RICHARD BUSH: Ladies and gentlemen, if I could have your attention, please, I think we have to get going. We owe it to Andrew’s students to be very disciplined in our time because Andrew has a class at 4:00, and he has been very kind to do this luncheon, but it was on the condition that he be able to get to his class at 4:00 on the Eastern Shore. We know how difficult it can be sometimes to get from here to the Eastern Shore, and we do want to hear what he has to say and have time to interrogate him about his findings and so on.

Thank you very much for coming. This is the first program for CNAPS this fall, and I am very pleased to welcome you here today. This program is actually the first in an occasional series that we’re going to be doing about various issues having to do with Japan and, in this case, Japan’s security relations. I can think of no better place to start than with Andrew Oros and his new book on Japan which is entitled *Normalizing Japan: Politics, Identity and the Evolution of Security Practice*, because Japan is changing, but it’s changing in very interesting ways. Those ways are subject to misunderstanding, exaggeration in some quarters, and so it’s very important that we have capable scholars like Andrew that can sort of dig through the clutter and tell us what’s really going on.

One other thing, there are copies of the book, *Normalizing Japan*, available in the bookstore if you’re interested in buying a copy on your way out, and it will help Andrew’s cash flow eventually.

So now, without further ado, I give you Andrew Oros.

ANDREW OROS: For those of you who don’t want to buy the book today, you can also pick up a flyer to maybe pick it up later.

Well, I’m really pleased to be here today. I was sort of musing as I was walking in the building, how often I’ve been at programs here that really taught me a lot and made me think about how I’d like to someday contribute to this kind of scholarship. So it means really a lot to me to be here and to have you all come to hear what I have to say about Japan.

I think since this is a kind of book launch, I should start with a few thank yous, not all too many. There are acknowledgements in the book, but I think it also sets a stage for the kind of intellectual legacy of this book or the history of the book.
I want to start with a deep thank you to the Japan Foundation Center for Global Partnership for awarding me a book project grant that allowed me to take an extra semester of leave from Washington College to be at the East-West Center, Washington for a semester, which was then followed by a semester at the Sigur Center at George Washington University that was part of a Washington College leave. That allowed me a whole year to get feedback on this book.

Part of this was having four meetings at the East-West Center that the East-West Center hosted, that had a group of about 25 dedicated policy types in Washington, both Americans and Japanese, who read through four chapters of my book and gave me extensive feedback. Richard was one of those people, and I thank him very much for that, and actually quite a few others in the room here too.

The grant also allowed me to spend three weeks in Tokyo to consult with policymakers and academics there on the work in progress. Last year, I was able to make some real last-minute changes when the book was already in production, thanks to, again, the Center for Global Partnership and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Emerging Leaders Program in Tokyo for a week, which allowed me to get some neat little details especially for my conclusion and introduction.

So I think that what you’ll find is despite the fact that this is clearly an academic book, really targeted to an academic audience, I hope that you find it interesting and perhaps more accessible than a lot of other academic work on Japan. So, in that way, I think that CGP got that right.

But, ultimately, this book has its roots in my doctoral dissertation, and therefore I owe really the greatest debt to my doctoral advisors beginning with Gerry Curtis at Columbia and, as well, my outside reader and close mentor, Dick Samuels, who, as many of you will know, also has a recent book out on Japan that I think actually complements my work more than it disagrees with it and, finally, to my host at the University of Tokyo while I was doing this research, Aki Tanaka. I want to acknowledge all of their great advice and support over time.

My doctoral dissertation gave me the opportunity to wrestle with the question of identity change and to consider two historical cases that are presented in this book: Japan’s decisions in the 1960s to formally limit the export of weapons and to formally restrict the use of outer space to peaceful purposes, which they further construe peaceful as meaning totally nonmilitary, not just defensive which is, as probably some of you know, the newest interpretation the
Japanese Government has issued just in the last few months.

But since then, since the sixties and also since I wrote that dissertation on the sixties, a lot has happened, and that is really the focus of my book.

What I’d like to do to begin this talk is, on just one academic point, to thank two scholars who I think really paved the research, and those are Tom Berger who is at Boston College and Peter Katzenstein at Cornell University. I think these two men deserve a large degree of credit for moving the discipline of political science and international relations to consider more systematically the role of identity and culture in political analysis in new ways. Their work on Japan really deeply interested me and, ultimately, also provoked me into writing a response, a response that focuses much more on the politics of identity in Japan and elsewhere and how identity shapes policy outcomes and how identity might shift in the future. These are ultimately the questions that my book addresses.

I’d like to begin the brief overview of my book by saying something about the title. As long as I’ve studied Japan which, believe it or not, is now nearing 25 years, I’ve heard about unique Japan is. In the 1980s, the famous so-called “revisionist,” Karel van Wolferen, even wrote that Japan was uniquely unique, in *The Enigma of Japanese Power*.

Certainly, cultures vary, and this is important, but I’m interested very much in the politics of security. Here, one of my main goals in this book is to normalize Japan for a non-Japan audience, to say in effect that Japan’s security politics are readily understandable and, largely, even predictable and that, in most ways, they’re similar to security politics in other democracies. Japan is not nearly the outlier that it’s often thought to be in the security realm. Of course, there’s a double entendre in the title. That makes it kind of sexy, right?

There are some in Washington and in Tokyo who think that to normalize Japan means to fundamentally change its approach to security, and I’m not of that school of thought. In my view, a majority of Japanese view their security politics as quite normal and are quite resistant to a dramatic change in security policy. After all, isn’t there something to envy in a country that hasn’t lost a soldier in battle for over 60 years?

I’d like to return to this point about how Japanese people view possible security change at the end of my brief remarks, but let me introduce you to the main argument in my book first. My main argument, essentially, I can set out in about four parts, and I have a few tables that are from my book that kind of help illustrate this.
Japan’s security policies are evolving, of course, but not as much as many think is essentially what I’m arguing and with much less clarity for the future direction than many think. Moreover, the way the security policy is evolving in Japan still is closely determined by the constraints of the past, in particular, what I call Japan’s security identity or central guiding principles to policymaking.

I identify three core principles of this identity and argue that they remain the central guideposts around which other policies are built, and I can show you these if I can hit the right button here. If you want to follow along in the book — this is small type — but on page 45, we have Central Tenets of Post-War Security Identity of Domestic Anti-Militarism is what I label this identity.

The three central tenets are no traditional armed forces involved in domestic policymaking, no use of force by Japan to resolve international disputes except in self-defense and no Japanese participation in foreign wars.

In my introductory chapters, I set out these criteria, and I have a historical chapter that draws on how this identity came about. But the short of it is that it isn’t the simple story that we often hear, that Japan lost in the Second World War and became pacifist and decided never to have a military again.

As most of you in the room know because you’re specialists, the politics of security in Japan was deeply contentious in the post-war period and from 1945, the defeat, to about 1960, when the U.S.-Japan security treaty was revised and put into effect indefinitely; this 15 years was deeply contentious. These core principles, I think, came out of that period, and it was a political compromise on really all sides. But once these became the core principles, it became very difficult to deviate from.

After these introductory chapters, I then look at three cases to look at how this identity shapes policy outcomes. So, to me, it isn’t just enough to establish that there is this kind of identity. The question is: Japan is a democracy that has a complex policymaking process. How does this identity interact with the policymaking? I talk about three ways in particular.

The first is that this identity provides a vocabulary to enable political cooperation around specific policies. So we could see, for example in talking about Japan’s decision to develop surveillance satellites. It’s sort of taboo to talk about surveillance satellites, right? They are multipurpose information gathering satellites. They are satellites that are shared among various ministries. This is a much more acceptable vocabulary to a general audience.
It provides a focal point for public opinion, explaining policy continuity over time. And so, again, if policy basically conforms with the security identity, politicians can be fairly confident that the public will support these ideas.

It’s not to say that they can’t pass policies that don’t conform to these guidelines. After all, for example, Prime Minister Koizumi dispatched troops to Iraq fairly recently against public opinion. At the time that he dispatched the troops to Iraq, most Japanese didn’t agree with that idea. After they got to Iraq and no one was killed and the general world opinion was favorable to that, many Japanese came around to thinking it was a good idea to have deployed them, but at the time it was very risky politically. That’s very much in line with my thinking about identity, that if you go beyond what public opinion expects, you can expect a response.

Finally, something that I think quite a few scholars have focused on is that this identity becomes institutionalized into the policymaking process, and so it exacts costs for violators of the identity. First of all, there’s a bunch of legislation that formalizes these practices. Again, a sort of topical issue right now is the peaceful use of outer space policy and Japan’s change in that area. The legislation has recently passed to allow to sort of reinterpret Japan’s policy that I write about in this book in a chapter that essentially sees now outer space as only for defensive purposes. You can use it for military purposes but only defensively is a very new interpretation that the Japanese Government has issued just in the past few months.

But, this faces a problem in the institutionalization part because Japan’s space agency, JAXA, has a whole series of rules and regulation and legislation that explicitly forbids the space agency from being involved in military activities. So this will be rewritten over the next year or a new space agency will be created. This is the plan for the next year. The point here is that one has to deal with this past institutionalization to make a change. It isn’t enough just to pass a new law.

So, finally, after talking first about how I established what this identity is, then talking about how this identity shapes policy outcomes, I look at the question that I think many of you are probably most interested in which is: Well, that may be fine and good from the past, but how likely is this identity to maintain? Might it be shifting in the near future?

Here, I’d like to acknowledge a debt I owe to three scholars whose work I draw on fairly liberally. For his work on identity, Jeff Legro, who is now at the University of Virginia, has been really inspirational to me. On the Japan field, John Campbell and Kent Calder both have written extensively about how
policy is made in Japan and how policy changes in Japan.

I try to engage with that, that scholarship, to think about, again from a more academic perspective, why do policies change? Here, I think this gets to the crux of identity arguments about Japan and why some people look at me as what political scientists call a constructivist and someone very interested in identity issues and other people look at me as someone who is really attacking the constructivist and identity crowd because what I argue, essentially, is there’s lots of reasons why policies change, the first of which links to identity.

People’s ideas about appropriate action can change, and this might be on a small scale affair or it might be on a large scale identity shift. But there are other reasons that policies change: political power distribution or a party in power changes that leads to change in policy even if an identity is fairly constant and, finally, the context or environment in which policy is made or to which its target changes.

As I’m sure everyone in this room is aware, if you look at Japanese security policy from 1989 to 1999, it’s clear that all three of these things have happened to a degree. Starting from the bottom, the environment in which Japanese policy is being made has dramatically changed, the security environment in East Asia. So we would expect policy to respond to that.

Secondly, the political power distribution and the party in power briefly changed in Japanese domestic politics. There was a fundamental political realignment, for a time at least, before the LDP came back to power.

The question at the top is: How much have ideas about appropriate action changed? Has there been an identity shift in Japan? I would say that clearly some ideas about security in Japan have changed, and this is an area where I think I particularly recommend Dick Samuels’s book, *Securing Japan*. It spends a lot of time looking at idea entrepreneurs and what are the different ideas of security out there.

Many of you are aware, I think, that certain discussions of security in Japan are much easier to have today than they were 10 years ago or even 5 years ago. The nuclear taboo is no longer so taboo in terms of discussions of this. Using neutral terms for military equipment is less controversial than in the past. You can sometimes call a tank, a tank. Self-defense force members often wear their uniforms outside of the bases these days. So some ideas about security have changed, but if you care to look at some of the data in my book, my argument is that most ideas, the sort of core ideas Japanese have about security, have not really changed very much. This, I think, is a fundamental constraint on major
policy change in Japan.

For the policy audience, what I want to sort of wrap up on is talk about one aspect of my work which is looking at if you accept the argument that the Japanese security identity is something that exists and that it has an effect on policy and then, secondly, that this identity is still fairly resilient, then the question is: What about the future and, if this identity were to change, how would we know that it’s changed? What would be the threshold or the indicators we would use to say, today, it exists and, tomorrow, it doesn’t?

In my introductory and conclusion chapters, I try to set out some ideas of thresholds, the first of which is set up in my introduction: Indicators of Possible Breaches of the Security Identity of Domestic Anti-Militarism. You will recall that I set out three tenets of this identity, and so I began to think about what it would take for me to be convinced that the Japanese political establishment no longer believes in this security identity, if it ever did.

The first is centralization of defense policy management solely within the ministry of defense or creation of a national security council to advise the prime minister that includes SDF officers. This seems to challenge what I consider the first tenet of domestic anti-militarism which is active military involvement in policymaking, which, in the post-war period in Japan, has been very much shunned.

If you’re a specialist in this area you might consider perhaps this is happening to a degree. I think it is happening to a degree, in fact. This gives us an area to look at, to really consider if things move forward the way, for example, the ministry of defense would like to reorganize the Japanese policymaking process. If a national security council gets set up in Japan where the MOD plays a major role, advises directly to the prime minister, I think that would be something that would help convince me that Japanese identity is changing.

But if you take the example of the National Security Council debates that have happened over the last couple of years -- I actually was able to meet with Ms. Koike when she was the de facto National Security Advisor last year -- we know that this came to nothing. The Japanese spent maybe 18 months trying to set up a National Security Council establishment that included military involvement, and it didn’t happen.

This is another point to keep in mind: When we talk about the change in Japanese security policy, what often happens is people talk about ideas for change and focus less on what actually changes. People are talking about doing this, and so that means there’s a change, and I think there’s something to
that. The lack of a taboo is something, but it’s not the same thing as actually achieving your goals.

We can look at these other two tenets briefly. My second tenet of domestic anti-militarism was about Japan not using force to resolve international disputes. So, if you begin to see Japan make statements that threaten the use of force to resolve international disputes or to develop explicitly offensive military capabilities, I think this would be a clear sign that the past security identity is no longer in effect. But, in my personal view, those things are extremely unlikely to happen anytime soon.

Finally, the third tenet, Japan’s participation in international conflict: Creation of offensive military plans or posture, commitments to the use of the self-defense forces in active overseas conflicts or unilateral use of the self-defense forces in overseas military activities, these are the kinds of things that you would expect if Japan became what some call the normal country; the more militaristic country. I think that these things, again, are very unlikely. You see some movement in some of these directions.

Again, specialists in the audience will be aware that right as this book was going to press, the mission of overseas PKO operations became a core mission of the self-defense forces. So I think that is an important change.

Does this mean, on this second line here of tenet three, that there’s a commitment to use the SDF in active overseas conflicts? I think it doesn’t mean anything of the sort. In fact, I think what Washington is likely to have to deal with in the next few months is that Japan is going to stop refueling operations in the Indian Ocean because in Japan it’s very controversial that the maritime self-defense forces is involved in something that could be perceived as an active conflict.

Just to wrap up here on my book overview, and I’d like to take some questions, after setting out this kind of framework and thinking about thresholds, my book then sort of shifts gears and I have three chapters that look at specific cases of how identity, politics and policy interact over time, looking at these things in depth. I think this is something that not many people have done before. We tend to read scholarship on Japan that talks about lots of different policies over time at the same time, right, and I think that you lose a lot of the richness of how identity is actually interacting with politics by not focusing on any one particular thing.

I revisited my doctoral work on the arms export restrictions. There have been changes in recent years about these restrictions, most recently with
missile defense. So I consider that case. I look at the case of the peaceful use of outer space policy up to the point of launching the surveillance satellites, what I would call surveillance satellites. Very recently, there’s been some change in that policy.

Finally, I look at the case of U.S.-Japan cooperation on missile defense, which actually is linked to the previous two chapters because two of the most controversial aspects of Japan developing missile defense are the implications of that policy on Japan’s arms export restrictions and on Japan’s use of outer space. So that kind of comes together.

The book concludes then by looking at other important security developments in the post-Cold War period, which I actually divide into two periods: the period before North Korea test launched its Taepodong-2 in 1998 and the period after 1998. I see that launch as a sort of Sputnik flinch that Japan experienced at that time in 1998, as actually a more important change in Japanese policy than the 9/11 attacks, for example, in 2001. So there are two chapters that look at that.

Here, on this last chapter, well, I’m running out of time here, so I’ll just show you the table here. There’s a list of ideas about in this post-Taepodong world the kinds of changes that have taken place, and my final chapter really tries to address how I can understand this scale of change within a framework that considers that identity is fairly stable in Japan.

Especially since she’s in the audience, I’d like to acknowledge here the work that Yuki Tatsumi and I had done together in our book for the Stimson Center last year called Japan’s New Defense Establishment. Frankly, some of the highly policy part of my research that didn’t fit well into a Stanford book became part of this book that came out faster, and I think is much more policy focused. So you can go to the Stimson web site if you’re interested in that.

If I can, Richard, do I have about three minutes to bring this to current day?

I thought I’d just say two things and sort of update this book. The first, I’ve mentioned already a few times, but on May 20th of this year the Diet passed legislation that formally reconsidered Japan’s peaceful use of space policy which was first dictated in 1969. Japan has now come in line with, essentially, all the other space powers to consider peaceful not to be non-military but to be defensive. So, in this sense, Japan was actually fairly unique in interpreting peaceful to mean no military usage at all to, instead, now consider it as defensive.
I think, here, because it seems like, boy, Andrew Oros must be pretty concerned about this because he’s done all this research on peaceful use of space policy, written a whole chapter about something that many people don’t pay attention to, and now the policy has changed. But, in fact, I see this evolution of Japanese policy is very much in line with the argument that my book makes -- the fact that Japan is not fundamentally departing, in my view, from the way that this policy has evolved since 1969.

It’s not advocating a militarization of outer space. It’s not advocating joint research with the United States to sort of balance against China in outer space.

It’s considering deploying early warning satellites to assist with missile defense, to beef up its defensive posture. Indeed, when this legislation was first proposed in 2007, the DPJ wouldn’t sign off on it because it didn’t sufficiently make enough gestures to Japan’s pacifist constitution, and the new legislation is really very clear about that in my view. Again, I think it is a good example of threshold that should be considered over time, but at this point I don’t think that it falsifies my argument.

I thought what I would conclude with is to come back to the Japanese people because, in my view, I think it’s very important especially in Washington to keep in mind that what actually happens with Japanese security policy and what actually happens with U.S.-Japan cooperation in security policy isn’t just what the people in this room can agree to, but also it’s something that the Japanese Government has to present to the Japanese people and it has to be legislated. There’s often quite a gap between what Japanese elites might like security to be like and what is sellable in a democratic Japan.

I thought I’d end with noting Asahi Shimbun’s annual poll in advance of Constitution Day. Constitution Day in Japan is in early May. Just in advance of that every year, Asahi conducts a survey about what the Japanese people think about the constitution and especially Article 9.

I think many of you will be aware of a shift in support for constitutional change in Japan recently but according to this Asahi poll, and certainly we can quibble a bit with the numbers, but I don’t think that we can say that they are fundamentally wrong. But according to the Asahi poll, 66 percent of those polled said that Article 9 should not be revised, 66 percent, and this is up dramatically from 49 percent the previous year. So a clear majority are saying that Article 9 should not be revised.

What’s even more intriguing is that of the 56 percent that say the constitution should be amended — so this is a different question. Should the
constitution of Japan be amended? 56 percent say yes. Of that 56 percent, only a little over a third, 37 percent of those folks, think that what should be revised in the constitution is Article 9.

Here, you have just over half of the people saying we want constitutional revision, but only a little over a third of that half says it should be Article 9, and — it gets even better — over half of that smaller group thinks that they don’t want Article 9 to be revised in a way that would allow easy deployment of Japan’s forces abroad. So some of those people actually want Article 9 to be revised in a way that is more restrictive of dispatching troops overseas. This, I think is a fundamental reality of security politics in Japan.

It’s not all about the constitution. I talked about other aspects of security that are important to policymaking. But as we think about Japan’s future course, I wrote this book in part to appeal to a policy audience to consider that perhaps Japan isn’t moving as fast on security changes as many think and, even more importantly, that Japan’s future direction of security change is quite unclear at this point.

Thank you.

DR. BUSH: Thank you very much. Let’s go straight to questions. I’ll have Andrew field the questions and just identify yourself for the record. I have lots of questions, but I’m going to let you go ahead. I think Bill Breer had the first question.

QUESTION: Thanks very much for your very good presentation.

DR. OROS: Thank you.

QUESTION: In thinking about what you said, we’re going to have more sort of a benign or stable security policy in Japan. How is this going to affect relations with the United States? In either administration, it seems to me, especially Republican, there are going to be high expectations that Japan is going to shoulder more of the burden or pay us more for moving to Guam or what have you. I don’t have a quibble with what you discussed as to the future of Japanese security policy, but there are others in this town that might.

DR. BUSH: If I could just amend Bill’s question.

DR. OROS: Please.
DR. BUSH: In what way is the U.S.-Japan alliance part of Japan’s security identity?

DR. OROS: Okay. I’m not quite sure that’s an amendment, but that’s a good question that I’ll come to.

Well, what’s the likely future? I think that even if you don’t buy the argument of my book or buy the book, most people probably expect that the near future of U.S.-Japan relations is going to be a period of some difficulties in part because the relationship has been so good in the last four years. You know the famous Bush-Koizumi personal friendship, but also I think an alignment of many interests between Japan and the U.S.

I think that regardless of what you think of my argument, it’s fairly clear that there’s going to be a period of conflict, not to say outright animosity like we have seen in the past. After all, when I first started studying Japan, according to one famous *Time Magazine* poll — this was in 1988 — more Americans saw Japan as a threat to the United States than the Soviet Union. It’s hard to imagine that kind of change in the U.S.-Japan relationship, but I do think that there will be some difficulties.

You mentioned, Bill, essentially the U.S. and Japan have agreed to a fairly extensive, in my view, alliance deepening which involves a number of new roles that Japan will play, and I think that some of those promises will be very hard for the Japanese to follow through on. I think that those promises would have been hard to follow through on even at the time that they were made, and now I think the political situation in Japan has actually deteriorated in the sense of having firm agreements with the United States.

How does that link to my book? Well, if you buy the argument of my book that you can’t expect a major security shift in Japanese policy, I think that means that the U.S. is going to have to deal with Japan the way that it’s dealt with Japan for the last 50 years -- understanding that it has a different approach to security, and we have to find ways to work together where it’s in our common interest, and in other ways we need to consider other approaches.

Now the world has changed, and so it may well be that the U.S. feels like it’s not worth shouldering that burden as much as it did in the past. But I think that in terms of making appropriate policy and having an appropriate relationship, it’s best to have an understanding from the start that what’s achievable in both places rather than pretending that we basically see things the same way.
Again, I think it’s easy, especially for non-Japan specialists who are working in the U.S. Government on Japan, whose work I really respect. I think it’s a very difficult job. But they’re mostly coming in contact with other people in the security apparatus, and I think it’s very easy for them to get an impression that this represents the way Japanese think about security in general, and I think that’s often mistaken.

To Richard’s question, a related question, about -- I’m sorry. Can you just rephrase it?

DR. BUSH: Is there a way in which the U.S.-Japan relationship is part of Japan’s security identity?

DR. OROS: That’s a great question. I think that when I had these forums in Washington to read drafts of my work, that was one of the most common questions. If you read the work, for example, of Mike Green -- who, certainly his expertise on Japan is not something I would wish to challenge -- in *Japan’s Reluctant Realism*, his book from, I believe, 2001, he puts the U.S.-Japan alliance as part of Japan’s identity.

I address this directly in my historical chapter on how Japan’s identity came about, but I think that the chronology is off. I think it shows why it’s very important to focus on narrower case questions to really understand what’s interacting with what. But if you look at polling data -- I actually have another table, but it’s not available on this computer -- in this historical chapter, you can see Japanese attitudes towards the alliance in the 1950s and 1960s, and you can track that against Japanese attitudes towards the self-defense forces. What you see is attitudes towards the self-defense forces are getting more and more support over time, and I argue that’s because the Japanese leaders have really figured out the security identity that’s going to be able to be resilient.

But attitudes on the alliance don’t do that. They don’t come up to a consistent majority support. They go up and down, up and down over the course of this period. So, to me, I think that means that there isn’t the same kind of consensus about the alliance framework as there is with other aspects of the security identity.

However, what I will say and I say in the book is that’s not to say the alliance is unrelated to the security identity. I do think, at the most basic level, Japan would be unlikely to be able to have developed this security identity if the alliance hadn’t been in place because they would have had to follow different practices. But that’s not the quite the same thing as to say it’s a part of the identity.
In the back?

QUESTION: Scott Harold from RAND. Andrew, first, congratulations on publishing your first book. That’s really pretty cool.

DR. OROS: Thank you.

QUESTION: And presenting at Brookings, also very cool. I want to ask you, though, a question that I hope you won’t take as hostile, but it has to do with the methodology because if I understand your explanatory variable and your dependent variables, they were “identity explains policy outcomes.” And, if I understand correctly again, then your proxy or way of measuring identity, it wasn’t through the kinds of surveys of literature talking about norms, values, what does Japan want to do, what kind of society or world does it want to live in.

Your measures were three policies. They were no military involvement in domestic political decision-making, no participation in foreign wars and no use of force to resolve conflicts which, at least from where I’m sitting and maybe it’s because I haven’t fully understood your argument yet, seems to involve what political scientists would refer to as an endogeneity problem, i.e., you’ve explained your dependent variable by pointing to your dependent variable as a proxy for your independent variable.

Most of the time when people use culture or identity to explain outcomes, they try and talk about, well, here are the values that stand in for Japanese identity. I’m going to survey Japanese literature. I’m going to look at the normative statements that policymakers make or that opinion polls reveal, which you did right at the end.

But I’m wondering, when you talked about you would know if Japan’s security identity is changing, I looked at your list which was, I think, longer that time. It was maybe seven or eight different things. But again, I found that it seemed like they were all policy outcomes, which is again to say I would know that the independent variable is taking on a new value by find that the dependent variable that I’m actually trying to use it to measure is changing. Maybe this is my ignorance, but it seems to be an instance of rather tortured logic.

I actually agree that you may be right in this argument about the importance of identity. I just wonder how do you get around that?

DR. OROS: Sure. That’s a great question that I’ve heard before, so I have an answer to that. How do you measure identity? Actually, to the first part of your question, I’m not saying in my argument that identity determines
policy outcomes because there are lots of cases, and you can read them in my book, of examples where policymakers have enacted policies that are contrary to this identity. What has happened in most of those cases is they’ve been beaten down.

I have a phrase for this. I call it Reach, Reconcile, Reassure. So a policymaker reaches past the security identity to do something beyond what one would expect to happen, and there’s a big outcry about it.

He tries to reconcile the new policy then with the identity itself. So we’re going to have surveillance satellites, but these aren’t really surveillance satellites. They’re multipurpose information gathering satellites, and they’re going to be shared by lots of ministries, and one of them isn’t the Japan Defense Agency which was still an agency then. The agency will be able to get some of that information, but it’s going to be in a different place. The resolution of these satellites is going to be only at a commercial level. It’s not going to be at a military level.

So the reach has to be reconciled with this identity, and then the public is reassured that this is going to be okay over time. This does allow the contours of the identity to change to respond to a new political environment, a new international environment. It’s still, in my view, having the identity structure the policy outcome, but it isn’t to say that the identity leads to that outcome.

Again, there are cases. I mention the satellite case, but if you look at the case of Prime Minster Koizumi’s deployment of the SDF to Iraq, here, this might seem like even more of a stretch and more of a reach. But, of course, the SDF was only involved in sort of humanitarian activities in Iraq and in only very limited numbers and, of course, they are home now. So I think it’s another kind of example of that Reach, Reconcile, Reassure.

On the broader methodological question, I would say that I don’t think I’ve followed a method that will convince everyone, especially people that are really obsessed with putting everything in a framework of independent variables and dependent variables.

What I think I’ve done differently than others who have tried a similar approach is I’ve identified three cases that I want to understand better: the arms export restrictions, the peaceful use of outer space policy and U.S.-Japan cooperation on missile defense. Those policies are not, in my view, what constitute Japan’s identity. Those are policies that are different than these principles. What I’m saying is the identity is characterized by these broader principles.
So, sure, you can say that arms export restrictions support this identity, but I’m not saying that the identity is defined by arms export restrictions. That isn’t what characterizes the identity. It’s an effect. It’s a policy effect. I don’t think it’s quite correct to say that I’m using a few specific policies to constitute an identity and use that to explain the policies back, but I do see, of course, that they’re linked.

I guess I’d have to say take a look at the chapters where I develop this more systematically. I do use polling. I do use public discourse and public journal article issues, and I also rely on a lot of Japanese scholarship. In a sense, I’m relying on the sort of secondary literature to some extent in describing this identity that’s come about.

What I’m trying to do in that chapter, where I look from 1945 to 1960, is to show how lots of different views of security were coming together by the end of that period in 1960. To me, the way I would describe what came together in 1960 is by these principles. Then what I’m interested in is explaining policies that happened after 1960. So I established an identity first, and then I’m looking at policies that emerge after.

One of the biggest surprises that I learned in the area of Japanese security policy, after I was well on my Ph.D. course at Columbia, is that Japan’s arms export restrictions weren’t determined by the Japanese after 1945. The first real codified arms export restrictions in Japan were in 1967. That’s 22 years after the defeat in the Second World War. In part, it’s because the U.S. insisted on arms export restrictions early on. So I’m trying to go temporally.

Others? I think Yuki and then back to Kim.

QUESTION: Andrew, thank you again for this presentation. I think you really did a nice combination of a theoretical framework and linking the source into how institutionalized those norms are through regulations, laws, such and such.

What I do actually want to ask you about is to push you a little bit on the U.S.-Japan alliance-related issues because I’m not disagreeing at all with your argument about Japanese security policy. There’s going to be a lot of slowdown in a lot of areas that the United States had pushed Japan to go forward in many areas.

When I’m doing my work -- and one of the key factors that I looked at in terms of how Japanese governments are institutionalized to bring about the policy outcomes that they want -- the key element that I looked at is the
process of decentralization of the policymaking and the strengthening of the cabinet offices and the prime minister’s authority. It really hasn’t beefed up all that much because they’re not legislated as such.

So I do agree with you on a fundamental point that you will see a slowdown because so much of the change that we saw in the normative statements on policy outcomes have been dependent on the very strong personality and popularity of Koizumi. When you take that out of the equation, you really don’t have that much leg to stand on.

So, if that is the case and, as Bill mentioned, whatever the next incoming U.S. Government, U.S. Administration comes in, Republican or Democrat, it’s more likely to look to Japan to do more in the sense to help, basically providing a little bit more substantive support in terms of its actual military operations.

It is certainly an argument that while the United States should continue to deal with Japan like it had in the last 50 years, understanding its limits, I see that during the Bush Administration I think they have made some of those policy changes, strategy changes like global posture changes, for example – working in their, perhaps premature and maybe overly optimistic, assumption that Japan is going to be more I wouldn’t say activist, but more proactive in terms of deploying its sources a little bit more liberally other than beyond peacekeeping and disaster relief and humanitarian assistance.

So, if that is not coming, and this administration has made some of those really fundamental decisions, working in that assumption, how does that affect the U.S.-Japan alliance?

DR. OROS: There’s a lot in there. I’ll start at that last part because it’s freshest in my mind. Essentially, would it be fair to rephrase the last part as saying, what’s the future of the U.S.-Japan alliance if Japan isn’t going to normalize in the way that Washington wants them to and become a much more active military player?

Frankly, one of the things that I’m becoming more interested in, in part because I enjoy my base now in Washington, is learning more about the evolution of military affairs and the kind of Pentagon planning for 30 years from now or 40 years from now. I was actually surprised because when I was at APSA, I went to a really interesting panel on looking at the future of off-shore basing in the long term. I think that there, in the long term, are a number of likely changes in the security environment due to both the rise of new actors but especially new technology.
It might, in the long term, call into question, for example, how important it is for the U.S. to have bases in Japan. If the U.S. were not to need or perceive a need for bases in Japan to have forward deployment, I think that that kind of change would fundamentally call into question what would the nature of the U.S.-Japan alliance be in a world where there were no bases?

We’ve faced that in the past in the context of when Japan politically, some in Japan politically wanted the bases out. We faced that question before, but that was a very different question because in that case the U.S. wanted the bases but not be able to keep them. What would it be like in 30 years from now if the U.S. doesn’t want the bases anymore because it feels like it has other options for forward deployment? In that case, I think you would have to really reexamine what the U.S.-Japan relationship would be like.

In fact, despite being critical sometimes of the sort of values-oriented diplomacy idea, I do think that the U.S.-Japan alliance is not just rooted in the U.S. desire to have bases in Japan. It also isn’t just rooted in the U.S. desire to have Japan help pay for U.S. forces or pay for security. I think that there is more to the alliance than that.

I think that two parties that fundamentally have a lot in common and a lot of shared interest, it’s logical for these two parties to work together in the future. You have to find a way that both parties are satisfied that there isn’t a free-rider in the system and there isn’t a fear of abandonment in a security emergency.

I think these are discussions that need to be had. We can’t just assume that the course that was set in the past under a close friendship with Prime Minister Koizumi and Mr. Bush is going to just continue. I’m struck in the last six months or so how often Japanese friends of mine have talked to me about the Takeshima/Dokdo issue, whether the U.S. is really standing up on this, the territorial disputes with China, the U.S.’s perceived selling out of Japan in North Korea. These are issues that are going to continue to arise because there are some areas where the U.S. and Japan don’t see things exactly alike. But I think in most areas we do, and so there’s a basis for that alliance.

So I’m fairly optimistic in, let’s say, the medium term at least. I mean for several decades. But again, as I mentioned to Bill at the beginning, I do think that we’re in for some tougher times; that we’ll look back to this period as being really quite a tame one in our relationship.

Yes, in front, please.
QUESTION: Keiko Iizuka from Brookings. I just started as a CNAPS Visiting Fellow just last week.

My question is about the United Nations, the factor of the United Nations. How is it put? How do you see the existence of the United Nations for Japanese people in the security identity in terms of disaster relief or international peacekeeping operations which the self-defense forces are now deeply involved overseas?

The existence of the United Nations is becoming more and more important, but I wonder how much importance the Japanese people see it as one of the elements, important elements of the security issues. The self-defense forces now are at the point of a crossroads, whether or not it should be used as a tool of the alliance between the United States and Japan or forces to be utilized or to work for the United Nations. I would like to hear your opinion about the factor of the United Nations.

DR. OROS: Thank you.

In some ways the first part of your question, I think, links to Richard’s question and in fact to Scott’s in the back about what in the identity and what’s not in the identity. I’ve been asked a series of these questions over time. Someone else can ask the nuclear taboo question and whether that’s part of the identity or not, but it’s not.

On sort of a more methodological point, I think that Japan’s policy towards the United Nations is a very specific policy because the UN is a single actor. So I wouldn’t want, in terms of methods, to put that as part of the identity itself, but I think that we can look at how does the security identity, as I define it, link to policy towards the U.N. I think the linkage isn’t especially strong in the way that I craft the identity.

I think in some ways, of course, the UN’s image is with the blue helmets and the peace-loving place, and this is the place for peace. Of course, it’s extremely in line with Japan’s security identity, and I think that explains in part why so many Japanese feel so strongly supportive of the United Nations in the sixties, seventies and eighties, at the time that Japan’s security identity, in my view, was flourishing. So, in a sense, I think that Japan’s policy towards the UN confirms my idea of Japan’s security identity. It’s not part of the identity, but in that sense I think it’s confirming.

It would seem to me I haven’t seen specific polling data on Japanese attitudes toward the United Nations. I’m sure it exists because the
Japanese are terrific at polling. In fact, I bet the *Yomiuri* has done that polling because they are a great polling organization.

My guess would be that Japanese are less supportive of the United Nations today than they were in the sixties or seventies, but I don’t think that necessarily means that something is changing in terms of Japanese views of security or views of peace. It could equally be that Japanese views of the United Nations as an institution, as a place that respects peace, as a venue for peace has changed.

I mean this is just complete conjecture because I haven’t done any research on that, but something that would lead me to think in that direction, of course, is the very contentious issue of Japan not getting a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. I think some of you have heard me say this line before because I think it illustrates, in my view frankly, a move in the wrong direction by the Japanese leadership in terms of how they conceive security.

I recall in the early days, like in the nineties essentially, of Japan really seriously trying to get a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. The main argument you would hear from MOFA, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which at the time in their blue book listed the UN as one of the three pillars of Japanese security. They would say that:

> It isn’t a world that Japan wants to support where the only people that get to have a permanent seat on the Security Council are countries that have nuclear weapons and send their military all around the world. Japan has a different point of view. We are the only country in the world that has this pacifist constitution, and this a model. Many people in the world respect Japan as this model in this way, and this entitles us as one of the major powers in the world to be on the UN Security Council. I found that, personally, to be a very persuasive argument, although of course it didn’t result in a seat.

But under Prime Minister Koizumi, a different position was taken: Japan is dispatching troops abroad. Japan is deepening its alliance with the United States. Japan is ready to balance against China by developing missile defense or other things. Japan is one of the biggest countries in the world, and China is on the Security Council. So we should be on the Security Council.

In my view, again, this is just my view, it isn’t based on research. But in my view, I imagine a number of Japanese also have less support for the United Nations if they see as an actor that basically manages wars around the world. That’s not to say that the UN only manages wars. Of course, there’s much more to the UN than the Security Council, and the UN does quite a lot of
important work in totally different areas.

A final part of your question that I’ll address is about how does the self-defense forces in overseas deployment then link here? Well, the short answer is overseas deployment of the self-defense forces is no longer linked to the United Nations. It’s only linked to a larger international institution which many would assume would mean the United Nations but could also mean a coalition of the willing, to use President Bush’s phrase.

Again, how do average Japanese people then understand that? It seems to me that as just a point of fact the UN is moving away from the focus for reasons, though, that aren’t necessarily related to the Japanese not liking the UN anymore but just the way the UN is evolving and the way the international environment is evolving. So I think that’s a long way to say I think the UN isn’t as central to Japanese diplomacy as it used to be, but perhaps there will be a return to that in the future.

I would say I’m not at all a specialist on the UN, but I can’t resist saying because I run the Model United Nations program at my college. We go to three simulations a year, and a lot of young people are very excited about the United Nations.

But, I will tell you that in my teaching career, I think young people are less excited about the United Nations today in the U.S. also because it just increasingly seems like an institution that isn’t really designed for the world that our young people know. I have to spend hours and hours of lecture explaining to them the world that existed at the time that the UN was created.

We go visit the United Nations in New York. I take my students on a field trip there. The Central Hall is the Trusteeship Council Hall that helped decolonize the world. My students are like: What’s that? We know about the Security Council and the General Assembly. I personally think, again as a non-specialist on the UN, that the U.S. and Japan together and other actors, need to rethink global governance institutions and make them more relevant to our world. But I’m also a political realist, and I don’t think that’s especially likely in the short term.

Kim, you’ve been patient and then over here on the left.

QUESTION: Hi. Kim Willenson of the former Japan Digest. A number of us see the United States, with its preoccupation in the Middle East and the limits on the forces, as being a declining influence particularly in Asia while, for the Japanese, China is becoming an increasing influence in trade and
obviously in military affairs. My question is how in the long run is that going to impact Japan’s security identity?

DR. OROS: What’s that, Bill? In the medium term. Yes, in the medium term. It’s a great question. To be honest with you, that is the biggest question I had for myself when I completed this project. If I were to start this book research from scratch right now and, frankly, if I had started it from scratch let’s say in 2005, I think that I would have tried to somehow more systematically include the role of China in Japanese perceptions of security than I did in this book because China is just not part of this book. It’s mentioned, but it isn’t anything systematic. In fact, my new research project that I’m involved in now is a trilateral project, a U.S.-Japan-China trilateral project where we have four scholars from each of the three countries getting together and writing an edited book together about the sort of future cooperative relationship among these three powers. So I’m very interested in the question.

To give you kind of a short take on my current thinking about it, I think that China is in the minds of many Japanese in terms of when they think about what are potential threats in the world.

But public opinion polling that I’ve seen on security issues in Japan, and there’s quite a lot of it, not just newspaper polling and cabinet office polling which is excellent, but there’s a number of academic projects that are doing systematic research on Japanese views of what threatens them. Right now, what Japanese feel most threatened about are domestic issues. They feel threatened about unemployment. They feel threatened about crime at home, burglary, that kind of crime, crime on the street. They feel threatened by immigration and not so much about being attacked by another country.

So to the extent that China plays in these other threats, the average Japanese person seeing Chinese people on the streets in Tokyo or in Osaka and perceiving a rise in crime, well, then China is a threat. Or, the Japanese vegetable producer who feels undercut by Chinese vegetable producers and this import issue, then China is a threat.

I think that understanding of the China threat is a very different idea of a threat than what Americans think of in terms of threat. I don’t think personally, and the polling also doesn’t show that many Japanese people are afraid of the Chinese military threat, that China is going to militarily take over Japan.

This makes your question more complex because then the question is, how will Japan manage a long-term relationship with China that is so
multifaceted? Here, I’m somewhat optimistic because I think that if you look in
the area of Japan’s economic relationship with China, it’s very multifaceted.
Many top Japanese companies are profitable right now only because of their
operations in China. They’re underwriting, essentially, unprofitable operations
elsewhere. Although you have certain economic interests threatened by China in
Japan, you have also other opportunities. So, to me, I think that suggests a future – a more cooperative future.

Now I hesitate to go on much longer on this because you can see
I’m interested in this issue. I’m thinking about this issue. I think ultimately it’s a
trilateral issue is the problem, that the U.S. and China also have a relationship and
this affects Japan’s relationship with China as well. So it isn’t just about thinking
about Japan and China and how they relate to each other. If the United States and
China enter a period of great confrontation, then Japan’s own inclinations could
be pulled on way or another.

I’m afraid this book isn’t really about that, and I don’t really have
systematic notes prepared to go into depth about it, but I would say I agree with
you that it’s a big issue in Japan’s security future.

The gentleman on the left.

QUESTION: Thank you. Albert Keidel of the Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace. I have a very quick follow-on to that
question. Mine was similar, the rise of China and also the softening of some of
the issues around China like the Taiwan tension, particularly the new Ma Ying-
jeou government and what could easily be some kind of a breakthrough in North
Korea and what that might mean.

But I’m interested to bring it back to your research because it looks
as if we’re now sort of in the twilight of a long period in which there wasn’t much
variation in your data to show about the staying power of identity as a real factor,
a causal factor in Japan’s posture, particularly in the U.S.-Japanese alliance.

What kinds of changes over the last 50 years would you point to as
significant variation in the experience that can really help you be a little more sure
that the identity is a very stable foundation for the alliance and for Japan’s posture
towards military activity?

It’s a good test if there was some real shifts and variations where
you get some real significance out of your looking for causal linkages. Then
that’s important going forward. But if it’s been a period of really very little
variation in the data, then we really are opening and saying we just don’t know,
don’t really have a good guide to what’s coming.

DR. OROS: I’m really glad you asked that question. It makes me think that I should actually make it as part of my opening remarks. I find in my research contrary as your question takes as a premise. I find in my research that there’s quite a lot of variation in Japanese security policy in the periods that I’ve looked at.

One of the things that got me thinking about this project in the way that it came about was this sense in Washington that you could hear a lot in the mid-nineties a story, which I think is incorrect, that Japan had an ossified security strategy that just sort of muttered along until the Cold War ended, and then the Gulf War was so difficult. The first Gulf War was so difficult for Japan because it didn’t have any experience dealing with security issues, and it sent everything in disarray, and now we don’t know which direction Japan is going to go. That’s a story I’m sure many of you have heard.

But I just don’t think that the data shows that is how security politics have worked in Japan. So I picked two cases to look at to get a sense of what’s controversial and what changes over time. The cases that I looked at in the Cold War period, as I’ve said, are arms export restrictions and the peaceful use of outer space policy, these issues.

If you go to the, well, it’s online now, but unfortunately it wasn’t when I was going through the Diet clippings library at the National Diet Library that clips articles from major Japanese periodicals on different topics. The arms export restriction file is huge because this kept coming up again and again, and policy had to react to what the external environment was like.

Similarly with outer space, the self-defense forces wanted to use satellites to communicate, for communications purposes, and this was a very controversial issue because it seemed like a military use of outer space. Over time, as satellites became much more widely understood and more widely used for other applications, this kind of policy was allowed, but there was a process by which this went about. It gets to the Reach, Reconcile, Reassure strategy that I identify in the Cold War period.

What I find with more contemporary issues, for example, the dispatch of the self-defense forces abroad under Koizumi, I think it’s a very similar pattern to the pattern that you would see under other Japanese prime ministers.

You also see, even while the LDP was in power, of course, in the
whole Cold War period, you see a lot of change in approaches to security in Japan in that period. Prime Minister Miki and Prime Minister Nakasone would have been part of a different party in most countries of the world. The reason why you saw a tightening of arms export restrictions in Japan in the mid-1970s was in large part because Prime Minister Miki became prime minister, and he extended the so-called three principles on arms exports which is really only one principle because the first two principles were already part of international treaties Japan had signed. So that passed in 1967.

In 1976, Miki says, well, we have these three principles, but we’re going to have a fourth principle which is we’re not going to export weapons at all. That’s a pretty big change.

Prime Minister Nakasone comes into power a few years later and says, well, we want to start doing joint weapons production with the United States. Technically, that would be an export of arms technology to the U.S., and so he wanted a policy where this joint production would be allowed. Ultimately, he settled for an exception for just the U.S. and just for components.

I think this way of compromising, of different actors really disagreeing about security. One group of people saying: We should not export weapons at all. That’s just part of our identity. Other folks saying: That’s just out of touch with how the world is today. We need to have a policy that’s more dynamic. These groups get together, and they come up with some kind of compromise that is still, I think, rooted in the basic principles of the identity. I don’t think that is very different now than it was 30 years ago, but my book does talk about cases like that, cases that I think were just as controversial at the time as Iraq deployment is today or Indian Ocean refueling is today.

You started your question with a China linkage.

(Inaudible.)

DR. OROS: Right. Well, the environment, the Japan security environment during the Cold War also changed as the Soviet threat increased and decreased over time. The Soviet Union became much more Pacific-focused, having much more of a Pacific fleet, and Japan responded by patrolling sea lanes for a thousand miles, building up its maritime self-defense forces.

Of course, the whole Cold War period, this isn’t a popular thing to say in the context of China’s big defense buildup, but in the Cold War period in Japan you saw a similar kind of defense buildup in Japan. Their spending as a percentage of GDP was constant, but their GDP was mushrooming. So Japanese
military spending was going way up, and it was responding to new threats.

I’m not saying it’s identical, but I think you can get insights from the past period to understand now.

Ishii-san, please.

QUESTION: Thank you. Masafumi Ishii, Embassy of Japan. Mine is not a question. It’s more a comment.

DR. OROS: That’s okay.

QUESTION: In response to the point raised about the difficulty with keeping pace with the new U.S. administration because of things we may not be able to do. We may be able to do something.

I think, yes, what we can do in the traditional security area, the area of traditional security, hard security, may be limited mainly because of the political situation. But I think there are things we can do in relation. Nowadays, I think what security means is getting really wide-ranging. In the area of nontraditional security like climate change, development issues, Africa, epidemics, part of which are getting like already a traditional threat, I think there is big room for Japan and the U.S. to cooperate.

In the years to come, you see the tendency on our part to make more emphasis on the joint activities in that area, nontraditional security areas. We may as well try to redefine the coverage of the alliance, saying that should cover not only traditional but also nontraditional security issues, which is going to be very important and where cooperation between the U.S. and Japan can make a real difference because we are two major economies.

DR. OROS: I realize that wasn’t a question, but I would like to respond. I agree with you. In a way, it’s a good response to Yuki Tatsumi’s question about future alliance cooperation. And, I agree with you that this is a way forward.

I think that the difficulty of that approach is that the actors are different. So, right now, the U.S. link to Japan is through the U.S. security treaty part of MOFA. As the ministry of defense increases in political power in Japan, it’s with the ministry of defense.

These nontraditional security issues are, I agree personally, threats that we’re facing, but climate change is not something that our military is dealing
with right now. So this will be hard to reconcile with the alliance, is the issue, although I think it does provide a broader basis for U.S.-Japan cooperation.

That’s a kind of nice way to end, isn’t it, because it’s looking towards the future of cooperation? Thank you all for coming today.

DR. BUSH: Let me add my thanks to Andrew for all of you coming. I think you provoked a really great discussion. I think we could have gone on for a long time, but we owe it to your students to get you on the road. We look forward to having you back again. Thanks a lot.

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