Anniversaries are an artificial moment to celebrate or cry. But even in this post-modern era, they provide a logical point at which to review the past before continuing. We are presented with such a moment a decade after the establishment of the first mandate for the Representative of the Secretary-General (RSG) on Internally Displaced Persons (IDP).

What follows is not a quantitative evaluation by a detached specialist but rather an informed overview. In my view, the topic is important and efforts on behalf of these victims are essential. At the same time, there are more and less effective activities, as well as more and less feasible future steps. This three-part note begins with an overview of the first ten years, which are further detailed in seven accompanying annexes. The second part consists of an admittedly subjective examination of progress to date. A discussion follows about some of the remaining challenges. This essay is the first, not last, word in an important conversation.

What Has Been Done?

In spite of obvious political and technical problems in gathering data in war zones, the most reliable and available indicator of suffering has usually been the number of “refugees.” Physical displacement is prima facie evidence of vulnerability because people who are deprived of their means of livelihood have great difficulty in resorting to traditional coping capacities. Refugees have been diminishing in number over the last decade while internally displaced persons—that is, exiles who physically remain within their own countries—have been increasing dramatically. The number of refugees at the beginning of the 21st century was generally agreed to have fallen to 12 million. The number of IDPs is considerably larger, at least twice that number—depending on who is counting, from 20 to 25 million displaced by wars with a similar or even greater number displaced by natural disasters and development projects. When IDP data was first gathered in 1982, there were only a million, at which time there were about 10 million refugees.

At the outset of the 1990s, the growing and massive numbers of IDPs and the changing nature of warfare suggested to watchful observers that what formerly had seemed a blemish on the international humanitarian system was actually an ugly structural scar. The fastest growing category of war-affected populations had, and still has, no institutional sponsor or agreed international legal framework, whereas refugees, whose numbers are diminishing, benefit from
well-developed institutional and legal efforts through the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).

In 1992 UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali made an important political and bureaucratic decision when he submitted the first analytical report on IDPs to the UN Commission on Human Rights (CHR) in Geneva. This and other key UN publications with a bearing on this issue are found in Annex 1. As a result of a concerted NGO advocacy campaign, resolution 1992/73 was approved, and not without controversy. The Commission authorized the Secretary-General to appoint a representative to explore “views and information from all Governments on the human rights issues related to internally displaced persons, including an examination of existing international human rights, humanitarian and refugee law and standards and their applicability to the protection of and relief assistance to internally displaced persons.” Proceeding cautiously and deliberately, the Commission also specified the scope for reporting: existing laws and mechanisms; possible additional measures to strengthen the application of such laws; and new ways to address the protection needs that are not covered by existing instruments. This and other UN decisions regarding IDPs are listed in Annex 2.

Shortly thereafter the UN Secretary-General designated Francis M. Deng, a former Sudanese diplomat and then a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, to serve as the RSG. He was asked to pursue his mandate on a voluntary, part-time basis—a dubious yet common practice for the cash-pressed world organization in the human rights arena. Deng and collaborators actively solicited cooperation from a wide range of experts and autonomous research institutions. The development of a comprehensive global approach for effective assistance and protection of IDPs has been independently formulated and financed since that time. A listing of the main donors—nine governments and five foundations—for the Project on Internal Displacement (PID) is found in Annex 3.

At the outset of the effort, the Brookings Institution worked with the Refugee Policy Group (RPG) and the U.S. Committee for Refugees (USCR); and subsequent partners have included The Ralph Bunche Institute for International Studies at The Graduate Center of The City University of New York and now The Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) at Johns Hopkins University. Roberta Cohen—a human rights specialist and former U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights—joined Deng in 1994 as associate and then co-director of the PID. Personnel and consultants who have been associated with their work are found in Annex 4.

Starting from scratch and without an official and assessed UN budget, productivity and output have been impressive. Since 1993, the CHR has consistently extended the mandate of the RSG for two and three-year periods—the latest in April 2001 for three years. Deng has reported annually to the Commission and at least biannually to the General Assembly. Twenty-five country missions over the last decade are listed in Annex 5. Eleven regional and country workshops and seminars in this period are found in Annex 6. In addition to a host of official publications, independent research and policy analysis have been emphasized, and key independent publications are listed in Annex 7.

**What Has Been the Impact of the Pillars of the Mandate?**
The RSG explains and justifies his work and that of the PID in terms of “four pillars.” This part surveys progress under each: raising international awareness and advocacy, the country focus; promulgating international law, the normative framework; promoting an international institutional framework; and improving the knowledge base. These same pillars provide the basis for some first thoughts about next steps in the subsequent part.

**Raising International Awareness and Advocacy, The Country Focus**

Measuring the extent of growth in international awareness about the peculiar problems and prospects of IDPs is necessarily subjective. Without a substantial research effort, it is impossible to do a scientific “mapping” of the extent to which international discourse and the public policy agenda have changed.

Awareness of the shortcomings in international responses has grown steadily throughout the 1990s. But so has the problem. As for virtually any development in world politics, it is methodologically difficult to dis-aggregate influences. Hence, it is not possible to draw direct causal arrows between the efforts by the RSG and PID and the increased visibility of the issue and the importance attached to it by individuals and institutions. Nonetheless, interviews confirm that their efforts have been an essential component of change. The issue is squarely on the international humanitarian agenda in a way that it was not a decade ago.

One of the main efforts at increasing international awareness has been based on country missions and related advocacy. Advocacy has been focused on raising general international awareness through speeches, writings, lobbying, and meetings but it has not given sufficient attention to country situations. There is little or no international publicity about the RSG country missions and reports (the recent PID Iraq report being an exception for obvious reasons); but within a target state, country missions generate a lot of publicity and national awareness. Sometimes country missions are presented as a fifth pillar, but they are such a necessary building block for awareness and advocacy that they are included here. Since 1992 the RSG has visited 21 countries, some a few times: Armenia, Angola, Azerbaijan, Burundi (2), Colombia (2), East Timor, Georgia, Indonesia, Mexico, Mozambique, Peru, the Philippines, Russian Federation, Rwanda, El Salvador, Somalia, Sri Lanka, the Sudan (3), Tajikistan, Turkey, and the former Yugoslavia.

Annual reports to the UN Commission on Human Rights are published as official documents of the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC); and biennial reports are submitted to the General Assembly. They contain analyses of the political, legal, and institutional conundrum of internal displacement. Country reports, with tailored and in-depth recommendations to governments and international agencies, are published separately (as annexes) but summarized in the main reports. Like all human rights efforts, those on behalf of IDPs are difficult to evaluate because of the inherent difficulties in isolating the impact of discrete efforts along with local and global geopolitical developments. However, it is safe to assume that Deng’s visits have raised national awareness of an acute problem, empowered local and outside actors to engage in the issues, and undoubtedly stimulated improvements in the treatment of internally displaced persons.
The contents and language of the country reports suggest an intricate blend of circumlocutions in “UNese” and more hard-hitting criticism. Merely getting agreement from a government to explore human rights and IDPs may actually be considered an achievement for an inter-governmental organization. Moreover, there are important subtleties that are apparent to specialized readers of these reports—for example, a willingness to examine closely a government’s rationale in allowing assistance into areas not under its control (Sri Lanka), or solidarity between a government and its internally displaced population (Azerbaijan), or the relative obscurity of IDPs absorbed by local populations (Armenia).

Part of the problem in appreciating the impact of the country reports by the RSG may result from the limited notion of the style considered most effective. Many non-governmental organizations (NGOs) as well as national governments and activist scholars have a single “model” for human rights monitoring. This consists of a highly-visible advocate employing high-decibel levels for public denunciations. If this is the standard, then the RSG—like special rapporteurs of the CHR itself—does not really measure up. At the same time, behind-the-scenes lobbying and discreet hard-work with governments can lead to break-throughs. Deng represents a hybrid between a free-wheeling NGO and a more reserved UN staff member.

Self-censorship (that is, anticipating what governments will find unacceptable and avoiding the topic) is a widespread shortcoming throughout the UN system. It is easier than most UN staff believe to surpass what governments construe as acceptable criticism, and the RSG continues to explore the limits. Criticism of Deng’s approach often resembles that lodged against the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), which argues that discretion often has its advantages for access and credibility, when acting as an interlocutor for a target government. The impact of the country missions by the RSG and the more outspoken NGOs working on human rights should be viewed as complementary and mutually reinforcing rather than as antithetical or mutually exclusive.

Country missions have been supplemented by public appearances, and by participation in conferences, workshops, and training sessions organized by the RSG and the PID or by others. The result has been advocacy with donor governments, inter-governmental organizations, and NGOs that represents an essential contribution to what many believe is the most significant normative change in the Westphalian system in the last half-century.

The first report to the CHR already set the normative agenda by confronting the tensions between state sovereignty and human rights that are central to the IDP issue. Deng’s earlier work on the Sudan and Africa had laid the groundwork for “sovereignty as responsibility.” His central premise is squarely Realpolitik—states are very much the bedrock of international order for the foreseeable future. Any notion of the “erosion” of state sovereignty thus should be carefully finessed.

Deng seeks pragmatically to reconcile the possibility of vigorous international intervention with the Charter regime. If the abuses of human rights are grave enough, a country’s sovereignty could temporarily disappear and the prospects for outside interference, including the deployment of outside military forces, increase. The evolution of the notion of sovereignty has been dramatic and affects the ability of humanitarian organizations to come to the rescue, even in civil wars. The
experience of the last decade underscores the higher expectations placed on sovereign political authorities to respect fundamental human rights.

The dramatic growth in the weight of humanitarian values to justify diplomatic and military action is clear to seasoned observers. “In the 1990s,” summarizes Adam Roberts, “humanitarian issues have played a historically unprecedented role in international politics.” For the military campaign in Kosovo, Michael Ignatieff notes that “its legitimacy [depends] on what fifty years of human rights has done to our moral instincts, weakening the presumption in favor of state sovereignty, strengthening the presumption in favor of intervention when massacre and deportation become state policy.”

Looking backwards over post-World War II history is instructive. On the one hand, “normatively based challenges to the sovereign rights of states are hardly new in international history.” On the other hand, the Security Council was largely missing in action regarding humanitarian matters during the Cold War. There was a virtual humanitarian tabula rasa at the outset of the 1990s. No resolution mentioned the humanitarian aspects of any conflict from 1945 until the Six Day War of 1967, and the first mention of the ICRC was not until 1978. And in the 1970s and 1980s, “the Security Council gave humanitarian aspects of armed conflict limited priority…but the early nineteen-nineties can be seen as a watershed.” During the first half of the decade, twice as many resolutions were passed as during the first forty-five years of UN history. They contained repeated references, in the context of Chapter VII, to humanitarian crises amounting to threats to international peace and security, and repeated demands for parties to respect the principles of international humanitarian law.

Whether or not one takes issue with Edward Luttwak’s characterization of “Kofi’s rule … whereby human rights outrank sovereignty,” humanitarian intervention undoubtedly was the most controversial topic within UN circles by the end of the 1990s. The Secretary-General’s own speeches were widely debated because what was aptly called “the age of humanitarian emergencies” had led to policies of “saving strangers.” An academic cottage industry grew, but more importantly governments sponsored a host of policy initiatives and published reports on the topic. The most recent was the Canadian-inspired International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) whose Responsibility to Protect is the most comprehensive statement to date of the problématique. This followed findings from a Swedish initiative, the Independent Commission on Kosovo; the previous United States (U.S.) government’s overview by the Policy Planning Staff and a report from the Council on Foreign Relations; and major inquiries into the legal authority for intervention by the Dutch and Danish governments.

Factors now routinely viewed as legitimate to justify Security Council action include a range of humanitarian disasters, especially those involving large exoduses by persons displaced within their countries of origin or across borders. As civil wars became the standard bill-of-fare in the 1990s, the cumulative impact of so many decisions in which rights trumped sovereignty has meant that “sovereignty as responsibility” has become a far more widespread concept even if not yet accepted as conventional wisdom. David Rieff would contest whether the spread of the idea has been productive, but state authorities are increasingly seen as having the responsibility to protect their citizens whose rights are being violated. The status of state sovereignty is not challenged but reinforced. However, if a state is unwilling or unable to protect the rights of its
own citizens, it temporarily forfeits a moral claim to be treated as legitimate. Its sovereignty, as well as its right to non-intervention, is suspended; and a residual responsibility necessitates vigorous action by outsiders to protect populations at risk.

In brief, the three traditional characteristics of a state in the Westphalian system (territory, authority, and population) are supplemented by a fourth (respect for human rights). This alteration in international awareness as well as a new normative and policy agenda can in no small measure be traced to work by the RSG and the Project on Internal Displacement.

**Promulgating International Law, The Normative Framework**

Because of inadequate international legal provisions governing the treatment of internally displaced persons, substantial energies have been devoted to filling this lacuna. The release in early 1998, and the widespread acceptance since that time, of the *Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement* are a success story. Existing norms applicable to this category of victim—prior to and during displacement, as well as during return, resettlement, and reintegration—are conveniently brought together into a single document that guides political authorities and humanitarians.

The process leading to the adoption of the *Guiding Principles* was itself a key tactical decision. It took half a decade and involved international lawyers and experts from all over the world, regional organizations, UN bodies, and NGOs. Consequently, they felt part of the process and then were ready to promote it.

Dissemination is a key objective for the *Guiding Principles*. In addition to the publication and distribution by the PID as well as OCHA and other UN agencies, a number of other outlets have been used including: the *Global IDP Survey* of the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC); the *International Journal of Refugee Law*; the *Forced Migration Review* of Oxford’s Refugee Studies Programme; the *International Review of the Red Cross*; and the *ICJ Review*. Moreover, a number of NGO newsletters have published the *Guiding Principles* including: *Uprooted People* of the Global Ecumenical Network of the World Council of Churches; *The Mustard Seed* of the Jesuit Refugee Service; *On the Record* of the Advocacy Group; *Human Rights Tribune* of Human Rights Internet; *Monday Developments* of InterAction; and the *RRN Newsletter* of the Overseas Development Institute. And these sorts of publications proliferate.

The translation of this document from English into the five other official UN languages was the first step. But perhaps even more importantly, the translation into 28 other languages has been crucial in making the *Guiding Principles* available to belligerents in many armed conflicts. These languages include: Abkhaz, Albanian, Arabic, Armenian, Azerbaijani, Bahasa Indonesia, Burmese, Cebuano, Chin, Dari, Dinka, Georgian, Kirundi, Luo, Macedonian, Magui, Pashtu, Portuguese, Ruturo, Serb-Croat, Sgaw Karen, Sinhala, Somali, Swahili, Tagalog, Tamil, Tetum, and Turkish. Individuals as well as local, regional and international organizations have begun to use the *Guiding Principles* as a basis for assessing responses to particular situations. This includes the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights of the Organization of American States (OAS) as well as such multi-country non-governmental groups as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch and such local NGOs as the Ecumenical Commission for Displaced
Families and Communities (ECDFC) in the Philippines, the Consortium of Humanitarian Agencies (CHA) in Sri Lanka, and the Grupo de Apoyo a Organizaciones de Desplazados (GAD) in Colombia.

Furthermore, the helpful and more non-technical Handbook has been thus far translated into Albanian, Bahasa Indonesia, French, Macedonian, Portuguese, Russian, and Spanish. The far more voluminous Annotations have not been translated—something local groups have indicated would be useful. The PID has conducted eleven regional and country workshops on internal displacement, about two a year since they began in 1998. The follow-up to these workshops by governments and certain armed opposition movements in Africa, Asia, and the Americas has been facilitated by the existence of documents in the languages of the parties themselves.

The evolution from an idea to a set of principles to guide governments, militaries, humanitarian agencies, and non-state actors is a substantial achievement in half a decade. This is especially the case because many Third World countries initially viewed any external scrutiny of domestic human rights as an unacceptable frontal attack on their sovereignty. Countries that have actually applied the Guiding Principles to the development of laws and court decisions include Angola, Colombia, Georgia, Uganda and Sudan (including the SPLM/SPLA, a non-state actor).

An April 1998 decision of the UN Commission on Human Rights recommends the use of “soft law” for IDPs. Along with taking note of the Guiding Principles, the CHR also noted an earlier (March 1998) decision to endorse these principles by the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC), which is composed of the heads of the major relief and development organizations of the UN system and major consortiums of NGOs. This IASC’s decision carried with it the call to bring the intrusive principles to the attention of all executive boards and to encourage staff to apply them in their operational, analytical, and advocacy activities.

UN institutions are thus seized at all levels by this issue, as are many regional organizations, NGOs and governments. More than any other of the pillars under review, the current parsing of international legal issues, in both official and private circles, can clearly be credited to efforts by the Project on Internal Displacement.

Promoting an International Institutional Framework

Ten years ago, the absence of international law governing internally displaced persons was clear, but so too was the lack of institutions to respond to their needs. The “absence of a focal point within the United Nations system” was pointed out in the CHR’s original resolution 1993/95. Providing a more adequate institutional base was also articulated as a priority by the RSG, for which he presented three options: creation of a specialized institution; designation of an existing agency; or enhanced collaboration. However, little headway has been made toward effective organizational responses to address the needs of IDPs.

Journalists and the proverbial woman on the street tend to think of “refugees” as all forced migrants whether or not they have actually left their home country. There is little recognition, outside of specialist circles, that a person merits the label only if he or she has crossed internationally recognized borders to escape a well-founded fear of persecution. The distinction
matters because those who have crossed an international boundary benefit legally from the 1951 international “Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees” and its 1967 “Protocol” as well as from the institutional ministrations of the UNHCR.

Those displaced within a country often are at least as vulnerable, and perhaps more so, but they receive less attention and can call upon no special international agency. The lot of refugees is hardly attractive, but they may actually be better off than IDPs whose existence customarily causes the issue of sovereignty to raise its ugly head. Many regimes actively and blatantly deny protection and assistance to the internally displaced as leverage to manipulate political actors and outside humanitarian agencies.

These are, of course, well-known lamentations from the RSG, but their enumeration in report after report has led to few meaningful institutional adaptations. Predictable turf-consciousness within the UN system, along with donor disarray, has prevented any viable mechanisms to meet the needs of IDPs. Given the largely operational challenge of satisfying their assistance and protection requirements, the only real candidate for this assignment is the UNHCR.

My own views are based on the analysis of internal displacement in the former Yugoslavia commissioned by the project.22 The UNHCR demonstrated that it was the most operational and effective of agencies within this most complex of complex emergencies. It adapted itself in an entrepreneurial fashion to provide assistance not only to refugees and IDPs but also to war victims who had not moved at all. The UN approach in the former Yugoslavia involved an unusual centralization of humanitarian responsibilities. The provision of aid and protection was given on the basis of need rather than on physical location or arcane organizational terms of reference.23

I have also documented the sad story of bureaucratic in-fighting that scuttled a proposal to place UNHCR in the driver’s seat for humanitarian action, a victim of the UN’s so-called reform of 1997.24 Had it been implemented, this proposal would have provided a sensible home for Deng’s activities within a “UN Agency for War-Affected Populations (UNAWAP).” There are other proposals being aired—for example, Arthur Helton’s Strategic Humanitarian Action and Research (SHARE), a new intergovernmental mechanism situated outside the UN system. But the creation of a UNAWAP would have been more straightforward and effective.25

The present cobbled-together arrangement simply does not address operational issues. In April 2002 a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) was signed by the Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC) and the RSG, which makes IDP advocacy the latter’s business but assigns operational coordination to the Geneva-based Internal Displacement Unit (IDU) within the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA).26 OCHA fulfills its coordination role through consultations with the Inter-Agency Standing Committee, which is chaired by the ERC, who has formally been mandated to serve as focal point for IDPs. OCHA currently has 16 small field coordination offices. Although specifically charged with the responsibility of addressing humanitarian issues that fall between the cracks of existing mandates, it has not always demonstrated the necessary authority and leadership to effectively coordinate the activities of the larger and financially well-established operational agencies.
The IDU was set up in January 2002 to help the ERC promote better inter-agency coordination on the ground. It is small—9 or 10 professionals who are mostly drawn from other UN agencies, plus several consultants—but more than there were before and all focus exclusively on IDPs. According to its terms of reference, the unit has an extremely ambitious set of tasks that include: to promote and support advocacy efforts; to monitor situations of internal displacement; to identify operational gaps in the response; to provide training, guidance, and expertise to Resident and Humanitarian Coordinators, UN country teams, and others involved; to formulate strategies to address the protection, assistance, and development needs of IDPs; to develop linkages between humanitarian response and security, political, and development spheres of activity; to mobilize resources to assist IDPs; and to further develop inter-agency policies on IDP issues. And in all of these efforts, the IDU is supposed to work closely with the RSG. It is obvious to anyone familiar with the UN system that, in order to operate effectively, the unit needs substantial support from the large operational agencies, which is not always forthcoming, in addition to strong backup from the ERC and the UN Secretary-General.

Judgments differ about how to evaluate efforts to date. Not to put too fine a point on it, the discrepancy between the requirements for program support to field operations on behalf of IDPs and the actual institutional wherewithal of the UN system could hardly be more glaring.

In the area of modest institutional changes at the inter-governmental and non-governmental levels, the RSG has made recommendations regarding how humanitarian and development action should be provided and how protection should be addressed. The IASC has adopted some suggestions related to specific action on behalf of IDPs, most notably an inter-agency policy for their protection, the appointment of focal points in different agencies, and targeting the Consolidated Appeal Process (CAP). Several humanitarian, development, and human rights groups have altered the ways in which they conduct their business and have expanded their activities with IDPs. Again, precise cause and effect are difficult to ascertain, but a number of changes can almost certainly be attributed to Deng’s work, which aptly is conceived as “catalytic.” For instance at the regional level, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights of the Organization of American States (OAS) and the Council of Europe have appointed rapporteurs on IDPs, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) has organized special meetings on internal displacement and pressed for more attention to the issue in affected countries, and a special workshop was organized in Addis Ababa with the Organization of African Unity (OAU) to encourage greater emphasis on IDPs on the continent with the largest concentration. Similar workshops have been organized with the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and are being planned with the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the Commonwealth.

In terms of NGOs, illustrative indications of progress include a host of changes in the programming of assistance increasingly targeting IDPs as a specific category. The Norwegian Refugee Council maintains a global database, intended to provide one-stop shopping for information—a long-standing recommendation of the RSG. The U.S. Committee for Refugees has expanded its coverage of IDPs in its widely circulated annual publication, the World Refugee Survey. Human Rights Watch initiated a special campaign entitled “The Challenge of the New Millennium: Protecting the Internally Displaced.” The Women’s Commission for Refugee Women and Children has added the plight of internally displaced women and children to their
reports. There is a forthcoming book by the Migration Policy Institute (MPI). And a myriad of local NGOs have developed outreach programs to internally displaced communities in countries as far flung as Indonesia, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Georgia, the Russian Federation, and Colombia.

**Improving the Knowledge Base**

As an analyst I can perhaps be forgiven my enthusiasm for independent research instead of the politically correct analyses that inevitably emanate from official UN channels. Autonomy is especially critical and appreciated when analytical topics are politicized. And what could be more politicized than domestic human rights abuses in civil wars?

Deng and his collaborators have published findings and policy suggestions about the peculiar challenges of assisting and protecting IDPs, which in many ways have helped to set the intellectual agenda outside as well as inside of inter-governmental forums. Foremost among the PID’s considerable published work are Deng’s book, *Protecting the Dispossessed* (1993); Cohen and Deng’s authored volume, *Masses in Flight* (1998); Cohen and Deng’s edited case studies, *The Forsaken People* (1998); and David A. Korn’s *Exodus Within Borders* (1999).

The particular importance of challenging normative orthodoxy through an international legal framework was highlighted earlier. The PID’s list of monographs, articles, and other publications has stimulated a host of other analysts who have begun to contribute to what is becoming an identifiable public policy concern. They are reflected in the PID’s *Selected Bibliography on the Global Crisis of Internal Displacement*.

Of especial relevance in explaining progress in relationship to this fourth pillar, but underpinning the others as well, is an independent financial base. On the one hand, the central approach to the problem of internal displacement is to get governments to take seriously their responsibilities for human rights; and so Deng’s work has to be associated intimately with the United Nations. On the other hand, there is a genuine necessity to preserve what he has described as “quasi-independent” status. The PID’s base at a private public policy institute working in tandem with universities provides the protection of a respectable distance from governments and from predictable multilateral diplomatic procedures. The expectation is that publications will push the limits of conventional wisdom in mainstream diplomatic circles.

Such an approach requires “soft” resources because policy institutes and universities rarely devote “hard” tuition income or endowments to subsidize researchers and non-instructional personnel. The very existence of the PID has necessitated support from a wide range of private and public donors. Their diversity and generosity over the last decade is encouraging. Direct financial support as well as substantial in-kind contributions have been made by nine governments (Austria, Canada, Denmark, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, United Kingdom, and United States) and five foundations (Ford, MacArthur, McKnight, Mellon, and Schurgot Foundations). Support has also come from several parts of the UN system (OSG, OHCHR, UNICEF, UNHCR, and OCHA) and partner universities and research institutions (Brookings, Ralph Bunche Institute of CUNY, Georgetown, and SAIS of Johns Hopkins).
The 2002 budget for direct costs is approximately $1.2 million—a trivial sum for what the PID is trying to do. This is not the only topic on the international agenda where resources do not match the long list of responsibilities in UN resolutions. However, internal displacement nonetheless lies at the far extreme of a spectrum: an extremely ambitious mandate without any regular funds. It is not possible here to present an analysis of financial expenditures and priorities over time, but the annual operating budgets typically varied from $500,000 to $800,000. In addition to cooperating partners having changed, many of the in-kind services from countries (both personnel and conferences) as well as support services from partners are difficult items on which to place an accurate price-tag.

Current and previous project personnel are drawn from a mixture of national backgrounds and types of expertise. Over the last decade, the PID has also engaged numerous short- and longer-term consultants from most regions of the world to work on research, outreach, and capacity-building. This diversity should be viewed along with participants from research institutions and humanitarian agencies worldwide who have participated in formal or informal sessions organized over the years under the auspices of the PID. There are very few knowledgeable specialists on internal displacement who have not worked with or been consulted by the project staff and who are not part of their global network.

Financial support from outside the world organization has made it possible, indeed obligatory, to act autonomously. Although respecting the bounds of diplomatic niceties, the RSG and the PID have consistently been more forthright and openly critical than would be the case for “normal” international civil servants. At the same time that this independence is generally accepted and admired at the UN, it also is at times misunderstood by some UN staff whose more bureaucratic approaches prevent their appreciating the benefits.

**What Remains To Be Done?**

The RSG and his collaborators have been effective prods to the international humanitarian system. Progress is evident, but the proverbial glass is certainly far from half full. What roadblocks remain on the path toward more adequate coverage for the assistance and protection needs of IDPs? How could the RSG and the PID make more of a difference in the next decade?

**Raising International Awareness and Advocacy, The Country Approach**

Part of a future agenda requires influencing larger publics about IDPs. Making realistic proposals about the media is always challenging—for a layman or for a media expert. There is great debate about what pushes the media to cover an issue and why their gatekeepers allocate resources or jump on a particular bandwagon. This is consequential because more must be done to address the extremely limited public understanding of the issue of internal displacement, including among journalists.

A potentially important precedent was set in October 2002 with the publication of *The Internally Displaced People of Iraq.* This document took the highly visible issue of Iraq—a possible war to enforce its commitment to disarm—and examined the repercussions on IDPs. This consultants’ report garnered far more media interest than previously commissioned publications.
Its analysis and style were more straightforward and openly critical of a sitting government than the standard country reports of the RSG.

More similar framings of issues might elicit similar coverage for the IDP issue because, traditionally, the plight of IDPs rarely has received specific coverage—in fact, as mentioned earlier, they are normally described as “refugees.” Some references to internally displaced persons have begun to appear, but a handicap to further progress is the fact that the wider public, even the most literate and concerned members, have very little appreciation either for the scope of humanitarian and development problems that are peculiar for IDPs, or for the need to adapt and create appropriate institutional mechanisms. The plight of IDPs is palpable, but the framing of issues still appears esoteric.

In terms of developing a workable future strategy, a small brainstorming session of journalists and media gatekeepers would be a sensible start. Part of the agenda would be to strategize about measures to enhance visibility and to overcome the lack of international attention normally given to country reports.

Another possible avenue, which is bound to elicit negative reactions from many host governments, is routinely designating international and local media representatives to the RSG’s country missions. Media exposure during and between field visits is decisive for building awareness about the mandate and follow-up issues. Under the right conditions, and by using various modes of promotion and public exposure, it would be helpful for Deng to catalyze, from the outset, linkages among countries and organizations concerned with the human rights situation of a target country. Public debate in many Western countries would be better informed if the print and electronic media were able to cover his missions. This might also be the case in some target countries although governments that produce IDPs in the first place are unlikely to tolerate much critical local media coverage. Care would obviously be required not to compromise the confidentiality, safety, and candor of either IDPs or local and national officials whose testimony is essential to maintain the integrity of the RSG’s human rights mandate.

The media might also help ensure more systematic follow-up for country missions. There is no established procedure or automatic mechanism within the international humanitarian system to track situations in the countries previously visited by the RSG. In his low-key and understated prose, internal displacement “is a global phenomenon warranting a more extensive system of on-site monitoring and follow-up than the present resources of the representative will allow.”28 There is no way to ensure that purported points of agreement are implemented or that points of disagreement are revisited periodically. In his reports to the CHR, Deng has repeatedly stressed the need “to sustain the momentum of the visits and to ensure active collaboration between the government and the United Nations agencies on the ground.” As with so much of the UN’s human rights machinery, there is a not only no institutional wherewithal to secure compliance, there is not even the means to systematically sustain embarrassment.

Indeed, the least to be expected would be subsequent reports to maintain minimal pressure on governments that continue to misbehave. But only three (Burundi, Colombia, and the Sudan) of 21 countries have had follow-up missions and reports, and then usually after five years. At a minimum, there should exist a more frequent and comprehensive system for monitoring and
publicizing situations when governments do not carry out Deng’s recommendations or the CHR’s rulings. An on-going thorn in the side could be placed by media coverage. Another could be the specification of follow-up to country reports by other members of the UN system; perhaps the easiest way to mainstream a concern with IDPs is through the special rapporteurs of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR).

Ironically, there is not even an established formula for dealing with governments that do not grant the RSG access to their territory. Perverse incentives reward governments that wish to avoid the attention associated with fact-finding missions. The countries that cooperate become the magnet for criticism while those that refuse can do so with impunity. A precedent that was set for special rapporteurs would be worth exploring. They too must secure invitations from member states, and many governments do not reply or delay responding to requests for a mission. However, a small but growing group of 38 countries has issued “standing invitations.”

Donor governments might consider providing incentives for countries to create a similar club of those who issue standing invitations specifically for the RSG.

Deng’s terms of reference have been written in the hopes of sidestepping the most vociferous defenders of state sovereignty, which then contributes to ignoring the needs of large numbers of IDPs. He is encouraged to “dialogue with governments” but has not been given explicit authority to establish direct contacts with insurgents. Although at the operational level direct contact with non-state actors is increasingly done by members of the UN system, at the political level such contacts are close to anathema for member states of an inter-governmental institution. Yet, addressing the problems of internal displacement obviously requires such direct access. To date, Deng has met with representatives of such groups in Georgia, Mexico, the Philippines, Sudan, and Tajikistan. In most countries, he has been discouraged or blocked from doing so. However, some movement is noticeable. The RSG and PID, jointly with UNICEF, recently held a workshop on internal displacement with the SPLM/SPLA in Rumbek, in southern Sudan, and the PID is supporting a program of the Consortium of Humanitarian Agencies in Sri Lanka that targets the LTTE with educational programs about the Guiding Principles.

As substantial numbers of IDPs are in areas outside of government control, both the assistance and the protection needs of such people are clearly overlooked to the extent that Deng’s activities are restricted to engaging with official contacts. Contact with all political authorities, be they governmental or insurgent, should be recognized as an indispensable part of his mandate when it is next reviewed.

Although many observers dismiss them as expensive distractions, it might be worth considering whether the topic of internal displacement would make a sensible focus for sustained work over a couple of years, beginning in 2005, by an independent commission of eminent persons. They could publish a report for the 15th anniversary of the RSG mandate in 2007. In particular, a reflection on regional differences in views about displacement and the advisability of institutional reform would be essential. The work of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty provides an interesting model. On a similarly controversial topic, consultations around the world contributed to both research and to an alternative framing of the issue that is already exerting an influence on state deliberations. The willingness of an
influential government to run interference for, but not interfere with, such a commission would
be essential.

**Promulgating International Law, The Normative Framework**

The widespread circulation of the *Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement* does not imply
their acceptance. Oratory is not action. Rhetorical advances do not address the crying needs for
physical succor and protection, or the demonstrated inability of states to take their
responsibilities seriously.

There are considerable differences concerning next steps. Partisans of proceeding directly with
negotiations for an international convention confront those who see a more likely pay-off from
pursuing a less direct path toward the gradual acceptance of the *Guiding Principles* as customary
law. Given the bitterness that has characterized inter-governmental debates on the present
document, a frontal attack on recalcitrant states is highly unlikely to be productive in the
immediate future. A more fruitful approach would be the slower and more evolutionary effort to
build up precedents through state practice and writings by legal specialists. The RSG and the PID
could contribute directly, whatever states decide to do or not to do. The recommendation here is
thus to continue low-key dissemination and training exercises. Continuing to publish translations
is highly desirable, not only of the *Guiding Principles* but of the *Handbook.* It is also desirable
to begin translating the *Annotations.* In addition, the development of materials suited to the local
level—for example, comic strips, power point presentations, booklets in local languages—could
be an important contribution.

Some additional evaluation work should be done to determine the relative advantages and
disadvantages of intense national seminars in comparison with longer and more diffuse ones that
draw together several countries. Which have a greater impact for which types of armed conflicts?

**Promoting an International Institutional Framework**

As a long-time participant in and observer of UN affairs, the topic of institutional restructuring
and reform is a never-ending source of frustration. The most logical and sensible proposals
usually go nowhere. Eyes glaze over when organizational restructuring is mentioned.
Unfortunately, it is essential.

There is widespread agreement among knowledgeable observers of IDP matters about two general
points. First, the position of RSG should be full-time and non-voluntary so that Deng can devote
more energy and time to the pursuit of his mandate. Initially there were predictable rumblings in
diplomatic circles that this might be a first step on the slippery slope toward establishing a new
institution; but the risk appeared so slight as to be derisory. Deng had no field presence and
minimal staff support within the UN (a single junior professional who had other responsibilities
for the UNHCHR); and travel funds were extremely limited. If the slope were at all slippery, the
application of governmental brakes was very firm. Second, since the approach to the problem is to
catch governments, as sovereigns, to take their responsibilities for human rights seriously, the work
of the representative should be associated intimately with the United Nations.
Recently some new concerns have surfaced. One has to do with potential duplication between OCHA’s Internal Displacement Unit and the RSG. Another is continued unease about the possible operational potential of the IDU. On the face of it, however, one wonders how one small unit and one voluntary representative could possibly be sufficient on this issue. Creating a special institution to work exclusively on behalf of IDPs—the equivalent of UNHCR’s statutory responsibility for refugees, and one of the many possibilities emphasized by the RSG and other observers—is infeasible. Better coordination of existing capacities seems more plausible. This is normally interpreted as establishing a better division of labor within the UN system.

For some time, four institutional options pertinent to the RSG have been on the international agenda. Each assumes that the position becomes full-time, but the location and support system change. In reviewing a decade of progress and shortcomings, the present consultation should revisit these issues.

The first option is a closer association with the work of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, which is where the office of the RSG is physically located at present. This approach makes the most logical and substantive sense—IDPs in Deng’s work are viewed primarily as the responsibility of governments as falling within the ambit of human rights. Yet, an extension or improvement of current administrative arrangements suffers from the severe shortcomings of the UNHCHR itself. Attaching efforts exclusively to the Geneva-based secretariat is unwise because the office of the High Commissioner is ill-equipped to pursue even his own objectives. Deng’s funding problems would hardly be alleviated by associating himself with what is the least well-funded and most controversial of the UN’s essential arenas of activity.

The second option is building-up the Geneva-based Internal Displacement Unit within OCHA and associating the RSG, who has recently seconded an officer to the IDU, more intimately with that office. In many ways, inertia points in this direction, often the best explanation for policy within the UN system. And there is some logic in that Deng’s mandate goes far beyond the protection of rights and encompasses emergency and often development assistance, which also figure in OCHA’s purview. Moreover, accomplishing his multidimensional and multidisciplinary tasks requires collaboration with a host of UN and regional organizations, and this too figures in OCHA’s terms of reference.

At the same time, OCHA is an extremely weak reed on which to lean. This part of the UN secretariat has little bureaucratic leverage and limited financial resources. And if familiarity with the field is a concern, OCHA was essentially stripped of its operational mandate and field-based personnel in the so-called reform of 1997. Moreover, the IDU itself is composed essentially of personnel on secondment from UN agencies and whose loyalties are thus divided. The notion that OCHA is a sensible institutional location for IDPs resembles the characterization of a second marriage by Oscar Wilde—the triumph of hope over experience.

The third option is to assign the responsibility for IDPs to a “lead agency” for a particular complex emergency. As stated earlier, the only real candidate is UNHCR; but the consolidation of the UN’s humanitarian machinery was rebuffed as an option in 1997.
Georgetown University’s Institute for the Study of International Migration is floating an alternative option, namely a UN High Commissioner for Forced Migrants. The mandate of this high commissioner would include refugees as well as individuals internally and externally displaced because of repression, conflict, natural disasters, environmental degradation, and development-induced displacement. The work of the new agency would be governed by the Refugee Convention and the \textit{Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement}. One key caveat is whether one agency could assist and protect both IDPs and refugees without compromising either group. UNHCR, understandably, is concerned that attention to IDPs might undermine the right to leave and seek asylum.

Donors may eventually see the necessity to get more from the UN system and insist upon the type of coordination whose absence they continually lament. For the humanitarian arena, fundamental change should be more feasible than for others because the main players are \textit{de jure} part of the United Nations proper. There is no need for constitutional change because the humanitarian components of UNICEF, the World Food Programme (WFP), and the UN Development Programme (UNDP) could be combined with UNHCR—the only one of the big four that is exclusively devoted to aiding and protecting civilian war victims. An interim step might be to focus at least on those forcibly displaced by armed conflicts (that is, refugees and IDPs but not those who do not move).

However, this would require consistency and constancy from Western donors, who pay the bills for these institutions. They would be required to speak with a single voice instead of speaking out of both sides of their mouths—that they are interested in better delivery of aid and protection but simultaneously wish to maintain the extant system.

Consolidation, seemingly far-fetched, almost became reality in 1997, truly amazing for any student of UN affairs. It was actually in the penultimate draft of the document prepared under the direction of Maurice Strong at the request of the then newly-elected Secretary-General Kofi Annan. However, at the eleventh hour donors supported the heads of agencies who argued that continuing the decentralized system was preferable to a modestly more centralized one. This recommendation would have amounted to a pragmatic adaptation of the UNHCR’s efforts to illuminate the Balkan gloom, where it embraced the challenge of displacement writ large and addressed the care of refugees, returnees, internally displaced persons, and those who had not moved at all. Someday donors may realize that the continuation of the present fragmentation privileges UN organizations and penalizes civilians trapped in war zones (including IDPs).

The fourth option—which appears reasonable over the next half decade because the others are highly unlikely or undesirable—is to make the most of the existing approach, while keeping open the necessary option of a more radical institutional change. This would consist of leaving the RSG associated with the UN Secretary-General and with footholds in UNHCHR and OCHA, but better funded and staffed. The preferred strategy is thus to continue to have the weight and influence derived from an intimate association with the 38th floor but jealously maintain an independent location and funding base. This arrangement helps the RSG to act as watchdog, advocate, policy entrepreneur, and source of knowledge about IDPs to help alleviate their plight. People matter—and the RSG and his team have made a difference. They could make more.
Improving the Knowledge Base

The most recent work program for the PID contains an ambitious listing of topics to be researched by staff or consultants. These include:

- national response to situations of internal displacement, or a comparative analysis across cases (underway, by PID staff);
- non-state actors, or an examination of possible relations with a series of more and less civil members of civil society (underway, by PID staff and consultants);
- international and regional complaints procedures for IDPs, or a legal handbook and a simplified manual (underway, by consultant);
- legal standing of the Guiding Principles, or an examination of the relationship to customary law (underway, by consultant);
- assessment of donor response (European case study, in collaboration with NRC and USCR, completed by consultant);
- evaluation of regional organization response (underway, by PID staff and consultant);
- challenges of development-induced displacement, or an analysis of the relevance of the Guiding Principles to types of displacement other than conflict and when such cases merit international attention, in particular of the RSGIDP (completed, by consultant);
- when displacement ends, or the development of criteria for establishing when persons should no longer be considered IDPs (underway, by PID staff, in collaboration with Georgetown and NRC);
- protection by peacekeepers, or how such military forces can better support relief and protection (underway, by consultant);
- a comprehensive protection regime, or a study to explore the complexities and tensions between protecting refugees and IDPs (underway, by consultant, in collaboration with MPI);
- a protection survey, or an evaluation of field-based protection (underway, by consultant, in collaboration with OCHA IDP Unit).

Realization of this research plan is underway, and a variety of consultants and staff are working with partners. A quick examination of the titles alone suggests a truly ambitious effort, particularly if the analytical work were to be done in a comprehensive rather than cursory manner. Present allocations for this work are based more upon available funds than any realistic assessment of actual analytical challenges and available data. A few months of a consultant’s time, desk research by interns, or intensive work by one of the principals between flights is the standard operating procedure. Most topics—for instance, comparative case studies, relations with non-state actors, or the use of military forces—would require a far larger commitment of research monies to be done properly. The establishment of a Center for Displacement Studies, as envisioned at SAIS, could be an important step in this direction especially if non-war-related displacement becomes a more significant analytical focus. The mandate of the RSG and the work of the PID should, however, remain linked exclusively to armed conflict.

A recent development that should be expanded is support for case studies on internal displacement by research institutes in war-torn countries. Partnerships with the Georgian Young Lawyers Association, the Calcutta Research Group, and the Jadavpur University’s Center for Refugee Studies are commendable. Pairing outside researchers with personnel from such
institutes would undoubtedly help the longer-term viability of such Third World partners. Orchestrating such efforts is, however, time-consuming and may be more effective as training and institution-building than research. It is too early to judge the research *per se*.

Another promising topic would be a scientific mapping of changes in political and legal discourse about IDPs, combined with a survey of decision-making and institutional commitments by governmental, inter-governmental, and non-governmental humanitarian agencies. It is essential, for practitioners and academics, to understand the extent to which previous work on various aspects of sovereignty as responsibility have contributed to the norms and rules around which state expectations converge. Ongoing research within the academy indicates the extent to which ideas and norms matter. And it would be desirable to understand better the precise impact of sovereignty as responsibility in contemporary world politics.

It is possible and desirable to quantify and compare change over time by examining the frequency that the term “IDP” or special treatment for this category of war victim appeared in journals, UN resolutions and documents, newspapers, and government publications. It would also be helpful to document the extent to which donors (governmental, inter-governmental, and non-governmental organizations) have established special programs or projects for IDPs as well as whether host governments and aid agencies have created any administrative mechanisms that respond to the special problems of this category of affected population.

The growing concern with non-state actors—on a spectrum from spoilers to be avoided through civil society organizations to be strengthened, and especially the gray area in between—is particularly important when conceptualizing strategies and tactics to counter internal displacement. Conceptual efforts to understand the interests of such actors is essential if the structure of such interests is to be affected as part of programming for assistance and protection to benefit IDPs.

Finally, a cost-benefit evaluation of the PID itself would be sensible. In particular, it would be useful to conduct a more thorough examination of the exact magnitude and utilization of funds. Donors should be in a better position to understand what portions of their contributions go to which parts of the work program, whether this leverage is used to mobilize other funds and in-kind contributions, and how project priorities have changed over time.

**Conclusion—Is Learning Possible within the UN System?**

In what qualifies as one of the understatements of the decade, a report in mid-decade noted “a considerable gap between the aspirations of the mandate of the representative and his capacity to pursue them.” Deng has clearly reached a plateau in terms of what a part-time volunteer can do, living from one grant cycle to another. A permanent mandate and a more adequate and guaranteed funding base are obvious requirements over the next decade.

Certain goals have been achieved—a normative framework is in place and international discourse has changed, guiding principles are circulating, and institutions have begun to emphasize the particular problems of IDPs within their programs and projects. However, a voluntary position with paltry and impermanent human and financial resources does not provide
the capacity to undertake systematic monitoring of situations, or to follow-up on previous visits to those countries that continue to pose thorny problems of internal displacement or flaunt international decisions. Further in-depth research and analysis are prerequisites for on-going policy and advocacy efforts, but gaps are practical rather than conceptual or rhetorical.

The most powerful leverage available to the RSG and his colleagues is the subtle but growing support for recasting sovereignty as responsibility, a concept that has been facilitated by the last two secretaries-general, and especially by Kofi Annan. The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty has also blessed the concept in the opening sentence of its report. Sovereignty and non-intervention are not timeless principles cast in concrete but rather products of actions and resistance by parliamentarians, aid workers, and intellectuals.

A consensus is gradually emerging about a state’s responsibilities and accountabilities to both domestic and international constituencies. A state is not able to claim the prerogatives of sovereignty unless it meets internationally agreed responsibilities, which include protecting the human rights of, and providing life-sustaining assistance to, all those within its jurisdiction. Failure to meet obligations on behalf of internally displaced persons legitimizes intrusion and outside intervention by the United Nations and the community of responsible states against a member of their club that misbehaves egregiously.

The most important factor behind the expansion of Security Council decisions in the 1990s was the humanitarian “impulse,” which is the understandable human desire to help those in life-threatening distress resulting from armed conflict. Invariably, this urge translates into a limited political momentum and a sliding scale of commitments that permit international action to come to the rescue of some, but not all, war-affected populations. This momentum has made coalitions of the willing an episodic phenomenon in world politics. When humanitarian and strategic interests culminate, a window of opportunity for those seeking to act on the humanitarian impulse opens.

The work on IDPs has contributed to the development of this impulse, although detractors are disgruntled because it is not an “imperative.” Those who believe that humanitarian values must be universal to be meaningful are dismayed because of unevenness in decisions by the Security Council, regional organizations, and individual states. The humanitarian imperative would entail an obligation to treat all victims similarly and to react to all crises consistently and with proportional resources—in effect, to deny the relevance of politics, which consists of weighing effectiveness and available resources. The humanitarian impulse is permissive, whereas the humanitarian imperative would be peremptory.

The humanitarian impulse is the maximum to which the community of states can aspire. This impulse was respected for IDPs and other victims of armed conflict more often in the 1990s than earlier, and it may be respected more systematically in the future. Because we cannot respond always, should not make us uncomfortable about acting sometimes. The dramatic growth in the influence of humanitarian values to justify diplomatic and military action on behalf of IDPs and other war victims is a positive development in world politics.

At the end of this issues paper, I am once again left asking myself, “Is learning possible within the international humanitarian system?” The establishment of “lessons-learned” units was part of a
growth industry in the 1990s within the UN and elsewhere. For instance, both the Department of Peace-keeping Operations (DPKO) as well as OCHA established them as a result of operational problems in responding to civil wars, and a number of private agencies founded the Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action (ALNAP).36 Academics and policy analysts, including those from the PID, also threw themselves into the intellectual fray as governments and foundations sponsored research about international responses of the 1990s. Nonetheless, have key lessons actually been learned?

Any military historian anxious to avoid fighting the last war knows that lessons are difficult enough to identify in the first place. Political, temporal, military, strategic, and geographic translations from one situation to another are methodologically arduous and operationally problematic. A note of caution should be introduced when looking over the impact of the last decade of experience by the RSG and the PID, with an eye toward the future. Public policy analysts often overlook the three stages of learning. The first is identification, when problems are observed and data collected. The second is diagnosis, when information is analyzed and underlying beliefs questioned. And the third is implementation, when revised policies and procedures are actually institutionalized and public and bureaucratic support is mobilized on behalf of changes.

Scholars and practitioners who are members of the international conference circuit frequently employ the conventional vocabulary of “lessons learned,” but decision-makers and bureaucrats rarely implement corrective measures. Lessons are usually identified by people who are not responsible for changing the rules. And decision-makers rarely understand the details and policy implications of major studies. What is commonplace and essential in the business literature—the third step, specific changes in policy and behavior—often is missing within the humanitarian enterprise.

Why is there a gap between lessons compiled and actually learned, between “rhetoric” and “reality”? Cynics would point to hypocrisy and leave it at that. Sometimes they are right, but often there are more complex reasons. Governments and agencies are not monoliths, but this reality is often overlooked when examining applied research. Those who conduct evaluations, draft resolutions, and make statements usually have not secured political backing from important actors. Competing interests dominate bureaucratic decision-making. Even when policy changes formulated to reflect lessons appear to have been agreed in headquarters, it can prove extremely difficult to translate them into practice on the ground.

To the extent that lessons remain relegated to file-drawers, coffee tables, and book jackets, the concept of learning is perverted. It would be more accurate to speak of “lessons spurned.” Scholars and policy analysts should be humble about how little the system delivery of assistance and protection for IDPs has changed over the 1990s as a result of research efforts.37 The proverbial bottom line is clear: There are obvious limits to analysis and advocacy without the political will by major donors to act on lessons.
Notes


9 See S. Neil MacFarlane, Intervention in Contemporary World Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), Adelphi Paper 350, p. 79. He cites, among others, the struggles between Protestants and Catholics in 15th and 16th Century Europe, the interventionist tendencies of the French Revolution, and the position of the Holy Alliance in the 19th Century as well as by others with humanitarian intervention in the same period.


18 Advisory Council on International Affairs and Advisory Committee on Issues of Public International Law, Humanitarian Intervention (The Hague: AIV and CAVV, 2000), and Danish Institute of International Affairs, Humanitarian Intervention: Legal and Political Aspects (Copenhagen: Danish Institute, 1999).


23 There are substantial voices of dissent within UNHCR and outside against the expansion of the agency to provide aid to so many victims rather than be the protector solely of refugees. See, for example, Gil Loescher, *The UNHCR and World Politics: A Perilous Path* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).


26 UN document HR/4584, REF/1172, 18 April 2002.


28 UN document A/50/558, p. 11.


30 *Manual on Field Practice on Internal Displacement* (New York: OCHA, 1999) is a useful compendium of best practices that complements the *Handbook* and should also be translated.


34 UN document A/50/558, p. 20.

35 The humanitarian impulse also appears in the face of natural disasters, but the politics of helping are totally different when acting without support of or even against the will or stated wishes of local political authorities. For a longer discussion, see Thomas G. Weiss, “The Humanitarian Impulse,” in David Malone, ed., *The UN Security Council in the Post-Cold War World*, forthcoming.


Annex 1*

Key UN Publications, 1992-2002


*Annexes prepared with the assistance of the Brookings-SAIS Project on Internal Displacement.*


Annex 2

**Principal UN Decisions, 1992-2002**

Commission on Human Rights Resolution 1992/73, *Internally Displaced Persons* (requested Secretary-General to appoint a Representative to undertake a comprehensive study on the issue of internally displaced persons).

Commission on Human Rights Resolution 1993/95, *Internally Displaced Persons* (extended the mandate two years).


In addition to the resolutions specific to the mandate of the Representative, a number of thematic or country specific resolutions of the Commission on Human Rights, the General Assembly and the Security Council refer to the issue of internal displacement. For example: General Assembly resolutions on Assistance to Refugees, Returnees and Displaced Persons in Africa, on the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, on the Sudan, and a Security Council Resolution on Burundi.
Annex 3

Funding Information

The work of the mandate and the Project has been funded over the years, although at different times, by a variety of governments and foundations. In addition to these donors, the United Nations has provided the mandate with a number of in-kind contributions and support services.

The current year’s operating budget is approximately $1.2 million, not including the value of in-kind and support services.

GOVERNMENTS

Support for Program Activities:
Canada
Denmark
Netherlands
Norway
Sweden
United Kingdom
United States

Support for Research Officer in Geneva:
Norway

Support for Research Officer in NY/DC:
Canada

Support for Seconded Staff Member to IDP Unit in Geneva:
Austria

Support for RSG Mission to Angola:
Japan

FOUNDATIONS

Support for Research and Program Activities, including the Development of the Guiding Principles:

Ford Foundation
John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation
McKnight Foundation
Mellon Foundation
Support for the Translation and Publication of the Guiding Principles and Handbook: Schurgot Foundation

Support for Project on Institutional Arrangements and Project on When Displacement Ends: Georgetown University (with grants from the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation and the Mellon Foundation)

UNITED NATIONS

Office of the Secretary-General: Provided a contribution for preparation of two-volume study, Masses in Flight and The Forsaken People

Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR): Provides a part-time support person in Geneva; funds 2 to 3 missions per year for the RSG; provides office support for Project research officer in Geneva


United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR): Seconded for two years a staff member to serve as RSG’s UN liaison in NY

Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA): Provides office space and support for RSG’s UN liaison in NY (position currently vacant).
Annex 4

Personnel*

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UN Liaison, based at OCHA

* The Brookings-SAIS Project also engages numerous consultants from all regions of the world to work on a variety of research, outreach and local capacity-building projects.
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OCHA IDP Unit, Geneva:
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(Austria)

Former Staff
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(Canada)

Galit Wolfenson UNAC Intern August 2000-July 2001
part-time consultant Fall 2001
(Canada)

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(U.K.)

OHCHR staff serving the mandate, Geneva:
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(Guatemala)

Juan-Pablo Ordonez Human Rights Officer April-July 2001
(Colombia)

Erin Mooney Human Rights Officer 1997-2001
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<th>Country</th>
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<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>Consultant</td>
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<td>Norway</td>
<td>Daniel Helle, Junior Professional Officer seconded by Norway</td>
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<td>Mongolia</td>
<td>Bat-Erdene Ayuush, Associate Human Rights Officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>Maria Stavropoulou, Human Rights Officer</td>
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## Annex 5

### RSG Country Missions, 1992-2002

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<td>2001</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>11-18 September</td>
<td>E/CN.4/2002/95/Add.1</td>
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<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>24-29 September</td>
<td>E/CN.4/2002/95/Add.2</td>
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<td>Sudan</td>
<td>22-25 May</td>
<td>E/CN.4/2003/86/Add.1</td>
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<td>27-31 May</td>
<td>E/CN.4/2003/86/Add.2</td>
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<td>Philippines</td>
<td>6-13 November</td>
<td>E/CN.4/2003/86/Add.4</td>
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Annex 6

Regional and Country Workshops, Seminars and Conferences
organized by the Brookings Project on Internal Displacement


2001 June -- Seminar on Internal Displacement in Indonesia, Jakarta, Indonesia (cosponsored by Brookings-CUNY Project on Internal Displacement, Centre for Research on Inter-Group Relations and Conflict Resolution at the University of Indonesia, National Commission on Human Rights of Indonesia, OCHA, UNDP, UNHCR) (UN document E/CN.4/2002/95/Add.3).


The Project also convenes meetings on thematic issues, such as development-induced displacement, criteria for when displacement ends and how to deal with “difficult countries.”
Annex 7

Publications: Brookings-SAIS Project on Internal Displacement

Books

Protecting the Dispossessed: A Challenge for the International Community, Francis M. Deng (Brookings Institution Press, 1993)


Introduction, Roberta Cohen and Francis M. Deng, pp1-14
Burundi: A Patchwork of Displacement, U.S. Committee for Refugees, pp15-56
Rwanda’s Internally Displaced: A Conundrum within a Conundrum, Larry Minear and Randolph C. Kent, pp57-96
Liberia: A Nation Displaced, Colin Scott, pp97-138
The Sudan: Cradle of Displacement, Hiram A. Ruiz, pp139-174
Dealing with the Displacement and Suffering Caused by Yugoslavia’s Wars, Thomas G. Weiss and Amir Pasic, pp175-232
Internal Displacement in the North Caucasus, Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia, Thomas Greene, pp233-312
Turnmoil in Tajikistan: Addressing the Crisis of Internal Displacement, Jennifer McLean and Thomas Greene, pp313-358
Sri Lanka’s Vicious Circle of Displacement, H.L.Seneviratne and Maria Stavropoulou, pp359-398
In Search of Hope: The Plight of Displaced Colombians, Liliana Obregon and Maria Stavropoulou, pp399-454
Will Peru’s Displaced Return? Maria Stavropoulou, pp455-499

Exodus within Borders: An Introduction to the Crisis of Internal Displacement, by David A. Korn (Brookings Institution Press, 1999)

The Handbook for Applying the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, jointly published with OCHA, 1999 (translated from English into Albanian, Bahasa Indonesia, French, Macedonian, Portuguese, Russian, Spanish)

Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement: Annotations, by Walter Kälin, jointly published with the American Society of International Law (ASIL), June 2000
Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement and the Law of the South Caucasus, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan, jointly published with the American Society of International Law, the Georgian Young Lawyers Association, and the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, forthcoming 2003

Papers

Improving Institutional Arrangements for the Internally Displaced, by Roberta Cohen and Jacques Cuenod, 1995

Refugee and Internally Displaced Women: A Development Perspective, by Roberta Cohen, 1995

Rethinking “Relief” and “Development” in Transitions from Conflict, by Steven Holtzman, January 1999

The U.S. Government and Internally Displaced Persons: Present, But Not Accounted For, by James Kunder, jointly published with the U.S. Committee for Refugees, November 1999

The Consolidated Appeals and IDPs: The Degree to Which UN Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeals for the Year 2000 Support Internally Displaced Populations, by James Kunder, jointly published with UNICEF, August 2000

Internally Displaced Persons and Elections: The OSCE Region, by Simon Bagshaw, September 2000


Selected Bibliography on the Global Crisis of Internal Displacement, by Gimena Sanchez-Garzoli, December 2001

The Need for a More Focused Response: European Donor Policies Toward Internally Displaced Persons, by Philip Rudge, jointly published with the Norwegian Refugee Council and the U.S. Committee for Refugees, January 2002

Recent Commentaries about the Nature and Application of the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, by Walter Kälin, Francis Deng and Roberta Cohen, April 2002

National Human Rights Commissions and Internally Displaced Persons, Illustrated by the Sri Lankan Experience, by Mario Gomez, July 2002

The Internally Displaced People of Iraq, by John Fawcett and Victor Tanner, October 2002

Seminar Reports


Summary Report of the Regional Meeting on Internal Displacement in the South Caucasus, jointly published with the Norwegian Refugee Council and the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, May 2000


Report of the Brainstorming Session on When Displacement Ends, jointly published with Georgetown University Institute of International Migration, Washington DC, April 2002


Articles

Francis M. Deng and Roberta Cohen have published numerous articles on the subject of internal displacement in journals such as Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Forced Migration Review, Foreign Affairs, Global Governance, Harvard International Review, Refugee Survey Quarterly, United Nations Chronicle; chapters in various books on the subject of displacement; and opeds in a variety of newspapers including the New York Times, the Washington Post, International Herald Tribune, Christian Science Monitor, Baltimore Sun, and Newsday. Erin Mooney (who became Deputy Director of the Project) and Simon Bagshaw (Senior Research Officer) have also published articles on internal displacement in journals such as the Forced Migration Review, International Journal of Refugee Law, International Migration, and Refugee Survey Quarterly.

Website

For a complete listing of all the reports, articles and other activities of the Brookings-SAIS Project on Internal Displacement, see website www.brook.edu/fp/projects/idp/idp.htm