

Private Capital in the Wake of the Crisis


Josh Lerner

Harvard Business School






Time of many questions

- ♦ Recovery in private equity deal volume...
 - More limited resurgence of debt financing.
- ♦ But residual unhappiness of limited partners:
 - Interest in “going it alone.”
 - Questions about explosion in secondary deal activity.
- ♦ And looming regulatory and tax uncertainties world-wide.




Suggests several possibilities

- ♦ Will outline four scenarios:
 - Recovery.
 - Back to the future.
 - The LPs' desertion.
 - A broken industry.




Four scenarios

| | Constant Investor Base | Turnover in Investor Base |
|-----------------------|------------------------|---------------------------|
| “Fair” Returns | Recovery | Back to the Future |
| Disappointing Returns | A Broken Industry | The LPs’ Desertion |




Scenario 1: Recovery

- ♦ VC and PE are inherently cyclical:
 - Too much investment during booms.
 - Too high-priced investments during booms.
- ♦ But there is a well-defined value proposition associated with these investments.
- ♦ While things may get out of balance in booms, steady state works well:
 - Classic process of recalibration going on right now.




IPOs and VC investments


IPOs and Number of Investments -- Internet and Computers




IPOs and Number of Investments -- Biotech and Healthcare




IPOs and Number of Investments -- Communications



IPOs and Number of Investments -- Energy




Debt and LBO multiples over the cycle




Source: Axelson, Jenkinson, Stromberg, and Weisbach [2009].

Also true at a fund level



- Funds do better as they get larger... to a point!
- Fund size is measured as capital committed at closing.
- Regression results control for vintage year effect, location, and fund category.


Private equity and management practices



Note: Sample of 4,221 medium-sized manufacturing firms. The bottom bar chart only covers the 3,696 firms which have been in the same ownership for the last 3 years. The 'Other' category includes venture capital, joint ventures, charitable foundations and unknown ownership.


Implications

- ◆ Gradual recovery of returns reflecting fundamental value creation.
- ◆ Inflow of funds back into VC/PE market.
- ◆ Repeating boom/bust pattern that has characterized industry through 1950s.




Scenario 2: Back to the future

- ◆ Returns to limited partners are inherently “undemocratic.”
 - Skewness of returns:
 - ◆ Only a few funds are winners.
 - ◆ Trend seems to be intensifying.
 - Most investors have done poorly, and will gradually abandon programs.




Returns of U.S. venture funds



Returns from inception to 12/31/09.

Source: Authors' analysis of Thomson/Reuters data.


Returns of U.S. buyout funds



Returns from inception to 12/31/09.

Source: Authors' analysis of Thomson/Reuters data.

European private equity returns



Persistence of performance




| | Bottom | Medium | Top |
|----------------|--------|--------|-----|
| Bottom Tercile | 61% | 22% | 17% |
| Medium Tercile | 25% | 45% | 30% |
| Top Tercile | 27% | 24% | 48% |

Source: Kaplan and Schoar [2005]


- High likelihood that the next funds of a given partnership stays in the same performance bracket

→ Persistence.

- 1% boost in past performance → 0.77% boost in next fund's performance.




Performance by investor type, private equity funds between 1992 and 2001



Source: Lerner, Schoar and Wongsunwai [2007]


Implications

- ◆ Questioning of assumptions behind private equity in many investment committees.
 - Exit by many LPs who have:
 - ◆ Newer programs.
 - ◆ “Too large” or “too small” mandates.
- ◆ Limited number of LPs will remain, and will thrive.



Scenario 3: The LPs' desertion

- ◆ Poor returns may lead LPs to essentially abandon asset class:
 - Precedent of oil-and-gas partnerships, others.
- ◆ May conclude that inherently impossible to set right.



Fees have driven sharp wedge between net and gross returns

- ♦ Payments *per partner per fund*, based on 240+ PE/VC partnerships (\$MMs):


| | VC | LBO |
|---------------------|-------------|-------------|
| – Carried interest: | 5.2 | 10.1 |
| – Management fees | 10.6 | 18.5 |
| – Other fees: | 1.3 | 4.1 |
| – Total | 17.1 | 32.7 |

- Metrick and Yasuda [2009]





An non-addressable issue?


- ♦ Failure to get traction partially reflected proponents and timing.
- ♦ But more fundamental challenges:
 - Fractured nature of LP community.
 - Competition between LPs to get into top funds.
 - Turnover within LPs.



Implications


- ◆ Decreasing LP pool.
- ◆ Extensive exit by funds.
- ◆ Increasing reliance on non-institutionalized capital sources.






Scenario 4: A broken industry

- ◆ Due to measurement issues and organization dynamics, PE groups may continue to raise funds.
- ◆ Even if returns are not there!
 - May continue for years or decades more...
 - ◆ Example of VC industry?!




Decade-plus disappointment in venture capital

Distributed/paid-in capital, by vintage year, U.S. VC funds




Source: Thomson/Reuters. Data as of 9/30/09.

Exits by venture funds (\$B)





Investments by venture funds (\$B)



Implications

- ♦ Reactions by LPs may be very slow.
 - Triumph of hope over experience?!
 - In many cases, may draw *wrong* conclusions:
 - ♦ E.g., shift to direct investments by sovereign funds.
- ♦ Suggests period of protracted disappointment.



Final thoughts

- ◆ Time to step back and think about where business is going.
- ◆ Can plausibly tell a variety of stories, with supporting evidence.
- ◆ All have elements of truth, but...
 - Believe some combination of first and second scenario is most plausible.



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