THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION

CENTER FOR NORTHEAST ASIAN POLICY STUDIES

SECURING JAPAN

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The Brookings Institution
Washington, DC
November 12, 2008

[TRANSCRIPT PRODUCED FROM A TAPE RECORDING]

ANDERSON COURT REPORTING
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P R O C E E D I N G S

RICHARD BUSH: Thank you very much for coming today. Welcome to Brookings. My name is Richard Bush. I'm the Director of the Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies, and it's our pleasure to host this luncheon meeting featuring Dick Samuels. It's always a great please to have Dick come down to Washington and talk about Japan. He is able to achieve both a breadth and a depth about Japan that all of us can envy and aspire to. Who could imagine that the Cabinet Legislation Bureau could be interesting? But he made it so.

There is, sometimes, I think an illusion in Washington that everything is fine with the U.S.-Japan alliance and that there's a broad, broad mainstream of people in Japan who support it and believe that it's Japan's only answer to its security problem, but Dick reminds us that it's a little bit more complicated than that and that we ignore that complexity at our peril. It's a great pleasure to have him here and I want to thank you all for coming. Dick, the floor is yours.

DICK SAMUELS: Thanks very much, Richard. I'm delighted to be back and to see so many old friends.

What I'm going to do today is going to be familiar to some of you because I know some of you have read Securing Japan. My presentation will have three unequal parts. I want to talk very briefly about the past, then I'm going to talk about the present, and then spend most of the time speculating with you about where things are headed.

At the end of World War II Japan found itself with four unequally endowed groups of strategic thinkers and activists. Each of these groups was connected to a prewar perspective that I explore in the book in detail. The first group, the pacifists, got an outsized dollop of credit for having shaped postwar Japanese security policy. They certainly deserve some, because only because the pragmatic conservatives, the fourth group down there, worked with them to elevate their concerns about the revision of the constitution, the protection, I should say, of the constitution.

The two middle groups, the neomilitarists, who actually were the darlings of the American occupation after the Cold War got underway but fortunate didn't get much traction, and revisionist/revisionists and pragmatists, form the divided core of conservative governance in postwar Japan. They are both still around, although as you'll see, the last group, the pragmatists, have been elbowed out fairly sharply.

With the victory of Prime Minister Yoshida and his disciples, Japan ended up embracing a bundle of ideas about national security in the postwar, the first element among which is civilian control. Under their leadership Japan adopted a package of cheap riding realism. Japan would maintain very low defense spending and rely on the United States for its national security. It wasn't free, but it was cheap, and was a very realistic calculation of how much the United States wanted to be out in that part of the world, how important the unsinkable aircraft carrier in the Far East was for U.S. security strategy, and how much the Americans were willing to forgive the Japanese for an unequal relationship both in security terms but also of course in economic and technological terms. So Japan embraced the nonnuclear principles, limited defense budgets, non-military use of space, and other policies you all are quite familiar with.

Japan worked hard to appear non-threatening and reassuring-- not just to its neighbors, but also to a domestic constituency that believes Japan has a military that is good at disaster relief, but not at much more.

But there is much more here. Japan has been tickling at the margins of global security. The Japanese SDF has acquired reach-out-and-touch capabilities, including a large number of things that were as recently as a decade ago or less considered unconstitutional, such as aerial refueling which extends the reach of the Japanese military and assault ships. The Japanese military does not have a Marine Corps., but it does practice "remote island defense" with the U.S. Marine Corps. And it now has a blue water Coast Guard. And there have been doctrinal shifts, including semi-permanent patrols to the Persian Gulf. Japan's is not exactly a global security presence of the kind that some American policymakers would prefer, but it is certainly more than it has ever been. Even the Japan Coast Guard speaks of having “new military power.”

How did all this happen? Certainly the domestic political landscape has shifted quite a lot. Specifically, the heirs of the Yoshida doctrine have been marginalized. In their place is a group that argues Japan should be “normal.” This group believes that the statute of limitations on Japan's bad behavior during the Pacific War expired long ago. I call them “normal nationalists.” They have now consolidated power in the LDP, and did so at a time when the opposition party was particularly weak. It's not as weak now as it was, of course. It also happened after the left completely disappeared or disintegrated as an organized political force.

That's the domestic story. In the rest of the world, of course, nothing is as it was. While all this was going on, there was that moment in which the global balance of power disappeared. The United States enjoyed its brief “unipolar moment.” And now there is a new balance of power in the region-- another way of acknowledging the rise of China.

In the face of all this, Japanese strategists began to slice the strategic salami, following the model set out by German defense minister Volker Rühe. One by one in Japan the rules changed. Homeland security expanded to regional security, and then to a global security role by the early part of this decade, as destroyers and tankers steamed to Diego Garcia, and as Japanese boots landed on Iraqi ground in Samawah. Over time there was a relaxation of the arms export ban and the Coast Guard began offering ODA to SE Asian states. So you're seeing changed unfold a slice at a time.

As my favorite professor in graduate school once said, “if there was ever a single reason for a political event it almost certainly never happened.” Change in Japanese national security policy at the end of the Cold War was certainly overdetermined. One usually starts with the "humiliation of checkbook diplomacy." You've all heard about this. The Japanese reacted badly when they weren't thanked by the Kuwaitis for having taxed their population and having ponied up $13 billion to pay for a large measure of the war that freed Kuwait from Saddam Hussein in 1991. It's the use of this “humiliation” at as a cudgel in domestic debates that is most interesting. There is also “force majeure” as an explanation for change in Japanese national-security policy. One often hears it said that the US government forced Japan to step up.

Then there is the DPRK, the mother of all catalysts. If Kim Jong-il didn't exist, he'd have to be invented because his serial miscalculations have been so useful to those who wish to see Japan become more muscular. Finally, of course, there is China. The game is afoot for regional economic leadership. I wouldn't go quite so far as to say that there's a full-blown security dilemma underway, but one can easily imagine that happening. Certainly there are the territorial disputes-- which provide one justification for the enhancement of the Japan Coast Guard. When there are Chinese subs in your waters, it is much less provocative to meet them with Coast Guard ships than with naval warships.

So, where is it all going? Let me try to map out for you as I do in the book, and begin by insisting that there is no single Japanese view of national security and that there never was one. Here, the horizontal axis is a proxy for the standard alliance dilemma of whether to get close to the stronger alliance partner and risk getting dragged into their wars or keeping a distance and risk loss of protection. The Japanese case is like the British case, either you embrace the US tightly or you try to get away to avoid entanglement. The vertical axis models whether you cleave to the Article 9 as written-- and not countenance the use of force as a means of settling international disputes-- or you believe that it is time to become “normal.”

This creates four quadrants. In the lower right are the pacifists who have not enjoyed much political power. In the lower right are the middle power internationalists, the heirs of the Yoshida line who were more willing to

work with the United States so long as the United States didn't demand too much of them on the military. They were the mercantile realists who wished Japan to remain a small island trading nation. They were after prosperity first. In the upper right are the normal nationalists who have consolidated power. They are the heirs of the "big Japan"-ists. Finally, here in the upper left quadrant are those "neo-autonomists" who would seek real distance from the United States and nuclear weapons to boot. This is how the debate is engaged.

These quadrants are not homogeneous. There is debate within each and it's very hard really to place people in some cases, and I'll show you why in this next slide. This is the result of a project that I did with Patrick Boyd for the National Bureau of Asian Research earlier this year. It was based upon a survey done by Tokyo University and the Asahi Shimbun of the members of the House of Representatives just before the September 2005 elections. Of the 500, 425 answered, which is really quite astonishing. We arrayed their responses to a suite of questions about national security against the notional diagram I showed you a moment ago from my book.

A few things were particularly interesting. First of all, my intuition was right. The respondents were allayed in roughly the right proportion to one another as I had expected. But, the pacifists are not quite as weak as I would have guessed. The normal nationalists are the largest single group which reinforces the intuition. The mercantile realists are much smaller, maybe half their size. They are both obviously conservatives who support the alliance. Most interesting was that only four of 425 respondents answered the questions as "neo-autonomists. The thing that surprised us the most was that the cumulative majority on this chart are on one line or another, which means that there is still a sorting out that has to happen. It means that there can be issues that force people to shift because they're not quite sure where they belong.

Each of these quadrants represents a set of security policy preferences and each has problems. The normal nationalists would stay the present course. Their Japan will not say no to the United States on alliance issues but will seek a fuller partnership. The problem is that in its pure form, this would alienate Japan from its regional partners and from domestic constituents. Don't expect to see it in its pure form for very long.

The neo-autonomists would argue for armed neutrality. They want reach out and touch capabilities that include nuclear weapons. Theirs would be a Japan that not only <u>can</u> say no, but one that <u>does</u> say no. But, as I've shown you, their position does not have much popular support notwithstanding all the overblown analyses one reads in the American media about the rise of Japanese nationalism.

The mercantile realists will not say yes top the United States on military matters. They'd take Japan back to the purest version of the Yoshida doctrine. The problem with this is that Japan has really moved on and it's just not a posture that's going to have much resonance among the Japanese public.

So, what we will get? I think we will get a combination of these preferences, one I call the Goldilocks posture. I see Japan as becoming more muscular, but continuing to be realistic and clinging to the alliance. I see a Japan that can say no and that sometimes will. This will make it "normal" in the way that Germany is normal, in the way that Canada is normal, in the way that France is normal. It is, after all, quite normal to say no to a country that is dragging you into a war that you don't want to fight. That's the Japan I expect we're going to see. We haven't seen it yet. Japan has been saying yes. But it's a Japan that worries not that China is going to come and invade it, but one that's would fall prey to coercion on the part of its much larger and over time likely equally powerful or maybe even more powerful neighbor, and it's one therefore that will pick and choose its missions with the United States. Notice how Operation Enduring Freedom came back in, but the US request for participation in Afghanistan itself has been ruled out.

Why do I expect this outcome? Because hedging makes sense under conditions of uncertainty and change. Japan will hedge against U.S. decline and against a change in the willingness of the United States to carry Japanese national security on its shoulders. It will hedge against being both entangled and abandoned.

To the surprise of most observers, Mr. Abe-- who was expected to be anything but Goldilocks because of his background and his positions on a great many security issues-- went to China and Korea before he came to the United States. He put in motion the reform of the exhibits in the Yushukan Museum on the grounds of the Yasukuni Shine. He did not visit Yasukuni and promised the Chinese that he would not. He accepted the 1995 Murayama apology and he acknowledged that his grandfather Kishi Nobusuke had been in part responsible for the Pacific War. These things are the things of Goldilocks. These are not the things of a rabid nationalist, what the newspapers and magazines had anticipated he would be. He appointed the Joint History Commission and stimulated negotiations on the territorial disputes and so forth.

As you all know, Prime Minister Abe melted down, but he was succeeded by a pair of Goldilocks twins. Once he won control of the upper house for his DPJ, Mr. Ozawa began pulling away from Washington by ending the Indian Ocean dispatch, at least temporarily. And Prime Minister Fukuda followed Abe's line and further relaxed the relationship with China.

We don't know how long Mr. Aso will remain in power. Mr. Aso will of course have to call an election because it will have been coming up to 5 years since the Koizumi landslide. Here is a list of his positions on major foreign and security policy issues. The alliance is his priority. He uses it to build trust with Japan's neighbors. He has abandoned that "Arc of Freedom and Prosperity" that we heard so much about from Mr. Abe. He is not going forward with troops on the ground in Afghanistan. He certainly continues to support constitutional revision but there is no forward motion on that now, given that an election is on the horizon.

Mr. Ozawa, of course, has different views. He wants to see equality with the United States but does want to suggest that this ought to be done by sacrificing relationships with Asia. I think he painted himself into a corner by inventing the idea of Japan as a "normal nation," but then tying normality to the abnormal idea that only the United Nations can legitimate Japanese military action.

I'm going to stop here. I apologize for having gone on as long as I did, but I understand we have about a half-hour for Q and A. Thank you very much for your attention and I'd be happy to answer your questions.

DR. BUSH: Thank you very much, Dick. That was terrific. You put a lot on the table. I'm sure it stimulated a lot of questions. I have a few but I'm not going to abuse my position. Just raise your hand and wait for the mike. If you think you need to identify yourself, do so. Otherwise go for it. Rusty?

QUESTION: Thank you, Dick. Excellent book, by the way. I've assigned it to my class at SAIS as must reading, and I think as you say here, it really does accurately lay out the dimensions. My question really is isn't there also a danger of muddle in Japan with the prospect now of weak political leadership for some time to come with rotating governments, the Upper House under DPJ control, maybe a DPJ government however long it will last? We have the risk of going back to the 1990s where you have a prime minister who lasts a year to a year and a half without any real clear policy decisions. Plus the budget crunch is preventing the JDA from really increasing its defense spending to meet any new obligations. The demography, the shrinking population, difficulty in recruiting new people for the military. And if you look at Japanese public polls, there's a lack of appetite for real leadership even on the constitution, sort for revisionists falling back a little bit. People seem to be much more focused on their own domestic agenda than on Japan assuming a major role. Isn't there some risk that we go through the next half-decade or even a decade without any real clear Japanese strategy?

DR. SAMUELS: Certainly it's impossible to disagree with that. The issue of Japanese leadership is an old standard. There were those who

believed that there is something about the way Japan is wired that makes the term Japanese leadership an oxymoron. I don't believe that's true for a number of reasons, but it is true that in the near-term there is going to be an enormous amount of political jockeying in an entirely new context-- one in which there is a powerful opposition party that controls part of the government.

On the other hand, we shouldn't be surprised by the emergence of strategic thinking and serious leadership in Japan that we saw with Mr. Koizumi. No one anticipated that he would become the kind of leader that he was, but he was an extraordinary leader not just because he knew how to say "postal reform" over and over, but because he knew what he wanted in the nature of transforming domestic political institutions as well as in the nature of shoring up a rather flaccid alliance.

I don't know who the next Mr. Koizumi is, but he was not the first surprisingly effective Japanese leader. Consider Yoshida Shigeru. No one expected Mr. Yoshida's ideas to congeal in the way that they did and then carry Japan forward for as long as they did. There's an old debate in the social sciences about "agency" and "structure"-- do leaders make institutions or do institutions make leaders? History, it seems to me, points to both. The great leaders know how to operate within constraints. And today there are serious fiscal constraints in the Japanese system made more difficult by the nature of the demographics. Still, leaders who are determined to make a difference can stretch these constraints.

QUESTION: Could you put General Tamogami and his comments and his little nest of vipers in the Air Force in the context of what you've just said? What's he up to there?

DR. SAMUELS: What a great question. In the book and in talks I often point out that many people are unnecessarily concerned about the fragility of civilian control in Japan. I like to talk about Japan's robust democracy and not only about what has been bureaucratic control of the military, but also political control of the military. When I was doing the research for this book, I visited the Defense Academy and had a look at their syllabi. The cadets are reading Locke and they're reading Mill and they're reading Tocqueville. This was all quite reassuring to me. But now the general has written and published this screed. Obviously there have been other eruptions from time to time, but this one was particularly disturbing because he also got 80-some-odd of his subordinates to write essays and submit them to this essay contest.

So, I have started feeling a little uneasy about my confidence in civilian control. On the other hand, it is important to remember that there was no daylight between the announcement of the essay and his firing by the Prime Minister. There were no protested when he was fired, either. Because he was

given the hook as quickly as he was, I guess my feeling and my sense, my optimism for civilian control in Japan, isn't completely undermined.

QUESTION: I have a question on political realignment. Do you think it's necessary for Japan to realign the policies of (inaudible) about the realignment? The first question is it's necessary or not, if necessary do you think it's possible or not. If it's possible, when do you think it happens? In addition to that (inaudible) how about the direct election of leaders (inaudible) and I think this is very difficult under the current constitution, almost impossible, but again do you think is it necessary for Japan or not or possible or not?

DR. SAMUELS: We have to ask "necessary" for what? Do Japanese politics have to realign for there to be forward motion on national security? What of pension reform? How about immigration? Each individual policy area is going to generate it seems to me a separate set of answers. In the same way that I would not presume to tell the Japanese that they should revise their constitution or reinterpret their constitution, I would not make a blanket declaration that realignment is necessary.

But is it likely? Here, I'd say yes. I do expect a realignment of Japanese political parties for several reasons and security is only a small part of it. I think at the end of the day the LDP understands that it's not going to be able to govern in the way that it is used to governing. We're going to start to see a sorting of politicians, and you've already begun seeing that in the form of study groups and so forth. So there's evidence that it's underway but it's going to require I think probably in the first derivative a failed election.

So I guess that gets to the when part. I suspect that the solidarity of the DPJ is just as much in play as the solidarity of the LDP. The DPJ has very deep divisions. Mr. Ozawa is still the leader of the DPJ, but the question there is for how long and when he passes the baton the question will be: to whom. I think we might actually see the DPJ make the first move should it fail to take power in that next election coming up.

The direct election of leaders has pros and cons, but I think you anticipated the point quite well by saying that given the nature of the Japanese constitution, it's very hard to imagine a direct election of leaders. In the Japanese electoral system there is direct election of leaders but only for governor and for mayor, and even in those cases they run typically as independents and with multiple kinds of coalitions. So it becomes a completely different kind of game. I don't see it happening.

Instead, I do see something that Mr. Koizumi got started which was the centralization of administrative power in the cabinet office. He took

responsibility for budget system away from the Ministry of Finance in large measure. He started making decisions inside the Cabinet Office itself. He was able to use that office to very quickly generate responses to global crises and was acting like a president rather than a prime minister. I don't think Japan will need to change the electoral system if the prime minister continues to consolidate and use power in the way that Mr. Koizumi started.

QUESTION: Like all the others, I enjoyed and benefited much from your presentation. But as I was listening to your typology, I wondered if this was not so much about strategy but more about debates about identity, about what kind of country of Japan? How far is its identity tied up with the United States? It's not just a security relationship. It goes much deeper. And maybe it's because of questions of identity that people in Japan who say they want Japan to be proud of being Japanese, immediately at that point raise all the issues about history. It means that all those people who might be very small in numerical terms on the very extreme right nevertheless have some sort of hold that goes far beyond their numbers within conservative circles especially. And when the left and so on speaks even in the past when they had some influence, they didn't really present a strategic view of Japan, it was much more a sense of what kind of country they wanted Japan to be.

I wonder if this whole issue of identity is shrouded in so much ambiguity as many writers have pointed out that that fits in quite well with the typology that you have, not exactly, but there's a lot of overlap there. I'd like to hear your comments on that.

DR. SAMUELS: It's a very good question and it gets to the fundamental debate for people writing about Japanese national security, foreign policy and diplomacy. Indeed, that larger set of issues is central to most discussions in international relations as a whole, so thank you for asking it.

Let me offer just a couple of reactions in the Japanese context. It has long been conventional wisdom to say that Japan had evolved an antimilitarist ethos, a set of norms that shaped Japanese choices in the world. As I mentioned, after the war Japan, which had been a great empire, now saw itself as “a small island trading national precarious dependent on imported raw materials in a hostile world.” Parse that phrase anywhere you like and you have a piece of Japan's national identity that I dare say anyone who's spent any time at all in Japan will recognize. So national identity doesn't not matter, it matters quite a lot. But, to make it a testable idea in the social sciences, we have to wonder: is it an independent variable or a dependent variable? Is the identity in service of someone with a strategic vision or is it a great force that shapes the strategic vision? Those who say that national identity is what drives government national-security policy are saying it's an independent variable. I say: prove it. Give me some evidence. I've never been convinced that that's the case. Instead, I've been

convinced that a form of national identity has been constructed by folks who have a strategic vision and find it useful to deploy it through a particular national identity that resonates well with Japan's past because it legitimates the path to a preferred future. That's the way I see national identity in this context, and theoretically that is how I approach the issue when I write and think. This understanding of identity works for me because it helps me sort out policy choices. For evidence on whether or not it's the strategy first, in the book I spend a lot of time talking about how the strategic imperatives were defined and refined by leaders in bureaucracy and within the LDP. It has been a realist story and one does not need to go to a second derivative that says identity is the driver.

On the culture wars, the study that I did recently with Pat Boyd looked at the issue of nationalism. As I said before, we'd been fed a steady gruel over the last 5 to 7 years of how the Japanese are becoming nationalists, ultranationalists, meganationalists-- take your Latinate root. We wanted to know: is it true or not? We divided our respondents into three generations, and found that the current ruling generation, folks who are mid-late 50s and above, who came of age during the 1950s and 1960s, are more moderate than the stereotype, and that they become more moderate as the age cohort gets younger. This was a very reassuring outcome for me, as was the outcome on the question of economic policy where you found the folks who were the most senior were the ones who were most likely to embrace "Japanese style capitalism," and as you went down the age cohorts you found that they became more and more liberal in a Smithean sense. So I'm not too worried that an ugly identity politics will drive Japan. Absent some forcing event of the kind that I've already suggested-- and that we cannot rule out, I am not pessimistic.

QUESTION: Mark Manyin with the Congressional Research Service. A comment and a question. The question is, assuming that you're still correct in that normal nationists are going to be driving this ship that's muddling in this Goldilocks world for the foreseeable future, what can we expect Japan to do proactively as opposed to reactively? What are the next steps in this evolution? The comment is that it strikes me in your answer to Rust Deming's question earlier that it's only some sort of exogenous shock that's going to get Japan out of this muddling situation that it's in and that perhaps for American policymakers if there are policymakers who want Japan to do more, that the only way to do that is to make Japan feel secure rather than more secure to produce that shock.

DR. SAMUELS: Let me take them each in turn. What to expect? I expect we're going to continue to see Japan create options for itself. When I published this book, the most thoughtful critique was from Chris Hughes the British analyst of the Japanese military. He took issue with me on this point. In his view, becoming strong for the Japanese has meant becoming entangled with the United States. The possibility of Japan creating options for itself is foreclosed

by the nature of their build-up. I remain unconvinced. I think Japan is creating options for itself and I think it's creating options for itself but at a low pace because of the fiscal constraints that Rust addressed.

It is true that you can't create lots of options by continuing to spend less than 1 percent of GDP on national security. On the other hand, you change doctrine here, you acquire new kinds of capabilities there, you reduce other kinds of acquisitions that used to dominate your budget and you begin to see a transformation of a force posture. I think this is well underway. The BMD experience with the United States is an important learning experience for the Japanese in the same way that licensed production of jet fighters was from the 1960s and 1970s and into the 1980s. It is not always a happy experience as you know. Try flying an F-2 sometime.

The exogenous shock that's going to stimulate serious muscularity in Japan is the one in which the Americans demonstrate to thinking Japanese that we're really not all that committed to their defense. In that unlikely and undesirable event, Japan will become terribly insecure. It is not likely, but it is conceivable. We need to carefully draw down and shift our posture. After all, the United States cannot afford to continue doing what it's been doing. The days of $700 billion defense budgets are past. So, the question is where are the economies from a drawdown going to come from? Just Europe, or Eurasia more generally? If it's Eurasia what's the balance? Is it just Korea? This is going to happen in part because it's one of the few parts of the budget where it's really manipulable and as it happens there's going to be lots of debate in Japan as to what it means and there are going to be those who are on the front end of that debate saying it means we'd better get our act together on our own, those are the guys on the left-hand side of my chart, and it's going to be others who say, no, continue hanging on. But change is afoot and I think change is afoot of necessity and it's exogenous to the Japanese debate.

QUESTION: My name is Shih-chung Liu from CNAPS. I have a question about whether there will be a change in Japan's perception of the future of the U.S.-Japan security relationship. I saw a poll conducted in February 2006 by Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs asking if the Japanese people thought that peace and security are ensured in Japan at present, back in early 2006, and only 42 percent said yes and 38 percent said no. Among those who said yes, the question was what they thought the reason was for the maintenance of peace and security of Japan? Seventy-one percent said that the Japan-U.S. security arrangement helps. I was wondering this is a very unique phenomenon, that over 80 percent of the Japanese are in favor of Obama's victory, what kind of role can he play, and also in terms of reinforcing the Japanese public's acceptance or their support for a stronger U.S.-Japan security alliance? And to what extent will it affect Japanese politics, especially assuming a general election will be held maybe next year, and if Prime Minister Aso will have many opportunities to meet with

President Obama. That might in some perspective -- some political point to the LDP. How would that influence the Japanese public's perception whether Japan is going to become a more normal nationalized country or will it lead Japan back to more pragmentalist proponents' type of political thinking?

DR. SAMUELS: I was not involved in either campaign, but I did notice that the language used by both the Obama and McCain campaigns was identical when it came to this issue of reassuring the Japanese. It was the language of the existing boilerplate: Japan is the cornerstone of the American strategy in Asia. The alliance is the cornerstone, touchstone, anchor, take your pick. Whenever there was a misstep, as in the Clinton campaign late last year, her campaign immediately issued a note of reassurance to the Japanese public. So the idea of reassuring the Japanese public and the need to reassure the Japanese public is well understood and widely accepted. Moreover, it is exactly the right thing to do, without regard to whether it is sufficient.

The larger question is the one I was trying to get at earlier in response to Mark's question: is that going to be the presumption on the American side? We'll see, but I expect it will be. It's the old strategy of wing-walking. Admiral Crowe, the former CINCPAC, used to talk about this all the time and it's a metaphor that I'm very fond of. When you talk about the alliance shifting from bilateral to multilateral, a new security architecture in the region and so forth, the Admiral used to get very folksy. He said in the old days when we used to have state fairs we used to have these acrobats get on the wings of airplanes and they used to do acrobatics in the air above the crowd, and everyone would ooh and ah. The acrobats were called “wing-walkers” and they observed one rule above all else: never let go with one hand unless you're sure you're holding on with the other.

That's the way I think about the security architecture in the Far East. If you can be sure that you've got something better to replace the hub-and-spoke architecture that we've got, that’s one thing. At that point you can begin to see change and my guess is the American alliance managers will begin explaining to the Japanese people why it's in Japan's interests as well as the United States to make changes. But I don't see that happening any time soon. Instead you should expect and encourage lots and lots of reassurance.

DR. BUSH: Thank you again, Dick.

DR. SAMUELS: Thank you.

DR. BUSH: It was really a terrific session that generated a lot of great questions. Thank you for your questions. I think we've learned a lot.

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