

THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION

SHIFTING PATTERNS OF CONFLICT IN PAKISTAN
AND IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY

Washington, D.C.

Thursday, August 5, 2010

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P R O C E E D I N G S

MR. WASEEM: (in progress) Arab states, from Kazakhstan in the North down to maybe Egypt and the Horn of the Africa, which country is, military speaking, as powerful as Pakistan.

So, having said that, I would say that Pakistan has a role, and that's why from 1954 to 2010 Pakistan has been a close ally of the United States, or to put it the other way around, that the United States found a considerable potential in Pakistan to be a regional partner, in the underbelly of the Soviet Union at that time and afterwards in terms of another agenda which is today's agenda; that is the War Against Terrorism. You see that Pakistan's army, Pakistan's state, as such, is considered to be relevant in terms of getting out some kind of an operation inside the country and some kind of playing a role outside, that it is a regional presence. Therefore, Pakistan is somewhere there.

But it all started with partition.

Partitions involved a big task of resizing these

states, and that has been not an easy task. First of all, Pakistan emerged as the culmination of a process of Muslim separatism which was transformed into Muslim nationalism. Until today, unfortunately, partitioning is going on.

Pakistan got out of India, but India did not get out of Pakistan, and we have been struggling all along to get that part of India out of us, which was there and it is there as part of our culture, our history, our geography, our civilization because, mind you, it was called, and has been called all along, Indo-Muslim Civilization in terms of distinction, let's say, from Persia and from the Arab World.

The Indo-Muslim Civilization, that part of it, it had to be nullified. It had to be, in a way, got rid of because we did not India in us, Hinduism in us. There is Mysticism which is called Semi-Hinduism, and the doctrine of Deobandi/Islam in Pakistan has not been very happy about those kinds of practices, like Sufi practices which are considered to be the heritage

of the mixture of the local religion, particularly Hinduism.

So we see Muslim separatism, and along with that we see one small peripheral region of British India. This became Pakistan. It's the periphery of yesterday's British India, which is today's Pakistan. That involves a bit of a problem because what happened, and I'll come to it later, the father generation, we struggled with the issue of what to teach. Is Muslim history in India part of Pakistan history? We gradually got rid of it.

Now and Akbar and Aurangzeb other kings and the Mughals, for whom Pakistanis did have all kinds of respect, and they ruled Muslim history in India, now there was a problem. Indian history, is it Pakistan history simply because the Muslim history has been there?

For five, six, seven hundred years there was a Muslim period in Indian history. What to do with that? Owning it? Disowning it? That was the issue, and we were trying to grapple with it.

There was then the perennial partitioning agenda, purifying our culture, because the wedding rites, mostly there are Hindu in Pakistan, and of course there are so many other social and cultural practices that are prevalent in Pakistan. Ulema and others, they continue to point out: Look, this is Hindu in us. This is not good. Get rid of India in you, et cetera.

And that means the partition was not only a geographical fait d'accompli. Actually, this is a length process, and it goes on. Therefore, Pakistanis tends to be, in some way, struggling with themselves.

There, around 1970, and here I remember Marvin's very insightful article, something happened that meant the breaking loose of ties with South Asia when India took the lead in getting its Pakistan out of Pakistan. Pakistan felt that this area was now a confirmed area of influence of India, and Pakistan turned West into the Middle East.

From 1970s onwards, you see Pakistan getting into the Middle East, and that continued to be a long

process until today. Pakistan is heavily engaged economically and politically and diplomatically and in so many other ways. They opened banks over there, and they erected actually intelligence agencies over there. They erected the air forces of small states, et cetera. They were massively there in the Middle East, particularly in the Gulf area, and that was not without a cost.

When they started returning, the return process, that brought in Wahhabism, Salafi mosques, Salafi madrassas, Salafi influence in Pakistan. That started to increase, and during the last 25 years or so what you saw in Pakistan was an increasing influence of Saudi Arabia in terms of potential Islamization. That is now part of any analysis of Pakistan, particularly the new kind of Islam which is Wahhabism.

Following the Hanbali Fiqh jurisprudence, the Pakistanis inherited the Indo-Muslim jurisprudence based on Hanafi Fiqh. Therefore there was a shift, and this is called usually in the scholarship

available to us as "Arabist Shift." From the Indo-Iranian and Central Asian Islam, which we've practiced for the last four, five, six centuries, we are now moving towards the Gulf Islam or the Arabian Islam, Hanbali jurisprudence.

Pakistan became independent in 1947, and it found that the majority of Pakistanis were Sunni. Sunnis tended to own the state and gave an identity to the state, whereby Shia's, Ahmadis, Zikris and so many others were rendered suspect, or at least outsiders, in the framework of the new statehood that was developing. That is what led later on to the Shi'a/Sunni conflict, to declaration of Ahmadis as infidels and of course the expression on others like Ismailis. Ismailis should be out of the (inaudible) Islam (inaudible) demand. And of course Zikris, they are considered to be heretics, and so on.

The partition process moving on to purification, that continues, and this is our end-stage now.

So the partition also involved migration, and migration, 8 million people came from India -- Muslims. And of course 4.5 million Hindus and Sikhs moved from Pakistan areas to India. So 20 percent of the population belonging to the migrant stock today in Pakistan is huge. It's like Taiwan, Israel.

Every fifth household actually is migrant, and migrants, who were the migrants, came from the center to the periphery. It was the center of the British Indian Empire, and before that the Mughal Empire, and before that the Delhi Sultanate. From that area, those who were the descendents of all those dynasties, the nobility, the elite, the Muslims -- they came to Pakistan. The elite came, and the Red Guard and the nobility class. The working classes could not afford to come, and they didn't come, at least not most of them, not even a minority, a very small minority.

Otherwise, class-wise, when they came to Pakistan, they enjoyed an upper class status in some way. And they came to a rugged territory that they

considered to be a territory where they were now enjoying admission to civilize. These are the people who do not even know Hindi and Urdu. They speak racial languages. They are on the peripheries of yesterday's empires, and they need to be taught.

You remember the British mandate in India where they wanted to civilize the nation, the Indian nation? That kind of mandate was assumed by the new ruling elite that came from India, and it started through the Pakistanis.

Remember, Jinnah came from India. Liaquat Ali, the first prime minister, came from India. Three-fourths of the bureaucracy came from India. A full fifth of the bourgeoisie came from India. The whole elite came from India, and the only major power bloc in Pakistan which was local, that is (inaudible).

So, in the civilian sector, intellectually speaking again, the Islamists intelligentsia came from India. Most, in fact 90 percent, or in fact more of the Islamic literature that exists in Pakistan is in

the Urdu language. It is the mother tongue of the elite. It came from India.

So here is a migrant state which started operating in Pakistan in 1947. This is the migrant state in front of us, which did not have a constituency in Pakistan from where it could get elected. That is how one lesson that we learned was you go for election; it's your political debt. You can't afford to hold elections.

For three long years, they continued to postpone elections. All tribes could devise ways and means of holding elections in such a way that the results would be, in their terms, positive.

Here it is that we see the 1962 constitution, for example. Before that, there was put together one unit that comprised all the four provinces of Pakistan and turned it into one province. In a way, it was elimination of federalism at the level of West Pakistan, which is Pakistan today.

So migrants, why did migrants enjoy so much power in Pakistan? Because they had been converted to

the Pakistan cause in and around 1936-37 at the time of the elections where the Pakistani people of that time, the inhabitants of today's Pakistan at that time, they were far from it. They were not converted to the Pakistan cause -- the Pakistanis today. It was only a decade later that they were finally won over by the migrants, or would-be migrant elite.

So the would-be migrant elite enjoyed a higher level of legitimacy as makers of Pakistan. The makers of Pakistan entered into Pakistan in 1947. So that is the irony of the whole situation.

Here it is that from the very beginning it was very difficult to operationalize the political dynamics of the country, and you had to rule from outside the Parliament because Parliament was elected by the locals and housed local people. So you couldn't rule to the local representatives. You had to operate from outside, for example, through the bureaucracy, and bureaucracy was taught by the migrants.

All the political parties, the Muslim League -- in Pakistan, the Muslim League had 160 members belonging to India and 150 only from Pakistan. Similarly, the Working Committee on top of the party, it had 30 members from India and only 10 members from today Pakistan. It was a huge power differential between the two, between the locals and the migrants.

So migrants would then go for externalization of Islamic identity. We hear a lot about strategic depth with the Pakistani defense establishment. It's supposed to have looked for in and around Afghanistan. The migrant population, the elite, looked for identity depth in the Middle East. It was very Islamist in its region, and it tried to cultivate the ties with the militant countries.

But that paradise could not last. In 1970, there was the indigenous revival. There were the locals, the Bengalis and Sindhis and Punjabis and the others that came. The election on the basis of one man-one vote could not be postponed anymore. There was popular pressure in that direction, and that meant

that finally that thing happened which was feared all along. That means that there was an indigenous state that local representatives with all the power, the legitimate power, they came to rule. Bhutto represented the new Pakistan, and here Muhajirs were alienated.

Now Muhajir -- Muhajir means migrant. Muhajir, or the term "Muhajir," applies to around one-third of the migrants who came from India. Although the word "Muhajir" means migrant, actually the Muhajirs, those who are called Muhajirs today, they're around 8 to 9 percent of the population whereas there are 31 percent or 30 percent of all migrants.

Most of the migrants are in Punjab. They are Punjabi migrants, but they have lost their identity and they're, in a way, assimilated with the rest of Punjab.

But it's the non-assimilated section of the Muhajir population that is the migrant population, which is today called Muhajir. They then developed the party, MQM. I don't want to go into details about

that. And that party now represents the migrants -- only the Urdu-speaking migrants, those who could not be, and were not, ready to be assimilated in their host community which is Sindh. And this party is considered to be the most militant party among those parties which operate in the mainstream politics.

All that has developed the two power centers in Pakistan. On the one side, you have a middle class. On the other side, you have a political class. I'm sorry, but I had to use these two terms in this way.

On the first, middle class is the educated, commercial elite. These are the people who are in the vanguard, who are in the forefront of the Pakistan Movement, not politically, but they are the backbone of the movement. This was the middle class to which Jinnah belonged to.

They are socially progressive, politically conservative. The households', for example, culture, they are the most developed. They are most westernized. They are most educated. They are most

liberal in their attitudes towards life. They are constitutionally and legally oriented in some ways, and they are there as a very enterprising, smart, intelligent, professionally well-equipped middle class.

But quite a few of them are from the Muhajir, that is the Urdu-speaking migrant class, and the Punjabi-speaking migrant section of the population. And even if they are local, they have no representation in the political system. They shy away. They don't participate in the politics. They hate the political system. They do not like democracy because democracy means all kinds of riff-raff may come and get elected into the Parliament, and therefore they play havoc with the nation; they're not wanted.

This is the middle class. It is in all other ways progressive, but in political terms they do not like democracy. Democracy will mean that the initiative slips away from their hands.

And of course all of them like, or a few of them like, a presidential system, a presidential form of government. They are hooked on the United States' presidential system. They want concentration of power as they like.

They say Parliament is no good. That means dispersion, dilution of state authority. Do not go the parliamentary way. That would also mean that those communities, the indigenous communities of Pakistan, they would get the initiative, and they would then try to influence the decision-making on top, for example, the Baluchi and the Bengalis in olden times and Sindhis and the Pathans. Those, the lesser people, they would then have a voice in the decision-making process, and that's not wanted. So they are out, and that's why if you have a strong president on top, which is Punjab, which is 58 percent of the population anyway, that would mean that there is a kind of secure system whereby you can keep the initiative in your own hands.

On the other side, politicians, they are the landed and tribal elite. They are extremely conservative in their social and cultural practices, vis-à-vis women, vis-à-vis their family structure. They are still living, for example, in the 18th and 19th centuries. They are the people who would not go, for example, children's education, not so much committed to it. Their pattern of domination in their respective areas of influence, for example, in the villages, in the towns, they are considered to be brutes. They are very oppressive in their social practices. They're out there in the society, but they want their lost power.

And the state is in the hands of the elite bureaucracy and the army. These two state apparatuses control all kinds of decision-making in the country. The social and political elite, which is outside this system, continues to knock at the doors of the state. They want to enter into it. How to enter? The only way possible is democracy, elections. So those who are socially and culturally very conservative, even

reactionary, they want democracy. This is the dilemma of Pakistan.

The most forward-looking people, for them, democracy is not acceptable. That means corruption, corrupt politicians who are given to superstition, nepotism, all kinds of shady deals. These are the people who then come to power. So keep them at bay. On the other hand, those people, they uphold the constitutional source of legitimacy.

Now the constitutional tradition is very, very dug-in. Don't forget it is part of, a small part of, India. Pakistan experienced all kinds of constitutional development with India's neighbors. Pakistan has a framework of exercise of power which is very constitutional. Therefore, the two traditions, military tradition and constitutional tradition, continue to compete with each other.

But in this battle what has happened is that the middle class continues to uphold the national interest. It was very interesting, whenever you heard Musharraf, you would hear that he was talking about

national interests. You talk to one general and the other and the third and the fourth, one word, "national" interest. And you talk to one middle class person and the next and the next, this is the terminology that they use, which means that this does not allow pluralism, does not allow talk of multiculturalism. Ethnic minorities have no space in this particular framework. Similarly, sectarian minorities should be out because they are disturbing, destabilizing.

On the other hand, the politicians obviously everywhere in the world, they talk of the public interest straight away.

I've clearly said it here: Potential repository of state authority, that's the middle class in the bureaucracy and through the bureaucracy, and in the army. On the other hand, Zardari and his cabinet, even including the prime minister, they are there. They are political bosses. Do they have the real power in their hands? That is to be debated.

Patterns of civil-military rule. That is in Pakistan the picture is very problematic. Here, the direct military rule, you have had for 17 out of 63 years and the elected government under a military president, for example, Musharraf, another 16 years. Half of the time, half of the country's history is gone.

Elected government under a civilian government, like Zardari of today and before that certain presidents in the 1990s, another 13 years.

You have supremacy of non-parliamentary forces, that means civil bureaucracy, which ruled Pakistan directly, particularly migrant bureaucracy in the first 11 years.

The only time that there was genuine civilian supremacy in Pakistan was six years.

This is unfortunately the picture.

But when they leave, what happens? The post-military state which we've got today. Here, first of all, all the ruling parties, they have suffered through the gap of legitimacy because the

constitutional state is very resilient. All the laws, all the codes, all the situational framework which was put together under the British times continues to operate. Therefore, what we have today is a kind of a mixed bag.

Here it is, a president. Typically, he takes over power. Then there is the judiciary which starts heading a case against the military takeover. So judiciary does have a role.

And, of course, there are others who lodge a protest and file a case in the court. They are there too. For each and every one of the four generals who was discredited, out in the street there were street agitations against them, five months long under Ayub. Under Zia, of course, it was a matter of days. He lost the war, and straightaway he was thrown out. Zia, again, there was five-month long agitation against him in 1983. And Musharraf again, one-and-a-half year's long protest movement against. So every military ruler was discredited and thrown out. So that is no solution either.

Musical chairs -- this is amazing. I've taken liberty in putting it together, decade-wise. It's not exactly 10 years. It can be 7 years or 11 years or whatever. The rule of civilians, then army, then civilians, then army, then civilians, then army. Who's going to be next? Well, we'll see.

Constitutionally, what is the state, the post-military state which we've got today? One, the military establishment then eats into the vitals of the constitutional states. What it does is it turns it into a semi-presidential parliamentary system. This is the first thing every military coup d'etat tries to do and has done. The first time it changed the whole system into a presidential system in the 1962 constitution. Otherwise, they try to make (inaudible) system is there into a semi-presidential system.

Then they try to break up the political party. The political party is the target of hatred in Pakistan for every military ruler. Why? Because the political party is there as a platform to mobilize

people, and it has a rival set of policies if it can, or it may be allowed to. It is a danger. Therefore, there have been co-opting factions, throwing (inaudible) and other elements out of the party, and the process of making and breaking or parties unfortunately has been going on under the military, and of course rigging elections. That is rampant.

And bogus referendums. I want to be. Do you accept me as President? That's the kind of referendum Musharraf had. If yes, say yes.

So, obviously, people don't go to the polling stations. Why would they? Again, after 2 or 3 hours from 9:00 in the morning, by 12:00, generals lose patience, and they start filling up the boxes, and that's how 3 times or 4 times this has happened.

A young niece of mine in the family, in the 2002 referendum, she went there, a 10-year-old, and she put in I think 35 times, the ballot box. Everybody knows that it was reported all around, but they stick to it because they think that now, formally speaking, they have done the job and they've got

legitimacy -- meaning thereby that legitimacy, they continue to suffer, the legitimacy camp, because it is a constitutional state.

People are in the habit of casting their ballot for the last 115, 120 years. The remotest villages, all people, women who have never come out otherwise, they will go to the polling station and vote. That is one thing which they have internalized. Therefore, that continues to pose a problem, and this is the country where there was room for transnational input.

First, the India Syndrome, we have suffered from an insecurity syndrome vis-à-vis India. India is going to attack and finish us. This is one persecution syndrome, insecurity syndrome which we suffer from. The Republic of India happens to be, first of all, 10 times bigger. At that time, it was 5 times. And second, Indian designs as you know, Indians are the way they are. Americans will know it later.

There is a suspicion like hell that we are not going to survive. That is what strengthened the army as the first defense. We first defend ourselves, and then we'll talk about economics and those kinds of things.

Second, not only the India factor, proxy war within Saudi Arabia and Iran. You daily hear people. For example, I was interviewing some people on the SSP side, one sectarian party. Then I went to the other, into the lanes, somewhere there in the squatter settlements, and there is telephone, there is fax, and there are others. The leader of sectarian militant party, he got a telephone call from Iran, and he started talking in Persian.

And when I went to visit the other party in Jhang, the headquarters of the sectarian party, the most militant sectarian party, SSP, there, they get millions of dollars each year from Saudi Arabia, and the two countries continue to fight the proxy war on the side of Pakistan. That has led to the Laskhar-e-Taiba, the SSP, the other parties. They play havoc in

the small towns and big cities, and they continue to settle scores with their rivals.

The Islamic networking to the Pakistani diaspora is amazing. The American Muslims, they are amazing. I'm sorry if some of them are here. But they're still a very small minority here. There are very radical. I sometimes talk to my colleagues, that American universities create more jihadis than Pakistan universities. Here, the production factory is really more fertile.

The idea in diaspora is alienation, particularly the third generation. By that time the networking first of all is somewhat in place, and the social identity here, that is reworked. By the third generation, there are very much into it and they are trying to rediscover themselves, and so on. I can come to it if there is any interest.

Otherwise, the American input. Of course, the Pakistani state would not be the way it is today if there was no American input. They make and shape the structure in Pakistan. For the last 50, 60 years,

they've been influencing the events, the happenings in Pakistan.

First and foremost, it is the institutional imbalance. Pakistan was born with the army and the bureaucracy to be on top, and the American role has only worsened the institutional imbalance in Pakistan. From 1954 onwards, the first shipments, when these arrived at the Port of Karachi, after that we have seen that the military has been going up and up in terms of strength and other civilian sectors have suffered accordingly.

There has been a functional engagement with Pakistan through security. Security has been privileged far more over democracy, and it continues to be the major concern as far as the United States, as it goes to Pakistan, is concerned.

And here, in this framework, religion came back to Pakistan. Here, Islamic ideology (inaudible) be mobilized as a source of state legitimacy. Pakistan got out of India on the basis of religion.

Now if you don't talk about religion, then you are in a fix. How? To prove your case, you are false. In a way, you're obliged to talk about Islam being the source of legitimacy. So the most secular, the most progressive, the most modern elements in the Pakistani elite continue to uphold the cause of Islam, particularly Jinnah himself, and of course after that all who were there.

Coming to Hulama, Hulama were defeated, put aside, marginalized in British India. After 100 years, they have now found space back in the political system. They have bounced back and realize the undoing of Jinnah, particularly after Zia's Islamization. Here, the position of Jinnah, that you have nothing, that religion has nothing to do with the business of the state, is his famous quote. From that position, that established the religion and politics.

Today, most of the educated elite in Pakistan, and of course the people at large, would talk about conflation between religion and state. In Islam, you have everything. It's a complete code of

life. This is the mantra of today's most expressive and educated elite in Pakistan. Here, what happened is the state, which used to define religion, now religion is defining the state.

This is the Islamic establishment. These are the four major aspects I talk about:

Iconoclastic setting where they proselytize mainly;

And the organizational setting where there is JI-JUI-JUP and other organizations, Islamic parties including the violent, the militant parties like SSP, LAT, TTP which is tied to the Taliban in Pakistan;

And, of course, there is the sectarian setting: Shi'a, Sunni and others;

And finally the educational setting which is madrassa on the one hand and the university on the other. The madrassa because the children, they are exposed to religious education in a sexually segregated atmosphere where a child from the age 10 to age 20 studies. Of course he is cut off from women, particularly his mother, his sister, his wife,

whatever, in all the roles. The women are very remote from the man child's imagination. She is a walking saint. He is bad. He is the devil. He is evil. And that's why the Taliban was able to come to power.

For the Taliban madrassa to educate the children and young men, the first thing to do is that women should be cordoned off, away from visibility as far as possible, and she becomes somehow the target of policy. And I can come to it.

Schools. There is now a compulsory, 11-year Islamic studies course. Everybody is supposed to go to that. The students come to us in the university with already 10 to 11 years of teaching. All the Islamic studies have gone in, and that teaching of course is based on various kinds of fundamentalist sort of teaching. So it's very unfortunate, but the youth is completely Islamized in indoctrinated terms.

Where it all began, here is Uncle Sam giving the bone to the Pakistan army, who gave the bone to ISI, who gave the bone to the Taliban, who gave the bone to Al-Qaida, and who gave the bone to jihadis.

And jihadis come the other way and start behaving funny with the Uncle, finally.

Islam is the rest. This is now part and parcel of the attitude which we have today because Pakistanis not only talk about Pakistan; they have an agenda for the whole country. But there is the dichotomous world view, Islam in the West, because there is a verification of Islam at this end. They talk of Muslim mind as if it's different from the Hindu mind or Christian mind or Jewish mind or whatever. This is the kind of attitude from here and across there.

They also in the same way will stress in Pakistan, the Ulema, and others, they would talk about the Muslim mind, and scholars in the West would talk in the same way. Two essential "isms," two mega concepts have come up: Islam and the West. Scriptural understanding of contemporary Muslim societies is unfortunately what seems to be very popular, where they talk about conflation between religion and politics as it was given, as if this is

what has been the practice during the last 1,500 years, which is not the case, at least not in the case of 95 percent of the societies and 95 percent of the camp.

Terrorism and international relations. Now from the Pakistani perspective, it is the unresolved regional conflict that transformed into Islamic causes, starting from Palestine in 1948 and then coming down to the first Gulf War. Actually, anti-Americanism of today took roots in the first Gulf War. From that time onwards, 1991, and then Bosnia and then Kosovo and then Chechnya and then, of course, Afghanistan and then Iraq, Muslim lands facing the Western agenda of various kinds -- there it is, the unresolved conflicts that have become part and parcel of the imagination of the people who are very, very frustrated and alienated.

So I say that it is a political conflict; it is not a religious conflict. There should be a policy on conflict rather than a policy on Islam.

In Pakistan, Taliban strongholds, where are they? We all know. Take the example of Swat and FATA. Swat merger took place in 1969, and there was Frontier Crimes Regulation, FCR. Then again, it returned in 1988 and the merger took place. There then, they were merged within the mainstream Pakistan.

But here, there was nostalgia for the (inaudible) regime. Remember British colonial takeover and then there was this mutiny in 1857. People want the old style, old world back. Therefore, TNSM, this party declared that judiciary is un-Islamic, bureaucracy is un-Islamic, army is un-Islamic, et cetera. All the paraphernalia of the Pakistani state today is un-Islamic. This is the pre-colonial mind which gives a religious injunction out.

And similarly, FATA, what is there in FATA? Nothing of the British common law, which is operative in the mainstream; there it is not. Judiciary, there, it is not. It's tirga. Rational legal bureaucracy, there is one political agent. Appellate courts, there are none. Protection of rights, even if, for example,

they have writs of various kinds, habeas corpus and others, there, nothing. That means that we have this problem which is very disturbing, tackling the Taliban.

How to control Islamic militaries? Without looking anti-Islamic, the guy who would like to control that, but then he's constantly being painted as anti-Muslim. The military is killing Muslims. Peace deal mechanism, the army opted for that. Army strategy, that was in the beginning, but the civilians conquered. Zardari and others, the political government would say, yes, we conquered because they looked towards GHQ, towards the army.

Army says, peace deal. Then we say, yes, peace deal.

Army says now there is going to be military operations and a civilian sector would follow. In this process, there has been decivilianization of counterterrorism operations.

In Afghanistan, there is a war, a military fight and NATO forces. Why should it be in Pakistan?

Because there should be, like in the United States, like in the U.K., like in other established frameworks of authority, there should be police, there should be rangers, there should be intelligence agencies, around the military because then there was a policy of getting some kind of no-go areas to them, and they have established their pockets. If it was never allowed to begin with, then probably we would have been in a much better shape, and that leads to American pressure and indictment of the (inaudible) apparatus in Pakistan and various alarmist approaches, that Pakistan is going to go. It's going to fight. It's going to be taken over by the Taliban, et cetera, all kinds of approaches you hear.

Finally, this is the final -- policy implications, very incomplete. I'll just hurry through, but I thought probably something should be there of that kind.

First of all, it's a discourse which is in a way counterproductive. Discouraging the use of religion for identity formation, this is necessary.

Every section of the intelligentsia and political rulers in Pakistan have a section of those who are there somewhere in the decision-making, positions where they tend to use religion. It is counterproductive.

Cultivating peace as a superior cultural norm. What is there? Violence. Violence is now considered to be somewhat acceptable. There is acquiescence of the society to violence if it is carried out in pursuit of a noble cause -- jihad, whatever. And recreating the citizen, that means the highest protection of the regime. Be constructing a knowledge base terror because that comes again to usability in pursuit of a noble cause.

Diplomacy. Resolving indigenous conflicts, there is utter failure of resolving the indigenous conflicts for the last 60 years, from Palestine onwards, until today. Probably something in that direction would help.

Democracy. We must privilege decision partners of a project, whatever kind we've got now.

Education is key. Education, we have to rebuild the public school system which has collapsed entirely, and that means 90 percent of the children unexposed to the kind of education they are. The rest, they got to madrassas, and we know in front of us all the consequences.

Thank you very much. (Applause)

MR. GRAND: Thanks, Professor Waseem, for that very, very thorough and thoughtful analysis of political conflict in Pakistan, and its origins.

Let me just open it up to those who want to ask questions.

SPEAKER: I agree with a lot of what you said. I would want to debate a lot of what you said, but I'd like to focus on one issue where I would have painted a more complicated picture perhaps than you did, and I wonder how you react to my observations.

My perception as somebody who lived in Pakistan for three years, and has kind of been and out ever since, is that you're dealing not with "the Islamic identity," but with a multiplicity of them

which are in competition. The two that are most obvious, apart from the sectarian mosaic and so on, the two types of Islamic identity that seem to me to be in competition are Islamist nationalism versus a much more austere and orthodox vision of what is demanded by Islam. That second is the one which is frequently associated with the fundamentalism, the Taliban and the Middle East and so on, although all of those things could be argued about.

You also mentioned at one point that the Muhajirs, the migrants, in contrast to the army and the people who had always lived in what is now Pakistan, were looking for Islamic identity depth in the Middle East. But I would have actually associated that mostly with people from the frontier areas who were looking to Afghanistan but also to the Middle East.

If you look on Pakistan's Islamic identity not as one but as a whole range of them, what does this do to the picture besides making it much more difficult to give a coherent presentation?

MR. WASEEM: There is Islamist nationalism. (inaudible) swears by Islamist nationalism and votes for parties which are not Islamic. Islamic parties were never voted into office. There are three or four major Islamic parties, and these parties have been fighting elections. People do not vote for them, except and that's only an exception, in 2002 in NWFP, which is the North-West Frontier Province.

So what happens is that people practice separation between religion and politics. But if you ask the intelligentsia, they'll say there is a merger between religion and politics in Islam.

In Islam, I don't know. In lived Islam, in practical Islam, in political Islam, today the vote doesn't go to Islamic parties, and the vote belongs to God-fearing, religiously-oriented people in Pakistan, meaning that they tend to behave politically in a certain way.

Similarly, the elite talk of Islamic nationalist, and it gets worked up, particularly when it's mentioned vis-à-vis India. Otherwise, it is the

state's interest, like any other state's interest, which takes precedence over ideology. So Pakistanis have been looking forward to bringing the United States into the region all the time, for the last 60 years, because it is considered to be an equalizer against the very powerful India next door. So Pakistanis have been making a beeline to all the presidents in the United States.

This time, the United States has come not only to Pakistan but also to India. So there is another dilemma this time.

But nationalist Islam, of course, is the only Islam we all know.

Muhajirs, it's very interesting. Muhajirs, that means the Urdu-speaking migrants, which means one-third of the migrants. The elite among the migrants particularly the Urdu-migrants, they were the first ideologues of Islamic nationalism -- the most advanced, educated, liberal section of the society. For 25 years or so -- no, later. In fact, 35 years, they continued to vote for Islamic parties -- Jamaat-

e-Islami and Jamiat Ulema Islam. So there was again some kind of confusion.

They are far ahead of others in terms of education, for example, engineering and medicine and all that. But they voted for Islamic parties.

In Pakistan they didn't have the territory under their feet, in terms of belonging. Until today, they have this problem of belonging to a territory (inaudible). The very definition of Muhajir means "migrant." We have come from India, and we are those migrants from Indian who are not Punjabi in origin. So there are two kinds of distinctions to make.

They are the Islamic ideologues, or at least during the first quarter of the century. Then they lost out. By that time, Punjabis had matured into the intellectual stock, and they are now. It is called a Muhajir-Punjabi state. Pakistan is a Muhajir-Punjabi state in the eyes of the Baluchi and Sindhi and Pathans, a Muhajir-Punjabi state.

But Muhajirs, because they had been alienated in the last quarter of the century, it is a

Punjabi state. For all of them, now Punjabization of the state is the model. It's a Punjabi state. Some people, in talking to others have used the word "Punjabistan" for Pakistan.

So, yes, it was after the 1970s when some people among the Muhajirs reacted to Jamaat-e-Islami, that it was not delivering. So they formed an ethnic party, MQM. MQM is party based on those elements who are yesterday's Jamaat, Jamaat-e-Islami. So they are converted to ethnic identity, but because they are mostly lower middle class, MQM is essentially lower middle class. Its constituency at large is local, and it's very Islamic, very (inaudible), ritual-wise, otherwise. But these days, there's a competition going on.

Americans want liberals, seculars, and stand up and be counted.

Army says, no, no, but we are secular. We'll do the job. Now the army has been totally (inaudible) during the last 20, 30 years. Go to their training center. Go to their sort of mandatory

prayers, (inaudible) prayers and others, and the curricula which they are exposed to. We will do the job. We are secular. This is the work. We are secular because we are against Jamaat-e-Islami.

NWFP says, we are secular. The NWFP says they have defeated MMA, the Islamic party. We are secular.

So everybody is trying to say or sell its credentials to the West, that we'll do the job. But that doesn't mean they are what they are. They have their influences of drawing on class to which they belong, to indoctrination in the last 20, 30 years or more, and they are a certain stock, unfortunately.

MS. NYE: Hi. I'm Pauline Nye. I'm an independent consultant and longtime South Asia watcher and also found your presentation fascinating and in some ways very challenging. The issues certainly are challenging.

I wanted to put forth a thought I had as I looked at your power centers, and I thought about your prescription which I can only agree with, that a more

citizen-focused future for the Pakistani polity is where everyone should want Pakistan to go.

But as I thought about it, I wanted to throw out a question for you, which is whether in fact we aren't seeing a pattern, whether another way to look at what's happening in Pakistan politically over the decades isn't either a rejection or an acceptance -- in a sense a sine wave that moves around this middle class perspective, what you described as middle class power center, so that what you don't have is a positive alternative even in terms of power centers.

What you have is people are either for it or against it. As they go against it, the United States is associated with the authoritarian patterns in the public mind, and so the whole thing goes out, and then it slides back in because in fact what you described as the political class seems almost like a shadow, a placeholder -- more like a placeholder as you think about what has actually happened in Pakistan over the years.

So that was my first thought -- that perhaps like Hannah Aaron's discussion about Plato, that what was so important about him was that you were either for him or against him, but there wasn't any real other ground during his time, isn't true perhaps of what I think of as a militaristic, and what you've described as a national interest focused, ideology that comes with the middle class. So that's the first thought.

The second question I have is really one about the implications of what you've been describing, and that is while I agree totally with Tazi that we can parse the reality, the question as a practical matter is: What are the lenses that are available to people who don't belong to either of the power centers, other than various Islamic lenses, for understanding the reality with which they're presented?

If you were redesigning the Pakistani political and educational system, how would you refocus the citizenry on a more it isn't all external

players who are to blame for our problems vision of Pakistan?

Pakistan externalizes a great deal of blame for a lot of things that have internal solutions, not just external solutions. How would you refocus the citizenry on putting its hands on the machinery and understanding what is within the grasp of an empowered citizenry and parliamentary system?

MR. WASEEM: The Pakistanis, of course, are fixed on outsiders. The Indians are doing it. So all the explosions would take place obviously (inaudible). So Americans are exploding bombs in the towns and cities of Pakistan. There is extreme hatred in certain sections about the outsiders and particularly these two enemies are there. But having said that, people do understand to some extent that finally something is wrong here locally with the system.

So, first, the middle class. Pakistan's state system, as I said, is liberal, constitutional, legal. It is the legacy of the Westminster model of government. So there are all kinds of provisions for

protection of human rights, protection of women's rights, protection of labor rights, minorities. So we've got one of the best constitutions in the world.

The middle class, particularly the civil bureaucracy, which is entirely middle class or nearly middle class -- nearly entirely -- they believe in rule of law rather than rule of public representative. Their orientation is towards rule of law. They don't believe in the other part. Rule of law was entrenched in the British Indian state for 100 to 200 years. The rule of public representatives emerged on the horizon only 10 years before independence, 1935, in the act. So it's a kind of a veneer over the massive structure of administration.

So that means even India, for example, when I was there, when I was struggling with my visa -- or not visa, but the police registration -- I went to the office and he asked me, what are you doing here? Are you Pakistani?

I tried to explain that there is a conference on democracy, and that's how I'm here.

And he said, democracy, this is doing havoc. It's bringing havoc to this country. What is democracy, all these kinds of politicians?

I, a Pakistani, started talking for democracy to this Indian bureaucrat who hated democracy. What kind of democracy are you talking about? All kinds of convicts and bandits, they are there in Loc Sava, et cetera.

So there is this ICS and other kinds of bureaucratic apparatus that think it exercises real power, and it does not like democracy, even there where democracy is. And who doesn't know "Yes, Minister" and "Yes, Prime Minister." We all know about the British TV series.

So the middle class hates the guts of politicians, in Pakistan especially, because they started from their migrant status. They did not belong to the area. Then even from Punjab, they belonged to the migrant stock. Then they were local status, but they had inherited the same ethos. That

is the kind of middle class. It does not believe in public mandate somehow. Public lifers are not there.

My students, quite a few of them, straightaway they're looking for jobs. They're not looking for political careers. In fact, it was 30, 40, 60, 100 years. Because Lellava, for example, he made this wonderful study of (inaudible), which was producing the Muslim nationalists, let's say. They were all looking for jobs. They didn't want to go to public life.

They did not want to go like in Congress, for example. The Congress was, typically speaking, Muslim, a middle class party. But Muslim League was actually the dominating party. The Muslim middle class was job-oriented, and it continues to be job-oriented for the last 100 years or so. This is the class you're talking about. It doesn't have any ambitions to play a public role. Job-oriented in a society where 91 percent of the people do not speak Urdu, so they are to some extent aliens in their own society, but they are on top.

But they are very enthusiastic about Islam of a certain kind. The political, the nationalist, the pan-Islam is Islam. There should be an Islamic bloc. They are OIEC-oriented. They are fully Islam-oriented people. Nodoc, for example, he declared that every religion has a bomb, as if every religion has a bomb. So Islam should have a bomb, and that's what the Pakistani bomb is called an Islamic bomb by some, those who laughed and those who didn't laugh, in this particular expression.

So those who are outside the ruling clique, there are these three smaller provinces. Zardari is an irritant. But can he represent these three smaller provinces? He was elected on the basis of the vote which came with a constitutional majority of his vote, and that's how he's the President. Punjab didn't, and Punjab is the people in the army; 79 percent of the army comes from Punjab. Army was out of it. Punjab was out of it, which is the center of the state. So Zardari, from the day one, represents those forces and

those political communities and those outsiders who shouldn't be there in the first place.

That is why there is a kind of an unsatisfactory arrangement between the civilian ruling sector and the middle class based (inaudible). So that's how I understand.

Minorities of all kinds are with the PPP. Sectarian minorities, they will vote for PPP. Hindus and Sikhs and Parsis and others vote for PPP. The Pathans and Baluchis and others, Sindhis particularly, they vote for PPP, apart from the fact that they have their own regional parties. Shi'as flock to vote for PPP. So PPP is an amazing party in a sense, that this is the fallback party of so many disgruntled elements in Pakistan.

Therefore, I see that all this makes up the situation in Pakistan. Pakistanis are, of course, externally-oriented when something goes wrong, but they do know that there's an element of Taliban and there's an element of sectarian militants within and ethnic militants within which is destabilizing.

SPEAKER: Can I just clarify one thing?

MR. GRAND: Sure.

SPEAKER: When you say that there's one group that is in favor of rule of law, and this includes bureaucrats, and another that's in favor of rule of elected representatives, are you drawing a distinction between technocratic rule -- rule by regulations on the one hand -- and rule by political rule or rule by politicians on the other?

MR. WASEEM: It's the bureaucracy, and it's constituency which is the middle class in general, from where army of the national guard comes and from where the professionals and others come. But at the center of it is still the bureaucracy. And on the other side, the political elite. I mean that.

MR. ARAKAT: My name is Sayid Arakat from the *Irkutsk Daily Newspaper*, and I thank you, Professor Waseem. Your presentation is really compelling and shows how much more we need to know about this issue.

My comment, or question really, to you is to have a better understanding. I remember reading about the Mujahideen and it was really to me it appeared no more or no less than ethnic cleansing or forced hedra, forced immigration, with our Muslims gone back and Hindus are leaving and so on.

And I look at what has happened with Pakistan and India since 1947, and you see on the one hand that India has managed to have a democratic or a somewhat organized governing process and so on. On the other hand, Pakistan has consistently been plagued by turmoil and strife and so on and all these things.

So I wonder if one could turn back the clock and say that if Jinnah was able, let's say, to really arrive at some sort of accommodation, that perhaps Pakistan's ailment is really a result of this partition or the result of independence and so on. I would like your thoughts on that.

MR. WASEEM: There are two aspects of it. One, could Pakistan have been avoided? Could

partition have been avoided? For a generation at least, scholars continue to write about that.

What went wrong? So most of the historians -- British, Americans, Indian, Pakistanis -- have been writing about what went wrong. Why was it necessary to go for partition? So we come to different conclusions on both sides.

If there was no division, what would have happened is a matter of conjecture. Maybe there was an Islamic movement during the act of partition in the northwestern provinces or maybe there was not. It's possible. Maybe there was some kind of a constitutional arrangement where both the leaders would have agreed. So quite a bit of it has been written, and I don't really have an answer, what would have happened.

But what has happened is that partition has had an destabilizing effect on the countries, on the two countries, far less on India. As I analyzed, the reason is that India's ruling elite was not destabilized because migrants from Pakistani areas

came from the periphery. The Indian elite continued to rule India.

In Pakistan's case, it was the Indian Muslim elite that came to rule Pakistan. That was very destabilizing. It barred the way to the leaderships of local provinces to come up to the top. For example, they were restricted to play their role at the provincial level. Muslim leadership from Punjab continued to play a role in Punjab. Muslim leadership from East Bengal continued to play, or rather was pushed to play, pushed down to play the role in East Pakistan, in East Bengal.

So, on top, there was the rule of non-representative Muhajir elite, and apparently there was a prime minister and a governor-general, and of course there was a cabinet and a national assembly, a parliament. But in reality there was the bureaucratic rule, and that bureaucracy that belonged to the Urdu-speaking, and to some extent the Punjabi-speaking, migrants.

And the industrial elite, as I said, being from Bombay and from Calcutta, to some extent from Delhi and from Ambala and some Punjab, like Washeedi, for example, from East Punjab and so on, Islamists from Bengal, and there were the leading houses from Bombay. That is where the Pakistan Movement started, matured, and they always consider in Pakistan that this was the country they had established, which they did. They were the makers of Pakistan.

But that created a problem in the new country. India, it has only 1 percent of the population which is migrant, as I said. In Pakistan, every fifth person is a migrant. And in terms of influence, it would be even higher. Therefore, the dilemmas of a migrant state have to be taken into account when we look at the destabilizing and unintended results of partition.

MR. GRAND: Thank you, Professor Waseem. We greatly appreciate having you here at Brookings and appreciate this presentation. Thank you. (Applause)

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