The Strategic Parallel between Ma & Hu

*It’s Not MaMaHuHu*

- Maintain strategic high altitude to ensure peace
  - Make efforts expressing good will
  - Pursue peaceful external environment
- Economic development/revitalization as priority
  - Express hope to end the state of hostility
  - Prefer negotiation instead of confrontation
  - Promote a form of framework relationship

My presentation at the Brookings Institution after last election 4 years ago.
President Ma’s 1st-term Guideline

- Ally with the U.S.,
- Rapprochement with China,
- Be friend with Japan
  (親美、和中、友日)
- Non-confrontational approach to China
  ≠ sold out Taiwan
- Ma was too close to China? Hu knows!
Ma’s 2\textsuperscript{nd}-term China Policy

- “1992 consensus” gained ground
  - But, it’s “one China, different interpretations”
  - Taiwan public: “don’t rock the boat”
- “Economy first, politics later” continues
  - Post-ECFA negotiations
  - Stronger parliamentary oversight by oppositions
- Political / Military negotiations - Unlikely
  - After 18\textsuperscript{th} Party Congress & U.S. elections
  - Mayoral elections 2014 / KMT candidate for 2016
Constraints in Political Calendar

- **2012**
  - 02/01: Transitional Cabinet
  - 05/20: 18th Party Congress
  - Fall: U.S. Elections

- **2013**
  - U.S. Presidential Inauguration
  - 5 Metropolitan Mayoral Elections

- **2014**

- **2016**
  - Next Taiwan Presidency
The Strategic Trident
U.S. Reengaging Asia
Ma’s 2nd-term U.S. Policy

- More focus on bilateral relations
  - To beef, or not to beef + visa waiver program + TIFA + arms sales . . .
- Positioning in U.S. Asian Strategy
  - ECFA for U.S. interests + Taiwan for TPP
  - Critical period in defense transformation
- Mini-S&ED for mutual benefit
  - Cross-agencies, cabinet-to-cabinet dialogues (at appropriate level) is warranted
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