

**AMERICA'S PRESIDENTIAL
ELECTIONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR
U.S.-TURKISH RELATIONS**

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Haluk Dinçer: Dear Guests, I would like to welcome you all to our joint conference with the Brookings Institution in Istanbul. The Brookings-TUSIAD program is in its second year and we have already seen in numerous occasions, the impact it had on America's, or at least Washington's perception on Turkey. I also would like to thank all those who have made this cooperation possible, fruitful and promising; especially President Talbott, Ambassador Paris, our Washington representative Mr. Akyüz and our dear friend Mr. Soli Özel.

Today, the speakers will analyze the different aspects of the possible outcomes and effects of the presidential election in the United States on our bilateral relations. Allow me to briefly touch upon some important topics within these parameters. Turkey and the US share a sound and deep-rooted partnership going back to the 19th century. Both countries have had a long-standing partnership, characterized by shared values, ideals and objectives, both regionally and globally. These include the promotion of peace, democracy, freedom, and prosperity. There have been controversies in the past over issues of shared concern, but the relationship has remained strong. We greatly value the relations between the United States and Turkey. These past few years, since just before the Iraq war, have tested the durability of our friendship and the strength of our cooperation. I am happy to say that both sides have come out of this problematic period with a better understanding of each others' concerns. In this sense, the visit to the White House by Turkish Prime Minister Mr. Erdoğan on the 5th of November was a turning point in our relations. The clear, explicit support of President Bush for Turkey's fight against PKK terrorism and the sharing of intelligence by the American military in Iraq are greatly appreciated by our government and the public at large. Now, this is a presidential election year in the US. No matter which candidate wins, a new era will begin and we will be watching the direction and the choices in American foreign policy with great interest.

We must look forward to a more comprehensive relationship. This will necessitate a careful and frank assessment of our interests. We must redefine the framework of our common interests, devise new approaches and be respectful of diverging viewpoints. Turkish-American relations require a special attention as the recent developments in Turkey have led to significant changes in the policy-making framework. The Turkish bid to join the EU, along with the democratization process, has made policy making more complex. The traditional US-Turkey partnership that was shaped around mutual security concerns isn't what it was a decade ago. A more multi-dimensional partnership has emerged as a result of changing threats and regional conditions. Therefore, new institutions and communication channels are needed to address the challenges of a new era in bilateral relations. Turkish-American relations in the 21st century must be built on a sound basis. Beyond the obvious strategic interests, the US and Turkey also share common values and as Turkey, we appreciate the support that the US gives to our efforts to improve our democracy on our way to the European Union. Besides the issue of the future of Iraq and our accession to the European Union; the promising developments in the long-awaited Cyprus issue, the future of Iran within the broader framework of the Middle East, the Israeli-Palestinian relations, the legislative developments about the Armenian issue at the US Congress, and the future course of American policy on these issues during the next president will be the main areas of interest to

us. Finally, since we are a business association, we attach particular significance to the economic dimension of Turkish-American relations. There are many fields of potential cooperation, energy being the most obvious one. We hope that the future of Turkish-American relations during the next president will have more room for mutually beneficial business partnerships as well. I believe that the contributions in this conference will help us clarify our expectations and long-term strategies. Thank you very much for your attention, now the floor is Mr. Talbott's.

Strobe Talbott: Thank you very much Haluk Bey. Let me first say that in addition to being grateful for all of you coming out this afternoon, I am very mindful that Arzuhan Yalcindag was going to be part of the program today. Haluk Bey, I would ask you to convey a message on behalf of all of your American guests to her namely `gecmis olsun` and I just hope that what I just said is incomprehensible only to the linguistically challenged Americans in the room, I think I said get better soon and may such accidents never happen again. Insallah.

I would like to add just few words of background to what Haluk Bey has said about today's event. This is really a watershed in the partnership that blossoming between the Brookings Institute in Washington and TUSIAD. Last year, thanks to instrumental support from TUSIAD, we were able to undertake our Turkey 2007 project while the focus was Turkey the locus of our work was in Washington DC, and I think I can say with some confidence that work made a real difference. We were able with our Turkish partners to elevate the level of understanding in the US, in particular, in the American capital of developments here in this country and their implications both for the region and also for the vitally important US-Turkish bilateral relationship. We were able to do this through a series of panels, working lunches and outreach programs that helped us build upon Brookings' contacts with the media with fellow think tanks and also with the Congress and the US administration. So it was a logical next step that we should move from the banks of Potomac to the banks of the Bosphorus and once again, it is possible for us to do this because of the support that we've had from TUSIAD. This is obviously as Haluk Bey said, an exquisitely well timed meeting in several respects. In the US, there is good deal of curiosity and I might add that it is curiosity tinged with a degree of concern on the part of one friend for another about political events here in Turkey, and how those events will play out in the months ahead. I've found in the several days that I've been here along with several of my colleagues, there is reciprocal curiosity here in Turkey about the political drama unfolding in the US, and that uncertainty includes a degree, not of concern perhaps but, of curiosity about what the implications of the US presidential elections and their outcome will be for the bilateral relationship and also for US policy towards this neighborhood. Without doubt, as will be reiterated shortly by my colleague Tom Mann, this is one of the most dramatic presidential elections that we've had in many years in the US.

What has stroked me over the last several days which have been one intense conversation after another, is the ease with which Turks and Americans are able to get together in private settings and trade questions and answers and insights. And what we are doing now with the opening of this program, is moving to a more formal setting but very

much in the same spirit of give and take, namely what can we learn from each other, how can we jointly brainstorm on ideas about insuring that the US-Turkish relationship will be strong in the years to come whatever the restitutes of domestic politics in both of our countries. And on the US side, I think we have a terrific team here and we should get down to business right away.

Tom Mann, who will be taking the podium very shortly, is one of the outstanding commentator, analyst and expert on US politics and you are about to get the benefit of his insights into what is happening in the American political seen. We are also very lucky to have with us Richard Burt, whom I've known for decades I think it is fair to say, and who like Philip Gordon who comes from the ranks of Brookings Senior Fellows has policy experience as well as deep intellectual understanding of events in this part of the world. And then of course, we have the captain of our Turkey team Mark Parris, and I am honored to consider him not only a mentor I might add a language couch, a colleague but also a very dear friend. Now I will turn the proceedings over to him, thank you very much.

Mark Parris: I want to say first of all what a pleasure it is to be back here not only in Istanbul, but in this room. I've given speeches here both as ambassador and since I left government service and it is pleasure to be back on this very spot, on this podium. I'd also like, before getting into the program, to express word of thanks both to Strobe for his kind words and to his colleague, in this endeavor, Arzuhan Yalcindag for their very very personalized support for our work on Turkey at Brookings over the past year. They have basically been, in a sense, my boss during this period and they've been the best kinds of bosses that is, they've very rarely ever told me to do anything and they've almost always done what I've asked them to do. It doesn't get much better than that and I can tell you it was never that good when I was residing in Ankara.

Our conference today comes at what Strobe suggested correctly is a very important juncture for both Turkey and US. In both countries processes are underway, that will be, I think, in a very real sense defining in terms of what kind of country each will be in the years ahead. It is the job of scholars and analysts at times like these, to try to look beyond to day to day headlines and understand the underlining dynamics and to make educated guesses about where things will come out and what it'll all mean. We are not going to try to do that for Turkey today, there are people here in the audience who do that full time and who can do it better then we can. What I hope we will be able to do, is to contribute to better understanding here in Turkey of America's ongoing presidential race. Our point of departure logically is that presidential transitions are really important. Our Turkey 2007 project last year in fact was premised on the expectation that Turkey's election of a new president last year would change fundamentally your political landscape, and I think that presumption was correct, and I think one can make the case in fact that the difficulties Turkey is experiencing today began last spring on the road to Cankaya. So successions matter, personalities of presidents or candidates matter, the kinds of teams that presidents bring into office with them matter, and the ideological or philosophical perspectives of presidents and their team's matter. And we should I think at moments and discussions like this, always remember that personalities, candidates,

their teams or their ideologies can surprise us. Let me give you couple of examples to put this in a historical perspective: George W. Bush ran for office in 2000 offering a vision of what he called a more humble American foreign policy, more competent management of our interests abroad and the turn away from what sums as feudal activities like nation building and pursuing peace in Middle East, and obviously has turned out very different then the candidate at least said he has expected. Bill Clinton's presidency is warmly remembered here in Turkey as synonymous with the concept of strategic partnership. I think what Turks generously generally forget is the initial years of Clinton's administration which saw very sharp differences of Iraq, over human rights, of de facto to arms embargo by the US Congress and Ankara's rejection on one occasion of American foreign assistance because it was linked to the Kurdish question. I think also, it is worth pointing out as we get started and Strobe has eluded to this that in terms of personalities, in terms of teams, in terms of ideology and philosophy, the 2008 US presidential contest offers perhaps the most dramatic contrast we have seen in American presidential race in years, most dramatic choices in a sense. Turkey has not directly been an issue in our debates thus far although, this is for you Phil, the Democratic candidates have found it necessary to make commitments on the Armenian issue that may prove problematic later and we will get into that later I am sure. But Turkey has absolutely vital interest in a number of regional issues that have emerged already and that will no doubt be at the center of the two ultimate candidate's debate on foreign policy in the months ahead. So Turkey is by no means a disinterested by-stander in this affair. And that is why, it is such an honor for me to be able to join Strobe and TUSIAD in presenting to this very select audience, a group of Americans who are unusually well qualified to help Turks to understand our forthcoming elections, the factors that may determine their outcome and the difference it may make in our bilateral relationship in the out years. We are going to do this in two parts. First Tom Mann who I will more formally introduce in a moment will speak on the presidential contest itself. Then we will take a short brake and Richard Burt and Philip Gordon will talk about how the Republican and Democratic approaches differ in terms of foreign policy generally, and Turkey in particular, and then Soli Ozel has kindly agreed to offer response from a Turkish perspective. And we'll take questions and do a brief Q&A after each presentation. So without further ado, I'd like to introduce my colleague Thomas E. Mann, he is the W. Averill Harriman Chair and Senior Fellow in Government studies at the Brookings Institution, between 1987 and 99 he was the director of governmental studies at Brookings and before that he was executive director of the American Political Science Association. He has practical experience on the Hill to buttress his academic credentials but has taught at some places you've heard of; Princeton University, Johns Hopkins, George Town, the University of Virginia and American University. He has written a list of books and in the brief couple of days that we've gotten to know one another better, I've been privileged to watch him be introduced to Istanbul for the first time and become, I think I can safely say, a fan. So Tom please come to the podium and enlightens us. Thank you.

Tom Mann: A fan is understating it, I am dazzled by this marvelous city! I managed to have three long delicious meals overlooking Bosphorus with stimulating conversation, it is to die

for, so I am looking forward to a return engagement when I can spend some more time and really get to know this lovely city. Mark gave me lovely introduction but I am sure some of you were disappointed, you looked on the program and you saw that Thomas Mann was to speak to you today and images of Buddenbrooks and Dr. Faust no doubt came to mind, it is a great name to have and I have to tell you about a post card I received at Brookings that is now framed in my office goes something like this, "Dear Mr. Mann, in one of my courses we are reading your book of Intensive Care, How Congress Shaped Health Policy and I've learned a great deal from it. In another class we are reading your Magic Mountain and I've been deeply moved by it. Only a genius could write fiction and non-fiction of such extraordinary quality what a shame that Germans drove you from Europe! It is a great country."

Upon leaving the airport after flying in on a Saturday afternoon the first bill board I saw was an advertisement for an American movie, Sex in the City which of course properly sets the stage for the two campaigns and the themes that the parties are struggling for, not in the terms of sex and the city, but rather looking to move American movies as a way of conveying a real sense of the campaign. As soon as Democrats realized that John McCain was going to be their candidate they said, aha the Academy Award giving us an idea, our theme will be "No Country for Old Man", then Republicans looking on this unending battle between Hillary Clinton and Barak Obama said, no, no, no the appropriate movie is "There will be Blood", and we've certainly seen good deal of it. I told the story to few folks on Saturday night and it is one of my most favorite, John McCain would be the oldest person to enter the White House if he is successful, but McCain is no dummy, he has a sharp political mind and he knows that the oldest age cohort in America is the one that has the highest rates of voting participation so he said, why not turn my age into an advantage, so he told his staff to schedule him in a retirement community. He wanted to do a little retail politicking there, so he appeared on the scene and went up to the first woman resident he saw there and said excited to her; "Do you know who I am?" She looked at him just absolutely bewildered and said; "No, but if you ask at the front desk they'll tell you". Now on the other side of the partisan aisle, this race has gone on so long and even with the resolution of the rules committee battle over the seating of delegations from Florida and Michigan who were sanctioned because they moved their primaries earlier in the calendar than permitted by the party rules, and the Porto Rican primary yesterday that Hillary won by over 2 to 1 majority, the race goes on. We have 2 more primaries South Dakota and Montana at which point it'd kind of wrap up, but as long as there are little hints that Hillary Clinton is thinking that carrying this contest on, so immediately what's conjured up in my mind as analyst is that wonderful picture of discovery decades after the end of World War II of Japanese soldiers who were still preparing for their next engagement on remote islands in the Pacific, so you conjure up the idea that Hillary, 6 years into Barak Obama's presidency will still be looking for a next round of primaries and contest. But listen, we make light of our politicians, but we have enormous respect for their commitment to engage in this brutal process of putting themselves in front of American voters, and in with more difficulty, American media, but in spite of the foibles and the missteps and the conflict, what you have to say is that this has been a most extraordinary year in American politics. I've been watching for almost four decades American elections and

policy making in Washington, and I've never seen set of contest and appetite for change, high stakes associated with the election, and perhaps most strikingly of all, the level of interest around the world not just in America as I have this year. I've been in recent weeks and months to Singapore, to Japan, to Italy and now to Turkey and I discovered the level of interest is quite amazing, I mean, you stop by a cafe and you see people talking about the relative merits of Caucuses, and primaries, and winner take all rules, versus proportional representation. I mean, Byzantium rules applied to the US, and people are really getting engaged in it. We've seen a surge of turnout in the primaries that is unprecedented. In America there is a palpable market for change in the face of very discouraging developments in America with respect to the economy, the war in Iraq, the overall state of governance and deeply unpopular and discredited president. We naturally gravitate to the personalities when we are talking about elections, and it is appropriate, they're relevant but before we do that, it is so important to understand the broad context the political environment in which the election is being fought, and there is no mistaking the fact that there are blowing in America gail force winds favoring the Democratic party in 2008. We see that there is no precedent in American history for a party being returned to the White House, specially a party that is already served two full terms in the White House under such adverse conditions. It doesn't mean that it can't happen but this election will be on many grounds be a first and that is certainly one of them. 80% of Americans believe the country is seriously off on the wrong track, Americans are more pessimistic, less confident in the economy then in decades and decades. It is partly short term fears of recession, but even more importantly I believe that for many Americans sort of living on economic edge, pay check to pay check, that the combination of escalating prices of gas, for healthcare, for college tuition now, increasingly for food commodities at the same time they've had no real wage gains since 2000 has created sense of anxiety and insecurity that is quite telling. Americans decided some time ago that the cost of war in Iraq has greatly outweighed the benefits, and while the improving security situation in Iraq has diminished the intensity of feeling about the war in Iraq now and certainly moved it to the back pages of the newspaper. The sentiment is there, and is reflected in all of the other broad assessments of the Republican Party, and the president. George Bush has been stuck at 30% approval ratings since shortly after the 2006 election. It's the lowest sustained rating of a president in modern history. We've seen during this time that Americans have moved from a position of 50/50 between Democrats and Republicans to a Democratic advantage with Democrats now enjoying a double digit lead in terms of party identification. And when it comes to party image, that is which party could handle the most difficult problems confronting the country again, it's a double digit Democratic lead when you look at harder indicators of the state of politics in America looking at new people being registered to vote, at turn out at primaries, and at fund-raising. Let me give you a little indicator at fund-raising; Barack Obama has raised more than \$260 million from the beginning of 2007 through April 2008. To put that in perspective, we have a voluntary public financing system that if you accept matching grants, you're limited in what you can spend and the limit during this whole pre-convention period is \$50 million. He's raised \$260 and well on his way to surpass, he's raising about \$30, \$40, \$50 million dollars a month. Hilary Clinton is no slouch; she's raised about \$200 million dollars. John McCain about a little under \$100 million. If you look at the party committees,

the candidates, the money now is, unlike the normal situation is, flowing disproportionately in the Democratic side. If you look at retirements from Congress in the Senate and the House, there have been five in the Senate, all Republicans. Look in the House there are 29 Republicans and 5 Democrats that have voluntarily left. It's an indicator of experienced politicians feeling a bad electoral year lies ahead of them. We've had three special elections in a row, with vacancies created from death and retirements, all in historic Republican districts, all of which were won by Democratic candidates. And then, if you look at polling and say which party would you like to have in the majority, the Democrats are leading the Republicans by 15 – 20 point advantage. In spite of the fact that the Congress itself as an institution gets 20% approval ratings, but the blame goes to the party that controls the White House. It's the way in which referendums work in our country. Now if only Democrats could find a way to have a generic candidate you know for president, not worry about the personalities involved, the election would be over, but it's going to be more complicated than that. Just to tell you, the Republicans have been looking for a way of improving their prospects because they're beginning to panic so the House Republicans came up with a slogan: "Change, you Deserve." Well, it's not that catchy but it's ok. That slogan is already taken. It was taken by a well known anti-depressant drug Effexor XR and Democrats were happy to point out there are various side effects associated with this, including loss of memory and nausea. So the question I put before you is: Do Republicans have any chance of retaining the White House and holding their own in the House and the Senate given the gale force winds and the sources of the well springs of those powerful forces operating this time around?

Well let's begin on the Republican presidential side. Let me say largely by serendipity, Republicans managed to nominate the strongest possible candidate for the general election that they could. Mind you, they didn't set about doing that, they almost drove John McCain out of the contest in mid 2007, but a combination of his retreating and returning to his underdog maverick style instead of running as the establishment front runner in the campaign allowed him to lay in wait ready for an opportunity that might be presented. And opportunities were presented because of the problems of Mitt Romney, Rudy Gulianis, and Fred Thomson. In the end he certainly managed to rise up again in New Hampshire thanks to the help of some of his other candidates to win a narrow victory in South Carolina, then was Florida, by the time they got to Rudy Guliani's favorite state, I mean he had vanished from the scene not having competed in all the events before that, and then with the winner take all rules of the Republican Party, some quick victories in big states pretty much wrapped it up for him early on. John McCain is a man with an extraordinary biography. A man with deep and relevant experience. A man of character and decency and straight talk, and he has gained as a result of his early victory while Democrats have carried the contest on to be able to start to unify a party that's never been particularly enthralled with him. He's just too much of a maverick. Too much of a person who says what he thinks. And let me tell you, a lot of his colleagues, Republican colleagues in the Senate, can't stand him but you can see they are rallying behind him as the only candidate who has any chance of winning the election so he's unifying the party, he's raising money, he's building a campaign organization, he's beginning

to define his differences with president Bush because any successful effort to tie him to the current president is the kiss of death.

Now on the Democratic side we've seen an unprecedented campaign. I mean, partly demographic; the first really serious female candidate and the first serious African American candidate. But what's really unprecedented is that this contest is so close. I was looking at the state of play following yesterday's primary in Puerto Rico and depending on how you decide to count various votes in caucus states and whether the Michigan votes get counted and if so does Obama get the uncommitted vote determines whether Obama or Clinton is on top, but both of them have run roughly 17.4 million votes over the course of the race. The leads range from roughly 0.1% for Obama up to a 0.4% lead for Obama or a lead of about .5% for Clinton if everything is counted the way she would like. And on delegates, there are only 154 delegates apart out of a grand total of about 4200. So it is an amazingly close contest. It took shape early in terms of not policy differences. The overlap between Clinton and Obama on policy is of the order of 90% 95%. It's much more stylistic. It's more a matter of the type of experience. It's the narrative of the campaign, the theme and this has produced the most striking demographic divide between the two candidates. Obviously Obama doing exceptionally well among young people, doing well among African Americans and doing well among upscale better educated higher income American voters. Where Hilary Clinton is strong with women, with Latinos, especially with older people and with lower income less educated Democrats. And those patterns have been so consistent that you don't have to look at polls, you can forecast the outcome of events based on the demographic makeup of the state. Now, Hillary Clinton began early on as the presumptive nominee, the likely, the favorite, the person who had endorsements, public recognition and popularity among Democrats, the capacity to raise money like no one else, her pick of political consultants. Barack Obama appeared on the scene, the consciousness of Democrats and Americans at the Democratic Convention of 2004. Just a few months later elected to the Senate for his first term but who had decided by the end of 2006 to seize the opportunity. Why didn't he wait? He's a young man, little experience, bide your time ... That's not how American politics works. We don't elevate people up a chain of experience. Obama consulted with various of his senior colleagues in the Senate and to a person they said go for it. The window seems to be open, you have a theme, a story to tell that resonates with the Zeitgeist of the time. We have severe ideological polarization in America between the parties. We've had a collapse of civility. We've had a bane of ideology in America truth be known and Obama was promising to help us get beyond that. Some said a little vaguely, wasn't clear how he was going to do it but that was the theme of change of bridging divides, of bringing us together and once he decided to go for it, he proceeded to put in place a campaign that was unprecedented. If the test of a candidate for office as far as their suitability for the White House is the prescience of analyzing strategically the situation and putting in place a campaign that fits it and then executing that, then Obama is the clear winner of this nominating contest. He, unlike Clinton, early on figured if he was going to have any chance, it was going to be hand to hand combat for delegates, not a fight for early momentum and blowing his opponents away. Hilary Clinton understandably followed the model that was operating for the last couple of decades

which is one candidate does well early on, emerges, blows the other candidates away, their resources dry up they drop out. It never comes to the rules, the caucus states beyond Iowa. She guessed wrong. She didn't have a compelling narrative, she didn't have a strategy that fit this particular opponent and the nature of the times and by the time they realized that when Super Tuesdays victories in the big states were more than compensated for in delegate gains from Obama's overwhelming victories in some smaller midsize caucus states and then his success in the next level of events. Then they realized they were behind, they were unlikely to catch up in a traditional way and the only way to win the nomination was basically to and so strongly and to have such serious questions raised about Obama's capacity to carry on and win in the general elections that the so-called super delegates, the 20% at the convention there automatically by virtue of being elected officials or party leaders, that they would be in the position to make the judgment that even if he had won a narrow victory among the super delegates, he would be way behind in the popular vote, he'd be trailing in the polls, pairing the two candidates against the Republican nominee that these super delegates would exercise their judgment and nominate her. The problem is Obama didn't collapse. Yes, he lost the states he was expected to but he made Indiana a real horse race, almost won it. A blow out North Carolina. He won Oregon and likely will win Montana and South Dakota tomorrow. In the polls, he managed to hold his own. Certainly a big lead over Clinton among the Democrats but even in the pairings against McCain was doing as well as Hilary Clinton was, so there was no compelling evidence for super delegates to reverse the seeming preference of Democratic voters in the primaries and participants in the numerous caucuses. So that's what's been happening. Clinton, because the contest is so close, had every reason to stay in and hope for developments like the Reverend Wright that would discredit the Obama candidacy that he would react in a way that underscored his lack of experience and naiveté, that somehow he could be too easily perceived and portrayed as a 1960s style radical, that in directly one way or another, that traditional white working class Democrats would be uncomfortable with his whole posture and his race and his background that, that possibility would exist. But alas over all this time when she's been enjoying substantial victories, starting in Ohio, continuing through Pennsylvania, West Virginia, Kentucky and now Puerto Rico, the super delegates have been moving toward Obama. So where at the beginning of this year she had a lead of over 100 net in the super delegates, now that's swung to 40 delegate advantage for Barack Obama and my belief for the last several months would be that on this next Tuesday night and Wednesday, once the formal calendar had been completed that the remaining super delegates and there are about 180 of those who haven't yet committed would move disproportionately, perhaps moving only in one direction to Obama, to provide the additional delegates he needs to have a strong majority at which point that race will be ended as he declares victory for the nomination and Hilary Clinton at that point having no basis on which to keep the contest going. So unlike my story of the Japanese soldiers in World War II who kept it going, I predict Hilary will not keep it going and will gracefully suspend her campaign and begin working on behalf of the Democratic ticket. But it does leave questions as to whether this long extended battle has worked to the advantage or disadvantage of the Democratic Party. My take on this is, all's well that ends well.

I think it's likely that those Hillary Clinton supporters who feel so strongly, so aggrieved, so hurt, who believe she was treated unfairly by the press and that didn't like some of the things that Obama said, I think in the end, Hilary Clinton can help bring them home. On the positive side, this extended battle has led to additional registrations and we're now talking in the millions across the 50 states to the building of Democratic organizations across states where they have not recently competed with generating extraordinary amount of votes and interest that is likely to serve them well in November.

So what's the bottom line? Where does all this end? I feel confident in telling you the congressional side of the picture. As you know there's a very narrow majority for the Democrats counting on two independents including Joe Lieberman who was campaigning on behalf of John McCain, but for organizing purposes he's with the Democrats. But it's 51-49. My prediction is that Democrats will pick up 4-8 or 9 seats in this election. Right now looking at this contest, the candidates, the fundraising I think it's going to be on the high side of that. There really is a prospect of a turnover like we had in 1980 when Ronald Reagan had that huge victory over President Carter and to many people's surprise all of these seats in the Senate fell to the Republicans and they regained the majority in the first time in a quarter century. I think that's very likely to happen and you're likely to see some real upsets. Mitch McConnell, the Republican leader right now is behind in the polls if you can believe it in Kentucky. Elixabeth Dole who's sort of seen as safe is now running neck and neck with her Democratic opponent and there are many other seats where Democrats are substantially ahead.

The same thing is happening in the House of Representatives. It was a big year for them. In 2006 they gained 30 seats, as I said earlier; gaining 20 seats more is perfectly plausible. You look at the open seats, you look at the candidates running and you get the sense that there is another wave if not tsunami building that will sweep more widely across what is largely an uncompetitive terrain in American congressional elections and produce substantial victories. Which means whoever is elected president, they will face a Congress with larger Democratic majorities than now exist, and I can guarantee you that speaker Pelosi and majority leader Reid will be returned as the leaders of their parties after the election.

But that leaves us really with a presidential election and here's the trick in all of this. We don't have that many elections. We, political scientists like to say we're analytic, we apply good modeling to forecasting elections, but how many elections do we have in which there's no president or vice president running on the ticket? Well the last time was 1952 and the time before that was 1928 so we don't exactly have a lot of comparable situations. Nor do we have a whole lot of situations where one party has been in for 8 years. We have, you know as I said, an unpopular president, an economy in turmoil, an unpopular war. You look at any one of these things and at the very least you conclude that there is a huge Democratic advantage going in to the election. The real question is how much the candidates can and their campaigns make a difference. How much of the difference can the candidates and their campaigns? We know they can be important in elections where the political forces are more neutral or blowing slightly one way or the other. Campaigns have certainly made a difference

in 2000, in 2004. You could argue in 1988. They can make a difference at the margin. But we don't really have an experience in which all the forces were operating one way and the candidates came in and moved the equation in entirely the opposite direction sufficient to overcome huge party advantages. So if it happens, if John McCain is elected president, it will certainly be as unprecedented as his age or Obama's race. It will be extraordinary if he is able to make that happen. Let me just say I know him well. I've worked with him on some issues including campaign finance. I like him. I have enormous regard for him but I am convinced he is cold sober about his prospects and his staff are too. They know what an uphill struggle they face. How are they going to do it?

Well first of all, it's the contrasting biographies. He will, as he has not much in the past, play up his experience in the military, his time as a prisoner of war, his involvement in major national security issues. The books he wrote about character and books written about him. He has a marvelous personal story to tell. Turn the age into an advantage, point attention to the relative youth and inexperience of Obama and play the sort of trustworthiness. These are serious, dangerous times, do you want to take a chance on someone you know so little about? Secondly, he has to argue he's not a typical Republican, that he is not a part of the ideological group that was central to the Bush administration, that he parts company on issues like climate change and possibly now on arms control. He has this dilemma because he has to mobilize Republicans who are deeply suspicious of him, because he's not one of them. He supported campaign finance reform, and they hate campaign finance reform in a philosophical basis. But he's done other things especially in his contest with George Bush in 2000, his bitterness over what happened to him in South Carolina, his decision to go back to the Senate and basically oppose President Bush' initial proposals including his 2001 2003 tax cuts. He had serious conversations with the Democrats before another Vermont Democrat Jim Jeffords switched from a Republican to an independent to give majority control to the Democrats, he had serious talks with Tom Daschle about doing something similar. He also had serious conversations with John Kerry about, mainly one way Kerry not McCain wanting to get McCain on the ticket. But it tells you something about the extent to which he had become so alienated from his party. But he made a decision that he was going to support George Bush in 2004. He reconsidered his position on taxes, he made peace with some of the prominent members of the religious conservatives and decided to go after the Republican nomination but his whole attractiveness in a general election is that he's not part of them. That he's a real independent-minded man and whether he can balance those two interests is a question. It's particularly difficult to balance them when now you are pushing for tax cuts that are more ambitious than those of President Bush, and when you are a very strong supporter of the President on the war in Iraq.

The final element in this, and this is the most difficult to talk about and to analyze because we simply have no historical experience to draw on. An African-American candidate running and the real question is with who obviously campaigned as a post-racial candidate who was the Tiger Woods kind of a candidate, not the Jesse Jackson candidate. Who really wanted to move beyond the Civil Rights background and to appeal broadly across races as part of the general tone of reconciliation, but you know, he has a complicated life of sets of

interactions with people in subcultures that seem very threatening to other Americans. The Reverend Wright is the primary example of that but there are others. So one way or another we're going to see a return of identity politics not in the sense of a racial or gender positive approach, but rather a questioning of whether this candidate shares our values, our beliefs, our loyalties and our Americanism. John McCain's not going to do this, I believe him when he says he's not but it will be part of the campaign backdrop and we simply do not know what will happen. He is going to stick to his message which is a message of change, excitement of reconciliation of getting beyond the ideological polarization, and he and other Democrats are going to do as much as they can to say that they are running against McCain-Bush ticket whoever McCain's running mate is, that this is the opportunity for a third Bush term and we can't have them.

Now, if you look at money, if you look at mobilization likely turnout, debates, role about side groups, this is going to be very active, very energetic campaign and at times it is going to be nobling and uplifting. I think Obama and McCain could well appear together in some link in Douglas like debates with no journalists intervening and no Wolf Blitzer saying "now let me turn to America's best political team" 17 times during the course of a televised debate and instead, two intelligent, decent extremely able individual politicians going at it on a range of issues, but at the same time there will be under current on both sides leading to a frankly uncertain but exciting campaign. My bottom line take on it is that, if history is any guide what so ever the broad forces that are operating are too strong on behalf of the Democrats to give Republicans good chance of winning, but a chance they have may be one in three chance of winning the White House, two and three chance of Obama winning that is worth investing some dollars on a one-third. It is not impossible, it will only if in the course of the campaign Obama is discredited and McCain is elevated, there is such a distinction that people are prepared to live with more divided government, more presumably irresolution on fiscal policy and health policy and the energy policy that they just don't trust Barak Obama, that is what it would take. It could happen, I wouldn't bet on it, so I think the most likely outcome is unified Democratic government whether that government led by Barak Obama could succeed in dealing with very difficult issues on the plate of new administration, domestic and foreign, or whether expectation raised in the American public would be dashed, or if McCain beat the odds and came to work with Democratic Congress, he would quickly discover that much of what he is proposing has been proposed by George Bush and would be dead in water so he would have to chart an entirely different course, completely apart from the platform on which he ran. In some ways, he probably would relish it. He would love to stick it to his Republican colleagues in the Senate and begin doing business with Democrats which he has done in the past. But it is not exactly how one expects elections and Democratic accountability to work, that is McCain governing in a direction that is closer to what Barak Obama was proposing then himself but in terms of getting anything done as opposed to just stases that would be the only opportunity for governing.

All of this raises such interesting prospects that it is no surprise that we Americans are really engaged in this campaign and as a student of American elections and American politics, it is great for business. Thank you very much.

Mark Parris: Tom that was splendid. We all learned a lot, including us, Americans in the audience. To get the ball rolling let me raise something that occurred to me while I was listening to you describe sort of what has gone on and what is likely to go on from this point on? You spoke a lot about personalities, you spoke a lot about style, you spoke a lot about tactics, you didn't talk a lot about issues as something that will really make a difference in this campaign in contrast to say 2006. 2006 elections was clearly about Iraq, and I wonder if that is in your opinion because this is a year where the candidate really is the issue, kind of person that we're electing and the American people's willingness to put sort of bet on one or the other depending upon their comfort level or whether there are and you cared to mention issues that are going to be tough for one or the other of them to handle and could have at some point break the race open. For example if Iraq was this kind of issue, and am not saying that is, but for argument purposes, you likely to have an election in Iraq at some point late summer, that is going to pretty late in our electoral cycle, if it is a success, and if the Sunnis come back in, and if you have a lot of people on television waving purple fingers to signify that they voted, if it looks like something that Republicans can describe as, we win! And you've got a Democratic candidate who is on record as favoring rapid withdraw not further define, could that hurt him in the end game? I don't want to focus it too tightly on Iraq but that is the kind of thing I've in mind when I raise the general question of do issues really matter in this election?

Thomas Mann: Great question, I did manage to get through whole talk on the elections without saying much about issues. Let me tell you why, what is striking these days in American politics is the level of agreement within each political party with respect to most of the central issues confronting the country. That has not always been the case, think of the battles that were based on policy differences, ideological differences in 1972, in 1980, even true in Democratic side in 1984. Bill Clinton had a huge impact on the Democratic party, he really repositioned them to be a very much a setter party, setter slightly left and many of the old battles that challenged the Democratic party have simply given way. Part of it too is that kind of sense of opportunity here that Democrats could really win and while we have nuances on how to reach universal healthcare coverage, and some modest differences on other matters that what unites us is much greater than what divides us and therefore the discussion of these Democrats running for the presidential nomination is not going to be in terms of differences of positions on issues but rather what we political scientists call valance issues that is to say yes or no. It is good or bad and that means referendums on issues, so what you do is run against the record of the party in government, on the economy, on taxes, on healthcare, foreign policy, on energy policy so the focus is against the party in power and tends to not get involved in details of the policy but instead critiquing the consequences of the policy. So that's been the strategy for Democrats and Obama who has a fully fledged policy staff and positions worked out on the range of issues you'd expect, has insisted on not being vonkish in his presentation and keeping his rhetoric more thematic. Now at times that left too little flesh on the bones for ordinary voters and he's had to fill in some of that but basically that's been the strategy. On the Republican side, you also had similar agreement. No one was attacking George Bush, they were paying feel tea for the most part to the positions embraced by the

core constituency groups within the party. So looking at the campaign, you had Democrats off here and Republicans off here and they had agreement within themselves, so it is only when you engage the general election campaign that you begin to see stark contrast in approaches, in this case between John McCain and Barack Obama. It is stunning to see the different world views on tax policy, on how one deals with down side of globalization, how one compensate those who are losing and left behind, even though community as a whole is gaining, how to deal with the fact that we spend now 60% of GDP on healthcare, and yet we have 15% of the population without insurance and our record of health is far behind countries that spend much less than we do. McCain says, it's the market and make the market work. Democrats believe this is a classical situation in which markets alone can't produce satisfactory and optimal outcomes. I think Iraq is another issue. Hillary Clinton realized early on, she was at a disadvantage by having voted for the war in Iraq and has moved to a position that's very close to Barack Obama's, and they will engage that issue but you are quite right if in fact some of the decisions of Al-Sadr in the cease fire the decisions of some Sunni forces to sort of continue to work in collaboration with Americans and the Iraqi government to deal with Al Qaeda forces, if the Iraqi government follows up on some recent actions that are quite surprising and encouraging in the military arena, and things are looking good that's less of an issue for Democrats, but there is no way I can be turned into a positive for the Republicans. What I would do is continue to let Iraq recede and for the economy to move forward. Right now the economy is overwhelmingly the number one issue on the minds of Americans. That is where the Democratic Party will be directing its attention on the domestic arena, but there will be a foreign policy story they want to tell, they'll be running against the Bush administration and its record, but they are also going to engage John McCain. They believe now after all this effort, to talk about a 16 month withdrawal which will begin presumably 3 or 4 months after a new president is inaugurated and therefore stretch over almost 2 years after 5,5 plus years in operation isn't so rapid, and in fact will make the argument that our chances of achieving a more stable situation is increased with more speedy withdrawal of American troops. They'll engage in but it won't be as critical a part of the campaign debate as the domestic issues are. But you are right, candidates themselves will also be talking about themselves, their experiences, their values, their beliefs, their loyalties and that will occupy a good part of the campaign.

Ozdem Samberk: First of all thank you very much for this very exciting presentation. But you didn't talk about the possible vice presidents. Do they play role in this race and if they do who are they? Thank you.

Thomas Mann: Listen, we all like to talk about the vice-presidents because it is one thing we don't know, it is an uncertainty, it is a mystery and in a heart of hearts we believe that the choice of a vice-president is a window into the thinking of presidential nominee into the kind of style of governance, even if vice-presidential nominee doesn't have any material impact on the election outcome. We also know that a lot of vice presidents become presidents therefore it is important who gets on the ladder. It was important when George Bush picked Dick Cheney or was it Dick Cheney picking Dick Cheney for the running mate slot when it was obvious Bush was not picking someone to begin a campaign to succeed him from the vice-

presidency. Bush liked that. So these things are important but they are not usually important in terms of effecting the outcome of the race. For example, I hear comments like “well Barack Obama has to get a very senior figure on foreign policy, to kind of buttress his inexperience. Wrong. The presidential candidate has to pass the hurdle, reach the threshold, and go beyond and list someone who is trustworthy to be commander in chief. It took Ronald Reagan in 1980 almost before the election to pass that test, but he did. Everyone has to do that, yes maybe Obama is interested picking someone who happens to have experience in this area, but it would not be a prime consideration. Let’s stay on Obama. General rules are; first do no harm, don’t pick someone who you know very little about, maybe who comes out of the business community but has never been through an election campaign, never been politically vetted, someone who’s complicated life as the husband of Geraldine Ferraro’s had. It becomes an issue when campaign diverting attention from the presidential nominee, so first do no harm, second pick someone who is plausible to occupy the White House in the face of a death or disability, that is extremely important. Don’t alienate any base in your party that is going to turn off because of it. Pick someone who you can imagine working with in a constructive way, who doesn’t contradict the theme, and approaches to the election campaign in the governing that you have. These are all principles, and then beyond those when you satisfy those, you might go looking for help in other ways. In Obama’s case, if I were looking for help, I’d be looking for someone with some significant connection to working class Democrats. Coming out of catholic tradition, you can think of anyone from Tom Dashle of South Dakota, the former Democratic leader of the Senate to Jack Reed, terrific Democratic senator who was in the military, the army with Chuck Hagle in Vietnam. On the arm services committee plain spoken, coming out of sort of working class roots, widely respected, but there are some governors to think about. Virginia offers at least 3 Democratic candidates; Tom Cane, Mark Warner and Jim Web. They are all sort of noteworthy, as are governors in Pennsylvania, in Ohio and then even some other possibilities and more red states. So I think, Barak Obama has huge group of people to consider and drawn, you noticed I did not mention Hillary Clinton. In my view that would be a bad idea, it is too much contrapontalism on the ticket. They have sort of different approaches; I think Obama’s weaknesses as demonstrated by Clinton’s successes could not be delivered to Obama if Clinton were on the ticket. I don’t think Hillary could actually help defob white working class Democratic support; part of that Hillary’s support was there because she was the alternative to Barak Obama and that could easily go to McCain if she were on the ticket. It is exceedingly important to have Hillary Clinton enthusiastic supporter of the ticket, but not to have her on, but more importantly I’d just think it would be a very difficult situation for governing in the White House. The possibility of bringing back issues pertaining the financial matters, conflict of interest with the Clinton Foundation and really sort of distraction. This is my thinking on the Democratic side and the Republican side John McCain needs to nominate someone younger than 71 or 72 but not as young as Bobby Jim Doll, the new governor of Louisiana, because that one reinforces Obama’s age, but secondly doesn’t meet the test of someone who is ready to step into oval office. So he is going to be looking at some experienced Republicans. I think traditionally not out of business community, it is too risky, there are some interesting governors from Florida to Minnesota, there are other possibilities that he can draw on, but again I don’t expect it to

make a huge difference in the election itself, but his choice if he were to win the presidency would quickly become one of the leaders of the National Republican Party. –Not Joe Liberman- Joe is close to 72 and Joe Liberman’s record apart from national security is sort of pro-same sex unions, pro-choice on abortion, he’s been against tax cuts, he is a liberal Democrat on a whole range of economic and social policies. That would so alienate core groups within the Republican Party, that it would do him more harm than good. It would also stimulate Democratic turnout who believe Joe has gone too far by becoming such a staunch supporter of John McCain.

Q: Thank you. During your informative talk you’ve reflected the fact that the selection of the Democratic candidate was quite a lively process and some has commented that this actually reflects upgrading Democratic participation into politics. On the other hand, the issues are not very different as you mentioned, but support toward them is quite different, so I wonder if there is some contradiction here, and if you could explain why this situation has rise. Also in view of this, can we say that the pattern of US has changed during this election campaign or is it very conjectural depending on the personalities of the candidates?

Thomas Mann: I mean it is very interesting what you asked, and it is quite correct to point out how odd it is to have policy agreement but such sharp demographic differences in the voting groups. I think it is a function of a number of things; one that we have a prominent woman running, secondly we have a prominent African-American running, third the African American candidate has made such a generational appeal invested in appealing to young people and remember America’s level of social tolerance has been increasing over time, but the way it happens is the new cohorts come into a different set of norms much more relaxed about race, about same sex relations, whole host of things, and yet older people sort of retain the kind of concerns you’re more likely to find strong traditionalism among older people and that sort of leads to a different set of attractions. I think it is also the case that the way in which Obama framed his campaign was one that resonated with certain kinds of voters rather than others and that Hillary’s, especially once she got her sea legs and became a good candidate, was making the kind of bread and butter appeals in very straight forward ways that her husband was so successful at doing it connecting with people. So it is not that their policies are different, but the way and which they solve them led to a different set of readings by voters in very different circumstances. It is very interesting to what’s happened to the makeup of the political parties lately. Right now Democrats still get majority of votes among the lowest income voters. On the other hand, they now are doing exceedingly well with highly educational professional class some of whom earn very large incomes, and others teachers, and the like not such high incomes but the same kind of values and orientations. Democrats are also home of the labor movement, and there is sort of racial minorities associated with them, some of whom stay in the black community or quite socially conservative but economically liberal. It is just a very different mix of people within the same party, but interestingly you can have broad policies that unite them, and so Democrats have good chance of pulling them together in a general election, but in a primary with two very attractive, very visible, very able candidates, it is not surprising that they develop their own kind of demographic appeals and that is exactly what’s happened this time. Let me say just in terms

of participation more generally, yes America is at the low end of the voting turn out, we beat the Swiss but not many others, but lately in the last several election cycles we've been increasing turnouts. It was true in 2004, when we jumped to over 60% of the eligible electorate. That is pretty good for us because we've been well below 50% in recent times and our midterm increased as well and every indication is that it is going to go up again. It is partly because you are getting this acceleration in turnout among young voters and if they turn up this time, they may well be socialized into playing more active role in our politics and you may see a different kind of dynamic develop in the future.

Q: Some people write that, era of conservative dominance in US politics has ended, do you see evidence to agree with that assessment?

Thomas Mann: That too is a very interesting question. American politics has been dominated in recent years by conservative ideas, conservative organizations and movements, we like to talk about this being started in the gold water loss of 1964, it sort of took some years, Richard Nixon governed in a different way. We were talking before less ideological more real politiqu, both domestic and international was discredited, but with the emergence of Ronald Reagan and the anti-tax movement, the call for smaller governments, the moral traditionalism and the assertive internationalism which then morfed into kind of neo-conservatism. The ideas and sort of leaders of conservative movement have really defined the play field of American politics. Bill Clinton very skillfully took advantage of economic downturn at the end of Bush and moved into office, and in some respect, was able to, as I said earlier, reposition the Democratic party and I thought found a sweet spot in American public opinion. But scandals and failure of Gore to move into the White House created yet another opportunity for quite conservative agenda under George W. Bush to perceive. But the cost of George Bush's success were at the expense of conservative movement because right now the sense is that the conservative ideas, by the way no one was more eloquent, and making this case than William F. Buckley before he died, that they simply no longer addressed the major challenges the country and the world faces. More and more tax cuts do not solve all problems, government has, as we see in sub-prime mortgage melt down, an important role to play in structuring competition and insuring transparency. And the world is such that acting alone we can't impose our will on other countries and build democracies from scratch. We are going to figure out a way to work more constructively in alliance with a much more complicated world with many sources of power and influence. So the sense is that and you see it in flailing efforts of the Republican minority in Congress to formulate set of ideas, and frankly you see it, and this will be a real test in the McCain agenda on the domestic side. It really is a reiteration of much of what president Bush tried to achieve, succeeded on the tax front but not in other areas. So yes my sense is that the project of George W. Bush and Carl Rove to kind of use government to use the idea of ownership society to attract more voters to build a durable, larger republican majority dominate our politics for some time, has failed utterly. Republicans will probably experience a second serious electoral setback in a row and will have to go back to the drawing boards. But for their part, for Democrats, if they want to take advantage of this, they have to deliver. And let me tell you, the plate of offerings we're getting from them now are not wholly realistic and not sufficient to deal with these problems

so they have enormous challenges on the governing front to seize the opportunity and to see out of this opportunity whether out of this opportunity they can create a credibly plausible program for governing to move forward with it such that there is enough positive response that they can get reelected and continue to develop in an upward moment. Nothing is guaranteed about the future of American politics, but what we do know is the conservatives have played out their ideas, they lost steam. Democrats have an opportunity, whether they will capitalize on it remains to be seen.

Mark Parris: Tom, thank you for virtuoso performance. We're now going to move to a portion of the program which focuses a little bit more directly on Turkey and what difference the various outcomes in the United States may make. We're going to start off with presentations by Richard Burt, and then Phil Gordon, and then Soli Ozel is going to respond and we may kick things around up here a little bit, and then open it up for questions.

So first, Richard Burt. He is currently the managing director at McLarty associates, a high powered Washington consulting firm. He has had a very distinguished career in and out of government and the media. He notably was the US chief negotiator in the strategic arms reduction talks with the former Soviet Union and indeed brought the nuclear arms treaty we refer to as START, to a successful conclusion. He was the US Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany, as it was called then, from 1985 to 1989. And he was Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs which is of course responsible for bureaucracy for Turkey from 1983 to 1985. He previously served as the national security correspondent for the New York Times from 1977 to 1980. Rick is a frequent visitor to Turkey. He's one of the people in Washington that you can count on, to know what he's talking about when the discussion of Turkey begins. There are not a lot of them. So Rick, we're delighted to have him with us this afternoon. Please join me in giving him a warm welcome.

Richard Burt: Well, first of all thank you for that nice introduction Mark, but I have to say I get a little nervous when I'm introduced by somebody who says that I know what I'm talking about. We'll see about that. I'm going to be fairly brief and we've agreed in advance that we've got three people on the panel, you don't want to just listen to us. I think it would be good if we could engage in a give and take. I should begin by saying or reacting, if I could, to one or two things that the previous speaker said about the American political situation. I am supposed to know something about foreign policy but because of course I live in Washington, everybody knows about politics who lives in Washington. It was noted that John McCain who I support and advice does have, a so-called age issue. He will be, when of course he's elected, 72 years old when he enters the White House, but he likes to remind everybody that his mother is 96 years old. And I've met his mother and she's a very energetic, feisty person. But McCain likes to tell the story of, when she went to France last year as a tourist, she tried to rent a car and the French authorities, when they saw her driver's license, saw that she was then 95 years old, and said you're too old to rent a car, she went out and bought a car and drove around France. So whatever you say about John McCain's age issue he at least comes from a very strong gene pool.

I'm going to try to quickly address a few questions about what may be a McCain and to a little degree what an Obama foreign policy might look like. And what it might, how it might affect Turkey. But let me make the most basic point which is I think, regardless of who gets elected in November and enters office in January 2009, you can expect the unexpected. And I would like to just remind you that when Richard Nixon was elected president in 1968 at a time when the United States was embroiled in an unpopular war in Vietnam, and at a time when the United States was beginning to confront some very serious economic problems, no one would have predicted that he would be the man that would help restructure international relations by first of all making a strategic opening to China, and sitting down with Mao Zedong during his first administration, and nobody would have predicted that he would have launched the era of détente in the US –Soviet relationship and reaching agreement on two very important strategic arms control agreements. Nixon was viewed as a right-wing conservative, not somebody who was particularly flexible or pragmatic about international relations. So I think we need to be very careful in making predictions from a podium like this or anywhere else about the foreign policy of a new administration. The same I think is true more recently, as it was pointed out earlier, that's true for George W Bush. I remember very very clearly, and I'm sure Phil does too, in the presidential debates 8 years ago, when he criticized nation building and talked about a humble American foreign policy when arguably this administration has launched the most far reaching nation building enterprise in modern history both in Iraq and Afghanistan, and I think few people would describe the experience of the Bush administration as an exercise in American humility. So expect the unexpected.

Secondly, I don't really also agree with the point that John McCain may have a one in three chance of getting elected. There are a couple of things to bear in mind, especially foreign audiences need to take into account about US presidential politics. I think that unlike most European politics, people when they enter that voting booth tend to reduce that choice down to two people: the party affiliation, the party platform, the party brand whether it's

Republican or Democrat in the United States is much less important than in many other Democratic countries around the world. They think about it as a choice between two people. And I think it's particularly interesting that this year when it is true that I think the Democrats enjoy many important natural advantages, when the Bush administration rightly or wrongly is seen as not having succeeded, at a time when there are strong recessionary pressures at work in the United States, and at a time when the United States is involved in an unpopular war in Iraq, it is very interesting I think, as a Republican to look over at the Democrats and see that this was the year that they decided to choose as presidential choices either a woman who has maybe the highest negative polling numbers of any major American politician in the case of Hilary Clinton, or an African American. I'm not criticizing their choice of those two candidates, there's many actually good things to say about that, but it is I think a risky strategy in my view. And that tells me, it's one of the factors that lead me to conclude that this election is going to be a lot closer than many Democrats, I think, expect.

Now concerning foreign policy. The first point I'd make about American foreign policy after 2008 is who would really want to be the man or potentially diminishing chances woman responsible for American foreign policy for the next four years? The number of challenges that individual will face is really daunting. You do have a conflict that is dragging on in Iraq with very uncertain prospects there. You have a very difficult challenge in Afghanistan. Sometimes we focus so much on Iraq because we all understand the complicated issues there, but we ignore the fact that Afghanistan is equally a difficult challenge for the United States and its allies there. You look at the problems and challenges of worldwide energy crunch when it appears that oil and gas reserves are leveling off, appetite of the emerging markets as well as developing markets for energy is ravenous. People want more not less energy so the complications of energy security, the problems that were brought up in our last session about global climate change and particularly now the challenge facing any new American president in building a new consensus, a new level of support for American leadership are really awe inspiring. The new president will face as big a challenge as I can remember in at least since the end of World War II. Now in facing that challenge a new president is going to have to trade off ideology and values which have become very popular in American politics in foreign policy versus realism and good old fashioned definitions of national interest. There's a kind of paradox here. During the cold war when the United States was competing with the Soviet Union, it was viewed by and large as an ideological struggle between democracy, free markets and communism. But the United States pursued throughout most of the cold war a realistic pragmatic policy. It didn't pursue a heavily ideological foreign policy. But since the end of the cold war and without a competitor as the Soviet Union was, the United States has had the luxury and both Democrats and Republicans have exhibited this, have become more ideological. Thus you did have during the Bush administration during the second inaugural address of a goal of trying to Democratize most of the known world. You have injected into American politics again on both the Democrat and Republican side is a greater emphasis on values and less on traditional definition of national interest. The question that's important for Turkey, I think in the

question McCain versus Obama is, will a new administration, will a McCain or an Obama administration be more ideological and more focused on building democracy and spreading democracy, or will it be more traditionally policy, focusing on strengthening relationships with key strategic countries. If it is more focused on democracy building then domestic developments in Turkey, could have a real impact on American attitudes towards Turkey. If on the other hand, the US foreign policy is more traditional and pragmatic, American policymakers will pay less attention to what's happening domestically in Turkey and more focused on building a strong strategic relationship with Turkey to deal with problems in the region. The question of the mix between ideology and real politic is unresolved, I have to be quite honest, I think in both the Obama campaign and the McCain campaign.

The second point, I think the second point I would make is Turkey is despite the problems and difficulties of recent years, particularly the aftermath of both the first Gulf War and more importantly the initiation of the War in Iraq, despite those problems, Turkey is viewed I think by both parties and both candidates as a strong traditional ally. That's the good news. The bad news is, I know that a McCain administration while it will certainly go further and try harder than the last administration to consult, to take its friends' views into account, to try to formulate a consensus with its allies, it will expect its allies to do more as well. That has to be the kind of trade off that at least on the Republican side of the political equation will need to work. We will work harder to achieve a consensus. We won't have a take it or leave it approach to American foreign policy. Remember the famous statement by George W Bush "You're either with us or against us" ? You won't hear that from John McCain. You'll have a much stronger effort by a man who's very experienced in over the years in working with particularly the NATO alliance. But we will expect greater cooperation and coordination and that will put new pressures perhaps and new demands on American allies including Turkey. I'll come to some of those pressures or demands in a few moments. To think about American foreign policy towards Turkey is I think too narrow. And that brings me to my third point.

We have to think about what would a new administration strategy be to the overall region. And that brings into account a number of disparate issues. For example, what will be US foreign policy towards the Middle East peace process because that will be an important variable, I think, in terms of American standing in the region. Will this new administration, unlike both the Bush and the Clinton administrations keep the Israeli-Palestinian issue on the back burner until the very end of its tenure? In the case of a McCain administration, I think that won't occur. I think there's a recognition that the peace process does need to be a priority, that you can't just put it aside and come back to it at some later date because the process worsens when you do that. So I think that one factor will be, I think, an effort by a McCain administration, the strategy of pursuing and achieving a two state solution with an independent Palestine alongside a secure Israel.

The other question is diplomacy beyond the Palestinians. I think the role for example that Turkey has evidently played behind the scenes in trying to generate some momentum in

the Israeli Syrian dialogue is something to be welcomed. It's good that countries like Turkey, like Egypt are beginning to involve themselves in the Middle East peace process because that is stabilizing and constructive.

The issue of Iraq, of course, appears on the surface in this campaign as a big difference between McCain and Obama. Whereas Obama's stated position is that he wants to begin the withdrawal process after taking office. McCain talks about achieving victory. I'd be curious to hear what my colleague Phil has to say when it's his turn to be up here. I tend to think that maybe in practice those differences may not be as great as they sound on the campaign trail in the sense that anybody who's going to withdraw US forces from Iraq has to focus on the consequences of creating a vacuum in Iraq. The consequences of creating a widening conflict not only in Iraq but also spilling over into neighboring countries. So in a sense, I think, a president Obama is going to be somewhat constrained. I'm not predicting that he won't withdraw forces, but I think it's going to be more difficult than he says. And at the same time, for a president McCain, a man who has served in the US military, has very close relations with military leadership in the United States, he's going to learn the pressures and constraints of maintaining a large number of forces in Iraq indefinitely, and the implications for our military capacities overall. So I think that the difference in our Iraq strategy, assuming this kind of present situation and this gradual improvement that seems to be taking place on the ground in Iraq, may not be too large. A bigger difference may in fact be not over Iraq but over Iran. I'll let Phil talk about Obama and Iran but I want to just really make two quick points. One, we shouldn't underestimate, I think, the consequences, particularly the regional consequences of the Iranian acquisition of nuclear weapons. I'm not predicting an Iranian nuclear strike against Israel but what I am predicting is the real potential for a number of countries in the region to begin seriously considering an acquisition of nuclear weapons themselves and Turkey may well be one of those countries. But I can give you a laundry list of countries including Egypt and Saudi Arabia that could be tempted to acquire their own nuclear capabilities as a response to Iranian nuclear acquisition. In my view, that would be highly destabilizing and I think a president McCain would work very very hard with the international community as well as the countries in this region to deter the Iranians from achieving that. Secondly, while Barack Obama has talked about sitting down and talking to the Iranians, I think it's easier to say that than to actually do it. First of all I'm not too sure who you talk to in Iran. Is it Ahmedinejad? I mean he apparently doesn't actually control most of the Iranian armed forces. Is it the supreme leader? I don't think we have a perfect understanding of how these decisions in Iran are made and I sometimes have the impression that Iranians themselves have difficulty reaching clear decisions and there seems to be a behind the scenes balance of power arrangement so I'm not too sure that any discussions or negotiations with the Iranians are going to be very easy or potentially successful. Now I'm not arguing we shouldn't attempt to do that. But we certainly should be very careful and very patient. I'm reminded here of a perfectly understandable desire of a young new president of the United States, John F Kennedy in the early 60s who wanted to sit down with Nikita Krushchev. He had a meeting in Austria, in Vienna with Kruschev, which turned out to be essentially a failure because Kennedy thought he was going to succeed in convincing

Krushchev, that the could work out the United States and the Soviet Union could work out a stable relationship and Krushchev was very aggressive and according to the historians actually shocked Kennedy by virtue of how aggressive he was. Some historians have argued that led Krushchev to think that Kennedy was so young and inexperienced that he could take risks such as deploying missiles in Cuba. So I'm not against in principal the notion of at some stage a US Iranian dialogue, I just would make the point that we better take it very slowly, we better think through the consequences and be very serious and very careful in the process.

That leads me just really to my conclusion which in both parties the two candidates and their campaign teams are so focused on getting themselves elected that they're not focused at this stage on working out a carefully formulated foreign policy game plan. So I think a better guide to understanding what their foreign policy will be is not so much what they are necessarily saying now in their public speeches. Look carefully at the people that they select beginning with their vice presidential candidates, and then importantly their national security advisors, their state and defense department cabinet members, and then I think it will become much more clear than it is now. Thank you.

Mark Parris: I should have mentioned before introducing Rick that while both of our speakers from the United States are advisors to the campaigns, they are speaking as individuals and not for the campaigns. So you should not confuse anything that they are saying with official position of the Obama , Clinton or McCain campaigns but rather as an expression of their own views. Phil Gordon who will speak next, is Senior Fellow for US foreign policy at the Brookings Institution where he's worked since 2000. Phil too has had experience in government to temper his impressive academic credentials. He was Director for European Affairs at the National Security Council under President Bill Clinton. I can tell you it was always reassuring when I called from Ankara late at night to hear his voice on the phone because I knew the matter could always be handled with great competence and responsibility. He has held teaching and research posts at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London, John Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies in Washington DC and elsewhere and like Tom, is the author of a number of books on US foreign policy including a rather provocative article that came out a few years ago which in retrospect is sounding prescient entitled "Who Lost Turkey?" Phil, may I welcome to the podium and would you please join me to welcome him.

Phil Gordon: Mark, thank you for the introduction, for having me here, nice to see a lot of old friends in the room and also nice to be on a panel with Rick Burt, Soli Ozel and Mark Parris all of whom I have great respect for. Like Rick, I will try to be brief so that we can spend most of our time with back and forth because there is a lot to talk about. Let me also reiterate Mark's point about speaking in a private capacity. I want to have a frank exchange and give you my views of these issues as an analyst. I'm not here to spin any campaign point of view or to win votes, although if anybody happens to be from South Dakota or Montana, maybe we could have a private word after the session.

Q: For which campaign are you working?

The Obama campaign I'm sorry. I'm an advisor to the Obama campaign but again let me just give you my analytical sense of some of these issues.

And I want to start with a broader point. It is very easy in these conversations to focus on their candidates and what their past positions were and who are their advisors and we can get in to all of that, and we should talk about it, but I want to begin with a broader structural point that I think will constrain anyone who happens to be the next president of the United States. And that has to do with America's optimism, power, and feeling about International Affairs. My point is if you look at this in a historical context, US foreign policy is more or less, lets say extroverted, interventionist, global, depending on how rich and powerful Americans feel. That is to say, go back and take different administrations Truman, John F Kennedy, Ronald Reagan, Clinton in the second term, certainly George W Bush. In periods when American was feeling ready to bear any burden and stride the world and you see the consequences for our foreign policy and equally you have cycles in between all of those where you might say Eisenhower, Nixon, Carter, Clinton when he was first elected, George H W Bush in which Americans are a little bit less ready to support such extroversion. My point in mentioning all of that is that, I think we are entering one of those second cycles whereby Americans will be far less ready than they have been in the early 2000s and were in these previous cycles to transform the world. The early 2000s, and I think this is quite relevant for Turkey because much of the interaction we have had with Turkey in recent years has been a consequence of this view of transforming the Middle East, spreading democracy and that was a unique product of the early 2000s when Americans were feeling particularly vulnerable after 9/11. But even more importantly particularly powerful after a decade the 1990s in which militarily, economically, politically, technologically America became by far the greatest power in the world with no real enemy and that plus the vulnerability led the Bush administration to reverse what was really the campaign platform or realism and humility and to turn it into a strategy for transforming the world including the invasion of Iraq. And let me just say that those conditions don't seem to me, to be in place any more. When that campaign started, we were spending more on the military than all of the other countries in the world put together, and a military that at that time wasn't overstretched and overused. We had massive economic surpluses, no one's feeling like that any more, economic growth was strong. Those conditions led to an American optimism that meant that when the President said we have a problem out there, and a security issue let's fix it by transforming the world and turning the Middle East into a Democratic zone of peace, Americans said "Ok, let's give it a shot." As they have previously on occasions, when America was feeling particularly powerful. That's not the mood anymore and my point is that no matter who gets elected President, they are going to be constrained by these realities of budget deficits, overused military and a disgruntled American public that wants to focus on the domestic concerns that are at the top of their agenda. That's my first point none of which is to say there aren't major differences between the candidates which I would like to talk about. There are differences of course, I just think that general constraint will apply to either one.

I'll give you what I think are the most important differences, but let me make one or two sort of prefatory remarks to that. One of that is that, I think that this is a little bit harder to talk about in the McCain campaign than in the Obama campaign, not just because I know the latter better but because I think the former is more divided than the latter. It may be fair to say it's hard to analyze the possible Obama foreign policy because there's less of a track record. That's certainly the case. Senator McCain has a lot more long standing positions on a lot of issues and more of a record than Senator Obama. On the other hand, the reason it's harder in the McCain campaign, and I think Rick Burt was honest about this, is that whatever Senator McCain's own positions may be, when you look at the advisors in that camp, I think you really do see a difference in the way they see the world between realists like Richard Armitage and Brent Scowcroft and Richard Burt and neoconservatives like Bob Kagan, Bill Crystal, or Randy Scheunemann the head of the foreign policy campaign team. Now, I just think that between the former and the latter campaign is a very different view of the world and Rick pointed out that much of what will characterize US Turkey relations, if there is a McCain presidency, would depend on the degree to which America is seeking to spread democracy in the Middle East. Well that will be a function of which sort of part of this campaign prevails in the debate over what kind of foreign policy a McCain foreign policy would be. So I caveat any comments I might make about the McCain camp with that notion that, what I think is interesting about it is that I think the candidate himself has much in common with the neoconservative camp in terms of the belief that the American military can be used in a positive way to change the world. The strong belief in democracy, an idealistic view of the world, the idea that we can roll back dictatorships but the structure points you more towards the realism, the American public and even a lot of Republicans thinking we've had enough of idealistic use of military power, let's be a bit more cautious about it. So I think there is a tension there between the candidate and some of his key advisors and the structural factors that will drive US foreign policy.

A second point I would make before talking about what I think the differences are between the two candidates is, I think we have to be honest and recognize that there are also some similarities. And this would not have been true had the Republicans nominated almost any of the other possible nominees. Giuliani, Huckabee, Thompson. By similarities, I'm talking about a couple of key issues: Guantanamo and detainees and torture. John McCain and Barack Obama have similar positions on those issues which are very different from most of the other Republican candidates and the current Bush administration. Climate change is another very important issue on which senators Obama and McCain have very similar views which would not have been the case for many other Republicans or the Bush administration. Immigration is another one on which McCain has had a different view than many Republicans and is not too dissimilar from Obama. So again I don't want to overemphasize the differences. There are some key areas of commonality between the two. All of that said what are the differences, let me just try to articulate what I think the main ones are.

You have to start with Iraq just given the degree to which that has been at the center of the foreign policy debate between the two individuals. Now, lately the smart thing to say about Iraq and so it's not surprising that Rick said it, is that those differences can be

overstated, that a primary campaign tends to push people towards the extremes and the politics of it pushes them towards an extreme view and then once they become the President, they have a push towards the center. That's true about almost all of these policies, its no doubt true about Iraq and therefore good sound analysts are emphasizing that McCain won't be able to stay as long as his rhetoric implies because we don't have the troops to do that, and the American people don't want that and the politics don't permit it and Obama won't be able to leave as fast as he says because we have responsibilities on the ground that won't make it happen. All of that is true and yet this has to be high on our list of differences between the two candidates.

John McCain has invested in so much in supporting this war, he supported and advocated it from the start, he supported and advocated for the surge in American troops that is still present in Iraq and he has said quite clearly that victory is the only possible outcome for the United States and he defines leaving before Iraq is a stable place as defeat and accuses Obama of embracing defeat. That is just very different from the position Barack Obama has taken which is to oppose the war from the start, and to oppose the surge and to call on American troops to leave. Obama of course has made clear over and over again that we have to be as careful getting out as we were careless getting in, but nonetheless he is determined to see a relatively rapid withdrawal of American troops from Iraq. Those philosophies about the war will matter when it comes time to making the hard decisions about what we do. Obama recognizes that the United States continues to have responsibility in Iraq, he says we'll continue to need troops in Iraq to fight Al Qaeda, to defend US officials, to deter the neighbors from intervening and that could quickly get you up to a number of troops that hasn't been defined. But he's also focused on the opportunity costs of being in Iraq not just for America's reputation in the world but for other contingencies not least Afghanistan where he advocates more US troops which is only possible if we significantly draw down the number in Iraq because we simply don't have enough to do all this at once. So, while it is true that the differences can be exaggerated given the politics, there are nonetheless important differences between them. I think those differences are less if the security situation in Iraq continues to improve. If it continues to improve, it makes it easier for McCain to draw down anyway because the higher number of troops wouldn't be needed and it also puts less pressure on Obama to act quickly to getting the number of troops down because there'd be less political pressure to do so and that would obviously be the best outcome for everyone and then the United States can gradually withdraw no matter who's the president. If that's the scenario I think we're OK.

The differences will come out if that happens not to be the case. If after another couple of months of the security situation getting better it should get worse, if the Sadr cease fire breaks down, if the awakening movement reverses and the Sunnis turn back against the United States, if Iran or others intervene the way that creates instability, if Al Qaeda gets off its back. Now who knows if any of these things will happen, we all hope none of them will, but I think if the situation deteriorates in Iraq then these differences would come to the fore. If it gets better, I think the differences narrow.

A second important difference between the two also already alluded to, is in the general area of diplomacy especially towards dictatorship, rogue states. That has been another part of the political debate and there's also some substance to it. As you already heard, the Obama logic McCain refuses to certainly have presidential talks and in some cases no diplomacy at all with some of these dictatorships or rogue regime where Obama has advocated engagement even at the presidential level. The Obama argument is that, unless you see talking to the United States in and of itself as a reward that is likely to lead to influence, we're better off doing diplomacy. You need to do diplomacy not only with your friends but with your enemies and as everybody knows he has even taken that to the point of saying he would be ready to personally meet with leaders from some of these countries if he thought that could advance American interests. JFK has been cited a number of times and Obama cites him too about never negotiate out of fear but also never fear to negotiate. That's a broad philosophical difference between the two candidates and it plays out most importantly and most specifically vis a vis Iran which will no doubt be, especially if the Iraq security situation continues to improve, in this miserable inbox that Rick Burt described that the president will have. Iran's going to be very near the top, it is not at all implausible that they'll be on the verge of a nuclear weapon's capability in the first year of this presidency. Nor is it implausible that they will be doing things that make a withdrawal from Iraq more difficult, requiring a response from the United States. And there, I think, the differences between McCain and Obama play out. Obama's specific readiness to negotiate even with enemies, plays out in Iran in an important way which is to say that the current US approach, indeed international approach has been to insist on the suspension of uranium enrichment before the United States will talk to Iran at all about the nuclear issue. Obama's view is that, that is just not working and what he means by no preconditions is to say that our objective would remain the same: they must stop enriching uranium but that's not going to be the precondition to talk to them. That's going to be the precondition to have an agreement with them. So that directly and immediately changes the way we talk to Iran. What hasn't been decided, I think, and these are important things are aspects of those talks as was already said, who do you talk to? That remains an open question whether you can find an interlocutor in Iran that is worth talking to certainly at the presidential level. When do you start talking to them? Iran also will have an election six months into our new president's term. Do you talk to someone on that side before that happens or do you wait for it to happen? And then, what is the scope of the talks? Do you have specific talks about the nuclear issue or do you broaden it to the whole set of issues we engage with Iran on? A lot of open questions about that but the basic principal of talks and negotiations with Iran qualifies as a difference between the candidates.

I would add Russia to the list of important differences between Obama and McCain. Senator McCain takes a very hard line view of Russia as do some but not all of his advisors. You've all heard this clip when he looks into Putin's sole unlike Bush, he sees the letters K-G-B, that's the way McCain talks about the former president Putin but more specifically on a policy level he has called for kicking Russia out of the G8 which would raise issues with European and other allies and is a position that Obama doesn't support. And McCain also has promoted this notion of league of democracies which will not include Russia again, as a way

of saying there are things we want to do in the world and we are going to do whether the Russians like it or not, and they are not going to be part of the conversation. So I think those are key differences with Obama. I should be clear however that the specific policy positions Obama has taken on a number of issues where US and Russia collide have not exactly been pleasant to the Russians. So to say that, he believes in engagement with Russia and want to have pragmatic working relation with Russia doesn't mean that he is somehow going to be nice or take positions that Russians like, as you look at the list of issues that are relevant, you find that Obama, I think, in every case has taken the same policy view, as McCain takes positions that Russians don't like. He supported independence for Kosova, he supports NATO enlargement, he supported membership action plan for Georgia and Ukrain, none of these he is very critical of Russia's cracking down on NGO's and the media and lack of democracy, so it is not as if Obama.....nuclear issues require cooperation with Russia and therefore we have to be careful about going too far in this Russia bashing because we need Russia as a partner and so again it fits this category of doing diplomacy not just with your friends or not just with people you agree with, but with sometimes your adversaries as well.

Let me mention just one last issue that I think is somewhat different between the two. One can go on and these are all nuances in different ways but the last thing I would mention as a difference I think would be in the terms of candidate's impact on the world. By that I mean to be perfectly honest it is a reason a lot of us ended up supporting Senator Obama in the first place if you care about America's image in the world and its relations with other countries and you want to turn the page on the Bush administration and the damage it did to those relations and America's image what better way than to have a president who is from another generation. The symbolism of African American, a style that is the opposite of Bush style in the sense that it is reflexive and flexible and pragmatic and yes humble and designed to reach out. If you care about America's standing in the world, this I think would be dramatic way to do it. Let me quickly add, I think the same is true for Senator McCain in many ways, he would also turn the page, he would also have different style of diplomacy so in that sense they both point in that direction but I think I would argue at least that in Obama case it would be a dramatic break with the past that would allow America to restore its credibility, image and relations with countries in a very important way. I think that provides great opportunity for all of us including Turkey and US together at the same time, I will be honest I think Rich said the same thing in that case about McCain presidency, it is an opportunity but it is also a challenge and I find in travelling around the world from Obama perspective, it is so encouraging to see so much support for turning the page in this way but it is little bit daunting to fear that expectations are so high that we will never be able to meet them. And in terms of challenge and asking things, the same thing is true for Obama. To be honest, I worry a little bit about a scenario whereby Obama is elected and he does all the right things in the eyes of many countries, on detainees, and torture, and climate change, and diplomacy, and Iraq, and then they say `thank you very much America you go and deal with these problems yourselves` we will be coming to allies and saying `OK, now you can't blame all this on Bush administration anymore, that pretext is gone we've got some serious work to do together and it is going to be hard for both of us`.

Let me end with Turkey, I suspect in our discussion this will come up a lot, maybe Soli will bring it up but I just wanted to make brief comment about how Turkey fits into all of this. With Turkey because it involves so many issues you could spend half an hour doing the check list of what are the policies on Armenia, Kurdish issue, Cyprus, Iraq, energy, I won't do that. I'd rather make a broader point that the new president will need a Turkey policy which I think will be a contrast with the past couple of years. What I mean is, I think in the past couple of years we got to the point where because Turkey was taken for granted, Turkey was residual of other policies not least spreading democracy and regime change in Iraq. I think we did use to have a Turkey policy. Turkey was strategic ally, was seen as important ally during the cold war and so we had this sort of implicit deal based on neutral interests where US supported Turkey's EU entry, it supported IMF loans to Turkey, it supported energy corridor in Turkey and had good relations with the Turkish government and Turkey in turn acted like a strategic partner and ally of the US and that was in our neutral interest for number of years or even decades. But it led us to believe that our relationship was so strategic that it could never go wrong. I think that was true on both sides. Turks never imagined Americans would really do things that Turks told them would be detrimental to, Turkey and the Americans never imagined that its close great strategic western looking partner wouldn't go along with the US when push came to shawl, and when that happened and we've seen the consequences in terms of Turkish opinion of US and my regular visits here over the past years I've seen that number go down, down and down. I think this is the first visit in ages where actually went up a little bit so maybe we've seen the worst of it. But the nonetheless, I think the cause of that was that America had other priorities and Turkey was just the function of those and my point is that I think for the next president we can't afford that anymore. Turkey is too important country, a player in the world and a partner for the US. I think the Bush administration itself realized this within the past year and started to do things, repair this relationship but I think that is going to be a priority for the next president as well the relationship is too important to just be residual of other issues. Why don't I just stop here and look forward to discussion. Thank you.

Mark Parris: Soli, I'd like to introduce you from here and I'd like to ask you to stay at the table so that we can sort of sagway into the panel discussion part of this and before you have chance to respond were really terrific presentations. I just like to say what a pleasure it's been for me to work with Soli Ozel, who was there sort of at the beginning along with Phill, actually in conceptualizing Brookings Turkey 2007 program and has been a, I'll repeat, performer in our Washington events including interpreting results of your July 22nd elections last year, sort of playing the Tom Mann role after the fact. So we would be very interested in sort of your assessment as one who has been watching this relationship in depth and for a long time as to what you heard today and how you think it plays in Istanbul and Ankara and elsewhere.

Soli Ozel: Thank you. Since both speakers were short and brief to the point I don't have to be. This is not an easy task mine that is, this has been two brilliant presentations and I think for the audience very helpful first in identifying what the next American administration would be seeing as its priorities and, of course, the different approaches of the two candidates, or one presumptive candidate and the other candidate.

There are certain concerns, here believe that you know everything in America not only that you know everything, but you do things for us and we are not really in charge of our own destiny, and I suppose this goes for much of the world even the Chinese in a bad day. And of course in his presentation, Phil Gordon said in the 1990's, this was the unipolar moment the US felt very strong, it was spending more money than anyone else and the revolution and military affairs was there and all that, so Bush came after nine eleven and told the American people there is a bad world out there and let's go out and change it. And the American people said let's give it a shot. Now, the presumption of let's give it a shot, is obviously what brings the problems for American foreign policy today. And I am not sure that the circumstances may never be the same or may not be the same in the immediate future for the US, therefore the same kind of hubris will not be displayed. But I think the residue of that particular approach in the rest of the world is going to be something that both candidates or next president will have to pay a lot more attention to. I understand that great powers are not in the business of empathy and so there is really no point to for great powers to start thinking about what others might think about them or the policies they want to pursue. But I am wondering if next administration may face a situation whereby if not empathy, certainly more concern about what others are thinking, what others want and what others are willing to see happening, and the degree to which they want to cooperate with the US that is if they like what the US is doing can be taken for granted. Mr. Burt said that McCain administration would certainly consult with allies but it will expect his allies to try harder as well, there will be no take it or leave it approach. This really doesn't strike me as recognition that the unipolar moment is gone and that the US will actually be more humble and first listen. I mean there is a line obviously between consultation and just listening or listening and hearing, and again I do not underestimate the great powers of the US, the importance that it has for the world order, but I am thinking of in the wake of 8 years of disaster under the Bush administration, the relation to the allies and to the enemies may necessitates more than just closing down Guantanamo, ending torture and rebuilding American rule of law rather than Cheney suspension of the rule of law.

Let's get to real differences as far as Turkey is concerned and that is really what Burt said, I mean emphasis on values or emphasis on realism. Of course, when one hears realism trumping values one hears it really doesn't matter whether or not Turkey is a bona fide democracy. That's been the case during the cold war. And the question that comes to my mind is, does it really not matter that Turkey is bona fide democracy for the next administration, if that one happens to be a Republican one, and when realism would be more important than values and ideology and if security trumps values and therefore a realistic foreign policy for Turkey is going to be the one that the next administration is going to be engaging itself in than what is Turkey's role supposed to be? What is expected of Turkey? Do we really put aside all the talk over the last 10 years of soft power and at least in Turkey the discussion we had over Turkey's importance stemming not just from its geographic location, anymore but also from its experience and the kind of society that at least pretends to be.

Then we go to Iraq, and obviously for all concerned, a precipitous withdrawal from Iraq by the US would be quite disastrous. What I am not sure after the two talks is whether the US leaves Iraq slowly or rapidly. What does it intend to leave behind? Again we've given our best shot and our best shot was not good enough we left a mess in Iraq and the country can go to hell in a hand basket taking the region with it, but you know the American people don't really support the war anymore and we really are beyond our means in fighting this war so we're going to withdraw and let's hope that what the relative stability brought up by the surge is going to be sustainable even after we're gone. We're going to be here; we cannot really move and go elsewhere. I mean if that is going to be the approach or the language of the next American administration, I am afraid you're not going to find many collaborators in the region that absolutely by necessity will have to help you, otherwise there is not going to be stability in Iraq and of course among those I suppose Iran is the most important and that of course is a very thorny issue.

If Iran becomes a nuclear power this is pretty undesirable for all and this might actually trigger race of proliferation, and already unstable region that has now several nuclear armed countries obviously would not be good news for the rest of the world. But what is more important for American foreign policy? Is it to make sure that the non-proliferation treaty is not violated once more since India and Pakistan did and everyone is living happily with it, or is it really to create conditions for regional participation? My question would be to both speakers, what is the limit of America's patience to try diplomacy, engaging the region and obviously Iran, before it says "OK we have to do something about this". And I suppose that something is going to be one or the other of the plans to go and bomb Iran's nuclear facilities. But is that really a terminal solution or is this just a delaying move and if it is just a delaying move then how you do propose really treat the issue once the delay is already finished.

Finally, in terms of Turkey my question would be to the panelists what your position would be vis a vie Turkey's or both candidates' position would be for Turkey's EU nonevent, but the broader question is the following; truly if we are going to rebuild Turkish American relations and if as Phil Gordon suggested, it is highly likely that under the Obama administration Turkey is not going to be the afterthought but it is going to be one of the central issues, how do you propose to lay the foundation of the new partnership, what is it going to be grounded on? What do you need Turkey for? What would we expect Turkey to do and that goes for you Mr. Burt as well. Thank you.

Mark Parris: With typical Turkish understatement you've given our panelists some good questions to chew on. I think I'll ask first Phil and then Rick to respond as much as you choose and then we will go to the audience.

Phil Gordon: That is a lot, I will be selective and then probably come back to some of the others afterwards. Maybe on Iraq, the precipitous withdrawal thing I don't think anybody calling for precipitous withdrawal I tried to articulate some thought about that up there, I mean the surge has been in place now and it is going quite well, the Bush administration is in place now for another 8 months and has made absolutely clear that they plan on maintaining a

very high troop level in Iraq and hopefully during that time the security will continue to improve, so the new presidents are not going to take the office until we have another 8 months of this surge which by then will have been in place for 2 years. If by that time, security is on an upward trend and clearly going better and the Maliki government is in power then I think we would all agree that it is possible to start withdrawing American troops and giving more responsibilities to the Iraqis. And there wouldn't be huge difference between the two candidates and even so called rapid Obama plan would take at least 18 months to reduce down to a number that has not been yet defined so that gets us to 2 and 2,5 years from now. So I don't then mean we can all debate what precipitous means but I don't think anybody will want to run the risk that you just described, where the US is saying or the new American president says "not my war, good luck to you guys who live in the neighborhood we're getting out of here". I think that the regional diplomacy would be an important part of it that would be part of Obama plan talking to the neighbors which includes Iran, Turkey and Syria and not just walking away. Now, what I would say is that the situation we're describing is very different from the one we thought a year or two ago and that situation might well have led the US to do what you just warned against. If it continued for 5 years to be a chaos in Iraq what looks like a civil war with Americans caught between it, I do think there is a risk that the American people would just demand of their leader that we get out and that might be part of our responsibility, but it would be just a reality and it would be unfortunate, but the argument would be we're not helping by being here. Fortunately, that doesn't seem to me the case anymore. We all benefit from that.

Iran and the NPT and the bombing issue very briefly, I do think the NPT is an important part of concern about implications, for nuclear nonproliferation is important part of American concern about Iran which I think it would be worst than what Soli said pretty undesirable. From an American perspective, it would be quite undesirable even more undesirable than the previous cases you mentioned which were also quite undesirable and we were against them, I am talking about India and Pakistan, but I would say even worst. Because India and Pakistan, I don't want to get too much into relative horror scenario, in Pakistan especially with China already having nuclear weapons was a somewhat closed proliferation circle. They wanted nuclear weapons mainly to deal with each other. I don't think there are any countries really who are now driven to get nuclear weapons because their neighbors do. Afghanistan is a neighbor but I don't think that is in the near term. Do you know what I mean? Iran is a very different matter because if Iran does have geopolitical rivalries with a number of countries in the region including some that have been named so we just would have to be honest that if we care about global nuclear nonproliferation, if we allow around developing nuclear weapon than we basically say NPT is dead it is not weak, it is not in need of improvement, it is dead and we are effectively saying that anyone can have them. Because what kind of credibility we would have towards another country Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Turkey or anyone who said in response "We are going to get nuclear weapons", then if we said we'd take you to Security Council that would be fairly laughable. So I do think we have to take it seriously and that's not even talking about the effect it might have on Iranian foreign policy given the security they would have from knowing that we couldn't do anything

about it if they did some things. So all of that is to say, it is more than pretty undesirable, I think it is very undesirable but let me also say because you raised the prospective military force that would also be undesirable. Here is the difference and I'll invite Rick to comment on it, at least an apparent difference between the two camps, is the way they've talked about use of force vis a vie Iran, or I'll put it differently and more broadly, there was a Republican debate in which the candidates were asked would they take a pledge that Iran during their first term will not become a nuclear weapon state, and all of the Republican candidates including I believe Senator McCain, raised their hands and took a pledge that would not happen. To me that is coming close to a threat of military force because as much as I like to believe our diplomacy will succeed, it might not, and the Democratic candidates were asked that same question and none of them took that pledge. They all said we have to do everything we can to stop it and it is more than pretty undesirable but they weren't willing to go to point to take that pledge which would imply and they used formulas like, we would do everything possible, but they wouldn't take that pledge because I think they see, and I would agree with this, that the consequences of force could be even worse for the reasons, I think Soli that you hinted, at not least because it would only put it all for a certain period of time and it would, in my view, convince Iranians absolutely to decide build nuclear weapons which they may not have so far. Again, I would be interested in Rick's view on the McCain side because I suspect on that side there would be some people who say this is absolutely intolerable and if we have to use force we have to bomb, bomb, bomb around and others who say that would be a mistake for the reasons I just articulated.

In terms of our genuine interest bona fide democracy in Turkey and what we would want from them, I don't want to monopolize but I do not want to evade the question. I think the democracy thing matters if Turkey has bona fide democracy. I don't think that the absence of it would somehow lead the US to break the relations and say we can't deal with this country. There are plenty of countries that aren't bona fide democracies with which we have important relations and that would be the case in Turkey as well. I do think it would be hard for the administration either, whether it is McCain or Obama, and again I don't want to harp on this point but I think there would be real debate within the McCain camp because I think there would be some who would say as I think Rick suggested, that's not the main issue and they would look at the strategic relations but there would be others, and they're quite on the record and they write a lot and they speak a lot, who would say that the promotion of democracy is a core American interest, we don't treat the non-democracies the same way we treat democracies. We particularly want to see a democracy with a majority Muslim population to show that it is possible to have democracy and Islam co-habiting so I think there would be a real debate on that side, and I think on the Obama side, and more broadly it would be just so difficult to have the same type of relations with a country that didn't seem to be a genuine democracy as one that was. So, you can play that out in specific ways and I think there wouldn't be dramatic policy differences, but just in terms of the American attitude, it would be hard to overlook steps that didn't appear to be Democratic.

Rick Burt: Thanks. I think I'll start on this last issue, the issue of democracy and Turkey, and its effect on the long term durability of the relationship with the US. I may be wrong here but I would tend to lump the US-Turkish relationship and here I am looking over. Let's talk about the post war period that whole span of time as one of the small number of what you can call special relationship that the US has, I don't quite know how to define special relationship but it certainly begins with a number of shared strategic interests. It goes on to building maybe on those shared strategic interests to talk about cooperation between different parts of the two countries' societies, not simply just military to military, although that's important the building on in terms of economic relationships people who have gone to school in the two countries, that kind of creation of different programs Fulbright programs, and the like a kind of cultural relationship. Everybody of course talks about the case of US and Britain but it exists in terms of some other European countries, US-Germany, obviously US-Israel, US-Japan, you can come up with number of those might say 10 or 15 of those relationships. My key point and I may be saying the same thing what Phil Gordon said differently is, one thing that I think allows for that kind of special relationship and special understanding is the fact that two countries are working democracies. So my point of view would be if for one reason or another democracy was to be threatened in Turkey not that the US-Turkish relationship would come to an abrupt end but that special element that allows cooperation in one area and maybe a lap over into another, the kind of political, cultural element to that relationship would be threatened. I think that would be a change of what is historically been the case and in fact one of the reasons historically the US and this is bipartisan in terms of both Republicans and Democrats have both publicly and even more strongly behind closed doors privately supported Turkish membership in the EU is not only that because it was seen as may be providing strategic and economic advantages and solidifying the West but I think it was also seen as strengthening democracy in Turkey. And I have to say my own view is that, it's been very disappointing for me personally to see the reactions of some European leaders who should know better, who have not been as constructive and as responsive earlier on to Turkish efforts to move more quickly ahead with EU accession. I might add there that, we in America face a little bit of dilemma because I meet with Europeans in private and Europeans tell me in private, will you Americans shut up about Turkey in EU, we're sick of having you lecture us on this issue. So sometimes we even have to be a little quite about it because the Europeans feel as though we're making harder for the Turks, by pressuring them in public.

Another few asides, I think American public is concerned about the standing of the US in the world. I think I understood your point and I think I don't agree. I think that the Bush administration was somewhat of an aberration by what it seemed to be lack of concern in the high levels in the administration about the decline in American standing in the world. The fact of the matter is that, as long as I can remember Americans have been obsessively concerned about American standing in the world almost to the point that we're almost neurotic about it. In all my professional carrier, people have been following polls produced by the USIA or other PEW Foundation or Chicago Council on Foreign Relations to see "Gee, are we 2 points lower or higher with the Turks or what do the Japanese think" so I think for better or worse

we are little bit neurotic that way and I don't certainly say that we shouldn't worry about it but I just want to emphasize it is kind of peculiar American neurosis.

On the issue of consultation, I want to go beyond what I said before about consultation and I think John McCain has gone on, it is not just a question of consulting and listening, that sounds good. Where it gets important is, whether you're prepared to adjust your policy to take into account other people's interest. There is a very well known Australian writer in International Relations Coral Bell, she's written some very good books about Henry Kissinger but she makes the point about American leadership in the last 40-50 years and she says the fundamental reason that other countries have been prepared to except American leadership is that they believe that when US government makes policy, it takes other governments' interest into account and frankly that explains a lot of the problems of the current administration. It seems to be if we want to exercise leadership, we have got to demonstrate that we are prepared to take other countries' interests into account in formulating policy and that means we cannot always get 100% of what we want to achieve. We've got to be willing to accept less. I think John McCain understands that and I think Phil will argue that Obama understands that.

One or two other quick points; one on Iraq, I should have mentioned this before but I think under any approach that it'll succeed in terms of a solution in Iraq, it would have to be regional. And I emphasize here Turkey will have an important role to play in that regional element and now this allows me to do a little advertising here, I honestly believe that in addition to the absolutely justifying the tough policy that the Turkish government is taking vis a vis the PKK. There is another side to this which is the growing engagement of Turkey in the economic development of Northern Iraq and that is where it plays critical stabilizing role. There is bigger economic and business presence in Northern Iraq from Turkey than any other country and I think it would be extremely stabilizing to see that relationship develop politically in working out closer ties and communication between the Turkish government and the leaders of Northern Iraq.

I will only make one last point on Iran, the choices don't boil down in Iran to dissuade the Iranians from acquiring nuclear weapons which we hope we could do with sufficient international backing and bombing Iran. We may at some stage have to address the issue of some kind of deterrent system in the region which could involve the extension by the US of deterrent umbrella for certain countries. This is what has kept Japan and Germany for example from acquiring nuclear weapons. There was principle reason that we were able to negotiate the nonproliferation treaty in the first place. I hope it doesn't come to that but we shouldn't think of this as a choice between bombing on the one hand and talking on the other, which is much too simplistic.

Mark Parris: Now we will entertain questions.

Q: I just want to say we did get in the 2008 platform position on Turkey that is saying that we encourage and support Turkey's role as mediator and involve them in the region. My question

has to do with horror with Iraq. If the surge is giving supposedly political space to Maliki government to be more inclusive, invite the Sunnis in to share the oil wealth and so on. What if in the next 8 months they still fail to be inclusive towards Sunnis but Sauris movement which is a large and strong movement that appears, maybe they're trying to below the S..... chance in the October election to be more representative in the national government. What will be the US policy be then? If we've not still progressed any further and then also how can Turkey address this problem?

Richard Burt: My answer will be very brief, I think essentially the McCain formulation is designed to address the emergence of these kinds of problems. It is not a strategy that says that we need over some period of time to leave Iraq, I think is flexible enough to recognize that there could be these uncertainties whether it is reenergize Sunni opposition, or it is this Tarik Sadr decides he is going to go try to grab power from the Maliki government. Clearly, we have to keep some options open in the near term to deal with these contingencies.

Phil Gordon: First, I agree with the premise that the Maliki government's failure to reach out and convince some of his opponents to give them incentives to cooperate, has been a problem all along. Second, it seems to me that there has been some movement on that over the past year. They have started to understand that doing so is a prerequisite for peace and stability in Iraq. That remains to be seen but I think they're making little progress. And third, I would say what Obama would say is that the Maliki government has had plenty of time to understand the situation and it should be on notice that the US is going to start to withdraw 8 months from now and it can make the call itself. It can try to exerciseover its opponents in Iraq which will probably lead to civil war and insurgency and undermine its power, or it can start to take advantage of the fact that it is now in power and supported by the US and will continue to benefit from US support in terms of financial assistance, political assistance, training troops if it does reach out and try to bring in some of these groups. I think that is the strategy that is already under way and that's part of incentive for these awakening movements and others to cooperate with this government. But I don't think he would change the Obama approach at all, which would really consist as I say putting it on notice they need to do this in their own interest and if they don't we wish them well.

Soli Özel: You are proposing basically that the Iraqi army take over from the American army with a government as you said has not been very successful in reaching out even if it tried. There is another problem, the way I see it obviously the Sunnis, who are now cooperating with the US may very well decide not to. And to the extent that what goes in Iraq is not just an ideological or a sectarian struggle but it is a struggle of redistribution of power and the Sunnis are basically unhappy with the way power is going to be redistributed. Therefore they are being supported by all the Sunni Arabs there is around. Unless you convinced the Sunni Arabs, "How are you going to get out and expect that there will be stability".

Q: I think this frames it nicely between Obama and McCain and this is a key difference. If you are right Soli, meaning they are implacably opposed to cooperating with this current government maybe their suspicions are too high, they'll never do it. Is the policy conclusion

from that that we just have to stay? Differences are so great that we need 160.000 American troops forever. If in 5 or 6 years they haven't gotten to the point where this is possible, I am willing to believe maybe another year and another year, but if you are telling me that this just can't be done I don't think that the US is just going to be prepared or should be prepared to be the permanent police force in Iraq.

Ozdem Sanberk: Mark I am sorry to ask once again a question, but we don't have such caliber panel every day so I couldn't resist the lure of asking this question. I wonder if there is a difference between the two candidates in terms of transatlantic relations. I mean, whether the two candidates are going to be able to meet the expectations of the Europeans in terms of transatlantic relations? Are we going to enter a new period of spring between the two shores of the ocean? And my second question is perhaps more important; either of the candidates, are they going to go down the road of the coalitions of the willings of or concerted or coalition of committed, so whatever name you may call it, are they going to look for a new instrument to manage the international relations in the field of multilateralism or are they going to empower the UN?

Mark Parris: Rick is this very good democracy all about?

Richard Burt: You asked two questions and I'll give you a brief answer. I think that both candidates have clearly stressed their desire to work out a closer relationship within the alliance, specifically. transatlantic US-European relationship. I tend to think that McCain who's probably spent 20-25 years regularly meeting and talking to Europeans and personally knows the heads of governments, the opposition leaders of most major countries in Europe. The likelihood of realistic and gradual improvement of that relationship is pretty high. I think as Phil pointed out, the danger on the Obama side of the equation is the issue of expectations. I think, in some countries in Europe he is almost as big as a rock star as he is in the US. He is viewed as the African American Kennedy and that could create some real expectations. That coupled with the fact that he is obviously extremely bright, capable guy but he just doesn't bring that kind of experience, background and the history, so he is going to have a learning curve. There was in the early part of Kennedy administration, remember bay of pig started with Kennedy as well as the failed meeting with Krushchev in Vienna so there could be some bumps before Obama and his new team work things out. But that said, I think they're both very much committed to a much more multilateral strategy. You talked about multilateralism; I think that the McCain campaign and McCain himself talked about this notion of closer cooperation among Democratic countries. And he calls it league of democracies, which he has said and others have said, it is not meant to be a replacement or substitute for the UN but it is an effort where countries.....

Philip Gordon:with anybody who's not named George W. Bush to be the next president so that will be the boost. I think as I argued and suggested before, boost of Obama would be even greater. McCain in many issues would be very pleasing to them. The problems I would see on that side would be Iraq policy, Russia policy and league of democracies. Those areas would be areas where they'd be little less thrilled and could actually be bumpy first year if

McCain actually did try to push forward on some of these things like kicking Russia out of G8. I think you'd have problems with Europe on that and you cannot create league of democracies of Europeans and that is one of my concerns about the league of democracies ideas I fear. Of course you can't just create such a thing, you'd have to negotiate it and I would worry about the administration coming forward with that idea and we spent the first year who is in, who is out what does it stand for rather than dealing with some of these problems. I also though have concerns about the first year of Obama's relations with Europe for the reason that we both said now. I know he would go on a trip and it would be fabulous but at somewhere, in some of the meetings on that trip, he would say I am delighted that you like me so much. We've got this thing in Afghanistan and I was just hoping that maybe you'd send few more troops to lift the caveats on your troop because I got to go back home and give a speech about this and it would be really nice if I could announce couple of thousand and than if the answer is "Barack we really do like you and we just love the fact that you're black and liberal and we are really enthusiastic about you but about those troops, we'll get back to you!" Then I'll just worry, then Obama goes back home and then people say where is all the stuff you promised, you said if we turned to EU you'd turn the page and we'd be liked again in the world and I agree with him, Americans do like to be liked, just to be liked but they like it even more if people will make contributions. So I do think we have to be careful on the expectation front because the honeymoon won't last forever.

Memduh Karakullukcu: I am with TUSIAD. The dichotomy between leading through values, leading through real politics which is very well established, I am wondering if the real question is can we create a structure where we can align real politics with values or can we not? That seems to be the distinction when I look at the cold war, I think of a period when the two were aligned. Aftermath of the cold war where we have now increasingly a unipolar world with a protruding US in that case structurally aligning values and real politics may just be impossible. And if that's the case then I wonder if somebody, some advisor of Mr. McCain thinks that creating some some balance of a bipolar world through the league of democracies will allow us to go back and have some structure where we can have values and real politics aligned as we used to have. Of course that would be very ironic because you were there at the termination of previous bipolar structure so it would be very interesting to see you being a part of an administration that would start a new one but my question is, is there a structural reason why a unipolar or a multipolar with a protrusion structure simply does not allow the alignment of leading through values and leading through real politics?

Rick Burt: My answer very simply is no. The only way you're going to do that is, remember the Russians used to talk about the new Soviet man and the state was going to wither away and then everyone was going to be collectivist and serving one's neighbor, under that kind of situation, real politics and the values are the same. But the problem is that you say during the cold war values and real politics were aligned well. The US had some very close relations with some pretty unsavory people. Remember Fransisco Franco in Spain and others, because we understood that it was in our strategic interest to do so. So I don't think there was a clear correlation, we may want to think of it in those terms as we look back on it, also I would

argue myself frankly that we are moving into a period when, as Phil was suggesting, US is not going to have the dominance that it had in 1990's and where power is going to be more dispersed, and in that situation, and in a period when I also assume not everybody is to become a democracy like the new Soviet man. It is going to be a while before every democracy breaks out or spreads everywhere. We are going to have to be used to making tough decisions and thinking more in terms in my view of national interest, and less about values. It makes us feel good to feel values driven but I don't think we have the luxury of doing it.

Phil Gordon: It is an important question and my answer ends up in a slightly different place from Ricks. The analysis is the same, I think it is right the cold war, let's not pretend that there were common values who drove this and you can give a long list of countries including, at times, Greece and Turkey. It was the cold war that had to do with our relationships, we did not care who was governing or on what basis. I think though and this takes us to the very first point about bona fide democracy and how much it matters and I think that's why our relationship with Turkey now is more dependent on values and democracy than it was before. When we had the cold war it did not matter and we might have preference for democracy in Turkey but frankly whatever government Turkey had, we would work with, same is true in Iraq. When we had to contain Iraq for all those years, when that was huge, strategic priority preference was democracy but at the end of the day strategic interest triumphed. Neither of those situations exist anymore. The cold war or the need to contain Iraq and in that sense the relative value of values, if you will, has gone up because to sell it to people, why this is important, you have to convince them even more that they are like minded and they share values and we'll be together on the big issues of the day because we have common views on climate change, proliferation, human rights and democracy. So, I don't think this relationship which was once so secure because of the cold war and strategic can just rely on the natural interests of the two countries so it matters more what kind of values and attitudes are in place in both places.

Mark Parris: I think we are going to wrap this session up here.

Soli Ozel: We had a very high minded debate so can I be petty at the very end and ask the simple question that will be in the Turkish public's mind? What if the Armenian resolution passes, Turkey reacts, what will the administration do? Are there really any clauses as the Turks think for the US to the passing of the resolution and the answer Turkish Republic might give to it?

Mark Parris: If you want to give quick answer to that and run I know you need to go and make a phone call.

Rick Burt: I've been dealing with the Armenian resolution for about 25 years so there are no simple solutions. All I will simply say is that first it depends on what the administration, any new administration, is really prepared to do to demonstrate to Turkish people and to Turkish government that they're making every good effort to resist it but it is going to be hard I think.

As others said, the Democrats are going to have their majority is going to get bigger and bigger and they tend to support this more than the Republicans but secondly there are things I think that the Turkish government can also do in terms of its efforts to demonstrate that it is taking this problem into account. I am sorry I have to rush off.

Mark Parris: Maybe I'll just pile on here because Phil has kindly invited me to but I told him I wouldn't get him off the hook from answering the question himself. I think that this is actually one where Obama is going to have another problem with expectations. The problem is of course he raised expectations among the Armenian community in the US by going, I think, a degree beyond in terms of explicitness his commitment to use the word when this comes up and of course it will come after three months when he is inaugurated. I have to believe that the audiences to whom he gave that commitment will seek to cash in, so I think there is high likelihood that a very early test of our ability to consult and to find win win outcomes on these things will be right there. Unfortunately, on an issue that is singularly difficult to sort of cushion with diplomatic language, all the cushion has been cooked out of this one, I am afraid over the years that it has been dealt with so I guess all I can say is yes it is out there, yes it will come due when it's least convenient as these things always do. I tend to agree with Rick that when you are sitting in the White House and you are looking at the strategic interest that we have in this part of the world, it looks different from when you're running in a hotly contestant primary in California and one can only assume that the case will be made in some form but it is going to be frankly, I think as one who watched this movie several times, now somewhat harder than before.

Phil Gordon: I do think it is something people have to brace themselves for. Senator Obama has taken a position, it's been his position for number of years, there is likely to be as Tom said before, a Democratic congress, maybe Nancy Pelosi still be the speaker and you have certain structural conditions for this to move forward. It is also true that in the past presidential candidates have been for the resolution before they were presidents and then they saw the world differently once they were in the White House. Who knows how this debate will play out but it is none the less a fact that senator Obama approves the resolution and a lot of Democrats in the Congress probably will as well. At the same time, of course there will be the opportunity to make all the usual arguments as we head towards April, all of the old arguments that prevailed will still be true and they'll be even more true in the first year with new relationship with Turkey. So I don't think by any means this is done for the same reason, it was never done before even it was pointing at that direction. So I would encourage our Turkish friends to not only be prepared to fight it as they no doubt will but to have a plan B in mind if it passes because that might well happen whatever anyone thinks of the substance of it.

Mark Parris: On that cheery note I will adjourn the session, thank you all for joining us on this first Brookings on the shores of the Bosphorus event in collaboration with TUSIAD, I'd like to thank Abdullah Akyuz and Haluk Bey for helping literally make this possible. We are honored to be associated with you in this effort both here and in Washington and we hope it is

one that we can continue to work together on. Thank you for coming and thanks to our panelists.