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PANEL THREE

HARD POWER VS. SOFT POWER – WHAT HAS CHANGED?

**KOREA'S SOFT POWER  
AND EAST ASIA**

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## **Panel 2: East Asian Perspectives on Soft Power**

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## **Panel 3: Hard Power vs. Soft Power -- What Has Changed?**

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**GEORGY TOLORAYA**

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## PROCEEDINGS

EVANS REVERE: Ladies and gentlemen, if you can take your seats, and we'll get started. Georgy is getting his technology put together over there. I'm impressed with the level of technology I've seen here today. Hopefully we have enough electric power, though. High-tech for me is a piece of colored chalk on a chalkboard.

I'm under strict instructions from my leadership that we will end on time, so be warned.

It is a delight to be able to chair this final panel today. I cannot remember a time when I have enjoyed so many and such a diversity of presentations as we've had today. And our mission that we have accepted for this last session is to pull some of the strands together that we have heard, with a particular focus on the link or the nexus between soft and hard power, and to try to gather and summarize some of the wisdom that we've heard today which will be an enormous project because there has been so much of it.

It's been noted by several of our colleagues today the very obvious fact that there is this important link between soft and hard power and that these two things do not exist in separate vacuum boxes. And one of the things that I hope my colleagues here will talk about is this linkage between the two and how these things interact. And, in an important sense, they are both a part of a continuum of power that states rely upon as they deal with today's regional and global challenges.

And I thought I would open with just a very brief anecdote, since a number of us have been in anecdotal mode today, to talk about this interesting connection between soft and hard power, because one of the most successful demonstrations of soft power that I have ever seen came because of an interesting application of the instruments of hard power.

One of my final tasks in the State Department as acting assistant secretary, on the morning of December 26, 2004, was to lead the State Department's response to the earthquake and tsunami that struck Southeast Asia. We woke up early that morning to this incredible scene of devastation, and several of us got together in the State Department literally within two or three hours after it happened, very early in the morning, and talked about what to do. And what we ended up doing was assembling, as it turned out, one of the largest U.S. military armadas since World War II: an aircraft carrier battle group; a Marine Corps amphibious-ready group that was actually on its way to Iraq and we turned it around; several hundred military aircraft building an air bridge between the United States and U.S. bases in East Asia going on down to Banda Aceh Airfield; and all sorts of other assets, which we combined with the assets that were made available by other countries, our cooperative partners in a so-called core group, including Japan and others in the region -- Australia, India -- and we combined that with the resources of the United Nations and NGOs. And for several weeks this massive military presence, largely military presence, was there, and a few weeks later it left. And this

massive infusion of military force and power that we put on the ground there ended up leaving a few weeks later, having killed no one and having saved hundreds of thousands of lives.

So my own contribution to his panel is just that little anecdote to show you an interesting linkage, that I would not have anticipated, between the hard and soft power. And I would only add that we did this in the largest Muslim majority country in the world where in the after math of events in Iraq and Afghanistan, our reputation was, to say the least, not very good. And when our military forces left Indonesia, positive support for the United States was polling at 90 percent plus.

Let's move on. I am sure that our three distinguished speakers representing three very important perspectives on these issues will enlighten us. They have many important and thoughtful things to say. I've been chatting with them on and off during the course of the day today, and I know they are ready to provide some very important and share some very important thoughts with you. And so without any further ado, let me introduce the first of our speakers today.

Seated to my right and is a good friend, Georgy Toloraya, who is currently director of regional programs at the Russkiy Mir Foundation, and a man that I have known for a number of years in a number of different capacities, and I am delighted to turn the microphone over to him.

DR. TOLORAYA: Thank you, Evans. How much time do I have? Fifteen minutes? Great.

DR. TOLORAYA: Modern Russia is one of the countries where the soft power probably lags far behind its hard power, although Russia, as well my Singaporean colleague Dr. Lam said here, is was one of the countries which offered some ideas for the humanity, none of them very successful—like the Russian interpretation of communism and socialism. It did gain worldwide attention and some sympathy in the beginning and middle of the 20th century, but, well, when its attractiveness lost its luster, communism collapsed, although at the time Soviet hard power was probably at its peak.

Well, naturally my opinion is that it was exactly this loss of soft power, loss of ideology which resulted in this, and I would say that Western soft power did much to obtain this result because I believe that John Lennon and Paul McCartney did more to break communism in Russia than Ronald Reagan did.

(Laughter)

So now we are at a new stage and quite recently there was a search for a new identity for Russia and a search for, you know, other ways to project its soft power because the Russian image abroad is, well, not very positive. It's often that of a drunken Cossack riding a deer with a balalaika and Russian beauty at his lap, something like that. And there was a need for playing in this game, and it was recognized sometime in the middle of the first decade of this century when the high oil prices brought economic de-stabilization, and political de-stabilization. And that's about the time when Russian

leaders and Russian intellectuals started thinking about the projection of Russian power and, well, at least working out some of the ideas and ideals and values of Russia.

One of the early responses was the creation of Russkiy Mir Foundation, which I work for now as a director for regional projects and specifically for Asian-African projects. And this is a legally NGO, but it was created with the decree of then-President Putin and its co-establishers are the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Education and Science. And we are financed mostly from the budget and some corporate sponsors as well. But being a nongovernmental organization legally makes us much more flexible and makes us, you know, not to follow very strict, you know, government-related rules, like needing a tender to buy every little piece of furniture or something like that.

So our foundation and, well, the intellectuals, we gather right now to figure out what are the Russkiy Mir, which literally means “Russian world” because “mir” in Russian means world, but “mir” in Russian also means peace and it also means community. So this is something like a message of the Peace to the World Community or something like this. So we are working out just to formulate some ideas and values of the Russkiy Mir, of this Russian world civilization, and also promote in it at the same time.

We already have established about, I think, 62 Russian language and culture study centers in major universities of the world, among them a couple in South Korea. One is, by the way, in North Korea, at Pyongyang University of Foreign Languages, so we’re promoting Russian soft power to North Korea as well, and hopeful it’s not that useless for the world as well.

And we are giving grants to different projects related to Russian culture promotion, so -- but we have to study. And I would say, frankly, that the annual report of Korea Foundation is one of my books lying on top of my desk because I really endlessly see how greatly sophisticated Korea has become in recent years to promote its positive image abroad.

And among other things we know that regardless of crisis, the Republic of Korea adopted a national branding program in 2009, which costs the equivalent of \$74 million a year, and the goal is to acquire the 15th position in the global nation branding index. So this is really a good example of a good setting of goals and good technology to attain them.

However, when -- and I come to the second part of my presentation -- when Korea is seen from Russia, we would say that these efforts for promotion of its soft power of Korea is not so much related to Russia but to Asia, to the Western countries and developing world. Traditionally, in Soviet times, brand Korea in Russia was associated with North Korea and, therefore, the quite, quite negative connotations. And South Korea at that time was just seen as a not very big state between China and Japan, just under the influence of the U.S.A.

However, after normalization of relations, South Korea was perceived with euphoria. As one of the researchers who lives here in Korea, a Russian researcher, writes Korea became -- wait a moment, I'll quote -- "a symbol of everything the Soviet people consider desirable: market economy, dynamic economic growth, openness to outside world," and especially the 1988 Olympics played a positive role at the time.

So for an average Russian, South Korea remains a country of technological wonders and economic success, and especially of the omnipresence of Korean companies like LG, Samsung, and Hyundai. They have become household names in Russia, and this provides a very positive image of the country.

Korea is now number 23rd destination for tourists for Russia. Actually, that's ahead not only of Japan but the U.S.A. as well. And the numbers of tourists has increased three-fold since 2007. And a Russian opinion poll shows that 58 percent of the Russian population considers Korea to be a friendly country. The connotations showed little drag in gaining power, remarkable progress, Koreans are seen as a laborious people and a working country, a non-wasteful country, use every grain, nothing is lost, people working like bees, et cetera. These are the quotes from the opinion polls.

However, I can say that the phenomenon of *Hallyu* is largely unknown in Russia, and only the soap operas and movies like *Shiri* and *My Wife is a Gangster* and some other films were shown mostly for elite public or in -- well, by some regional TV channels, for example, in Sakhalin and in the Far Eastern region. And Russian TV networks don't show these Korean serials and the Korean pop stars are also largely unknown in Russia, apart from some occasional concerts.

Also, Korean cuisine hasn't gained much popularity unlike Japanese. Japanese sushi has remarkable, enormous success in Russia. I don't know why because it's quite contrary to the normal Russian diet, and it's quite, quite, quite unaccustomed for Russians. But in big cities, well, you can see Japanese restaurants, well, about two in a block, you know. And interestingly about Korean restaurants, well, in Moscow I think there's only five or six restaurants which are mostly located in one place.

I would say that South Korean soft power, if you take it related to the hard power, is much more influential in Russia than South Korea's hard power. We could talk about that because largely South Korea is perceived just to be under the U.S. extended defense umbrella. And so it's not really much taken in consideration, and there's the soft power of Korea which is more popular in Russia.

However, still there exists a sort of dichotomy because one part -- there is rather strong if not numerous pro-North Korean lobbying in Russia, and the die-hard communists and conservatives who consider North Korea very positive and support it. And actually, if we look into the statistics, for example, of the Russian news agency, ITAR-TASS, for the period of the last 20 years since normalization of relations with ROK, the news about Korea is almost evenly divided: almost 160,000 news items on North Korea and 150,000 on South Korea.

But I should say that news on South Korea are mostly positive. And, well, if we analyze them apart from some episodes like the, well, offensive cartoon published in the *Korea Times* of the terror acts in Moscow, the news on Korea and the information is quite positive. And a recent review by KOTRA in Russia showed that Korea received 4.6 points out of 5 on the (inaudible). This is quite an achievement.

So summarizing, I would say that there are several tools which are used by Korea and which can be used for promoting its positive image in Russia, promoting and projecting soft power. Well, first is, of course, bilateral visits, especially from Russian citizens to Korea. No one I know has ever said some negative things about Korea because everybody was very much elated about the experience of this country. And for this the special government-sponsored exchange programs are very effective. And Russians are in the ninth place among foreigners coming to Korea. The bulk of them comes from Moscow and the Far East, including some sailors and some tourists as well.

The education systems are not yet used effectively for promotion of a positive image. There are only 550 Russian students in Korea and about 1,000 Korean students in Russia. Korean language is studied in 26 Russian universities, and 19 of them are in the eastern part of Russia. And the Korean government and educational institutions they suggest many new programs, like electronic learning, organizing an educational center, bilateral universities, et cetera, but it still has to be implemented.

I would say that Russia-Korean studies in Korea has a long history of more than a century, but now it's actually declined due to low financing. And Korea provides assistance to scholars which is very effective, especially for Korea Foundation grants and activities. And, well, this is effective politically because, well, this small group of Russian Korean experts there, well, their opinion is listened to in the policymaking bodies.

For example, the Russian Association of the University of Korean Knowledge was created and supported by Korean government. But in 1990-2006, there were only 500 books on Korea—in all areas of Korean studies, including philology, history, traditions, and modernity—published in Russia, which is much less numerous than in, say, in U.S.A. or China.

So I've already said about Korean TV and video production. And, well, it is inadequate and I don't know what to do with it because, well, Russian public is more West-oriented. We are mostly under European and American cultural influence. This is a fact, but, however, the interest to Korea, to the Eastern civilization, to the Orient, is now growing, especially in part because of Russian efforts to establish itself as a Euro-Pacific power as to be -- to increase its cooperation with China and other Asian countries. So I think this is a good chance for Korea to ride this wave of interest and introduce more of their pop culture and production to Russia. And one other thing: taekwondo is gaining popularity, but other sports are virtually unknown.

Well, I think that the products of Korea which are mostly popular in Russia are technical products -- automobiles, electronics, mobile phones -- but not good-



living clothes like fashions, accessories, and hair goods which became so popular in Asia.

Okay. So I think I gave you a little briefing on how Korea is perceived in Russia, and also some suggestions about how it should be promoted. Thank you.

MR. REVERE: Thank you very, very much, Georgy. It is very, very useful.

We're going to shift to a Taiwan perspective now, and I'm delighted to be able to introduce Erich Shih, who will offer his perspectives based on a career at looking at developments in hard and soft power from his position as a journalist and a news anchor over the years. Please.

ERICH SHIH: Thank you, Evans, and indeed today's discussion has been very, very interesting. Well, starting with the notion soft power, of course, it means many things to different people. And Joe Nye has his version of what soft power is, but in the rest of the world people adopt the phrase, but they interpret differently. And if I try to use Joe Nye's version of soft power, then it can be said that I am a product of American soft power. Because the culture is desirable. I, like many people before me, I grew up and went to college in Taiwan, and after that I went to the United States to study and I stayed there for 18 years. And I remember Richard once said that I'm practically an American. And actually, the fact of that when I'm in the newsroom, my colleagues call me an American.

And so spending 18 years, and 15 and 16 years of which in Washington and then moving to Taipei a year and a half ago, sort of gives me a different interpretation of what soft power is. And since we're in Korea, my imagination of the Korean definition of soft power is what the rest of the world is looking at the United States for -- basically, it's American pop culture. That's American soft power. It can be narrowly defined as such.

For example, Washington is the heart of world hard power and Hollywood and Madison Avenue are the centers of soft power. Basically for any other country who wants to exert its soft power, the best way is to assimilate itself into the current existing framework of American soft power. For example, the Hollywood version of foreign movies or the Hollywood version of foreign TV shows, like *The Weakest Link*, or the foreign actors starring in Hollywood movies—are too many for me to name.

But there's been a gradual change because of the peace and stabilities and the spread of liberal democracy and the loosening of controls by certain regimes. So it unleashed boundless energies and creativities. And so the consumer culture or the pop culture, is no longer dominated by Western democracies, especially leading by the United States. And we see many nations in a process of becoming a liberal democracy. They unleashed their potentials, and they try to reinvent their culture to make them more attractive in the eyes of many, to make it attractive, to make it desirable. It is no longer the turf simply belonging to the United States.

And one very good example is Japan. Like Professor Nakayama had stressed, even though the Japanese economy has performed poorly since the 1990s, this is exactly the moment where the Japanese culture influence started to take off. And nothing is more true than video games. And we have things like Nintendo, PlayStation, and SEGA. And arguably, the game called *Gran Turismo*, I believe most of the younger generations know what it is, or if you're old enough you know what that means because your kids are always talking about it.

And we have a bunch of American generations, young generations, that are talking about Mitsubishi Lancer Evolution or they are talking about Nissan Skyline GT-Rs and they are talking about Subaru Impreza WRX STI. These are the cars never being imported to the United States nor to the rest of the world, to be fair, almost none, especially Skyline GT-Rs, but everybody has heard of it and they want one simply because they play *Gran Turismo* in the PlayStation console. And that's how the Japanese soft power become relevant.

And, of course, the other thing is Japanese *manga* and Japanese animation. And it has become so popular that nowadays, during my days in Washington at least, all the young high school students or even primary school students, they read the same *manga* that I read earlier, but only that it's not in Japanese, it's in English. And this is how the Japanese soft power is being disseminated and it's a perfect example. And now we're talking about Korea, the ROK. Actually, the ROK is a very, very fast emerging new force to be reckoned with in this arena. But of course, it has yet to show its influence on the world stage.

But just like that Professor Shim had mentioned this morning, while it has become a serious phenomenon in East Asia. For example, Korean fashion and Korean TV drama and Korean pop idols are so popular in East Asia that, as many of you may remember, the wife of former Japanese Prime Minister Abe freely proclaimed that she is a fan of Korean pop culture, and she's a fan of the famous actor Bae Yong-joon. And this sort of softened the relationship between Korea and Japan, from the outsiders' perspective, because it made the Abe administration more welcome in the eyes of many Koreans. Because how can the Abe administration be hostile to Korea if the wife of the prime minister is a fan of one of our biggest TV stars?

And since my wife and I moved away from Washington and settled down in Taiwan for the past year and a half, we got to experience what people have been talking about in terms of Korean soft power because it's difficult to go anywhere without feeling the presence of Korean soft power. For example, the hit group Wonder Girls, and their MTV video "Sorry, Sorry," it's practically -- everyone's heard of it and everyone can sing a little bit of it and dance a little bit of it.

And, also, the Korean TV dramas they're more popular actually in Taiwan than, say, arguably, Taiwan's own TV drama production and certainly more popular than mainland productions, more popular than Hong Kong productions, and more popular than Japanese productions.

And, of course, the quality and the skill, the level of sophistication of the Korean cosmetic industry has become the standard bearer or the reference for many East Asian countries. It's basically the standard and, of course, by the perfect look of Korean celebrities. And it is known that the Korean celebrities, they are really into this cosmetic surgery -- big and small -- and the result of that is that nothing is short of perfection. And this is how the influence of Korean soft power has spread in East Asia in the past 10 years or so.

But, of course, soft power is like hard power. It has its own limitations and, for example -- a perfect example is Japan. Just like Professor Nakayama has said, that cultural export was something big in Japan, but anti-Japanese sentiment is quite another. You can freely buy Japanese consumer products, adopting Japanese pop culture, playing *Gran Turismo* on your PlayStation console, but when time comes and you go and you rally against the "Japanese invaders" and you swear you'll never forget what they have done to people back in the 1930s and 1940s.

And, of course, there are limits of American hard power and American soft power. And you don't need to look far and you can look at South Korea, and the base issue and the transfer of command issue and, over the years, the anti-American sentiment—even though the American soft power is omnipresent. It's everywhere. And another example, a case study about the limitation of Korea's soft power, it was the Asian Games that just concluded yesterday.

And just like Georgy has said, that taekwondo has become very popular in Russia. It has also become very popular in the United States, as well as in Taiwan. And then, you know, the Korean culture is so popular in Taiwan. But during the Asian Games, when a taekwondo competitor from Taiwan was disqualified, it immediately triggered an outrage against the Republic of Korea. And it was really, literally a public outcry and people targeted anything that is of Korean origin. You have people stopped eating and buying Korean food. They vowed to stop watching Korean dramas and Korean entertainment celebrities -- at the prudent judgment of some of their agents -- decided to postpone their trip to Taiwan. And if you search the web, you can find everything and anything you wanted, full of emotional opinions. And you have homemade videos posted on the web mocking and trashing anything that is Korean.

And the Taipei Korean School was even attacked by eggs, but nothing more serious than that, not Molotov cocktails. And some Korean stores in Taiwan reported a 20 percent to 30 percent drop of sales. And you have importers of Korean cosmetics and Korean electronic products publicly destroying some products to show their support for the Taiwan athletes.

And in terms of media, the media either initiated it or they enabled it, or they were forced to follow this anti-Korean trend. And, of course, the Taiwan mayoral elections has just concluded last weekend. So during the run up to the elections, of course, the politicians weighed in and they declared their support for the female athletes and basically accusing the other party of not not showing enough support for our athletes.

And so, in short, my conclusion is the world has become a better place because of soft power. But the problem is, without hard power to back it up, soft power will basically remain soft power. And soft power, I think, can enhance the presence of hard power. For example, we all say that we know that America is powerful, but we don't know what really makes America powerful unless you see a carrier strike group staging offshore, 30 kilometers away from your capital. The United States has the hard power to back up the country's soft power.

And does soft power matter? It matters. But does soft power not matter? It doesn't matter. If you look at the case of the People's Republic -- it is one perfect example. The People's Republic is rising very rapidly and -- but in terms of soft power, it is modest. And it is increasing, but it is modest, but it's hard power has barely diminished, if not increased.

And, for example, the evidence is everywhere -- from the renminbi issue to the trading imbalances to the tense situations in the Korean Peninsula. And so my conclusion, again, is that soft power is very good. Soft power is desirable. But if you really want to make your presence shown and to influence actors on an international stage, you really need to have hard power to back it up.

And American hard power is a lot easier for many countries to absorb because of what it stands for: the moral high ground, the ideas, and the leadership, the generosity, the culture. But rest assured, without all of the above-mentioned elements, America would still be the most powerful country in the world and still exercising the same influence. Thank you.

MR. REVERE: Erich, thank you very much for that very thoughtful and comprehensive presentation which also, among the other things that you accomplished, teed up our next speaker perfectly, I think. And so, let's move directly into the presentation by our next speaker, who is professor and associate dean of the School of International Studies at Peking University. Jia Qingguo, please.

JIA QINGGUO: Thank you very much. It's great to be back in the Brookings crowd. And also, I want to take this opportunity to thank KDI for the invitation.

As far as China is concerned, I think the short answer to the panel's question -- that is, hard power, soft power, what has changed? -- the short answer to this question is that there is both change and continuities, okay? On the continuity side, China's belief in hard power has not changed that much. As a developing country with a humiliating history during modern times, China believes in hard power and has been trying hard to attain it, both in terms of the economy and in terms of military modernization.

As one of the slogans in Chinese said, *guojia zunyan shi da chulai de*: national respect can only be obtained through fighting. So, without a strong economy, without a strong military, you are looked down upon. That's the kind of a lesson many

Chinese learn from the past. But as far as China gaining hard power, especially during the past 30 years, China has attached greater importance to the question of soft power and has done a lot in this regard, especially in recent years.

Before we talk about China's approach to soft power, I think we need to disaggregate the soft power concept, as some Chinese have been doing. I think maybe soft power can be disaggregated into something like soft power resources, soft power management, and also soft power effectiveness as a sort of result.

When we talk about soft power as resources, we're including things like hard power resources -- hard resources, like quantity and quality of China's economy, Chinese military, science and technology capabilities. And then there are also soft resources, such as culture, education, ideas, values, visions, we have talked about.

Both hard resources and soft resources are sort of a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for soft power. So, a country has to have some kind of hard and soft resources to have soft power. In terms of soft power management, we're referring to the ability to transform resources into power. In other words, how to mobilize your hard and soft resources for certain policy objectives.

And, of course, in terms of soft power effectiveness, basically the criteria is whether you can get things done. In China's drive for soft power, it appears to me that China's focus is on soft power management and effectiveness now. It has made some progress in soft power management and has been effective in some areas in terms of soft power effectiveness. However, overall, China's soft power effectiveness has been limited to the frustration of many Chinese, including their leaders.

Over the past years, China has made a lot of efforts to improve the soft power management, such as building Confucius Institutes all over the world. Now you have hundreds of Confucius Institutes. The Chinese government has spent a lot of money on this.

China has also drastically increased the number of fellowships to foreign students, especially those from developing countries. And also, China has been conducting growing numbers of training programs for foreign officials and officers, military officers, especially from developing countries.

China has also made increasing efforts to propagate Chinese views overseas, through media and other means like the Internet, including the recent publication of the *China Daily* in the Korean language, as I was just told. And also, China has assigned more importance to the recent, heightened interest in public diplomacy. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China just set up an office a few years ago to manage public diplomacy. And also, the Chinese leaders, as far as I know, are paying more attention to so-called public diplomacy. This concept has been included in the Chinese official document.

China has tried to explore appropriate ways of representing China, for

example, in holding the Olympics. The Chinese government spent a lot of time, you know, trying to come up with ideas as to how to make it attractive, not only in terms of facilities, but also in terms of ideas. So they talk about the ideas of green Olympics, scientific Olympics, and also humane Olympics. And, of course, the CCTV -- Chinese Central TV -- has done a lot of things. Among other things it has hired foreign correspondents and anchor people to give China a new face.

And China has also made a lot of efforts to develop new and creative ideas for management of international relations, such as the things that actually Richard Hu has mentioned, like a new security concept, “harmonious world” and “common and differentiated responsibilities” when we talk about climate change. Of course, some people have regarded this as a sort of obstacle to progress. But anyway, when you look at all these efforts, many Chinese still feel that China has a shortage of resources in terms of soft power, okay? They’re not confident, especially on the question of ideas, institutions, visions.

For example, when people talk about the “Beijing consensus,” there is a lot of difference -- a lot of debate as to what that means. A lot of people say there is no Beijing consensus. A lot of people say that we don’t have a model. A lot of people say that, you know, so-called China’s development model is not repeatable, okay? In other words, it’s kind of something unique to China, so there is no such thing as a China model for development.

So there is a lot of difference in terms of what other people can emulate. But Chinese overall share the belief that there is a need for combined use of soft and hard power resources. In other words, smart power, okay? But how to balance that is a question that Chinese often debate among themselves.

Despite its success in some areas of soft power effectiveness, the Chinese often feel frustrated with the way China is interpreted and understood in the outside world. There are a lot of criticisms of China and I was asked once by a journalist from *Global Times*, you know, how do you interpret this? I said don’t worry about this, you know. The stronger China becomes, you get more criticisms. The country which gets most of the criticism is the United States. We’re far from that. But, anyway, there is a lot of frustration.

To conclude, I want to say that as far as China’s policy is concerned, China’s approach to hard power has not changed very much, but its approach to soft power has changed a lot. China has devoted a lot of resources to soft power management and has made some efforts and has devoted a lot of resources to it.

China may have made much progress in terms of soft power management, it’s soft power effectiveness is likely to remain limited. This is because China itself is caught in domestic development and reforms and has a long way to go to build up its soft power resources at home, such as political institutions, values, and visions, ideas.

Given the fact that China will need more time to sort out its own domestic

problems, it's likely to take some time for China to develop soft power that can live up to people's expectations. If one wants China to have more soft power, one has to be more patient. Thank you.

MR. REVERE: Thank you very much, Dr. Jia, for yet another very good presentation. We've had three very distinctive and very thoughtful interventions by our colleagues here, and I want to open the floor for questions.

And I thought I would take the liberty, since I'm in the chair and I've got hold of the mic here, to perhaps ask the first one. Because something that you said, Dr. Jia, really struck a chord with me, and you were talking about the occasional frustrations that China feels as it sees the way it is perceived in the world. And as a former American diplomat I can only say welcome to our world.

(Laughter)

But on a serious note, what steps, in your view, that China has not taken so far might it take to get a better sense of how effectively you are telling your story in the world? You mentioned it in passing that CCTV has some foreigners as correspondents and reporters there presenting a somewhat different image, which I think is probably a very good thing. But in terms of getting a better sense of how the product is selling out in the world and how your image is being effectively presented overseas. Are there other things that you think that China can do better in making the sale, if you will?

DR. JIA: Well, that's a good question. I think China has not been very successful in explaining the rationale of what it has done, to explain effectively why it has done certain things. Basically you don't hear a lot of explanations from China in terms of why it does certain kinds of things.

For example, more recently, as far as South Korea is concerned, China has called for an emergency meeting of the heads of the delegations of the Six-Party Talks. And from the Chinese perspective this makes sense. But the problem is why does it make sense? I think China has not been very effective in terms of telling the world, you know, why, you know, we must have the third meeting of the heads of the Six-Party Talks, why this meeting can make a difference from the Chinese perspective.

Unless China can effectively, you know, offer explanations to its behavior, to its decisions, China will have difficulty because people can interpret this decision, this behavior from all kinds of ways, especially when they don't know China, when they have suspicions of China. They can talk about China from very different ways, not to the liking of the Chinese leaders.

MR. REVERE: Thank you for that. Let me open the floor up to questions now. Please keep your questions in the form of questions. Keep them brief. Identify yourself. And first and foremost, wait for the microphone to arrive there.

And I thought I saw a hand way down there. Yes. We have been ignoring

the corners of the room here, so let's make up for our sins here. Please.

QUESTION: Hi. My name is John. I'm from Jawaharlal Nehru University in New Delhi. Thank you for the wonderful presentation and the insight. But, however, I think we need a more analytical understanding of what a soft power is all about. But since we're dealing with power and, I don't know, we need more analytical understanding in terms of how soft the soft can be. Since we're dealing with many factors, the soft power aspect of the conservance of (inaudible) values to put it from the nationalistic or a nation state power, so that I don't know how soft that can be.

And also, my question goes to the chair actually because you are actually the one who was referencing it before. It's about we need a more plural and comparative understanding of what is soft power and the softer aspect of it. Because I'm from India and we have a backfired -- I mean, in the early 2000s, we had this "Shining India" campaign. Actually it was a political suicide for one party and they were thrown out of power, so we have to be careful about the domestic response of the image creations that we do.

And also, the one aspect of promoting this national power we seems to be having lots of national branding campaigns. And we also should not forget the fact that it's actually promoting an identity conflict, based on national levels. And that could be more dangerous in the long term. Erich has already said how it could backfire from the Taiwanese experience. So we have to be very careful in dealing with it. Actually we are dealing with very sensational matters. So how do you respond to it?

MR. REVERE: Thank you. Erich?

MR. SHIH: Well, my problem with the idea of soft power is basically it's very difficult to define. And Professor Joe Nye, of course, wrote an article, and then subsequently he wrote a book about it. And he's going to Taipei next Wednesday and deliver a speech about soft power. So I'll give it one more try to understand exactly what that is.

(Laughter)

And my problem is that it's a very difficult concept to grasp. And I think it is also something that is uniquely American because the United States is the most powerful country in the world. And the United States is in a position to think about the outreach of her power. Is there anything that we can do as a nation or to do more to achieve our national objectives other than the pure use of hard power?

And many people may not agree, but let me try to ask you this question: Has any country ever successfully persuaded the government or the people of the United States to pursue a policy or a course of action that is to its liking by using soft power? I cannot think of any. And this pretty much, you know, explains my understanding of soft power as an academic term and the limitation of the phrase "soft power."



But anyway, I'll give it a try next week. Thank you.

MR. REVERE: Strobe, you had a –

STROBE TALBOTT: Absolutely terrific panel. I'd like to put a question to Georgy and then a question to the panel.

Georgy, could you give us what you think is the best way of understanding President Medvedev's visit to what our Japanese friends call the Northern Territories and what he calls a particularly beautiful part of the Russian Federation?

(Laughter)

And for the panel as a whole, including the chair, I'd be interested in your candid views about the current state of American soft power in the light of the weakness and ill health of America's fiscal situation, which Joe Nye, of course, includes as a component of soft power. I've already sent him one e-mail. I'm going to have to send him several P.S.'s it sounds like. He's far and away the most quoted personality at this conference, which may say something about soft power itself.

But the other shadow over American soft power from my own travels seems to be the manic depressive cycle with regard to what only two years ago was the celebration in many countries around the world -- not all -- of the Obama election and now the sense of disappointment and dismay that seems to have crept in. So a response on that would be interesting as well.

DR. TOLORAYA: Well, President Medvedev's visit to the Kuril Islands, I think it was meant as a public relations exercise. Nobody much heard about it actually because it was planned as a part of his tour around Asia and Russia, and so this was seen just as a sort of occasion to visit this area, to pay attention to the needs of the Far Eastern people. So nobody, in fact, expected the Japanese to react so strongly. And after that it was a matter of principle, of course. You cannot take advice from foreign governments where the national leader should go. What if the Japanese would tell President Lee Myung-bak not to go to Dokdo, for example?

And I would say that from the internal policy point of view, well, this visit got overwhelming support of the Russian population. So if you're speaking about the soft power in terms of internal politics and election considerations, that was a right step. In terms of foreign policy, probably not. The timing wasn't good, but actually no one thought it would be just in the middle of the Chinese-Japanese conflict.

And one more small comment on the U.S. soft power. When I grew up in the former Soviet Union, well, everything in the U.S. was a sort of icon. Starting from jeans and music to films. Now I see that the Russian population, the most part of it, are not so fond of America. And this means that the soft power, when it's combined with hard power, sometimes this gives a negative effect to the perception of a country in another part of the world. Thanks.

MR. REVERE: Strobe, I'm going to defer to my colleagues on your second question, but just make one comment on it. I really want to hear their perspectives on how we are viewed in Taiwan and China, et cetera. But I'm just wondering whether the downturn in the U.S. economy, that the net effect of that is that it is not so diminishing America's soft power -- it has done that obviously because we don't have the resources that we had -- as it is affecting the way America's ability to apply its hard power is perceived around the world by both friends, allies, and adversaries. But let me defer to my colleagues on that and the other questions that were raised.

MR. SHIH: The short answer to your question, Strobe, about the diminishing American perceived soft power and the budget deficit and all: I think, of course, it hurt the United States. And the best way to deal with it is to get the fiscal policy back in order and to make America healthy and strong again. And people like the United States. People want to be Americans not only because the country is strong and it's big, it's also a success story, and the people believe in it and the people believe in so many values that it represents. But you have to be successful for people to believe in you. And right now, the fiscal policy or the national debt is one serious problem. If it is perceived that the United States is not going to be that attractive if -- from an outsider's point of view -- the United States cannot get the fiscal policies in order obviously it hurts their reputation. The best way to deal with it is to really just run a good policy and do good politics.

DR. JIA: Well, I think the impact of the economic problem on U.S. diplomacy or soft power happens more on the minds of the Americans. It's less confident in addressing certain kinds of issues. I think American soft power has not changed that much, but then it's the question of, you know, if you believe this is right, you should push for it. But, of course, it has undermined the soft power effectiveness in the sense that you cannot devote enough resources or adequate resources to push for certain good ideas, such as climate change or free trade or principles -- in that order.

As far as the relationship between democracy and soft power, I think democracy is a plus for soft power in some aspects and then it's a minus in some other aspects. American allies and friends are often frustrated, you know, whenever you have an administration change—especially when the opposition party comes into office, they want to change everything, but then after two years of problems then you change back. So everybody has to go along with it. It gets very frustrating.

But then, you know, on balance, I think, you know, it's still a plus, it seems to me. People understand, oh, you have a system like that, you know, and this is reality. You can't do certain kind of things. You can always say, oh, it's because of the opposition party or the Congress or somebody else. You still want to do this. You still want to fight climate change, but then, of course, we can't do very much because of the Congress, because of the Republicans. People understand or at least people have to swallow, accept, despite the frustrations.

MR. REVERE: Do you have a follow-up?

MR. TALBOTT: Yes, if I could. I'll just bellow. Qingguo's and Erich's last two comments lead me to want to put on the record of this conference something that Mike Mullen, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was willing to put on the record even though he said it off the record at Brookings last May. He gave a tour of the horizon of the various hard power challenges facing the United States. And at the end of this presentation he was asked what is the single biggest threat that keeps him awake at night? And his answer was the national deficit and the national debt. That, coming from the senior military official of the United States, I think represents some sort of nexus between hard and soft power or threats thereto.

MR. REVERE: He's a wise man. Let's come over here on this side.

QUESTION: Hiro Matsumura. As for the effectiveness of international media reporting in the context of soft power I'd like to sharpen the chair's question to Professor Qingguo, but I'd like to address this question to all of the four.

My question is, is soft power possible without free speech and a free press? There is no such country with ideal free speech and a free press. It's ranged from direct governmental control and censorship and/or self-censorship by the media itself or control under the name of classification. But the U.S. certainly has a criticism because of its tremendous power, but it has, at the same time, exercised some soft power. So soft power does not necessarily conflict with criticism.

And again, maybe because of recent WikiLeaks affairs, the U.S. government may suffer from a decline of confidence. But if the U.S. media reported these issues very well, U.S. media and also the U.S. soft power may experience some increase in confidence. So how do you respond? This is a very serious question to our Russian and Chinese fellows. Also, in this WikiLeaks context, it is also a very sensitive question to Americans, too.

MR. REVERE: You want to start?

DR. TOLORAYA: Well, I'll just answer the second part of the question. As far as I know, the Russian government said it has found nothing interesting in the WikiLeaks information, so we're not going to play this game.

(Laughter)

MR. REVERE: Spoken like a true former diplomat.

DR. JIA: Well, the relationship between soft power and freedom of the press and speech I think is a complicated one. Of course, you cannot have much soft power if you are completely a dictatorship. And a complete dictatorship would make it very difficult to develop your economy and become really powerful in terms of resources.

You know, if you look at China's development, accompanied with China's

rise China has become more liberal in terms of press freedom and also freedom of speech. Of course, there are still a lot of limitations. China believes that the level of freedom is associated with the level of development. Unless you have strong institutions, freedom of speech may cause more damages than benefits. So you have to balance between political stability and also freedom of speech.

But if you are a developed country where the institutions are strong, even though you still have certain limitations on freedom of speech in terms of political correctness, you can tolerate a greater level of freedom. But then when you are in a developing country where institutions are weak, political stability can be jeopardized if too much freedom is allowed in the eyes of a lot of people in China. So we have to balance between the two and, of course, try to make the press and personal speech freer as our institutions become stronger and also the economy more developed.

MR. REVERE: I'm going to pass on WikiLeaks other than saying that I completely associate myself with the eloquent and thoughtful and profoundly important comments made by Strobe Talbott at lunch today.

Let's come over here.

QUESTION: Scott Harold of RAND. I'm going to attempt a quick synthesis of two comments that I didn't necessarily agree with and would like elicit more comments on.

First, Professor Jia just said, if I understood correctly, I think you said you could not have soft power under an absolute dictatorship. That doesn't accord with my understanding of Chinese history, particularly in the post-1949 period. China's soft power is greatest when it actually stood for something. It stood for revolutionary class warfare, a value that was also associated with decolonization and was appealing across much of Southeast Asia and Africa, in my sense. Which I think drives to the question of what really determines soft power's impact? In my mind, soft power is about one thing at least, and that is what is global politics about at the period in which we're talking about?

I think one of the reasons to then turn to the question of something Lam Peng Er said -- does Korea have any great contribution to soft power, to human society? I think that Korea democratized at a time when many countries were moving from the view that decolonization and class warfare were the order of the day to a view that said development and democratization were the human values that countries should pursue, something China has not yet done and something that I think many outsiders criticize China for.

And so then to look at what Korea has done, I would say the ROK's contributions to human society include a rotation in power peacefully of political parties, and—extremely impressive in the Asian context, the prosecution of former presidents for military crimes. In the Taiwan context, one could say that Korea applied a generosity of politics in the pardons that were issued to those former presidents. And there is a

relatively egalitarian level of development that I think many in the U.S. believe we could positively learn from that Taiwan, Japan, and many in Asia aspire to.

So I guess I would push back a little against the earlier definitions of a very narrow or instrumental approach to soft power. I actually believe in an extremely expansive version of soft power. It's not just blue jeans. It can't just be Japanese video games. But when I want my society to look like modern China, contemporary China, then China will have soft power. When I believe that the only things I'm getting from Chinese media are more effective propaganda or a more widespread monolithic recitation of the views of the news of the Chinese Communist Party, then China will have less effective soft power. Similarly, I think that you hear a diversity of views from South Korea, and I think that's why South Korea actually has more effective soft power.

But I would be very interested in learning from the panelists if I've made some error or if there's something that I should learn from them about their views on this matter. So thank you.

MR. REVERE: In my opening comments this morning, I think I gave a definition in effect of soft power that overlapped with a lot of what you said, and I'll say no more about that. But I do want to turn to Dr. Jia and ask him to take on the hot potato that you threw his way.

DR. JIA: I'm not sure whether during Mao's period, especially during the Cultural Revolution, China was more powerful in terms of soft power. I think a lot of people during that time draw inspirations of ideas from different parts of the world and they just happen to hit upon Mao's ideas, even though they did not understand what went on in China. As far as I know, many of the Maoist scholars in the United States became so frustrated, and some of them even became anti-China after China opened up and they went to China and saw that China was very different from what they had anticipated. And also, in terms of influence, even in terms of soft power, China now has much greater influence than during Mao's period.

Now, when people think about things, you know, they think about China. They think about what China wants to do. They think about, you know, how we should manage if China does this and does that, much more than during Mao's time. It's precisely because China's influence was, at that time, not so big, but maybe bigger than China's hard power at the time, that the United States pursued a sort of policy of isolation and containment until the '70s, until the beginning of the late '60s and '70s. So China could be ignored or somehow ignored and managed as sort of outside the international society because China did not have the power -- even when you talk about soft power.

MR. REVERE: Thank you. One last question. Please. Thank you for your patience.

QUESTION: I'm from Seoul National University and I'm especially interested in the issues of backlashes and decline of soft power. That's why I was anticipating the remarks about Taiwan, especially after the incidents at the Asian Games,

backlash against Korean soft power there.

You were very quick giving the recipe for how the U.S. can repair its perceived decline in soft power. Could you give any recipe to Korea how it can repair its soft power now in Taiwan after this? And I think it's going to be a very difficult question, so it's probably because the difference between backlash and really decline and the countries which are involved in this issue.

In South Korea, Taiwan has for a long time been considered as a competitor. They started economic development about the same time; a very similar growth rate, just different industrialization strategy; very similar dates for democratization. So maybe it's that -- if the Taiwanese have that similar perception of Korea as Korea as competitor, maybe that was the reason why the backlash against Korea's soft power was so quick and so big in scale in Taiwan. Thank you.

MR. SHIH: Yeah, there are some underlying factors, just like you've said. Taiwan has always considered that the ROK is one of the prime competitors even though the ROK has never seen Taiwan in that role because for the ROK, Japan is the competitor.

And second of all, the Koreans as a people are known to be very, very tough and to act very strong and very patriotic, which translates through the prism or the mirror from the eyes of people in Taiwan. Sometimes it can mean that the Koreans are competing unfairly when they're in their own games. And in this particular situation, the taekwondo and the Asian Games disqualification issue, I think the best way to deal with it is that the truth will set you free.

And basically Taiwan's backlash against South Korea was imagined, it was not true. It has nothing to do with the truth because the governing body -- well, the people who actually made a decision that caused the backlash, they barely have any Korean connections and it's more of a perception because taekwondo originated in Korea back in the '50s and the '60s. And, of course, there are disproportionate representations of Korean citizens, nationals, in the governing body that caused that problem.

And also, the other thing is that the truth should come out. Basically the truth was that the Taiwan athlete who was declared a loser, then disqualified, was on good standing because the judge played by the rules. And in Taiwan, the same videotape that proclaims that our athlete was not cheating, if you put it in the framework of the rulebook it says that she has the intention to cheat. And it's just caught in the maelstrom of so many elements, you know, Korea as a competitor and past histories in Asian Games or regional sports activities. It's an accumulation of all that. And then when you have South Korea and you have taekwondo and you put China together, people stop using their brains.

(Laughter)

And it's an emotional outlash. And, in fact, we're doing an investigative

report, which is to be aired pretty soon. It's going to tell people what actually happened. And so many people who declared their support for the female athlete will be embarrassed.

MR. REVERE: I am reminded as we end this session of two of the words that made me feel extremely uncomfortable during previous Olympics when I was here as the DCM in the American Embassy, and those two words were "Apolo Ohno."  
(Laughter)

And those of you who remember that, I need to say no more.

Ladies and gentlemen, can you please join me in thanking our panelists?

(Applause)

RICHARD BUSH: On behalf of those of us from Brookings, I would like to thank everyone who's participate in this really stimulating and thoughtful session today. I think, you know, we've learned something from every single presenter. Some of the panel chairs have made their contribution as well, like Evans. And so I think that we've had a very successful day.

I want to express a particular thanks to KDI and Wonhyuk Lim and all your staff, to my staff for making all of this possible. And we look forward to getting together again soon. Thank you very much.

(Applause)

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