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U.S.-RUSSIAN ARMS CONTROL IN THE 1990s:

EXPERIENCES AND LESSONS LEARNED

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PARTICIPANTS:

Introduction:

STROBE TALBOTT
President
The Brookings Institution

Featured Speaker:

GEORGIY MAMEDOV
Ambassador of the Russian Federation to Canada

Moderator:

STEVEN PIFER
Senior Fellow
The Brookings Institution

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P R O C E E D I N G S

MR. TALBOTT: We're obviously off to an appropriately informal and friendly start. For many of us in the room -- I'd like to think for all of us -- this is a particularly rich and enriching occasion, and I just want to give a little bit of background on the program before I turn the proceedings over to Ambassador Mamedov.

We here at Brookings have something that we call the Arms Control and Nonproliferation Initiative. It is housed in our center in the United States and Europe, which is part of our foreign policy program, directed by Fiona Hill, who just recently returned to Brookings from a stint of several years at the National Intelligence Council.

Before Fiona came back the program was under the -- the initiative was under the very able leadership of Steve Pifer, a very productive, distinguished Senior Fellow here at Brookings, who is a former ambassador to Ukraine and knows a lot about subjects we'll be talking about today.

Steve is now doing much of the intellectual leadership and heavy lifting in our program on arms control and nonproliferation, and we are very pleased to have both the support and partnership of the Ploughshares Fund and the McArthur Foundation in being able to do this work on a subject that as recently as 10 or 11 months ago seemed almost

to be a historical subject as opposed to a subject of current events, by which I mean of course that arms control was the central positive enterprise of the cold war, and for many decades the conduct of diplomacy on how to keep the nuclear peace, which involved many countries but instrumentally and most consequentially United States and Soviet Union and then subsequent to that post-Soviet Russia, was something that kept many of us in think-tank row and government and academe. It was pretty much a full-time job.

And then going back about a decade, maybe a little more than a decade ago, that business seemed to kind of close down. The shutters went up. There just wasn't very much going on in the realm of arms control. That changed with the advent of a new American administration, and now I think it's fair to say that arms control and nonproliferation proliferation policy more generally are back in business.

And the agenda for the year ahead requires that all of us, whether as citizens or in our professional capacities, look back on history and see if there aren't some lessons to be drawn from that period when arms control was as central a pre-occupation as it was for guidance on how to, we hope, conclude a successor to the START treaty; pick up the issue of ratification of the comprehensive test ban treaty; review how we're doing in the nonproliferation treaty; who knows, perhaps even pick up on

conventional forces in Europe as a subject of negotiation at some point in the future.

So, it's with that backdrop that we are particularly fortunate that we would have Ambassador Georgiy Mamedov with us today to look back and then look forward and give us his thoughts based on his career, which has been involved in many, many issues having to do with the U.S.-Soviet/U.S.-Russian bilateral relationship and with the Soviet Union and Russia's role in the world, but I think it's safe to say that he has probably worked more in the vineyards, if that's the right metaphor, of arms control than just about any other issue.

And, by the way, he has worked with quite a number of people in this room, and I'm not going to either get through the whole list or take up too much by naming all of you, but I do want to single out a gang of three. Right down here in the second row -- even they were too bashful to sit in the front row. And if you knew Tom Pickering, Victoria Nuland, and Jim Collins, "bashful" would not be the first word that would come to mind. But you've got two former ambassadors to Moscow and a former ambassador to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, all three of whom I had the privilege of working with in the 1990s and all of whom had the privilege of working with Ambassador Mamedov.

I think pretty much everybody here knows at least his CV. But his CV does not really do justice to the contribution that he has made, quite simply, to world peace. He played an instrumental role over a period of time that saw immense changes in the world and the bilateral relationship and in his own country. There have been now four leaders -- only four leaders -- who inhabited the Kremlin who had the title president, and those of course were Mikhail Gorbachev, Boris Yeltsin, and Vladimir Putin, and now President Mamedov. Georgiy Mamedov has served all four of those presidents extremely ably, and he has done so on many issues but particularly the one that we're going to be talking about today.

And if I can just make a personal comment here, it was one of the great satisfactions of my career impersonating a diplomat back in the 1990s to have a chance to work with some outstanding people in my own government, a number of whom are here today, and also to have the good fortune of some foreign partners that I worked with.

And I will always remember how the word "partnership" -- Tom, you'll remember this, too -- entered the vocabulary of U.S.-Soviet relations as it then was. It was when Admiral Bill Crowe, who was Ronald Reagan's Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, went to Moscow to meet with President Gorbachev, and President Gorbachev used the word "partnership" to describe the relationship that he wanted between the

United States and the Soviet Union. And he had one set of issues in mind in particular, and that was arms control. Admiral Crowe was a little taken aback. He didn't know quite how to fit that word into the tenor of the times. But since then we have learned to define that word in very practical ways. And nobody -- certainly on the Russian side, and I'm tempted to say maybe nobody on either side -- has done more to give practical meaning to that word "partnership" than Georgiy Mamedov.

He was very closely involved with the Bush '41 administration particularly working with Dennis Ross and others at a particularly tricky time in the relationship with the Soviet Union and the cold war were both more or less simultaneously coming to an end. He was instrumental in some progress that we were able to make during the Clinton administration and also helping manage some mutual disappointments and frustrations that we had during that period. And he was very, very active throughout the George W. Bush administration, and he is today of course serving in Ottawa.

And I will conclude just by saying that the Russian government and the Russian people have been very, very lucky to have this diplomat in their service. We in the United States were very, very lucky to have him be, in many ways, our principle working-level partner on the Russian side. Canada is very, very lucky to have Georgiy Mamedov

representing the Russian federation in Ottawa, and I'm very lucky to have him as a friend.

Georgiy has a mastery of the English language, which he improves upon sometimes, and he has phrase that Tori and I remember well, which is -- he says, "I'm not just trying to butter you, Strobe." And, Georgiy, I'm not just trying to butter you, and I know that you will not stint in your candor as you make some observations to this group, and then we'll pick up with the conversation first with Steve and then bring in the rest of the room.

So, over to you.

AMB. MAMEDOV: Thank you very much. I am truly humbled to address this audience. It was, I believe, more than 30-something years ago that I first set foot in this institution. I was working on my PhD, and I didn't hesitate to steal your intellectual property from all this fine, you know, research reports. I wasn't running for the president, so I wasn't afraid to get caught.

Anyway, since I'm in such huge debt to many of you sitting in this room for the good partnership and for the friendship, I owe you all a confession and I will start with the confession. I don't come here as a specialist in arms control. I don't come here even as an American hand. And least of all, I come here as an ambassador to Canada. I come here

as a friend of Strobe Talbott, and I will talk to you in this capacity. So, you needn't find in *Pravda* or another newspaper the lines that you probably will hear from me. So, it will be all very, very informal.

And it's very nice to be a friend of Strobe Talbott. It's very profitable. And one of the advantages of being his friend -- you don't have to write memoirs, because he will write them for you so you won't stand the risk of clearing them for bureaucracy -- you know, going through the motions. When Strobe was working on the Russian end, which is devoted to Yeltsin and Clinton years, he asked whether I would like to see the proofs. I said no way, because if I see the proofs I will have to go back to people who give me the mandate to negotiate with you and vendors and I will have to explain to you why I sold away all the family jewels to Strobe Talbott.

But now finally I have the great satisfaction of coming every year to Toronto University to address the students there who have obligatory to study the Russian hand. And because some of our old friends happens to be a professor there at Toronto University, so he makes them to memorize every page of it. As a final treat, he asked me to come and just shows me around. So, like I said, being Strobe's friend is a great privilege and been very thankful to him for bringing me here to talk to

all of you, to meet my old friends, and to share with you a little that I have to share.

You know, arms control -- being an arms controller, I believe it's like being a marriage counselor. You have to deal with many things at once, you know -- love, affection, you know, marital greed, environment, your neighbors. The same is true about arms control. You're not only dealing with security per se. It's not about just numbers, first strike, second strike, fourth strike, or arms control regime, export control regime; it's about influence. It's about trying to influence not only your own decision making but also decision making of your vis-à-vis, which is a huge task, and if even the process you can contribute, even in a small way, the improvement of bilateral relations of clearing the atmosphere, you know, multilateral relations, then your job is done. So, it's not just sitting, you know, deep into the night at the table negotiating some kind of fancy stuff about warheads or (inaudible).

It's much more, and if you'll look at the history of arms control, it will jump up right into your face. I remember when we started in earnest arms control. It was, unfortunately, after the huge impact of Cuban missile crisis. Fear sometimes is a greater communicator than the diplomats are, and it brings people together. We would prefer that they come together out of free will, out of, you know, noble designs on world.

But sometimes it's fear that brings you together, and this is what happened the early stages of serious arms control between Russia, Soviet Union at that time, and United States.

I was privileged to know some of the people who were in charge of those negotiations.

By the way, I would like to use this occasion today to recognize my mentor and teacher with whom all of you are well acquainted who dealt with the Soviet Union and Russia. He turned 90 last week, and of course I have in mind Anatolia Dabrillion, who spent quarter of a century here, and he combined with him all that is best about people who take arms control seriously. For him, it wasn't just an exercise to bring around another piece of paper. It was (inaudible) to keep countries at peace and slowly and painful to transform the relationship for the better.

So, initially those who are in charge of arms control on our side saw this exercise mostly as a refuge from major confrontation. Everybody was, you know, scared witless at that time of nuclear war, nuclear confrontation; and arms control was an excuse to get together. Dope and all these fine books and research papers these days you will find quite different. Story, many academicians will, I'm sure, bring about new PhDs by saying how conscientiously we prepared this arms control, what were the schemes and the numbers. It wasn't the case. I'm telling

you as it was. It was out of fear that we got together, and, frankly, neither side was really intent on bringing about some radical, important results in cutting down the nuclear arsenals to say nothing about, you know, conventional arms at the time.

Slowly things improved, but then military had their major say, and they used arms control negotiations to fight for this, you know, fantastic, out-of-this-world advantages or disadvantages that sides may have in the terrible event of unthinkable and the terrible event of nuclear war. And they were running the show, and there are many books that you can read and see that military were actually guided those discussions. Political will worked in -- only to the extent that these negotiations really were happening -- Sergei Collose, another of old timers from our side of the great divide.

So --

(Interruption)

AMB. MAMEDOV: No, you're not interrupting. You made me remember some more nicer things than just, you know, negotiating arms and control, because I hail -- initially I came on my sabbatical here to Washington 1972 when I visited Brookings from Moscow Institute for U.S. and Canada Studies. However, it was known at the time our (inaudible)

institute -- now you have Sergei Rogoff as director of this institute, and Sergei is doing --

MR TALBOTT: You mentioned that (inaudible).

AMB. MAMEDOV: No, I didn't. I didn't mention many things here. I'm a very secretive and private person. The less that's known about me probably the better.

And so when the military started to call the shots, it became more practical, more pragmatic, numbers appear, and everything else. But the logic was still crazy. The underlying logic was expectation of nuclear exchange, and negotiators were judged by the effectiveness of promoting their military postures, whether it was Soviet military posture or Russian, Soviet, or American military posture.

Then we came very close to another terrible tragedy. I believe last time we were prepared to go to nuclear war with you and vice versa was 1983. And, again, I'm in this fear. This bell rang, and they brought together Mikhail Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan. Now you have the privilege of many books showing that Ronald Reagan started thinking about nuclear disarmament and negotiations with the Soviet Union long before he became President of the United States. And of course I want to trust this evidence as displayed and these books, because really it was something very momentous and historic and reek havoc when they came

close to agreement on elimination of nuclear weapons, which certainly caused many of their aids some very terrible heart attacks. They couldn't imagine such change of venue. And much of what we have today is basically legacy from Gorbachev, Reagan meeting and reek havoc.

The START treaty that we are negotiating right now is back to reek havoc, and the treaty on intermediate ballistic missiles, which was signed later in Washington, D.C., also dates back to reek havoc, so there was a blend of political will, conducive environment, and, unfortunately, some helping of fear that brought about such interesting denouement in reek havoc.

After that, of course, things began to change rapidly. Strobe already mentioned that. The end of cold war, collapse of Warsaw Pact, and then Soviet Union; and there was a new infusion of political element in arms control, because I know many of the people with whom we negotiated were really trying to use arms control not even as much as to -- I mean to reduce deeply nuclear arsenals but to bring about and to solidify the transformation in the East.

The same was true about, you know, conventional arms at the time, and it was, on one hand, a new impetus, but on the other hand it went as a detriment of sustainable military agreements and balance, because political will was driving everything. Negotiations were saddled

with deadlines. I'm not going to criticize my own bosses at the time, but they were also caught in this whirlwind of, you know, euphoria about new world, new brave world that was coming around and much of what they were doing were political in nature. And its after-effects on security weren't discussed in great depth.

And, as you know -- and I already mentioned -- arms control is nothing without relevant domestic environment and politics and relevant support, and I remember not many people in this room I think give thought to the fact that after START I, which we're negotiating, we also had START II with much deeper reductions. And we even ratified it. But United States Senate turned it down, just like City-Bitty with much deeper reductions, and we had it by now probably we'd be negotiating START III. Now we're negotiating the son of START I, which is not as effective as I think the one that I think we might have negotiated.

So, the domestic environment was not very conducive. We had first Yugoslavia, and of course our assessment of what happened there differs radically, and it had certain after-effects in Russia, and I remember when I came to negotiate START II I was, you know, hailed not with cries, you know, finally you brought the peace to us but traitors -- traitors, what did you do? -- your brethrens, Slavic brethrens are being, you know, bombed out of existence now by NATO aviation and so on and

you bring us this treaty, which also was considered to be one-sided because it put very strict restrictions on land-based ICMs. I'm not going to go into any, you know, explanation why our strong suit is land based. ICBMs and Americans were supposed to be submarine and long-ballistic missiles and the aviation armaments.

So, it was a very radical departure from our previous practice. But because of international environment, because our leaders weren't coherent enough in explanations of importance of arms control, it was -- it had a terrible day in our Parliament, but still we managed to carry it by a few votes.

When it was killed in the United States, of course it gave huge (inaudible) to our position saying, you know, you are prepared to trade away the best you have and Americans don't even appreciate that. And it had a huge after-effect. The same as inability of American administration to convince their Parliament -- I mean, the Congress -- of importance of City-Bitty, because City-Bitty was also -- I mean, complete test ban. It was also considered to be an agreement of new age after the cold war, after the Soviet Union, A.D., almost.

When it failed to materialize, again, domestic environment changed for arms controllers radically in our case, and the final blow? The mortal blow came with Bush, Junior, administration working out on ABM

treaty. Again, if you have questions, we may debate until Hell freezes out. Whether it's better to have a ballistic missile defense or to have ABM Treaty, but the proposition for the treaty was very simple because there were two major countries and continues to be only two major countries that can destroy each other and the rest of the world in 15 minutes. It just -- it's only us and you.

So, to keep us more responsible, we agreed to give up defense against each other's strategic potential. First, we wanted to have this defense. Of course technologically we basically failed, but it didn't prevent you from getting terribly frightened from our developing defense. Then you believed you were ahead. You didn't want to negotiate. Finally we came together. We had this treaty. The beauty of it was under it you can down really deep, because it doesn't matter. If you don't have any defense you can have zillions of, you know, generals in this room and still they wouldn't be able to convince you that without this ballistic missile defense you have to have tens of thousands of warheads.

When we still had ABM treaty, we made the last try with American administration. We floated so-called McNamara golden number, which is 1,000 -- 1,000 missiles -- warheads. All in all. And at the time, we had much greater numbers, like, you know, 6 or 7,000 on both sides. So, we suggested that if you are prepared to stick to the

provisions of ABM treaty, we can go down to 1,000, and it was really hard to squeeze it out of our military who believed in all this, you know, like your military and all this second strikes and third strikes and fourth strikes. So, 1,000 was named and we made a terrific pitch in favor if it. It was turned down and down the drain when the ABM Treaty after that, so there was actually no faith left.

I am the last person of course to complain, because I received government decoration for a piece of paper that papered over this, you know, period after holocaust -- after arms control holocaust. We had a nice piece of paper and I am still proud, not of its substance but of the fact that was it actually (inaudible), because I had to negotiate with really tough people, and Strobe knows them. Strobe was tough as nails, but John Bolton was nobody's patsy, believe me. And only after I very strongly hinted that the President of the United States probably would like to have this piece of paper we made some, you know, advances.

But nevertheless, it was damage limitation experience. And even the huge tragedy of 9/11 didn't help in major way, though it brought about the realization that the challenges are different, that we are all in the same boat, and this boat is very fragile and it's full of gimmicks and gadgets that we don't need anymore. Otherwise we all will drown. As simple as that. And notwithstanding this realization and attempts to use it

for the better of our bilateral realizations, for the better of arms control, we couldn't attack major interests in arms control for almost years.

Yes, there were some important agreements reached, bilateral against nuclear terrorism. Some structures were created, vis-à-vis Iran and North Korea, international structures to deal with the threat of proliferation, but the major threat of Russian-American arms control was basically frozen. So, I wholeheartedly agree with Strobe -- and I'm a closet liberal. I watch CNN more often than I watch Fox and (inaudible) in public option, though don't quote me to my Republican friends.

Anyway, I hope that we may witness a second coming of arms control. And it comes not out of ideology and not out of fear this time and not out of Joint Chiefs of Staff or our general staff.

By the way, to humor Strobe I brought about the folder that Joint Chiefs presented to me. Now probably they think I stole it, but I have eye witness. I didn't. From the tank, you know, this -- their mock war room when they explained to us how they are going to destroy our strategic potential unless we agree to the changes in the ABM treaty. Very persuasive argument but didn't lead them to anywhere.

So, I think it's not ideology this time, not all these theories and not fear but common sense. And Mr. Medvedev, who is even younger than your President, and then Barack Obama will have

representatives of new generation of politicians who want some change, and with some change we may agree. I mean we are old timers. I am old man - with some probably not, but I think common sense and desire for modernization would sooner or later lead -- and probably already led, I don't know, I mean, it seems like their chemistry is excellent. They meant recently in Singapore and from what I heard, they're very enthusiastic about, you know, renegotiating START treaty, but they that all this mass of armaments, which were compiled under different circumstances now hurt us, and they don't want to see people simply banking on having those armaments forever.

But people still make (inaudible) of it. Let's be straightforward. And during my course of being arms control negotiator, I happened to learn little about different interest groups both in the United States and in Soviet Union, later in Russia, who had in-built interests in continuing this arms race. And it really makes a lot of people angry right now, including, I hope, Mr. Medvedev and Mr. Obama. It's almost like the CEOs from certain companies that failed during the crisis -- now they are asking us for additional money out of taxpayers' pocket -- I mean bailout money -- and still they think they have all the right for million bonuses. I hope this won't happen with military industrial complex. Russia for centuries -- even before, you know, Soviet Union had the very militarized

bureaucracy. War ready. If you read our history, even as rendered in War and Peace, you will understand why. Even from Tolstoy, it's quite obvious why we felt the nature (inaudible) up, and then we had to be battle ready.

But what I am saying here -- some people predicted we will all go to the dogs when military industrial complex collapsed in 1991, because actually what we have to day is one-third or even probably less. Sergey knows better, so he does less than one-third. I am trying to be conservative for a change, not the liberal here, with these numbers. And nothing happened. I think we are better off now. We're free. When this iron curtain folded, we are ready to integrate in world market economy and the military industrial complex is no longer a great motivation. And if you look at the bailout package, I mean, compiled -- comprised both our and your bailout packages, it's exactly the military expenditures that we'll have both next year. We will have $700 billion plus. We will have 10 times less but still substantial number for us.

So, I think common sense dictates our new leadership to take arms control seriously. Of course, if we achieve success, if we're successful in our major bilateral negotiations, we will have the moral right to really pressure Iran and other countries to do what we think is important to keep nonproliferation alive, to deny terrorists and extremists nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. We need to have this moral right. We

lost it during the last 10 years. And we can say whatever we like. We can frighten people with sanctions. It only makes then more belligerent. Believe me. During my negotiations in my tenure as arms controller, I visited Iran, and sanctions never made great impression on them. It's when your President decided to have a discussion with them, a dialog. That made them afraid. And that's why all this recent, you know, repercussions inside Iran, because they're more afraid of talking to you than they are afraid of your sanctions. Believe me. And this one.

Anyway, I really hope that now we have an opportunity to renew our commitment to arms control. I know that my leadership is committed. My new president is committed. Some people ask me what about Putin. Without Putin we won't be able, you know, to communicate his desire for arms control. I work for Putin. I negotiated with you all this for Putin. So I work with him personally, and I know he's an arms control fan. I know he wants to have agreement with the United States. I know he wants to cut it deeper than we are discussing right now. So, I am that certain that if there is will from this side, if domestic environment allows your administration to have a free hand with arms control then we will complete not only son of START treaty but also other treaties, it will be a very sound foundation.

In my biography, there is another blatant lie. It says that first I came to Washington in 1972 and I almost confirmed that, so I will finish with another confession. Actually, I was brought to Washington more than 50 years ago by my parents who worked for our embassy here. It was a very dire time of cold war. We weren't allowed to mix with American children, but sometimes, you know, encounters of the third kind occurred. We were living near the Rock Creek, and they used to taunt me, probably because I was dancer, I was stubborn. They used to call me nickelhead. So, I must tell you that I will proudly remain a nickelhead in everything that concerns arms control, including negotiations with the United States, and I really hope this time we won't have -- forgive, ladies -- the coitus interruptus. Thank you very much.

MR. TALBOTT: I'll just say a couple of words.

Steve and I were passing notes in class, because we decided it would be a good idea to go as quickly as possible to a conversation with the audience. I can't resist making just a comment or two.

You've got to love this guy for many reasons, including, as I said earlier, the way he improves on the English language. Tori and I for a while, and I think Jim and Tom were in on this, too -- we actually -- we

kept a list of Mamedovisms. But you just did a new one. It's knucklehead, knucklehead. Did you write that down?

MS. NULAND: Only knuckleheads engage in (Inaudible)

MR. TALBOTT: Okay, Tori.

And as for --

AMB. MAMEDOV: We'll take it from an expert.

MR. TALBOTT: Yeah, and I'm a little bit -- I'm a little bit annoyed that you didn't give me that anecdote about your first visit to the U.S. for me to use it in the biography of you that I wrote.

But there is one episode that I did recount, which I'll share with all of you, and it has to do with a kind of globalization moment that I'll never forget. It was the third of October, 1993, and I'm sure Tom and Tori and Jim are all nodding. Many of you who you're all historically literate, so you say oh, yes, that was Mogadishu. Well, yes, but it was also the day that Russia went to war against itself, fortunately in a very, very mercifully circumscribed part of Moscow. But it went to war against itself. And it was daytime in Moscow, and Georgiy was in his office at the Foreign Ministry. It was very much night time in Washington, D.C., and Tori and Jim -- and I think you got to go home that night; I stayed on my -- slept on my couch in the State Department, and when it became clear that President Yeltsin was going to move against the Armed Insurgents in the

Parliament., the Ops Center -- the Operations Center came and got me and I went down and went into the Operations Center and sat in front of the television and called Georgiy -- or maybe you called me. But it was an amazing moment, because we were -- he was in his office in Moscow, I was in virtually mine in Washington, and we were both watching CNN giving live coverage to the attack on the Russian White House and trying to figure out what it meant.

Well, one of the things that it meant--

AMB. MAMEDOV: Think attack.

MR. TALBOTT: Yeah, well -- and RPGs and a whole lot of stuff. But one of the things that underscores thought is that the Russian Foreign Ministry and professional government epitomized by this guy here managed throughout that entire tumultuous decade to maintain an extraordinary degree of policy coherence and diplomatic professionalism. It was obviously also a credit to your president. Maybe first and foremost to your president. But there was a linear and rational and highly responsible Russian foreign policy on key issues during that whole period.

But why don't I turn it back to the moderator, Steve, and you can either pose some questions or throw it out to the audience.

MR. PIFER: Oh, let me start with a question here, because I think back to how the U.S. -Russia relationship was a year ago and where

it is now and, Georgiy, I think of some of your comments there about how arms control both shapes but also is shaped by the bilateral relationship. And it does seem that when you look at where the U.S. relationship has come over the last eight or nine months, arms control, the restoration of negotiations on a post-START treaty have been a big driver. What would be your cautions? Are we putting too much on arms control in a sense of asking it not only to reduce nuclear weapons and improving security? But is there a risk that we're asking also to do too much in terms of trying to shape that broader relationship?

AMB. MAMEDOV: Well, first of all, we're discussing arms control here, so I made a pitch for arms control. But if you ask me what for me is more important in terms of Russian-American relations is I think are building trust in general, and the best way to rebuild trust now that we are no longer afraid that you will attack us and you I know (inaudible) the same people here are no longer afraid that we will attack you. It boils down to built-in interest. And it can't be just negative built-in interest, like, for example, whether your heart (inaudible) of Afghanistan or we will have problems in the Caucuses and we get together and have a tradeoff.

There must be some positive built-in interest in the (inaudible). We are all besieged now by one of the worse economic crises ever. When our leaders in G20, in other formats, it's so nice and dandy

you know. They discuss, you know, global governments, new elements of socialism, (inaudible) throw -- I mean, controls over banking, you know, government martyrs and stuff like that, but there are -- it's not what easily translates in bilateral relations.

I hope that our business and your business, which I think are mutually complementary for many reasons. We are not at all competing for some niche radically. I think if the result of this crisis will be greater economic exchanges, which means greater people exchanges, which means certain people here being called Russian (inaudible) for all the right reasons, not for all the wrong reasons that there used to be during the cold war. I mean, the Communists and so on and so forth.

This I think is more important, more crucial for our bilateral relations than arms control is. Our arms control is probably more important for the third countries now. If we achieve success, we will together be able to influence, you know, Korea, Iran, Middle East, stuff like that. If we can't even agree between ourselves on the redundant things that no longer belong to agenda today, then there's a very slim chance that we will agree on something dealing with proliferation in the third world. To this extent, of course, arms control is very important. As an instrument of bilateral relations, I would put economy first. Like one of our mutual friends used to say, "It's about the economy, stupid."

MR. PIFER: Let's go ahead and take questions. And if you could please identify yourself and your affiliation and have a question mark at the end of your intervention.

MR. STONE: Thank you. I'm Jeremy Stone. In 1999, you and I and Prime Minister Stepashin tried to advance the idea of a thousand warheads on each side. Is Russia still prepared to consider reductions to a thousand on each side?

AMB. MAMEDOV: It's a very, you know, academic question. We're now trying to make you agree to a much higher number and you can't. So when we will be able to bring you around to our position of much lower ceilings like right now, I believe revisit 1,000 is quite possible.

MR. TALBOTT: Could I bust in here now that I've got a different line of vision. I see Graham Allison sitting right in front of Jeremy, who was very much part of the team that worked with Georgiy and his team on many of these issues, and just seeing Graham makes me think of missile defense for some reason.

If the day comes -- and I could imagine that it might -- that the U.S. government would be prepared to go back to join you in going to the what we'd call the stone's debauchan (?) concept of a thousand warheads on each side.

AMB. MAMEDOV: It was official proposal from us.

MR. TALBOTT: Presumably, that would require resurrecting, in some fashion, the Antiballistic Treaty. What do you think the trigger point is or the threshold as Russia is prepared to come down where it will insist on the regulation of strategic defenses as a precondition for further reductions and strategic offenses.

AMB. MAMEDOV: First of all, and here is probably -- I will sound a little blasphemous to my general staff. I am not very much concerned about your ballistic missile defense. I believe the deterrent is still there. With what I can imagine you may come up in, I don't know, 10, 15 years and be on that time it's very hard, you know, to envision the arms control horizon. For me, it's much more important that we finally agree to the fact that we can have a mutual enterprise, not only in offensive of arms but in defensive as well. This, for me, is the heart of the matter.

MR. TALBOTT: So, the key was --

AMB. MAMEDOV: You deny us the right of being your partners, equal partners on ballistic offensive systems.

MR. TALBOTT: So, the key would be substituting for regulation, collaboration, or cooperation.

AMB. MAMEDOV: Collaboration and joint -- two keys control. Two keys control was crucial. I remember when we started discussions with Bush, Sr., administration. Dennis Ross was heading

your delegating, and everybody euphoric, because, you know, it was immediately after collapse of the Soviet Union -- a couple of months into collapse of Soviet Union. So, your Congress gave standing ovation to Yeltsin, who addressed both Chambers saying you know, I killed Communism, so everybody was hopping, were madly happy about everything, and we started to discuss joint protection -- global protection system, which was basically mutual ABM. To kill forever any sign of start of war, and we were able to agree to certain details, you know, to a number of (inaudible), to (inaudible). But when it came down to two keys control, the answer was (Russian), no, it's our own. We can discuss offensive with you, but this is (inaudible). You are not that close. Nobody's that close to us. And this perception lingers. So, this is, for me, the basic test.

I can foresee a situation when we would go even down even deeper without any son of ABM. It will take some convincing to do. I mean, change your majors, change your circumstances in the world. But for me, the crucial test will come when, again, new head of delegation will face your new head of delegation. So, I would prepare now to cooperate on this as well in the real way. Two keys control, and when the answer will come yet, it will be a major breakthrough, for me at least, psychologically and practically.

MR. PIFER: Okay, right in the back there.

MR. MILIKEN: Al Milliken, AM Media. From your perspective, has the style and/or socializing of the negotiating participants changed much since the 1980s and the end of the cold war?

AMB. MAMEDOV: It depends. Again, let's not over-dramatize the importance of negotiations. Everything depends on human beings. I remember human beings during the hate of cold war, which were much more forthcoming, socialized a lot, though of course they sometimes later paid the penalty of being demoted and so on. Now, nobody instructs me how to negotiate. I mean, the style, whether I can visit my American friend at home. It's no longer a problem. But much depends on personalities. If people are timid, if they are not convinced that their leaders want to make really, you know, a revolutionary step forward, they're afraid for their careers, it's true in the Russian sense; it's also true in the American sense. Pinstripe bureaucrats are the same everywhere, you know, and so I don't believe that there's such a watershed change of style underway, probably because I knew the people who negotiate now before, and I don't see any changes of them probably. I mean, they became a little older. The only thing. I don't think there's a major change of negotiating style now.

MR. PIFER: Sergei.

SPEAKER: Sergei (inaudible) United States and Canada, and first of all I want to strongly object against your definition that we are old men; we are mature men. We are not old men.

MR. PIFER: Still capable.

SPEAKER: Now, here is my question. Would you agree to the following assumption -- and I'm sorry, I missed the beginning of your presentation. Maybe you've already said it -- in the 1990s we had two major achievements after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. We succeeded in preserving the arms control regime including START, IMF, ADM, and CFE. And secondly we succeeded in prevention of proliferation of the Soviet Nuclear Arsenal, and the (inaudible) between the United States and the Russian Federation to maintain Russia as the sole owner of the Soviet nuclear weapons was crucial. But what we failed, and miserably failed, in the '90s, to change the paradigm of the nuclear relationship based on mutual issue of destruction, and eventually that produced the crisis in arms control regime when we now, unless we sign the START (inaudible). We can face a total collapse of arms control regime. ABM is dead. CFE is not alive. START is expiring, and IMF is not in a very good condition. So, would you agree that should change mutual issue destruction, and if we succeed in START for long we should look at the new relationship no more based on the presumption that we

should be always ready in 15 minutes to destroy each other and the rest of the world, over.

AMB. MAMEDOV: Next, Strobe.

SPEAKER: You also would comment.

MR. TALBOTT: I just would add a sentence or comment, a subordinate clause, taking into account also that your president and our President here in the United States have both committed themselves together to the proposition of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. Zero is now part of the --

AMB. MAMEDOV: Just like Khrushchev and Eisenhower.

MR. TALBOTT: Yeah, well, we'll see. Maybe just like. That's the question.

AMB. MAMEDOV: Okay, first of all, of course I agree that it was a major achievement that we retained the arms control system and we must pay a tribute of course to our American counsel first, because nowadays it's very trendy to say how selfish they were, how presumptuous they were, how, you know, rude they were us after we collapsed. It's not exactly the keys. It's not, you know, black and white picture. They -- certainly they didn't want, at the time, to continue this arms control structures. ABM Treaty -- they could have easily walked out

on it, and nobody would be the wiser, because Soviet Union was no longer there.

And again I want to pay a major tribute personally to Strobe and personally to President Clinton, in this particular order, for helping us secure the withdrawal of nuclear weapons from Ukraine, because that's done, and Belarusia, and, remember, very hurting experience.

MR. TALBOTT: When we kidnapped you.

AMB. MAMEDOV: Being kidnapped from Moscow to here, and it was a very unenviable situation, because there were 15 Ukrainian generals --

MR. TALBOTT: On Bill Perry's plane no less.

AMB. MAMEDOV: Ten American generals and your humble servant between them, and if it weren't for the good will of Mr. Perry and the Americans' President, it would be very difficult to convince Ukrainians to give up their nuclear weapons at the time. We didn't have the leverage. On the opposite, we continued to produce strategic weapons together with them. So, it was very awkward for us to pressure them too hard, because we could win that without part of our nuclear arsenal. So, it was thanks to the wisdom of American administration in this particular case that entered into very sustainable agreements at the time, and they still are with us with the change of all administrations. So -- and to the other part of your

question, would it be good to change them in this -- under (inaudible) arms control mutual issue? So certainly it would. But first of all I would like to test the limit, the proposition that we have now, because we are not doing enough (inaudible) within the framework for what we have. And my example that Mr. Stone I hope supports with 1,000 warheads is exactly one of those things that I won't go over with you. I know now it's more difficult to convince our military in the absence of ABM Treaty, but still it can be done if the proper (inaudible) continues in negotiation. That's why I hope that they will come to an agreement on START II as soon as possible, because window of opportunity may be closing. Something terrible may happen in the world. You have elections next year. I don't know where your health care is going to be. Whatever treaty you will come up with, I don't want it to follow the fate of START II in your Senate.

MR. TALBOTT: Sergei mentioned CFE, which I forget what you -- I think you said more a blunder not a lie that's certainly not being observed in key respects. Can you imagine a circumstance in which CFE might come back?

AMB. MAMEDOV: CFE is a function of our general relationship. In this case if we move in the strategic play and it will be much easier for both sides to exercise leadership in (inaudible). You remember when we achieved this adaptation treaty. You and I together

traveled to Greece and Turkey, of all the places, to convince them to abide by certain, you know, parts of the agreement that was tough for them because of their bilateral strained relationship. So, if we keep first things first, I think we will be able to come up with some version of adaptation of CFE Treaty. It wasn't much easier when we negotiated the first one, and, again, it's interesting to remember that the final pressure has to be put by Americans on two former Soviet Republics, not by Russians, you know. General stereotype is that we're, I mean, strangulating this poor gentleman and ladies, but the case was it was the head of American delegation who came up to the head of Ukrainian delegation and this negotiation's adaptation (inaudible) and told him very loud and clear it's no longer a Soviet Union so you better agree. That's very interesting. I still remember it. Good thing I'm not going to write it.

MR. PAYJACK: Roger Payjack, formerly with the U.S. Treasury Department. Ambassador, Mamedov, from your perspective on the Soviet and Russian government and scene, what impelled President Gorbachev to become interested in arms control in the first place?

AMB. MAMEDOV: What --

MR. PAYJACK: What caused him -- what impelled him to --

AMB. MAMEDOV: What was his motivation?

MR. PAYJACK: Yes.

AMB. MAMEDOV: Well, his motivation was like (inaudible). He wanted to modernize the country he was living in, and to modernize it without getting great or what was -- everything that wasn't burdening -- it was impossible. And you probably remember that by 1985 when they first met with Reagan in Geneva, our economy was in dire straits. We, you know, squandered away our oil money, and he wanted modernize Soviet Union, and it meant to cut old expenditures that were not relevant to our security and well-being. So, arms control was a case in point, and we were producing enormous numbers of ICBMs and other weapons in early '80s, so I think it was common sense that drove him, and desire to change the economy and foundation of the Soviet Union, and also he was simply a peaceful person. He believed in world peace. There are leaders like that, you know.

MR. PIFER: Graham.

MR. ALISON: Graham Alison from Harvard. It's a great opportunity to see an old friend from many years. Let me get you to talk about the current START follow-on and why this seems to be difficult, because it would seem like it should be easy. And if I go back and just put it in context, if you go back to the beginning of the end of the Bush administration before the so-called reset and you were to say, for the Russian national security community, what are the things you're

concerned about? If I read it right, the list was first Ukraine or Georgia are on a fast track to NATO; secondly, the abolition of the ABM treaty and the possibility that there were technologies that might be somehow dangerous; and, thirdly, the deployment of missile defenses in Czech and Poland. So, now I look at the Obama administration and I see first no talk about fast track for NATO. Of course, it never was likely anyhow but any case was a matter that Russians talked a lot about; and, secondly, the April decisions that Secretary Gates announced, which basically eliminate -- I mean, basically functionally said the U.S. will live within the ABM treaty for the foreseeable future certainly to the end of the next decade; and then, thirdly, a redeployment of the missile defense that was a matter of concern. So, in principal I would say well, then the next step of this should be easy7, but it seems to be hard.

AMB. MAMEDOV: You put me in a terrible position, because my instinct would be to start discussing details with you, which I am not at freedom to do.

MR. TALBOTT: Go ahead, go ahead.

AMB. MAMEDOV: They are not very exciting, believe me. Not as exciting, because Steve has things we discussed with you some time ago. The problem is political, and the problem is as much here as it is in Moscow, because look at the opinion poles. Look at the opinion

poles and sometimes you have hard time convincing your military to do certain things in Afghanistan and the rag that matter much too more to you. So, I don't know whether you have the clout to spread on START II. That's the answer to your question. But whether -- because some of the position that I believe -- I don't know, I am not negotiating -- you are taking right now is a rehash of what we turned down back in 1991 when we were negotiating START I Treaty and START II Treaty, and why they appeared once again out of the blue yonder, it's even hard for me to understand. Probably because there are some people who believe it's an opportune moment to try and advance then, but there wasn't a rationale for them at that time, and I don't believe there is a great rationale for them 20 years later.

SPEAKER: If I could just follow briefly. I mean, if no follow-up treaty -- and let's just imagine the U.S. takes the position let's just forget about it, we're not enemies anymore, the Bush administration, and so we don't we don't have a treaty so you do what you want you want to do and we do what we want to do.

AMB. MAMEDOV: Excellent position, but you can't then exercise your moral leadership as a North Korean (inaudible). You can do with agreement. They say we are also not going to attack Israel, so sorry,

guys. No adherence to certain agreements, we'll kiss you goodbye, let's shake on it.

SPEAKER: To make the U.S.-Russian Arms Control Agreements contingent or to have as a significant factor in it, American moral leadership in trying to deal with North Korea I don't think will make much difference.

AMB. MAMEDOV: It's not contingent. I'm simply saying that you're going to lose a lot if you are not bound by official agreement, and I personally think -- and I put a wager with my friends from Canadian Counterintelligence that we will have this agreement.

SPEAKER: Well, I hope so.

AMB. MAMEDOV: So, don't dishearten me.

SPEAKER: Great.

AMB. MAMEDOV: Okay? Don't do it again.

SPEAKER: Yeah. If I could just add. It does seem that when you look at what the two presidents have said, they very much want an agreement, and so I mean I think this becomes the crucial question in the end: Do they basically use their clout, which is considerable to sort of the break the final (inaudible)

MR. TALBOTT: I might add a point of speculation but not totally out of the blue, and Georgiy, you're welcome either to comment or

not comment, and my sense is that the Russian position in Geneva has stiffened, not because the U.S. has come forward with unreasonable last-minute proposals. I mean, speaking of out of the blue, there's a very important issue of verification having to do with encryption of twantatry (?) of phrase that makes our hearts go pitter-patter, those of who spent or misspent our youth working on these issues. And Georgiy mentioned opinion polls. I assume you're talking opinion polls in this country, right?

AMB. MAMEDOV: In Canada, Europe presence is 80 percent popular.

MR. TALBOTT: No-no-n0, but -- okay.

AMB. MAMEDOV: Eighty percent, much popular than Prime Minister --

MR. TALBOTT: He also wanted an opinion an opinion pole conducted by the Norwegian Nobel Committee, and he's due to get a prize on the 10th of December, which is five days after the expiration of the START Treaty, and there are straws in the wind that suggest there might be some motivation on the Russian side to see if they can drive a hard bargain.

AMB. MAMEDOV: But a Nobel prize?

MR. TALBOTT: Because of the Nobel Prize, and then --

AMB. MAMEDOV: Because we didn't get the Nobel Prize?

MR. TALBOTT: Because President would want to have something to show for him as a peacemaker including in the category that the Nobel committee featured in its original statement. By the way, remember that he's going to be getting the Nobel Prize shortly after announcing the escalation of a war, so I think that -- this may be a case of -- if the speculation is true, I think it's much too clever by half on the Russian half, but I also end on a conciliatory note. I share your optimism that there will still be a treaty if not by the fifth then by the end of the year.

AMB. MAMEDOV: Forgive my French, but all this connection with Nobel Prize is bullshit.

MR. TALBOTT: Because you're Ambassador to Canada you have to speak French on every occasion.

AMB. MAMEDOV: I agree. The problem is I think that you haven't yet decided whether you want to cut your numbers, and your strategic review is not done yet.

SPEAKER: Nuclear program is not done yet.

AMB. MAMEDOV: No, nuclear program is not done yet. That's one of big problems, so it will take political clout of one man. Like, it will take political clout of one man to say whether to send 40,000 people or 30,000 people to Afghanistan. It takes time. So, it has nothing to do with Nobel Prize.

MR. SCHOETTLE: Peter Schoettle from Brookings and retired State Department, lots of arms control negotiations. My question to you is can you give us a scenario maybe including some steps Russia and the U.S. so that nuclear weapons don't proliferate much further?

AMB. MAMEDOV: My good friend, Tom Pickering, has a brilliant idea. We might take leadership on the enrichment of uranium, for example, together, and since you have April nuclear summit coming rather soon in Washington, international event, probably would be a good time to come to an agreement on that. So, if we have a transparent joint (inaudible) inspections of International Atomic Agency it certainly will be a concrete step to help stifle proliferation. Short of military intervention, you can't, you know, change certain governments, and you already tried it, and you're still living with the consequences I believe you will have to be reconciled to step-by-step approach, and one of the steps is exactly the one that I mentioned and that we discuss with your people.

MR. PIFER: Okay, one last question at the back there.

MS. PETROFF: Casey Petroff, American University. You mentioned Iran in your speech several times. In September President Obama made the decision not to proceed with the missile defense system in Eastern Europe but a meaningful gesture, and I was just wondering if

you could offer a few words on what this means for U.S.- Russian and Russian-Iran relations. Thank you.

AMB. MAMEDOV: For our relations of course it's very good, because we will consider that -- well, I'm speaking on my behalf, you understand, not on behalf of my government. If you want the position of my government, Mr. (inaudible) is 15 minutes away waiting for you at the Russian embassy. Good friend of mine. We worked together. He was in charge of all this, you know. Arms control negotiations. So, he will brief you to the minute details as to position of our government. My position was it wasn't that much of a military threat. I mean, your stretch of their then political provocation, like Pershing's in 1982-83. Getting your strategic systems -- and it's called strategic systems. Nobody cares what -- it's if a (inaudible) for defense. It's missiles. Read what Israelis say about some, you know, antiaircraft systems, and you will understand that our hearts weren't exactly warm when we learned that you want to introduce missiles in Czech Republic and (inaudible) who have a very sad history of relations with us. It was considered to be a provocation to driver's edge (inaudible) needed to be driven already have a very difficult history and we're just trying to recuperate to come out of it, you know, to build bridges, and when you introduce a strategic -- it's like us, I mean, saying, you know, we will place some strategic defense in Cuba. Anybody

in his sane mind, including your Joint Chiefs of Staff, understands it won't make a difference. But remember, you measure the uproar here. It's in your face. So, it was good when Mr. Obama decided to reset our relations who represent, like I said, new thinking -- though I don't like this expression because it belongs to Mikhail, Sergei -- in foreign policy did that. As to Iran, I don't see any major connection, because from a military standpoint this systems in Poland and Czech didn't help you much from Iranian threat. Geographically probably would have been wiser to put it -- I don't know -- in Turkey or in some other countries over there, and we discussed it with you. Why it is relevant -- I think that demonstrates good faith, good will, which certainly invokes a response from us, and it's easier for us to discuss difficult issues, like Iran and so on. Iran for us is not some kind of distant country. After collapse of Soviet Union, which were mentioned on numerous occasions here. The only country that (inaudible) former Soviet Union was Iran. They crossed the border, made the land grab, and we fought them back. It's a little known fact from our history, but it's there. So, there is no great love lost between us and Iran, but we are neighbors. We are neighbors, and before 9/11 when you weren't interested in Afghanistan we appealed to you to try and help us out, you know, to eliminate terrorist bases there and you told us it's your bloody history, we don't care before 9/11, so, I mean, go packing -- the only

country would -- who we were able to forge a very, you know, awkward alliance against Taliban in (inaudible) was Iran. They were fighting with us against Taliban, because Taliban believed that the sky's the limit and they were advancing to Central Asia, former Republics of the Soviet Union. So, I think Iran is not in general lost case, and I believe President Obama made a very smart first move opening the dialog. It won't be easy. They won't jump, because they're in built interest and the policy of hostility, vis-à-vis the United States and their friends there. But it was an important first step, and what you did to your plans in Poland and Czech made us much more agreeable and forthcoming (inaudible) ratios that concern you but there is no direct link between this system and what we do with Iran -- I mean with systems that you planned to put into Poland and the Czech Republic. Not directly. No trade-offs.

MR. TALBOTT: Okay. Well, let me thank you for coming and speaking with us today and covering a wide range of issues with the candor and humor that I recall from the times when we were together in government.

AMB. MAMEDOV: Thank you.

MR. TALBOTT: So, please join me in thanking Ambassador Mamedov.

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