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PANEL TWO
EAST ASIAN PERSPECTIVES ON SOFT POWER

KOREA’S SOFT POWER
AND EAST ASIA

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Keynote Address:

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Panel 1: Korea’s Growing Soft Power:

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Lunch Address:

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Panel 2: East Asian Perspectives on Soft Power

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Panel 3: Hard Power vs. Soft Power -- What Has Changed?

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PROCEEDINGS

DR. LIM: Thank you very much for the speech. And now we’ll move on to Panel 2. Professor Lho will chair the session. Lho Kyongsoo will chair the session and I will invite the other speakers as well to the podium.

DR. LHO: Shall we start?

DR. BUSH: Yeah, go ahead.

DR. LHO: Good. How do you follow after such a magnificent luncheon address? I’d like to begin by thanking the KDI and the CNAPS at Brookings for hosting this very useful, interesting seminar.

If Wonhyuk Lim is still here, I’d like to congratulate him on his stroke of genius breaking up the luncheon so that we come down here for the luncheon speech. Had we had the luncheon speech upstairs, I worried that people might just go up to their rooms after lunch for a snooze, jet lag and all. But he forced us to come down here, so I think our defection rate is relatively low. And after that stimulating presentation by President Talbott, I think most of us are still awake.

We hope to follow on in this second panel today with a reflection and examination of what soft power is. I remember Joe Nye from my undergraduate days when he was teaching Gov 20 at Harvard, this is the international politics course. And even back then he had this inkling that America was more effective in pursing its foreign policy goals by using what would constitute soft power today rather than hard power. But it also goes without saying soft power isn’t quite effective without a measure of hard power. We have lots of countries like New Zealand, Denmark, which have plenty of soft power; but in terms of global -- getting things done on the global stage, independently or in coalitions, they’re not that effective. You have to be persuasive.

Nevertheless, our topic today is not about hard power, in this panel at least, but about soft power and what Asian countries think of soft power. To my left and to my right, I have three very distinguished scholars: Richard Hu from the University of Hong Kong, who will speak on the Chinese and Hong Kong perspectives; Professor Nakayama, who will speak about Japanese perspectives on soft power in this region; and, last but not least, Lam Peng Er from the National University of Singapore. Singapore is one of those small countries but a small country not without power. Singapore has lots of soft power. And so we will have the perspectives from two major players in the region and another major player in Southeast Asia, smaller but with a very big voice in what happens in this region.

So, without further ado, may I invite Professor Hu to give your presentation.
DR. HU: Okay, thank you. Thank you, Professor Lho, for your introduction. And also I want to thank KDI and CNAPS to holding this conference, provide us opportunity for the CNAPS fellow alumnus to have a reunion. And talking about soft power, this kind of reunion is a kind of soft power itself. It’s a networking power in the region.

I’d like to also start with a Joe Nye story. In 1992, I was an honor fellow at Harvard Center for International Affairs. Joe was the director of the Center. I remember we had one-on-one conversation, but not on soft power, on the nuclear learning which related to my dissertation.

But his book, Bound to Lead book in 1992, was the first time I’ve encountered the concept of soft power. It was very influential, and I’m glad 20 years later people finally pick it up as the important themes for international relations.

Well, my job today is to talk about Chinese perspective of soft power. I think this morning we heard some very interesting or excellent presentations about Korea’s growing soft power. I think these presentations touch on a very important theme in East Asian IR, which is the rising -- the growing importance of soft power competition in the region. Although these days happen to be the irony, the hard power is in play. But still if you look at big pictures, I think both soft power and hard power are getting more important.

Although there are territorial disputes, hard power competition, military alliance, and a power balancing, nobody should deny that soft power is getting more important -- visibly or not so visibly. And so by that stance, I would say soft power competition is kind of non-zero sum competition in East Asia. And in some way, this non-zero sum competitions among major powers has changed the landscape in East Asia. And also you will find a new game, and if the hard power competition is driven by the logic of balance of power, the soft power competition is defined by the logic what I call the balance of influence. So, this is high time -- is a good, very timely topic for us to talk about soft power.

Now, for the sake of time since I only have -- 20 minutes? I have 20 minutes. I will focus my remarks on two issues: first, how China developed its soft power; and second, how we assess China’s soft power, its effectiveness, and weakness.

Well, first, the development of Chinese soft power. Now, in recent years, you probably noticed that the soft power theme or soft power topic has becoming high priority when people in China, within China, and also outside China, talking about Chinese foreign policies. And we have seen Chinese leaders and elites use the term “soft power” more frequently. And soft power concept has been already officially incorporated into the policy documents.

Now, here comes the questions. Why China has becoming so clear about soft power? I think there are several reasons. First, everybody knows the -- China is
rising as the rising power. Now, rising power, you know, typically tend to have mirror imaging thinking about, as I rise, what kind of lesson I learn from history? So, there’s a lot of this kind of mirror imaging thinking in China in the history, how other great power has risen. A few years ago, there’s a TV series called The Rise of Great Power, and that educated the Chinese audience about how other powers have risen in history.

Now, one of the interesting things to the Chinese audience and also the intellectuals is over last 2,000 years a lot of countries rose through gaining more hard power. But in the 20th century or 19th century, you see this new type of rising. The rise of United States to the world stage is through a combination of hard power and soft power. So, the uniqueness of U.S. story tells us that if you want to establish global leadership, it has got to be something different for the traditional ways. It has got to be you accumulate more soft power as though -- the soft power in terms of your value, your systems, your practice becoming attractive to others. Now, this is, I think, one of the weakness as China rise, people will find China need to do more on accumulating soft power.

Now, the second reason why China cares about soft power I think has to do with the things that the others -- how others perceive China’s rising. And there’s no question China’s hard power is rising rapidly, but how you legitimize the rise of hard power and the way to legitimize the hard power rising or rising power have to be -- have a lot of things to do with the soft power. So, the rise of China needs to be put in the context or the discourse of peaceful rise. So when talk about peaceful rise you have to think about the elite and believe that it should not just have power, it have to, you know, give people impression and also assurance the rising power will not be a threatening power.

So, for these reasons in recent year we see there’s lot of discussions about Chinese soft power inside Chinese policy community and intellectuals.

Now, how China developed a soft power in recent years? Now, this question I think is not an easy task. It depends on how you define soft power. What is soft power? And this morning we talk a lot about these issues about culture impact, economic dimension, and I think it’s very, very useful for this.

Now, my understanding of soft power is probably a little bit narrower than earlier speakers’ on the definition of what is soft power, because Joseph Nye’s original definition of soft power is the ability to get what you want through the ability of co-option and persuasion, and so this is what he tried to -- you know, he means what is soft power. So, if you use that definition, I would characterize Chinese activities in building soft power in the following categories.

The first category is what I call activity of symbolism or activity of name recognition or brand name building. This is very common for a lot of countries. As you rise you need to be recognized by others, and this morning we heard a story about how Korean hosting of the G20 meeting as a good occasion to present Korea to the world, to
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Now, China has done similar things. In the recent years, China has become very care about building its image, and China has showcased its economic and the development success by hosting the 2008 Olympic Games in Beijing and then this year the 2010 Shanghai Expo and now just last week just finished the Asian Games in Guangzhou. And also there’s activities like manned space flight, the Lunar Exploration Project, the -- you know, and also if you travel to major cities in China you see everywhere building the tall skyscrapers. And these are just -- you know, it’s a showcase. It have symbolic meanings to show the world China’s rising, and this is what I called branding effect. This is very common for every rising countries.

Now, China also expanded culture and education exchange, receiving a lot of foreign students, even provide financial aid to these students. Now, CCTV have international -- have 24 hours broadcasting global coverage. And also a lot of culture exhibitions, and you also notice there’s a growing number of Confucius Institutes all over the world. So, these -- in some ways, it’s kind of a branding effect for the rising countries. Now, it’s also very good for image building. So this is one category of activities in building soft power.

Now, second kind of activity is -- according to Joseph Nye, soft power is the ability you attract -- you induce emulations from other countries. So, in some ways, China is doing a lot of things trying to increase its attraction and induce some emulation. And you probably notice China’s official leaders and officials becoming more confident to share with the world China’s successful story of economic development. And there’s - - although the term “Beijing consensus” or “China model” were not coined by Chinese government or Chinese intellectuals, but they are never shy to share some of the Chinese experience, especially with third-world countries. So, in some way, this is another way to build your soft power, setting examples and telling your stories. And in some way, I remember Joe Nye says a story tells a thousand words.

Now, another kind of activity China has done is how to increase its moral authorities in international relations. This is the problem for all the rising powers. Now, China trying to make some normative contribution to international relations, and there’s a -- if you’re familiar with Chinese foreign policy, China has long championed so-called five principles of peaceful coexistence.

Now, in recent years, the intellectual circles and the Chinese leaders keep introducing some new concept to international relations and international debate. These concepts, including xin anquan guan, new security concept, which is basically cooperative security, and democratization of international relations, guoji guanxi minzhu hua, and then harmonious society and respecting cultural diversity in the world affairs and also attaching no condition to foreign economic aid and limited sanctions. These are the concepts, if you are closely following the Chinese foreign policy discourse, you will find this is China’s contribution to the normative debate in IR.
Now, last but not least, soft power is how to attract -- how to increase your diplomatic appeals to other countries. So it got to be something in the behavior side, either some behavior change. So, in recent years you see, especially in Asia, in Southeast Asia, there’s a so-called charm offense, good neighborhood diplomacies, and these behavior changes in diplomacy in some ways increase or help improve China’s image. And China’s Asian policy, I think you see some fruit, mulin anlin fulin, good, secure, and prosperous neighborhood policies is well received -- receptive by other countries. And China’s becoming more positive, participating in the regional institution building and the regional forum and dialogue.

So, these are the -- I just gave you a very brief summary about what China’s doing trying to increase soft power.

Now, let me quickly turn to the second topic, which is how we assess Chinese soft power. How effective is this? What is the weakness of this?

Now, it’s how you assess this. It all depends on your definition. And soft power is a perceptional power. It also depends on whose perceptions. Now, if we -- I think there are two difficulties here.

First difficulty is how you tell soft power really works. It’s difficult to establish this causal relations. This change of China’s influence increase is caused by soft power. It’s very difficult to establish that -- or by hard power maybe.

The second difficulty is the definition. What I mean by soft power? What exactly makes the soft power? The concept soft power is easy to say, but is very difficult to define.

Now, as I said earlier, Joe Nye defined it as an ability to obtain what you want through co-option and attraction. So, soft power is more defined in what is not -- it is not something material, something military, something economic induced. But what is soft power is still not very clear. You know, a lot of debate. So, in my view, in assessing Chinese soft power, how effective it is, my message here is if hard power is the ability to make people fear you, soft power is the power that you make people love you. But looking the record, you can see what make people love you has proved to be much, much more difficult than to earn that -- make people love you. So, this is my major message here.

Now, let me give you some example why I said that. Now, people -- this morning we talk about cultural powers. Culture could be a source of soft power. I agree with that. But culture itself, I think in some way, is not a soft power, because many people in China, many scholars -- somebody I know very well -- they argue that culture, Chinese culture, could be a soft power. But they said culture product like Chinese calligraphy, Peking duck, panda, Great Wall, Chinese movies, Peking opera -- these could be soft power. But I have different views. I see these are the cultural attractions instead of cultural product. Cultural product can carry some message, can reflect your
values. But cultural product itself have name recognition effect or -- but culture products itself is still a commodity. It is not a tool of soft power, if we use Joe Nye’s original definitions.

So, that means people may love Chinese culture, but they do -- they may not like Chinese policy, right? To use Richard’s phrase, we have to look at what Kim Jong-il’s CD collection is. He may have a lot of Korean pop songs CD collection, but he doesn’t like South Korean policy. So, culture itself may not necessary be a soft power, it could be a source.

Another issue is the image building. Every country cares about its international image. There’s no question about it. But building a good, positive international image is a very tricky business. You know, if we use a balance sheet, we’ll see sometimes you can have a credit, but sometimes you have more debits, especially for a rising power like China. People have high expectations. You should be responsible great powers, but it a very high bar for China to be a responsible great powers. So, its image in the 1970s when China just opened door, I think that 20 years before June 4th, was a good time for China have very positive international image. After that, it proved to be very difficult China to establish an image in a positive image to satisfy everybody.

You can -- if you have a good image, but your economic clout cannot automatically translate into your positive image, and also you are keep being distracted by Dalai Lama, Nobel Peace Prize awarded to Liu Xiaobo, and even the Olympic Games, the outside China torch relay was viewed as negative.

So, I think here -- I think there’s a very interesting story. U.S. Ambassador to China, Ambassador Huntsman, talked to the Chinese intellectuals, and he said China needs to get used to international criticism, (in Chinese). So, you know, you’ve got to use that. So, image is -- there’s both domestic and international constituencies. It’s difficult to reconcile these two constituencies.

Now, soft power is the ability to attract, induce respect from other countries. Now, attraction -- attractive power is not necessarily soft power. Sometime can turn the other way around. As China’s economic power, military power grows a lot of people get scared. You know, a lot of people get scared. And so the world has becoming not so receptive to the rising Chinese powers.

Now, lastly, but let me turn to those normative concepts China proposed in international relations, and you will find there’s also a lot of limitations. The world is not so receptive to those new concepts.

So, the core meaning of Joe Nye’s soft power concept emphasize the ability to attract, induce emulations, but to get that I think China have long way to go to cover that. And there are some Chinese scholars argue that, this is a Professor from Tsinghua University, it’s difficult for China to compete with United States unless China’s value, ideology, political system has changed. And in today’s world, I think the
normative foundation of soft power is also very important. In the end, soft power is a perceptional power, so if others do not accept, do not agree, there’s no attraction.

So, thank you.

DR. LHO: Thank you, Professor Hu. Hopefully we’ll hear a little bit about Hong Kong’s perspective during the question-and-answer session.

DR. HU: (inaudible).

DR. LHO: Now I’m going to, with the speakers’ permission, switch the order around a little bit and instead of having Nakayama-sensei speak first, we’ll have Dr. Lam Peng Er be the second speaker.

DR. LAM: Thank you Mr. Chairman. Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen.

I come from Singapore, which is located in Southeast Asia, a region of more than half a billion people, and it’s winter in Korea but it’s perpetual sunshine in Singapore. Singapore may be tiny, but I suspect that some of you know that Singapore is a forum where North and South Korea have been holding their so-called “secret talks.” They’ve been holding talks in Singapore. But the fact that we say that it’s secret talks, so it’s not that secret anyway.

The interesting thing is despite the up-and-downs in the relations between Pyongyang and Seoul, the Kaesong industrial project is ongoing, the secret talks are ongoing in Singapore. So, to what extent the latest episode will result in the derailment of secret talks in Singapore, that I wouldn’t know. But I hope they will carry on in Singapore, which is perceived by both sides to be a neutral forum rather than Washington, D.C., or Beijing for talks between North and South.

Without further ado, let me flesh out the basic outline of my short presentation today. I will begin by alluding to Southeast Asia’s multicultural olio, (inaudible) of Southeast Asia, is basically multiculturalism. And next I’ll talk about the Korean wave, okay? The Korean wave -- maybe I should say Korean tsunami -- in Southeast Asia. Third, more personal sharing. I’ll tell you five things. If I had more time, if the chairman had given me more time I will say 10 things I like about Korea, since I’ve been instructed to keep it -- you know? That’s a guillotine for 15 minutes --
not least, I shall talk about South Korea’s soft power, possibilities and limits.

First, Southeast Asia’s multicultural olio. First point I’d like to make, first talking point, is that Southeast Asians states and societies rarely talk about (inaudible) soft power. Southeast Asia may have its own discrete charm, so -- but you notice that there are 10 ASEAN countries, but we do not beat our chests and say, hey, you know, this is our soft power and this is how we are going to charm you and this how we’re going to influence you. I mean, we don’t really say that.

This region is very special. Why? Because it is the hybridity of Indian, Chinese, Islamic, Western, and indigenous culture. So, in that sense, it is quite distinct from certain Northeast Asian countries.

If you look at Korean, South Korean, and Japanese societies, they have become more globalized, more pluralistic, but they are basically ethnically homogenous countries. That is not so in Southeast Asia. Southeast Asia is a mélange, a blend of so many cultures, which I don’t think you can find in other continents.

Next, let me say something about intellectual “soft power in Southeast Asia.” I remember in the 1990s, before the Asian financial crisis, Southeast Asian countries like Malaysia, Singapore tried to raise the possibility that liberal democracy is not necessarily the end of history. They actually rejected the Francis Fukuyama’s argument that the end point of humanity -- this like Hegelian march of the dialectics -- is a liberal democracy. So, Malaysia, Singapore, some elements in Japan argued that as far as human organization or governance is concerned, there are different possibilities, different alternatives. Of course, liberals within Malaysia, Singapore, and Japan will disagree with the government.

Interestingly, I remember in the Foreign Affairs magazine, Lee Kwan Yew, who is now minister mentor, who still wants to run in the forthcoming elections at age 87 -- you know, he wants to outlive maybe, like, Konrad Adenauer, you know? I don’t know. He debated with Kim Dae-jung about culture and democracy. So, Lee Kwan Yew basically argued that culture is destiny and certain countries have certain cultural disposition. You will probably have certain patterns of governance, certain types of political culture, which will not necessarily end up like Western liberal democracy. Kim Dae-jung argued that to a certain extent certain East Asian countries, including Korea, has assimilated certain aspects of Confucianism, and in Confucianism the people are sovereign, the people are more important than the ruler, and as such, East Asian culture, Confucianism is compatible with democracy. So at this debate, debate within East Asia, it shows that a case can be made that the East Asian countries were prominent -- not only in terms of economy development, but did not -- they did not swallow hook, line, and sinker the kind of intellectual fads from the United States. But then again, this culture about the Asian values debate and so on kind of ended with the Asian financial crisis when the sense of triumphalism amongst Southeastern Asian countries were -- took a hit.
But one thing which the Southeast Asian countries are quite proud of is taking the lead in regionalism. Institutional building, like the ASEAN + 3, ASEAN Regional Forum; ASEM, the Asia-Europe Forum; ADMM; East Asian Summit. In fact, South Korea, Japan, China are very important, pivotal participants in this process, but Southeast Asian countries, there’s the image that we are Lilliputians, but as I’ve said earlier we are more than half a billion people. We do try and make ourselves useful to the great powers, to Korea, to China, to Japan. And we would like to think that next to the EU in the whole wide world we have the intellectual capacity to be one of the leading builders, the architects of regionalism, because we don’t think if the Japanese or the Chinese or the Koreans are left to their own device they can forge some kind of a trilateral association similar to ASEAN, because of various reasons. But we in Southeast Asia, we can play that role. We don’t call it soft power. Some people when you say that the ability of ASEAN to be a platform for regional building to link Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia -- and even bringing in the great powers, including the United States -- that’s a form of soft power. We don’t call it soft power, but we would like to say that that’s a role we can play.

What about the future? I would argue that there’s a powerful possibility if Southeast Asia can do three things -- harmonize three features: economic development, which is very, very important, eradication of poverty, there’s no dignity in poverty. So, I would say economic development; multiculturalism, which Southeast Asia already has; and democracy -- and democracy. You can do these three things, reconcile these three things, balance these three things, have a good tradeoff, then it will exercise soft power in the world, even if Southeast does not say, hey, we have considerable soft power. But if Southeast Asia can do this -- economic development, multiculturalism, and democracy -- and it will be a fantastic model for the rest of the world.

More specifically, if I look across to the South -- Indonesia -- its moderate Islam, secularism, multiculturalism, tolerance, and democratization can be a source of soft power, especially to the Muslim world. So, if Indonesia can rise up to the occasion and do this, I think it will be a tremendous model, not the kind of Iranian theocracy or the Turkish kind of convoluted secularism, but if Indonesia can reconcile the three features of economic development, multiculturalism, and democracy, it will be a very, very powerful model for the Muslim world.

And Singapore and Malaysia, in terms of population size Singapore is small, 5.1 million; Malaysia, 27-28 million. But then again, I think we have significance -- Singapore and Malaysia, significant beyond its size. Why is that so? Because Singapore and Malaysia are the only two countries in the world where there’s significant Western, -- under the British -- Islamic, Indian, and Sinic influences. No other countries in East Asia, in Africa, Latin America have these features. So, Malaysia and Singapore -- hopefully we can show the world how civilizations can co-exist and energize each other, to have a synergy so that civilizations do not necessarily clash when we can actually cooperate and show the world.

So, I hope that can be our soft power for Southeast Asia -- hey, next
coming to the Korean Tsunami in Southeast Asia.

I mean, there’s a certain celebratory note in this conference of talking about South Korea soft power and so on. It’s rightly so. But a gentle reminder that South Korea is a cultural latecomer in Southeast Asia. It’s a cultural latecomer, why? Because the Indians and the Chinese have been there 2,000 years earlier. The Europeans, they have been there half a millennium, Portuguese, Dutch, British, French, Americans colonize the Philippines. So, Korea is a welcome wave. We love, you know? We assimilate all these waves. So, it’s just one among many is the latest wave. But after Korean wave, I’m not quite sure what will be the last wave, no? The Korean wave will not be the last wave in Southeast Asia, okay? There will be more waves to come. I don’t know, maybe 10 years from now there might be a Brazilian wave, I don’t know. But, still, I would think that Korea has become a permanent feature in Southeast Asia’s cultural terrain.

Now, how does Southeast Asia view South Korea? I came across two public opinion surveys, the 2008 Chicago Council on Global Affairs on soft power in Asia, the statistics are there, how Vietnam, Indonesia view South Korea vis-à-vis other countries. There’s also a 2010 BBC World Service poll, which said that Southeast Asians view South Korea – it says mildly positive according to the BBC. Mildly positive, okay? So, the South Korean wave is there, but let’s not be carried away. It’s not the only wave. There are many waves. Okay? Before the Korean wave, there was a Japanese wave. It is still there. It has not disappeared.

Now, why the Korean waves in Southeast Asia? Without belaboring the point: K-pop, soap operas. At any one time there are so many boy bands, girl groups in Singapore, and there’ll be thousands of teeny-boppers, everything (inaudible) at the concert halls and so on. So, that’s a fact of cultural life in Southeast Asia.

The other thing is affordable, good quality, increasingly stylish cars. Used to be predominantly Japanese, but these days we see more and more German and Korean cars. They’re more affordable, good quality, and very, very stylish. High tech electronics and mobile phones. There’s an explosion, a proliferation of Korean restaurants in Southeast Asia. So, you go to centers like Bangkok, Kuala Lumpur, Singapore, Jakarta, you find there are so many Korean restaurants, and that’s wonderful.

My daughter, she’s 13 years old. She dragged me along. She buy South Korean nail polish. She’s 13 years old, but I’m quite happy to bring her along to buy it, you know? She cannot go to school with nail polish, but during her school vacation she’ll use nail polish, and they have Korean products. So, Korean fashion is also very popular in the region now.

Okay, one of five things I like about Korea. My first trip to South Korea was in 1994. I fell in love with the celadon pottery, this beautiful green-glazed pottery, and I bought quite a number. I paid a princely sum for it, insured, and sent it back to Singapore. And when I saw it, it reminded me of the saying by John Keats, the poet. “A
thing of beauty is a joy forever.” But I think he said that when he looked at the Grecian urn. I don’t get turned on by a Grecian urn, but I got really turned on when I saw the celadon pottery. Beautiful, you know? A thing of beauty. Hot pepper paste, cloudy rice wine.

The next thing I say may sound very strange to you. One of the things I like about -- I like it not because it happened but it represents something important to me. That’s the 1980 Gwangju uprising.

Why would I say 1980 Gwangju uprising? When I was at Columbia, I did a course on Korean domestic politics. My term paper was on the Gwangju uprising. I felt very touched, because it is a mass resistance against an authority military regime, and they paid the price for freedom. I mean, it can be interpreted in many ways, but that’s one way of interpreting it.

And of late, I’ve watched the DVD, Wonder Girls, you know? It’s really very, very infectious. You can’t escape from the Wonder Girls, especially that tune, “Nobody.” (Singing) “I like nobody but you --” (Laughter). So, you know, I couldn’t escape from that, so I like that.

Now, next, Korea’s soft power possibilities and limits. And Dr. Lee, South Korea’s pop culture, food, cars, electronics are entertaining and appealing to the masses in Southeast Asia and beyond. However, personally I think its so-called soft power has limited influence or no influence on Pyongyang, Beijing, and Tokyo.

I would imagine that national security elites are not swayed by frivolous -- to them frivolous K-cool. It doesn’t matter how many CDs they have in a collection or movies they watch. I don’t think they can be swayed so easily by that.

The questions I would raise about Korean soft power is what higher values and ideas can Korea make towards human civilization? Can Korea -- has Korea offered any higher values and ideas to human civilization? It produced wonderful products, entertaining products, but what higher values and ideas can Korea make? Can Korea make a difference in terms of human civilization? I mean, that kind of a question can be asked to all countries, and most of us would fall short of that kind of ideals. Another question is can South Korea become an Asian model of democracy, development, and culture? Can it? I think it’s somewhere -- making its way there, but I don’t think it’s the only paragon or the best paragon of Asian model democracy, development, and culture. And I’m not sure.

Last but not least before I end is this difficult and awkward question. Can a divided country, preoccupied with the uncertainty and instability of the Korean peninsula -- does it have the energy to play a larger role in the world beyond appealing to middle-class consumers abroad for profits? Again, I’m not sure.

My sense is that one reason why K-pop, K-fashion, and all these have
been so popular -- soap operas -- is because of the rise of South Korea as a middle-class society appealing to the rise of the middle-class in Southeast Asia. If the middle-class in Southeast Asia is really, really small, then I think there’s a limit to how South Korean middle-class fashion, movies, music, and so on can reach out.

So, I think, interestingly, despite our different histories, languages, and different regions perhaps there is some kind of emergence of an Asian middle-class society so what you have in South Korea has a certain resonance in Southeast Asia because of the rise of the middle-class in Southeast Asia, too.

Thank you for your -- for listening to my presentation. (Applause)

DR. LHO: Thank you, Dr. Lam, for a tour de force. It was just 20 minutes.

DR. LAM: Mm-hmm.

DR. LHO: But as is usually the case when I go to conferences in Singapore, highly charged, very stimulating, provocative, and interesting as papers should be.

You know, before we go to Nakayama-sensei, because you were pointing out Korea, I had to point out to some of the people on this Presidential Committee for the G20 that this doesn’t help Korea’s soft power. None of this does. There’s a difference between being able to host a meeting like this and something called convening power. If you have convening power, you have something approaching what we understand to be soft power. Singapore has convening power. You mentioned ASEAN, ASEM, and others. But, for example, there’s a Shangri-La dialogue with which some of us are very closely involved from the beginning. It brings Asian security defense ministers together. Singapore can do that because of Singapore’s place in the intellectual terrain of the political and military leaders of the region. And it’s very difficult to get across to my countrymen the difference between convening power and just having the money and the organizational capability to put tables in place and microphones in place and have cars to take people around and having hotel rooms. It’s not the same as soft power.

Likewise, I’m glad you mentioned “Nobody But You.” “Nobody But You,” meaning South Koreans, believes you’re increasing your soft power by sending girl groups or boy groups overseas or selling kimchi. This doesn’t constitute soft power. The Beatles were from the U.K. If you were talking about cultural icons, Beatles beat anybody hands down, and what did it do for the U.K. soft power, or Beckham, for that matter, or Bond Street?

I mean, it takes intelligent leaders to have soft power in the first place, especially if you’re not a mega-power bestowed with large amounts of land mass, huge populations, and whatnot. So, an intelligent discussion of soft power would go far beyond talk about kimchi or “Nobody But You.” (Laughter) So, I’m delighted that Lam
Peng Er was able to point this out.

To finish, I think when Joe was talking about -- Joe Nye was talking about soft power back in the ’70s, late ’70s, this was just after the end of the Vietnam war and right after the first oil crisis when the U.S. was having a soul searching, a very painful period thinking about what its global priority was going to be, and it was still the Cold War, the second wave was about to begin in the Cold War. And I think his comments on soft power, his thoughts on soft power that began in the ’70s is that the U.S. has an ample inventory of what we call the hard power: money, at the time; weaponry; huge military assets. But not using them would increase the diplomatic flexibility of the U.S. far more than trying to pressure the world with military power.

And in retrospect, countries like Korea that emulated the U.S., Taiwan that emulated the U.S., other Asian countries that emulated the U.S. did so because, I think, of five things. Their perception that America was a very generous country. It was wealthy, but it was also generous.

Number two, we admired America’s culture, and this is into the ’50s and ’60s and partly into the ’70s when things began to unravel. We believed in the superiority of the American political and educational institutions. I’m a part of that belief as are many in my generation and generations before me.

And, finally, we subscribe to the ideals, to the values -- it’s a big word, but the moral leadership of the U.S. on the global stage as compared to the Soviet one or the Chinese one at the time. This is what constituted the core, I think, of America’s soft power and its ability to lead. And why we worry about America today is that we believe much of this has been eroded and continues to erode.

But by these five yardsticks simplified, five yardsticks, if we measure China, China may increasingly have impressive inventory, huge markets, and whatnot, and we need them for our market-driven economies. Do we really believe in Chinese generosity? Do we really subscribe to China’s cultural magnetism? Do we admire China’s political or educational institutions? And do we truly believe that China has ideals, visions, a moral core that we admire and would like to follow? Unless China meets these five tests, I don’t think its soft power is going to convince the rest of us in Asia, and I’m glad Lam Peng Er began by criticizing Korea along these lines. I don’t think we’re going to lead any time soon. (Laughter)

But the country, in my view, that punches below its weight in this region is Japan. China may have surpassed Japan in terms of absolute GDP, but when you look at Japan, it still leads in so many areas: in technology, in economic processes, education. But especially over the last 20 years, since the end of the Cold War, Japan’s role has been particularly limited in my view. So, it would be very interesting to hear from Professor Nakayama what his view -- what the Japanese view is of soft power in this region.

DR. NAKAYAMA: Thank you. But as being a typical Japanese, I have
to apologize first. (Laughter) It’s my voice. I have to be as efficient as possible because my voice span is really badly damaged. I hope it will last 15 minutes or so.

I’m a ’05-’06 CNAPS fellow. Glad to see you all again. And I’ve been a strange loner since the start of this conference, because, you know, I didn’t want to use my voice before this session, so.

And unlike Professor Shim this morning, I’m not an expert on soft power. My main job is to teach at a university, but I have added two more: adjunct fellow at a major think tank in Japan and the other is a member of NHK World Deliberative Council. It’s one of the new sort of efforts in Japan trying to be beefing up its soft powers. So, I tried to -- I just wanted to prove to you that I’m minimally at least qualified to be on the panel.

And it’s really easy to be cynical about Japan these days, and I am, too. But I’ll try to avoid being cynical and try to catch the new thinking within the DPJ, which came to power last September. Many of the negative aspects have been highlighted, especially in the context of managing U.S.-Japan alliance. But in terms of soft power, I think they may have a better chance than LDP. So, hopefully I can say something positive about Japan and soft power.

I think if you look at the post-war Japan, even before the word “soft power” was coined, Japan has been consistently a soft power. In a way, there was no other choice. I think there was two pillars. One was to prove to the United States that we would be a democratic nation and get the past -- overcome the past, and to our Asian neighbors, our rise and our recovery is not dangerous. That was the two pillars of Japan’s post-war foreign policy. And that was to expand the space where within Japan can act within the international community. So, in that sense, I think it was based on realism. And Japan foregone -- we were quite satisfied being a sort of a salesman of transistor and never thought about dignity or prestige of a nation. We were quite satisfied in thinking ourselves as salesmen of transistor. And ultimately I think that in itself, reviving of our image in the region, was the ultimate foreign policy goal during the post-war period. It was to become a peaceful, democratic, cultural nation. So, it’s a bit different from Professor Nye’s notion of soft power, but how the others would see us, that was very important for us, because that image was limiting Japan’s capability in acting.

And in the 1970s, we’ve quite successfully recovered and rebuilt our nation, and people saw Japan as an economic power, and we had to sort of manage the image of the rise as China is doing today. In the model of British Council or the Goethe Institute, Japan established a Japan Foundation. It is still active today. It was designed and established by Foreign Minister Fukuda. I think when a country is rising, in many cases you would have a visionary leader, and I think Prime Minister -- Foreign Minister at the time, Fukuda was one of them. And of course he is known to sort of opening up our doors to the ASEAN countries. And it was Fukuda’s vision to make an institution that would proactively show the positive side of Japan, and the fact that Japan Foundation is still ongoing shows that he was a visionary leader.
And there were other efforts as well. For instance, Japan Echo, which is - - maybe some of you have seen it. It’s one of the first English publication about Japan, so -- and there were only few English written literature about Japan at the time, so Japan published a magazine called Japan Echo. And there were some others -- Foreign Press Center, which was to show Japan in a positive light in the media context. And this is also still ongoing.

And there was some other effort as well, an imperial family, imperial diplomacy. Of course, Japanese emperor is a very sensitive figure in the region, and in the ’50s, ’60s his role was mainly domestic. But in the ’70s -- I think in 1974 -- he visited the United States for the first time and there’s some places, very important places, he hasn’t visited yet. But Japan has started using the emperor family as a sign of peace and as a soft power and a public diplomacy tool. And that was in the 1970s.

And in 1980s, we became more proactive in image building, going beyond just the regular cultural exchanges: kabuki and sumo wrestling, and the Japanese traditional cultures. We wanted people to know more about modern Japan. And the slogan at the time was “kokusaika,” which literally means “internationalization.” And it was like the second opening of Japan, and the Japanese people started going abroad and many people came to Japan. And there’s one famous program called JET Program, it stands for Japan Exchange and Teaching Program. Close to 5,000 foreigners, mainly English-speaking foreigners, have come to Japan and taught high school students English and about their own culture, and this has been a very successful project. If you look at the U.S. JET Program alumni, there are mid-aged, young, soon-to-be Japan handlers in the alumni of the JET program, so this is one of the successful soft power programs, which is directly linked to the Japanese national interest.

But I think ultimately, the ultimate source of soft power in Japan during the 1980s wasn’t a government program or some other specifically designed institution, but it was the “Made In Japan” products. So, during that time, people like Matsushita and Morita of Sony and Honda, they weren’t just business leaders, but they were seen more as national leaders, even more respected than politicians. And what I worry about these days that we lack those kinds of visionary business leaders today. So, that’s what worries me a bit looking at the current situation in Japan.

In the 1990s, the Cold War ended, and people were sort of starting to have an interest in new form of power. And in the book, Bound to Lead, Professor Nye came out with this notion, soft power. And by the time Japan was the second largest economy in the world, there was this self-searching process within Japan that are we doing enough as a second largest economic power. And this notion of soft power was very convenient for Japan. And, yes, Professor Nye always stressed that they have to come together. But Japan saw something -- soft power as something antithesis to hard power, because that would rationalize their role in global space. So, at a snap, a soft power was, I think, a very popular notion in Japan. I think it became much more popular faster in Japan than any other place in the world, because there was this specific background in Japan.
And this period, the ’90s, was a very difficult period for Japan in the sense that you saw a negative -- especially in the United States, you saw a Japan bashing, especially in the early 1990s. Japan bashing in the United States was seen as a very serious issue, and we felt that we couldn’t control the negative spiral of Japan’s image. So, in light of that, Japan, with the direction of the government, established a Center for Global Partnership -- the CGP -- mainly to deal with U.S.-Japan relations to fund a project which would sort of enhance cooperation between U.S. and Japan. And this is still ongoing, so I think it’s one of the successful projects started, launched by the Japanese government. It’s a blend, a mixture of a government and a civil society. So, this was one of the successful effort in Japanese soft power institution building.

And by this time, I think the “Made In Japan” product was no longer made in Japan. It was becoming more global -- Sony and Lexus and Acura. And despite everything we did in the realm of public diplomacy and in soft power, this brand image, the global brand image, was the Japanese image. But at the time, I think we started to think beyond just being a salesman for transistors and we were more becoming seriously engaged in who we are, what our roles are. But the irony of history is that that’s exactly the time when Japan’s influence in the region has started to decline.

And I guess before firmly establishing who we are and what we can do in the region, we saw in Fareed Zakaria’s words in a different context, the rise of others in Northeast Asia. And if you look at the post-war period, soft power in Japan was always about controlling the image of rising Japan. That was -- like I said at the beginning, that was the sole purpose. But in the 2000s, that wasn’t the case. The context of Japan exercising soft power was no longer about controlling rising Japan’s image but how can we sustain our soft power that has been built during the post-war period in the context of Korea and China rising and in some respects over-passing, going beyond Japan’s place. And that’s the time when the Japanese politicians started to come out with a value-oriented diplomacy, because Japan never talked about values and diplomacy. We were salesmen.

But in the early 2000s, our prime ministers started talking about arc of freedom and prosperity, and value diplomacy in line with the neo-conservatism in the United States, although it’s a bit different. And the Bush Administration liked that, because they felt also that they were pursuing a value based diplomacy. But -- and Japan sort of jumped into that wrong. But it never really sort of took off.

And shifting issue a little bit, Japan has always been criticized as being a manufacturing power. It has been good at making things. But it was always being criticized as not being able to produce more -- not a tangible soft products, software -- I guess pop music, animation wasn’t satisfactory for many of the Japanese. We wanted to become more of a high-cultured, an idea-driven country. But we never were. But in the late 1990s and early 2000s, there was this word, “GNC,” gross national cool. (Laughter) And in this respect, Japan was doing okay. But these days, even in those realms, we were consuming Chinese and then many huge amount of Korean aspects.
So, where are we? We’re still searching. And what worries me the most is that as a result of a very aggressive budget screening conducted by the new Democratic Party of Japan, *Japan Echo*, that I’ve just introduced to you, was -- it’s no longer there. CGP -- Center for Global Partnership -- and Japan Foundation’s budget have been cut. My institution, Japan Institute of International Affairs -- Japan is known for not having a viable think tank, and there’s JIAA and some others -- and the fund for JIAA, subsidies for JIAA, has been cut as well. So, just when time -- when Japan has to revive and control and become more forthcoming in the realm of soft power and public diplomacy, the financial basis of that is eroding, and that worries me a lot.

I’ve skipped this slide.

So, is Japan a soft power superpower? I think we have been successful in some areas, but there are key failures as well. If you look at the general image, how the world sees us, in fact it’s very good. It’s one of the best. If you look at how the U.S. sees Japan, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs conducting how the U.S. sees Japan annually, and this year for the first time in 30 years, China has surpassed Japan as the most important partner for Japan among the elites in Japan. I don’t know important that number is, but it does I think signify a certain trend. But the most important thing is how our neighbors see Japan. This is very difficult, and I think it’s not solely our fault. There’s fault on both sides. But in terms of this image, specifically people in South Korea and China sees us, it’s very negative. So, that’s the area that we have to put more effort in.

And, like I said, although this has become -- because we’re not just enough selling transistors anymore, we have to -- this issue has become a national priority. But robust domestic support is lacking.

But last year, we saw a change in government for the first time in Japan. Like I said at the outset, negative aspect has -- and I’m one of the very critical scholars on DPJ’s foreign policy, literally all of the Japanese foreign policy experts are critical of DPJ’s foreign policy, but I think that there are potentials. And I’ve talked to some of the officials in the prime minister’s office, and there is a new thinking in this field. And they see a new opportunity. And DPJ, and specifically Prime Minister Kan, is trying to design a Japan brand, just going beyond *manga* and Sonys and all that. They’re trying to focus more on lifestyles, ideas, longevity, energy conservation, those type -- they’re not just technologies, they’re ideas. So, that’s what they’re trying to do, and I hope it works.

And up until now, this soft power, public diplomacy effort has been very sporadic. It hasn’t been well coordinated. So, it seems like the prime minister’s office is going to coordinate an effort. I’m sure there are limits to what a prime minister’s office can do in terms of exercising soft power, because there are so many that civil society and other institutions can do. But I think it’s at least good news that there will be a certain degree of coordination. And they would use all sorts of communication methods. And this is -- the thinking behind that is that it’s no longer enough to react to things. If there’s a demonstration in Thailand in the 1970s, anti-Japanese demonstration, we will react. But now we have to be more proactive in showing what Japan is about and what we’re
thinking, and beyond uniqueness, because Japan, more than any other countries -- all other countries are unique, every country is unique but Japan, I don’t know why we say we’re so unique, but we have to go beyond that, and we have to focus more on the universal values of Japanese culture, and I hope that works as well.

And lastly, I think if you’re talking about soft power, there’s really three pillars. It’s about increasing your presence, increasing your likeability, and increasing knowledge. And for the whole of the past years, we never worried about our presence except for ‘40s and the early ’50s. It was always rising. But now this presence is declining. So, in that context, what can we do to sort of enhance our -- increase likeability towards, the feeling of likeability towards Japan and knowledge about Japan. That is a very serious. I don’t have an answer, but I am willing to say that we are fully aware of this, and many people in Japan are focusing how can we redesign Japan’s soft power and public diplomacy.

Thank you very much. I’m very sorry for my voice.

DR. LHO: Thank you, Professor Nakayama. Nineteen minutes.

DR. NAKAYAMA: Nineteen.

DR. LHO: Thank you. This leaves us about 13 minutes before the 3:00 limit Lim Wonhyuk -- Dr. Wonhyuk -- gave us for the coffee break. While you were away, we were mentioning that it was actually a very good strategy to break up lunch. Nobody left. They all came down, but I think they were ready for a coffee break, so now we’ll open up the floor to questions.

Yes?

QUESTION: Hiro Matsumura, former fellow at CNAPS. I think that Professor Hu’s and Professor Nakayama’s views on the soft power is actually well compared and contrasted. And then Professor Hu’s idea of soft power, sometimes referring to Joseph Nye, has some element, measured element, that soft power in China, whereby China’s establishment is used to justify the rise of China. So the idea is very much instrumental. And then the question is how this instrument could be utilized effectively.

And you pointed out five principles, one of which is that the Chinese have to respect cultural diversity in the world affairs. But what China does in domestic arenas, like their policy to minorities like Tibet and Xinjiang, is actually far from respecting a culture of diversity. So in that sense, what they’re doing in the inside and what you are telling to the outside is inconsistent, and sometimes -- this is not first time in the world history, but it sounds very much autocratic, so, which means there a serious limit of the Chinese understanding of soft power, from my view at least.

For Nakayama-san’s ideas, I tried to reconstruct that you are treating us a
new approach or a new constructivist approach to the soft power. That means we try to, with the Japanese government, try to reshape the mindset of other people. And then so essentially, in Asia where the post-modern Japan and a modern South Korea and a modern Taiwan, and a pre-modern China, and maybe increasing the digressing from pre-modernity North Korea, these are coexist together.

And then, as you said, many ideas like lifestyle, energy conservation, and longevity and these things could shape the way other people think. And then, if not that these people don’t like Japanese, but they would ultimately think in an almost similar way as the Japanese.

But the question is, this is like Chinese medicine: It takes a long time. There is no immediate impact which could be utilized in the policy context. So these are my two distinct critiques to Professor Hu and Professor Nakayama. I’m happy to get your feedback.

DR. HU: Thanks for the questions. I think there’s no limit -- there’s no limitation on the Chinese side about it’s understanding about its soft powers, but the Chinese are still learning, that’s true.

Now, the question also says that China is trying to use soft power as, you know, in an instrumental way. I do not personally share that belief. As I said, culture itself is not a soft power tool because cultural products are a contribution to the humankind. Everybody like it. Cultural products are getting a global identity, not simply belong to any countries, although it has a name recognition effect.

And also, I don’t think economic clout should be used as a tool to promote soft power. This is clear in my presentation.

Now, I do share with your questions, the point that China have a lot of problem how to build and improve its international image, because this is a common problem for any country, especially a big power. You’re vulnerable to criticism, you know. Everybody can criticize what you’re doing, your policy. This is not just for China, but also for United States, and so China needs to get used to international criticism.

Now, the problem is image-building has both domestic and international constituencies, and sometime there’s a gap, you know. Although there’s overlap between these two constituencies, but sometime you really need to focus on what you’re doing domestically. So maybe the message to our side is contradictory. Okay, you argue for culture, ethnical diversity, but your minority policies are maybe not quite in alignment. Yeah, that’s true. You know, some practice -- you know, this has been pointed out -- I think China needs to -- there is some work needed to be catch up. But here the thing is this is a common problem for a lot of countries. The two constituencies, how you can satisfy both in simultaneously. Okay, thank you.
DR. NAKAYAMA: Thank you, Professor Matsumura. I totally agree that it doesn’t have an immediate effect. It takes a long time, but I think by definition soft power and public diplomacy efforts, to see an effect it will take a very long time. So I think the important point is that if we’re going to focus on ideas and lifestyles of Japan, you know, ideas and lifestyle of Japan doesn’t change by a change in government, so it has to be continuous. So I think that’s the most important point that we have to stress. This immediate effect, we can’t expect that.

DR. LHO: I think we have time for possibly one or two more questions. Yes?

QUESTION: Thank you. I’m James Tang from the University of Hong Kong. Since, Chairman, you yourself has made some remarks about Korea’s soft power, I’m wondering whether I could also ask a question of you in terms of your own assessment about the limitation of Korea’s soft power. And how far do you think Korea’s actually moving towards what you think would be more effective soft power in terms of, you know, the various other things that you mentioned and not just organizing a meeting? So that’s the sum of my question.

Also, I have a couple of other questions for the other panelists. Toshi, I know you have a voice problem but I’m still a bit curious about the business dimension of Japan’s soft power, because Japanese business actually has become even more globalized. But somehow the kind of figures you mentioned or other forms of articulating Japanese economic and business presence and voices in soft power terms seems to have been weakened. I don’t know what’s your sort of evaluation on that.

And finally, Peng Er, I don’t know whether we can draw you out on also comparing Korea soft power vis-à-vis how China and Japan are being perceived in Southeast Asia. Thank you.

DR. LHO: I wish we had a half an hour where we could have a serious sort of discussion about your very important question. I’ll just say that Korea’s still a work in progress. We don’t know. I don’t think our political leadership knows. I don’t think our political opposition knows. I think the whole country still doesn’t have an answer about what we want to be.

The tragedy of power, I think, you know, that word has problems for this country. If the Republic of Korea decides as a national priority that we’re not going to unify, that not only is the Korean Peninsula’s stability best served by staying divided from North Korea but at peace with North Korea, or if it decides that it’s better served by unifying at whatever high cost that entails, the paths that this country and this people will follow are going to be radically different, and the impact it has on the reorganization of the Northeast Asian political, economic, and military landscape will be consequentially very, very different. We don’t know.

I don’t think, to my recollection, that we’ve had a very serious national
debate about what is best for our future. Events have forced decisions on the Republic of Korea since its birth: the Korean War; trying to recover from it; now today feeling a little bit proud and confident that that we’ve emerged from the ashes relatively wealthy, relatively stable, relatively comfortable, and with a future, it seems. Things change rapidly in global affairs. Here nothing is assured, especially in this corner of the world.

So I think, to answer your question what is Korea’s soft power, I think if we can call soft power something else, what is Korea’s sort of example for other countries, if we can call that an aspect of soft power, is that you can go from utter hopelessness, utter devastation, and utter poverty, if you figure out a political system and economic modality of growth that you can achieve what we have. If we have soft power -- if we can call it that -- it’s the power to persuade developing countries and the very least-developed countries that if you as a national system, as a political system, as an economic system get your act together, find a niche that works for you and try to compete with other economies around the world, find a niche that works for you, then you can reach a modicum of success.

Our ability to be an example to teach and, number two, I think politically it might be that we show as an example to other areas of conflict that, you know, being patient with provocations is better than going to war. I think we’ve done that for six centuries now. And despite this recent provocation, if we can call it that, by North Koreans’ misadventure, I think the wise counsel would be to be patient once again. Trying to teach North Korea lessons, I think, will be counter-effective for both us and for the region.

So those are the kinds of things, you know, in conflict within areas we can go and say, look, we’ve lived with this kind of pain, and you can, too. And figure out a way to have dialogue. That kind of power may be what we offer, if you can call that power. Thank you.

DR. LAM: I will try to be succinct to respond to Professor James Tang’s question about comparing South Korea with Japan and China. So his question is, how do the Southeast Asians perceive China and Japan? Okay, first let me address China.

I think we have to make a differentiation between country, civilization, state regime, and people, okay? So Southeast Asians, when they view China, there’s a degree of ambivalence, a great deal of admiration for Chinese civilization. Country, yes, rising. That’s also a consideration. Admiration for China’s economic growth being a very important additional engine of growth, along with India, for Southeast Asia. So that’s appreciated.

Regime. The soft power of the Chinese Communist Party is absolutely zero in Southeast Asia. Again, so you have to make a differentiation: state, party, civilization, people. In the South China Sea, that is one thing which is of grave concern. China’s assertiveness, recent assertiveness, in the South China Sea. Okay, it’s disputed waters. There’s quite a degree of concern. So on the one hand, we can talk about
Chinese soft power. On the other hand, there’s all this territorial disputes with China in Southeast Asia. Okay.

Japan. You mentioned Japan had transformed quite significantly in Southeast Asia. It started off as a fearsome samurai, conquering samurai, but in the 1970s became a rapacious merchant. But over the years, Japanese came up with the Fukuda Doctrine in 1977. In fact, the first country, Asian country, which enjoyed peaceful rise in East Asia, it’s not China but Japan. Japan was the first country, post-Second World War, to not just talk, but also walk the walk, become a peaceful and fairly pacifist state. But it is not some kind of a passive pacifism, you know. It’s an active pacifism in a sense that Japan is involved in peace-building in countries in Southeast Asia suffering from internal conflicts -- civil wars, for example. Right now Japan is a key player in the peace process in Mindanao, Southern Philippines.

It was active in Aceh, also a dispute between a region, Aceh, most Islamic region of Indonesia with Jakarta. Also, East Timor and Cambodia. Okay, so that’s walking the walk, to some extent. The image of Japan is generally positive in Southeast Asia: anime, manga, cosplay, and so on.

A last sentence, Mr. Chairman -- a last sentence. Japanese soft power is by no means inferior to Korean soft power in Southeast Asia. Thank you.

DR. NAKAYAMA: I’ll be very brief to James’s question about the Japanese business leaders. I don’t have enough knowledge to talk about leaders in Japan, but my impression is that the Japanese corporations have become like dinosaurs: the institutions are too big, and they’re now sort of directed by commanding figures in the postwar period. They have become an organization, so you can’t really pinpoint who the leader is. And in that context we don’t see any business leaders like Makihara-san of Mitsubishi Corporation, and Kobai-san of Fuji Xerox; there is no leader like that.

But there are some new rising businessmen, young in their 30s and 40s, in the Internet and other, you know, new fields. But they’re more free-wheeling. They don’t see themselves as Japanese, they’re more like global citizens, so they’re not really willing to sort of play their role in this political, you know, soft power public diplomacy arena. So that is an issue for us. Thank you.

DR. LHO: Thank you, Nakayama-san. It seems obvious to me that we could go on for another hour, but the coffee break is upon us, and Dr. Lim is winking at me. I think five minutes is not too bad. Perhaps he’ll give us five more minutes for a coffee break.

But next session is hard power, so much of what we talked about will meld into the next session. So let’s go have our coffee break. It remains for me to thank my three colleagues. Wonderful presentations. Thank you. (Applause)