DAWN OF MODERN CHINA:
THE 100TH ANNIVERSARY OF CHINA’S 1911 REVOLUTION AND THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA

Opening Remarks and Panel 1:
The 1911 Revolution and its Aftermath

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Introduction:

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Keynote Address:

DR. MARY BACKUS RANKIN
Author, Early Chinese Revolutionaries and
Chinese Local Elites and Patterns of Dominance

OPENING REMARKS

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PANEL 1: THE 1911 REVOLUTION AND ITS AFTERMATH

Moderator:

DR. STEVEN PHILLIPS
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Panelists:

DR. DAVID STRAND
Charles A. Dana Professor of Political Science
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DR. EDWARD McCORD
Associate Professor of History and International Affairs
The George Washington University

DR. ZHENG XIAOWEI
Assistant Professor of History
University of California, Santa Barbara
PANEL 2: THE CONTEMPORARY SIGNIFICANCE OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA

Moderator:

DR. NANCY BERNKOPF TUCKER
Professor of History, Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service
Georgetown University

Panelists:

DR. THOMAS GOLD
Professor of Sociology
University of California, Berkeley

DR. LIU FU-KUO
Executive Director, MacArthur Center for Security Studies
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DR. RICHARD BUSH
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* * * * *
DR. RICHARD BUSH: The 1911 revolution obviously brought to an end the imperial system in China after intense political and social conflict during the late Qing Dynasty. At its best I think the imperial system provided unity, stability and order, relative prosperity, cultural brilliance, effective governance, and international respect. And one can say that since 1911, China has been on a quest to restore all of those things and obviously some objectives compete with the other.

So far we’ve seen two approaches, two sort of tentative solutions to that question. One is the ROC on Taiwan. The other is the PRC on the mainland. The quest is not over but the centenary is a good time to reflect back on the revolution itself, what happened after, and what it means today.

And to help us get started on this part of the program, it’s my great pleasure to invite Ambassador Jason Yuan, who is Taiwan’s representative here in the United States and the defender of Taiwan’s interests here, to say a few words.

Ambassador Yuan.

(Applause)

AMBASSADOR JASON YUAN: Dr. Bush, excuse me, ladies and gentlemen. Before I start my remarks I just want to say I just got back from New York City late, late last night. And because -- oh, thank you -- because of my vice president, Vincent Siew had a very, very smooth transit through New York City from Panama and Paraguay, and he learned I’m privileged to be here with you, so he asked me to say hello, particularly to his best friend, Richard Bush, and his friends, old friends, back in Taiwan and here to say hello to everybody. And in the meantime, also about a week ago President Ma Ying-jeou had a very, very successful video conference at CSIS. He also wanted me to take this opportunity to say hello to everybody who attended or who read his text during that conference.

Today I really would first like to extend my thanks to the Brookings Institution for inviting me to give these remarks at this very, very important forum. For over 90 years, Brookings has been a leading voice in the formation and refinement of an international system that is more secure, equitable, and predictable. The people of Taiwan are grateful to your institution’s contributions to the fulfillment of this vision in East Asia, which has allowed both Taiwan and the region as a whole to prosper.

It is also a great pleasure and an honor for me to exchange views with such distinguished panelists as we commemorate the hundredth anniversary of the Republic of China. I know some scholars today will focus on a historical review of the past 100 years, so I would like to focus on the present day and how our goals and achievements are already shaping the future.
The Republic of China in the year 2011 is a land of political freedom and economic opportunities. These features did not arise without effort. It is because of our values and their perseverance that we can achieve so much in so little time. But they also required another element, a spirit of openness that has helped accelerate our progress and that will be essential as we step into the future. It is that element that I would like to address today because it has not only stimulated our political and economic development, but it has also contributed to cross-strait rapprochement, strengthening the U.S.-Taiwan strategic partnership, and ensuring a bright future for the Republic of China on Taiwan.

As you all know, the Republic of China is the first republic in Asia and the modern ROC is the first truly democratic political system in Asia—a distinction that our citizens continue to take pride in. Our first direct presidential election was held in 1996, and like all young democracies, modern ROC endeavored to live up to the principles enshrined in its constitution.

Now, with our next presidential election on the horizon and the two peaceful transitions of power already behind us, the resilience of Taiwan’s democracy is assured. Our open system is fortified by transparent governance, a healthy business climate, and independent and lively media, a vocal civil society, and accountable elected officials. For these reasons Freedom House recently gave Taiwan some of its highest marks for political and civil rights.

In the arena of trade and economic competitiveness, Taiwan’s progress in recent decades has been nothing short of astounding. Taiwan’s per capita GDP was US$18,603 in the year 2010, a far cry from 1951 when per capita GDP was only US$154. And while much of the world continues to struggle to gain the momentum lost from the global economic crisis, Taiwan is racing ahead. Our growth rate of 10.82 percent last year outpaces mainland China and eclipses the global growth rate of 4.1 percent.

Taiwan’s unemployment rate of 4.48 percent is considerably lower than that of the U.S. and Japan, and has been gradually diminishing for the last 19 months. Taiwan’s spirit of openness is also reflected in our willingness to lower barriers to trade. Taiwan is ranked the world’s 16th largest trading nation in terms of merchandise trade by the WTO and hit a record high of US$526 billion in trade volume last year.

Entrepreneurs today are voting with their feet and in increasing numbers listing their numbers on the Taiwan Stock Exchange rather than the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. At US$400 billion, our foreign reserve is the world’s fourth largest. Our currency is stable, our economy predictable, and our business transactions protected by a transparent and durable legal architecture. For these and other reasons, the year 2011, the IMD economic competitiveness scorecard ranked Taiwan’s economy the number six most competitive in the world. Taiwan is indeed one of the best places in the world to do business.

These advances are due in part to the wise choices made by Taiwan’s leadership which came into office three years ago today. At that time it was difficult to imagine how much progress we could make, especially in cross-strait relations. Today, tensions between the ROC and the mainland are at their lowest point in decades. Nearly three million Taiwanese and
mainland Chinese travel across the strait each year. More than 5,600 mainland students studied in Taiwan universities in the year 2010, and 70,000 Taiwanese companies are investing more than US$100 billion on the mainland. That’s the official record. The unofficial record is way, way beyond that number.

People from the Republic of China and the mainland are talking to one another, learning from one another, and doing business together. How is it possible to make such strides in just three short years? I will say just two words: pragmatic leadership. Upon his inauguration exactly three years ago today, President Ma Ying-jeou put forward a vision that sought to reverse a stagnant and increasingly dangerous status quo. President Ma embraced a viable diplomacy where the principles of dignity, autonomy, and flexibility reshaped Taiwan’s foreign policy. And by implementing this approach, he significantly reduced cross-strait tensions, repaired strategic alliances, and advanced economic integration through increased trade and investment. He resumed a consistent and constructive dialogue with the mainland based on the concept of flexible diplomacy: our Three Noes policy—that is no unification, no independence, no use of force—and the earlier 1992 consensus of a one China respective interpretations.

By taking an economic first, political issues second approach to negotiations, both sides have now concluded six sets of talks and reached 15 agreements. That includes the historical Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement, or we call it ECFA, which took effect on January 1st of this year. The ECFA will grow Taiwan’s economy by 4.4 percent, but its value as a model for future trade agreements with other Asian nations is immeasurable.

As a result of our government’s calm and prudent stewardship, the Taiwan Strait has been transformed from a major flashpoint into a conduit for regional peace and prosperity. We welcome America’s support for this undertaking and appreciate President Obama’s strong endorsement of our approach, including in his discussions with Chinese President Hu Jintao earlier this year. But these efforts alone have not ensured Taiwan’s continued security. Taiwan’s willingness to defend our sovereignty backed by security commitments of the U.S. have and will continue to play an essential role in keeping the peace. Today the Taiwan Relations Act remains the bedrock of the U.S.-Taiwan strategic partnership and the single greatest contribution to regional stability as we face new challenges together in the 21st century. Indeed, Taiwan’s work towards a peaceful resolution of cross-strait differences would not have been possible and it will not be sustainable without America’s enduring commitment to Taiwan’s security.

Looking beyond the Taiwan Strait, our government recognizes that all countries must do their part to shoulder the burden of enhanced global well-being and that Taiwan is no exception. In the not too distant past, Taiwan was a recipient of foreign assistance. Today, as a responsible stakeholder in the international community, we extend our hand to those in need as a donor of humanitarian aid and long-term development assistance. Taiwan contributes to the global common good wherever possible, from providing solar energy technology to the Solomon Islands, to establishing a medical mission in the Marshall Islands, to trade contracts to disseminate locally manufactured H1N1 flu vaccines to other countries in need, to providing resources and search and rescue teams in the wake of natural disasters in Haiti, Sichuan, and Japan. In response to the recent big tornadoes that caused destructive effects to many southern states in the U.S., our local offices not only helped mobilize the Taiwanese community to join
relief work, our government also donated US$250,000 to those states affected most.

As Taiwan extends a helping hand to those in need, the world is taking notice. Two extraordinary Taiwanese citizens were recently recognized by TIME Magazine’s list of the 100 Most Influential People. The 73-year-old Dharma Master Cheng Yen, founder of the Buddhist Tzu Chi Foundation was applauded for her leadership of what TIME called “a non-profit humanitarian machine.” When disaster hit Japan, the Tzu Chi Foundation tapped into its global network of 10 million supporters and volunteers swiftly distributed food, medicine, warm clothing to the hardest hit regions of the country.

Chen Shu-chu, the other Taiwanese citizen honored by TIME Magazine is an ordinary person who works in a traditional market selling produce in eastern Taiwan, but her heart and the generosity are truly extraordinary. Despite a modest paycheck, she managed to donate over US$320,000 to those in need while supporting three children from an orphanage. “Money serves its purpose only when it is used for those who need it,” she says. In our government’s renewed commitment to humanitarian response and foreign assistance, Taiwan is trying to live up to the example set by Master Cheng Yen and Ms. Chen Shu-chu.

As the Republic of China reaches its 100th anniversary, the people of Taiwan are asking: how can we continue to extend our spirit of openness to new ventures and horizons? Taiwan remains committed to engagement with the world through open borders and people to people contacts. Often the best diplomacy is done by individuals, tourists, investors, entrepreneurs, friends, and families. As Taiwan and the U.S. already celebrate many years of friendship and shared values, we are hopeful that Taiwan will soon gain admission to the U.S. visa-waiver program.

Where will the next 100 years lead us? President Ma said it best in a speech at Harvard University last year. “Against the background of thousands of years of Chinese history, the last century was in some ways merely a comma, but from a larger perspective it was nothing short of an exclamation mark. As it has been a hundred years of struggle, a hundred years of experimentation, and a hundred years of education before people learned that they, too, have the unequivocal rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.” President Ma’s vision is for Taiwan to continue along its current path as a peacemaker, a provider of humanitarian aid, the standard bearer of Chinese culture, and the creator of innovative technologies and new business opportunities. Under this leadership we will continue to work hard to earn the respect of the international community through pragmatic diplomacy and sound economic management.

In conclusion, at this important juncture the people of Taiwan look toward a future filled with possibility as a past that was at times marked by great uncertainty recedes from view. We will undoubtedly continue to hold dear our Chinese traditions and values and remain the protector of thousands of historical texts even as we dedicate ourselves to global engagement and technological innovation. Taiwan’s preservation of Chinese culture goes hand in hand with our promotion of democracy. In short, we will continue to serve as the “beacon of democracy to Asia and the world” that President George W. Bush referred to just three years ago. And we hope, through both our examples at home and our role in the world, that we can extend the light of freedom to all corners of Asia and beyond. We look forward to the next 100 years as we work...
to preserve and strengthen democracy and prosperity in East Asia and the whole world.

Thank you very much.

(Applause)

AMBASSADOR YUAN: In celebrating a great year and a great day of the Republic of China and Taiwan, President Ma Ying-jeou also sends a congratulatory message for this very meaningful event. May I ask Dr. Bush to come to the podium?

DR. BUSH: Thank you. Thank you very much, Ambassador Yuan, for those remarks. This is a congratulatory message. The letterhead is President of the Republic of China, Ma Ying-jeou, dated May 20, 2011.

“Dr. Bush, distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen:

I am pleased to learn that the conference titled “Dawn of Modern China: The 100th Anniversary of China’s 1911 Revolution and the Significance of the Republic of China” is taking place in Washington, DC today. First of all, I would like to thank the Brookings Institution and Dr. Bush for providing me with this opportunity to share some thoughts with you. As the Republic of China celebrates its centennial anniversary this year, it is both timely and laudable for a renowned think tank such as the Brookings Institution to host a conference revisiting the significance of China’s 1911 revolution, reviewing the achievements made by the Republic of China, and shedding light on the prospects of the ROC in the coming century.

The evolution of modern China has been a journey in pursuit of wealth (fu) and power (qiang). However, Dr. Sun Yat-sen, the founding father of the Republic of China, fully understood that without the pillars of democracy and liberty, China would never be modernized. Wealth and power gained without the support of these pillars would be unsustainable. Therefore, he incorporated President Abraham Lincoln’s idea of a “government of the people, by the people, for the people” in his “Three Principles of the People” (sanmin zhuyi). This demonstrates that from its inception, the ROC—the first republic in Asia—has had a deep bond with the United States based on shared values.

Following the establishment of the Republic of China in 1912, two world wars and the rising tide of communism prevented the Chinese people from realizing our founding father’s promise of a free and democratic country. However, despite all the problems the country and the people had encountered, the ROC Constitution, adopted in 1947 on the basis of Sun Dr. Sun’s ideals, has provided a comprehensive plan for political and economic development in Taiwan.

After the ROC government relocated its seat to Taiwan in 1949, it began a long journey toward democratization under a relatively stable environment, thanks in no small part to U.S. security assurances. Over time, elections expanded from counties and cities to provincial governments and, finally, to the national level. With its first direct presidential election in 1996 and the consolidation of democracy through peaceful transitions of power in 2000 and 2008,
Taiwan became not only a full-fledged democracy—the first in 5,000 years of Chinese history—but also a beacon of democracy for Asia and the world.

Meanwhile, mainland China headed in a totally different direction. In 1979, following three decades of tragedy and failure, it commenced a single-minded pursuit of wealth and power. Thirty years later, it is now painfully clear that, without democracy and liberty, rising military and economic power also breeds fear and distrust among the mainland’s neighbors.

Without comprehensive political reform—as I have urged repeatedly on the anniversaries of the event in Tiananmen Square, and in my call for the release of Nobel Peace Prize-winner Liu Xiaobo—mainland China cannot sustain the wealth and power it has amassed or win the world’s respect and trust. Their leaders know this, and hopefully they will act accordingly.

In the past three years, Taiwan has reduced tension in the Taiwan Strait and improved economic and social relations with mainland China. Today, with 1.5 million Taiwan people living and doing business in mainland China and a roughly equivalent number of mainland tourists visiting Taiwan each year, I firmly believe that Taiwan is playing a historic role by providing mainland China, via people-to-people exchanges, with a free and democratic framework of reference.

Over the course of the past century, the Republic of China has forged a close alliance and partnership with the United States in combating the scourges of aggression, communism, and terrorism. We have also worked together to promote liberty, democracy, and free enterprise. With strong support from the United States, Taiwan has become a resilient economy, a vibrant democracy, and a generous contributor to the international community.

As the ROC enters a new century, I pledge to my fellow citizens to continue Taiwan’s course on the cutting edge of technological and industrial advancement. Our culture and society will be an exemplar for the Chinese world and beyond. We will fully uphold our responsibilities to our land by respecting the environment, to our country by following the constitution that is the foundation of our government, and to our people by providing necessary services and fundamental liberties. Last but not least, we will promote peace, stability, and security by exercising our right to self-defense.

Together with the United States, the Republic of China has achieved much in its first century, and we will accomplish even more as we embark on our next hundred-year journey.

In closing, let me extend my best wishes for the great success of this event and the good health and happiness of all in attendance.”

(Applause)

[ PDF of Ma Ying-Jeou’s letter available here >> ]
DR. BUSH: With that, I propose that we get going with the first panel. And so if Steve and his colleagues would come to the podium we can get started.

DR. STEVEN PHILLIPS: Thank you. I was going to -- I was going to thank Richard Bush for organizing all this but after you’ve received thanks from the president, somehow having me chime in just doesn’t quite seem the same. But I deeply appreciate this opportunity to kind of bring history to policymakers.

I would also like to say how excited I am. I’m a bit of an academic groupie. Three wonderful panelists who I’ve learned from and read their materials in the past. And the way we’ll organize this is each will speak for about 15 minutes. I’ll offer a few comments at the end and then we will go until about five of four.

Let me start by introducing all three at once and then just let them come up one after the other and give their talks. First to speak will be David Strand, who will speak on Republican China as a republic. David Strand earned graduate degrees at Columbia University and right now he holds the position of the Charles A. Dana professor of Political Science at Dickinson College. He is author of a wonderful book, Rickshaw Beijing: City People in Politics in the 1920s from the University of California Press. And I’m looking forward very much to his upcoming book which is coming out in June.

DR. DAVID STRAND: That’s right.

DR. PHILLIPS: I’m happy to plug this wonderful book entitled An Unfinished Republic: Leading by Word and Deed in Modern China.

Our second speaker will be Ed McCord from George Washington University and he’ll speak on the emergence of warlordism. Professor McCord received his degree from the University of Michigan, and he’s written a very well received book called The Power of the Gun: The Emergence of Modern Chinese Warlordism. He’s also done many articles that appeared in Modern China, Republican China, and Modern Asian Studies.

Our final speaker is Zheng Xiaowei and she’ll speak on nationalism, new conceptions of China. Zheng Xiaowei is assistant professor in history and the East Asian language and cultural studies program at the University of California, Santa Barbara. She received her Ph.D. from the University of California at San Diego and she had a wonderful article out a couple of years ago concerning Red Guards at Tsinghua University. And that’s how I got to first know her scholarship. That’s in the well-known Esherick volume.

With that I’ll ask each scholar to come up and try to limit their remarks to about 15 minutes. Thank you very much.

(Applause)

DR. STRAND: I spilled water on my notes. I hope that’s lucky. Okay. I have a PowerPoint here but it’s not too many images. Let’s see. Okay.
I thought I’d begin with three comments about the 1911 Revolution and its immediate aftermath that shows the range of opinion by 1912, 1913, about whether this revolution had been a success. Plainly it had happened, but what exactly had been the outcome?

The first comment—I know it’s hard to see; the rest of the slides are images, not text -- is by Tai Chi-tao [Dai Jitao] in 1912. He was a journalist, soon to be Sun Yat-sen’s personal secretary and he wrote very angrily about what Yuan Shikai in the summer of 1912 was doing in Beijing. He said, “China today, although a republic in name with legislative organs, a cabinet, and a constitution for the public instruction of the Chinese people actually in terms of how power and tactics are wielded and played out is a country where everything is concentrated in the hands of one man, Yuan Shikai.” So very negative about the outcome.

The second is from the philosopher and teacher, Yang Changji, teacher, of course, to Mao Zedong among many others who returned to China from study abroad in 1913. And he wrote the following year a very different account of what had happened. He said, “China has experienced tremendous change in the transformation of its political system into a republic, the profound nature of which can hardly be expressed.” So very positive.

And then Liang Qichao, who must be one of the great thinkers of this period in world history, made another kind of comment—rather strange but I think it summed up some of his complex feelings about a revolution which he helped make. He said, “It,” the 1911 Revolution, “was like when you open a bottle of cold beer, the foam quickly bubbles up to the surface and appears awfully busy but when the moment is over and the foam dissipates, it’s still a cold bottle of beer.” I don’t know what he meant by that but it can’t be positive.

(Laughter)

Now, Tai Chi-tao made his remarks in Shanghai less than six months after the end of the Qing Dynasty. As Yuan Shikai consolidated his hold on power in Beijing as provisional president, a position seated to him by Sun Yat-sen earlier in the year. This was three years before Yuan attempted and failed to turn his dictatorship by that time into monarchy and six months before 40 million men went to the polls in China in the winter of 1912-1913 to elect a new national legislature.

Now, these voters presumably assumed a Chinese republic was here to stay. They turned out to be right and Yuan Shikai wrong when he assumed Chinese would later welcome his bid to become emperor. And yet Tai Chi-tao was certainly correct that the national institutions of the Chinese republic were being emptied of power and authority before the first year the Republic was over. And herein I think lies a central problem or paradox. The Chinese republic was very quickly criticized, bemoaned, mocked, ridiculed, defied, defeated, but it wouldn’t go away. It couldn’t be made to go away. And why not?

Now, the record of the 1910s and 20s, too, I think, suggest that the Chinese republic, as a set of institutions, constituted a kind of failed national government or maybe failing is the better way to characterize it. But not I think what we would call today a failed state. It
wasn’t Somalia, although as Mary Rankin’s comment suggested there were areas of great violence and despair in China during this period.

Now, the way the national institutions failed so publicly with so much comment I think actually helps sustain a political culture of active citizenship among widening circles of Chinese. I think my feeling about the 1911 revolution and its aftermath therefore is closer to Yang Changji but certainly admits the other critical comments being made around this time.

Now, we know that Benedict Anderson has given us a classic definition of what national consciousness is. He’s characterized the modern nation as an “imagined community.” This is the notion that we have in our heads, a reasonably vivid and complete picture of the political society we live in and that includes people we know and meet, and—here is where the imagination goes to work—those we never meet but we know them as compatriots. There must be sufficient overlap of these pictures we have in our head to make a common political imagination possible.

So one question is what did Chinese during this period have in their heads? And I would submit today they had Sun Yat-sen in their heads. Now, what good did that do them? That’s a complicated question but something was there. And in addition to that, although I think we can document pretty well that this imagined community was emerging probably as Mary Rankin suggests, beginning in the 1880s, gathering momentum after the 1911 revolution. There was also something like an imagined state in people’s minds, and this isn’t a term that I know of. Maybe I thought it up basically coming off of Benedict Anderson’s ideas.

Now, what I mean by that is that the people who were conscious of themselves as Chinese and cared about China’s future had a corresponding appetite for national leaders like Sun Yat-sen, Chiang Kai-shek, Mao Zedong, and a legion of other national and local leaders who promised what they didn’t have. That is, an effective government joined to a mobilized citizenry which they already had. So it’s in my heart; why isn’t it in Beijing? It’s in my mind; why don’t these institutions work?

Now, I have an image here that I think suggests some of the dimensions of this consciousness. This is a cartoon from 1920 and you can see a typical protest with merchants and government people and students, and one man has a set of binoculars and he’s looking at eastern Shandong province, the part of Shandong that is now controlled by Japan.

This kind of posture I think was quite important in understanding how people were thinking about not only their status as citizens but also the problem of government during this period. As a citizen, one stood within one’s group among other groups in one’s locale in the vastness of China, increasingly represented as a map that you would find in school rooms and textbooks and in the newspapers like this, often with a mulberry leaf by its side to suggest the shape of China and also the fact that imperialist worms were nibbling at its borders. This standing within this picture, whether we think of this as a real space outside Tiananmen or as more of a metaphoric space where people thought of themselves as having compatriots they never knew, or on a map of China obliged one to look beyond one’s particular position. And Mary Rankin indicated how strong localness was in China during the run-up to the 1911
revolution. How did that localness, that local patriotism become something larger?

And I guess what happened, and I think this for me is a useful cartoon, if we think of the binoculars in a more metaphorical sense as standing for things like newspapers or novels or photographs or eyewitness accounts that afford a simplifying patriotic perspective that can be passed from hand to hand, group to group, community to community until you begin to share that common vision. A leader like Sun Yat-sen, for example, I think was able to offer his own political thought as a way of seeing the country. Now, Sun Yat-sen has been criticized for having an over simple view of politics but in many ways compared to Liang Qichao, who had a very complex view of politics, the simplicity, I think, actually worked to his advantage.

And so one way we can think about what’s going on in China in this period of the 1910s in particular is not only to record the failure of the institutions but the development of other social and political technologies Chinese used to embrace the idea of the modern state before they felt its full weight. As long as the Chinese state was more rhetorical, that is of their own invention, than real in administrative or social engineering terms—not saying that people weren’t being taxed or weren’t being pressured by the government, but their attitude toward government would naturally be more positive than if they felt the full weight of the fiscal responsibilities that they would have as citizens.

So I think when we look at Yang Changji’s words, having returned to China in 1913 after 10 years abroad, when he saw the Republic, what he saw was not a set of failed institutions but a long list of challenges that were being addressed nationally but also locally, politically but also socially. He noted the imperial exam was gone, queues were being cut, opium oppressed, foot binding was coming to an end. Of course, interesting, all of these initiatives had begun under the Qing and not under the republic but in a way what this revolution did was to bracket a whole period of reform that people were involved in before the 1911 revolution and afterward. So the republic, to the extent that it succeeds, is one way of packaging many of these new ideas.

And Yang declared there was more work to do. In his case, ending arranged marriages, the taking of concubines, for example. Republican China was a political system but also for many the embodiment of change at every level of government and society against, Yang reading admitted, opposition at every level as well. So this kind of relationship—that is if we think of the state and not of government in a kind of partnership, there are people who are thinking about the value of government and acting locally to achieve it. And this is holding the place, I think, for some more profound governmental change, whether positive or negative.

By contrast, Liang Qichao, after his return in 1912 to China and to Beijing, was disappointed in what he found. This feeling was shared by many. The revolution for him was the mere pop of a beer bottle. For others, it was more like an explosion or some kind of blast. But for many, the high hopes that either quickly evaporated—that’s Liang—or the dust settled on dynastic debris or even worse, on the same institutions, the same individuals in place and in power before the revolution. And people like Yuan Shikai, for many revolutionaries rightly or wrongly, epitomized that. At the same time as Tang Xiaobing reports, Liang did feel that there was something new in 1912 when he returned to China, that he could not entirely make sense of.
And because he could make sense of practically anything, I think that this is significant. He wrote to his daughter that “the misery of socializing is absolutely beyond words. If one has to live such a life constantly, I wonder where the pleasures of life could be. People here in the capital welcome me as if they were crazy. Every day I have to go to some three different gatherings.” It sounds like a liberal arts college that I attended. Liang’s complaint about Chinese republicanism as it was practiced in and out of government, in effect too many meetings, echoes his contemporary British literary titan Oscar Wilde’s objection to socialism. It would take too many evenings.

Chinese republicanism, therefore, I think, from the beginning was as much a social and cultural phenomena as it was institutional in government. So if it’s failing governmentally, that’s true, but since the 1880s we’ve had this public development of questioning and writing and opening schools and visiting people and trying to share the word about whatever issue concerns you, there is this cultural and social base that sustains the idea of the republic. Ironically, the worse things get, the more adamant are people about what they actually want so that that pressure for government rather than the idea of abandoning the idea of government I think is a hallmark of this period.

Because republicanism spread everywhere, and not just in terms of formal governmental edicts but in hairstyles and clothing that men and women adopted, the language and terminology they use, the books and newspapers they read, and how they read them, the number and kinds of meetings they held and attended and the rituals of protest and public gatherings they adopted, republicanism was also often fluid, expressive, unpredictable, and undisciplined, the kinds of things we complain about in Washington as a sign of political decay. But you never know when these kinds of activities can produce something more positive.

For example, political parties, presumably among the most organized manifestations of the republican principle outside of government had a tendency as republican revolutionary and historian Li Jianrong complained, “to float like duckweed without firm roots” (shuishang wugen de fu ping), their strength lay in their rapid firability to grow, the effervescence, not in their organizational coherence and rigor but I think Li, like Liang, saw this as simply bubbles on the surface. Why can’t we have real political parties?

One sign of this is Huang Xing, who as Mary Rankin indicated is one of the heroes of the 1911 revolution, after the revolution joined eleven political parties and he said, you know, when asked why he did that he said I basically couldn’t decide on what party to call myself. So he agreeably joined when asked, and without resigning his other affiliations. So this kind of pluralism or chaos, if you will, is part, I think, of the response to all of those developments that happened before 1911, now trying to find some kind of institutional context. And, you know, it is true that at the national level it’s harder and harder for these reformers to find it. But China is a big place. Lots of different levels and we see a lot happening locally, both good and bad during this period.

And then to finally return again once more to Liang Qichao, in another context he described this I think quite well, talking about the earlier period but in some ways the 1910s and the 10 years before the 1911 revolution are very much alike, whether we call one republic and
the other the end of empire, that is a body of development that probably has to be looked at as a whole. Liang Qichao ironically talking about his own ideas, he says, “New ideas swept in like a raging fire, introduced in the so-called Liang Qichao style, disorganized, unselected, incomplete, ignorant of the various schools and with an overemphasis on quantity. Still, society welcomed these ideas, just as people in an area ridden by disaster will gulp down grass roots, tree bark, frozen birds, and putrescent rats, ravenously and indiscriminately.” With his high standards, I think Liang wanted quality not quantity, but what the 1911 revolution gave China was quantity with some quality but you had to sift through all these institutions, different kinds of chambers of commerce, some of them simply a plaque that said chambers of commerce, others quite well organized.

And so the development of political parties, of chambers of commerce, of study groups, of schools, has this serial quality which is chaotic, even anarchic, but I think it is where one wants to look in addition to government failure for the history of this emergent Chinese state.

Okay. Now, in addition to these kinds of activities, let’s take a look at Chinese government. This is the Senate in Nanjing early in 1912. And that’s Sun Yat-sen presiding. There are 43 senators and about half of them seem to be here. A foreign observer who went to observe the Senate concluded that it was different than in Europe because if you were in Europe looking down at a group of politicians like this, most of them would have bald heads. And I did take a magnifying glass and there is some thinning of hair which you’d expect after a revolution, but basically these are young, young men. Republicanism was a young idea. I think that’s also important as Mary Rankin indicated. These young people of different generations play a very important role here.

Now, one way of looking at this is failure. However, if you look at the history of the Chinese Senate during this period—I think I’ll have to end with this because we’re running out of time—we see something that actually is quite lively. In the period from about January through March, the senators in Nanjing debated and approved a new constitution through two drafts and 32 days of argument. They accepted Sun Yat-sen’s resignation in favor of Yuan Shikai. They weathered the attacks of infuriated, gun-toting, window-breaking suffragists in March. They quarreled amongst themselves over the location of the capital before finally decamping to Beijing in April. Speeches and debate were notable for being highly emotional. During the debate over whether the republic’s capital should be in Beijing or Nanjing, one delegate threatened to kill himself on the floor of the senate if the vote did not go his way.

Debates over other questions were civil and thoughtful, like deliberations led by Song Jiaoren and Hu Hanmin over the relative value of centralized versus decentralized governance. One definition of a republic is debate-based and that’s what China had. And it had not because the senate was doing it and the rest of the country wasn’t, but because much of the rest of the country, especially in the cities was doing it before 1911, after 1911. And after 1911, if you look at newspapers from places like Hunan, they focused on these national institutions, recorded the debates, and developed a perspective that I think does suggest a gulf of the kind that Mary Rankin indicated between local people in the center. But it was a gulf to be closed not by a return to monarchy but some kind of better republic.
So I think it’s in the tension between social and cultural developments on the one hand, including a lot of people, including women, and these national political institutions that one finds the development of China during this period. Focus on either one alone I think doesn’t give us a state. It gives us a government, it gives us localities, but this connection I think is a quite intriguing one.

I just have a few more slides I’ll just show you. This is a cartoon about what can happen when things go bad. And this is Sun Yat-sen. I like this picture because it shows both his vulnerability and the kind of strength that he had to endure all the meetings and speeches that he went through from the end of 1911 when he returned to China. And a lot of what he did was, well, take group photos. He’s there.

And then I’ll end with this one. I was going to talk more about women but if you look here at a group photo you see Sun Yat-sen in the middle. This is his game face. And the challenge of being Sun Yat-sen in China probably was even greater than being Liang Qichao but he was more in his element. He loved meeting people, loved giving speeches. But look at this woman on the end. She is someone who for the whole of 1912 has battled for women’s rights and lost. And she has this Mona Lisa-like look, enigmatic. And I wish I had time to talk more about what women were doing during this period but they were among the most active political people in China. They and the Manchus were the banner men who had most to lose. Women who had most to gain were among the most active politically. It’s hard to register these kinds of developments unless one looks for some greater balance between the social and cultural on the one hand and the governmental on the other.

Thank you.

(Applause)

DR. EDWARD MCCORD: The subject of my talk, warlordism, is probably at odds with any kind of celebration or commemoration of the significance of the 1911 revolution. This is not what we usually think about when we think about the 1911 revolution. And the reason for that, of course, is that any real examination of the emergence of warlordism after the 1911 revolution tends to place a negative light on the revolution in a sense that it exposes the failure of the revolution to achieve the kind of strong democratic state that it set out to achieve. So as this is kind of dark spot in Chinese history, many people think we should simply let it go. You know, this is something best left ignored and moved on.

But I think it’s fair to ask if there is, in fact, any reason to study or remember the warlord period beyond a kind of historian’s interest in what actually happened. I teach at a school of international affairs and so I find my students are always asking me to prove why they should study history and they actually end up only thinking it’s useful if it has relevance for today. So while my interest as a historian on this topic is not to see how we can use past to understand the present, I have softened up somewhat in this kind of request for my students.

So for today’s event I thought maybe I could at least consider whether there is any
broader value in trying to understand the rise of warlordism following the 1911 revolution, apart from any kind of purely historical interests and in doing so I’m probably going to stray a little bit from just approaching this as a historian.

As a starting point I thought it was kind of a remarkable coincidence that the anniversary of the 1911 revolution is coinciding with this wave of democratic uprisings in the Middle East. So we have this 100 years lapse. We see a similar movement of two different areas towards democracy. Now, I hesitate to suggest that there is anything in the collapse of republican hopes in the 1911 revolution that can directly help us understand or predict what will happen in these jasmine revolutions in the Middle East today.

So at most, I would probably agree with Mark Twain when he said history does not repeat itself; at best it rhymes. And I think that’s what we can find. If we can actually find some rhymes, some rhyming going on between what happened 100 years ago in China and what we see in the Middle East today. And if nothing else, I think looking at the 1911 revolution and what happened after the 1911 revolution may tell us something about the fragility of democratic transitions, the difficulties of achieving democracy.

One rhyme that I’m particularly interested in looking at these two periods is the role and the importance of the military in democratic transitions or in democratic revolutions. Many times when we look at democratic revolutions we’re very much focused on intellectual transitions or looking for sources of popular dissatisfaction. While all these things are obviously very important, I think the fact remains that in many cases revolutions without military power or without military support are unlikely to succeed. So in China, the revolution actually began in most provinces with military uprisings or with at least political declarations that had military support of the new armies in the provinces. If we look at the recent events in Tunisia and Egypt, obviously they didn’t start with military uprisings but it was the unwillingness of the military in those countries to suppress popular demonstrations that has been the really key factor in their success. And likewise, the willingness of militaries in say Libya and Syria to back up the regimes which are a key to their troubles. So I think it’s very important to try to understand the role and motivation of militaries amid democratic revolutions and I think this is particularly true in the case of the 1911 revolution.

Now, ironically, the reason behind the military’s role in the 1911 revolution was also the first step towards warlordism. So I think this is one of the kind of troubling aspects of the revolution itself. What this was and the reason behind the military’s role was something I would call the politicization of the military that included an entire period before the 1911 revolution.

Now, the way in which the military became involved in politics has a lot to do with who was drawn into politics in this period and it was basically the result of the transformation of the military as the Qing Dynasty really sought to modernize and improve the quality of its armies. And this is one of the great ironies, of course, too, is that here is one of these efforts of the Qing Dynasty to create a new kind of military force that would strengthen the dynasty and ends up, of course, being one of the forces that brings the dynasty down. So it’s one of these ironies of unintended consequences of reforms.
Anyway, besides reorganizing its armies and trying to arm them with advanced weaponry, one of the main goals of the Qing military reforms was to try at least to attract educated men into the armies as both soldiers and officers. And at the same time their ability to do this was enhanced by the rising nationalism in China to kind of change the perception of military careers among a lot of the people where it now became actually admirable to be a military officer. And so there were educated men that actually joined the military, became officers, and even became soldiers out of kind of a nationalist sense or at least to see this as a positive career alternative. Now, the end result, as Mary Rankin has said, is not that all the armies became very crack units with good men across the board but there was a leavening of these educated men inside the armies that became a very important part of the new armies.

So the new armies attract these large numbers of educated men. These men though were also influenced by the same kind of nationalist and revolutionary ideals that were spreading through the rest of the social elite in this period. And so as the general elite swung towards revolution, the educated men in the military also swung with them. So you have this correlation between what’s going on in society in general and what’s going on inside the military. So the key point in the military’s role in the revolution then was the social affinity they had for the broader elite as that broader elite moved towards revolution.

Now, obviously in an area of popular democracy it’s the social connections we might see between the military and the people on the street that becomes most important but the principle is the same, that there is this correlation between—the army actually feels connected to the people or the people that matter in the case of the 1911 revolution, which is really more of the elite.

So the politicization of the military was a precondition then for the military’s role in the revolution. So the fact that the military men were engaged in this same kind of political process, political thought, political discussion that was going on among the civil elite was also crucial in leading them up to the role they were going to play. But as I say, this is also I think the first step towards warlordism because it began the process of drawing the military into politics. So you had this first step taken.

The revolution itself was the second step towards warlordism because it marked a second process which I see, which is the militarization of politics, where politics becomes militarized. The involvement of the military in the revolution basically represented an effort to resolve political issues by military means. To the extent that the new armies were involved in the revolution, it was an effort to resolve this basic sense of “what should the government of China be?” by military means, by military effort. And this is, of course, an essential feature of warlordism down the road or militarism down the road where the military becomes involved in political resolutions.

Now, what I’m not trying to do then is suggest though that the 1911 revolution itself was the beginning of warlordism. I’m talking about steps that are being taken towards warlordism, not that the 1911 revolution itself made warlordism. For warlordism to happen, that political engagement or the military engagement in politics has to be somehow institutionalized.
and that is what is going to happen then as we move into the republic itself. And I see this somewhat happening as a result of something I would call the republican realization crisis, the crisis of the inability to realize the republic as it is envisioned by the revolutionaries. And here is where we see the real difficulty in any kind of democratic transition. The 1911 revolution is a perfect example of this.

One of the explanations for the rise of warlordism in China that I’ve never really found very convincing is a suggestion that the fall of the dynasty created some kind of vacuum, the government collapsed and as a result of that vacuum, the only thing out there to move in was the military. And I think what we’ve already see with Mary Rankin’s talk and also with David Strand’s talk is there is actually a lot of stuff going on in society. It’s not that society all collapses and there is no institutions, there’s no discussions, there’s no meetings going on. Lots going on. The central government continued to operate after the revolution. Provincial and local administrations were maintained or quickly reconstituted by local elites. There was no political collapse of civil government.

I might also say if we look in the Middle East again and make that comparison in Egypt and Tunisia, there’s no collapse of government. That’s not what’s happening in these cases. The government collapses. Actually, the government that’s on the ground continues on. People adjust it, people manipulate it, but it continues on.

The main problem as I see it for the early republic is that there was no real agreement among all the various forces that participate in the revolution over how the new government should be organized or who is supposed to lead it. In fact, the only real agreement I think really is a sense that it had to be a republic. But that’s a very broad category of political interpretation. What is a republic? What does that entail? How would you write a constitution for republic? These can be very contested areas.

And they remain there for a very strong disagreement there over, number one, whether or not the new government should be some kind of a federalist system that would permit a great degree of local self-government or whether the interests of the nation would be better served by a strong central government. And number two, there’s a lot of disagreement about the distribution of power within the government. Should the government be—should the main power of the government be held by representative assemblies or should it be held by the presidency, a strong executive? So these are fundamentally constitutional issues. How do you write a constitution for a democracy that’s going to work?

Underneath all this though, of course, is the underlying issue that’s driving all this and that is which constitution, which political form is going to actually make China stronger? And which way should we lean then? Should we lean towards democracy or do we lean towards strong leadership? And this is the real question that any kind of society facing this similar situation would have to face.

All these efforts came to a head with the various efforts by President Yuan Shikai to centralize power under the presidency. So he’s obviously an advocate of centralized government and a strong executive. That put him into conflict with both reformers and
revolutionaries who sometimes, but not always, supported parliamentary and federal systems of
government and often they only did that because they were opposed to Yuan Shikai. So personal
politics also enters in.

And this conflict was also exacerbated though by the very weak commitment that
Yuan Shikai himself had to the principles of democracy that he was supposed to be upholding as
the president of the republic. And we ultimately see this in his effort when he tries to make
himself emperor in 1915. What this makes me think about also then, I was just reading the news
article about Egypt, the interview with the spokesperson from the military council in Egypt the
other day in The Post. Taking some caution when you look at statements from that military
council about how the army is in support of democracy, this from an army that has got no
experience with democracy. So you never quite know if what they’re saying and what they’re
representing is actually what they’re going to do down the road.

Anyway, the third step to warlordism then was a crisis of political authority that
resulted from the situation, from this republican realization crisis. In the absence of a real
political consensus or what I would see as more importantly probably a way to achieve a political
consensus, a method of achieving consensus, both sides ultimately turned to military force to try
to resolve their political differences. So in essence then these civil political disputes drew the
military back into politics where we already had this kind of starting point with the revolution,
now they’re drawn back into politics again. And this, of course, is one of the great problems
facing any kind of democratic transition where you have a failure of politics and how the military
might be drawn back in because of that failure of politics.

But here’s where the specific nature of military forces in any one country make a
strong difference in outcomes. In cases where you have a united national military, the end result
can often be the establishment of military dictatorship. And this, of course, is what Yuan Shikai
actually envisioned. He was going to establish a military-based, anyway, dictatorship.
Unfortunately for him, his control of the military was incomplete and that goes back a lot to the
way in which the military was organized as a result of the late Qing reforms. The late Qing had
failed to create a single unified national army. Instead what they ended up with is a very kind of
hodge-podge of different forces in the provinces that were not really united together by any kind
of bureaucratic way.

What this allowed then is for different sides in the political conflicts to approach
different military forces to get their support for their position. And on the other side of that, of
course, it allows individual commanders to decide which side they’re going to support. So you
have a condition of both sides playing into the same kind of process of looking for military
support and giving military support. And of course, military commanders do this based on their
own political preferences but also based on their own particular interests. The end result was a
whole series of civil wars to try to resolve this crisis of authority but the fragmentation of the
military itself made it very difficult for any kind of military success to actually occur. The
military was so fragmented it was impossible for any one military force to actually unify the
country. And so this really prevented any kind of resolution of this political crisis. So the civil
wars degenerated very quickly from conflicts over basic constitutional issues to a struggle for
political power among competing individual warlords or commanders.
So it’s the succession of civil wars then that becomes the fourth and final step to warlordism, because what these wars did is provide a context for individual military commanders to increase their own control over civil administration and military administration in the territories under their control. The end result then was indeed to solidify and institutionalize the political fragmentation of the nation among competing warlords. And this then becomes kind of the end result of the 1911 revolution. You started off with high hopes, you end up with military rule and political fragmentation.

Now, the emergence of warlordism in this period then I think has had a lasting impact on China. One example is it brought the military permanently into politics and we see some of that still today in the way in which the military plays a very important role in politics in the PRC. So this is one of the legacies of warlordism. But I’d also like to say one of the legacies of warlordism is the way in which it served as a negative example. So the very existence of warlordism in the 1920s highlighted, I think, its contradiction with the goals of the revolution. So the revolution was a rejection of despotism, and yet what they end up with the warlords is kind of a new kind of military despotism, military rule. The revolution sought to create a strong, unified nation and what warlordism gives is, of course, showing the danger of political fragmentation.

So I think it was actually the presence of warlordism that acted as a constant reminder of the unachieved goals of the revolution itself. And therefore, the rise of warlordism was matched almost immediately by the rise of anti-warlord movements. And I have to say this is where my own research is kind of gone now. I’m now coming to the conclusion that probably what was more important in China in this period was not the rise of warlordism but the rise of anti-warlordism. That really is the engine of history. So again what the existence of warlordism did is highlight the absence of democracy and the absence of unity and then people tried to achieve these ends.

At the same time, the memory of warlordism in some ways has also acted as an obstacle to the realization of the democratic goals of the revolution once unity was created by the Communist Party. Because the Communist Party has always been able to argue that if the party collapsed, if the party’s control collapsed, China might again collapse into warlordism. Warlordism might return.

And I think it’s not only the communists that think this. I remember years ago I went out to the Stanford [Hoover] Institute to try to find if I could get some money from Ramon Myers and he told me the only way I could justify a historical study of warlordism is if I could show that if the Communist Party ever collapsed, warlordism would reoccur and therefore my work would be relevant.

Anyway, I think we have to be very careful though about how we interpret the lesson of the history of warlordism. The memory of warlordism by the Chinese people certainly may create a concern of the possibility of a reoccurrence of warlordism. But history itself does not actually predict these kind of outcomes. We have contingent circumstances of the 1911 revolution phase and the circumstances of China today. There’s nothing that says the same
circumstances exist that would create the same kind of outcome. So it’s not at all clear that the fall of the Communist Party would result in warlordism. That would be one of many possible outcomes.

Rather than predicting outcomes then, I think the history of warlordism is at most providing us with a caution about the potential role of the military and democratic transitions. It warns us about the types of circumstances that can, in fact, lead to military rule instead of democracy. And as such, I think knowing about this history can be useful as we approach looking at democratic transitions as a contact, such as the jasmine revolutions in the Middle East.

But for China actually, I think the main meaning and legacy of warlordism is actually the memory of warlordism itself. That’s the legacy. While on one hand I think there is, it does create this kind of fear that someday warlordism might occur, that we have to prevent the kind of disorder and civil war and fragmentation that would occur and after a political crisis, say with the fall of the Communist Party. At the same time though I think what the history of warlordism actually does is remain as a negative example, a negative example that, in fact, serves to reinforce the original ideals of the revolution because it does the opposite of the revolution. So the real legacy of warlordism is that fear of warlordism reinforces the goals of democracy, national strength, and unity. And that then becomes the most important way that I think we should actually remember warlordism after the 1911 revolution.

Thank you.

(Applause)

DR. ZHENG XIAOWEI: So the title of my speech today is “Nationalism: New Conceptions of China.” So I want to know how many of you in this room know Chinese. Okay. So we know that China is also called zhongguo in Chinese. To be exact to the historical context I’m going to refer to this term zhongguo a lot. So zhongguo roughly means China. Okay.

So movement politics and nationalism are the two greatest driving forces of Chinese politics in the 20th century. Nationalism energized movement politics and they together led to successes of the nationalist and communist revolution. Nationalism actually also enabled Mao Zedong to launch the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. Even today, when the reform in China has said farewell to revolution, nationalism remains.

A recent example was in May 1999 after the U.S. planes bombed the Chinese embassy in Belgrade. In an overwhelmingly bottom-up fashion, in over 100 Chinese cities, Chinese citizens of all ages and backgrounds went on the streets to protest the bombing.

So this paper explores the origins and the development of Chinese nationalism. To be noted, Chinese nationalism and the idea of thinking China as a modern nation state were actually recent historical phenomena. It was during the late Qing period that some Chinese thinkers came up with new ways to imagine and define China and they used the term zhongguo.

So there are three parts of my talk today. The first part I want to give you an
introduction about this idea, the new conceptualization of the term zhongguo. And the second part, I will explain why Chinese thinkers needed to reinvent this concept and I will elaborate the concrete sense of zhongguo. And the very last part, part three, I will explore how such an understanding continued into the early republican period and examine the ramifications of Chinese nationalism. So this is the outline of today’s talk.

So part one. Zhongguo. So what is zhongguo? Anyone knows?

SPEAKER: Central kingdom.

MS. XIOWEI: Central kingdom. So this actually is a very old term. The term zhongguo appeared in 600 BCE in the Classics of History in Shangshu. Okay? So at that time this word translated as the middle kingdom was referred to the Western Zhou. So Western Zhou dynasty was the center of the civilizations at the time.

So how did the Chinese people refer to their country before the late Qing period? So normally when Chinese people referred to their country they used the dynasty’s name. The imperial government referred to themselves as the Empire. For example, the Empire of the Great Song. The Empire of the Great Qing. The Empire of the Great Ming. But still, this term zhongguo remained and existed. So as the gentlemen over there had already explained, it is translated as the middle kingdom, the center of the civilization.

So the use of this term zhongguo actually implied a claim of political legitimacy. And zhongguo was often used by states who saw themselves as the sole legitimate successor of previous Chinese dynasties. For example, in the Southern Song Dynasty, both the Jin Dynasty and the Southern Song state claimed themselves to be zhongguo. Okay.

So even though this term zhongguo first appeared a long time ago, in the late Qing this term zhongguo gained a new meaning. So I want to give you some examples about how late Qing people talked this term, zhongguo. The first one is a mid-Qing thinker, Gong Zizhen. So he had this one sentence: daqingguo yao yilai suowei zhongguo. Okay, I’m going to translate that. So the empire of Great Qing is the zhongguo from Emperor Yao’s time. Okay? Daqingguo yao yilai suowei zhongguo. So we know that Yao was considered the first legendary Chinese emperor.

So in this sentence we see this term zhongguo actually was used to refer to a real political entity. This did not happen before the Qing period. We know that before the Qing period the term existed but the term was always used as this very vague sense, the center of the civilization, the middle kingdom, but now in the late Qing, this term is related to a real political entity.

Another example was from the late Qing intellectual Liang Ji. He actually committed suicide after the 1911 revolution and he actually wrote a letter and told people why he committed suicide. So he said the reason that he chose to commit suicide, “keyi wei zhixun Qing, keyi wei zhixun zhongguo.” So both for the sake of the Qing Empire and for the sake of zhongguo. And he continued “Qingguo zhe shu bai nian yi gai zhi guo ye; zhongguo zhe wo san
gu yi chuan ban nian bu gai zhi guo ye.” So the empire of Qing is a country of a few hundred years and zhongguo is the country that existed for thousands of years.

So what is so significant about this quote? Because even though this term existed but it was never a clear, defined state? But in late Qing, this term was used to refer to a defined state and also in Liang Ji’s second sentence, zhongguo, this term, was used to refer to the political entity that transcended all dynasties. Okay?

So all dynasties were only different stages of the history of zhongguo. So as we can see at this time in the late Qing period, this term zhongguo had been a very different term from the earlier period. The earlier period only refers to the center of the civilization, the middle kingdom. Now it’s a real political entity. Okay?

And we have to keep in mind that before the Qing dynasty, this conceptualization of the term zhongguo did not exist. For example, a very famous Ming intellectual, Gu Yanwu, when he talked about his country he never used this term zhongguo. Either he said it’s Mingguo, or either he said it’s tianxia, all that’s under the heaven. So this is -- this new meaning was only gained in Qing.

At the end of Qing, this term zhongguo gained greater popularity. Zhongguo as a term actually appeared more frequently than the term daqing, the Great Empire of the Qing. And many people have mentioned Liang Qichao. Liang Qichao is really the most important intellectual of the late Qing period. He actually always used this word zhongguo when he was writing his articles.

So zhongguo became something very real for the Chinese intellectuals. It was a political entity. It was something definite, something real, something that transcended all the dynasties. Okay?

So if Chinese intellectuals only formulated this new concept zhongguo at the end of Qing, then we need to understand why they formulated a new concept at that specific time. What was the major problematic they were facing and the major problem they had to deal with? Why did they need a new concept to replace the old way of understanding the word? And also to address their own country. So this is what I’m going to talk about in part two.

So let’s first take a look at this map. So this is how Chinese people think about the word, the middle kingdom. So at the very heart, zhongyuan, the central plain, and then somewhere here, this is Japan. And the Philippines is over here. And there was xiaorenguo, the country of the dwarfs. And then there is darenguo, the country of the giants. So you know that Chinese people at this time really thought they were the center of the universe. They didn’t even care about the proper names of other nations, other countries, so they just put out this map. This is how they imagined the world. Okay. And actually, an accurate map before that map existed, so this is a map of 1620. This map was made by Jesuits.

So Liang Qichao wrote a paragraph describing how Chinese people understand the world and how Chinese people positioned themselves in the world. So this is a paragraph
Liang Qichao wrote in 1899 explaining the world view of the Chinese people. So “from the very ancient time, zhongguo was a unified country. All those countries,”—let’s go back to that—“all countries surrounding zhongguo were barbarians. They did not have cultures, nor did they have a developed political system. Our people, wumin, thus did not treat the barbarian countries as equal counterparts and our country, wuguo, for several thousands of years had always been in the position of standing alone. Our people thus considered our country as the entire world.” And this is a good illustration of that world view.

So China means all that’s under the heaven. Following this line, another thinker, Yang Du stated there was no other world beyond zhongguo. There was no other state beyond zhongguo. So as you can see, this map shows that world view.

So Chinese people did not encounter challenges from other states, and in such a situation they viewed their country as all that’s under the heaven, tianxia. This idea of equating zhongguo with the world lasted till the Qing Dynasty. However, in late Qing when Chinese intellectuals opened their eyes and viewed the world, they realized that the real world and the world in their mind were two very different things. And they realized that in the real world China was in a very dangerous position.

So after realizing this fact, Chinese intellectuals were very anxious. They were thinking how and in what direction China should develop and how China should position itself in the real world. And in fact, this is the biggest concern of Chinese intellectuals in late Qing. So the real world was actually dominated by western nation states. Especially in the 1890s, this sense of anxiety was most prevailing. Especially after Africa was carved up. So this is a cartoon of the 1890s carving of China. So we see Queen Victoria and the Japanese samurai, France, Germany, and Russia. Okay.

And this is a picture actually drawn by a revolutionary. So Russia was represented by the bear and France was represented by the frog. So China was all carved up by the western nations. So this is how people feel this is the real world. Just think about that—less than 100 years ago Chinese intellectuals thought they were the center of the universe; now this is the reality. So after they realized the real world, they actually developed new concepts to better position China in the real world.

So after the Chinese intellectuals opened their eyes and discovered the real world, their mindset changed and they started developing new convictions. So the old notion that China equaled the world, zhongguo ji shi tianxia, was quickly debunked. Rather than believing China was the center of the universe, they realized that actually the world was made up of many powerful states. And in particular, the European states, because of their very developed sense of nationalism, had built themselves up as powerful nation states. Moreover, these nation states were actually the masters among all states at the end of the 19th century. They, not China, were actually the center of the current world.

So according to Liang Qichao, this kind of nationalism and such a formulation of modern nation states were exactly what China needed to learn from the European states. In 1912, Liang Qichao announced that transforming China into a complete state, wanquan guojia, and
enabling it to assert itself in the world was actually the political foundation of the Republic of China.

So in order for China to enter the world and have a position in the world, China needed to be one of those nation states. So almost all intellectuals at the end of Qing considered building up nationalism and constructing a new nation state their top priority. So in that sense, western political theory on nation states and nationalism actually became the dominant political thought and the most important and powerful theoretical inspiration of the Chinese elite in late Qing. Okay. So, Liang Qichao; a picture of Liang Qichao.

So how should we understand the Chinese nationalism in late Qing? I think there are two very important characteristics. First of all, some people had argued that because China as a culture entity existed for a long time, so this transition from China as a culture entity to China as a nation was rather simple. But after I presented the transition, we actually realized that China, zhongguo, becoming a nation state was also carefully and artificially formulated. It’s not a natural process. So it is invented, just like many other nation states elsewhere.

The second characteristic is that we see that a lot of the intellectuals at this time when they try to build up Chinese nationalism they focus on building up a nation state. So Chinese nationalism had a very strong focus on the state. So this is something very important. Okay.

Part three. Okay. So how did nationalism appear in early Republican China? The commitment to build China into a complete nation state continued after the 1911 revolution. Chinese thinkers, though having different focuses and various perspectives, were all doing what they considered the most effective ways in building up a nation state. So at the beginning of the Republic of China, Chinese intellectuals first tried to build up a modern Chinese nation state via building a constitutional order, adopting the western political model to assert China’s position to achieve wealth and power. And then the rather failed attempt of building up this political model and the disappointment in early republican politics led to the New Culture Movement, that is changing the customs and mindsets of the Chinese people to build up a strong nation.

The New Culture Movement imagined that China would be revived through culture reconstruction. But the New Culture Movement was not the most effective way in building up the nation state. Chinese intellectuals experienced various political schemas until they settled on the format of building the nation state via building a Leninist party-state. So this is a very important transition here.

So I need to wrap up. I have two sentences. Okay.

So in order to build up a strong nation state, Chinese intellectuals realized that they need a disciplined mass politics under the supervision of a highly disciplined pedagogical party. It is only after the establishment of such a party that a powerful propaganda machine was built. And after the propaganda machine was built up, Chinese nationalism in its modern sense—that is a broad, popular identification with China as a sovereignty, a community, and the political entity with limited borders—finally arrived.
So at the center of this modern nationalism lay the political parties that had arisen in the early 20th century. And by the 1920s, these parties had succeeded in dominating the processes through which the nation was being imagined and invented. This politicized nationalism endured and actually this remains to the present day.

Thank you.

(Applause)

DR. PHILLIPS: Thank you. Thank you very much.

In order to allow plenty of time for questions, I’m just very briefly going to attempt to sum up all debates over 1911 and its success and failure. You know, drawing together these talks is not easy, but I’d like to offer a way to look at this in the context of the two organizations that have really set the terms of debate of 1911’s success or failure. And that’s the Nationalist Party and the Communist Party over the last decades. And again, this isn’t about agreeing or disagreeing, but nevertheless, they’ve sort of set the tune we all dance to when we talk about 1911 and what does it mean in history.

And I’d like to suggest that one way to sum up all the contending perceptions, success, failure—because, I mean, we’ve had discussions of how republicanism in a sense of culture and society are in some ways a success. Warlordism, through a dialectical process, turned out to be a success even though at the time it wasn’t. And then new conceptions of the Chinese nation which spread rapidly thanks to 1911. I’d like to suggest that perceptions of 1911 are governed by political agenda, topic, time, and place as a way to kind of sum all these up.

Political agenda is probably the easiest and I’ll start with that, which is I would argue that for the last 100 years for the Nationalists and since 1921 with the Communists, we’ve all been debating how each party needs 1911 to kind of be in this sweet spot of “successful but not too successful.” It has to have disappointment and incompleteness with inspiration and hope. And as someone who looks at a lot of Taiwan, I can tell you that Taiwan in the 1950s was designed to be the fulfillment of 1911. Anyone who looks at Chiang Ching-kuo and his discussion of, early discussions of democratization on Taiwan—it wasn’t about democratizing Taiwan. It was about completing the work that began in 1911. And I think it’s important to recognize those contexts for it.

For the communists as well—we won’t go into all the details and bore you to death with the idea of China being half feudal and half colonial and what that means. However, the half success and the weak bourgeois that gives you the 1911 revolution and its semi-success is what justifies Communist Party policies and a United Front right up through 1949. And so on political agenda, I think it’s important to recognize that aspect.

The other area, topic. Let me offer a few ideas how the topic we pick kind of decides whether you think 1911 worked, or was a success, or not. If the topic is the removal of the Qing, I would argue that’s kind of the thing that hasn’t been discussed enough. If you
consider China’s history of monarchy, if you consider how many countries in the world after the removal of the monarchy spend decades or even hundreds of years debating whether that monarchy should return or not, what an unqualified success China is. We can talk about Republican China. 1911 to 1949 is a series of debates and often, you know, horrendous violence. People debating political movements, everything from federalism to liberal capitalist democracy to eventually Leninist party-states. Isn’t it remarkable how little the monarchy even comes up? And I think in that way if you choose that topic you get a success; you choose warlords, like Ed, you have to look a little harder to have success. It has to be sort of the reaction against the warlords gives you the success.

Finally, this idea of time and place. Simply put, 1911 I would argue, in general, looks better the further we get from it. Whether it’s free and fair elections on Taiwan or an teleological process that leads us to 1949, I would say you have a completely different vision of what 1911 was and its significance than from, say, a young person living in a rural area under warlord control in the 1920s. And I think that’s important to remember.

And I’ll close with one interesting thing that these two civil war antagonists, the Communists and the Nationalists, agree more than ever on the nature of 1911. This is a trend that began in earnest with communist praise for Chiang Ching-kuo upon his death. Again, whatever defects he had, he was always a good Chinese patriot. Events like 1911 and the Nationalists’ efforts in the War of Resistance are evaluated more favorably than ever on the mainland. In some ways, they sound like the Nationalists of the 1950s.

I’ll just close by saying we really don’t have a 1911 revolution as a single event, but to me in 1911 we have a way to understand the changing nature of politics since 1911 until today. And then with that I will open the floor to questions. We don’t have much time for questions. And I ask when you ask, please identify yourself. And I think there is someone with a microphone. So can we start with –

QUESTION: Thank you. I’m a visiting fellow in CNAPS of Brookings. My question is to Zheng Xiaowei.

Thank you very much tell us about zhongguo, the new concept. But if we discuss about nationalism, I need to know more because you mentioned the middle kingdom. So could you tell us more about who lived in the periphery? Who lived in the marginal area? And also we know the famous slogan from Sun Yat-sen in the Xinhai Revolution, that is quju dalu, huifu zhonghua. So that means we need to chase some barbarians and we need to recover our Han Chinese countries. So could you tell us what is the significance for the nationalism? Who is dalu? Okay. Thank you.

DR. ZHENG: So I will answer your first question first. So who lives in the center and who lived in the peripheral?

So when this term middle kingdom, zhongguo, was first used, it was referring to Xi Zhou. So in that sense there was xirong, dongyi, and nanman. So all the barbarians lived in the peripheral and the center of the universe was the Western Zhou Dynasty. So that’s how this
So your second question, I wouldn’t say that Sun Yat-sen’s sense of nationalism is the modern sense of nationalism. It is a mixture of racism and nationalism. And actually, it created big problems because after the Republic of China was declared, Mongolia declared its independence. And the reason that Mongolia declared its independence was that “we had allegiance to the Qing emperor but we had no allegiance towards the Republic of China.” So very quickly after that, Sun Yat-sen had a new formulation saying that the five different ethnicities should live together harmoniously, wuzu gonghe. So in that sense, wuzu, they belonged to different ethnicities but they can belong into one political entity. So that wuzu ethnicity is something different from nationalism. Does that answer your question?

DR. PHILLIPS: The gentleman right beside you.

QUESTION: Well, as you can see, I’m from India. And so I’m wondering what happened to 2,500 years when Buddhism spread from India not only to China but all over the world. And so how could anybody in 1890 say that, well, everything around is barbarian, when they have already been swamped by an ideology from their neighbor?

DR. PHILLIPS: Good question. Does anyone… That’s an awkward silence kind of question.

DR. MCCORD: I’ll take it. I think one of the interesting things about China is we do have these conceptions such as, you know, center and periphery, and yet throughout its history China has actually been very adaptive. I think the real strength of China has not been that it has a concept of itself as a central core that you have to preserve central things and it has to remain that way forever, but rather throughout history it has absorbed things like Buddhism and other things from the outside and incorporate it into this concept of China. And that might be part of the way in which you go from calling for a Han, you know, Han nation to ending up with a nation of five ethnicities. And so I think it’s one of these contradictions in Chinese culture but I think it’s there.

DR. PHILLIPS: Can we have that gentleman and then up front.

QUESTION: Thank you. Akira Chiba from Japan. I’d like to build up what Professor Phillips mentioned in his summary, that is the origins of 1911. And of course, we all know it’s implied that it’s because of the corrupt Qing Dynasty that led to the century of humiliation that triggered the revolution. But when we look at the origins of the center of humiliation, we know that it started out with the Opium War. And when we look at why the Opium War started, it’s because Lin Zexu burned all the opium because the British sold China opium because China monopolized tea. I know that tea doesn’t rhyme with rare earth but do we see a parallel in what the Chinese are doing? Are they trying to use their comparative advantage as a strategic leverage?

DR. PHILLIPS: Another awkward silence.
DR. MCCORD: I just think you’re getting beyond what historians like to talk about. I pushed myself as far as I could go outside of history and I would rather leave that to some political scientist out there to answer.

DR. PHILLIPS: We had one lady over here who had her hand up earlier. And then Dr. Lieberthal. Because we are running out of time. I’m sorry.

QUESTION: Thank you. I’m Genie Nguyen with Voice of Vietnamese Americans. My question is for Dr. Zheng Xiaowei. The presentation, the conception of nationalism that you presented, is it an official view of China today?

So how did you arrive at the conception of nationalism? From what you’re saying, “The new political entity of China was formed since 1911, afterwards in the 1920s in a way.” So before then the zhongguo only referred to a cultural center if I did not misunderstand you. The political entity came afterwards and the nationalism that you proposed only arrived in the 1900s. Correct? And so Sun Yat-sen at that time put the meanings into the people’s rights and that is adopted from the western ideas. Before then, the people in China, in zhongguo, actually had no rights. They were considered black people. They were people who lived in black houses made of mud. They were slaved. And from what you proposed or what you explained to us, except fice ethnicities in the middle, the surroundings were all barbarians and we, the Vietnamese, were considered one of the barbarians. But somehow in the south of the river, there are 100 different ethnicities who live in the south. And we were all barbarians.

So then my concern to you is how official is your idea and how is that being regarded by the official Republic of China and the People’s Republic of China today? Because that political entity given by you, a professor, would make a big difference for generations to come as for how we deal with the political entities.

DR. PHILLIPS: Okay, thank you. Thank you. We need to sort of –

DR. ZHENG: So how official this view was. I would say that the Republic of China and People’s Republic of China would never say this is the official view because we know that the CCP divided Chinese people into 56 official ethnicities, even though there are a lot of problems in the classification of people into those 56 ethnicities. The official line is all those different minorities and the Han people can co-exist harmoniously. So this is not the official line. And no worry about that, please don’t.

DR. PHILLIPS: Our last question. Ask, Dr. Lieberthal.

QUESTION: Mine will be simpler than that question. Ken Lieberthal at Brookings. I appreciated your focus on zhongguo. It seems to me what changed was the guo in zhongguo. Right? What guo means. But what I never quite understood is how did nationalism -- how did a key term for nationalism come to be minzu zhuyi? Because that’s distinctly different from what you would think about. I would have thought it would become guojia zhuyi. Right? So can you kind of play with those concepts and tell us how they relate, please?
DR. ZHENG: Sure. I think you raised a very good point. I just talked to a number of Chinese intellectuals several days ago in Beijing. We now actually use the term guozu zhuyi to translate, yeah, nationalism. Guojia zhuyi refers to statism. That’s a different political thought. So minzu zhuyi actually is not a good way to translate nationalism because China’s nationalism had this very strong focus on building up the nation state. In the 19th century, the intellectuals, so many of them focused on building a modern state. So guozu zhuyi –

DR. LIEBERTHAL: (Inaudible) you said just now but, you know, for 100 years it’s been minzu zhuyi? How did that term become the central term for the expression of the notion of nationalism and what does that tell us when you focused your presentation on zhongguo and how guo changed? That’s my question.

DR. STRAND: Maybe I could just say one thing. I think Sun Yat-sen, because he stressed social organization and political organization, was willing to treat, I think, everyone in China regardless of nationality as part of this national project. So many people at the time actually used guojia zhuyi partly because, as I was trying to suggest, the idea of the state, because it wasn’t necessarily as controversial as the disorders of the country, was something that you could use in a more neutral way.

And certainly for Sun Yat-sen, I think he felt that everyone should be part of that. And he was as suspicious of Han Chinese and their tendency toward decentralization and localism as he was for any breakaway group. In fact, my reading of his thought is he was more concerned with the center than with borderlands. And some of his attitudes toward foreign powers, he was more than willing to let this bitter -- that bit go, as long as he could retain the center. And so I suppose in some ways he is a traditionalist but the guijia zhuyi is part of the debates during this period of the ‘10s, ‘20s, ‘30s, and ‘40s. And sometimes used in a relatively clear way as nationalism. The minzu, I guess, is problematic though as you suggest.

DR. ZHENG: Some people actually use guojia zhuyi to translate nationalism. So it was contested throughout the early republican period.


DR. LIEBERTHAL: The terms were contested, right? Which is what makes it interesting. But patriotism was aiguo zhuyi. Right? So again you have this kind of real tension between guo and minzu. Right? It didn’t become aizu zhuyi. Right? So I’m still just uneasy as to when you think of the rise of nationalism in China, it seems to me that centrality overall of minzu zhuyi is something that is very important to explain because it is in a sense moving into a different category the central concept of the time. Maybe I’m wrong but it’s bothered me.

DR. ZHENG: I think the reason it bothers you is we have different understanding about this idea of nationalism. So I actually understand nationalism in a very clear defined and specific way. So I think nationalism, when I use the term, I always refer to the modern nation state. Patriotism, for example—the Boxers, maybe the xenophobic sentiment against foreigners. Maybe you can say that’s patriotism but it’s never nationalism. So for me, when I use the term nationalism, it always comes with the building of the modern nation state.
DR. PHILLIPS: Thank you. I’m headed off to look for Cihai and all of its earlier incantations to start tracking this down. You’ve awakened interest.

Can we have a round of applause? And we will reconvene at 4:05. Thank you.

(Recess)