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China's Soft Power

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PROCEEDINGS

DR. RICHARD BUSH: (In progress) -- question of China and its role in the world and soft power. There is a scholar at a neighborhood think tank who is making a big deal of this and is saying that China is very good at soft power and is running rings around the United States in the area of soft power. We could talk about U.S. soft power and the problems there, but I think it is very useful to have a Chinese perspective on China's soft power, and we could have no better person to talk about that than Dr. Pang Zhongying who is our CNAPS Fellow from China this year, and we are very lucky to have him. He comes to us from People's University of China, and China's soft power is what he is going to talk about today. Dr. Pang?

DR. PANG: Thank you very much, Richard Bush, and good morning colleagues, friends, and distinguished guests. I am so pleased and so honored to speak here, first of all, and let me express my acknowledgement that this is my first time studying in the U.S. and at a world-class think tank, the Brookings Institution. I thank the Brookings Institution for the invitation. Dr. Richard Bush, I also thank you very much for helping me prepare this presentation because my agenda is so busy and I have had many writing deadlines and trips during the past two months. So this is a very rough presentation about China's soft power. As Richard said, I will try to do my best to describe a Chinese perspective because this is not only an external discourse in the U.S. or in other places in Asia or in Europe, but also an internal discourse, and many scholars in China including the top leaders are now talking about China's soft power and the importance of soft power to China's foreign policy.

So the first question is about the definition. This is a policy-oriented think tank, so the first challenge is the definition. I have no definition in this presentation, but I will say something about soft power. This is a difficult definitional problem, and in American social science, international relations is really American social science. Professor Joseph Nye coined this concept of hard and soft power. Soft power is the power to attract, and if it works, soft power rests primarily on three resources. First is the culture, the second is political values, the third is foreign policy. So I will use this concept made by Professor Nye to describe China's soft power.

Let me just point out that China has benefited greatly from this American social science in international relations in the past 15 years, and China introduced this concept of soft power many years ago. I commented on and introduced this concept made by Joseph Nye more than 15 years ago and I wrote about the concept and published articles on the concept in China. But in the Chinese context, soft power is a little bit different from the original meaning.

Second, let me mention some points about China's role in today's world. First, China is fully engaged with the rest of the world and peacefully plays a pivotal role in the global system. China is fully integrated with the region in Asia and the rest of the world, and China addressed its peaceful development and peaceful drive in the global political economy. Second, as I pointed out, China has been learning and adapting in the changing international system. Third, China is the largest industrial nation in the world as a world production center or manufacturing center, and China has been conducting so-called "economic diplomacy" since the late 1970s. Fourth, China has to play a larger role beyond just a participant in the global system, diplomatically and politically. Finally, China has increasingly invested its interests in a rules-based world in the existing international system where conflicts are resolved and influences are realized in a civilized way.

My third part of the presentation is about how to assess China's soft power. This year, you can imagine that this is really a hot topic internationally. I attended two seminars recently. The first seminar I attended in Seoul last May at Seoul National University. The topic was assessing China's power, including economic power, military power, soft power, cultural power and diplomatic power, et cetera. The other conference I attended, just last week about China's soft power, was organized and sponsored by Nanyang Technological University, and the newly created School of International Study, SIS, and I presented a paper about China's soft power and my paper was "China's Development and Its Soft Power."

So how to assess China's soft power is really a thorny and challenging question. In my view, to realize the importance of soft power in Chinese foreign policy-making — maybe I will look at it from a Chinese perspective. I think there are three reasons to address this importance. First, Chinese leaders and Chinese people are helping in trying to modernize Chinese diplomacy and foreign policy, and thinking of a more effective foreign policy instrument to implement Chinese foreign policy. Second, maintaining good relations and winning new friends in the world. Third, playing a bigger or maybe a leading role—like China's role in the Six-Party Talks on North Korean nuclear weapons—in global cooperation and global governance.

Let me just say that China in recent years addressed the importance of soft power in Chinese foreign policy-making and implementation because Chinese leaders and the Chinese people realize in this changing world that China must increase its power and try to use a softer means to achieve China's goal to kick-start China's interests.

So as Richard mentioned, many people in the world now talk about China's soft power. I agree that China's soft power is rising steadily and so far smoothly. So from Professor Nye's formula, and I use culture and other soft resources and foreign policy, to describe and to assess China's soft power. The first is about China's culture. We need to

say more about Chinese culture because this is a similar Asian vision in the world, and Professor Samuel Huntington knows China's civilization very well. Because the Chinese government and the Chinese people now are familiar with the world, China conducts cultural diplomacy after economic diplomacy. Second, many people are talking about Chinese experiences and lessons or models of China's power in devising economic growth, if economic growth does not necessarily lead to economic development and others. Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao and other leaders are now talking about China's traditional ideas and philosophers' ideas, such as traditional wisdom.

One of the big Chinese ideas is harmony—harmony in the world, and harmony in society—and China pursues harmony. The other idea is regional stability and international global stability, and China like the U.S. is promoting a big idea, maybe universal harmony, and Hu Jintao talked of harmony in the world in the U.N. General Assembly two years ago, and at this Party Congress Hu Jintao formally introduced this foreign policy idea: that China would pursue more harmony in the world.

The fourth part of my presentation is about Chinese approaches and strategies to initiate soft power and public diplomacy. I know several scholars dealt with China's public diplomacy and China's new diplomacy, and China focuses on not only the public around the world, but also focuses on foreigners and international students and businessmen or women at home, and China did a lot to attract the global public and used many means to win the hearts and minds in China's relations with the developing world. This is maybe a central question, a crucial question, and people are now talking about China's soft power competition with the U.S. for the hearts and minds of the world. If the competition argument is correct, I think the major battlefield is the developing world, the Third World: Asia, traditionally China's immediate neighbors, particularly Africa, recently Latin America.

China applies the key principles of foreign policy in these regions in the developing world. There are two principles. First, no intervention or no interference. I do not know the difference between intervention and interference in English, but in Chinese usage, it is no interference, not to mention intervention. The other very important principle is no political strings are attached in China's aid to developing countries. The third is a good-neighbor policy in Asia, and China these days deals successfully with the ASEAN countries, with the South Asian countries, India, with the Central Asian countries, and with the Northeast Asian countries including Japan, South Korea, and North Korea.

Also China addresses its role in global governance, particularly climate change. In the last months, in the beginning of the year, Hu Jintao said China will be a responsible country and will support international efforts to tackle climate change. Finally, China also realizes the importance of the export of ideas and values to the world.

These are really interesting questions, so let me address China's export of ideas or values to the world later.

The fifth part of my presentation is about the challenges and the dilemmas. Frankly speaking, the challenges are so huge and the dilemmas so many in building China's system properly for soft power. The first is the imbalance between China's hard power and soft power. In the past 30 years China achieved a lot with great progress economically and socially, but this imbalance problem like global imbalance and China's power imbalance emerged. The second problem, like environmental degradation and the gap between the poor and the new rich in China's economic growth, has undermined China's soft power I think. Third, there is a huge cultural trade deficit: far more foreign culture products are import than the cultural products that China exports. The Japanese kung fu and American Hollywood movies, and even Hyundai and other Korean products and cultural products, are so popular in China. Many Chinese now are very good English speakers, and Chinese children learn their English from elementary school. Fourth, China's culture still could be modernized. The apparent limit of traditional Chinese culture and thought and the Chinese model I mentioned, and foreign policy principles are so problematic.

While China and developing countries continue to share many principles and values—for example, no interference into regional affairs—and the newly created political value gap and possible frictions between the two are emerging, particularly between Africans and Asians. Relatively weak capabilities and leadership in international agenda settings and in treaties, so the international agenda setting, this is also an American international relations concept, and China is not so familiar with international agenda setting. China is also facing growing concerns, pressures, criticisms, and worries from the West and from others such as NGOs, and so China's soft power in some places in China gains, and in some places in China loses. So maybe the importance of soft power in China's foreign policy may indicate China's foreign policy shift.

According to Hu Jintao's political report at the 17th Party Congress, I think China's foreign policy will continue to be one of careful or low-key diplomacy, and soft power considerations may help further transform China's foreign policy. This is my argument. I think China will deal with the world softly and China will promote our country's new image effectively by using soft power, and by exercising soft power, China will continue to be more sensitive to the world's concerns and worries over China's rise.

China's foreign policy leaders have fully realized that the other side is concerned about China's rise, and this passion, if I may use the word passion, between China and the outside world, maybe this is a natural development between a rising country and the outside world, particularly Asia and the U.S. China will continue to try to rise or develop itself softly, meaning that China will continue to use soft approaches like economic

diplomacy and cultural diplomacy to achieve China's interests. Finally, let me use a typical American concept to project power projection that China will project China's soft power to respond to global world problems, in pursuit of a harmonized world.

I think that there are many misperceptions and misjudgments and wrong policy recommendations here and there, so let me just talk about the soft power factor in Sino-U.S. relations. I will just raise some questions because the soft power factor has already been included in Sino-U.S. relations. The first question is about the challenges of the so-called China threat, that China's soft power really challenges the USA. I think it such a repeated and overstated discourse. The second question is, is China in competition with the U.S. for soft power? Is the rise of China's soft power at the expense of American soft power? Are China-U.S. relations heading toward a new ideological cold war or serious competition between the two soft powers? I think this is a self-fulfilling prophecy, and Professor Nye uses this concept.

Finally, let me raise the argument, and this is maybe my answer to this question. The argument is that soft power competition or strength or challenge would trouble future China-U.S. relations, so let me talk about the implications of the soft power question and its implications for future China-U.S. relations. As you know, the new leadership has emerged in Beijing, China will host its own Olympic Games for the first time, and the U.S. presidential election is on. So maybe China and the U.S. have many common opportunities to narrow these kinds of political differences constructively and positively.

This is China's strategic choice for the long-term, for the long-run, for better constructive, positive strategic relations with the U.S. So China will continue to manage to maintain its relationship with the U.S. as the most important one, and these relations I think are the key to China's future development and China's relations with Asia and China's relations with others. China would and should strengthen its dialogue at various levels of strength with the U.S. on inclusive political things, values and management, global governance, and multilateralism. And through cooperation by commonly using soft power in global and regional governance, I think China and the U.S. should discuss how to commonly use their soft power in global governance, and China and the U.S. should go beyond the so-called Washington consensus and Beijing consensus.

Finally, let me conclude that I think that China's soft power pursuit is a good thing and China's soft dimensional power is emerging and rising, but it is still not powerful enough. Second, China's foreign policy will be conducted by merely using or mobilizing its soft power resources. Third, China's soft power building may increase the world's understanding of China and shape prospects of our future stability and cooperation. Fourth, China's approach to soft power is different from that of others, and at the moment it is too early to say if China's soft power poses a threat to U.S. interests and values, or if

it would provide a new opportunity for international cooperation. This is my suggestion that America should respond to the rise of China's soft power positively.

Let me just show some pictures. I planned some pictures for showing China's soft power. This is traditional culture that the Confucius Institute created by the Chinese Ministry of Education and the Chinese University, including my university, People's University in Beijing, and my former university, Nankai University, and this is soft power. This is Yao Ming, and Yao Ming represents both Chinese soft power and also American soft power because he plays in the NBA. This is diplomatic soft power, and this is the Six-Party Talks in Beijing. This picture shows Hu Jintao and the Australian Opposition Labor Party Leader, the prime minister candidate Kevin Rudd, who speaks Chinese fluently, and he exchanges his views in Chinese with President Hu Jintao, not through the interpreter. I wrote a journal paper about China's changing attitude toward international peacekeeping operations three years ago, and these are female peacekeeping troops in Africa and in other regions. This is a book called "Africa's Silk Road," and foreign students graduating from Chinese universities took a picture at People's University last November during the China-Africa Summit in Beijing where we had very good discussions between the Chinese students and African students.

Finally, from the Washington Post, there is a very good report entitled "Chasing the Chinese Dream: A Growing Number of the World's Emigrants are Heading East, Rather than West, in Search of Safety, Tolerance, and Opportunity." These people come from the war-beaten Republic of Iraq, and these are Iraqi businessmen who are in Guangzhou, China.

Thank you very much for your attention, and I would like to respond to any questions about China or about Chinese foreign policy.

DR. BUSH: Thank you very much, Dr. Pang. The floor is now open for questions. Please wait for the mic and identify yourself and pose your question.

QUESTION: It was a very interesting discussion and I enjoyed your talk. My question concerns the economic diplomacy you mentioned. Regarding economic diplomacy or economic power, you mentioned using economic diplomacy as a use of soft power by China. How do you characterize your economic power in terms of soft power versus hard power? May I have concrete examples? Is it the access to the Chinese markets or is it the Chinese soldiers going to foreign countries that represents economic power split between hard and soft power and do you have a balance in those two?

DR. PANG: Thanks for your question. China's economy in my view is so problematic because China's economy so heavily depends on the international global economy, that China serves as the world's workshop manufacturing center and the

imports to the Chinese economy relies on exports to the international market, so this economic power has its own problems.

For example, the so-called made-in-China products all over the world do not necessarily equate to economic influence for China, it also means multinational companies' influence. Also, multinational companies based in Seoul or based in Tokyo have benefited greatly from the Chinese economy, but the Chinese economy suffered from such things like made-in-China products having many problems and people will not buy Chinese products made in China. So in terms of hard power, economic power is hard power in my understanding, and soft power and the reputation of Chinese products, but the problem is the Chinese meant this ownership of Chinese products in harmony and ownership. So maybe the Chinese economy shows a double-edged-sword effect through both China's soft power and hard power. Thank you very much.

QUESTION: Professor Pang, I am David Brown from SAIS down the street. In your presentation you said that China was currently now identified with two big political ideas, the idea of a harmonious society, and of stable politics. In your slides about the challenges of promoting Chinese soft power, it seemed to me that you were questioning whether this was a viable approach. My question to you is, do you believe it is in China's interests over the long-term to identify itself with these two particular ideas?

DR. PANG: Thank you very much. Thank you for your comment. This is a very interesting question. I pointed out for this particular purpose China's soft power. I was a discussant on a paper called "The Big Chinese Idea" and I say such ideas as harmony of society and harmony of the world should be modernized, should project some new elements like good governance and democracy. Hu Jintao says no democratization or no socialism with Chinese characteristics. Hu Jintao last year at Yale University gave a speech during his state visit to the U.S., mentioning for the first time this relationship between democracy and Chinese socialism.

So such big ideas are I think very good. Harmony and global governance in this dangerous world, this divided world needs such big ideas including democracy, including freedom, including human rights, good governance, including harmony, including every universal idea, but the problem for China is how to combine its own understanding and its human rights ideas like harmony and other universal ideas.

QUESTION: Thank you. One of the things that you did not mention in this model of development is that China is challenging to the United States. This is the big part of any soft power of what the future holds for others to follow. Now obviously, democracy in a sense is in the West is not so popular in the rest of the world given that the United States is not doing so well promoting democracy and publicly (inaudible) Taiwan for one of the most interesting democracies, and that economically China is

surging ahead and obviously that serves as a strong model for development. I wonder what comment do you have on this model of development, even though to use a Confucian idea that the model is not what you say but what you do, and even though Hu Jintao is talking about democracy, what China as a country does serves as a stronger model for the (inaudible).

DR. PANG: Yes, and my comment is too simple about the so-called Chinese model. In the past 30 years, China seemingly finished its economic reforms and to have a market economy, a market economy in terms of international standards, not Chinese standards, and many countries now acknowledge that China is a market economy, and China also was recognized by the U.S., the European Union, and Japan as a market economy. But this is a political issue between China and the U.S. on China's market economy status.

The other part of the Chinese reform is political reform definitely, and it just seems to me and to my Chinese colleagues that this part of the political Chinese reform is not finished yet. This is a half-finished business, but I believe China will finish its business in the future. In the past 30 years the Chinese political system has changed a lot. From the late-1970s with Deng Xiaoping, the major task is an economic one, not just a class struggle, Deng Xiaoping changed the Chinese political system, and in the past 15 years or 10 years of this new century, the Chinese political system continued to change. I believe the Chinese political system will change in the near possible future.

So people are now talking about the new formula in a liberal market economy plus a liberal political system, or economic liberalism plus a liberal authoritarian political system, or other descriptions about the Chinese model from Beijing professors and others. I do not agree with such a summary about the Chinese model, and this may mislead other countries, particularly the African countries, the Asian countries, and the Latin American countries. For example, China's political role in Latin America is neutral now and China has great economic energy, raw materials, builds relations with Latin American countries, but China keeps its distance with many capitals in Latin American countries. Thank you very much.

QUESTION: Dave Fitzgerald, private consultant. Thank you for your comments. I was struck in listening to it that what you seemed to be talking about when you are talking about Chinese soft diplomacy, soft power, is really looking back to the Japanese example in the 1960s and 1970s, it is really more what the Japanese called at that time a low-profile foreign policy in which Japan was focused more on economic advance than in development and international acceptance than really full participation in all of the hard power types of aspects of any foreign policy.

Is that really what you are looking at more, in terms of what you have called soft power is really a kind of lower profile for how China interacts with the world, trying to get international acceptance of China and economic development rather than really projecting Chinese values that would be attractive to other societies?

DR. PANG: Let me pick up your last point about your use of the words Chinese values. In my presentation I mean values like harmony, not necessarily Chinese values. Confucian values, not necessarily Chinese values. And anyway, American values and Chinese values, is a misnomer I think. Before the end of the Cold War, Japanese diplomacy was really a model of low-key diplomacy and China learned a lot from such low-key, low-profile diplomacy, and concentrated on economic construction, economic development, foreign trade, and economic business relations with the outside world.

China has a different background. Before the Second World War, Japan was an industrial country. China even today is still developing and a poor country. It needs to develop itself. So China's concentration on economic diplomacy will last for the next 10 years or even 20 years. Chinese leaders call it a strategic choice; in the future 10 years or 20 years, and Hu Jintao is now talking about China will double its GDP per capita by 2020 and 10 years later. Thank you very much.

QUESTION: First of all, congratulations for your wonderful presentation.

DR. PANG: Thank you very much.

QUESTION: I think I had problems with your notion of the challenges in developing China's soft power. I just have one question. I agree with you there's a different definition of soft power, and normally when we talk about a nation or a culture of soft power, we would argue not so much power on the government's side or instigated by the government or formulated by government policy, we normally talk about people. In other words, a strong and affluent private sector, a strong and affluent middle-class will ensure a society or a country's social and economic stability. Somehow I missed that notion in your presentation. Could you elaborate on that?

DR. PANG: This is really a challenge to Chinese diplomacy. For example, Africa has very good relations with the ruling party or ruling elite and at the corporate level, this is good to stabilize Chinese relations with regard to Chinese interests. China needs to develop its relations with civil society groups and NGOs, which maybe have a different point of view from their government. And China needs to develop such relationships based on society to society, based on people to people.

Let me just say in past years China had a tradition to develop people-to-people relations, but in the new context, in the new situation, China needs to modernize its

people-to-people relations. Today China's people-to-people relations are mainly conducted by nongovernmental organizations such as the Women's Federation, Chinese Communist Youth League, and other such official organizations which lead China's people-to-people relations. In the future, in terms of soft power, China must attach importance to NGOs, to civil society, and communicate with them by sending more students and scholars to communicate with the outside world.

QUESTION: I am more concerned about within China, whether a strong and affluent private sector, a strong and affluent middle-class, are really parts of the government's policy in supporting the growth of the private sector.

DR. PANG: The so-called emergence of the Chinese middle-class: I think the middle-class is emerging, but it is still weak. It is still a small group. The majority of Chinese society is still dominated by no middle-class. So the middle-class, including the new rich, will play their role, including foreign policy-making. But I do not think the middle-class will play a larger role in China's foreign policy-making because the current Chinese leadership, this leadership is talking about the poor and how to care for the poor, how to increase jobs for university students, and how to narrow the gap between the rich and the poor. So this government, this leadership, will attach more about the low-level society, not at the high-level middle-class.

QUESTION: Thank you. I am currently a Visiting Scholar with the Sigur Center at George Washington University. I have a question about the soft power concept. You just mentioned Chinese soft power and U.S. soft power and you cannot imagine European Union soft power or South Korean soft power or something like that. For example, regional integration, cultural diversity, welfare or something like that. You still have a lot of things from Western European Union or the northwestern side. Why didn't you mention about other soft power?

DR. PANG: Other soft powers matter, and particularly the soft power the European Union holds. The European Union as a whole—not as individual European Union member countries—in hard power is so weak. There are no European troops, no European Ministry of Defense, even Tony Blair will be the European President, and the European Union will get European Foreign Ministers. But their advantage is soft power rather than hard power in implementing European foreign policy. In China's relationship with the E.U., the European Union always exercises its soft power and always stresses the importance of multilateralism, and the European Union provides a good partner in addressing the importance of multilateralism, and this is a strategic partnership between China and the E.U.

China also faces soft power competition, from South Korea. Korea is a good soft power in the world and in the region. Yes, other soft power really is very important.

QUESTION: I'm Victor Li from the China Society. Along the process of globalization there is kind of like a clash of cultures or religions between different religions become very important for this world right now. I think there is potential for China to play an important role to create harmony. In the history of China it seems we have had harmony among different religions, Buddhism, Confucianism, Taoism, even Islam and also some Judaism existed in China before, and if you can really make big efforts to show an example to the world as far as can it really increase China's soft power greatly. At this point we saw a lot of criticism for not allowing religious freedom. So allowing within China and the Chinese government make more kind of space for religious freedom and provide harmony among different religions so that we can really play an important role to increase their soft power.

DR. PANG: Thank you for your question and comment. I think that the key word is the dialogue between or among civilizations. In several years the U.N. advocated dialogues between and among civilizations, among different cultures, and this will continue to be a top priority that the U.N. is now doing. The Chinese government as I know supports dialogue among different religions, different cultures, and different civilizations. This is China's foreign policy.

On religious freedom, these are thorny questions. Last week I was in Singapore and the Dalai Lama from China was with American leaders, and so many people are still interested in religious freedom. But let me just point out that religious freedom, compared with 30 years ago or 20 years ago, 50 years ago, or 100 years ago, the Chinese people now enjoy much religious freedom, but this problem has been politicized by many including international actors, nonstate actors in particular, about religious freedom. In fact, I think that religious freedom according to our country's constitution is a basic right of its citizens. So I hope in the future that religious freedom will be its strategy.

QUESTION: [Inaudible.]

DR. PANG: Two big questions. I think China must have several world-leading universities. Currently, several key problems perplex and trouble Chinese universities, including my university. I have taught at three Chinese universities, Tsinghua, Nankai, and People's University. I found problems that Chinese universities are facing. So try to build good universities for the Chinese youth, Chinese talent, and try to attract world-leading intellectuals to teach and do research in Chinese universities and let the Chinese intellectuals enjoy academic freedom and academic discipline at the same time to let them explore their scholarly work more freely. This is very important, I think.

QUESTION: I have to follow up on the question that my professor asked because he taught me in law school years ago about exporting culture abroad however, I really don't know how things are after the Cultural Revolution.

DR. PANG: I think don't worry. Don't worry, but I also wanted to say Confucian ideas have their limits and its usefulness must be reexamined, must be revisited, must be modernized. This is my view, modernized to include modern ideas, its own cultural modern ideas, because China is now part of the modern cultural and must accommodate with modern ideas.

QUESTION: Thank you for this interesting presentation. My question is of an academic nature. I am very interested to know a bit more about the academic debate within China on soft power. In the beginning of your lecture you also said that within China the concept of soft power is understood in a different way. Could you elaborate a bit more on that?

DR. PANG: Yes, and several ways, including your topic, public diplomacy. I mentioned and I did talk a little about public diplomacy. There are many ways to increase China's soft power. As a big country or a small country, the country must have soft power. This is a natural thing. In soft power, every state actor, every nonstate actor, has a stake in soft power and China must find many good ways to increase its soft power. Let's discuss this issue later personally.

QUESTION: Thank you very much for your interesting remarks. I am Peter Schoettle from Brookings. I would like to push you a little bit on the distinction between economic influence and power and soft power. I can see that China has huge and rapidly growing economic power. It is obvious. But to me, that is different from soft power. I can see all kinds of countries and companies around the world wanting improved economic relations with China. I do not see too many societies around the world clamoring to adopt your society's values, your social system, et cetera, which to me is sort of a key element of soft power.

DR. PANG: Yes, I agree. I agree, but in the future it depends on China's economic further success, and it depends on the understanding made by the others about China's culture and about China's soft power in particular. The country, China, just joined the world and it needs time to let others understand.

QUESTION: Let me pose a hypothetical. I think that ultimately China has to develop some kind of democracy that its role and its soft power projection will change once it becomes a true democracy. The problem here is that once it becomes a democracy, then there are a lot of minority populations, for example, Tibet, there are a lot of Korean-Chinese living in certain areas, certain regions with different populations, and

they may want self-rule and there seems to be a lot of contention with (inaudible) power and that might lead to a very difficult position for the Chinese to maintain harmony as you suggested. So my question is, first of all in this assumption, would China ultimately have to become a true democracy to project the kind of soft power that other people have talked about? Second is that if China becomes a true democracy, that could lead to conflict among those people currently living in China, and how will China resolve those issues?

DR. PANG: I think you are talking about democracy, based on the American model, on the Western model, the British model, the European model. But I think the democratic model should have other models and even if China becomes a democratic country and recognized by the West, such a democracy, I believe it differs from the American model and should be a good development to the world of democracy. I acknowledge this is a key issue to develop China's soft power, and trying to link democratic development or political development with the building up of soft power is a good beginning and a good suggestion for Chinese foreign policy to include.

DR. BUSH: Other questions? Thank you very much for your stimulating presentation. Thank you all for coming and for your questions, and the meeting is adjourned.

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