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THE TEXAS A&M UNIVERSITY'S BUSH SCHOOL OF  
GOVERNMENT AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS

**BEYOND THE TAIWAN STRAIT:  
PLA MISSIONS OTHER THAN  
TAIWAN**

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Senior Fellow and CNAPS Director, The Brookings Institution

**Steven Metz**

Chairman, Regional Strategy & Planning Department, SSI, U.S. Army War College

**Andrew Scobell**

Associate Professor, Texas A&M University

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**David Lai**

Professor of Asian Security Studies, SSI, U.S. Army War College

**Dennis Wilder**

Visiting Fellow, John L. Thornton China Center, The Brookings Institution

## PROCEEDINGS

RICHARD BUSH: Why don't we go ahead and get started? I'm Richard Bush. I'm the Director of the Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies here at Brookings. And for the third year in a row, it is our great privilege to provide the venue and be a co-sponsor for the rollout of the latest NBR-Army War College-Texas A&M volume on the Chinese Military.

You didn't come to hear me, so I'm going to take just a little more time. But I do want to say that this series of volumes is the longest sustained and high quality effort on the development of the Peoples Liberation Army, it is a contribution to understanding and scholarship, I know that because I use the volumes myself, and so it is a privilege for us to be the host for this event and the ones that have come before.

It's my pleasure now to call on Dr. Steven Metz from the Army War College. He's the Chairman of Regional and Strategic Planning in the Strategic Studies Institute, and he's also Research Professor of National Security Affairs; Steve.

STEVEN METZ: On behalf of my boss, Doug Lovelace, the Director of the U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, I'd like to express my welcome and my thanks to everyone for coming here today. If you're not familiar with the Strategic Studies Institute, it's the Army's strategy level senior research institution. But in addition to our own research that we produce, one of the things the Institute does is to form partnerships within the academic and the analytical community, which leads to a variety of collaborative products. Very often it leads to a conference followed by some sort of publication.

This particular project, the one dealing with the Peoples Liberation Army, I think is safe to say it really has been the crown jewel in this particular program for us for the ten years that we've been involved with it.

Larry Wortzel and Andrew Scobell initially led our partnership in this involvement. Now, as they continue, David Lai has picked that up for us. And as Richard said, I think if you go back and look at the history of this particular conference and the publications, the volumes that have come out of it, you'd find that they really do represent the cutting edge on a very crucial national security and political issue. And all you have to do is use Google to find out just how important they are. The current volume, the one that we're releasing today, has sustained that high level of scholarship, and I think it, like its predecessors, will also play an important role in thinking on this issue and will resonate among the policy community. So with that said, once again, I'd like to express my thanks to you for coming in.

RICHARD BUSH: Let me now call on my old friend, Andrew Scobell from Texas A&M University, to say a few words.

ANDREW SCOBELL: Thank you, Richard. I stand before you today wearing two hats, that of sponsor and that of editor and contributor. My first hat, I represent the Bush School, George H.W. Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University, co-sponsor the conference the produced the volume we're launching today.

The Bush School is dedicated to objective policy relevant research and analysis of China and other issues and is proud to work closely with the National Bureau of Asian Research and the Army War College, two fine organizations that share these objectives.

Moreover, I think it's particularly appropriate that we are being graciously hosted today by an institution that has long possessed a stellar reputation of its own for policy relevant research on a host of issues, including China. My second hat, I stand before you as co-editor and contributor of Beyond the Strait. My fellow editors, Roy Kamphausen and David Lai, and I wanted to explore Chinese military missions other than Taiwan. We do not mean to assume or imply that Taiwan is no longer important or has been resolved. We certainly don't intend to minimize the importance of Taiwan for China or ignore the complexity of the issue.

Of course, Taiwan remains a central war fighting scenario for the Peoples Liberation Army. Our use of the term, beyond Taiwan, is consistent with DOD usage in recent annual reports on Chinese military power.

My task was to produce a brief chapter discussing Taiwan so that other contributors could focus on their assigned topics without wasting space and effort, articulating their assumptions about the state of play in the strait.

My basic contention is that how Taiwan is managed will significantly affect China's future trajectory, whether it is military modernization, foreign relations, or economic development. So you might ask, how will the course of cross strait relations go? I don't pretend to know. But what I've tried to do is think about the range of possibilities. And I think I have a slide hopefully that we brought up. I promise it's just one slide. I've been through enough PowerPoint briefings to last me a lifetime, so I will not subject you to a long one.

ROY KAMPHAUSEN: It's a great slide; you'll want to see it.

ANDREW SCOBELL: After that build-up – but anyway, as I said, trying to think about the range of possibilities, I thought it made sense to produce a two-by-two matrix with using what I think are the most important – two most important variables. Whether there's a resolution of the issue that's acceptable to Beijing or not, that's the first variable--whether its resolution of the issue is acceptable to Beijing or not--and the second variable, whether military force is used or not.

So all the contributors focused on military missions other than Taiwan. I believe they assumed that the scenario would be one of those in the top row, that is, status quo, what I would call no conflict, no resolution, or resolution without conflict, in which positive trends continue and things take care of themselves gradually over time. In other words, the authors of subsequent chapters base their analyses on no use of force in the Taiwan Strait. I suggest that use of force in the Strait might significantly alter their conclusions. My framework suggests, not surprisingly, the use of force would trigger a shock of some kind-- major or minor--depending on whether the military conflict ended in a resolution acceptable to China or not.

So as I said, I'm not assigning any likelihood to any one of these scenarios, we can all draw our own conclusions, but we needed to start from some point as our contributors to this volume went forward.

Having said that, let us set aside Taiwan for the moment and explore in some detail other military missions for the Peoples Liberation Army. Thank you.

ROY KAMPHAUSEN: Good afternoon; I'm Roy Kamphausen and I direct the Washington, D.C. Office of The National Bureau of Asian Research. And it's my privilege on behalf of NBR to welcome you and to welcome our distinguished chapter authors. It's our great pleasure to work with SSI for the third year, and we're in the midst of our fourth year already, and, of course, a privilege to continue working with Andrew in his new coordinates down at the Bush School, and we're hopeful that that will continue in the coming year.

Of course, thank you, Richard, for partnering with us again on the launch. It's always a privilege to come here and to work with you. And we're so pleased that we'll hear from Dennis Wilder at the end representing the China Center here at Brookings, as well, and we'll talk about that more in a minute.

You know, this conference now in its 20<sup>th</sup> year is really the brainchild, if you will, of Ambassador Jim Lilley, near and dear to many of us here, our former Ambassador in China and several other places in Asia.

He started this conference series 20 years ago, recognizing that the modernization of China's military was going to be critical to America's own understanding of its place in East Asia. And he's the guiding force behind the first several years before Larry Wortzel, who will join us shortly, and Andrew took up the mantle at the Army War College a decade ago. Ambassador Lilley was our keynote speaker this past year and it was a treat and a treasure for those who were there to hear him walk through 40 years of U.S./China relations in his Friday night keynote address that kicked off the conference. At the conclusion of the conference, those of you who know him, in his own inimitable way, he said, listen, don't take a year to get the book out, like you have done in previous years, get it out in the spring, and so with that as our charge, all of the authors, the great editorial team at

the War College, and everyone pulled together. I think April 30<sup>th</sup> qualifies as “spring”, so Ambassador, I think we achieved that objective.

We’re also very appreciative that the Inaugural John M. Shalikashvili Chair of National Security at NBR, Admiral Dennis Blair, joined us for the entire weekend last fall, and chaired the wrap-up, “What Does it All Mean”, panel on Sunday afternoon, and then was gracious enough to write the foreword to this year’s volume just before assuming his duties as the third Director of National Intelligence in January of this year; we are so pleased that Admiral Blair was able to do that.

Of course, when you’re an organization like mine, you’re grateful for the funding organizations. And a quick mention of the Lynde and Harry Bradley Foundation, the Henry M. Jackson Foundation, the Russell Family Foundation, and, of course, L3 Corporation. General Pat Hughes, who’s joined us at the conference in year’s past, regrets that he couldn’t be here today for the launches as he has been in past years.

Well, before turning very quickly to our distinguished panel of chapter authors, I should share a bit of complementary information to what Andrew shared about our focus of moving beyond Taiwan, and some of the motivations that we collectively had in shaping this volume.

You know, it’s a widely observed phenomenon in recent years that China’s role in international affairs is becoming more consequential, both contributing to and benefiting from or resulting in changing security structures and balance of power relationships.

We thought it was important to take a concentrated effort at better understanding this changing international security environment and how that might be shaping new missions for the PLA.

As Andrew said, it’s not to say that Taiwan has been resolved, but rather to say it’s a much more complex environment. And so what is expected of the PLA, and how are they organizing themselves to accomplish these missions? As Andrew said, the importance of Taiwan to the PRC and to the U.S. is not diminishing, but if we continue this very focused approach to almost a Taiwan-exclusive approach to understanding the PLA, we’ll miss some other very important driving trends. Thus the title and the motivation of the volume.

Now, when we made these judgments a year ago January, little did we know that what we had conceived of as a conceptual effort really was borne out in real terms over the course of 2008. You may recall the spring festival blizzards that trapped so many Chinese citizens in train stations in Southern China and how the PLA was deployed to help clear the rails and allow people to get home for the holidays.

In March 2008 we saw significant deployment of PLA in support of and logistical roles or in actual security roles in Tibet. We saw the PLA's massive response to the earthquake in Sichuan, the Olympic Security Mission, and then by year's end, the deployment of a naval task group to the Gulf of Aden.

Those are all real world ways that demonstrated that the PLA is certainly preparing and thinking about how to prepare for missions beyond Taiwan, other than Taiwan. And so, in fact, there are some case studies in the volume that I think you'll appreciate reading. We hadn't anticipated at the start of the year, but it seemed prudent as the year went on that we included these.

Well, that's it for my portion. You'll hear from the panelists in the order in which they're listed. We've asked them to each talk for about eight minutes, extendable to ten, and our primary motivation there is to leave some time for good discussion at the end.

I won't further introduce them, as their name and information is there before you, but I'd also like to acknowledge the authors who aren't here, and they include Brad Roberts, who wrote on strategic forces and strategic issues. He's since become a Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense and so was unable to join us today; also, James Mulvenon, Bates Gill and Chin-hao Huang.

After we hear our presentations, and Larry Wortzel will be the last, then we'll have a time of Q and A, I'll moderate that from up here, and we'll look forward to some good back and forth when we get to that point. With that, Scot, would you begin?

SCOT TANNER: Roy, thank you very much. My name is Scot Tanner, I'm with CNA. Let me make my first official disclaimer. This presentation in the paper, in the book, represents my own views, not those of CNA Corporation, its corporate officers or sponsors. And I want to also start by taking an opportunity to thank Roy and to thank Andrew Scobell and all the others who organized this, and in particular, the enormous amount of logistical support provided by people such as Sarah Snyder, and the tireless Travis Tanner, no relation to me, who was in charge of forcing me to get my edits in on time, no mean feat, I'll tell you.

The collection of essays in this excellent book focus on the PLA's missions beyond the Taiwan mission, but it's universally accepted that the PLA will always ultimately be responsible for one mission that ranks even before the Taiwan mission, and that is, if necessary, to use force to help the CCP, the Chinese Communist Party, maintain its grip on power.

On June 3 through 4 of this year, we're going to commemorate the 20th anniversary of the PLA being ordered to violently suppress overwhelmingly peaceful student and worker protestors in Tiananmen Square in downtown Beijing, a tragic event during which I was unfortunate enough to be in Beijing. That operation traumatized both the Chinese political system and the PLA itself. And former Defense Minister Chi Haotian and

others have made it very plain that the PLA hopes to never again be asked to undertake such a mission. So my opening research chapter in the book examines contemporary official views of the PLA's internal security role, the strategies that the Chinese Communist Party and all of its civilian and military security forces have developed for dealing with China's persistent increases in unrest in the past decade and a half, and how effectively these strategies have permitted the PLA to distance itself from internal security work and remain in the third line of China's security forces, the first line being the civilian public security and state security, the second line being the paramilitary peoples police, and the third line being the PLA.

The chapter also looks at the fundamental importance of this potential mission for the PLA and the relationship between this mission and the PLA's other expanding missions vis-à-vis Taiwan and beyond Chinese territory.

And in the extreme, there are potentially stark and dramatic interactions among the internal stability mission and the other missions of dealing with Taiwan and other possible external PLA missions. On the one hand, those of us of a certain age will recall a time when the Peoples Liberation Army bore direct heavy, daily responsibility for a wide array of economic and internal security tasks, and a key aspect of the parties demand that the PLA professional and modernize to deal with new external missions has been building up other institutions and systems for dealing with these former internal security missions.

It's difficult to imagine the PLA successfully reorganizing itself to undertake these other missions if they cannot keep clear of regular large scale involvement in domestic security missions.

And to permit this from – beginning in the early '80's, and especially after 1989, the Chinese Communist Party has focused on building up its civilian public security, people's armed police, state security, and a wide variety of other government and semi-private security units.

Conversely, however, if the Chinese Communist Party ordered the PLA into an operation against Taiwan that did not succeed, I think most of us here believe that the subsequent anger in Chinese society once again forced the Chinese Communist Party to have to rely on both the PLA and the police forces to maintain their grip on power. So my chapter examines the PLA's potential internal security mission from three perspectives; first, it examines in some detail the official available – the available official laws, regulations, training materials, and other materials that define or at least imply the nature of the PLA's domestic security mission and how it might be carried out.

The second section steps back from the PLA and analyzes much more broadly the entire Chinese Communist Party and its security sector's strategy for dealing with social unrest that they've adopted since protest began to seriously spike around 1997, '98, '99. And it addresses seriously the question of whether this overall strategy for the civilian and



paramilitary police provides an effective guarantee that allows the PLA to continue to avoid direct involvement in suppressing social stability.

At the same time, it tries to ask the question, can we identify weak links in the party's strategy for dealing with unrest that might risk the possibility of loss of control and the need to bring the PLA back in.

That question is by no means hypothetical, which brings me to the third section of the paper, which is a detailed analysis of the March, 2008 protest and riot in Lhasa, and how they got out of control, why party and government officials felt the need to get back-up assistance from PLA forces, and to the extent that we can reconstruct it, exactly how the PLA took part in that mission. To some extent, the Lhasa – the breakdown of control in Lhasa was a bit of a perfect storm of a lot of conditions that caused a loss of control and the need to use the PLA. But it's also the most critical case study for us since Tiananmen in many cases as to what could go wrong that would force the leadership to turn to the military.

I don't want to take too much time with this, but there are a few noteworthy conclusions that the chapter reaches that I'd like to spotlight for you right now very quickly. First of all, regarding the PLA's official internal security mission, the available materials largely treat the PLA's potential role in putting down unrest as what I refer to as a mission that dare not speak its name.

These official materials certainly never so much as imply that the party would ever let the PLA off the hook for being ultimately responsible for restoring order and keeping it in power if necessary.

But beyond that, with a few exceptions such as the law on marshal law, these authoritative statements of mission are left deliberately extremely vague, for example, referring to the units involved as the Chinese Armed Forces, which is a collective term of art that includes the militia and the people's armed police, as well as the Peoples Liberation Army.

The law also makes clear that in the event that the PLA needs to carry out this mission, it's going to need to do – it's going to have the opportunity to do so under the leadership of its own separate set of military leaders and headquarters, in contrast to the other civilian and paramilitary forces which would be largely under leadership of local party and government officials and police officials.

One of the central conclusions of the paper is that, overwhelmingly, the civilian and paramilitary forces built up since the '80's to relieve the PLA of its domestic security burden have succeeded. There's little or no evidence of the PLA putting down protests since Tiananmen until Lhasa last year.

At the same time, since Hu Jintao came to power, there are intriguing signs that the PLA expects, pardon me, that the Chinese Communist Party expects the PLA to be more prepared for and more involved in some of these operations. One place this is particularly noteworthy is in Hu Jintao's 2004/2005 discussions of the PLA's new historic missions, of which the number one historic mission was for the PLA to provide a guarantee of power for the Chinese Communist Party's continued hold on governance. Since he's here, I want to credit the person from whom I learned a great deal about this, the person who really first studied the new historic missions and has done I think the best work on this, Dan Hartnett, now of the U.S./China Security Review Commission.

There are also a number of other documents that indicate – that have evidence that indicate that the party has a growing official expectation that the PLA has got to be prepared for and trained to take part in a number of other internal stability operations, including anti-crime, counterterrorism, which others will talk about, disaster relief, and a variety of other missions, where public security forces have – and peoples armed police forces have been insufficient in number or lack sufficient power or arms to deal with these.

The PLA has sometimes been called in to help take part to a degree that we cannot measure based on the available evidence. This includes anti-crime, anti-drug, and some sources indicate even cross border anti-kidnapping rescue operations. But the Lhasa protests provide a valuable insight into the broader weaknesses in the security system that might gradually draw the PLA back into greater involvement in the future.

In many ways, these reflect the special demands and dilemmas of the party's effort since 1998/'99 to find an anti-unrest strategy that minimizes the risk of police violence that could possibly cause popular backlash.

For example, this strategy places an enormous premium on getting good intelligence about protester plans; that failed badly in Lhasa. They did not know that the protests were going to start – the Ramoche Temple.

Consequently, a lot of security forces were misdeployed to monasteries outside of town. There were also questions of whether there were sufficient forces, armed police and public security forces there. The loss of security officials also delayed several hours before attempting to coercively take control of the riot areas, and this may reflect the very serious regulations that require fairly high level political approval for police to undertake these kinds of coercive operations. And just by coincidence, party leaders in Lhasa happened to be in Beijing at the National Peoples Congress and the Chinese Peoples Political Consultative Congress at the time that the riots broke out. In the end, however, the available evidence suggests that the public security and PAP forces were able to regain control through their own repressive power, that the public security and armed police relied on the PLA primarily for logistical public safety, perhaps some intelligence support, although there are some reports from informed sources that the PLA did provide back-up assistance when the actual door to door arrests operations were taken during the days to come.

But while Lhasa may reflect a low probability perfect storm of what could go wrong, it's by no means unique. And I think that, in conclusion, I would simply say that we would be wise to assume that there will be other future events in which the public security forces and the peoples armed police are unable to maintain control quickly on their own and PLA support is needed. Thank you.

ROY KAMPHAUSEN: Thank you very much, Scot. Now we turn to Rob Modarelli.

ROBERT MODARELLI: Thanks very much. And I'd like to start off also by thanking NBR and Roy, Travis, Sarah, and the team there for their support and for the invitation to be a part of this project, and also to issue the caveat that my paper and my comments today are also expressly my own, they do not reflect the views of the National Center or any of its board member companies.

The primary purpose of my particular chapter of this book was to identify key missions for the PLA in the areas of border security and counterterrorism and to understand how it pursues preparation for these missions through security cooperation with other countries, primarily through the mechanism of combined exercises.

The paper focuses on identifying and analyzing these missions from a strategic perspective, tries to look at how they integrate with overall Chinese strategic priorities, and it looks at the division of missions and responsibilities between the PLA and the PAP and other public security forces and discusses the implications of these relationships for understanding China's strategic approach to these mission sets, and it concludes with some reflections on possible implications for U.S. policy makers to consider.

The primary sources consulted for this included the 2006 Defense White Paper, which was the most current version at the time of the preparation of this, as well as publications from PLA and PAP sources, schools, professional journals, and the public media. And I'll make some remarks at the end on the 2008 paper, because there were some changes in the way China characterized the border mission that reflect on some of the conclusions of this paper.

The protection of sovereignty and maintenance of stability in the frontier regions has been a strategic priority for China for many reasons, historical, economic, political, and social. Ethnic differences, economic inequality, particularly in the development between frontier regions and some of the interior regions, perceptions of foreign influence in those regions, and local and regional power dynamics, all combined to continue to make these frontier regions of key strategic importance to Beijing's central government.

This is reflected in the fact that the 2006 Defense White Paper actually devotes an entire section specifically to the issue of frontier security and border defense,

which was not the case in 2004. Most of the sources consulted show a very sophisticated analysis of the problems posed by frontier security, including the proliferation of non-traditional threats, the wide range of actors involved in successful execution of frontier security missions, both public, government, and military, and also the importance of understanding the concept of missions other than war and the fact that PLA leadership needs to prepare itself to understand and define the missions in non-traditional ways.

The sources differentiate between the concepts of frontier security and border defense. The issue of frontier security applies more to a comprehensive, ongoing sort of peace time mission of maintaining internal political social stability within the frontier regions. And the border defense mission deals with the more traditional and limited mission of preventing foreign invasion or violation of sovereignty and responding to such in a traditional military fashion.

The division of labor between military and public security forces is different in each of these cases. In the event of – in the frontier security overall, the PLA missions are generally that, in the event of a major border incursion, the PLA assumes the lead role in defeating invading forces and restoring order in the frontier regions. In the broadest terms, this is generally approached through a basic strategy of delaying, shaping, counter attacking, relying on interior lines, a very traditional approach. And a lot of work has been done in the past to talk about the details of how they are executed. Some of Taylor Fravel’s work in particular in 2007 is very helpful in understanding that.

In the more ongoing mission, if you will, of peace time frontier security, the PLA’s main function is to provide support to local civilian and PAP efforts to promote and maintain social stability in the frontier areas.

This means the PLA generally operates as a junior partner, if you will, under the combined command of interagency Commissions on Border Defense, which exists at local levels. And they also have an important sub-mission of providing training and administration and equipping of border defense forces, including the militia and the PAP. This is probably one of the most important peace time roles that the PLA plays in support of the frontier security mission.

And the stated principal under the White Paper of 2006 under which this is implemented is what’s called an administrative system of “sharing responsibilities”. The term can actually be probably interpreted several ways, whether it’s sharing responsibilities, dividing responsibilities, separating responsibilities. The official English language translation is “shared responsibilities”. But in practice, the implications seem to be more one of divided responsibilities.

In its simplest form, this is expressed through explicit designation of the PLA as the main force for defending China’s borders and coasts, and the public security force is given the specific mission of safeguarding security and maintaining social order in borders and coastal areas.

At the highest level, this coordination is effected through the State Commission on Border and Coastal Defense, which includes the State Council and the PLA and is headed by the Minister of Public Security. And this model of joint military-civilian commissions is replicated at pretty much every level of command down to the county level.

For actual border defense, principal and tactical headquarters appear to reside at the prefectural or military sub-district level. These levels are specifically, again, detailed in the White Paper as being “in charge of military, political, logistic, and equipment work of border defense troops, as well as border defense duties, talks, meetings, border management, protection, and control, a very wide mandate for those commissions.”

The PLA is noted as the main force preventing a major incursion or invasion by foreign forces, and these are routinely described as being in service of national strategic priorities.

The description used strongly implies national level control in both time and space of potential border defense operations, which also implies as is stated in some of the documentation that the PLA needs to consider the possibility of being prepared to be ordered to cease operations when political or diplomatic objectives are achieved, regardless of perceived tactical or operational objective status in actual zones of operations.

Strategic defense of maritime and air borders seems to be grounded in similar division of responsibilities, but the literature is much more limited. The structural command is probably quite different, and this is likely due to the nature of the frontiers and the dynamics of how such incursions happen. As maritime and air violations would tend to be much more time sensitive, occur at much faster speeds, and involve responses over greater distances, it's unlikely that provincial command levels would be relied upon to be the principal responder. There's also evidence for a transition in thinking, particularly in maritime, from what's called the old model of coastal defense to a model of offshore defense or near sea defense – *jinhai fangwei*.

And also, as on the land borders, there's an increasing concern about non-traditional incursions, incursions by criminal elements, smugglers, pirates, and illegal immigration.

So, as a result, there is much literature for greater PAP and maritime law enforcement capability and a transition from what was described as relying on military defense to one that “provides equal emphasis on civilian administration and military defense.”

In frontier security, the PLA plays a supporting role to the PAP to build social stability and maintain order through physical and technological infrastructure building, relations with people and civil authorities. All these are doubly beneficial to the PLA as they support the peace time frontier security mission and also create a friendly environment in

which the PLA could operate were it required to go to a military operation against a border incursion. Counter insurgency and counter separatism also remain missions of the PLA, as well, and if it were to assume primacy for a frontier stability problem, it would do so, had that problem exceeded the capabilities of civil authorities to control or mitigate.

There are some difficulties with this structure. The sources speak often of problems like unclear authority structures, blurred divisions of responsibilities, highly fragmented operations, environments that discourage innovation to meet new realities and non-traditional challenges, even though they're recognized as being needed.

There are also descriptions of lack of unit integration and communications problems, and specific mention of the lack of a national border defense law or formal regulations to govern these relationships.

The most common prescription in most of the PLA professional literature is to improve and increase joint and combined training at all levels. The evidence provided in this chapter highlights a couple of examples of exercises where this appears to be implemented with the PLA augmenting and training local units, and exercises involving a wide range of civilian and military actors.

The other area that this paper focuses on is counterterrorism. This is another area where the PAP is given the primary role, with the PLA in a supporting role. This is particularly the case where the PLA is expected to provide support in areas of maritime, air, or non-conventional terrorist incidents involving weapons of mass destruction. This is probably due to the PLA's specialized assets and training, but it's not – this is not clear that it's 100 percent exclusive. Some exercises have been conducted without open acknowledgement of PLA participation, which did involve non-conventional munitions.

Basic PLA missions in counterterrorism include working with civilian and police authorities to deter terrorism, to augment police forces in response to attacks, and as noted, to provide the primary response in air, maritime, or WMD.

The PLA also recognizes the need to operate in an international context in counterterrorism, and so counterterrorism exercises with neighboring countries is an important part of their trained program. These exercises, mostly conducted with other SCO members, are almost always described as CT exercises, and these serve several functions for the PLA, including an opportunity to observe and learn from foreign forces, and prove PLA capabilities to operate outside of China and alongside other nations, and to provide deterrence and promote stability. There is likely a division between domestic and international counterterrorism between the PAP and the PLA. Most of the international participation appeared to be PLA up until the 2008 White Paper, which I'll talk to you about in just one second.

Overall, the 2008 White Paper, just to update, instead of addressing it as a border security issue and then talking about what everyone does, it addresses the issue under

each category. So while talking about the PLA, it talks about its border security; while talking about the PAP, it addresses counterterrorism.

That's a different approach to the issue. The implications of that probably still need to be considered and it's worth following study on that.

The implications for the United States, essentially, the continued emphasis on the strategic importance of frontier regions means that the U.S. should be prepared for an increased potential risk of border incidents, especially maritime and air incidents, in situations where China perceives its sovereignty to be threatened. The EP3 incident, of course, and the recent activities with USS Impeccable I think illustrate that that continues to be an issue. China will continue to be sensitive and focused on these issues. One would expect an increase in China's strategy of pacifying and neutralizing its land borders through seeking diplomatic solutions to its outstanding land border disputes, while expanding maritime and other frontiers through diplomacy and developing capability, and expect to continue to use counterterrorism as a pretext or a cover under which to continue expanding its international military cooperation.

One final point I would make is that one area that the literature does address, but has only begun to develop is the concept of the frontier itself. Aside from traditional land and maritime frontiers, there's a growing recognition of economic frontiers, frontiers in space, cyber frontiers.

How does one determine when those frontiers have been violated? How does one determine when such a violation constitutes an act that requires a response? What's a proportional response?

These are all extremely important questions that China is beginning to grapple with and that United States policy makers need to consider as well in figuring out the PLA's role in the frontier defense missions.

Thank you.

ROY KAMPHAUSEN: Thank you, Rob. Dean, now we turn to you.

DEAN CHENG: Good afternoon. I, too, would like to also thank The National Bureau of Asian Research, the Army War College, and the Brookings Institution for the opportunity to be here today.

At the same time, I'd also like to express my appreciation to the People's Republic of China for continuing to sustain and support their space program so that my paper has not been overtaken by events, at least as of this morning.

Indeed, in the intervening months since the conference, far from reducing their space activities, Chinese efforts to exploit the final frontier have continued apace.

In addition to their first spacewalk, the Chinese have orbited several additional remote-sensing satellites, placed the first of the new expanded series of compass-navigation satellites into orbit, and had made it clear that their manned presence in space will soon expand to a space lab.

These efforts, however, are not simply the actions of a nation intent on developing space capabilities, nor the expressions of a significant and growing advanced scientific and technological capacity, although both of these are true. Rather, they occur within a particular strategic and military context, most of which go beyond Taiwan, both physically as well as conceptually.

The first contextual element is a broadening view of the responsibilities of the People's Liberation Army. One of the first and foremost responsibilities of the PLA is, as Scott pointed out earlier, the preservation of the rule of the CCP.

But as PRC's economic and national interests have expanded beyond its geographic borders, what is deemed essential for preserving the power of the party has also expanded. And to this end, Hu Jintao and his predecessor Jiang Zemin set forth what are now termed the historic missions of the PLA. I'd also like to thank Dan Hartnett, but I've cited him in a footnote, so you got your credit already, Dan.

Not only do these historic missions sustain the long-standing task of providing support to the CCP, but now the PLA is responsible for safeguarding China's national development, its expanding national interests, and furthering the objective of maintaining global stability and peace.

And it is in this strategic national light, and especially given the PLA's role in safeguarding national development and national interests, that China's space capabilities have been expanding.

If the PLA is to fulfill these historic missions, it will have to be able to exploit space at times and places of its own choosing and, as important, be able to deny an opponent the same freedom of action.

We also find increasing mention in PLA writings of the need for a deterrence capacity. And so to these historic missions must be added the additional task of constraining conflicts, both by preventing their outbreak and limiting their extent should they, nonetheless, occur. And both of these tasks fall under the rubric of "deterrence."

But what is striking here, however, is that, whereas, Western writings on deterrence generally focus on dissuading an opponent from performing actions that the deterring power would prefer that an opponent not undertake, Chinese writings also veer into the realm of compellants.



That is, if the PLA is to be successful in deterring an opponent, not only should it be able to dissuade, but it must also be able to coerce an opponent into undertaking actions that they deterred power would prefer not to. And in this regard, Chinese discussions about deterrence note roles not only for conventional and nuclear forces, but also highlight the importance of space deterrence as well.

Finally, by way of context, the PLA continues to improve its ability to undertake joint operations. And this interest in joint operations was already evident over a decade ago, when the PLA promulgated a variety of *Gang Yiao* that would help guide future military planning, training, acquisition, and operations.

The capstone of these *Gang Yiao* was devoted to joint military operations. The ability to conduct joint operations is portrayed, in fact, as a hallmark of local wars under modern high-tech conditions, because they facilitate synergies among services, hit one strength -- one's strengths against an opponent, and shields one's own weaknesses.

As the 2006 edition of China's National Defense notes, "Taking joint operations as the basic form, the PLA aims to bring the operational strengths of different services and arms into play."

But as PLA analyses have emphasized over the ensuing decade, joint operations are founded upon the ability to gather, transmit, and exploit information. And, indeed, the very description of future wars has shifted local wars under high-tech conditions to local war under informationalized conditions.

That is, the most important high technologies are those related to information. Widely dispersed units must be able to establish a common situational awareness. They must be able to coordinate their activities and time their operations. In the future, wars will be marked by the three nons -- non-contact, non-linear, and non-symmetrical. Information will be the sine qua non of successfully conducting these future wars.

In order to affect joint operations, a military, according to the PLA, needs to be able to exploit space. And only from the high ground of space can one gather information, transmit it rapidly, securely, and reliably, and then promptly exploit it.

Space is described in PLA writings as essential for reconnaissance and surveillance, for communications, for navigation, for weather forecasting, and for battle damage assessment.

A military that is capable of undertaking effective joint operations is one that can also deter an opponent, and so space capabilities not only deter in their own right, but help strengthen conventional deterrence. So the PLA has an interest in being able to achieve space dominance, *zhi tian quan*, in order to fulfill its historic tasks, in order to deter future conflicts, and in order to fight and to win local wars under informationalized conditions.

So with all of this in mind, it suggests that there is a particular method to China's development of an expanding array of space capabilities, including not only an ever-growing range of satellites, but a new heavy lift space launcher, and a fourth launch site, one that just happens to be much closer to the equator. These are reflected in certain space missions, which PLA writings suggest are of particularly great importance at least as aspirational goals.

Now the most obvious is the ability to exploit space and space information better. And, so with each passing year, China's satellite constellations provide more and better types of information to military users.

Chinese systems today include an autonomous navigation system, which, unlike the European Galileo one, is actually operational; a data relay capacity now as well as weather forecasting. In addition, China's improving space capabilities, coupled with its steadily advancing conventional forces, provided with better ability to seek space superiority through a combination of space offensive and space defense of operations.

The space component of all this was demonstrated in January 2007, when the PRC conducted an ASAT test with a direct ascent kinetic kill vehicle.

The improvements in its broader conventional portfolio, however, are also important because of the holistic Chinese view of space warfare. Chinese writings on both offensive and defensive space operations are not limited to or even primarily focused on attacking systems in orbit.

Instead, they discuss a range of efforts aimed at affecting the entire panoply of space related capabilities, including not only satellites, but space-related terrestrial facilities and the data communications and telemetry links that tie all of these systems together.

And so space office of operations include not only applying hard-kill capabilities against satellites -- the core, sexy part of space warfare -- but attacking launch bases and tracking telemetry and control facilities. They also discuss the use of soft-kill techniques, including jamming and dazzling, in order to minimize a generation of debris and the attendant physical and diplomatic consequences that come from that generation.

And they also will likely involve the application of cyber warfare methods against various data and communications links that transfer information and allow satellites to actually complete their missions.

Similarly, space defensive operations incorporate a range of measures of information denial. These include passive measures, such as camouflage and deception, so that the information that an opponent derives from their space-based systems are inaccurate.

But in addition, it also includes efforts to prevent an opponent from attacking Chinese space-related systems, including neutralizing and suppressing their space

infrastructure; again, relying upon a variety of both kinetic and non-kinetic electronic, physical, and deceptive means.

And this is all consistent with what may be -- and let me emphasize "may" -- be a guiding concept for space operations -- unified operations, the key point of space dominance. In this case, unified operations refers to applying all types of capabilities -- terrestrial and space-based, active and passive, hard-kill in self-kill -- so that the PLA can derive and exploit space at times and places of its own choosing, while preventing an opponent from doing so.

And finally, as I indicated earlier, the PLA also views space capabilities as essential for deterring an opponent.

And most intriguingly, Chinese writings, with regards to space deterrence lays out what appears to be almost an escalatory ladder -- Herman Kahn would be proud -- beginning with testing space weapons as the lowest rung on the way to the actual use of space forces.

So what does this expanding Chinese set of space capabilities and attendant set of PLA missions portend especially beyond Taiwan?

One could well make the argument that China's evolving space capabilities suggest that the PLA is, in fact, already thinking beyond Taiwan. For a Taiwan contingency, space is often a nice-to-have capacity.

For reconnaissance, surveillance, intelligence gathering, communications, even weather forecasting, space-based assets are useful, but there are terrestrial substitutes for a country that's only 100 miles away, ranging from UAVs to human intelligence, to ground-based stations and systems. It is worth recalling, after all, that D-Day was conducted without the benefit of satellites.

But if the PLA is to secure Chinese national interests and safeguard China's national development, it will increasingly have to operate beyond Taiwan, both physically and mentally. And if the flag follows trade, China's expanding trade with Africa and South America, including direct investments, will likely lead to a greater demand for out-of-area Chinese military operations.

And in order to effect such operations, to coordinate its forces, to obtain intelligence, it will, in fact, then have to rely upon space-based assets. We see the first signs of this already. We see it in terms of how the Chinese are using space not simply to support military, but also diplomatic goals. So for the PLA, as it looks beyond Taiwan, it is likely to be guided by and will be looking toward space.

Thank you very much.

ROY KAMPHAUSEN: Thank you, Dean. Mark, now we turn to you.

MARK COZAD: Good afternoon. My name is Mark Cozad. I am from the Defense Intelligence Agency, and as well as my colleagues here on the panel, I would also like to thank the organizers of the conference and this event, as well as all the people who put in the hard work to actually publish the book,, and in particular I'd like to thank Sarah and Travis as well as Roy for their patience in my constant tardiness on the paper.

I'm sure I'm probably the straggler that put this out in six months vice four or five. So, thank you for all the help and understanding.

Okay. Well, I feel better now.

I would also like to say that the views expressed here, as I highlight in the publication, or strictly mine. They do not reflect the views of the Department of Defense or the Defense Intelligence Agency.

The topic that I was given to examine was looking at the South China Sea and East China Sea. And, as I started out looking at the paper, the first thing that becomes very clear right off the bat is the fact that these missions are currently being done by the PLA.

There are areas where the PLA have devoted budget, resources, training. They've developed infrastructure, and they're key parts of China's national security strategy, as it currently stands.

What I thought was the most compelling threat that ran through the entire discussion of the future of their missions in the East China Sea and South China Sea was looking primarily at the centrality of Taiwan to Chinese defense planning as well as also looking at the concept of broader regional power projection, and really focusing on the sustainable level of power projection throughout the region; but also looking eventually at global power projection and what some of the drivers would be that would force China or drive China in the direction of developing those capabilities to really be much more globally projected.

As everyone in this room is aware, there's been a debate raging for the past several years, and in particular since the -- since the announcement of the historic missions of the PLA that have really focused on a key or a core set of new missions that have been outlined by the Chairman of the CMC; that the PLA and others in national security circles in China have really been debating.

The one thing that really stands out about these is that while they have been talked about, as we start looking at the force development of the PLA, in many respects, we haven't necessarily seen authoritative strategy documents, studies that have been conducted on specific mission requirements or capabilities, and also funds for the types of infrastructure and equipment that would have to go along with those corresponding missions.

In one of the conversations that I had most recently, a point that came out is that thoughts are very nice, but funds are critical. Any type of strategy that is actually going to be operationalized has to have some resources and funding behind it. As I went through the paper, it was very obvious from my perspective that these debates are still ongoing. The ideas of where China's military is going to go and how it's going to support these broader national security objectives are still very much in question and open for future development.

In terms of Taiwan, Taiwan really still is the central mission, and, as we got into the conference, one of the points that Andrew wanted us to focus on was to look at which quadrant on that chart that he showed really applies or applies best to the situation that we were asked to examine. As I pondered that idea, when we start looking at conflict scenarios and post-resolution scenarios, there wasn't a lot of resonance in terms of what the Chinese national security thinkers were actually talking about.

Most of their discussions either didn't address the Taiwan issue or addressed it in such a manner that made it seem as if this was going to be an enduring issue, and are going to have to be some decisions made down the road about strategic choices that the Central Military Commission and the Chinese Communist Party were going to have to make.

I think there are three critical areas that really need to be looked at as we start talking about this decision-making process, and I tried to address all of these in the paper.

The first is that there are critical mission drivers. The Chinese have identified a number of key areas where, in the future, they may have vulnerabilities, and they may have to devote resources to protect their national interests. Some of the most prominent among these are sea lines of communication and protecting their vital flow of resources from different regions in the world.

That goes very closely along with protecting resources. And, in many cases, the protection of resources focuses on territorial claims and competing territorial claims, but also maintaining relationships with other countries that can aid them in gaining the necessary resources.

Another issue that came up was the protection of citizens and interests abroad. And this has been an area that numerous thinkers have talked about in national security circles in China. And it really, I think, is starting to resonate. As China becomes more globally engaged, becomes more involved in peacekeeping operations, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, and Chinese businesses and corporations are spread more throughout the globe, there is a possibility that this is something that they will have to contend with on a much more regular basis in the future.

The next issue is presence and military diplomacy. And this is an area where the People's Liberation Army believes that they have had some significant success.

Part of the capabilities that they bring to bear with their military are being able to go out, show the flag, and actually interact with other militaries throughout the world. They have done this in a much more proactive way over the past several years. And we start seeing the level of military-to-military engagement and also port calls and visits actually rising.

In terms of another key, critical or another critical area to focus on in this discussion, I looked at organizational and bureaucratic drivers.

The one thing that I thought came through in many of these discussions was that, in some respects, there is a fundamental debate about the strategic environment and where the strategic environment stands. I've seen a significant amount of these writings after the 2008 election in Taiwan, but they really started again after 2004 and really got the ball rolling with the discussion about the historic missions.

We've seen a number of discussions about what these types of capabilities mean. Is there a need to devote military capabilities or some other strategy or element of national power to be able to address them?

That leads into the next discussion of strategies to deal with the security questions. In some of these areas, such as energy security, we've seen significant debate about the need and the level of military effort to support that future mission and that future role. In some circles, there are discussions about looking more towards diplomatic and economic incentives to try to shore up their access to resources.

Behind that we also see a number of issues that indicate service-focused debates about the future of the PLA. The PLA has traditionally been an Army dominated military. As China becomes more globally engaged and has much broader aspirations of becoming a global power, we see the discussions moving more into the circles of Navy and Air Force in order to try to secure resources potentially for those future capabilities and future missions.

Lastly, I want to conclude with some of the issues that I saw that would potentially foster change that would drive China to devote more of its resources to this power projection capability.

The first obviously is the resolution of the Taiwan issue. The resolution of the Taiwan issue doesn't mean that China would stop modernizing; it means that it would modernize differently.

In addition, any possible reevaluation of Taiwan strategy and policy, especially as a trade-off between the investment that would be required for a Taiwan-centric military strategy as opposed to their modernization goals and making sure that they protect their access and citizens overseas.

Some of the things that I also address in the paper that are potential areas that would prevent this change are the bureaucratic entrenchment.

If the Army is able to continue to dominate discussions about national military strategy and keep things solely focused on Taiwan -- and there are other reasons why they would do that as well, but from strictly a bureaucratic perspective, this would limit their ability down the road to be able to devote the resources to other issues.

In addition, resource decisions and constraints, and again these alternative strategies. If they think that there is a more cost effective alternative strategy to deal with some of these future issues, then they might pursue -- that they might decide to pursue those -- pursue those different areas.

But lastly, it really gets to the point of resource decisions and constraints. We have a very poor understanding right now of how China does its defense spending, how it does its defense budgets, and where the money goes in different areas.

And so, to be able to make that kind of projection, I think we have to devote a significant amount of work in the future to be able to answer some of those basic questions about budgeting and spending.

I think I've used up the rest of my time, so I will turn it over to Roy.

ROY KAMPAHUSEN: Thank you, Mark. Now we turn to Larry Wortzel for the final paper presentation. Larry?

LARRY WORTZEL: I was asked to look at the joint operational contingencies that the PLA might develop in South Asia, Central Asia, and Korea.

I thank the Bush School and The National Bureau of Asian Research and the Strategic Studies Institute for challenging me to think about those things and for organizing the conference and develop in the book; and Brookings for hosting this great event. Thank you, Richard.

I really have two -- you could call them personal -- underlying assumptions that informed the chapter. And they're important.

The first is that there won't be a debilitating conflict over Taiwan. That sort of depletes PLA resources and people and its military; and second, that within the limits of technology and resources, a nation's military capacity is going to grow to secure its vital interests.

As you get into the appendices of this book, I spent quite a bit of time looking at what vital interests the PRC in this in here abroad, in its periphery, where it's most able to act today.

Now there's (sic) questions about who defines these interests. You know, we here have a public debate on that in the United States. The Politburo Standing Committee pretty much does it in China. And how they are defined affects how things go.

And I have to say as we get in here, you can see that the PLA has been quite balanced -- China has been quite balanced -- in developing its military. Russia and North Korea put all their resources into the military and have collapsed economies.

China has got a lot more money to play with, and that they have been quite balanced about it; and that I think they're taking a very sound and rational approach under the current leadership in China.

The current defense posture, the general defense posture, is essentially defensive. The 14th through the 17th Party Congresses have maintained pretty consistent lines that a peaceful international environment is required to focus on economic development.

But they're still putting 13 to 16 percent of their money into military growth. And despite this general defensive military posture, China is quite prickly about some sovereignty and territorial issues. Taiwan is one of them -- but obviously the South China Sea and the Paracels and Spratlys, the East China Sea and the Senkaku's, the exclusive economic zone, space, and aerospace, and the Law of the Sea Treaty.

And it's that prickly nature to things that led to incidents like the EP3, the Impeccable, two incidents involving the Bowditch research and survey ship, and two incidents involving the Kitty Hawk so that the access denial and anti-access strategy plays into this and so does developing systems that will hit a carrier battle group with ballistic missiles and hyper-sonic cruise missiles.

But I think it's fair to say that China is moving away from being an insular -- or has moved from being an insular, inward looking nation to a nation that's very conscious of its vital interests and how to protect them.

And that's reflected in the historic missions for the PLA outline by Jiang Zemin in 2004, captured very ably again by Dan Hartnett in his book on these historic missions, because I really -- it opened for me the idea that this is really no longer the PLA that we have been dealing with over the centuries; that the Politburo Standing Committee, the central leadership in China, has made a decision to look elsewhere.

The basic missions are military loyalty to the CCP. That's domestic security, sovereignty, territorial integrity, and then finally safeguarding expanding national interests. It's that decision that lets China put a fleet or a task force into the Gulf of Aden, and that opens up some of the possibilities that I outlined in the book chapter.



Now two major PLA publications that are used in their general officer courses at the National Defense University kind of led me.

One is a very exploratory book by a guy by the name of Jiang Yaomin who I don't know and never met called *Yuan Zhan*, or long distance operations. He talks about a global military that can operate to secure China's interests across the domains of war. The other is Wang Lideng's *Zhong-guo Hai-yang Li-yi*, a discussion of China's national maritime interests. *Yuan Zhan* is the Academy of Military Science Press 2007. Wang Lideng is NDU Press in 2007.

I'll just read a little quote from Wang Lideng that "China must develop the capacity to project power and protect its interests, support economic development, defend its distant lines of communication, and prevent a distant attack." -- so that the PLA no longer envisions itself as conducting single-service operations.

They have a national command and control system. They can pump control and command and intelligence out in an integrated way, to conduct joint operations across ground, maritime, air, space, and the electromagnetic domains of war.

In South Asia, China has developed ports, rail lines, and energy investments, particularly in Burma, Bangladesh, and Pakistan. Part of this is flanking or containing India. Part of it is opening up other means to get energy or to export goods. Those are vital national interests. They've got listening posts down in the Indian Ocean, and they have a robust arms sales program down in South Asia.

In Central Asia, they've worked mostly through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization to pursue interests, and they're very cognizant and even constrained by Russian interests in the region. But they have a huge energy and infrastructure investment that the PLA is quite capable of moving in and securing if it needed to.

And in Korea, it is simply an absolute refusal on the part of senior military leaders and others in the government to allow a collapse of North Korea. That means that China is using the Six-Party Talks as a way to keep China central to American policy. It means that it continues investments in North Korea that in some ways undermine the Six-Party Talks. And they've been reasonably tolerant of North Korean nuclear and missile programs.

Now there has been a -- it's a long-term buildup of comprehensive national power that's envisioned in three steps by the People's Liberation Army really to culminate in a global power by the year 2050.

In South Asia, I argue in here, that they've been reasonably unconstrained what they can do. And I think I'll go here right to some of the comments I made about South Asia that they're -- the PLA is more likely to be used in the case of serious in Myanmar or

Burma; that we can look for a regular presence in the Indian Ocean; and that they'll likely see that developing around toward Pakistan.

In Central Asia, they would probably not act in a joint contingency operation without trying to work through what they need to work through because of Russian interests. But if Chinese workers were diplomats were killed or kidnapped, and they may well seek to act and they've had exercises with regional security forces that would enable them to do that.

And in the event of a complete collapse of order in Central Asia that threatened these huge economic investments, I think the any response would have to be calibrated to Russia, just because of its dominant interests there.

On Korea, the CMC and the general staff department, I think will try to avoid involvement in a territorial dispute among North Korea, South Korea, and Japan.

In the likelihood of a collapse in North Korea, I think the PLA would be used to stabilize the situation or even restore control. And it's pretty likely that they would, in some way, telegraph that to the United States and Japan and maybe at that time consult.

But I argue in there that I don't think they'll consult your coordinate in advance on contingency planning and that it's pretty likely that the PLA would be used in the vicinity of the North Korea-China border in the event of instability in North Korea.

Thanks.

ROY KAMPHAUSEN: Thank you, Larry. Well, I think you can get a sense of what a pleasure it is work with a group like this, which is so distinguished each in his own capacity and earnest about doing a good job and tackling these very difficult issues to understand about China's military modernization. Thank you all.

We're going to turn in a minute to questions from the audience. But before we do, we have the opportunity to invite first Dr. David Lai from the Army War College up to offer a few minutes of commentary on the presentations and the chapters.

As you'll notice in your book, David wrote the introduction to the book, along with NBR Research Assistant Marc Miller, and it is a treat to see Marc, who has since joined the State Department, but he was able to get some time off and come to the launch today. So we're pleased that he could be here.

And then after David, Dennis Wilder, who served in the second George W. Bush administration as a Senior Director on the National Security Council staff and is now a fellow here at the John L. Thornton China Center, will offer some comments as well. And then we'll open it up to the audience. David.

DAVID LAI: Thank you, Roy. Great compliments to the authors to this book. It's an excellent work. And also thanks to the Brookings Institution, Richard Bush for arranging this book launch that really helped promote this work.

I just want to quickly highlight three things, and then turn it over to the other commentator. The first one is certainly about this book, and the second one is about the People's Liberation Army's mission. And the third one, finally, should be with an eye to the future.

I think the book certainly is a very timely analysis of the People's Liberation Army. A lot of the analyses, as written in these chapters, are right on target.

As you can see, this brief reiteration of the major themes, they are really right on target to address some of the pressing issues of the People's Liberation Army. I think it's timely in the sense that it's the right time for the Obama administration, because -- and due to this time there has not been an Obama policy towards Asia.

A coherent one has not come out yet; and then one towards the PLA in particular is not out there yet, either. So this book certainly is very timely for its cut to provide an intellectual as well as practical analysis of the PLA, and it will be a good reading for the Obama administration.

By the way, I just want to quickly comment on what happened to the Bush administration's dealing with the PRC and the PLA as well.

I would characterize Bush's dealing with China, as some sort of an accidental success, because the Bush administration started with a very confrontational approach towards China. But September 11th somehow turned the tide entirely around. Then Bush found China to be a convenient ally to fight against terrorists. And then from there evolved the Bush cooperative and constructive relationship with China.

Notwithstanding, was the Bush administration's officials' claim of success of its dealings with China. And then be that as it may, the Obama administration has the luxury to put China now on a low priority while trying to address other more pressing issues. But then things on the other side of the Pacific are developing very fast. China is really expanding. Its economy is becoming global.

The PLA's mission -- and my second issue to this one certainly -- is now going global, as many of our authors have noted.

As the Chinese come to define their mission, traditionally China defines its interests in the order of survival, security, and then development.

Now you can see -- in your reading of Chinese officials' speech and what they do, you can see that China is now -- placing development at a higher priority. As a result,

Chinese leadership wants the PLA to provide and protect and support not just this development, but the opportunity to the development as well.

In China's 2006 and 2008 National Defense White Paper, Chinese leadership has already articulated policy guidance for the PLA to pursue this global mission, to protect China's opportunity for development. So, in that sense, Chinese leadership and the PLA leadership as well has already -- overcome and crossed this strategic significance of its global mission. Then the next thing certainly is how they will do it.

So, as in the back of this book we put the question for this volume as well as for the next one as well is that this new and enhanced PLA mission suggests many important questions. How do these expensive new missions affect the evolution of the PLA's objectives and capabilities? Are they accompanied by new PLA doctrines for their use? How will they affect the security environment of the Asia-Pacific and beyond?

Which brings me to the final point I want to highlight—it is about the future. Just within the last six months, a lot has taken place on the other side -- on the Chinese side.

We have seen the Chinese navy make its debut on this global mission, the first one, and they have the battleship engaged in real battle operations in the Gulf of Aden. It's a small step, but it's very significant.

And then we -- just in the last several days -- and it is still ongoing -- the Chinese navy is celebrating its 60th anniversary, and then in October the Chinese will celebrate the PRC's 60th anniversary. Hu Jintao is determined to put up a show of China's comprehensive national power.

While Chinese would continue to pursue these expanding economic interests, the PLA certainly will follow very closely to develop its capability.

And, as I said, they have overcome -- already crossed the strategic significance of its mission. The next step is how they work out the details, and the details certainly are overshadowed by many things. China wants to develop its land power, sea power, and outer space power. The most pressing one, certainly, is the sea power, the maritime power.

China has eight ocean neighbors, and China has disputes with all these neighbors in the South China Sea and East China Sea,, as well as the new ones as a result of the United Nations Law of the Sea Treaty, that has given these nations' claim to the Exclusive Economic Zones. And none of those has been settled, and, so, the PLA has an urgent task to pursue these Chinese national interests.

Now, in settling these issues, Taiwan certainly stands the toughest. China has this long quest to settle Taiwan first because that will allow China to break the so-called first island chain in the Pacific, and allow China access to the broader Pacific Ocean. It's very

critical. And if China can settle that, it certainly can free itself to pursue other missions at a much broader sense.

Now, in settling these issues, China certainly anticipates balancing with Japan, the United States, and other powers in East Asia, but the most difficult one will be the United States because everywhere China goes, everywhere the PLA goes, it will run into United States interests and U.S. military. And how China would deal with, come to terms with the United States is a big question that Chinese have no answer.

Now, the book is good for the Obama Administration, and it's good for the Chinese, as well when we present it to the Chinese PLA officers. They should be pleased because they can learn how to implement their policy and strategy, and this book would be a good read for them. So, again, great compliments to our authors, and we'll continue to do a fine job in our next volume.

Thank you very much.

ROY KAMPHAUSEN: Thank you, David. Now we call on Dennis Wilder. No accident that he be here with us.

*(Laughter)*

DENNIS WILDER: Thank you very much, Roy. As a recently-unemployed policymaker, victim of a hostile takeover in this town, I do congratulate the authors of this publication. These are really important works.

I've participated in the past years in some of the discussions of this group. In many ways, I was thinking what would you call this group? And there are a lot of names you could use. But I think we'd have to call them the men of the iron rice bowl today because they are going to be in business for a long time.

*(Laughter)*

Why? If you think about U.S. policymaking on China, first of all, it has become a standard in this town to say getting China right is one of the most important questions that any administration faces. We faced it, the Obama Administration will face it, administrations, I'm sure, for many years to come will face this question. But to get the policy right, the analysis underpinning the policy has to be right, and that's a struggle, particularly on the subject of the PLA.

This is an area where information is cloudier than just about any area on China. When I think back to the last few years of the Bush Administration, some of the most perplexing moments that we had were over actions of the PLA, whether it was the collision by a Chinese fighter into our EP3 aircraft or the decision to launch an ASAT test or following our administration recently, the incident involving the U.S.S. Impeccable in the

South China Sea, U.S. policymakers are very uncomfortable about what we really know about how these decisions get made on the Chinese side to take these steps, which sometimes seems so out of character with the rest of Chinese policy toward the United States.

And, frankly, and I hope I don't offend anybody in the room, but going to the MFA and asking them for an explanation is not always the most enlightening experience that you can have as a policymaker. Often, it's a shrug of the shoulders, a why are you asking me, the PLA did that. Or I'll go back to Beijing and get you an answer in the next week or two. And this leads you to a very uncomfortable feeling as a policymaker that there are things about the PLA, its relationship with the rest of the Chinese Government, that are pretty hard to understand.

I'll mention just one other area. Cyber.

Today, the amount of cyber attacks coming out of China is astounding across computer systems not only in the United States, but in other countries. Is this the work of a military who is trying to test capabilities? Is this the work of kids just hacking? We don't know. What we do know though is it's very persistent, sometimes pretty targeted, but it is wide and pervasive, and it leads you with a very uneasy feeling.

Now, the United States Pentagon has worked very hard to try and build relations with the PLA in order to get a better sense of confidence in the relationship. Regrettably, however, that has not gone as well as we would have liked. In fact, I think we can all agree that the most underdeveloped part of the U.S.-China relationship is the military-to-military relationship. This isn't for the want of trying.

In the Bush Administration, we tried to get the commander of the Second Artillery Corps to visit the United States. The president of the United States actually made a personal invitation to Hu Jintao on that. We managed to get a member of the Second Artillery Corps to Washington, but we have yet to see the commander of that very important part of Chinese forces here.

And, of course, regrettably, after our decision to sell defensive weapons to Taiwan last fall, then there was the hiatus in the relationship on the military-to-military side, which, as I understand from Chinese literature or Chinese press statements, still has not been restored.

So, I think that until the PLA changes and is more willing to engage in a productive dialogue leading to more mutual trust, the research of gentlemen like these is going to be critical to us because we need their help to avoid the kinds of misunderstandings and miscalculations that are so easy to get into, particularly when you have a group like the PLA that is beginning, as Larry discussed, to spread its wings, to begin to move outside of its traditional space into new areas where they can bump up against the United States.

I was thinking when Larry made his projection of global Chinese military power in 2050 that it would be fascinating if we could sit here and read the seventieth copy of this report published in 2049 to see whether Larry's right and exactly how well did the PLA do in this regard. I'm afraid I doubt that I'm going to be here to read that report, but I sure hope this effort continues because it is a very important part of assisting the policymaker.

Thank you.

*(Applause)*

ROY KAMPHAUSEN: Thank you very much, Dennis. I would like to open it to the floor for questions. I think it's the best use of our time if you indeed do frame a question and address is to a specific member of the panel. If you don't, I'll unilaterally choose somebody. I think it would also be helpful if you identified yourself and your affiliation as you do that.

I'll call on you as you raise your hand. Please.

QUESTION: Hi, Justin Higgins from the State Department. I'd like to draw out perhaps Mr. Modarelli, and perhaps Larry Wortzel, as well, just sort of on the question of what kinds of continuances in neighboring states might get China or the PLA, I should say, to sort of step away from its non-interference policy. One thing, maybe Burma collapsing or Kyrgyzstan collapsing, or, perhaps, some other state like that.

Is there any sort of doctrine, any writing, anything we can grab hold of that might actually give us some guidance on whether China might actually drop noninterference and intervene in a situation like that?

Thank you.

LARRY WORTZEL: Justin, I don't think there is a body of writing that I know of available that will give us strong indications. I mean, there are a lot of academic journals in China that discuss interests. What I did was look at a combination of capabilities, infrastructure investment, resource dependence, and constraints. So, I argued in there that they are almost unconstrained, in my opinion, down in Burma. If they either needed to secure lines of communication or get access to oil or make those ports work, it would really challenge the United States, which has those deep relationships with (inaudible) to respond to that. They have very strong interests in Bangladesh, and that sometimes conflicts with Indian interests. I actually think that the Sino-Indian border and their old conflicts are well-managed, but they also have very, very strong interests in Pakistan, and that's a place where, again, they could act.

Central Asia, what is it, \$9 billion in Kyrgyzstan? That's a lot of interest, and have actually exercised the capability out west, but that's where Russia makes most of its transporter erector launchers and runs their space program.

So, I'd call that a constraint, a political constraint on what they could do. So, that's why I said I think that they're capable and they have deep interests, but there's a place where, not because of ideology, but because of that Russian interest, have got to balance it.

In North Korea, I have had a minister of defense, the chief of the General Staff Department, and two deputy chiefs of the General Staff Department just look at me and say we're not going to let it collapse, and if you think you're going to go up there with the South Koreans and stabilize North Korea, it's going to look like 1950 all over again. I mean, one guy kicked his staff out in front of an airplane and said get your notebook out. So, you're an intelligence officer. Report this back to Washington.

So, I'm not the smartest guy, but I think they're capable of that. I think they recognize the volatility of that, but it's an area where there's a high likelihood that if they needed to, the PLA would be used. I also think it would be telegraphed and discussed.

ROBERT MODARELLI: I'd just add there isn't a lot clear in the literature that I looked at in terms of frontier security missions, a clear statement on what would trigger that, but you can look at things like the exercises, the scenarios in the exercises that involve going and rescuing Chinese citizens on foreign soil that are held by terrorist groups. There's clear indication that frontier security is a trans-border issue in the Chinese view, that stability on the other side of the border is just as important as security within the Chinese border.

So, there probably is a point where you can start making the case to drop that noninterference, but it's not clearly laid out in any way that would make it simple. And, also, the principles of active defense are still applied and still adhered to, so, preserving the right to act preemptively, for example, against a terrorist threat that was directed against China that you got intelligence was forming in a neighboring country.

While it's not explicitly stated how that would take place, I think it's very clearly something you'd have to anticipate.

ROY KAMPHAUSEN: Sir? Upfront?

QUESTION: Chia Chen, freelance correspondent. I have three concerns. First is this. When I observed the TB last time and I just don't know why they react so slow. Then, now, I find the reason, that because Mr. Tanner tells us that party leader at the time was in Beijing. And, also, I heard Mr. Robert Modarelli said that they have created authority.

So, these three persons have knowledge to their system. First, Dr. Dean



Cheng and Dr. David Lai, and the last one is Mr. Dennis Wilder. What's the commanding authority in their system?

And second is this: Mr. Mark Cozad mentioned about the security and he mentioned about this resources. And I have to think that one very big thing is safety, health, and the environment. Our nation and also army forces are quite good at this, and I just wondered could U.S. and China have some collaboration and we give them some help?

And third thing is this: I find that we send young military officer to China. The aim is to develop their diplomatic capital city. And I know they're doing studying language and then go over the country. I just wonder that could we pursue that China send people to here, do this thing, because I think this is very good to have two sides, have some kind of understanding.

Thank you.

ROY KAMPHAUSEN: Thanks. I think the third question really exceeds the bounds of what our volume covers. Maybe we can talk about it afterwards. I know there are a number of folks here who have pretty well-developed views on the question of whether we ought to encourage more younger, Chinese military officers to come to the United States.

But the first question, as I understand, is really a command and control question. Who's in the charge of the PLA, and I'd invite any of our panelists who are interested in addressing that to do so.

And then the second really derives from Mark's paper with regard to, as I understood it, maritime resources and, perhaps, environmental cooperation. So, if you have anything on that that you can think of, Mark, that would be welcome.

Anyone want to address the command and control question? Larry, you often like to –

LARRY WORTZEL: I mean, it's very clear that the Central Military Commission of the Chinese Communist Party controls the People's Liberation Army through the General Staff Department and really in consultation probably with the whole Politburo Standing Committee, and it's that collective decision-making apparatus that sometimes slows them down and paralyzes them.

DEAN CHENG: Far be it from me to disagree from Larry Wortzel.

*(Laughter)*

No, and especially as for which there is no disagreement. But to dig down just a little bit below that, that is certainly what happens at the highest level. It's like who's in charge of the United States. Well, the president of the United States is in charge. Well,

actually, no, you do have Congress, of course. Sometimes, they have an opinion or two. And somewhere along the line, the Supreme Court does, too.

And, so, in looking at, for example, the January 2007 ASAT test, I don't think there's much question that somewhere the line, the Central Military Commission had its say and that the head of the Central Military Commission, Hu Jintao, was a participant somewhere along the way. But the devil, as they say, is in the details, and, so, at what point was this actually discussed and talked about and debated, if there was any debate at all, is much less clear, and, so, one could posit that the General Armaments Department had a particularly large role to play.

One would guess that somewhere the Politburo Standing Committee had a say with regards to the broader outline of the issue of should China develop an ASAT capability, but that's not the same thing as saying that well, on this meeting of December 14, item 14 on the agenda subparagraph B was "should we fire this one off next Thursday?" And the answer was well, "Thursday is bad for me, how does Friday look?"

*(Laughter)*

That is true, again and again, for a lot of Chinese decision-making. The way I phrase it is that we have the blocks in the line and block chart, but we don't have the lines.

MARK COZAD: In terms of your question on cooperation on maritime resources, I have not really seen any discussion in any of the sources that I looked at that really brought that up as a possibility or as a realistic issue. And, actually, I think the one thing that inhibits that is that, in many of these discussions, especially with the protection of sea lines communications that involves some of the territorial claims, there appears to be a framing on the part of the individuals writing these articles that the United States is really an adversary in some of these discussions.

Now, I don't know how far that runs through the policy circles. I really don't know how representative those thoughts are of other leadership bodies actually, but there has been a framing of the United States as the primary competitor in many of these domains, so, I think if we draw that to the next logical step without some serious type of discussion that includes multiple countries from out the region and multiple claimants, I think that would be a difficult proposition to actually make happen.

ROY KAMPHAUSEN: Thanks, Mark. Any other questions?

QUESTION: I have learned a lot of this in general, a description about China and the relation with the neighbor countries globally. I also have a question. Oh, by the way, I'm a freelance writer and student of all these kind of matters, Sino-strategic relations to the international community.

My question is: In the past, as we say, there are many territory conflicts or disputes, like China with India, with Vietnam, with Philippines, and even now with Japan. Almost everywhere, but we can see China, for many years, their attitude, their response, they're all passive. They're all passive everywhere. For the stronger Japan or for the weaker Philippines, India, they're all kind of passive attitude toward conflict.

But what in the future do you think would really come out into the military conflict and in what condition or what can cause that? To what level they really break into military conflict, or we'll say in this case, and which location will be most likely? And, of course, I appreciate anyone's comment, and particularly from Larry.

ROY KAMPHAUSEN: You know, I just returned from India two days ago, and the Indian historical memory quite contrasts with your view of China as a "passive" actor. In fact, there's a fixation on 1962 as though it occurred just a month ago, and a very real concern that the PLA is modernizing so that it can once again teach India a lesson.

And, so, I think the Vietnamese would have a similar sort of thinking about the 1979 border war, but there may be others who have views they'd like to offer on that question, as well -- is China a pacifist or passive actor?

LARRY WORTZEL: I think that when you send somewhere around half a million of your troops 30 miles deep into another country's territory and hang around 30 days or so and pull back out, that's not very passive, and it delivers a very strong message, a political message that lasts a long time, so, that I don't see them as passive, I see them as having over the years and in 1962, in 1969, and with the Russians, in 1975 with the South Vietnamese, in 1979 with the Vietnamese, and in 1950 with the United States, delivered some very strong, aggressive signals. So, those last a long time. You don't have to start little border wars to whack somebody once a week when you've committed that many people and that much force.

I would also say that I don't worry too much about sort of big events causing a conflict. I think it's the unplanned incidents and the differences over things like the exclusive economic zone and the law of the sea and the Bowditch or the Kitty Hawk or the EP3 incident or something over the Senkakus or Japan or over Dokdo with Korea or Japan that is the most dangerous chance of precipitating something. I don't say it's likely to happen, but they're the ones that concern me the most.

SPEAKER: China (off mike) Japan.

LARRY WORTZEL: China. With China. I mean, if China and Japan mixed it up over the Senkakus I don't care what the State Department says about not taking a position on contested islands, it's kind of hard to ignore a big ally like Japan out in Asia.

ROY KAMPHAUSEN: In the back, please.

QUESTION: Yes, my name is Young Whan Kihl from Georgetown University. I was interested in reference to China, North Korea kind of signing an oil development project according to Larry Wortzel, and you cited *Los Angeles Times*, December 25, as a source.

This kind of interests me, that I didn't know that North Korea or China -- is it east coast or west coast sea of Japan or Yellow Sea? I didn't know that there is any oil deposited there. Perhaps, that this is something having to do with some kind of contiguous plan, perhaps to China, is interested in North Korea, possible political change in the future.

So, could you elaborate further and help me understand why this particular oil deal development was signed?

LARRY WORTZEL: I wish I could. I can only say that, as I reviewed the materials there, I think it's more related to Dokdo than anywhere else. But that there's a range of industrial development projects that are not well-defined, but that deal with building new industry in North Korea, improving rail and ship communication ports, rail lines, and it's simply North Korea is a very vital interest to the People's Republic of China.

QUESTION: My name is Shih-chung Liu; I'm from CNAPS at Brookings. Despite the fact that the topic of this project and the progress is about PLA missions beyond Taiwan, I still couldn't help wondering about issues related to Taiwan, especially with respect to the most recent changes of cross-strait relations.

I assume that the current Taiwan government, the policy that it adopted in the past 10 months has, to some extent, moved the cross-strait relations from Dr. Andrew Scobell's, PowerPoint slide, from this Cell A, no conflict, no resolution to a possible Cell B, to a possible resolution without conflict. Most people tend to agree, assume that it's moving toward that direction.

I was just wondering, if this is the case, will there be a resolution that can be mutually and democratically accepted by both sides of the Taiwan straits? To what extent would that affect the future PLA plans on Taiwan? At least according to the most recent QDR report released by the Pentagon shows that, despite that the current Taiwan government has shown a lot of way out to the other side in the past 10 months, there haven't been any positive signs from PRC to listen. It's a military threat against Taiwan.

I would like to hear some of your comments on that. Thank you.

SCOT TANNER: Well, first of all, if you want a really good authoritative answer to that question, you're facing in the wrong direction; Richard Bush is in the back of the room.

*(Laughter)*

One thought that crosses my mind, I don't follow this with the level of detail that it deserves, and I really do recommend you take your question to Richard on this, but what I have read recently, there's been some striking debate among at least an acknowledged PLA officer and one person writing under a pseudo name, it was probably another PLA officer, debating the question of what kind of security concessions, if any, what kind of confidence building measures China might want to consider, and this is an effort to reach an interpretation of a comment that Hu Jintao made in his end-of-the-year statement to the Taiwan compatriots.

One of the things they were really fighting over is whether or not it's too soon to make a concession, and, in particular, there's still that fear after probably the best year you can possibly imagine from China's point of view in terms of relations with Taiwan. There's still this fear that if they make serious concessions, confidence building measures, or a number of others to the Taiwanese, to blue government, a green government is going to come back some day, it's going to be the economy that does it, it's going to be something else, and they will find themselves having made too many concessions and be stuck out with a group that is going to try and take those concessions and push them even further and further to drive wedges between the two.

DEAN CHENG: To follow-up on that, one of the ironies is that, as both Scott and you have noted, you potentially an opportunity for a greater cooperation across the straits, and when does it occur? It occurs in the middle of the first massive economic downturn from the Chinese leadership's perspective since basically the rise of Deng Xiaoping. I mean, now, we are talking about not hitting the magic 8 percent needed to sustain domestic growth, and, therefore, keep all those newly-arriving 18-year-olds employed, as well as all those old foggy 50 and 60-year-old state-owned enterprise people who are being put out of jobs.

So, is Beijing in a position when it is confronting 50, 60, 70,000 incidents of mass unrest already domestically, and that's Xinghua reporting, which I would suggest makes it more of a floor than a ceiling, under those circumstances. Is Beijing going to feel that it is in a position to make concessions to the Taiwan compatriots, who may be blue for the moment, when you have domestic unrest, with the potentiality then of neither blue nor green people in oh, Tibet and Xinjiang and elsewhere, as well as just plain old workers who are unhappy.

Now, I don't want that to be interpreted as a statement that the government in Beijing shouldn't make concessions. I am merely throwing out the issue of whether they feel that they are in a position to make concessions when especially, as Scott also notes, there is that nagging little feeling in the back of their heads that you know this whole democracy thing really is an excuse for changes of government later that decrease predictability and Lord knows that unpredictability is bad.

MARK COZAD: And I would say we're jumping way ahead to look at this as getting to the point where we're even talking about resolution of the Taiwan issue. And I

caution a number of the analysts that I work with when we get into these discussions that things have been so bad for the past eight years and so tense for the past eight years that one year of good engagement, we don't need to jump on the bandwagon too quickly.

There are still a lot of structural issues, trust issues, engagement issues, and I think one of the key areas where that engagement really has lagged has been on the military-to-military level on the confidence-building level. So, until they're really able to get down and start addressing some of those issues, which I do not see as short-term answers, I would be very cautious about saying that we are anywhere near resolution of the Taiwan issue.

ROY KAMPHAUSEN: We have time for one more question if there's -- is there a hand? Yes?

QUESTION: Yes, my name is Sunny Kim; I'm with ExecutiveAction, a D.C.-based consulting company.

I recently read in the news last month that the Chinese PLA jointly signed a contract with Pakistan to produce 42 fighter jets. I'd like to get some information from the panel with your perspective about the PLA's military-to-military engagements with other countries, especially with Pakistan and how it's going to impact their relationship between PLA, China, Pakistan, China, India, and India and Pakistan, as well?

LARRY WORTZEL: If you look at this Appendix II, page 385, you'll see that the two places that the People's Liberation Army has had the most robust arms assistance relationship have been Bangladesh and Pakistan. Both are places that were once part of India. Both are places that potentially flank or contain India, and I think that the PLA will continue with this robust set of security assistance policies with those two countries as they possibly can. And the Pakistanis are also quite happy to get that assistance from China.

MARK COZAD: Depending on which aircraft you're talking about, and I haven't seen the specific reports, I mean, there have been two significant deals between China and Pakistan for aircraft over the past few years, and that's been for a variant of the F7 and also the FC1, which was a co-produced aircraft between both China and Pakistan. I haven't seen any indication that there are new contracts out there that this would be something along the lines of the F10. I would highly doubt that because of it's so early in its production.

But I think an important point to pile on to what Larry is talking about is China has been constrained to a certain extent not by its intent to sell weapons or to become an arms supplier, it's been the quality of the weapons in the post-sale support. If China starts modernizing or continues to modernize its military and indigenously produce a lot of new generation, high-quality systems, they're going to become a much more significant player on the market, and it is significant to note that there are a lot of countries that they cannot afford western systems and they're dissatisfied with the level of the equipment, the quality of the equipment in post sales support that they receive from Russia.

So, in many respects, China is a very strong potential alternative once many of these systems are up on the open market.

ROY KAMPHAUSEN: Well, thanks, Mark. It's been a pleasure to be with you all here today and I hope you'll join me in extending our appreciation to our panelists, chapter authors, and appreciate your presentations and discussion today. Thank you.

*(Applause)*

RICHARD BUSH: I guess my role today is to do the call to worship and the benediction.

*(Laughter)*

I do have a religious background. But I would, in conclusion, in addition to affirming Roy's thanks, I'd also like to thank the three organizations that made this volume possible and the staff for making the event possible.

I would like also to echo Dennis Wilder's comment, that the analytic work that is being done in this series of books is really very, very important. So, I hope all of you will not do as I do sometimes. I go to an event and grab a free book and put it on my shelf and never read it.

*(Laughter)*

This is a book that should be read, as all of them should be read, because there's a lot to learn there. Thank you very much for coming, and the meeting is adjourned.

*(Applause)*

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