. We have treaties like the biological weapons convention, the chemical weapons convention, the various terrorism conventions that have been adopted by the vast, vast majority of states.

We obviously have seen that they have value as norm-setting, value as establishing a set of principles that are agreed to, but we also see a problem with many of

these that, absent an effective enforcement mechanism, it becomes very easy for states to agree to these norms and principles and not follow through. Then we have the problem, if you want to try to combine the two, how do you build enforcement into it, and who is going to be the mechanism of that enforcement? And there you get to the challenge that Ann identified, which is the temptation is to say you need an international organization to do it, and you move toward a kind of centralized answer of a form of world government. Is that going to be effective? Or can we now, in a new way, begin to adapt some of the strategies that Ann suggested, to use transparency and accountability as a means of enforcement rather than having a centralized enforcement mechanism?

In addition to the universal treaties, we obviously have international institutions, which are either universal, like the UN, or at least universal for a region, to try to also establish norms and goals. We're seeing right now the challenges of making the UN system work in the security context, where the individual members have different stakes in the outcome and are going to be making choices in which they are trying to balance their long-term interest in having a system of collective security against their short-term interest, that Jessica has identified, of trying to deal with a specific problem.

A question which I think has been posed very dramatically by the Bush administration, which is that if you accept their assessment of the threat then even if there is an inherent legitimacy in the processes of the UN, will it ever be acceptable for others to make a judgment about a threat if you feel that your security is directly acted on? That's why there's been a tendency to move towards like-minded approaches, which is why at least during the Cold War NATO seemed to be so effective because there was a shared sense of both the nature of the threat and the challenge to be met. So you sort of had a threshold in which the legitimacy came not because of the inherent character of who was in it, but rather because there were shared views about what needed to be done.

This idea of like-mindedness, it seems to me, has become an increasingly important part of our overall landscape on thinking about collective action. It's different from what I think Jessica correctly criticized, the coalitions of the willing, which are ad hoc formulas. But they are means of overcoming the kind of problem of common interest that global universal institutions had, but they also have the problem that because they are not comprehensive, there are going to be actors outside it who don't share the views.

So in addition to having regional institutions of like-minded, like NATO, you have regional or like-minded regimes such as the Missile Technology Control Regime, which are not universal but represent a group of states which are willing to take a common objective and agree to a set of principles. In the technology area of security, this has become an increasingly pervasive tool. We have it with missiles; we have it with the chemical weapons side, on chemical supplies; we have it on nuclear supplies with the Zanger group. These things obviously have an attraction as a strategy because you do have countries -- since they voluntarily come to it, their willingness to live up to the norms is much higher than things which are sort of universally imposed. But you have the problem of how effective can they be if they don't include the very people who you

want to observe the norms, who don't have to choose to join the treaty and can stand outside it.

Then finally you have a whole new world that Ann has begun to identify, of more setting outside the actual governance, of creating a set of principles, whether they're in fair labor practices or whether they're in issues like landmines, where the norm-setting comes not from governments trying to impart will, but trying to set standards which governments then are challenged to meet.

It seems to me that what we need now to do is to begin to look at each of these categories, to look at the circumstances in which the different strategies can work -- where are treaties likely to be effective? -- dealing with what kinds of problems, with what kinds of expectations, with what kinds of mechanisms of enforcement. And similarly, through each of the different types of challenges that we face, through global institutions, regional institutions, gatherings of like-minded states, to begin to develop these very pragmatic strategies where we match up specific problems against the different tools that we have available.

It seems to me that ultimately that's the only approach to governance that's likely to meet the kinds of challenges that both Ann and Jessica have identified.

MR. TALBOTT: Thank you, Jim, very much. We have about a half an hour. It's your meeting, ladies and gentlemen. Perhaps identify yourself, and if you'd direct a question to one of the members of the panel.

Q: My question would actually go to anybody. I'm John Workman, with Consortium of Social Science Associations. Something that we've seen in the press recently that the E.U. is starting to debate is whether they want to institutionalize a presidency. Do you think this is something that can rival the U.S. presidency eventually? Is it something that can work? How would you advise them on that?

MR. TALBOTT: Jim, it strikes me that this is something that you've been working on.

MR. STEINBERG: The challenge that the Union faces is that it has two very different dimensions. It has its intergovernmental dimension and it has its communitarian dimension. Where the Union acts as a collective, where the full authority has been ceded to the collectivity, to the Commission, it seems to me that having a reasonably strong executive can work because you have a match between the authority and the power that's been granted to it.

The problem with the new presidency that is being discussed now in the constitutional convention is that that president is representing not the communitarian side of the E.U. but rather the intergovernmental side. So even though this person can in effect be a spokesman when the intergovernmental process generates results, that person is still only able to act when the governments themselves act.

It seems to me that as long as you have the presidency associated with the intergovernmental part of the process, you don't have an executive in the classic sense. In fact, it is really like having the president of the Senate. You have somebody who can speak once the collectivity has agreed, but they're still going to decide things in an intergovernmental way.

I don't think that inherently is going to give much of an impetus to the unifying of that side, the intergovernmental part of the Union. The most one could hope for is that by giving sort of a central place to organize the work plan around that there could be more agenda-setting, and therefore more ability to try and do some forward-looking thinking and get the intergovernmental part of the E.U. to take on issues that they don't do now, that they are largely crisis oriented in their orientation. So I think it's a positive step forward, but I don't think by itself is going to lead to a greater centralization or unification of the policymaking on issues like the common foreign security policy or the other intergovernmental aspects of the E.U.

Q: Graham Saul from the Bank Information Center. This is a question for Ann. You spoke earlier about the transparency within the International Monetary Fund, which I think is fair to say to some extent also is for the multilateral development banks, like the World Bank, given the fact that in the early 1990s these institutions didn't even have disclosure policies per se.

Interestingly enough, though, given that the issue before us here is global governance, the area of transparency in these institutions, multilateral development banks and the International Monetary Fund, what has changed the least or progressed the least is in fact in the governance of the institutions themselves, the governing bodies of these institutions. Specifically here I'm talking about the boards of executive directors, which are groups of 20-odd people who cumulatively represent the member states and govern the institution at a policy level.

This Sunday the Development Committee of the World Bank group and the International Monetary Fund will meet to discuss the voice and participation of developing countries in the governance structures of the World Bank group. Ironically enough, they'll meet behind closed doors to have that discussion, and in fact behind police barricades.

I was wondering if you had something to say to them about the role of transparency in fostering legitimacy of the governing bodies of these institutions in terms of not only with it between the bodies and the member governments, but between the bodies and the citizens of the countries where these institutions operate. What would that be?

MS. FLORINI: A big question. I think my response would be -- I started to smile when Jim started his remarks talking about legitimacy and effectiveness as being the reasons that you need voice and accountability. I actually had a paragraph about



exactly that in my remarks that I took out in the interest of time, so I was very glad that he brought the point up.

The fight over transparency is always a battle, and it is a battle in part because people want to keep secrets, sometimes for good reasons and sometimes bad reasons, but also because transparency is just inherently frightening. When you are not in the habit of disclosing information, the fact that somebody is saying, we want to see what you're up to so we can decide how we're going to hold you accountable, how we're going to think about what you're doing; if you're not accustomed to that it's a very frightening thought.

Any time you have a debate over transparency -- and you see that especially coming from the international organizations right now. Everyone is saying transparency is a wonderful thing; point the spotlight that way, not this way. So it is not at all surprising that you're seeing the governing bodies of those institutions holding their transparency debates behind closed doors. That's pretty much par for the course. The E.U. has been doing much the same thing.

I think those organizations are at something of a turning point right now, and this is a turning point that it's the member governments have to decide what they're going to do something about. It's not the institutions per se. It's not the staff at the institutions. These are political questions about who is accountable to whom. That is a question that the member governments of organizations like the IMF and the World Bank have not yet come to an answer about. It's essentially a principal agent problem. These are international organizations that are agents of their members, and their member governments are the principals. But those member governments in turn are agents of their citizens, who are supposed to be their principals.

When you're talking about transparency, you're often talking about, how do you deal with the principal agent problem where agents are keeping secrets from the principals so that the agents can go off and do what they want to do, as opposed to what their principals have hired them to do? When you're talking about international organizations it gets very complicated because there are competing ideologies about who actually is the principal. Is it the member government, or is it the citizenry to which the member governments are supposed to be answering?

My argument would be that you can no longer legitimately make the argument that it's the member governments alone who are the principals, that it truly is the citizenry to whom these member governments are answerable, that if you want to keep secrets from the citizens you have to make an argument for why it is in the interest of the citizens that this information be kept confidential, and I don't think that's the way they are currently framing the debate.

MS. MATTHEWS: If I could just briefly add something. If you look back to where the World Bank was and the WTO, say, in the mid-1980s, these institutions, while still certainly imperfect, are unrecognizable in terms of their openness towards non-state agents, principals. So there has been an enormous change. The gap now as compared to

the WTO in the mid-1980s in terms of recognizing the legitimacy of anybody other than national governments, this is a completely different entity, and the Bank even more so. So maybe where we are is digesting a period of enormous change in a time when the digestion process is going forward and not much – excuse this metaphor – coming out the other end. (Laughter.)

And the other thing that I think has happened is that this is a time when technology and changes in the sense of what's acceptable have sort of outstripped our ability to manage it very successfully. For me the experience that was searing in this respect was during Three Mile Island when I was in the White House and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, in the first few days when we had no idea what was going on inside the reactor and what the consequences were going to be, had to meet in rolling meetings of two people because if three of them came into the same room at the same time you had to go through this whole set of mandated procedures of calling an open meeting and having reporters and having advance notice in the middle of a crisis. So there were literally two guys would sit at the table and then one would leave and a third would come in, so that they weren't actually meeting, to meet the transparency rules. As you can imagine, this was not the world's best way to manage a crisis.

We may be in a digestion phase.

Q: Jeff Steinberg with EIR. I have a question for Jessica, but I'd welcome anyone else who wants to jump in. I just reviewed Vice President Cheney's "Meet the Press" interview on March 16<sup>th</sup>, just preceding the launching of the Iraq war. I think he used the reference to September 11<sup>th</sup> I think 14 times in the one-hour interview to basically justify the U.S. assertion that the entire framework of 20<sup>th</sup> century post-World War II institutions and methods of international relations was down the tubes.

I wonder whether or not the actions by the Bush administration in Iraq and the apparent intent to unilaterally handle the postwar occupation and economic recovery somewhat hijacks the issue and poses a challenge to all other governments and international organizations, whether they're just going to sort of pretend it didn't happen and hope it goes away or whether you think that there has to be a direct frontal challenge to this assertion of one superpower, one vote decides everything.

MS. MATTHEWS: The only answer that I can give you is it depends how this comes out. I really believe that. I think the question you've posed is there, and it's on the table. If it should turn out even now that the rest of this is much easier than I personally think it will be and the U.S. comes out of this with a sense that you see this was all a waste of time, the UN should just be a giant NGO that delivers food and water and blankets and everything else serious should be done by the U.S., etc., we may go one way. Equally I can imagine it very much going the other way.

I guess I do think this, that the key document was the National Security Strategy document, and that we never had the debate over the concept of preemption that was called for, for two reasons. One was that many people believed that this was not really a

serious strategy but only a way, given the intellectual framework around Iraq, and therefore we should ignore it, and also because it kind of got wrapped up and submerged in Iraq. But to me that document is the document that deserves now for us to return to, and that holds within it, frames the debate for the people of the United States that we haven't had.

MR. STEINBERG: Well, obviously there's a lot to be said about the national security strategy we've all been talking about a lot. But I want to go back to the core of your question because I think the problem here is that no one is covered with a lot of glory in this entire episode. There's no question about the risks about the unilateral actions that the Bush administration has taken. On the other hand, the UN's dealing with the problem of disarmament of Iraq over the last 12 years has also not been an endorsement about the effectiveness of the Security Council as a particularly good tool, even by its own terms.

This goes to my broad point about the Council and the resolutions, beginning with 687, were important norm-setting principles. It was decided by this collective organization representing the world community that it was not acceptable for Saddam Hussein to have weapons of mass destruction. It was the condition of the cease-fire that was adopted, not unilaterally by the United States but by the Security Council. Yet for 12 years the Council was essentially not serious about it. We had a sanctions regime. Over time it was not taken very seriously. We have an inspection regime that was not backed up by the Council so that when Saddam finally figured out that he could get away with restricting the activity of the inspectors, restricting the access, that Council was not going to act forcefully to implement its mandate.

So while you can argue that the United States has kind of blown the whole international system open by acting unilaterally, the question was, who was going to stand up and act on behalf of the Council's own resolutions? So I think on both sides there are some real risks here that need to be addressed and repaired if we're going to think about the alternatives to having the United States feel like it is the only actor that is capable of acting, and therefore will act irrespective of what others say.

Q: Maryann Cusimano Lord (ph) from Catholic University. I'd like to ask both Ann and Jessica to speak on two trends. Even though we're in a unilateralist moment, we're seeing the undercutting of international institutions, we nevertheless see kind of Anne-marie Slaughter's government-to-government, subgovernment, or whether you look at it as functionalism or federalism, that type of cooperation increasing on security issues, terrorism, money laundering, et cetera. And you also see a lot of at least talk, if not full action, on public-private partnerships as another way. So they both seem to be means of global governance that states accepting that they can't act unilaterally and integrating non-state actors.

I wonder if you could talk about those two trends, both the government and the sub-governmental cooperation and the public-private partnerships, and the problem for

transparency and accountability with them if those systems are not built in to those mechanisms from the get-go.

MS. FLORINI: Let me take a crack at it first. Yes, the kind of cooperation that Anne-marie Slaughter writes about, which is governmental agencies cooperating across borders, not at the level of treaties but at the level of actual decision-making on the ground kind of stuff, is certainly growing, and we're seeing it in everything from justice officials communicating with each other to banking officials, pretty much across the board. That kind of discussion is growing and happening and having regulatory consequences.

You're also seeing an enormous growth in what's called public-private partnerships, which are the partnerships that bring together all of the sectors, government and NGO's, now particularly increasingly involving corporations as well. If you look in the environmental sector, that is what everybody is looking to as the great hope for the future. At the Johannesburg summit last year there were hundreds of public-private partnerships that were formally launched, the idea being that because the corporate sector is responsible for so much in the way of environmental problems it also has the capacity to implement so much in the way of solutions; that rather than regulating changes in behavior in the environmental field, what you do is work out what's the desirable behavior and how do you create the incentive systems that make everybody happy about this. It's a kind of goodwill approach to governance, really.

There are big questions about this because it does not go through formal governmental channels, and so the questions about who is accountable to whom for living up to what standards is very much an open question. In a lot of the campaigns that I look at in my book and have looked at elsewhere, the kind of accountability that you get is a very informalized accountability and has a great deal to do with the willingness of civil society to be monitoring what's going on in these partnerships, or in the independent behavior of corporations and governments. It's not clear to me what other kinds of accountability mechanisms you can have when you're talking about those partnerships.

If you see a continued growth in the willingness of civil society organizations to take on that kind of active monitoring role, I think you have to have a sector of the NGO community that does not participate in these partnerships, that sees itself as the monitoring side of the advocacy community, and you are seeing some of those being established as well. Now, some of those are actually working in partnership with corporations to figure out how do you do the monitoring in the first place, so there is a real danger that you will not have sufficient independent voices to make the process work. It's not clear to me whether it will work or not.

In the whole range of possibilities for governance that I was talking about in this more generalized democratic approach to global governance, I don't think that it's clear that any of it is going to work. I think Jessica raised some very good questions about we're not sure how well this is going to develop.

The point of the book really was to say there are at least these possibilities out there. They're a lot better than any of the other possibilities we can think of when we talk about how are we going to do global governance. It's in part a call to action on the part of this whole range of nongovernmental actors to take very seriously and systematically their own role in global governance. So I think there are serious dangers in the public/private partnership kind of approach to governance, but there are also real opportunities.

MS. MATTHEWS: Very quickly. I have thought for years, and still do, that the area where there is the biggest discrepancy between capacity to act and not just willingness but ability to act in self-interest as well as the broader one is in the private sector. For me this has been crystallized – I serve on the Secretary General's advisory council for the global compact, which is this effort he's put together, voluntary with business, to advance universally accepted principles. It keeps stumbling on precisely the issue that Ann just described, which is NGOs saying, well, wait a minute; who's setting the rules here and who's saying that they're actually doing what they're saying they're going to do? It almost immediately turns into, from the company's point of view, gee, I'd like to join this thing but all I'm going to get out of it is downside.

The thing gets sort of stuck there, and I see both sides' set of interests, and until we have a broader concept beyond doing well by doing good kind of social action by business, I don't see this ability to move forward too much.

Q: Kevin Finneran with Issues in Science and Technology. In Jessica's list of treaties where the United States was on the outside, I was struck by how many of them involve science and technology, whether it's genetically engineered crops, arms control, global warming. It seems to me that at least in the United States the science community has been pretty ineffective in playing a strong role in the making of these decisions, and at the international level the UN has virtually no formal mechanism for incorporating scientific and technical expertise into its negotiations.

My colleagues at the National Academy of Sciences are eager to participate with other national academies to try and play an active role in many of these areas. I don't know that they've figured out at all how to go about doing it, and I was wondering if you had any suggestions about what type of role that type of expertise in health, engineering and science, how it might be used to contribute to the types of things that you're talking about.

MS. MATTHEWS: I don't think that's the hang-up, Kevin. I mean, I don't think it's the lack of agreement on the science generally, right? It might be worth thinking about sort of recapping what we went through here, the enormous debates in the 70s about how to incorporate scientific and technological understanding into legislation. In the 70s, in the beginning it was sort of which side can call more Nobel prize winners to testify, and it was sort of, you got four and I got five, so my side won.

Then there was the idea of a sort of Star Chamber: we're going to make this more rational, more closed, we're going to have formal hearings. Then we created the Office of Technology Assessment. It had its strengths and its weaknesses, and now its death. We could kind of go back over what works.

Certainly what has not been a stellar success internationally has just been communication among national academies. That has really not been a powerful – but the other thing that has worked has been issue-specific. The IPCC, the climate change group, has been a huge success, and that's a model that has really done it all; that is, joined countries that have enormous capacity with countries that have very little capacity but a big interest in science and done a lot of equalizing, and also linked the scientific process to the political process in an almost unique way. It would be interesting to take a look more specifically at models.

I think this is where Jim ended his remarks, with a sort of sense that this is an area – and what he described at the end of his remarks is precisely what that Managing Global Issues book attempted to do, which is to take our whole experience in this area across 16 different issue areas, from environment to arms control, finance, everything in between, and say what worked and what didn't. It's a first step that I think is very valuable. It's huge, as Strobe mentioned, and it's heavy. It's not light reading but it at least captures what we learned so far as mechanisms, some of which deserve more looking. But this is a prism that is worth maybe a specific look.

MR. TALBOTT: Jim, do you want to comment?

MR. STEINBERG: The key is the willingness of the scientific community to engage in the policy debate itself, which happened in the context of the IPCC, notwithstanding this was just going to be science. But the other example, which is a dramatic one -- you cited the case of GMOs. I mean, there has been tremendous international scientific cooperation on this. The five-academy study on GMOs is a broad consensus study. It has our national academy, the European academies, developing country academies, and it has had absolutely no impact on anything at all.

Q: Why not?

MR. STEINBERG: Because there has been no attempt to take that into the political process. There isn't anybody in Europe who is now saying -- actually, the commission has done something, to their credit, but nobody in the political process has said, now wait a minute, this is our best scientific judgment about this, here's where we're going to take this forward.

What Jessica says is absolutely right. You can't just do the science in the science community, and it isn't just advising governments in their kind of government capacity. It has to be part of the public political discourse, getting to the broader democracy that Ann is talking about. Because what's happening is, you know, in Europe is that the scientists are not trusted. The people who are trusted, the NGOs, are being irresponsible

about the science in this particular case. So creating that kind of public engagement and being part of the process seems to me to be a critical part of really introducing it.

MS. MATTHEWS: You have to grease the skids between the science and the political process or else the science work goes into a black hole.

MR. TALBOTT: I'm going to take one last question on this side of the room on the condition that it be very short because Jim and I no doubt are going to have to contend with at least a hailstorm and perhaps a blizzard between here and Dulles Airport.

Q: This may be shorter than short. It's a question about vocabulary. One of the things I'm struck by listening to Strobe in the set-up is the extent to which the term "global governance" can really be divisive itself. It's a hot-button issue for a lot of people. I just wonder, in all the thinking that's being done on this issue, whether somebody is thinking about this sort of vocabulary and communications components of how to talk about this in a way that isn't necessarily divisive.

MR. TALBOTT: One is by changing the suffix on the word on the G word from government to governance, which I don't mean to be entirely glib because it relates to much of what's been said. But the others would perhaps each like to have a crack at that.

MS. MATTHEWS: To me governance is what we're talking about, and if we can't talk about it, we're unlikely to be able to do it. So if governance is too divisive a word to use, well, I mean, the answer to your question for me personally is, yes, I've thought about it a lot and I know I can't think of something better than governance. Nobody has ever talked seriously for a long, long time about global government. And maybe you just do it more than you talk about it -- (laughter) -- for those people for whom it's a hot button.

MR. TALBOTT: Not a great description for a think tank, by the way, where we love to talk about it, and so do all of you, I gather, because you're here.

Jim?

MR. STEINBERG: I think the problem is two-fold, which is, one, by calling it global it sounds like it has to be universal, and I don't think -- as I suggested before, in some cases it does, in some cases not. Second, the problem of governance is it gets to the problem that Ann has identified, that it sounds top-down, and that also is something that doesn't need to be done.

The closest I come to this, and it is sort of the title of some work that we're doing here, is cooperation. The big project we're doing in trying to think about this is called power and cooperation, because our judgment is that those are the two pieces that are, one, necessary to deal with these transnational issues. Cooperation seems a little not very effectual, but it is the character of what we're talking about here, which is much more on the level of multiple actors dealing in a common way with problems rather than a system

of top-downness, which I do believe sends the wrong signal and creates part of this political perception of what is trying to be done.

MR. TALBOTT: Ann, last word.

MS. FLORINI: I see my editor in the back smiling at this question because we went around and around on this one trying to come up with a title for the book. The book actually talks a bit about collective action, which is even worse than global governance because it sounds like Stalinist collectivities. But collective action is actually the social science term for what we're talking about.

We ended up coming up with a vocabulary that talked about emerging democracy and rules for running the world, which I think is the less divisive kind of vocabulary. But I also think Jessica is right. We are talking about global governance, and if we aren't willing to put that on the table, we're not going to make a whole lot of progress.

MR. TALBOTT: This was a terrific discussion occasioned by a terrific book. I want to thank all of you for coming, and hope you'll join me in thanking the panelists.

(Applause.)

(END)