

**THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION**  
**CENTER FOR NORTHEAST ASIAN POLICY STUDIES**

**TAIWAN'S ELECTIONS AND WHAT THEY MEAN**

**SESSION FOUR: IMPLICATIONS FOR CROSS-STRAIT  
AND U.S.-TAIWAN RELATIONS**

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### **Session One: Opening Remarks**

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### **Session Two: What The Elections Say about Taiwan Politics**

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### **Session Three: Lunch Remarks**

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**Session Four: Implications for Cross-Strait and U.S.-Taiwan Relations**

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RICHARD BUSH: Let me begin by expressing my deep gratitude to Professor Ho and Mike Fonte for their outstanding presentations during lunchtime and their submitting to questions. And now I would like to turn the chair over to my friend Nancy Bernkopf Tucker.

NANCY BERNKOPF TUCKER: Thank you, Richard. Welcome back from lunch. I hope you got of sustenance to participate in the discussion this afternoon. We are now going to shift our attention from the developments in politics in Taiwan to the issue of cross-strait relations and U.S.-Taiwan relations. We have a very capable panel to do that. I will point out to you that on the handout you have extensive biographies of them and so I will give only the very briefest introductions because I think we want to get into the discussion as quickly as possible. Therefore I also want to remind my fellow panelists up here that we have asked you to speak for a maximum of 15 minutes so that there will be time for the audience to be able to ask questions and participate.

We will start with Alan Romberg, Distinguished Fellow and Director of the East Asia Program at the Henry Stimson Center. As most of you know, Alan spent many years in the U.S. government so he has seen policies both as an independent scholar and as a government official. Following him will be Randy Schriver who is a partner at Armitage International, and again as you all know, played an important role in government until very recently. And finally last but hardly least is my old friend Yuan Peng from the Chinese Institute for Contemporary International Relations in Beijing and who will I think give a different perspective on these issues from others who have spoken today. Why don't we go right into it? Alan?

MR. ROMBERG: Thank you very much, Nancy. I am very pleased to be here and to be on this panel with longstanding colleagues. I don't want to say old because that wouldn't be nice. I am not going to speak for 15 minutes. I am going to make some relatively brief remarks and then hope that in your own comments and questions we can get to issues of concern. I also have to say that I am not sure that we are turning our attention away from cross-strait issues. It seems to me we spent a lot of time on that in the first panel.

The first thing I guess I should say is to join others who have congratulated Taiwan on the success of this election. A lot of us were privileged to be there to watch this process and it was indeed quite a successful one. And whatever the outcome, I met with a cabinet member during the visit there and said, I know you would have wished a different outcome but we share the pride in the election, and his response was an immediate, yes, the process, the democratic process, was quite successful and we really are very pleased by that. So I think that even those in the DPP are quite willing to share that view.

I would also note—I will come back to them and mention them in the course of my comments—the key issues here I think are peace and stability across the

strait on one hand and the issue of sovereignty on the other, and I would ask you to keep those in mind as we talk about the questions in this session.

One other thing is that unification is not on the table. The PRC obviously has that as a long-term goal, but in terms of the impact of this particular election, the next four—and to what I'm sure Mr. Ma would hope to be eight years, and I would argue personally for a long time beyond that—we are not talking about unification. So when we talk about the impact of the election and of possible initiatives between Taiwan and the mainland on, for example, American concerns, I think we have to frame this correctly that this is not about the ultimate resolution of the issue but rather, again, a process long before that.

I would like to make a comment first that echoes a bit of what was said this morning because it impacts on the question of Taiwan's relations with the United States, and that is Mr. Ma certainly got a mandate to improve cross-strait relations but he will need to follow through robustly with the promise he made that Ho Szu-yin mentioned at lunch about reconciliation with the DPP and with the 42 percent of the people who voted against him. He cannot pursue his policies with the U.S., or cross-strait, or much of anything else in a successful manner in my judgment unless he does that and I think he is quite sincere about doing that. But on the other hand you also got to get what Mike Fonte talked a bit about which is you have to have reciprocity that is a positive response coming back from the DPP of a willingness to play that role. Yes, the DPP has a different set of principles and policies but it is not simply a matter of monitoring the Ma administration. They need to also cooperate, as Mike put it, for the good of Taiwan.

Given the deep suspicions that the DPP at least expressed, and I think probably hold, that Ma would either purposely or through an inability to resist both inducements and coercion move to subordinate Taiwan somehow to the mainland, he is going to have to demonstrate credibly and persistently that this is not the case. I do not think it is going to be the case, but I am not one of the 42 percent of the people who voted against him and he has got to make that case very clear.

So I think that in thinking about what the PRC is going to do, they also need to have that in mind. Some people suggest, and indeed I think Mr. Hsieh suggested, in the election that the mainland would seek to take advantage of Ma's attitude toward cross-strait relations and extract more and more concessions from him. If that is the approach that the mainland takes, it will also be a failure.

The question Mike Pillsbury raised earlier about what Ma will or will not say I will not answer in a one-word answer, but I do believe that he will reaffirm his position on one China with respective interpretations, which is not to accept the PRC's definition of one China. If you ask him what one China is, he will say it is the Republic of China—and the PRC will not accept this. But I believe that it is an accurate assessment that the PRC will then basically consider that good enough, and they can set this issue aside and not have to worry about it.

Now obviously in dealing with the relationship across the strait, dealing with international space, again the sovereignty issue is critical and if Taipei challenges Beijing on this question it is not going to get anywhere, but I think that that is not the intention—of what I understand anyway—will be a Ma administration policy. But they will be able to move forward on a lot of fronts. President-elect Ma has talked about an economic agreement, he has talked about an eventual peace accord which Hu Jintao has also talked about, he has talked about a modus vivendi which means figuring out international space that will be acceptable to both sides. But Beijing needs to be forthcoming in order for all of these things to really work and to have a new kind of relationship across the strait. I think it needs to adopt a proactive and creative and flexible approach again all within the framework of Beijing's one China principle. I do not expect any easing off on the principle but I think the implementation can be a lot more flexible if there is a sense of trust that the government in Taipei is not moving to independence which it clearly will not be because otherwise—again just to stress this—there is not going to be the political support in Taiwan to do the things that Ma says he wants to do.

I think that in light of this strong mandate that Ma has, in light of the decisive defeat of the two referenda which were so worrisome to Beijing, Beijing can do this. The WHA issue, the World Health Assembly issue, was mentioned earlier today. I think this is an important opportunity. I guess it was Harvey Feldman who at lunch raised this question: last year Taipei applied both for membership and for observership. I do not know what they are going to do this year, obviously. But even if they were to do that, which I hope they do not because I think the application for membership complicates life for everybody, but even if they do that I would argue that it is in the PRC's interests to recognize that going along with that would be a gesture that would be very important to Ma's ability to continue on a positive agenda across the strait. He is going to do it anyway.

Everybody can make up a reason why Beijing would not have done something this year, but I think it would be a unique opportunity to do that. Over time as Hu Jintao suggested—as in fact was included in the Hu Jintao-Lien Chan joint communiqué of 2005—they are going to need to move on confidence-building measures and eventually move toward a peace accord and so on. I think that those of you who recall when President Jiang visited Crawford, Texas, and talked with President Bush, he put some kind of a vague proposal out there about how if the United States were to stop arms sales, the PRC would consider drawing down missiles, both destroying some and moving some back. On its face it was not a good agreement. It was also, as the U.S. government put it, addressed to the wrong people. But I think here now we have an opportunity for Taipei and Beijing eventually to sit down and talk about these kinds of things and I hope that that will work.

Related to the WHA issue which is an official kind of an organization, although Taiwan's representation would not be viewed in that light, there are a whole bunch of NGO organizations where Beijing has insisted in recent times that delegations

from Taiwan identify themselves as from “Taiwan China.” They should stop doing that. That is not necessary, it is not related to sovereignty, and the organizations are not by their very nature. It is irksome.

I have advocated, in an article I wrote a bit back, that even over time while the possibility does not exist now that Beijing cooperate in creating an opportunity for Taiwan to participate in the activities of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, not as a voting member, certainly not as a sovereign state, but actually participate because I think the Taiwan economy is important enough in the world that it merits that and I think again it would be seen symbolically as recognition on the part of the PRC that Taiwan has a certain standing in substantive terms in the international community and that is important to follow through on.

And if they do not follow through now, and I do not mean next week or even in May, but if they do not follow through now from the PRC on these issues, when are they going to do so? When are they going to have a better situation, a president, a leader in Taiwan who is committed to improving relations across the strait, to not challenging on independence issue? So I think that this is a terrific opportunity and if it is not taken up I think it will set things on a very wrong course potentially for a very long period of time.

By the way, on the referenda, one statement on that, I guess. I hope that Beijing does not misinterpret the failure of half of the electorate to pick up the ballots for the referenda. In fact, it is worth pointing out that even half the people who walked into the voting booths did not pick up the ballots. But there is, I think, a very widespread desire in Taiwan not only to be in the U.N. but to participate much more broadly in the international community. And if somehow the defeat of these referenda through lack of participation is seen as actually the people of Taiwan saying, no, we really do not care after all, I think that would be a mistake. I think what they said is what they say consistently, and Emerson Niu's charts this morning showed this: they want to maintain the status quo however they define it—status quo/forever, status quo/decide later, status quo/ independence, status quo/unification eventually—they want to maintain the status quo. They do not want to take a risk. And so I think that that's what that vote essentially was saying.

Finally, on the United States, of course the U.S. has what we define as a one China policy, a very complex policy, and it probably can be in terms of its implementation tweaked here or there but I think the fundamentals of the one China policy serves American natural interests very well, I think they have served the people of Taiwan very well, and I think they have served the PRC and U.S.-PRC relations very well. So I do not see the likelihood or the reason to change it. Indeed, I see no viable alternative. But the U.S. needs to be willing to indicate very directly that it will accept the kinds of arrangements that Taiwan and the mainland may reach together over the coming year. Again, I think it is important in this context to repeat what I said before, unification is not among those, but there are some people in the U.S. and I am sure some people in the U.S. government who worry a bit about what Taiwan and the mainland

might do together that could affect U.S. interests. I think President Bush's statement of congratulations on the occasion of the election and also his conversation with President Hu Jintao indicate that he agrees with that and that he is going to be supportive.

There are some tough issues ahead. People have mentioned arms sales, economic negotiations, FTA, and so on and so forth. And the most difficult issue between Taiwan and the United States I think for the coming period is going to be to restore trust which I think has been extremely badly damaged in recent years, but I think that can be done and I think both sides have a will to do that.

Two final points. One, I think this is an opportunity for improvement along all three legs of the U.S.-PRC-Taiwan triangle. That has not been true for quite a while and I think they will be mutually reinforcing if we can manage that well. So I think that we need to keep that positive framework in mind. And finally, a very specific question that people have asked about, and that is about Ma Ying-jeou coming to the United States, indeed, coming to Washington. As I said yesterday in a Carnegie Endowment event up on the Hill, I think that the United States should go along with that request. Ma Ying-jeou will not be an official and so none of the restrictions that apply either to the top four leaders in Taiwan not to visit the United States except in exceptional circumstances or if they are in office, say, the foreign minister not to come to Washington, I do not think they apply, and I think it is in the U.S.-Taiwan relationship interest, I think it is in Beijing's interest that the U.S. government and Mr. Ma have some initial conversations. He is not going to be able to come back while he is president, and I do not believe this is an impingement or an infringement on sovereignty questions. So this is a very difficult issue for the United States government, there is no question, and Beijing will not offer voluntary endorsement of this idea, but I do think that it is something that ought to happen and I hope that it will be in very serious consideration. Thank you.

DR. TUCKER: Thank you, Alan. Randy?

RANDY SCHRIVER: Thank you very much, and thank you to the organizers, to Brookings and Georgetown and CSIS, for having me. I thought that was an excellent presentation. I agree with a great deal of what Alan said. I guess Alan would probably say that that means I am just getting smarter and smarter. But it also might be that I think we have shared about three panels together in the last couple of weeks doing a tag team here so it may be just over time it is morphing and I am starting to agree with what Alan is putting out there on all these subjects. But it was an excellent presentation, a hard act to follow, but I will offer a few thoughts on the same topic.

It is a great occasion for the people of Taiwan. Everyone should feel good irrespective of the results that another successful election was held. These are not insignificant events when you are talking about a 12-year history of democracy and a 12-year experience in directly electing the president. It is quite significant and no one should forget that.



But in our euphoria and our optimism I think we also should think very carefully about the impact of the election and think specifically about some of the trend lines that have been unfolding in the cross-strait environment and in the various legs of the triangular relationship and give serious thought to which of these factors and elements are going to be impacted most directly by the election and in fact can change in pretty short order and which factors will in fact essentially be either unchanged or will require a lot of investment and work in order to change them. And I think when you give that overlay and apply that analysis, it is clear there is still a lot of work ahead.

There is a lot of work ahead for of course the two principal participants in this long-standing dispute, Taiwan and the PRC, but there is a lot of work ahead for the United States as well if we want to achieve our goals. And I of course agree with Alan that the primary goal is in the sustainment of peace and stability, but I think we have other objectives as well. I think the United States has a great interest in Taiwan and Taiwan's success not only as the success of Taiwan's democracy and the sustainment of its freedoms clearly the best for the people of Taiwan, but it is good for us as well. It positions Taiwan to be a partner with us on a lot of issues where we share interests and share concerns but also it supports our regional goals of supporting democracy, of supporting of a free-market economy, et cetera. So we do have a stake in Taiwan's success and it goes well beyond just the sustainment of peace and stability although that of course is the primary and overriding goal.

So what are some of the things that this election, no matter how optimistic we may feel about it, are going to require a lot more attention and a lot of investment and a lot of work? Several of these we did discuss yesterday at a Carnegie event, but I think it certainly bears repeating and there are some faces here who attended but many who did not, so let me repeat some of the things I said yesterday.

First of all, we should have a lot of concern about the direction of PRC military modernization. Much of this has been oriented against Taiwan for decades. I think the modernization goals extend well beyond Taiwan now, but a lot of the orientation of current capabilities are still directed squarely at Taiwan. This of course has also been coupled with some atrophy of Taiwan's own capabilities and a lack of investment on Taiwan's part in its own defense. So the growing military imbalance is of concern to the United States, to the people of Taiwan, and I think to all parties who have an interest in peace and stability because this growing gap of capabilities in itself can become provocative, it can become more of an attractive option to the PRC to use force, even if not directly, as a means of intimidation and coercion, and so this I think is something that bears a lot of attention on the part of both Taiwan and the United States. Ma Ying-jeou has stated publicly his goal of spending 3 percent of GDP on defense. That would actually be an increase from where Chen Shui-bian was for the duration of his administration if you look at an average figure for the duration of his tenure. So that would be a good start and that would be an improvement.

But I think we have to be candid and say what has transpired, particularly over the last 4 years, does call into question how committed the KMT will be to serious

defense modernization and reform. It is not a determinant of how they will behave once in power but I think all the arguments we have heard from legislative leaders in the KMT about questions about the special budget and defense purchases, they are in a position to work through all of that now and we will see how they do, and it will be an important factor to the future of U.S.-Taiwan relations.

There are a few other things that will not change immediately as a result of this election: the United States and our continuing strategic distraction, our focus on Iraq and the Middle East I think calls into question how committed we could be in the event of a crisis and I think we are a long way from a crisis at this point, in fact, I agree with everything I have heard said about a great opportunity for us. But I think this distraction could continue for quite some time and into a new U.S. administration so this is also a factor to keep in mind and something that this election in Taiwan will not immediately alter.

We have to think about PRC decision making and the role of the PLA. There are plenty of people in China who have a great deal of sophistication and a great deal of understanding about cross-strait issues, about Taiwanese politics, and can give very thoughtful and creative proposals for moving forward to improve cross-strait relations. I am not sure many of them are in the PLA, I am not sure the PLA is really poised to take a new course on Taiwan, and I am afraid that they may in fact continue to be a voice that is a proponent for more hard-line policies. It is a complex situation for them. Resources are involved. Their national character is involved in the Taiwan situation. So I would be concerned about the role of the PLA as we go forward and whether or not this election is truly going to have the impact on them that it would have on maybe some of the civilian leaders.

There are the changes that have taken place on Taiwan that are not easily reversed or perhaps not reversible at all as a result of this election. I think Mike Fonte's comments at lunch spoke directly to that, the campaign for national consciousness, national identity, was quite successful and it is a legacy of this administration in Taipei and it is one that certainly a KMT government could not reverse easily even if they wanted to. But I think in fact what they have done is probably embraced a lot of the rhetoric and a lot of the conceptual orientation around these issues, the desire for international space on the part of Taiwan is not changing, and I think at the end of the day the PRC's feelings about democracy, their feelings about public dissent, their feelings about a free press, et cetera, there is a lot of discomfort, I would say profound discomfort in China about these things and they may have greater confidence that this is not a government in Taipei that will take dramatic explicit steps in the direction of independence, but remember they are defining steps toward independence on their own, we are not defining it for them, and they are defining their own thresholds, their own red lines. And as I stated yesterday, the PRC was opposed to legislative elections in 1995, they were opposed to the presidential election in 1996, they were opposed to changing the constitution which ironically worked in their favor when all was said in done, so there are things that a KMT government may want to pursue that may look like steps toward independence even though the most dramatic things are probably going to be taken off

the table by this government. So there are a lot of things to continue to keep an eye on and continue to work and make investment on.

I have some real questions about whether the PRC is positioned to take advantage of this opportunity, as I said yesterday, are they ready to take yes for an answer. I think that remains unclear. My guess is—and I look forward to the comments of our colleague here—China is almost forced to be in a wait-and-see mode. I think that is sort of their natural inclination in any event. But if they adopt this sort of wait-and-see approach here, things are going to happen. You may have arms sales, you may have a visit by Ma Ying-jeou, you may have things that they are going to be forced to react to, and hopefully we do not sort of spin back out of control. There are plenty of opportunities for the PRC to make positive gestures. The World Health Assembly has been mentioned, and the inaugural is an opportunity I think for the PRC. Whether or not they send a representative, there are probably things they can do to express their support for the new policies of the incoming government. I would say the Olympics is an opportunity for the PRC. But I do not know what is in store or what they might roll out.

I am more interested in what may come out of Washington or might happen in the United States. I think this is an opportunity for us, but it is only that, and that an opportunity has to be seized and taken advantage of. I think there are a lot of things we need to do. As some of you may be aware, we released a recent report on U.S.-Taiwan relations that I helped co-chair a study group for, and we put a lot in that report. We purposely released that report before the election because we did not want that to be a green or a blue or some suggestions that only one party could take up. We wanted these to be ideas that both parties could embrace. We had good response from both parties before the election. Now we know the outcome and the question is would Washington and Taipei be prepared to move forward on some of this.

We are very interested in seeing an improvement in the quality of communication. Perhaps that involves raising the level of visits and direct discussions, but there are probably other ways to do that as well to make sure that communications are authoritative, consistent, and sustained. I think the quality of defense planning needs to be improved. The United States has the ball in their court on that one, and there are plenty of things that could be done outside of the public eye that would I think pay great dividends in our defense relationship with Taiwan and ultimately serving the goal of buttressing deterrence and dissuasion of the PRC.

I think there is a more robust bilateral agenda that the U.S. and Taiwan could pursue. There is a great foundation exists. A lot of people have invested careers in building U.S.-Taiwan relations, but in fact there is much more that we could be doing to leverage Taiwan's willingness to be a responsible stakeholder. We talk about China being a responsible stakeholder, but Taiwan is very well positioned to be such in the region and globally if they have a strong partner willing to assist them in this because they need help in the international community to do humanitarian response, disaster relief, work on global health matters, or democracy promotion. They are not always invited to the table unless they have somebody like the United States standing up for

them and championing their role on these kinds of issues.

I think the United States has work to do in its discussions with China about the future of Taiwan. I think we have sort of drifted into a de facto almost co-management. I do not want to go as far as to say we are there, but certainly we have not done enough to disabuse our colleagues in Beijing that we cannot always deliver Taiwan for them. I think we have raised some expectations in a way that puts us in an uncomfortable position now. I am certain we said what we said about the referendum not because Beijing asked us to but because we felt we had interests at stake. But if you at sort of the collective responses coming from Washington over the last couple of years, you can see how perhaps we have created the impression in Beijing that we are willing to try to deliver Taiwan for them from time to time and I think they need to be disabused of that and we need to be stronger in our support for Taiwan's democracy and their freedom.

So I think there is a great deal that we could do. I think there are some near-term things we can do. I agree with the proposal for Ma Ying-jeou to visit the United States. As far as I am concerned, he could visit Washington. Nobody has asked me in the U.S. government, but you could imagine a meeting outside of Washington as well somewhere on the West Coast if that would be somehow easier to do. I do support immediate release of the F-16s to Taiwan. I think that would be a good signal and a good statement about where we want our defense relationship to go. And I would like to see the articulation of a more robust bilateral agenda including ways to leverage off of Taiwan's willingness to use sort power or use its own success story to help others who are also aspiring democracies and aspiring economies.

So I think there is a lot we could do very quickly to signal from Washington that we are prepared for this new opportunity and that we are willing to do the things that would be necessary to get the relationship on a better track. Thank you.

DR. TUCKER: Thank you very much. And finally, Yuan Peng.

YUAN PENG: Thank you, Nancy, and thanks to Richard Bush for the invitation for me to come here in a very important event.

I think Randy Schriver mentioned the military imbalance across the strait, and I always find an imbalance of the presentations here in the States. We have almost five Taiwanese participants where I am the only scholar from the mainland and the reasons for me to come here to give a presentation are, one, because I once served in the CNAPS program here at Brookings so my former boss Richard Bush asked me to come and on a visit to China I invited him to give some presentations. So it is an equal footing basis. And secondly because of the imbalance of Chinese participants.

But unfortunately I came right after the election so I have no information of what is the Chinese mainland's official stance. So I ask for the Chinese response from Bonnie Glaser because it is hard for me in my hotel to check the Chinese version. So I am less qualified to represent the so-called Chinese point of view. I am just representing

a former CNAPS fellow's point of view.

I think when I observed the March 22 events, in my mind there are “two plus one” events. The first two are the election of the new Taiwanese leadership and the referendum. The other is the LY election because the LY election in January is connected to this election so it is a “two plus one” event.

In thinking about the election of the new Taiwanese leadership, I think the Chinese attitude is very clear. That is, we do not care who becomes the new leader but we care more on the policy that can be conducted by the new leadership. The policy matters more than the specific figure of the new leadership. In terms of the referendum, I think the Chinese stance is also very clear; that is, any topic related to the sovereignty and territory should be decided by 1.3 billion mainlanders plus 23 million Taiwanese people. So it is very clear. So saying that, my points can be divided into three parts.

The first part is the election's implications for cross-strait relations for mainland China. I think before the election we do some games, we have some scenarios, which scenario is the best situation for China. One is, Ma wins the election and the referendum fails, which is the fact today. This is the ideal situation I think. The second is, Ma wins and also the referendum passes. This is a little bit of a dilemma. And the third is Hsieh wins the election while the referendum fails. It is not too bad because of the LY control by the KMT, by the pan-blue, which means that independence is more impossible. And the worst scenario of course is Hsieh wins the election and the referendum passed. But we are very fortunate to see the game, the first referendum, coming to truth. Of course mainlanders' fear is much easier than before. I am reluctant to use happy or something, because today the Taiwan issue is one of the most important issues in Chinese domestic and international policies. But still there are four other issues as important as Taiwan. Maybe they are more urgent than the Taiwan issue.

One is Tibet unrest as everybody noticed. Second is of course the Olympic games. Third is disaster relief for the snowstorm in 19 provinces and cities which means half of China suffered from the disasters. And finally is the economy. As Premier Wen Jiabao mentioned in NPC, he said this year will be the most difficult year of the Chinese economy because of, first of all, the inflation issue and because the stock market and housing markets are not that encouraging, and also because of the international environment like the subprime crisis in the States and the American economy in recession. So the Taiwan issue is just part of the whole picture. But the result is a little bit easier for us to see because we can refocus our main energy and resources in dealing with all the other four more urgent issues. This is my first point.

My second point is that in the longer term I think the results of the election constitute a so-called opportunity for the future which can be explained, first of all, as you know, what is the Chinese grand strategy. You have the Bush doctrine which is not that good, but we do have Hu Jintao's doctrine, that is “harmonious world.” Under this we have a grand strategy named “peaceful development.” Under this we have four pillars to sustain that grand strategy. That is constructive relations with big powers, the good

neighbor policy with surrounding countries, and also friendly relations with all those developing countries like in Africa and Latin America. And finally, positive engagement with international organizations or multilateralism.

In terms of this I think we do have a new Taiwan policy in accordance with this new grand strategy. That is a peace and development policy which constitutes into several parts. The first part is we have a two-step strategy. The final goal is of course the final reunification of Taiwan, but we have a realistic step in maintaining the status quo which means peace, stability, and development. So that is why you will notice that President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao in recent years just mentioned a peace and development framework rather than mentioning a peaceful reunification framework because this is a realistic attitude and under this I think we have a new definition of one China. So from the year 2002, in the Sixteenth Party Congress speech issued by President Jiang Zemin, I think our definition has already been accepted domestically as a new three words in describing our new China policy. That is that there is but one China in the world. Both mainland and Taiwan belong to this one China and Chinese sovereignty and territory cannot be separated. This is one new policy of one China.

Which means we take the Taiwanese side as an equal partner rather than we want to swallow the Taiwanese compatriots. And thirdly, I think that if the resumption of the dialogue, given the new pace of the 1992 Consensus, then anything can be discussed including ending of the hostile situation, including a signed peace agreement, and including something else. So in terms of this I think I find some overlapping points between our strategy with Ma's mainland policy which means the 1992 Consensus, this is a common base for us for resumption of the dialogue. Secondly, peace and stability, maintaining the peaceful status quo, this is the same. And thirdly is three links and common markets between our two sides. And of course, finally, the pandas. We would like to send the two pandas to Taiwan as soon as possible. So from the longer term of the strategy I see some overlapping of the Chinese new Taiwan with My Ying-jeou's new mainland policy.

So what will be next? Everybody here is talking about now the ball is in your hand, in Chinese hands, but from my point of view, I think the opportunity is in both mainlanders' hands and Taiwanese hands, maybe in America's hands, because if the winning party of the KMT has a misjudgment of the future because overnight transferred the situation from the party not in office to power, then maybe they are thinking a little bit of change. So still the opportunity should be seized in the first in Taiwanese hands I think. Of course we want to seize the opportunity, but remember that it takes time first of all because of the four other urgent things that we should deal with in the near future. And secondly, do not forget that mainland China also had a very important election during the NPC. Now we have a new president, new vice president, several new vice premiers, and many new ministers, so it is time for them to reorganize the new government and that takes time. Then also it takes time for us to review the situation in Taiwan in the U.S.-Taiwan relations.

For example, I remember when President Hu Jintao came into the power,

the covers of "Time" and "Newsweek" said "Who is Hu Jintao?" Today maybe My Ying-jeou is very familiar to us because he is very handsome, but still the question who is Ma still takes because on the one hand he speaks very good Mandarin, but his English is as good as his Chinese. And he has some [inaudible] wording during that campaign period, but how after the election can he send some good messages or just think that the good message has already been sent? Maybe the Chinese side will wait for another good message. And also because of the nature of the mandate, what is the nature of the mandate? The mandate if used correctly will be the improvement of cross-strait relations. But if you use the mandate for the so-called Taiwanese identity related things, then sooner or later you will become the second DPP. And secondly I think because of the structure in Taiwan, because even if the referendum failed but still if you combine these two referendums together still there are almost 70 of the voters support which means there are more than 6 million Taiwanese people. So it is still a problem of the Taiwanese identity issue.

And finally is U.S.-Taiwan relations. The test of the U.S.-Taiwan policy depends on how the U.S. views a rising China. If you view rising China as a real stakeholder, you will seize the opportunity to encouraging cross-strait relations. Then you will have some self-constrained policy rather than some dangerous actions. And if you will view China as a potential adversary, maybe Ma Ying-jeou's Taiwan is easier to be used as a hedging place to deal with Taiwan, it is more easy than dealing with A-bian because A-bian is something of a mixture. He dislikes the mainland and he dislikes the Americans too. So Ma on the one hand likes the mainland, on the other hand likes America. So it is a double-edged sword to the U.S.'s Taiwan policy, so we just wait and see. Thank you.

DR. TUCKER: Thank you all. The floor is now open for questions. Please identify yourself when you ask your question.

QUESTION: Charles Freeman with CSIS. A great discussion and a great panel. I want to congratulate Yuan Peng for actually facing the infrequent situation of being one of the few mainlanders in the room when there are so many Taiwanese.

You talked about the issue of seizing the opportunity and I think that is a very important point for all involved. This morning Jeff Bader raised a question when he asked, if we see the mainland and Taiwan getting close together really quickly what should be the role of the United States? I think there might be a separate danger given all the other priorities that the mainland clearly has and given the challenges that Ma has that it may take more time than we might like to see in the United States for that opportunity to be seized. There is a limited window though in many respects for that opportunity to be seized because 2 years from now there is another LY election and that really is going to be another referendum on Ma's first 2 years in office and part of that will look at how he has managed mainland affairs policy.

So I guess the question is, in that situation where you have had a delay perhaps in the two sides coming together on a real meaningful basis—either because

there have been distractions on our side, distractions in Taiwan, or some of the real challenges that the mainland faces—what should be the role of each in trying to push to come together? What are the real challenges and opportunities that the three sides face in trying to hurry up and come together?

DR. YUAN: It takes time to seize the opportunity, but I do not mean that the time is so long because even if we have several other more urgent issues but the Taiwan issue almost always is the most important and sensitive issue, so we should spend lots of time thinking about this. But my meaning is that it takes time because of a bunch of issues and the reorganization of the new governments, but I guess they are reviewing very, very fast. I think in this very sensitive period that America's attitude still matters because of today I witnessed a review of America's Taiwan policy, and Randy Schriver's report suggested that the United States should develop U.S.-Taiwan relations parallel to U.S.-China policy. But in my mind the Taiwan issue always in American Taiwan policy is a factor of U.S.-China relations, is a factor in the context of U.S. and China. So if you review Taiwan's position in the correct way then you will have some other policy and not that self-constraint, that's what I mean, which my meaning is that the opportunity is not in our court but also in Taiwan's court or in America's court. If we would like to have a peaceful development environment in the whole Asian Pacific region then all the three parties should be the responsible stakeholders rather than any single part be the stakeholder.

DR. TUCKER: I would like to push you just a little bit further and then Alan would also like to say something, but I think certainly here in Washington a focus on the coming election has been intense for some time. I would assume in fact that the focus in Beijing has been even more intense even longer. So what I am really asking, I guess in part, is a question about how decisions are made in Beijing. This may not be a fair question to you, but how is it that Beijing now needs time to think through the response to the election when Beijing got the result it hoped for and had many, many months to plan for what would happen the day after the election?

DR. YUAN: Actually we have done lots of homework preparing for the resumption of the dialogues just because of the DPP administration refused to the resumption of the dialogue based on the 1992 Consensus so we lost almost 30 years. So if the dialogue resumed, I think old homework can become the concrete steps for future dialogue including the ending of the hostile situation and a signed peace agreement and all these contents can be found in Hu's four points in the Hu-Lien summit, everywhere can we find that.

But I think in the near future, in the next one or two months, mainland China should be reassured by both the Taiwanese side and the American side because there are already some things. For example, Ma's visit. I don't know how our officials will view that, but there is something of a surprise. And also arms sales. The Taiwanese side is always blamed by the American side that we want to sell you something but you never buy because of your domestic structure of the political system. Now one party can control both branches, making it easier for arms sales. Then if arms sales are containing



some dangers like F-16s, this thing combined together will give a wrong message to mainland China. So I think in a very critical or crucial time China should be reassured by both Taiwan and the States to make them respond more quickly and more positively.

MR. ROMBERG: My comment, and you could take it as a question if you want, is on the same subject. It is not that China has had five months, because China has had five years or eight years to prepare for this and I think that it is easy enough to insist that the PRC ought to be prepared to deal with this situation. It is, as I said in my opening remarks, about as positive a situation as you are going to get and if you cannot respond to it positively now, I am not sure when you are ever going to be able to do so and that I would find very disturbing.

Even on arms sales and the issue of F-16s, it is very controversial, but even on arms sales I think what one has to take account of is that there will be an entirely new political framework here. Entirely new in the sense of no push for independence, a desire for a number of agreements which as you pointed out are in a number of formal statements by PRC leaders, in the Lien-Hu statement of 2005, it calls for all of this renewed cross-strait negotiations as soon as possible. It does not sound to me from your remarks as though “as soon as possible” is very soon and I have to say that I find that concerning and I hope that in fact as the policymakers in Beijing think about these things they will move rather more quickly. A number of us have talked about moving even before May on the WHA issue. I think that is important. So I just would say I hope that your sense of caution in Beijing is overdone, that there is a willingness to take steps because caution in Beijing will lead to caution elsewhere.

DR. TUCKER: Back of the room?

QUESTION: Thank you. John Zang with CTI TV of Taiwan. I have a couple of questions for Mr. Yuan. Actually I have a couple of questions for your assertions. Number one, you said that Ma Ying-jeou likes China, Ma Ying-jeou likes the United States. Ma Ying-jeou may like the United States, but are you sure he likes China? He probably does not dislike China, but do not forget he loves Taiwan, his first loyalty is to the people of Taiwan. Another assertion that you had was with the election of Ma Ying-jeou as the next president it would be easier for China to deal with Taiwan. Are you sure about that? To me it is probably easier for Beijing to deal with a Chen Shui-bian administration because you can always have no as an answer almost to everything—the U.N., WHA, WHO, U.S. arms sales, everything—and now you need a much more fine-tuned or nuanced response to different situations.

A case in point. Ma Ying-jeou says that he wants to come to the United States for a visit before assuming office. China has not so far said anything much about it. Would China oppose this? How would China react should the United States decide to let him come? Thank you very much.

DR. YUAN: I used “like” because of my poor English, because my words are very, very limited. My meaning is that Ma Ying-jeou on one hand wants to improve

better cross-strait relations, on the other hand wants to improve better U.S.-Taiwan relations. That's what I mean. I am sorry for using lovers' wording.

Secondly, I think China today is more open-minded than you imagine because of the success of the Chinese economy and something else. The very biggest reason is because China is open-minded. So the same case in dealing with the Taiwan issue so we do not use our cold war mentality in dealing with Taiwan. That is why we think Ma's winning the election is a little bit better than DPP's. As a matter of fact, some netizens in China say that we prefer DPP coming to power for another eight years. Then maybe eight years later the Taiwanese people will beg for China to reunify Taiwan because of the DPP, but a divided Taiwan is better for Chinese long-term interests but it is just some netizens' opinion. In Chinese mainstream opinion, we are very open-minded. We want a win-win-win solution in cross-strait relations and U.S.-China relations and Asian Pacific peace and stability.

DR. TUCKER: Over there in the middle?

QUESTION: Wen-Yen Chen from the Formosan Association for Public Affairs. The success of Ma's cross-strait policy, it seems to me, hinges on the reciprocity of the Chinese attitude and their reactions. And in view of the past, the Chinese stance on certain sensitive issues to me is very, very stubborn. They insist on certain principles. Based on what you see, what is the likelihood that China will become more flexible and more willing to talk about willing to yield to certain demands from the Taiwan side? What are the incentives to make China more willing to accommodate Taiwan's political development? Do you have anything to speculate on the likelihood that China is willing to do that?

MR. ROMBERG: I think the incentive is that there is, as has been said repeatedly, a window of opportunity that may close at some point or it may start to close at some point, so the incentive is to try to deal with about as friendly a government as you can expect. And I do not mean that in the "like" sense or in the "friend" sense, literally I mean that in a government that has campaigned on certain forward-leaning initiatives to improve cross-strait relationships. So the incentive is, I think, basically that there is a window of opportunity that may close. If it closes and China still feels that "time is on its side," the catch phrase everybody uses, that is another strategy they can employ.

I do question about how much flexibility they have. There is a softer sounding tone, there is a softer sounding rhetoric, but the insistence on adherence to old formulas is still there and so I think there are some real questions about how much flexibility they will have ultimately.

MR. SCHRIVER: China has said, the mainland has said for a long time that if the government in Taiwan were to embrace the concept of one China then we could move ahead, and Yuan Peng cited a lot of things that came under that. Although it will not be their definition of one China by any means, Ma Ying-jeou will do this in terms of "one China respective interpretations." During the election both President Chen

and Frank Hsieh said, but PRC will never accept that. I do not agree with that. We will see, but I do not agree with that based on a lot of conversations over a very long period of time. I think they will accept that.

Does that mean that everything that Taiwan wants is going to be feasible? Of course not. But it does seem to me that the kinds of things that have been talked about, go back to the Jiang Zemin and the eight-point proposal, talk about the Lien-Hu April 29, 2005 joint press communiqué. There are a whole bunch of statements out there which, it seems to me, make clear that opportunities for moving ahead in a variety of ways opens up in these circumstances. So the incentive is to get out of the box they have been in for the last 8 to 10 years. It is not just the Chen Shui-bian administration. It goes back to the Lee Teng-hui administration as well, from the PRC's perspective. So this tension I believe is not in China's interests and I do not think they think it is in their interests. I think that they also, under Hu Jintao, come to the position of blocking independence rather than pushing unification, keeping unification as the long-term goal—obviously, that changes a lot of things. And so I think that the incentive is to move away from this bad situation and to create a web or fabric of relationships that will ease tensions, promote interdependence to some extent but certain interaction and exchanges so over time hopefully this will lead to a more natural reconciliation decision of some sort that will be acceptable to both sides. That is what I think Beijing is looking at.

DR. YUAN: The principal issue, I think China is a big country and a big country always has its own principles like the United States. In China we are always complaining about, why is America so stubborn to uphold the principle of freedom and democracy in the universal venue, but we never see America give up basic principles. China on the other hand, we have our basic principles like noninterference of the other's internal affairs. So this time China faces some pressure from the outside world we should interfere with North Korea, Sudan, Burma, but will never give up the basic noninterference principle because China is something different from the States. Just because China is a principal big power, then America views China as a respectful competitor. This is [inaudible] wordings, not mine. But that does not necessarily mean that we do not have some flexibility. If you read the documents from 2002 up to now you can find that our definition of one China, our definition of the status quo, changed rapidly, changed almost for me in a revolutionary way, really.

QUESTION: Jorge Liu, Central News Agency, Taiwan. I have three questions to Director Yuan. As a mainland scholar but not a politician, do you see the recent Taiwan election as a presidential election or local leader election? The second question is hypothetical. If invited, is China ready to send a representative to Taiwan to attend Ma's inauguration? And the third question, will Ma be welcome to visit China—of course accepting the one China principle, but as the President of the Republic of China?

DR. YUAN: Thank you for mentioning that I am a scholar and not a spokesman of the Chinese government. I really do not know how to—everybody knows the meaning of the different wording so still I use one China. They also suggest that we should welcome Ma or somebody else to the Chinese Olympic opening ceremony. So

lots of thinking is very interesting in China, but I do not know the official response because I am now in D.C. Maybe when I am back in Beijing maybe I got more information. I am sorry for that.

DR. BUSH: Let me begin by saying that I totally associate myself with Alan Romberg and his belief in the fact that we have an historic or strategic opportunity in the current situation, but I would like to pick up on the thread of Randy Schriver's comments and say that I think the core problem that has bedeviled everyone for the last 15 years is the asymmetry of the security dilemma that has existed between Taiwan and China, and the mutual insecurity that is created. China's insecurity has to do with political moves that Taiwan could take. Taiwan's insecurity increasingly is the military buildup that China has undertaken in order to deter against those military moves. Taiwan can address China's insecurity simply by undertaking political restraint and I think that that is what Ma is prepared to do through words and actions. It will take time to convince Beijing that he is sincere and that they can trust him. There will always be the doubt whether it is politically sustainable over time, but I think he wants to address their sense of insecurity about Taiwan's political intentions.

The problem is that Beijing has forces in being and I cannot believe that those forces are going to go away even if Ma is successful in addressing Beijing's insecurity. We can talk about confidence-building measures, but the forces are still there. Perhaps there can develop increasing trust on the part of the population of Taiwan and habits of coexistence, but I think the burden of proof is actually on those who say this will work out, confidence-building measures and so on, if we are going to believe that this mutual insecurity is going to go away particularly on the part of the people of Taiwan. Thank you. If anybody wants to comment on that I would welcome it.

MR. ROMBERG: I think it is a very important comment, but let me respond a little bit to it. Whatever the circumstance, the PRC is going to maintain what they would consider to be an effective deterrent against Taiwan independence because even if they are convinced, as I believe they should be, that Ma Ying-jeou is not going to move in that direction, they cannot be sure that some future administration in Taiwan will not. So I do not believe they are ever going to give up a deterrent that they think they can use which also means that Taiwan will continue to have the military requirement of its own in the face of that.

But if you believe what people said at the time of the October 2002 Crawford visit, that included not just pulling back some short-range missiles from areas near the coast, but actually destroying some of those missiles. That does not destroy the deterrent. In fact, longer-range missiles would overcome PAC-3s more easily so they maintain it. But again I will stress something I have stressed a long time and that is this is a political issue. It is not a military issue. And so while there is a huge military component to it, if both sides are willing somehow to lower the military dimension, reduce the military dimension of this problem, first of all, I think it is possible, second of all, I think that it will contribute even further to the strengthening of the new political framework where there is this trust.

What is a peace accord going to be all about? Essentially in my estimation, and maybe Yuan Peng could tell us something different, but in my estimation it is this tradeoff that was mentioned this morning between no independence and no use of force. Neither side can guarantee the future but I do think that those two conditions are essentially are in the interest of both sides and so I think that both sides can work in a political way backed up by actual steps which would include something on the missiles. Ma Ying-jeou said if we are going to have a peace accord, a precondition is in fact to reduce or eliminate that missile threat, but that does not eliminate it at all and I am sure he has that fully in mind. So, yes, it is a dilemma, yes, as I think Randy was saying it is a very hard issue to deal with all of this stuff, but I do not think we should say it cannot be dealt with. I think it can.

QUESTION: Jacob Chang from the KMT-PFP office here in Washington, DC. I really have a very burning question I have to ask. First I have to apologize for two things. First, as a lawyer I like to watch the words very carefully. Yesterday after the White House released the U.S. side's story about the telephone call between President Bush and President Hu Jintao, people are getting very excited that President Bush urges the resumption of a closer dialogue based on the 1992 Consensus. But if you read the report by the Xinhua New Agency, then the next sentence is to reach a termination of hostilities under the one China principle. This is actually a retreat from April 29, 2005, Lien-Hu communiqué. During that news conference and the communiqué, nothing was mentioned about the one China principle. So how can the PRC let the Taiwanese people feel comfortable after only 2 years now and the one China principle suddenly pops up again? How can you reassure Ma Ying-jeou to have the confidence to deal with the PRC? I am sorry, this is maybe not a fair question, but scholarly discussion, the facts are here, words are here, so I would like to listen to Dr. Yuan's opinion. Thank you.

DR. YUAN: When we research on the Taiwan issue and the American issue, we focus more on what President Bush said, what Condi Rice said, we focus less on what the Washington Post or some bureau said. So when you research on what is mainland's Taiwan policy you should read Hu Jintao's four points. I bring a book with me, a very excellent book that is our new Taiwan policy document. They have lots of speeches and paper documents issued in recent years by Hu Jintao, by Wen Jiabao. That is our official stance. As for some specific media wording, I do not suggest you read that so carefully and so seriously. That is my point.

Another thing is because of a lack of channels for so many years, some misperception always constitutes the biggest obstacle. That is why I mentioned that the resumption of the dialogue is everything, almost everything, so we are very pleased to see that the 1992 Consensus has already constituted a basic base.

MR. ROMBERG: Jacob, the other thing is that the Lien-Hu joint press statement did refer to the 1992 Consensus and in my conversations, the 1992 Consensus and the one China principle have been used in Beijing pretty interchangeably and the 1992 Consensus is used as code because it was thought that the DPP would find it hard to

talk about one China. But anyway, I do not, and maybe others here will disagree, see a difference in Beijing's mind between those two terms. So maybe they are being less careful in this Xinhua piece. I doubt that the person who drafted that was quite as careful as the person who drafted the Lien-Hu joint press communiqué, but I am not sure I see the retreat that you are talking about.

QUESTION: My name is Norman Fu, I'm with the China Times. Let me begin with Alan. Mr. Romberg, you indicated that you are in favor of having Ma Ying-jeou visit the United States as president-elect. My question to you is, when he does come, if he comes, and how would the administration receive him? Because two years ago when he came in his capacity as the chairman of the KMT and also mayor of Taipei, he met with the number two of the state department, Zoellick. Obviously when he comes as president-elect you would have to upgrade the level of reception. So do you have any particular idea as to who should be his interlocutor when he comes? This is my question for Alan.

And also Randy, yesterday during the debate on the Hill you said the United States should send an appropriate delegation attending the inauguration of President Ma Ying-jeou. I wonder, when you say appropriate and proper who do you have in mind? I have a suggestion. How about sending the president's father, Bush 41? I do not know. I would like to get your thoughts about it.

Lastly for Mr. Yuan, the CCP, the Chinese Communist Party, already has some party-to-party relationship with the KMT. I am surprised that after the victory of Ma Ying-jeou so far the CCP has been silent with no expression whatsoever. I remember 20 years ago when Chiang Ching-kuo died, the CCP sent a message of condolence. I guess this is probably easier, to deal with somebody who is dead than somebody who is alive. The PRC embassy even took the trouble to alert me that they sent a message expressing condolence over the death of Chiang Ching-kuo. I wonder why so far the CCP has failed to send a congratulatory message to Ma Ying-jeou without reference to his winning the presidency of the Republic of China, just your party will not, so I am curious. This is my question for you.

DR. TUCKER: I would ask the panelists to be brief. I will take one more question after this.

MR. ROMBERG: I do not have specifics, but I agree with you that it probably would have to be at a higher level. But again, the principle behind this, or there are two principles behind this. One is, he is not coming as an official. Two is that the logistical arrangements also have to, however, respect the way we conduct relations with Taiwan. So in terms of where he would be met in so on and so forth I think that that also—this is not just Ma is coming to Washington, we'll just—you cannot quite do it that way. But I do think that it makes sense to have senior officials meet with him.

MR. SCHRIVER: On the inaugural I think there are several things that could be done and there are several models that have been used in the past. You could

send somebody senior from the administration; you could send somebody who is a sort of close confidant of the president, that is kind of the Vernon Jordan model; you could do what we did in 2004 which is send a sitting member of Congress who has some familiarity or responsibility for Asia, that was Jim Leach; or you could send sort of a senior eminent person and that is kind of a variation model to the senior emissary and need not necessarily be a close personal confidant of the president in that case, but somebody of significance gravitas. I am pretty sure the administration does not care what I think, but I personally would love to see somebody senior from the administration. I think that would be the most appropriate thing to do. And we have not sent a cabinet official yet and the Clinton administration sent three, so I do not think it should be the secretary of state necessarily, but I think you could send a cabinet-level official to the inauguration and that would be the appropriate thing to do.

DR. YUAN: I am sorry, I really do not know why. But I can assure you that the CCP does not want Ma Ying-jeou to die.

(Laughter)

DR. TUCKER: One final question. I have been saving Eric for last.

QUESTION: Eric McVadon from the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis. If things go swimmingly well, what should this coming administration in the U.S. be thinking about as far as the implications for the East Asia strategy that some of us are working on with respect to things like the Northeast Asia security mechanism, even our alliances, maybe even more simply the East Asia Summit, and so forth? Alan and Randy, I would welcome your comments on what we might think about for the next four to eight years.

MR. ROMBERG: It is hard to give a short answer to that. I guess I would want to know what do you mean if things go really well? I assume you mean dialogue resumes, cross-strait direct links, trade, and all those things, the peace accord.

ADM. MCVADON: The historic opportunity.

MR. ROMBERG: The historic opportunity. I think it would be in the interests of the United States to bring Taiwan to the table in regional things. It would be democracy, a like-minded partner in so many things. So if Beijing is in a more accommodating mood because things have gone so swimmingly, let's have Taiwan's broader participation in things in the Asia Pacific region. I think that would be a good place to start and I guess I would leave it at that.

MR. SCHRIVER: On the issue of alliances and our deployment patterns, it is going to take a very long time before we think about or see whether there is any change in the requirements. I think that what you've got in terms of PLA modernization is largely what is driving the U.S. on this. Yes, it is focused at the moment on Taiwan, but as Richard Bush said before, a lot of these things are not going to go away. Maybe

some of the short-range missiles could be, but the basic drive to modernize and expand PLA capabilities will not. And I think prudence demands essentially that the United States continue to basically look at that larger picture. But I would also say that we are hedging. We talked about this. We are hedging, but the way you hedge makes a difference. I was truck by Yuan Peng's point about how the U.S. is seen to be using Taiwan against the PRC and so on and so forth. I think most Americans would not agree with that characterization and I think it is important that the way we continue to conduct ourselves and our own deployment patterns and so on into the future reinforce the notion that we are not trying to confront China. That may be easier said than done, but I do not think it is impossible to do that either.

DR. BUSH: Thank you all very much. Thanks to all the panelists. Thank you to Nancy and Charles for helping us out today. I think we award Yuan Peng with the funniest line of the day.

(Applause)

DR. BUSH: But seriously, thank you all for coming. I think we have had an outstanding day of presentations and dialogue and we have all learned a lot and we owe it to our group of experts for providing us with that opportunity. So, with that, the meeting is adjourned.

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