The Economics of Place-Making Policies

ABSTRACT Should the national government undertake policies aimed at strengthening the economies of particular localities or regions? Agglomeration economies and human capital spillovers suggest that such policies could enhance welfare. However, the mere existence of agglomeration externalities does not indicate which places should be subsidized. Without a better understanding of nonlinearities in these externalities, any government spatial policy is as likely to reduce as to increase welfare. Transportation spending has historically done much to make or break particular places, but current transportation spending subsidizes low-income, low-density places where agglomeration effects are likely to be weakest. Most large-scale place-oriented policies have had little discernable impact. Some targeted policies such as Empowerment Zones seem to have an effect but are expensive relative to their achievements. The greatest promise for a national place-based policy lies in impeding the tendency of highly productive areas to restrict their own growth through restrictions on land use.

Three empirical regularities are at the heart of urban economics. First, output appears to be subject to agglomeration economies, whereby people become more productive when they work in densely populated areas surrounded by other people. Second, there appear to be human capital spillovers, whereby concentrations of educated people increase both the level and the growth rate of productivity. Finally, the urban system appears to be roughly described by a spatial equilibrium, where high wages are offset by high prices, and high real wages by negative amenities. Do these three regularities provide insights for policymakers, at either the local or the national level?

The concept of spatial equilibrium, presented in the first section of this paper, generally throws cold water on interventions that direct resources
toward particular geographic areas. If high prices and low amenities offset high wages in a spatial equilibrium, there is nothing particularly equitable about taking money from rich places and giving it to poor places. Subsidies to poor places will be offset by higher prices, and the primary real effect will be to move people into economically unproductive areas. The spatial equilibrium concept thus suggests that the case for national policy that favors specific places must depend more on efficiency—internalizing externalities—than on equity.

The second section of the paper formalizes this theory and discusses its implications for optimal spatial policy. The model allows for agglomeration economies, which imply that productivity rises with the population or the population density of an area. Two types of evidence support the existence of those externalities: the concentration of economic activity in dense clusters and the robust connection between density and productivity. In principle, omitted exogenous differences in local productivity could explain both facts, but there is little evidence that any such differences are large.

At the local policy level, agglomeration economies provide a further justification for local leaders to seek to maximize population growth. At the national policy level, the existence of agglomeration economies and congestion disamenities makes it unlikely that a centrally unencumbered spatial equilibrium will be socially optimal. However, the mere existence of agglomeration economies does not tell us which areas should be subsidized. The spatial equilibrium model suggests that resources should be pushed to areas that are more productive and where the elasticity of productivity with respect to agglomeration is higher. Empirically, however, economists have little idea where that is the case. Given the difficulty even of identifying the magnitude of agglomeration economies, it should not be surprising that we cannot convincingly estimate nonlinearities in those economies.

The spatial equilibrium model suggests that agglomeration economies are best identified through shocks to amenities or housing supply. For that reason, in the paper’s third section we use the connection between climate and population growth to estimate the impact of population on productivity. We find little evidence to suggest that agglomeration economies are larger for smaller than for bigger cities, or for more compact than for less compact cities. We also find little evidence that the negative impact of population due to urban disamenities differs across types of cities. If anything, there seems to be a more positive link between population and amenities in more compact urban areas.
The fourth section discusses the historical record of place-making policies in the United States. From the Erie Canal to the Interstate Highway System, government-sponsored transportation infrastructure has long influenced the growth of particular places. We review the evidence showing a strong connection between access to railroads and growth in the nineteenth century, and between highways and urban growth in the twentieth century. We argue that the place-making effects of transportation infrastructure do not imply that one should judge transportation spending on the basis of its ability to change the distribution of population across space. Since we lack confidence about which places should be subsidized, a simple model suggests that social welfare is maximized by choosing transport spending to maximize its direct benefits, not according to its ability to enhance one place or another. Current federal subsidies to transportation favor low-income, low-density states, which are unlikely to have particularly large agglomeration effects.

The Appalachian Regional Commission (ARC), created in the 1960s, is the largest example, in terms of total spending, of unambiguous American regional policy. Using transportation subsidies and other forms of spending, the U.S. government has tried to boost the fortunes of Appalachia. There is little robust evidence suggesting that this spending has been effective. Given that the program involved a modest amount of money spread over a vast geographic area, this is unsurprising. No regional policies that direct relatively small amounts of money at big places can be properly judged, since too many other forces influence these areas’ outcomes.

The ability to measure impact is one of the appeals of highly targeted interventions, such as the Empowerment Zones established in the 1990s, that direct significant resources at small areas. Matias Busso and Patrick Kline find that Empowerment Zones did boost local employment, but at a high cost: the program spent more than $100,000 for each new job that can be attributed to an Empowerment Zone. Moreover, just as the spatial equilibrium model suggests, housing prices rose in these zones, possibly more than offsetting any benefits to renters who were employed there before the policy.

The paper’s fifth section turns to the national housing policies, such as urban renewal, that were seen as a tool for urban revitalization in the middle decades of the twentieth century. One rationale for these policies is that dilapidated housing creates negative externalities. The case against them is

that declining areas already have an abundance of housing supply relative to demand, so that it makes little sense to build more housing. Empirically, we find little evidence that either urban renewal or the subsequent Model Cities Program had any discernable effects on urban prosperity.

Indeed, it might make more sense to focus on building in areas that are more, rather than less, productive. Given the huge wage gaps that exist across space, it may be better strategy to enable more people to move from Brownsville to Bridgeport than to try to turn Brownsville into a thriving, finance-based community. If the most productive areas of the country have restricted construction through extensive land use controls, and these controls are not justified on the basis of other externalities, then it may be welfare enhancing for the federal government to adopt policies that could reduce the barriers to building in these areas.

The sixth section of the paper turns to human capital spillovers, which occur when productivity is a function of other area residents’ skills in the area. The existence of human capital spillovers suggests that local leaders trying to improve area incomes or increase area population should focus on policies that attract or train more skilled residents. Like agglomeration economies, human capital spillovers mean that a decentralized equilibrium is unlikely to be optimal. For example, some education subsidies are likely to enhance welfare. Determining the correct national policy toward places, however, requires not only identifying the average effect of human capital externalities or industrial spillovers, but also knowing where these effects are larger.

There is little clear evidence that human capital spillovers or industrial spillovers differ between smaller or larger, or more or less dense, cities. If anything, the impact of skilled workers and industries seems to be convex, suggesting possible returns from pushing skilled workers into already skilled areas. Of course, any tendency to artificially subsidize those areas with high human capital would seem inequitable. The recent tendency of skilled people to move to places where skills are already abundant seems to be progressing without government aid. If anything, these results bolster the case for working against land use restrictions that stymie growth in areas with high human capital.

**The Spatial Equilibrium**

The economic approach to urban policy begins with a model that has three equilibrium conditions. The urban model makes the standard assumption that firms are maximizing profits and hence hiring workers to the point
where wages equal the marginal product of labor. The model also assumes that the construction sector is in equilibrium, which means that housing prices equal the cost of producing a house, including land and legal costs. Finally, and most important, the model assumes that migration is cheap enough to make consumers indifferent between locations. High wages in an area are offset by high prices; low real wages are offset by high amenities. For more than forty years this spatial equilibrium assumption has helped economists make sense of housing prices within cities and the distribution of prices and wages across cities.3

The assumption of low-cost migration between places implies only that expected lifetime utility levels should be constant across space. In practice, economists typically assume that enough migration occurs at every point in time to ensure that period-by-period utility flows are also constant across space. This assumption is standard, if extreme, and we will use it here. The indirect utility function for an individual in location \( i \) can be written as

\[
V[W_i, P_j^i, \theta_i(N_i)],
\]

where \( W_i \) refers to labor income in area \( i \), \( P_j^i \) is a vector of prices of city-specific nontraded goods (especially housing), and \( \theta_i(N_i) \) describes the quality of life in the area, which may be decreasing in population, \( N_i \), because of congestion externalities. Traded goods prices and unearned income may also enter into welfare, but since these are constant over space, we suppress them. A variable \( X_i \) that influences wages must have an offsetting impact on either prices or amenities that satisfies

\[
\frac{dW_i}{dX_i} + \sum_j \left( \frac{V_{x_i} dP^i_j}{V_{w_i} dX_i} \right) + \frac{V_{x_i} d\theta_i}{V_{w_i} dX_i} = 0.
\]

If amenities are fixed, if the only nontraded good is housing, and if everyone consumes exactly one unit of housing, then

\[
\frac{dW_i}{dX_i} = \frac{dP^i_j}{dX_i}.
\]

Any wage increase is exactly offset by a price increase.

The spatial equilibrium assumption has significant implications for urban policy. If individuals are more or less indifferent to location, then there is no natural redistributive reason to channel government support to poor places. The logic of the spatial equilibrium insists that the residents of those places are not particularly distressed, at least holding human capital constant, because low housing prices have already compensated them for low incomes. Moreover, the equilibrium’s logic also suggests that governmental attempts to improve incomes in poor places will themselves create

3. Alonso (1964); Rosen (1979); Roback (1982).
an equal and offsetting impact on housing prices. If the spatial equilibrium assumption holds, then property owners, not the truly disadvantaged, will be the main beneficiaries of aid to poor places.

How strong is the evidence supporting the spatial equilibrium assumption? The striking disparities in income and productivity across American regions might seem to be prima facie evidence against it. Table 1 presents some figures for the U.S. metropolitan areas with the highest and lowest values of several relevant characteristics. The top panel lists the top and bottom five metropolitan areas ranked by gross metropolitan product (GMP) per capita. These figures are produced by the Bureau of Economic Analysis; they are meant to be comparable to gross national product in that they attempt to measure an area’s entire output. (The figures are based on the output of the people who work in the area, not of the people who live there.) By this measure Bridgeport, Connecticut (which includes Greenwich), Charlotte, North Carolina, and San Jose, California, are the most productive places in the United States, with GMP per capita in the range of $60,000 to $75,000 in 2005. The five least productive places all have GMP figures less than one-third of the low end of that range: GMP per capita in Brownsville, Texas, America’s least productive metropolitan area, was about $16,000 in 2005. The relationship between income per capita and GMP, shown in figure 1, is very tight, with a correlation coefficient of 75 percent.4

The next panel of table 1 shows the disparity in family income between the five richest and the five poorest metropolitan areas. The five poorest areas have median family incomes less than half those in the five richest.

For these remarkable income differences to be compatible with the spatial equilibrium model, high prices or low amenities must offset higher incomes in the richest areas. The strongest piece of evidence supporting this view is that there are no legal or technological barriers preventing any American from moving from one metropolitan area to another, and indeed mobility across areas is enormous. Forty-six percent of Americans changed their place of residence between 1995 and 2000, half of them to a different metropolitan area. Critics of the spatial equilibrium assumption can argue, however, that moving costs—both financial and psychological—are often quite high. The existence of these costs leads us to examine other evidence on the existence of a spatial equilibrium.

4. Some places, such as Sioux Falls, South Dakota, and Charlotte, North Carolina, have GMP per capita far above their income per capita, presumably reflecting relatively high levels of physical capital.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Top five MSAs</th>
<th>Average value</th>
<th>Bottom five MSAs</th>
<th>Average value</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gross metropolitan product per capita, 2004</td>
<td>Bridgeport, CT $74,285</td>
<td>Brownsville, TX $16,025</td>
<td>San Jose, CA $68,406</td>
<td>McAllen, TX $16,149</td>
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<td>Charlotte, NC $68,406</td>
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<td>San Jose, CA $68,311</td>
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<td>Washington, DC $66,251</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Sioux Falls, SD $59,003</td>
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<tr>
<td>Median family income, 2000</td>
<td>San Jose, CA $81,053</td>
<td>McAllen, TX $26,009</td>
<td>Bethesda, MD $81,000</td>
<td>McAllen, TX $27,853</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Bethesda, MD $81,000</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Bridgeport, CT $77,690</td>
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<td>Nassau-Suffolk, NY $76,595</td>
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<td>San Francisco, CA $75,416</td>
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<td>Las Cruces, NM $33,576</td>
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<tr>
<td>Share of adult population with a college degree, 2000</td>
<td>Boulder, CO 52.4%</td>
<td>Dalton, GA 9.0%</td>
<td>Bethesda, MD 50.2%</td>
<td>Lake Havasu City, AZ 9.9%</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Bethesda, MD 50.2%</td>
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<td>Ann Arbor, MI 48.1%</td>
<td>El Centro, CA 10.3%</td>
<td>San Francisco, CA 43.6%</td>
<td>Hanford, CA 10.4%</td>
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<td>San Francisco, CA 43.6%</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Cambridge, MA 43.6%</td>
<td>Merced, CA 11.0%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Median house price, 2000</td>
<td>San Jose, CA $441,900</td>
<td>Odessa, TX $47,700</td>
<td>San Francisco, CA $440,500</td>
<td>McAllen, TX $52,400</td>
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<td>San Francisco, CA $440,500</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Santa Cruz, CA $377,500</td>
<td>Brownsville, TX $53,000</td>
<td>New York, NY $362,500</td>
<td>Danville, IL $56,000</td>
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<td>New York, NY $362,500</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Honolulu, HI $309,000</td>
<td>Pine Bluff, AR $56,200</td>
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Sources: Bureau of Economic Analysis; U.S. Census Bureau.

a. Units of observation are metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) under the 2006 definitions, using metropolitan divisions where applicable. All dollars are current (2000 or 2004) dollars.
b. Among MSAs with at least 100,000 population.
One reason spatial income differences may not reflect differences in welfare for similarly skilled people is that people in different places do not have similar human capital endowments. The third panel of table 1 shows the differences across metropolitan areas in the share of the adult population with a college degree. Bethesda, Maryland, is one of the richest urban areas in the country, and more than half of its adults have college degrees. By contrast, fewer than one in ten adults in the least educated metropolitan areas have college degrees. The poorest metropolitan areas also have more non-native English speakers and more residents who speak English poorly or not at all. For example, more than three-quarters of the residents of McAllen, Texas, speak a language other than English at home.

One simple exercise is to compare the standard deviation of wages across metropolitan areas before and after controlling for observable individual-level human capital variables, such as years of schooling. The standard deviation of mean wages across metropolitan areas drops by 26 percent when we control for individual characteristics, suggesting that...
differences in human capital account for about half of the variance in metropolitan-area wage levels. There are also important differences in unobserved human capital, which may themselves be a product of the differing experiences and role models across particular locales.

Even after accounting for differences in human capital, however, large differences in earnings remain across metropolitan areas. For the spatial equilibrium model to be correct, these differences must be offset by variation in the cost of living and amenities. The bottom panel of table 1 shows the disparities in housing prices across areas using Census data on housing prices. In the five most expensive areas, three of which are in California, the value of the median house was $309,000 or more in the 2000 census. According to National Association of Realtors (NAR) data on recent housing sales, the average sales prices for San Jose and San Francisco were $852,000 and $825,000, respectively, in the third quarter of 2007. Meanwhile prices below $60,000 are the norm in the five cheapest metropolitan areas. These places are again primarily in Texas, although Danville, Illinois, and Pine Bluff, Arkansas, are also among the least expensive areas.

High incomes and high prices go together across metropolitan areas. Regressing the logarithm of income on the logarithm of housing prices across areas yields a coefficient of 0.33, which is reassuringly close to the share of housing in average expenditure. Figure 2 shows a strong relationship (the correlation is 70 percent) between income per capita and house prices across metropolitan areas. For every extra dollar of income, prices increase by nearly ten dollars. This relationship means that higher housing costs exactly offset higher incomes if each extra dollar of housing cost is associated with 10 cents of annual expenses in interest payments, local taxes, and maintenance, net of any capital gains associated with living in the house. This figure does not seem unreasonable for many areas of the country.

Even though higher housing costs absorb much of the added income in high-wage places, they are only one of the costs of moving into a high-income area—many other goods are also more expensive. The American Chamber of Commerce Research Association (ACCRA) has assembled cost

5. This exercise was done using 2000 Census microdata. Our individual-level controls are age, race, educational attainment, and speaking a language other than English at home.

6. The NAR figures for inexpensive areas are considerably higher, since those data only look at recent home sales, which skew the sample toward newer, higher-quality homes. Using NAR data, it is the Rustbelt, not Texas, that has the cheapest homes: Decatur, Illinois, Saginaw, Michigan, and Youngstown, Ohio, are the three cheapest metropolitan areas according to the NAR, with median sales prices below $90,000.

indices on a full range of commodities across metropolitan areas. Figure 3 shows the relationship between the logarithm of the ACCRA price index and the logarithm of income per capita, both as of 2000. The correlation between these variables is 54 percent, and as the ACCRA index goes up by 0.1 log point, personal income rises by 0.08 log point. Higher prices are offset by higher incomes, just as the spatial equilibrium model predicts.

Of course, there is still plenty of heterogeneity in real incomes across space. The spatial equilibrium model implies that lower real incomes must be offset by higher amenities. One of these is a pleasant climate. Figure 4 shows the relationship between average January temperature and real wages in 2000: warmer places pay less, just as the spatial equilibrium model suggests. A large literature shows that real incomes are lower where amenities are high.8

If it is much better to live in a high-income place, then one would expect population to be flowing toward richer areas. However, figure 5 shows a

lack of any relationship across metropolitan areas between population growth from 1980 to 2000 and income per capita in 1980. People are not moving disproportionately to higher-income areas. The stability of the spatial equilibrium model is also supported by the relatively weak convergence of incomes across metropolitan areas in recent decades. If higher incomes in some areas represented some disequilibrium phenomenon, one would expect firms to abandon those areas and workers to gravitate toward them. Both forces would tend to make incomes converge. But as we have documented elsewhere, the 1980s saw essentially no convergence, and in the 1990s convergence was much weaker than in the 1970s.

One final piece of evidence comes from happiness surveys. We reject the view that responses to questions about happiness are a direct reflection of consumer welfare—we see no particular reason why utility maximization should be associated with any particular emotional state, even one as

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11. All of our metropolitan areas have at least 60 respondents to the happiness question over the period, and 95 percent have at least 100.

Figure 4. Real Wages and Mean January Temperature

Log of average real wage, 2000

Sources: U.S. Census Bureau; American Chamber of Commerce Research Association; City and County Data Book, 1994. See appendix B for details.

a. Each observation represents a single metropolitan statistical area under the 1999 definitions, using primary rather than consolidated MSAs where applicable and New England county metropolitan areas where applicable.

b. Real wages are defined as the ratio of income per capita to the ACCRA cost of living index.

desirable as happiness. Still, a strong tendency of people who live in poor areas to report lower levels of happiness would be seen as a challenge to the spatial equilibrium approach. Using the General Social Survey between 1972 and 2006, we form self-reported happiness measures at the metropolitan-area level using the fraction of respondents who report being happy.\footnote{11} Figure 6 shows no relationship between self-reported happiness and income per capita—people do not seem any less happy in places that are poorer.

11. All of our metropolitan areas have at least 60 respondents to the happiness question over the period, and 95 percent have at least 100.
These facts certainly do not prove that the spatial equilibrium assumption holds. Given that amenities are part of any region’s appeal and that it is impossible to know how much people value those amenities, it is effectively impossible to prove that welfare levels are equalized across space. A better way to describe the evidence is to say that many empirical facts are compatible with the spatial equilibrium assumption, and few, if any, would cause us to reject the assumption. Of course, we accept that welfare might not be equalized in the short run. A negative shock to an area’s productivity will lead to a reduction in income that is not immediately capitalized into housing costs.12 Moreover, when such capitalization does occur, homeowners will face a real decline in wealth in response to the area’s economic troubles. The spatial equilibrium assumption is best understood as a characterization of the medium and long runs, not year-to-year variation in regional well-being.

We will now fully specify a model to guide both our empirical work and our policy discussion. For our empirical work, we will assume that production and utility functions are Cobb-Douglas. But since these forms generate policy prescriptions that do not hold generically, we will have to move to a somewhat more general formulation when we discuss the implications for national policy.

We assume that individuals have Cobb-Douglas utility with a multiplicative amenity factor. We assume that they face a proportional tax rate of $t_i$, so that the indirect utility function can be written as $U_i = \theta_i(N_i)(1 - t_i) W_i \Pi_j(P_j)^{-\beta_j}$. The spatial equilibrium assumption is that utility in each area is equal to a reservation utility $U_i$, which implies

$$\log(W_i) = \log(U_i) - \sum_j \beta_j \log(P_j) - \log(1 - t_i) - \log[\theta_i(N_i)].$$

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**Economic Policy and Urban Theory**

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$$\log(W_i) = \log(U_i) - \sum_j \beta_j \log(P_j) - \log(1 - t_i) - \log[\theta_i(N_i)].$$
With a slight abuse of notation, we assume that $\theta_i(N_i) = \theta_i N_i^{1-\sigma}$, to capture possible congestion externalities. On the production side, we restrict the model to two goods: one traded good that has a fixed price of one, and one nontraded good with an endogenously determined price of $P_i$. The share of spending on the nontraded good is denoted $\beta$, so overall utility is $\theta_i N_i^{1-\sigma}(1 - t_i) W_i P_i^{-\beta}$.

The traded sector is characterized by free entry of firms that produce traded goods according to a constant-returns-to-scale production function $A_i(N_i) F_i(L_i, K_T, K_N)$. We let $A_i(N_i) = a_i N_i^{\alpha}$, which is meant to capture the level of productivity in the area, which may be increasing in the total number of people working in the area. $L$ represents labor, $K_T$ a vector of traded capital inputs, and $K_N$ a vector of nontraded capital inputs. A fixed supply of nontraded capital implies that a production function that displays constant returns to scale at the firm level will display diminishing returns at the area level—at least if agglomeration economies are not too strong. If the production function is written as $F_i(L_i, K_T, K_N) = a_i N_i^{\alpha} K_T^{\alpha \gamma} K_N^{\alpha (1-\gamma)} L_1^{1-\alpha}$, and if nontraded capital in the area is fixed (denoted $\bar{K}_N$), then labor demand in the area can be written $Q_{W_i}(a_i N_i^{\alpha} K_T^{\alpha \gamma} K_N^{\alpha (1-\gamma)} W_i^{1-\alpha})^{1/\alpha \gamma}$, where $Q_W$ is constant across areas.

We assume a housing sector characterized by free entry of firms with access to a production technology $H_i G(L, K_T, K_N)$. $H_i$ represents factors that impact the ability to deliver housing cheaply, and $G(., ., .)$ is a constant-returns-to-scale production function. The housing production function is $H_i \tilde{Z}_{N_i}^{\mu} K_T^{\mu (1-\nu)} L^{1-\nu}$, where $\tilde{Z}_{N_i}$ represents the nontraded input into housing (land), which we assume is different from the nontraded input into the traded goods sector. To account for the returns to nontraded capital inputs (land), we assume they go to rentiers who also live in the area. They have the same Cobb-Douglas utility functions as workers but do not work or noticeably affect aggregate population. Instead they are a wealthy but small portion of the population; because of their wealth they contribute to demand for the nontraded good, but because of their negligible number they do not add to area population. Thus, $N_i$ equals only the sum of labor used in the two sectors. The government also spends a share $\beta$ of its revenue on the nontraded good.

We now define our equilibrium concept:

**Definition:** In a competitive equilibrium, wages equal the marginal product of labor in both sectors, individuals optimally choose housing consumption, and utility levels are constant across space.
The spatial equilibrium condition, labor demand, and equilibrium in the housing sector produce solutions for population, wages, and prices:

\[
\log(N_i) = \kappa_N + \frac{1 - \beta(1 - \mu + \mu\eta)}{\sigma} \log(\alpha K^{w}_{N_i}) \\
+ \frac{1 - \alpha + \alpha\gamma}{\sigma} \log\left[(1 + t_i)\theta_i (H_i Z^{w}_{N_i})^\beta\right]
\]

\[
\log(W_i) = \kappa_w + \frac{\sigma + \mu\beta}{\sigma} \log(\alpha K^{w}_{N_i}) + \frac{\omega - \alpha\gamma}{\sigma} \log\left[(1 - t_i)\theta_i (H_i Z^{w}_{N_i})^\beta\right]
\]

\[
\log(P_i) = \kappa_p + \frac{\mu\eta}{\sigma} \log(\alpha K^{w}_{N_i}) \\
+ \frac{\omega(1 - \mu + \mu\eta) + \mu\eta(1 - \alpha) - \alpha\gamma(1 - \mu)}{\sigma} \log\left[(1 - t_i)\theta_i\right] \\
+ \frac{\omega - \alpha\gamma - \sigma(1 - \alpha + \alpha\gamma)}{\sigma} \log(H_i Z^{w}_{N_i}),
\]

where \(\kappa_N\), \(\kappa_w\), and \(\kappa_p\) depend on the tax rate and constants, and \(\sigma = (\sigma + \beta\mu\eta)(1 - \alpha + \alpha\gamma) + (\alpha\gamma - \omega)[1 - \beta(1 - \mu + \mu\eta)]\). This system of equations will guide our discussion of the empirical work on agglomeration economies. These equations show that an exogenous increase in area-level productivity or amenities will impact population, wages, and prices. In urban research all three outcomes must be used to understand the impact of an intervention.

The most natural social welfare function is \(\sum_i N_i \theta_i (1 - t_i) W_i P_i^{-\beta}\); which equals the (fixed) total population times individual utility (which will be constant across people). We also include the welfare received by rentiers; if total rentier income is \(Y_r\) and the size of this group is fixed exogenously, then the additive utility function that includes rentiers can be written as \(\sum_i \theta_i (1 - t_i)(N_i W_i + Y_r) P_i^{-\beta}\).

Our first policy question concerns the optimal local tax level to fund local amenities. We assume that local amenities are a function of local spending and population, so that \(\theta_i = g_i(t_i W_i N_i, N_i)\). These amenities could include public safety, parks, and schools. Following Truman Bewley,\(^{13}\) two assumptions are typical in the literature. Amenities may be a pure public good, meaning that there is no depreciation with population size and \(\theta_i = g_i(t_i W_i N_i)\), or a pure public service, which means that output is neutral.

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with respect to population and $\theta_i = g_i(t, W)$. We assume the latter so that amenities are a function of individual taxes.\textsuperscript{14}

**Proposition 1**: The allocation of people across space in a decentralized equilibrium maximizes social welfare. If an individual’s amenity level $\theta_i$ is a function of that individual’s tax payments, then the area-specific tax that maximizes the sum of utility levels across areas is also the tax that maximizes utility within each area when holding population constant. A local government that seeks to maximize population will choose tax rates that maximize the sum of total utility levels, whereas a local government that seeks to maximize wages per capita will minimize social welfare. Housing prices should be maximized if agglomeration economies are sufficiently large or house production is sufficiently capital intensive, and minimized otherwise.

In this model, agglomeration economies do not change the optimal policies for local governments. Maximizing population was desirable even without agglomeration economies; the existence of such economies only provides another reason for its desirability. The result that population maximization is optimal is not general, however. In some cases local governments must decide between actions that improve the welfare of existing citizens and actions that attract more citizens. Restrictions on land use development are a pertinent example of a policy that reduces area population growth but may increase the quality of life for existing residents. When a conflict arises between attracting more people and caring for current residents, agglomeration economies will tend to strengthen the case for policies that attract new residents.

Despite the existence of externalities, our assumptions about functional forms imply that there are no welfare gains from reallocating people across space.\textsuperscript{15} The key to this result is that our functional forms imply that the elasticity of welfare with respect to population is constant. To address spatial issues more generally, we will need a more general formulation for agglomeration economies.

This observation notwithstanding, Proposition 1 does not rule out a role for government. Indeed, by assumption the government provides the amenity level, so there is an inherent role for government spending. The proposition does imply, however, that decisionmaking about optimal policies

\textsuperscript{14} For simplicity we assume that this is true for the rentier class as well.

\textsuperscript{15} The decentralized equilibrium is, however, not a Pareto optimum. There would still be gains from redistributing income across space, holding populations constant.
spending can ignore population responses and simply maximize the welfare of the current population. A decentralized decisionmaking process, where individual areas choose tax and amenity levels to maximize the welfare of their citizens, will yield a Pareto optimal population distribution. This result depends on the functional form that guarantees a constant elasticity of well-being with respect to population.

The proposition also hints at some of the key results from urban public finance. When localities maximize population or property values, they will also be maximizing utility and choosing an optimal tax level. If they try to maximize income per capita, however, they will actually be minimizing social welfare. In other settings, of course, maximizing population does not yield socially beneficial results. For example, if one area suffers a negative externality from congestion and another area has no such congestion, it will not maximize social welfare for the congestion-prone area to try to maximize population. A distinguished literature, following Henry George, shows that choosing policy to maximize local land values is usually the most reliable way to achieve a Pareto optimum.

To derive more general results about the location of people across space, we move to a more general model and ignore the role of government in creating local public goods. We will also suppress the terms for capital and write output of nontraded goods in an area as $A_i(N_i)F_i(N_i - L_i)$, which represents total output of nontraded goods minus the costs of traded capital, assuming that traded capital is chosen optimally. Likewise, we write production of housing as $G_i(L_i)$, which again is meant to be net of traded capital. Utility is $U[Y_i, H_i, \theta_i(N_i)]$, where $Y_i$ is net income, which may include rental income, minus housing costs. The next proposition then follows:

**Proposition 2:** (a) A competitive equilibrium where net unearned income is constant across space is a social optimum if and only if $U[Y_i, \theta_i(N_i)]$ and $N_i\theta'_i(N_i)U_{\theta_j} + U_jA'_i(N_j)F_i(N_j - L_j)$ are constant across space, where $U_{\theta_j}$ is the marginal utility of amenities in location $i$.

(b) If either all unearned income from an area goes to the residents of that area, or the marginal utility of income is constant across space, then moving individuals from area $j$ to area $i$ will increase total welfare relative to the competitive equilibrium if and only if

$$\theta_i(N_i)U_{\theta_j} \frac{N_i\theta'_i(N_i)}{\theta_i(N_i)} + U_j \frac{N_jA'_j(N_j)A_i(N_i)F_i(N_i - L_i)}{A_i(N_i)}$$

is greater than

17. See, for example, Brueckner (1983).
Part (a) of Proposition 2 reveals two reasons why a spatial equilibrium may not be a social optimum. First, a spatial equilibrium equates total utility levels across space, not marginal utilities of income. \(^{18}\) Thus a planner could increase welfare by transferring money to areas where the marginal utility from traded-goods consumption is high, and holding population levels constant. \(^{19}\) Since everyone is identical ex ante, there is no natural means of placing different social welfare weights on different individuals to eliminate the gains from redistribution that come from different marginal utilities of income.

The Cobb-Douglas utility functions discussed above imply that the marginal utility of income equals total utility (which is constant across space) divided by income. In this case redistributing income to poor places is attractive—if population can be held fixed—not because poorer places have lower welfare but because they have a higher marginal utility from spending. This result would disappear if poor places had amenities that were substitutes for rather than complements to cash. \(^{20}\)

The second reason for government intervention arises if \(N_i \theta_i(N_i) U_{ni} + U_i A_i(N_i) A_i(N_i) F(N_i - L_i)\) is not constant across space. In the absence of congestion and agglomeration economies, the competitive equilibrium is a social optimum. Alternatively, if the sum of agglomeration plus congestion effects were (somewhat magically) the same everywhere, the decentralized equilibrium would be a social optimum. These unusual circumstances were satisfied under the functional forms described above, which reflect a constant elasticity of amenities and agglomeration with respect to population. Those

18. This is a spatial version of the Bergstrom (1986) problem, where wages for the volunteer army equate total utility levels but not marginal utility levels. Glaeser (1998) examines this issue in the context of indexing transfers for local price levels.

19. This failure of the decentralized equilibrium is not an artifact of assuming a utilitarian social welfare planner. The decentralized equilibrium will not generally maximize any weighted average of individual utility levels. If the planner puts a larger weight on people in areas where the marginal utility of income is high, then the spatial equilibrium will generally be suboptimal, because the utility of those people is the same as the utility of people in areas where the marginal utility of income is low.

20. This argument for redistribution appears in many situations where the market equilibrium equates total utilities, rather than the marginal utility of income; the same argument can be used to justify transfers to high-amenity occupations that pay lower wages, at least if those amenities are not a complement to earnings. However, as Oliver Hart emphasized in his comment on Bergstrom (1986), this problem can be solved privately with cash lotteries that occur before choosing occupations or locations.
conditions, and the assumption about the functional form of the utility function, ensured that welfare could not be improved by moving population around.

Another way to understand the benefits from subsidizing places is to consider moving people from one region to another, as discussed in part (b) of Proposition 2. Gains can accrue from reallocating people to an area if either the amenity elasticity is lower there or the agglomeration economies are higher. The condition on agglomeration economies multiplies the agglomeration elasticity \( \frac{N_i A_i'(N_i)}{A_i(N_i)} \) by \( \frac{A_i(N_i) F_i(N_i - L_i)}{N_i} \); in words, it is the product of the marginal utility of income and output per capita in the nontraded sector. This second term implies that it is desirable to move people to richer areas if the marginal utility of income is constant across space. We will focus on the differences in agglomeration elasticities in the next section.

**Agglomeration Economies**

Two important facts support the existence of agglomeration economies: the spatial concentration of economic activity, and the tendency of densely populated areas to be richer and more productive. The majority of the world now lives in cities, and hundreds of millions of people crowd into a small set of particularly large megacities. Industries are also often spatially concentrated.21 In principle, the concentration of people in cities and of industries in clusters could simply reflect exogenous differences in productivity. This view may well be accurate for the nineteenth century, when, for example, hundreds of thousands came to New York to enjoy the productive advantages created by its natural harbor. In the twenty-first century, however, it is hard to think of any comparable exogenous advantages that could explain massive urban agglomerations. Glenn Ellison and Glaeser find that a large battery of local characteristics can explain less than one-fifth of the concentration of manufacturing industries across space.22 Since so much clustering occurs without an obvious exogenous cause, urban economists have tended to interpret it as the result of endogenous gains from co-location, which are referred to as agglomeration economies.

The belief in agglomeration economies is also bolstered by the robust correlations between income or productivity and urban density. Figure 7

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shows the relationship between the logarithm of GMP per capita and the logarithm of metropolitan-area population. City size explains one-quarter of the variation in GMP per capita (that is, the correlation is 0.50), and the elasticity of productivity with respect to city size is 0.13.

Because GMP data have been available for only a few years, earlier researchers looked at either metropolitan-area income or state-level productivity measures. Antonio Ciccone and Robert Hall show the remarkably strong correlation between state productivity and the degree to which the population within a state is concentrated in a small number of dense counties.23 Glaeser and David Mare show that the urban wage premium does not seem to reflect differential selection of more-skilled people into big cities.24 They do find, however, that recent migrants to cities experience only a small portion of the urban wage premium immediately, instead reaping most of the gains through faster wage growth. The steep

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age-earnings profile in cities suggests that cities may speed the pace of human capital accumulation.

The great challenge facing research on the connection between city size and income is that this connection may reflect the tendency of people to move to already-productive areas, rather than any sort of agglomeration economy. Ciccone and Hall address this reverse causality issue by turning to historical variables, such as nineteenth-century population and railroad density. Pierre Philippe Combes, Gilles Duranton, and Laurent Gobillon pursue a similar exercise using French data. Using these variables as instruments for density, these authors continue to find a strong connection between density and economic productivity. However, as we will discuss later, historical instruments of this kind do not naturally solve the identification problem in a spatial model such as the one described above.

Since the public policy implications of agglomeration economies depend on the size and nature of those economies, table 2 reproduces these standard approaches to measuring agglomeration using individual-level data from the 2000 Census. We run the regressions using only prime-working-age men (those between the ages of 25 and 55) to avoid capturing variation from differences in labor force participation, but similar results obtain when we include all employed adults. Regression 2-1 in table 2 shows the basic correlation between the logarithm of population in a metropolitan area and the logarithm of wages, holding individual-level controls constant. The measured elasticity is 0.041, meaning that as population doubles, income increases by a little more than 2.8 percent. If population is exogenously distributed, then the Cobb-Douglas functional forms above imply that the measured elasticity of wages with respect to area population equals \( \frac{\omega - \alpha \gamma}{1 - \alpha + \alpha \gamma} \); thus if labor’s share in output is two-thirds, then the agglomeration parameter \( \omega \) equals 1.041 times \( \alpha \gamma \), the share of nontraded capital in production, plus 0.027.

Regression 2-2 in table 2 examines whether the elasticity of wages with respect to population differs between big and small cities. It is specified as a piecewise linear regression with a break at the median population across our sample of metropolitan areas, thus allowing the impact of area population to be bigger or smaller for larger areas. The estimated elasticity is higher for smaller cities (0.076 versus 0.038), but the difference is not statistically significant.

Some agglomeration theories focus on area size, others on population density. Regression 2-3 includes both population and density as indepen-

Table 2. Regressions of Wages on Metropolitan-Area Population and Density

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent variable</th>
<th>Regression 2-1</th>
<th>Regression 2-2</th>
<th>Regression 2-3</th>
<th>Regression 2-4</th>
<th>Regression 2-5b</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Log of population in 2000</td>
<td>0.041</td>
<td>0.023</td>
<td>0.089</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.009)</td>
<td>(0.010)</td>
<td>(0.037)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log of population in 2000, below-median subsample</td>
<td>0.076</td>
<td>0.057</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.029)</td>
<td>(0.029)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log of population in 2000, above-median subsample</td>
<td>0.038</td>
<td>0.020</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.012)</td>
<td>(0.013)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log of population density, 2000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.029</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.015)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log of density in 2000, below-median subsample</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.041</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.017)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log of density in 2000, above-median subsample</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.027</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.020)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of observations</td>
<td>1,591,140</td>
<td>1,591,140</td>
<td>1,591,140</td>
<td>1,591,140</td>
<td>1,282,116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of MSAs</td>
<td>283</td>
<td>283</td>
<td>283</td>
<td>283</td>
<td>210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R^2$</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.22</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Authors’ regressions.

a. The dependent variable is the logarithm of the individual wage. The regression method is ordinary least squares except where noted otherwise. Only fully employed men aged 25 to 55 are included in the sample. All regressions include individual controls for age and education. Individual-level wage data are from the U.S. Census Public Use Microdata Sample, as described in appendix B. Metropolitan-area covariates are from the U.S. Census Bureau as described in appendix A. Units of observation are metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) presented under the 1999 definitions, using primary rather than consolidated MSAs where applicable and New England county metropolitan areas where applicable. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered by MSA.

b. Instrumental variables regression using the logarithm of population in 1850 to instrument for log of population in 2000.

The coefficients on the two variables are similar, at 0.023 and 0.029, respectively. Regression 2-4 is a piecewise linear regression for both density and population. Again the estimated coefficient on population is stronger for smaller cities. However, the estimated coefficient on density is stronger for areas with more people per acre, but the difference in the density coefficients is not statistically significant.

Regression 2-5 follows Ciccone and Hall and uses historical data—population of the metropolitan area in 1850—to instrument for current population. We have data for only 210 metropolitan areas from this period, so our sample size shrinks. The estimated coefficient on population in this regression is actually higher than that in regression 2-1, which suggests that the population-income relationship does not reflect the impact of recent population movement to more productive areas.

The model clarifies what we need to assume for instrumental variables regressions such as this one to be interpreted as estimates of agglomeration economies. If historical population affects wages by raising productivity, perhaps because it is associated with investment in nontraded infrastructure, then the estimated coefficient will equal \( \frac{\sigma - \mu \eta \beta}{1 - \beta (1 - \mu + \mu \eta)} \), which is also what ordinary least squares would estimate if cross-city variation came from heterogeneity in productivity. These parameters do not tell us anything about agglomeration economies, but instead provide us with information about decreasing returns in the housing sector. If, however, historical population acts through housing supply or amenities, then the estimated instrumental variables coefficient will equal \( \frac{\omega - \alpha \gamma}{1 - \alpha + \alpha \gamma} \), which can be transformed to get an estimate of agglomeration economies. This would also be the ordinary least squares coefficient if the exogenous spatial variation came entirely from amenities or housing supply.

Table 2 raises two challenges for economic policy. First, these simple correlations between income and area population may not be instructive about agglomeration economies, since they could result from omitted productivity. Second, even the ordinary least squares relationships fail to find a clear difference in agglomeration economies between bigger and smaller areas or between more and less dense areas. Since the rationale for agglomeration-based spatial interventions requires agglomeration elasticities to be different in different types of areas, we next look for this effect using more complex estimation techniques. But uncovering differences in elasticities that are not visible using ordinary least squares is a tall order.

**Estimating Agglomeration**

The urban model presented in equations 2 through 4 implies that agglomeration economies can be estimated if we have exogenous sources of variation that impact amenities or housing supply, but not productivity. If agglomeration economies exist, then the extra population brought in by amenities should raise productivity. The mean temperature of an area is certainly an amenity: people prefer milder climates. We therefore use climate data to see whether places that attract more people because of their climate also see an increase in wages.

January temperature and precipitation are both relatively reliable predictors of urban growth in postwar America. Regressing the change in
population between 1970 and 2000 on these two variables yields the following equation:

\[
\log \left( \frac{\text{population}_{2000}}{\text{population}_{1970}} \right) = 0.0603 + 0.0166 \text{ temperature} - 0.0068 \text{ precipitation}.
\]

The adjusted \( R^2 \) is 0.39 and there are 316 observations; standard errors are in parentheses. One interpretation of these correlations is that they reflect the interaction between climate and new technologies, such as air conditioning, that make warm places relatively more appealing. Glaeser and Kristina Tobio argue that warm areas tend also to have had more-permissive land use regulations.27 An alternative approach might therefore be to use the Wharton Land Use Index, which measures the restrictiveness of the building environment, to capture variation related to housing supply.28 In both cases identification hinges critically on these variables being orthogonal to changes in productivity at the local level, except insofar as the productivity changes are due to agglomeration economies. We cannot be sure that this is the case, but given the absence of other alternatives we will use variation in climate as our instrument.

Using the model above, we assume that our climate-based instruments predict changes in the housing supply and amenity variables, \( \log(HZ_{ij}) + \log(\theta_i) \), but not changes in the productivity variable \( \log(aK_{ij}) \). In this case the univariate regression of wage growth on population growth will estimate \( \frac{\alpha - \gamma}{1 - \alpha + \gamma} \). By examining the interaction of this treatment effect with other area-level characteristics, we can determine whether \( \omega \) appears to be higher in some places than in others. This procedure also requires \( \alpha \) and \( \gamma \) to be constant across space.

Taking the logarithm of our baseline wage equation (equation A1 in appendix A) yields the following relationship between the wage of person \( j \) and the size of metropolitan area \( i \), where the person lives:

\[
\log(W_j) = (b_0 + b_iX_j)\log(N_{ij}) + \sigma Z_j + \zeta_i + \varepsilon_j.
\]

The vector \( Z_j \) represents individual characteristics, such as age and education, and \( \sigma \) the vector of coefficients on \( Z \) at time \( t \). Each metropolitan area

28. The index was developed by Gyourko, Saiz, and Summers (2007) based on a survey of local zoning authorities nationwide.
has a fixed effect, $\zeta_i$, due to nontraded capital and MSA-specific noise, and the error term $\epsilon_j$ represents the effect of any unobservable individual characteristics as well as noise in setting the wage. Population size $N_{i,t}$ impacts the wage through the coefficient $b_0 + b_1 X_i$, which equals $\frac{\omega - \alpha \gamma}{1 - \alpha + \alpha \gamma}$. The possibility that these coefficients might be different for different types of cities is captured by the term $b_1 X_i$, which allows city-level characteristics, $X_i$, to impact the agglomeration economy. This procedure requires $b_0$ and $b_1$ to be constant across space. If we also assume them to be constant over time, then we can write

$$\log(W_i) = (b_0 + b_1 X_i) \log(N_{i,t}) + (\sigma + \tau) Z_j + \zeta_i + \epsilon_j,$$

where $\tau$ augments $\sigma$ because we allow the effect of individual characteristics to change over time. We can rewrite equation 7 to show an explicit dependence on population growth:

$$(7') \log(W_i) = (b_0 + b_1 X_i) \log\left(\frac{N_{i,t+1}}{N_{i,t}}\right) + (b_0 + b_1 X_i) \log(N_{i,t}) + (\sigma + \tau) Z_j + \zeta_i + \epsilon_j,$$

In equation 7’ the MSA-level fixed effect becomes $\mu_i = (b_0 + b_1 X_i) \log(N_{i,t}) + \zeta_i$. This is also the estimated MSA-level fixed effect in equation 6, so we can write

$$(6') \log(W_i) = \sigma Z_j + \mu_i + \epsilon_j.$$

We will estimate $b_0$ and $b_1$ by pooling equations 6’ and 7’ together for Census years 1990 and 2000. We can thus run

$$(8) \log(W_i) = (b_0 + b_1 X_i) \log\left(\frac{N_{i,2000}}{N_{i,1990}}\right) I_{2000} + \sigma Z_j + \tau Z_i I_{2000} + \mu_i + \epsilon_j,$$

where $I_{2000}$ is a dummy variable equal to one for observations in 2000.

We first estimate equation 8 as an ordinary least squares regression, omitting any interactions with population growth. Results are presented as regression 3-1 in table 3, and the sample again includes only prime-working-age men. The coefficient on population growth is strongly positive, indicating that expanding cities are also getting more productive. In regression 3-2 we attempt to identify the effect by using January temperature, July temperature, and precipitation as instruments for population growth between 1990 and 2000. If $b_1 = 0$, this should yield an unbiased
Table 3. Instrumental Variables Regressions Testing for Agglomeration Effects

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent variable</th>
<th>3-1</th>
<th>3-2</th>
<th>3-3</th>
<th>3-4</th>
<th>3-5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Population growth in 1990s × year 2000 dummy</td>
<td>0.200</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>0.166</td>
<td>-0.020</td>
<td>-0.099</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Above-median population dummy × year 2000 dummy</td>
<td>0.006</td>
<td>0.017</td>
<td>0.133</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population growth in 1990s × above-median population dummy × year 2000 dummy</td>
<td>-0.165</td>
<td>0.133</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Above-median centralization dummy × year 2000 dummy</td>
<td>-0.038</td>
<td>0.022</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population growth in 1990s × above-median centralization dummy × year 2000 dummy</td>
<td>0.216</td>
<td>0.163</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dummy for bottom quartile of MSA population growth, 1970–90 × year 2000 dummy</td>
<td>-0.057</td>
<td>0.026</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log of population in 2000 × dummy for bottom quartile of MSA population growth, 1970–90 × year 2000 dummy</td>
<td>0.398</td>
<td>0.252</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of observations</td>
<td>2,950,850</td>
<td>2,950,850</td>
<td>2,950,850</td>
<td>2,490,733</td>
<td>2,950,850</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of MSAs</td>
<td>287</td>
<td>287</td>
<td>287</td>
<td>229</td>
<td>287</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Authors’ regressions.

a. The dependent variable is the logarithm of the individual wage for employed men aged 25 to 55. Regressions are instrumental variables regressions except where noted otherwise. Instruments are mean January temperature, mean July temperature, and precipitation, from the 1994 City and County Data Book. Individual data are from the 1990 and 2000 Census Public Use Microdata Sample, as described in appendix B. Population data are from the Census. Units of observation are metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) under the 1999 definitions, using primary rather than consolidated MSAs where applicable and New England county metropolitan areas where applicable. All regressions include individual controls for sex, age, and education and MSA and year fixed effects. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered by MSA.

b. Regression is by the ordinary least squares method.

c. Centralization is defined as the fraction of MSA employment located within five miles of the central business district, from Glaeser and Kahn (2004).
estimate of \( b_0 = \frac{\omega - \alpha \gamma}{1 - \alpha + \alpha \gamma} \). The coefficient drops to 0.004, implying that a doubling in population is associated with a 0.3 percent increase in wages. But this coefficient does not mean that agglomeration economies are absent. The theory predicts that wages will only increase with population \( (b_0 > 0) \) if population is a larger input into production than fixed capital. If \( b_0 = 0 \), then \( \omega = \alpha \gamma \); that is, extra population is just as valuable as extra fixed capital, and increasing prices absorb all of the gains from agglomeration.

We have little empirical guidance on the amount of nontraded capital in the production function. Eventually, all capital may be endogenous, but over the course of a decade or two, much capital is relatively fixed. The user cost of commercial real estate provides one possible source of information on the fraction of fixed capital in the economy’s aggregate production function. If this real estate is worth the $5.3 trillion claimed by Standard and Poor’s (2007), then assuming the same 10 percent user cost as for residential real estate gives a contribution of $530 billion to U.S. GDP, or about 4 percent. Assuming \( \alpha \) to be one-third, fixed capital would thus represent \( \gamma = 0.12 \), or 12 percent of all capital.

The coefficient of 0.004 estimated in regression 3-2 gives a point estimate indicating that agglomeration is only slightly more important than fixed capital, although the large standard errors make the true agglomeration effect hard to estimate. The 95 percent confidence interval on our estimate ranges from \(-0.19 \) to 0.2; with \( \alpha \gamma = 0.04 \) (12 percent of one-third), the former implies that \( \omega = -0.09 \) and the latter yields \( \omega = 0.18 \). A higher value of \( \gamma \) would push both of these estimates upward, and a lower value would reduce them.

The main implication of the model was that policy should subsidize places where the elasticity of productivity with respect to population is higher than elsewhere. One significant question is whether agglomeration economies are greater for larger or smaller cities, and table 2 suggested the latter. To test this hypothesis, regressions 3-3 through 3-5 interact the log of population in 2000 with various variables \( X_i \) intended to capture larger, denser, and declining cities, respectively. We now instrument for population growth with the weather variables as well as the weather variables interacted with \( X_i \).

We first explore whether adding people has more of an effect on the productivity of larger places. Regression 3-3 thus uses a dummy variable indicating whether an MSA’s population was above the sample median in 1990 for \( X_j \). A positive coefficient \( \delta \) on the interaction between this dummy and population growth would imply that adding population is in fact more valuable for the productivity of larger places, but we find no significant
evidence for any such interaction. The impact of population on productivity seems to be the same for both smaller and larger metropolitan areas.

Another possibility is that growing population has more of a positive effect in areas that are more geographically compact, with a dense urban core. To test this hypothesis, regression 3-4 uses a measure of centralization—the share of employment in the area that lies within five miles of the central business district—as the interaction variable. These data are based on zip code employment data described by Glaeser and Matthew Kahn. The data would ideally come from before 1990 but are available only from 1998. In this regression the coefficient $\delta$ is small and statistically insignificant. We cannot conclude that density increases productivity more in faster-growing cities than in others.

Regression 3-5 examines whether agglomeration economies seem to be greater in places that were previously in relative decline. We let $X_i$ an indicator variable that takes a value of one if the area was in the bottom quartile of population growth (that is, had population growth of 7.08 percent or less) between 1970 and 1990. This regression shows that having been in relative decline reduces productivity, but this effect is dampened slightly for larger cities. This result suggests that population increases may be most advantageous in areas that have already been in decline.

This analysis does not offer a compelling answer as to where agglomeration economies are strongest. We look for differences based on size, compactness, and past decline and are unable to uncover convincing differences. If anything, the table suggests that agglomeration effects are stronger in smaller metropolitan areas, more centralized metropolitan areas, and metropolitan areas that have been in decline. However, all of these measured effects are statistically insignificant and not robust. Until further research yields more precise estimates, these results suggest the difficulty of establishing any clear gains to subsidizing one region or another.

*Congestion Externalities*

We now turn to the impact that metropolitan-area size has on amenities. We will first look at the connection between area population and three direct measures of urban disamenities: commute times, pollution, and crime. We will then consider real wages. In all of these cases we remain concerned that the disamenity is itself influencing urban population. However, since the costs of these disamenities are arguably minor relative to overall income, we are more comfortable looking at the ordinary least squares coefficients. Since the case for national spatial policies depends

on different effects of population on amenities across different cities, our focus will be on whether the slope of population is different for cities that are larger or more centralized.

Regression 4-1 in table 4 examines the connection between average commute time and population. The basic elasticity is 0.12, meaning that as city size doubles, the average commute increases by 8.7 percent, or about two minutes. We also investigate whether this coefficient is larger for cities above the median population in our sample. The interaction is tiny in both economic and statistical terms. In fact, the interaction is sufficiently precisely estimated that we can reject the hypothesis that the elasticity of commute times with respect to population increases or decreases by any significant amount for larger cities.

Regression 4-2 in table 4 considers the interaction between area population and centralization, again using Glaeser and Kahn’s data on the share of employment within five miles of the city center.30 In this case we find a marginally significant interaction. Increasing population has a bigger effect on commute times in denser cities than in cities where the population is more dispersed.

Regression 4-3 looks at the atmospheric concentration of TSP-10 particulates, one of the key measures of air quality at the metropolitan-area level.31 The elasticity of this variable with respect to city size is 0.142, which is statistically significant: bigger cities have slightly worse air. However, we do not find a larger slope for bigger cities. Regression 4-4 adds a variable interacting city size with centralization. We find that city population has a weaker effect on pollution in more centralized places, perhaps because people there are more likely to use public transportation.

Regression 4-5 focuses on crime, another disamenity generally associated with urban size. Glaeser and Bruce Sacerdote provide evidence that although some of this connection reflects the sorting of crime-prone individuals into urban areas, it partly also reflects the tendency of big cities to increase the supply of potential victims and make arrest and conviction more difficult.32 This regression finds only a weak connection between murder and city size, although this has declined substantially over time.33 Regression 4-6 finds no significant association between murder rates and centralization.

### Table 4. Regressions of Urban Disamenity Measures on Metropolitan-Area Population and Centralization Measures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent variable</th>
<th>Log of average commute (minutes) 4-1</th>
<th>Log of concentration of TSP-10 particulates 4-2</th>
<th>Log of murder rate 4-4</th>
<th>Log of real wage 4-8</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Log of population in 2000</td>
<td>0.12 (0.012)</td>
<td>0.142 (0.056)</td>
<td>0.222 (0.146)</td>
<td>0.028 (0.015)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log of population \times population above median in 2000</td>
<td>−0.003 (0.002)</td>
<td>0.001 (0.012)</td>
<td>0.004 (0.018)</td>
<td>0.000 (0.003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centralization(^d)</td>
<td>−0.874 (0.420)</td>
<td>2.065 (2.134)</td>
<td>4.305 (5.476)</td>
<td>0.974 (0.611)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log of population in 2000 \times centralization</td>
<td>0.052 (0.033)</td>
<td>−0.222 (0.156)</td>
<td>−0.309 (0.442)</td>
<td>−0.089 (0.048)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>1.65 (0.137)</td>
<td>2.531 (0.210)</td>
<td>1.945 (0.657)</td>
<td>2.284 (1.134)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of observations</td>
<td>318</td>
<td>248</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>153</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Authors’ regressions.

a. Population, income, and commute time data are from the U.S. Census Bureau, as described in appendix B. Murder rate is from the Federal Bureau of Investigation Uniform Crime Reports, and TSP-10 data are from the Environmental Protection Agency. Units of observation are metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) under the 1999 definitions, using primary rather than consolidated MSAs where applicable and New England county metropolitan areas where applicable. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.

b. Total suspended particulates of less than 10 microns diameter, a standard measure of atmospheric pollution.

c. Computed by adjusting the average nominal wage for the cost of living index from the American Chamber of Commerce Research Association.

d. Percent of employment within 5 miles of the central business district, from Glaeser and Kahn (2004).
Regression 4-2 suggested that increasing population in centralized places has a more unfavorable impact on commute times, and regression 4-4 suggested that increasing population in centralized places has a small negative impact on pollution. The overall lesson for spatial policy is therefore unclear. We attempt to get around this by looking at real wages, which provide a measure of overall amenities. Since population is more likely to respond to the entire basket of amenities than to these individual disamenities, we are more concerned with problems of reverse causality in this regression.

Regression 4-7 investigates the elasticity of real wages with respect to area population. Neither the raw effect nor the interaction with population above the median is statistically significant. The failure to find a robust relationship confirms the spatial equilibrium assumption that agglomeration economies offer no free lunch: high nominal wages are offset by higher prices. The absence of a clear interaction means that there does not appear to be an amenity-based rationale for pushing population toward bigger or smaller cities.

Regression 4-8 finds a statistically significant negative interaction between area population and area centralization. Interpreted literally, this result implies that any negative effects of population on amenities are minimized in more centralized locales. In principle, this finding seems to suggest that pushing population toward more compact and less sprawling places might be welfare-enhancing.

Despite this finding, we have little confidence that either agglomeration or congestion externalities differ significantly across smaller or larger, or denser or less dense, cities. This does not reassure us that the current situation is a Pareto optimum, but it does suggest that it is not obvious which way government policy should deviate from the status quo. For us, this degree of ignorance suggests that explicit spatial policies are as likely to do harm as good.

U.S. Policies toward Places

In this section we turn to a brief empirical evaluation of three major types of policies related to urban growth. The first is transportation policy. America’s most significant place-making policies have been improvements in transportation. Railroads in the nineteenth century and highways in the twentieth both had major impacts on the growth of different areas. Nonetheless, there is little evidence to suggest that the place-making capacities of transportation are actually working in a desirable way. As
a result, transportation should be judged on its ability to reduce transport costs and not on its ability to remake the urban landscape. The second type of policy consists of large-scale interventions that had the direct goal of strengthening particular places. In the twentieth century, such interventions included urban renewal and the Appalachian Regional Commission. We find no clear effects of these policies, but this is unsurprising, because they involved small amounts of money relative to the sizes of the areas involved. The third type of policy is typified by the enterprise zones of the 1980s and 1990s, which provided much greater resources to much smaller areas. These policies do seem to have had an impact, but the costs per new job are extremely high.

**Transportation and Place Making**

American governments have been in the business of subsidizing transportation since the dawn of the Republic. Even before the Revolution, George Washington had contemplated a canal that would connect the Potomac River to the Ohio River valley and the western states. After the Revolution, Washington’s enormous prestige enabled him to get the support of the Maryland and Virginia legislatures to charter the Potomac Company. Washington served as its president. The states invested in the company, granted it a perpetual monopoly on water traffic along the Potomac, and gave it considerable powers to acquire land. Even with this support, the Potomac Canal was unable to fulfill its mission, and it collapsed in the mid-1820s. Construction along the route turned out to be enormously difficult, and the limited willingness of credit markets in 1800 to trust private companies with vast sums made it hard for any firm to raise sufficient finances to pay for such an expensive undertaking. The Potomac Company was not a complete failure, but it did not produce America’s great waterway to the west.

That waterway would be created by an even more extensive governmental investment in transportation infrastructure. It seemed obvious to DeWitt Clinton, New York City’s mayor during most of 1803–15, that connecting the country’s greatest seaport with the Great Lakes would yield enormous returns. Clinton became one of the canal’s greatest proponents, and when he was elected governor of New York State in 1817, he quickly began construction. To many contemporary observers, a New York canal looked no wiser than one in Virginia, and the idea was dubbed “Clinton’s Folly.” Yet with massive government spending and prodigious feats of

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engineering, Clinton managed to construct a canal that connected the Hudson River to Lake Erie.

The Erie Canal was an enormous success by any measure. Its toll revenues readily covered its costs, and, like the earlier success of the Bridgewater Canal in Manchester, England, it set off a national craze for canal building that changed the face of America. In 1816 it cost 30 cents to move a ton of goods a mile by wagon overland. At that price, moving goods fifteen miles overland cost the same as moving them across the Atlantic. The canal reduced the cost of transport by more than two-thirds, to less than 10 cents per ton-mile.

Urban economics certainly suggests that transportation infrastructure could have a major impact on urban growth. Some forms of transportation, like a port or a rail yard, significantly increase the productivity of adjacent land and therefore attract new businesses. Others, however, like the highway system, reduce the gains from clustering and hence disperse population. It is hard to accurately estimate the impact of the canals of the early nineteenth century on the economic development of different urban areas. It is occasionally claimed that the Erie Canal was critical to New York City’s rise, but New York was already America’s largest port before the canal, and Glaeser shows that it did not accelerate the city’s growth.36

However, the growth of Syracuse, Rochester, Buffal0, and other cities of upstate New York was at least temporally connected with the canal. These cities are all close to the canal and grew as mercantile cities exploiting that proximity. Yet although individual histories certainly attest to the importance of canals in promoting urban growth, it is hard to tease out the impact of the Erie Canal statistically. For example, a regression of the logarithm of population growth for New York State counties between 1820 and 1840 on the logarithm of initial population and a dummy variable indicating whether the county contains or abuts the canal yields the following estimates:

\[
\log \left( \frac{\text{population}_{1840}}{\text{population}_{1820}} \right) = -\frac{3.4}{(0.7)} \cdot \text{Erie Canal} - \frac{0.08}{(0.12)} \cdot \text{Erie Canal} + \frac{0.28}{(0.07)} \cdot \log (\text{population}_{1820})
\]

36. Glaeser (2005). An easier case can be made that Chicago’s success depended on artificial waterways. Its growth was set off by a boom anticipating the completion of the Illinois and Michigan Canal, which connected the Great Lakes to the Mississippi. With that canal, the city of Chicago became the linchpin of a system of waterborne transportation that stretched from New York to New Orleans.
The counties along the Erie Canal saw remarkable growth during this period, but there was remarkable growth everywhere—especially in those places that started at higher densities. The canal was surely important for the development of many places, but this regression raises questions about how to appropriately estimate its impact on regional growth.

By contrast, the growth of the railroads tends to be quite closely connected with different forms of local development. Michael Haines and Robert Margo show that areas that added rail transportation in the 1850s were much more likely to urbanize.37 Although it would be hard to claim any sort of causality from such regressions, the correlations are striking.

Table 5 reports population growth regressions for the nineteenth-century United States using rail data from Lee Craig, Raymond Palmquist, and Thomas Weiss.38 We construct a dummy variable indicating whether a county was accessible by rail in 1850 and then look at population growth both in the 1850s and for the rest of the century. Regression 5-1 looks at population growth in the 1850s and access to rail in 1850. We control for the logarithm of initial population, proximity to the ocean, and, as a proxy for human capital, the presence of Congregationalists in 1850.39 There is a strong positive relationship between access to rail in 1850 and population growth in the ensuing decade: on average, those counties with access grew by more than 14 percent more than those without. Regression 5-2 looks at population growth over the entire 1850–1900 period and again finds a strong positive effect of rail access in 1850 on subsequent growth.

The Craig, Palmquist, and Weiss data also provide information on access to waterways in 1850, but for a smaller set of counties. We also find a significant effect for this variable for the 1850s: counties with access to water grew by 0.12 log point more, on average, than counties without access (results not reported).

It is easy to argue with these regressions. After all, rail yards were not randomly strewn throughout the United States, but rather were located in places considered to have the brightest economic future. Still, plenty of supporting evidence suggests that railroads were important for urban success. After all, civic boosters worked extremely hard to get rail lines to come through their towns. This would hardly have made sense if rail were not expected to have an impact. Moreover, case studies of most

38. Craig, Palmquist, and Weiss (1998). The data were kindly provided by Robert Margo.
### Table 5. Historical Regressions of Population and Income Growth on Metropolitan-Area Transportation Measures and Controls

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Independent variable</td>
<td>5-1</td>
<td>5-2</td>
<td>5-3</td>
<td>5-4</td>
<td>5-5</td>
<td>5-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log of initial population</td>
<td>-0.335</td>
<td>-0.629</td>
<td>-0.101</td>
<td>-0.038</td>
<td>-0.007</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.011)</td>
<td>(0.017)</td>
<td>(0.023)</td>
<td>(0.010)</td>
<td>(0.007)</td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distance in miles to ocean or Gulf of Mexico</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.037</td>
<td>-0.021</td>
<td>-0.013</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.003)</td>
<td>(0.005)</td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dummy for county accessible by rail in 1850</td>
<td>0.144</td>
<td>0.203</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.023)</td>
<td>(0.036)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congregationalists per capita in 1850</td>
<td>0.925</td>
<td>0.96</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.181)</td>
<td>(0.286)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log of new miles of highway, 1960–90</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.111</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.039</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.026)</td>
<td>(0.009)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dummy for top-50 airport</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.046</td>
<td>0.025</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.021)</td>
<td>(0.011)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of population with college degree in 1990</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.337</td>
<td>0.097</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.088)</td>
<td>(0.047)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>3.154</td>
<td>6.431</td>
<td>1.309</td>
<td>2.412</td>
<td>0.136</td>
<td>0.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.100)</td>
<td>(0.158)</td>
<td>(0.245)</td>
<td>(0.109)</td>
<td>(0.086)</td>
<td>(0.046)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unit of observation</td>
<td>Counties</td>
<td>Counties</td>
<td>MSAs</td>
<td>MSAs</td>
<td>MSAs</td>
<td>MSAs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of observations</td>
<td>1,517</td>
<td>1,517</td>
<td>205</td>
<td>205</td>
<td>318</td>
<td>318</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R²</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td>0.57</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Authors’ regressions.

a. Metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) are under the 1999 definitions, using primary rather than consolidated MSAs where applicable and New England county metropolitan areas where applicable. Population, income, and Congregationalists data are from the U.S. Census Bureau, as described in appendix B. Data on proximity to rail transportation are from Craig, Palmquist, and Weiss (1998). Distance to ocean or Gulf is from Rappaport and Sachs (2003) and is the distance from the closest county in the MSA. Highway data are from Baum-Snow (2007). Airport data are from Bureau of Transportation Statistics (1996). Standard errors are in parentheses.
large American cities that grew rapidly in the nineteenth century, from Boston to Los Angeles, argue that rail played an important role in that growth.

In the nineteenth century, population growth accompanied rail access, and railroads seem to have particularly encouraged the growth of big cities. Initially, people and firms clustered around rail yards, as exemplified by Chicago’s stockyards, to save transport costs. Later, intraurban railroads enabled cities to expand by facilitating commuting from “streetcar suburbs.” In the twentieth century, further declines in transportation costs accelerated the process of urban decentralization. Nathaniel Baum-Snow compellingly shows that suburbanization proceeded more rapidly in those cities that had more highway development. He addresses the problems of reverse causality using an early highway plan developed for national security purposes.

Highway development also seems to have been strongly associated with the growth of metropolitan areas as a whole. Gilles Duranton and Matthew Turner show a striking connection between highways and urban growth in the United States over the last thirty years. They use a number of different instruments, including the security-based highway plan used by Baum-Snow, to handle the issue of reverse causality. The raw correlations are impressive.

Regressions 5-3 and 5-4 in table 5 follow Duranton and Turner in reporting correlations between population and income growth, respectively, from 1960 to 1990 and highway mileage built during the same era. The first of these regressions shows the relationship between population growth and highway construction, controlling for initial population, proximity to the coast, and initial share of the population with a college degree. The elasticity of population growth with respect to new highway mileage is 0.11, and the coefficient has a $t$ statistic of 4.3. Regression 5-4 reports the elasticity of growth in income per capita with respect to the same variables from 1960 to 1990. In this case the elasticity is 0.039 and the $t$ statistic is again over 4. The extent to which we can be sure that highways were causing growth, rather than vice versa, depends on the validity of the instruments of Baum-Snow and Duranton and Turner, such as the initial highway plan based on national security needs. Yet it is certainly true that highways and growth move together quite closely.

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More generally, the decline in transportation costs has been associated with a host of changes in urban form. Figure 8 documents the 90 percent reduction in the cost of moving a ton of goods one mile by rail, and figure 9 the parallel explosion of highway transport. These two developments mean that whereas it was enormously costly to move goods over space in 1900, transporting goods had become almost free 100 years later. Glaeser and Janet Kohlhase argue that this change has led to the rise of consumer cities, which are located in places where people want to live, rather than producer cities, which are located in places where firms have innate productive advantages due to waterways or coal mines. Glaeser and Giacomo Ponzetto go a step further and argue that declining transport costs may have contributed to the decline of goods-producing cities like Detroit but boosted the growth of idea-producing cities like Boston and New York. Their argument is that globalization has increased

the returns to skill and that workers become skilled by locating around skilled people in cities that are rich in human capital.

Richard Green argues that airports have played the same role in promoting urban growth in the last fifteen years that railroads and highways did in the past. His principal piece of evidence is that places that have more airline boardings per capita have grown faster. Although this fact could represent the positive impact of access to airports, it could also reflect consumer amenities: places that are attractive for people to visit should also be attractive places for people to live. One way to check whether the connection between airplane boardings and growth reflects access or consumer amenities is to replace the number of boardings per capita with an indicator variable for whether a metropolitan area has a major airport. We constructed a dummy variable for having a major airport, with “major” defined as one of the fifty airports in the country with the most flights per day. Regressions 5-5 and 5-6 in table 5 show that hav-

ing a major airport did have a positive but modest effect on population and income growth in the 1990s.

Although new transport technologies such as airports still seem to matter for urban growth, there is little evidence to suggest that investments in older technologies such as rail have any impact on urban success today. For example, Glaeser and Jesse Shapiro find that places with more public transit usage grew less in the 1990s than those with less usage. This certainly casts some doubt on the view of public transportation advocates that new rail systems have the same potential to foster growth in the twenty-first century that they had in the nineteenth.

There is no question that new transportation infrastructure has been able to reduce the cost of moving people across space. This suggests that local leaders who lobby for new forms of transportation spending are not being foolish. However, it is less clear how transportation’s ability to make places should influence the evaluation of national transportation projects. We turn to that issue next.

**Place and the Evaluation of Transportation Investment**

When discussing the benefits of transportation investments, it is typical for public officials to emphasize the ways in which a new highway or rail line could turn their area around economically. The previous discussion has suggested that these advocates have been right in some cases. Yet the ability of transportation to make or break cities does not necessarily change the rules by which transportation investment should be evaluated.

Transportation infrastructure can be seen both as nontraded productive capital and as a consumer amenity that enters directly into the utility function. In that case:

**Proposition 3:** In a social optimum, the social benefits of transportation spending within an area, 

\[
N_i \frac{U_i [Y_i, H_i, \theta_i (N_i), t]}{U_i [Y_i, H_i, \theta_i (N_i), t]} + A_i (N_i) K'_{s_i} (t_i) \frac{\partial F_i [K_{s_i} (t_i), N_i, - L_i]}{\partial K_{s_i} (t_i)},
\]

are set equal to the marginal cost of that spending. In a competitive equilibrium, where marginal utility of income is constant across space, the social benefit of transport spending in area \(i\) exceeds

\[
N_i \frac{U_i [Y_i, H_i, \theta_i (N_i), t]}{U_i [Y_i, H_i, \theta_i (N_i), t]} + A_i (N_i) K'_{s_i} (t_i) \frac{\partial F_i [K_{s_i} (t_i), N_i, - L_i]}{\partial K_{s_i} (t_i)},
\]

if and only if

47. Glaeser and Shapiro (2003).
This proposition implies that at the social optimum, transportation spending should be evaluated according to its direct effect on consumer welfare and firm productivity, not according to its place-making potential. This result reflects the fact that in a social optimum, population is directly optimized across space. In a competitive equilibrium there can be place-making benefits from transportation, but these benefits result only if the externalities are higher in particular locales. Unsurprisingly, the ability of transportation to move people across space has value only if moving people across space is desirable.

The previous section gave only a little guidance about where those externalities might be higher. There may be productivity gains from moving people to richer areas, and the negative externalities of population growth might be lower in places that are already denser, but these effects are weak. They do, however, provide a benchmark for thinking about current transportation spending. Should transportation be subsidized disproportionately in rich, dense areas?

Table 6 reports, for several different modes of transport, the correlations between transport spending per capita and measures of agglomeration—population size and population density—and income. Highways are the dominant recipient of federal aid to transportation. The table shows federal transfers for highways both with and without the gasoline tax payments that the states make to the national transportation trust fund. The results suggest that the United States subsidizes long-distance transportation in lower-density and lower-income places, which is exactly the opposite of the model’s predictions. Transportation policy seems to be working against, rather than toward, taking advantage of agglomeration economies. Environmental externalities probably also push toward higher-density development that involves driving over shorter distances.48

\[ N\frac{\partial}{\partial t} \left[ \frac{U_s[Y, H, \theta_s(N), t]}{U_s[Y, H, \theta_s(N), t]} + \frac{A'(N)}{N, A(N)} \frac{A(N)}{N} F[K_s(t), N, -L] \right] + \sum_j \frac{\partial N_j}{\partial t} \left[ \frac{U_s[Y, H, \theta_s(N), t]}{U_s[Y, H, \theta_s(N), t]} + \frac{A'(N)}{N, A(N)} \frac{A(N)}{N} F[K_s(t), N, -L] \right]. \]

This proposition implies that at the social optimum, transportation spending should be evaluated according to its direct effect on consumer welfare and firm productivity, not according to its place-making potential. This result reflects the fact that in a social optimum, population is directly optimized across space. In a competitive equilibrium there can be place-making benefits from transportation, but these benefits result only if the externalities are higher in particular locales. Unsurprisingly, the ability of transportation to move people across space has value only if moving people across space is desirable.

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Table 6 reports, for several different modes of transport, the correlations between transport spending per capita and measures of agglomeration—population size and population density—and income. Highways are the dominant recipient of federal aid to transportation. The table shows federal transfers for highways both with and without the gasoline tax payments that the states make to the national transportation trust fund. The results suggest that the United States subsidizes long-distance transportation in lower-density and lower-income places, which is exactly the opposite of the model’s predictions. Transportation policy seems to be working against, rather than toward, taking advantage of agglomeration economies. Environmental externalities probably also push toward higher-density development that involves driving over shorter distances.48

48. The full environmental calculus is quite complex and involves the trade-off between more air pollution in densely settled areas and less pollution per square mile over a larger area.
Of course, if the direct benefits from transportation spending are greater in poorer, low-density areas, then current spending patterns make sense. Indeed, the major point of this section is that transportation needs to be evaluated according to its impact on travel costs, and nothing we have said suggests that the current distribution of highway spending fails to meet this criterion. However, if one includes the place-making effects of transportation when evaluating its benefits, then current spending does not appear to be targeting the high-income, high-density areas where the agglomeration effects are likely to be strongest.

Urban Renewal, the Appalachian Regional Commission, and Empowerment Zones

Americans have rarely embraced a wholesale regional policy dedicated toward reinvigorating declining regions. Despite regular calls from mayors and even promises from presidential candidates, only in a few instances has the U.S. government explicitly embraced policies meant to turn around declining areas. In this the United States stands in stark contrast to many European countries, which have regularly invested heavily in their poorer regions since before the formation of the European Union. For example, Italy has a long-standing policy of using tax incentives to encourage investment in its south. Such policies have been a particularly important activity for the European Union, which has regularly redistributed funds from wealthy areas to poor ones.
The supporters of place-based policies have generally argued for such policies on the basis of two related arguments. The first is purely egalitarian: place-based support for poor places may create more economic opportunity for poorer people. The second invokes some market failure that is causing a particular place to underperform. For example, it is sometimes alleged that the need for coordinated investments makes it impossible for private firms on their own to turn a declining area around. In the framework of the model, this can be understood as claiming that agglomeration economies are particularly strong for such places. Yet our empirical work in the previous section found little evidence to support that claim.

Against these arguments, economists argue that place-based policies are unlikely to be of material help to poor people. Place-based policies that aim to turn a declining region around are often thought to be futile, since the forces of urban change are quite powerful. Place-based policies that throw enough resources at a small enough community may indeed be able to improve the quality of that place, but it is not obvious that the poorer residents of that community will benefit. Some community-based policies may just lead employers to come to the area and hire new migrants. Others may make the community a more attractive place for outsiders to live and thus increase rental costs for longer-term residents. In general, the spatial equilibrium model leads economists to think that place-based improvements increase the value of property, which may be a good thing for local homeowners and landlords, but may not be so desirable for renters.

Finally, economists have voiced a basic skepticism about the desire to induce poor people to stay in poor areas. Place-based policies may boost a poor area, but they may also discourage poor people from leaving that area for areas where opportunities may be greater. The rationale for spending federal dollars to try to encourage less advantaged people to stay in economically weak places is itself extremely weak. For example, it is not clear why the federal government spent over $100 billion after Hurricane Katrina to bring people back to New Orleans, a city that was hardly a beacon of economic opportunity before the storm.

In U.S. history the major instances of regional policy have been the Appalachian Regional Commission (ARC), which targeted development of a large area in the eastern United States; the enterprise zones and Empowerment Zones of the 1980s and 1990s, which offered tax breaks to firms locating in poorer communities; and policies aimed at urban renewal. The last class of policies was primarily oriented toward housing and construction, and so we will consider them in the next section. We turn first to the ARC.
The Appalachian Experience

In 1963 Harry Caudill published Night Comes to the Cumberlands, which described the rural poverty of the Cumberland Plateau of eastern Kentucky. Caudill’s book brought national attention to Appalachia and suggested that the region’s problems were the fault of northern coal investors who had taken the wealth out of the ground and then invested their returns elsewhere. Needless to say, this argument works better as rhetoric than as sound economic analysis—the policy implications of the spatial equilibrium model are not changed if rentiers live outside the regions where they receive their rents.

Even before Caudill’s book, the governors of several Appalachian states had started a coordinated effort to obtain federal assistance, and President John Kennedy responded in 1963 by forming the Appalachian Regional Commission. The ARC was originally founded to seek legislation to provide assistance for the region. In 1965 Congress turned the ARC into a federal agency that would distribute funds among the Appalachian counties, to be used for a variety of local projects intended to enhance economic vitality. Transportation accounted for a particularly large share of this funding, so the ARC should be seen as a hybrid between a pure transportation program and a local economic development program.

The political definition of Appalachia was county-based, and the area covered by the ARC stretched from Mississippi to New York. The inclusion of so many states helped to create a legislative coalition for the policy, but it inevitably meant that funding per acre was modest. In the first thirty years after it was founded, the ARC disbursed $13 billion. Today the ARC receives much less funding, about $90 million a year.

Did the billions spent on the ARC have a demonstrable effect on Appalachian success? Andrew Isserman and Terance Rephann address this question by comparing income and population growth for a matched sample of Appalachian and non-Appalachian counties. They use a matching algorithm to connect counties that were in the Appalachian region with other areas. The study specifically excluded counties that were close to Appalachia as possible matches because of fears of contamination from the ARC. As a result, Allegheny County, Pennsylvania, was matched with Erie County, New York, which contains Buffalo, and Catoosa County, Georgia, was matched with Warren County, in southwestern Ohio.

Comparing the growth experiences of the two samples, the authors find that income in the Appalachian counties grew by 5 percent more than in their comparison counties between 1969 and 1991, and income per capita 17 percent more. Their bottom line is quite remarkable: they find that $13 billion in Appalachian expenditure yielded $8.4 billion of income in one year alone. This appears to be a quite positive demonstration of the efficacy of regional policy.

Since Isserman and Rephann’s methods are sufficiently different from those used in most economic analyses, we repeat their exercise using a more standard regression methodology. Our approach is to include all counties in any state that was partly included in the ARC, except those counties within 90 kilometers (56 miles) of the coast. We then use a dummy variable to identify those counties covered by the ARC. We are thus comparing Appalachian counties with reasonably comparable counties in the same region. We examine both income growth and population growth. We include only the initial values as controls, but the results are not sensitive to including other controls.

Table 7 presents our results. The first regression finds that between 1970 and 1980, being part of the ARC coverage area was associated with 0.037 log point faster population growth—evidence of a treatment effect on population during this first decade. Between 1970 and 2000, however (the second regression), the dummy variable for location in the ARC area has a coefficient of −0.002, which is small and statistically insignificant.

### Table 7. Regressions Estimating Impact of the Appalachian Regional Commission

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent variable</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dummy for county in ARC coverage area</td>
<td>0.037</td>
<td>−0.002</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>−0.029</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.008)</td>
<td>(0.020)</td>
<td>(0.005)</td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log of initial population</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.004)</td>
<td>(0.010)</td>
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<td>Log of initial income per capita</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>−0.406</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>(0.016)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>Constant</td>
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<td>5.172</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>(0.099)</td>
<td>(0.082)</td>
<td>(0.123)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted $R^2$</td>
<td>0.051</td>
<td>0.015</td>
<td>0.512</td>
<td>0.420</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Authors’ regressions.

a. Units of observation (N = 898) are counties. Income and population data are from the U.S. Census Bureau, as described in appendix B. Standard errors are in parentheses.
The remaining two regressions report the relationship between inclusion in the ARC and growth in income per capita. We find an insignificant positive effect in the 1970s, which turns negative over the longer period. One possible interpretation of these results is that although the ARC was able to boost population growth slightly during the period in which it was best funded, the effect soon disappeared.

Given that Issermann and Rephann found quite different results, we do not claim to have proved that the ARC had no effect. Indeed, the standard errors on our coefficients are sufficiently large that we cannot rule out large positive effects of the program, at least relative to its modest cost. A more supportable conclusion is that it is unlikely that the effects of a $13 billion program spread over a giant swath of America over three decades can be accurately evaluated. Far too many things were affecting regional growth at the same time for a relatively modest government program to have had clear positive effects. Powerful economic forces are driving people to the Sunbelt and to coastal cities. Current spending on the ARC is no more than the cost of a few large Manhattan buildings. Could such a program really have changed the course of a region considerably larger than California? The ARC may or may not be cost effective, but there is little chance that its effectiveness will ever be evident in the data.

**Enterprise and Empowerment Zones**

We now turn to a much more targeted approach: enterprise zones. As Leslie Papke summarizes, enterprise zones were pioneered in the United Kingdom by Margaret Thatcher’s government in 1981.\(^\text{52}\) There were originally eleven such zones, but the number later increased to twenty-five. The British zones were particularly oriented toward industrial development. Firms that located in the zones were exempted from local property taxes and could deduct all spending on industrial buildings from corporate income tax. This tax relief was accompanied by significant public sector investment in the area.

Although plenty of economic activity occurred in the enterprise zones, evaluations of the zones were largely negative. Roger Tym suggests that most of the jobs in these zones did not represent new activity but simply a reallocation within the metropolitan area.\(^\text{53}\) John Schwarz and Thomas Volgy estimate a cost per job created of $67,000 during the 1980s, which

\(^\text{52}\) Papke (1994)
would be more than $125,000 in 2007 dollars. Rodney Erickson and Paul Syms find a moderate increase in land prices within the enterprise zones.

In the United States the enterprise zone experience begins with state enterprise zones in the 1980s. Papke reports that thirty-seven states had created such zones by the early 1990s. Unlike the British zones, the American enterprise zones were particularly oriented toward revitalization of urban neighborhoods and were, in some sense, the descendants of the urban renewal projects described below. The zones were often quite small—the median zone had 4,500 residents—and they were quite poor.

Papke’s own evaluation focused on the Indiana enterprise zone system, which exempted businesses in the zones from property taxes and taxes on income from inside the zone. There was also a tax credit for hiring workers who lived within the zone and an income tax credit for zone residents. Despite these considerable tax incentives, and despite an increase in business inventories within the zones, Papke finds that the zones actually lost population and income relative to nonzone areas. Certainly, this should not be interpreted as a true negative treatment effect of zones, but rather as evidence that the Indiana zones were relatively ineffective.

In the 1990s the federal government began its own system of areas called Empowerment Zones, administered by the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). There were six original Empowerment Zones; two more were added later. Firms in the zones received employment tax credits and regulatory waivers. There were also block grants and spending on infrastructure. The overall cost of the program was slightly more than $3 billion.

Busso and Kline undertake a particularly careful analysis of the federal zones’ impact. They compare the zones with similar areas chosen from among communities that also applied to HUD to receive Empowerment Zone support. Busso and Kline use a propensity score method to match these communities appropriately and find strong positive results. Although the populations of the zones did not increase, the poverty rate fell by an average of 5 percentage points and the unemployment rate by an average of 4 percentage points in these communities relative to comparable outside areas. Housing prices increased by 0.22 log point and rents by 0.077 log point. There was no appreciable increase in earnings.

54. Schwarz and Volgy (1988)
55. Erickson and Syms (1986).
On one level these results seem much more promising than Papke’s findings, but there are still reasons to be skeptical. First, the authors estimate that a program costing more than $3 billion created 27,000 jobs between 1995 and 2000. This comes to more than $100,000 per job in current dollars, which seems an expensive way to boost employment. The figure of 27,000 jobs refers to the employment increase in 2000. If 27,000 extra jobs were created in every year, then each job-year would have cost $20,000. The $3 billion figure includes substantial private money, however, so it is not clear whether this should be counted as an actual cost. The answer depends on whether this money reaped private returns and whether it was induced by other federal programs, such as the Community Reinvestment Act. Nevertheless, the true cost per year is probably below the $100,000 number.

For already-employed workers in Empowerment Zones who were renters, earnings did not increase, but rents did. Perhaps other amenities rose in the Empowerment Zones, but for this group the zones represent a pure financial loss.

Busso and Kline themselves suggest that the program generated a $1.1 billion increase in output and a $1.2 billion increase in the value of homes and rental properties. These two estimates should not be added, since the housing values are presumably capturing the value of having access to a more successful labor market. Indeed, one view is that the closeness of these figures reflects the fact that both are capturing the same gains. However, in the case of housing values these gains would omit benefits to previous residents who are not changing their behavior due to the program. Nevertheless, these gains do seem to be substantially less than the cost of the program.

Overall, the evidence on enterprise zones is hardly overwhelming. The British evidence shows positive effects, but the price per job created is extremely high. The Indiana evidence shows essentially no effects on key social outcomes. The evidence on federal Empowerment Zones shows significant employment gains from the programs, but the price per job is again extremely high. It is hard to see an empirical case for zone-based policy.

It is harder still to evaluate more amorphous government policies such as those embodied in the Community Reinvestment Act of 1977 (CRA). This act required financial institutions to invest in businesses in poor areas as well as rich areas and to make credit available to poorer people. It can be argued that economic efficiency would be better served by allowing banks to focus on lending to firms that are most likely to be most productive rather than firms that have a particular geographic locale. However, one
could also argue that the CRA served equity purposes and had only a small negative effect on overall financial efficiency. Without more thorough evaluation—and it would be hard to imagine how to produce such an evaluation—it is difficult to come to any strong conclusions about the CRA.

An alternative way of understanding enterprise zones and certain other place-based policies is as a means of reducing taxes on nontraded business inputs such as real estate. Optimal taxation theory suggests that it makes sense to have lower tax rates in areas where these inputs are more elastic. Enterprise zones can be justified if the supply of the nontraded output is more elastic in depressed areas. However, we know of no evidence that this is the case.

Another interpretation of enterprise zones is as an indirect means of freeing local businesses from paying for social services for poor residents of their community. If one thinks of those social services as a national responsibility whose costs must be borne by someone, then making the residents of one community pay disproportionately for those services will be distortionary. These taxes will induce lower input demand in that area, which will lead to too little production there relative to the first-best outcome. A similar conclusion results if one taxes the rich in a community to pay for services to the poor in that community. Such a policy will lead the rich to live elsewhere, which is also a distortion relative to the first-best. Reducing the added governmental costs of locating near poor people may reduce the tax-created distortions that induce firms and people to leave poor places.

To sum up, the combination of theory and evidence leads us to be suspicious of local economic policies that are meant to increase production in a particular area, whether that area is depressed or booming. Empirically, these policies seem to be either extremely expensive or ineffective. Theoretically, the case for these policies depends either on extra agglomeration economies in depressed areas or on a particularly high elasticity of demand for inputs in those areas. These conditions may exist, or they may not. There is, however, a case for reconsidering policies that require local businesses and workers to pay for social services for the local poor in a way that essentially amounts to redistribution.

**U.S. Housing Policies as Place-Making Policies**

As in the case of transportation policy, one could have a housing policy without any particular spatial objective. It is not necessary for the cabinet secretary who oversees housing to also supervise urban development. Indeed, the earliest federal forays into the housing market during the
Great Depression, the Reconstruction Finance Corporation and the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, were not intended to reinvigorate any particular locale. More modern interventions, such as Section 8 vouchers and the low-income housing tax credit, are similarly aimed mainly at making housing cheaper, not at making places more economically vibrant.

**Urban Renewal**

Starting in the 1940s, there has been an increasing tendency to link housing policy and urban revitalization. In 1941 the National Association of Real Estate Brokers advanced a scheme whereby the government would use its powers of eminent domain to assemble urban parcels and then subsidize private development of that land.58 The Harvard economist Alvin Hansen endorsed a similar scheme, and individual cities, such as New York, increasingly subsidized urban renewal efforts. After a great deal of legislative wrangling, in which “Mr. Republican,” Senator Robert Taft of Ohio, strongly supported public housing against the opposition of his fellow Republican, Wisconsin Senator Joseph McCarthy, Congress passed the Housing Act of 1949. Title I of that act brought the federal government into the business of urban renewal.

The 1949 housing act authorized $1 billion in loans to cities for them to acquire blighted land and $100 million a year in outright grants for such purchases. In principle, the cities were to pay one-third of the purchase price, but the contribution could be made in the form of new public facilities.59 The sites would then be given to private developers to build new housing or commercial buildings. The Housing Act of 1954 broadened the program to allow funds to be used for renovation and for Federal Housing Administration mortgages for renewal projects.

Several rationales have been given for urban renewal. The intellectual roots of the slum clearance movement go back to the Progressive Era, when reformers believed that the poor conditions and high densities of poor neighborhoods spread disease and fomented crime. A related, externality-based argument is that blighted areas create aesthetic externalities for neighbors. Amy Schwartz and coauthors find some evidence for this view:60 neighboring housing prices seem to go up when dilapidated housing is replaced with a new housing project.

Another argument for urban renewal is that private developers may be unable to assemble sufficiently large land parcels for major projects

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60. Schwartz and others (2005).
because of the hold-up problem: any individual landowner’s part of the area is indispensable to the project, so all of the former landowners will try to extract the project’s entire surplus. Of course, this argument is really a justification for the use of eminent domain and provides no rationale for subsidizing private developers. A policy intended to solve hold-up problems would presumably have developers pay market rates for land assembled through the use of eminent domain.

In the 1950s and 1960s, urban renewal was increasingly also seen as a tool for revitalizing cities. There are two ways of understanding how subsidizing housing might, in principle, help declining cities. The number of people in an area is generally proportional to the number of homes there. Subsidizing new housing is one way of increasing the population of an area to take advantage of agglomeration economies. A slightly different view is that better housing might attract residents with more human capital, who will then generate positive externalities in the workforce. In this case housing policy becomes a human capital policy, as discussed in the next section. However, there are also good reasons for skepticism about these arguments. A key distinguishing characteristic of declining cities is that they have an abundance of housing relative to demand. Many of these cities have large numbers of vacant homes, making it hard to see how building more housing is likely to improve the situation. Moreover, in many cases subsidized housing destroyed large numbers of units, so the overall population of the area did not increase.

We are not aware of any comprehensive data that measure total federal spending on urban renewal in the 1950s and 1960s. Since aid to cities often came from many different sources, there is no unified data source for such funding. Using the limited data that John Staples assembled on urban renewal for twenty-one cities, table 8 examines whether any correlation exists between that spending and urban success. The regression reported in the first column examines the correlation between urban renewal spending per capita and population growth across these twenty-one cities during the 1960s. The point estimate is positive but statistically insignificant and small. The second regression investigates the correlation between this spending and growth in income per capita. Again the coefficient is tiny and not statistically distinguishable from zero.

These results cannot say whether the benefits of urban renewal outweighed its costs, only that there was no statistically significant surge in

those cities that received more urban renewal funding. As with the ARC, however, these interventions were modest relative to the population covered; they were also modest relative to the other forces driving urban change. Such small-scale interventions are unlikely to ever yield statistically robust results, making proper cost-benefit evaluation essentially impossible. At best, one can say only that urban renewal does not seem to have turned places around, but that is perhaps sufficient to reject the strongest claims of the early urban renewal advocates.

**The Model Cities Program**

During the twenty years that followed the 1949 housing act, the primary opposition to urban renewal did not come from economists questioning the value of spending to build new houses in places with low demand. The loudest cries came from community activists who protested the destruction of older neighborhoods. The writer and civil rights activist James Baldwin famously referred to urban renewal as “negro removal.” By the mid-1960s there was a growing consensus that urban renewal created social, or at least political, costs that outweighed its benefits.

In response to these outrages, Congress in 1966 passed the Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan Development Act, which established the Model Cities Program as part of the War on Poverty. This program still aimed to improve urban areas through new housing and commercial development, but it embraced community participation and the rehabilitation of existing neighborhoods. In the first round of the program, 193 cities applied to HUD to be included. There was no uniform model city plan; rather, the cities themselves offered detailed plans for using Model Cities funds. HUD then selected seventy-five model cities using an “intricate selection process.”

Political pressure led eventually to an expansion to include 150 cities, which meant a reduction in the funding available per city.

At its height, the program was supposed to spend more than $500 million a year. Administrative difficulties, however, often meant that actual funding was significantly less. The more holistic nature of the plans developed under Model Cities made them a bridge between the housing-based urban renewal projects of the 1950s and the Empowerment Zones of the 1990s, discussed above.

The Model Cities Program was thus another place-based program that offered aid to particular cities in the hopes of reviving their fortunes. It was essentially a transfer from taxpayers nationwide to the governments of par-

ticular places. The individual projects are so varied that it is impossible to say anything categorical about them. We will only attempt to see whether cities that were included in the program achieved greater economic success than cities that were left out. We consider only those cities that won funding in the more selective and potentially more generous first round. Since HUD did not engage in random assignment, this is not a natural experiment.

The third regression reported in table 8 shows the correlation between Model Cities status and population growth between 1970 and 2000. The coefficient is negative and insignificant. The fourth regression considers the relationship between Model Cities status and growth of income per capita, and again the coefficient is insignificant. In results not reported here, we also found an insignificant relationship with housing prices, and we found similar results when we focused only on the 1970s, when the program was active.

Urban renewal and Model Cities thus do not seem to be significantly related to urban success, but this finding can lead to two very different conclusions. One view is that these programs could have had important results if they had been better funded. A second view is that these programs were

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent variable</th>
<th>Growth from 1960 to 1970</th>
<th>Growth from 1970 to 2000</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>In population</td>
<td>In income per capita</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban renewal spending per capita (dollars)</td>
<td>0.0022</td>
<td>0.0004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dummy for Model Cities participant</td>
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<td>(0.051)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log of initial population</td>
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<td>(0.051)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log of initial income per capita</td>
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<tr>
<td>Adjusted $R^2$</td>
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<td>0.45</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Authors’ regressions.

a. Units of observation are metropolitan statistical areas under the 1999 definitions (primary rather than consolidated MSAs where applicable, New England county metropolitan areas where applicable). Income and population data are from the U.S. Census Bureau, as described in appendix B. Urban renewal spending per capita is from Staples (1970).
never going to achieve meaningful results. Many commentators, such as
the political scientist Edward Banfield, have embraced the latter view, but
our statistical results certainly cannot distinguish between the two inter-
pretations. Perhaps the only thing we can say is that our statistics do not yield
any positive evidence supporting the benefits of these federal attempts at
place making.

**Housing Supply and Urban Growth**

Past place-making forays into the housing market have focused pri-
marily on generating new building in places where private demand is low.
The theoretical grounds for such policies seem weak, and empirically
there is little evidence that they were successful. However, this does not
imply that there is no role for the federal government in housing and urban
development. Over the past forty years, many localities have become
much more stringent in their restrictions on land use. These restrictions
may be having a major impact on where and how America grows. If
localities determine local supply conditions in ways that may benefit their
own voters, but that do not maximize national welfare, then there may be a
role for national policy toward land use.

The first analytical step in making the case for national involvement
in land use planning is to show that land use restrictions do influence
urban growth. It is clear that housing supply is not constant across the
United States. Figure 10 plots relative growth in the housing stock between
2000 and 2005, as measured by permits issued, against housing prices in
2005. If housing supply were equally elastic in all areas, then this graph
should show an upward-sloping relationship: places with stronger housing
demand should have higher prices and more building. However, the figure
reveals that the most expensive places have little building, while the places
with the most building are not particularly expensive. This pattern cannot
be explained by heterogeneity in demand alone. It must be that housing
supply is quite inelastic in some areas and elastic in others.

One possible explanation for this heterogeneity is the natural availabil-
ity of land. Perhaps land is simply abundant in the area around Las Vegas,
for example, and not on the San Francisco peninsula. But land availabil-
ity does not seem to be driving the heterogeneity in new construction.
Figure 11 shows the relationship between permits per square mile between
2000 and 2006 and existing houses per square mile in 2000: the places
with the least available land built the most. This fact persists when one

controls for demand by controlling for prices, or when one considers only those areas where prices are high enough to motivate new supply. The negative correlation between land availability and new construction can also be seen within some metropolitan areas, such as Boston.\textsuperscript{66}

An alternative explanation for the heterogeneity in housing supply is land use regulations. Local communities have significant ability to impact the ease of new development through regulations ranging from minimum lot sizes to rules concerning subdivisions. These supply restrictions would naturally be expected to reduce construction from its equilibrium level without the restrictions, and consequently to increase prices. After all, what does a minimum lot size do if not limit the number of homes that can be constructed on a fixed amount of land? Is a local growth control that explicitly limits the number of new homes anything but a limit on the size of the community? Glaeser and Bryce Ward compare 187 towns in Greater

\textsuperscript{66} Glaeser and Ward (forthcoming).
Boston and show a strong connection between the amount of housing in a town and its rules restricting new development. Lawrence Katz and Kenneth Rosen compare communities with and without growth controls in California and find higher prices in those areas with controls.

Figure 12 shows that the Wharton Land Use Index, described earlier as a measure of the difficulty of new construction, is positively correlated with housing prices. The overall correlation between this index and new construction activity is slightly negative but statistically insignificant. In a regression of permits issued on the Wharton index and climate and education variables, we find that the Wharton index is negatively associated with new permitting (results not reported).

Land use restrictions may reduce development and increase prices, but this does not necessarily mean they are bad policy. Perhaps there are

Source: Census of Construction, as described in Glaeser and Gyourko (2005); U.S. Census Bureau. See appendix B for details.

a. Each observation represents a single metropolitan statistical area under the 2003 definitions.

externalities, such as congestion, that justify price-increasing restrictions. One way of testing whether land use restrictions are welfare maximizing is to see whether they appear to maximize land values. A standard result in urban economics is that land value maximization leads to efficient outcomes.\textsuperscript{69} Local communities that succeed in maximizing land values by restricting development are in effect shifting the costs to outsiders, at least if the community does not have monopoly power over some particular amenity or natural resource.

To see whether communities are maximizing land values, we need to examine the elasticity of prices with respect to density. If the cost of building a house is denoted $C$, and a community has a total land area of one, and a total of $D$ homes are built, then the value of land in the community is $D[P(D) - C]$, that is, the number of homes times the price of homes, less construction costs. This quantity will be maximized with respect to $D$ when $DP'(D) + P(D) - C = 0$, or $[P(D) - C]P'(D) = -DP'(D)/P(D)$.

\textsuperscript{69} Brueckner (1983).
According to this calculation, efficient land use restrictions should imply that the elasticity of housing prices with respect to density equals that share of housing prices that is not related to construction costs. Glaeser and Ward found elasticities of price with respect to density that were less than $-0.15$ across areas in Greater Boston. These estimates were made using both ordinary least squares and a variety of instruments, including zoning laws and forest acreage in 1885. On average, construction costs are less than 50 percent of home value in their sample, so building more housing would substantially increase land values. Although Greater Boston is hardly typical of the United States as a whole, these results do suggest that some areas experience far less development than they would if communities were actually maximizing land value.\footnote{Why do communities fail to maximize land value? The Coase theorem, after all, suggests that side deals between property owners should lead to maximizing joint wealth. One answer is that property rights are murky and that the democratic process is not geared toward such side payments. In many cases the right of an owner to build is the outcome of a complicated regulatory process that cannot be predicted in advance. In other cases explicit legal impediments prevent such side deals. Since each new development creates a windfall for one owner and a host of inconveniences for everyone else, one can understand why democratic decisionmaking would lead to many restrictions on building.}

The spatial equilibrium model presented above suggests that land use restrictions could be desirable if they move people from areas with low to areas with high agglomeration economies, or if they move people away from areas with large negative externalities. There is scant evidence that this is happening.

There are certainly environmental and other externalities associated with new construction, but it is far from obvious that existing land use restrictions handle these externalities appropriately or even work in the right direction. If one regards carbon emissions as creating an externality that is currently underpriced, then building on the urban fringe in Texas, where land use restrictions are few, is not environmentally friendly. Yet this is exactly the outcome if coastal California and the East Coast suburbs restrict new building. Communities do not have the ability to stop development in the United States as a whole; they can only push it elsewhere. So if denser communities restrict development, they will push it to areas where there are fewer people. Glaeser and Kahn show that land use restrictions are most stringent in places with the lowest carbon emissions, suggesting that the impact of land use restrictions is to move development to areas that have higher environmental costs.\footnote{Glaeser and Kahn (2008).}
Land use restrictions also seem to push people away from high-income areas, which have stronger agglomeration effects, at least if the marginal utility of income is constant across space. Figure 13 shows that human capital, as measured by college completion rates, has a weak positive association with the Wharton Land Use Index. As we will discuss later, skilled areas are much more productive than unskilled areas. By restricting development in the nation’s most productive places, land use restrictions are pushing people toward less economically vibrant areas.

If local governments are undertaking land use policies that are undesirable from a national point of view, then federal policies that worked against such policies could be welfare enhancing. What would a federal policy that tried to encourage development in high-cost, high-wage areas look like? It seems implausible that the federal government could directly oversee land use controls in tiny local areas. An alternative approach would be to reward high-cost states for undertaking policies that encour-
age building in restrictive areas. Another approach would be to directly offer incentives to those communities in high-cost areas that build.  

Any attempt to handle local land use restrictions runs into the same problems faced by the Model Cities Program: the federal government is not well positioned to interact directly with small communities. Yet moving people into high-wage areas seems to be an easier spatial policy that would increase GDP. More people will not be able to move into those areas unless there is more building, and this cannot happen unless localities change their land use rules.

Some transportation policies can also be seen as a means of dealing with local land use policies. Building more highways allows more housing to be built on the urban fringe, where restrictions are less binding. But although this may allow some metropolitan areas to grow, it does so in a more expensive and inefficient manner than if more construction were allowed in areas closer to core employment centers. Whatever may be the best way to move people around, a fundamental reason that it matters where they end up is what comes of their interactions. Since ideas are nonrival, it is natural to examine their spillovers, and more generally all the externalities that flow from human capital. We now turn to human capital spillovers.

**Human Capital and Industrial Spillovers**

Human capital spillovers result whenever people learn from other people around them. As our neighbors acquire more knowledge, a little bit of that wisdom rubs off on us. The existence of such spillovers is beyond debate; we are an enormously social species who spend much of our lives listening to and watching people around us, beginning with our parents. The relevant empirical question is not whether such spillovers exist, but rather how important they are and where they are most prevalent.

For more than a century, economists and other urbanists have suggested that these idea flows will be more prevalent in dense environments flush with face-to-face interactions. If people learn by communicating ideas to each other, urban proximity helps them transmit those ideas. Alfred Marshall wrote that in industrial clusters, “the mysteries of the trade are no mystery, but are as it were, in the air.” The urbanist Jane Jacobs was particularly associated with the hypothesis that urban areas foster creativ-

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72. Glaeser (2008) provides a more detailed plan of this kind.
73. Lawrence Summers emphasized this point to us.
74. Marshall (1890, Book 2, ch. 10).
ity by speeding the flow of knowledge. Robert Lucas connected the flow of urban ideas with his new growth theory, which emphasizes the production and sharing of knowledge. Just as urban density two centuries ago facilitated the flow of cargo onto clipper ships, so that same density today serves to facilitate the flow of ideas among people.

Faster idea flows in cities are one of the many types of agglomeration economies, and they suggest that cities where large numbers of skilled workers live are likely to be particularly successful. Any urban edge in facilitating communication should be more important for more skilled people, who have more to communicate and can benefit more from others' knowledge. This type of reasoning has led to a significant literature documenting that skilled places are more successful than unskilled ones.

Over the past fifteen years, a series of papers has established several propositions about the relationship of skills to urban success. First, holding individual skills constant, incomes are higher in cities with more skilled workers. Second, skilled cities have faster population and income growth than less skilled places. Third, skilled places seem to be growing because productivity is rising faster there. Fourth, skilled people tend increasingly to move near other skilled people. Finally, skilled industries are more likely to locate near the urban core, and less skilled industries on the urban periphery.

The existence of human capital spillovers justifies subsidizing education and provides some guidance for local leaders trying to boost either incomes or population growth. Indeed, the remarkably strong (50 percent) correlation between urban growth and initial skill levels among cities in the Northeast and Midwest suggests that skills are by far the best antidote for Rustbelt decline. Local policies that either attract or produce skilled people seem likely to offer the best chance of improving the fortunes of a troubled urban area. Good public education, which both produces skilled graduates and attracts skilled parents, is surely the primary example of such a policy.

However, the existence of human capital spillovers does not provide any clear guidance for national place-making policies. A policy that moves a skilled person from one area to another helps the area that receives the

75. Lucas (1988); Romer (1986).
skilled worker and hurts the area that loses her. A framework like the spatial equilibrium framework presented in this paper can help sort through the welfare implications of human capital spillovers. The framework allows for individual heterogeneity, but to keep things simple we now omit the nontraded goods sector. If there are \( K \) types of people, we assume that total urban output in the traded goods sector is \( A_i F(\tilde{N}_i^k) \), where \( \tilde{N}_i^k \) is the vector of labor in each of the different subsectors.

The wage spillover literature essentially postulates that the productivity parameter, \( A_i \), is a function of the average skill level in the area, \( \tilde{S} \). This literature emphasizes that working around skilled people makes people more productive at a single point in time. The urban growth literature that shows a connection between initial skills and subsequent population and income growth postulates that the average skill level in the area also increases the growth rate of \( A_i \). This literature suggests that the growth rate of local productivity is higher when there are more skilled people, perhaps because skilled people come up with more new ideas.

Since the urban growth literature considers both population and income, it has generally specified a spatial equilibrium, although usually the equilibrium does not fully explain why some places have more skilled people than others. The wage literature often fails to specify the spatial equilibrium at all. To specify a complete model that will help us interpret the results and discuss appropriate public policy, we assume that the utility of people of each group in city \( i \) can be denoted \( \theta_i \varphi_i(N_i^k)^{-\sigma} W_i^k \), where \( \theta_i \) is a city-level amenity variable, \( \varphi_i \) is the exogenous endowment of amenities in city \( i \) that appeal to people of type \( k \), \( N_i^k \) is the endogenous number of people of type \( k \) in city \( i \), and \( W_i^k \) is the endogenous wage of type \( k \) people in city \( i \). Each type of worker has an exogenous productivity scaling factor \( E_i \) and a reservation utility denoted \( U_i \). Amenities will essentially drive the distribution of labor, and this is the best case for empirical work.

Firms’ production functions are typically characterized by a constant elasticity of substitution across different groups, or \( \tilde{N}_i^k = \left[ \sum_i E_i \left( N_i^k \right)^\rho \right]^{1/\rho} \), so that wages for individuals of type \( k \) in city \( i \) equal

\[
A_i \varphi_i \left( N_i^k \right)^{\rho - 1} \left[ \sum_k E_k \left( N_k^k \right)^\rho \right]^{\rho - 1}. 
\]

The skill distribution in an area satisfies

\[
N_i^k = N_i \left( \frac{\varphi_i E_i U_i}{\varphi_i E_i U_i} \right)^{1/\sigma - \rho};
\]

hence the distribution of skills across cities is

determined only by amenity differences. We let $n_k^i$ denote the ratio of type $k$ individuals to type 1 individuals in area $i$. For any type $m$, population will equal

$$N^i = \frac{A\varphi \theta \partial^* E^i}{U^i} \left[ \sum_k E_k \left( \frac{\partial^* E_k U_{ik}}{\partial^* E_k U_{ik}} \right)^{\frac{1}{\sigma + \varphi}} \right],$$

so total population in the area equals

(10) $$N^i = \left( A\varphi \theta \right)^{\frac{1}{1 + \sigma - \varphi}} \sum_k \left( \frac{\partial^* E_k}{U_k} \right)^{\frac{1}{1 + \sigma - \varphi}} \left[ \sum_k E_k \left( \frac{\partial^* E_k U_{ik}}{\partial^* E_k U_{ik}} \right)^{\frac{1}{\sigma + \varphi}} \right].$$

and wages for type $m$ individuals equal

(11) $$W^i_m = \left( A\varphi E_m^\theta \omega \frac{U_{ik}}{\theta \partial^* \omega} \right)^{\frac{1}{1 + \sigma - \varphi}} \left[ \sum_k E_k \left( \frac{\partial^* E_k U_{ik}}{\partial^* E_k U_{ik}} \right)^{\frac{1}{\sigma + \varphi}} \right].$$

which is a function of amenities and productivity as in equations 2 and 3. This type of spatial equilibrium model provides an interpretation for the city-level growth regressions, because if only amenities and productivity change, then

$$\log \left( \frac{N_{i+1}}{N_i} \right) = \frac{1}{1 + \sigma - \varphi} \log \left( \frac{A_{i+1} \theta_{i+1}}{A_i \theta_i} \right) \quad \text{and} \quad \log \left( \frac{W_{i+1}^m}{W_i^m} \right)$$

$$= \frac{\sigma}{1 + \sigma - \varphi} \log \left( \frac{A_{i+1}}{A_i} \right) - \frac{1 - \varphi}{1 + \sigma - \varphi} \log \left( \frac{\theta_{i+1}}{\theta_i} \right).$$

If human capital changes the rate of productivity or amenity growth, it will impact the growth of population and wages.

Figure 14 shows the relationship between population growth from 1940 to 2000 and the percent of the city’s over-25 population with a college degree in 1940 for those metropolitan areas that had more than 100,000 people in 1940. This type of result holds when we instrument for population growth using the presence of land grant colleges before 1940, or using the skills implied by a city’s occupation distribution in 1880. If the skill level in 1940 caused either productivity or amenities to grow more

82. As in Moretti (2004).
quickly, then the model predicts that more-skilled places will see more population growth, assuming the other parameters are constant over time.

Two recent papers have used this type of framework to test whether the rise of the skilled city reflects rising amenities or rising productivity; both papers conclude that it is the latter. The premium associated with working around skilled people has risen steadily over time. The connection between initial skills and productivity growth can be understood as a reflection of the greater tendency of skilled people to innovate, or of the growing importance of working around skilled people. If people become skilled by being around skilled people, then the rising wage premium associated with working in skilled cities is yet another example of the rising returns to skill in the economy as a whole.

The assumption that skills are unrelated to changes in other parameters seems belied by the fact that skilled places are becoming more skilled. Figure 15 shows the relationship between the percent of the over-25 population with college degrees in 1980 and the growth in that share between 1980 and 2000. The correlation between these two variables is 58 percent. As the share of the population with college degrees in 1980 increases by 10 percent, the growth in the same variable over the next twenty years increases by 3 percentage points. This fact, documented by Christopher Berry and Glaeser,85 might also reflect an increasing tendency of skilled entrepreneurs to innovate in ways that employ other skilled people.

To address contemporaneous human capital spillovers, we assume that productivity is a function of the current spillover level, $\hat{S}$, where $S^i_k$ might or might not equal $E^i_k$.

If $A(\hat{S}) = a_1 \hat{S}^\alpha$, then the equation becomes

$$(11') W^m = \frac{Q^m_w}{(\bar{\Theta}^\nu)^{1-\frac{1}{\nu}} \left( \begin{array}{c} \sum_i S_i n_i^k \end{array} \right)^{\frac{n}{\nu}}} \left( \begin{array}{c} \sum_i E_i n_i^k \end{array} \right)^{\frac{a(1-\varphi)}{1-\varphi}}$$

where $Q^m_w$ is constant across areas. The $n_i^k$ term denotes the ratio of type $k$ individuals to type 1 individuals in area $i$, which captures the skill distribution within the city. Typically, some form of nonlinear least squares procedure would be needed to estimate this equation. If $\varphi = \rho$, then ordinary least squares can be used. In that case wages equal

$$Q^m_w \left( \begin{array}{c} \sum_i S_i n_i^k \end{array} \right)^{\frac{n}{\nu}} \left( \begin{array}{c} \sum_i E_i n_i^k \end{array} \right)^{\frac{a(1-\varphi)}{1-\varphi}}$$

To use least squares we would need to assume that $\hat{S}$ is constant for some group or set of groups across space, and that all of the variation in the skill distribution is coming from amenities that impact the location of the omitted groups. In that case we would need to run the regression only for the groups whose amenity levels do not change.

This formulation suggests the difficulty of using wage regressions to estimate spillovers. Even when we assume that there is no heterogeneity in the relative productivity levels of different skill groups across space, herculean assumptions are needed to justify least squares estimation. When different groups have different productivity levels, estimation becomes even more difficult.

James Rauch’s 1993 paper was the first to set out to estimate human capital externalities using within-country data. He documented that, holding individual skills constant, wages were higher in cities that had a higher concentration of skilled people. He showed that rents were also higher in those areas, which presumably maintains the spatial equilibrium. Although it is possible that high wages in high-skilled areas reflect unobserved indi-
individual skill characteristics, Rauch’s finding remains an important part of understanding wage patterns across urban areas.

Regression 9-1 in table 9 reproduces a version of the Rauch result using area-level human capital and wages from the 2000 Census. Individual skills and industries are held constant. As before, we look only at fully employed men between 25 and 55 years old. As the share of the adult population with college degrees increases by 10 percent, wages increase by 7.8 percent. Figure 16 shows the relationship across metropolitan areas between the average wage residual from this equation and the share of the population with a college degree.

The same two major problems that trouble the interpretation of the correlation between income and city size also bedevil interpretation of the correlation between area-level human capital and productivity. First, omitted area-level productivity variables may be positively correlated with area-level human capital, if skilled people move to areas that are more productive. Second, omitted individual-level human capital may be positively correlated with area-level human capital. The fact that real wages increase with human capital much less than nominal wages do should make one slightly less concerned about the second problem.

Two recent papers have tried to address the problem that unobserved ability may be correlated with area-level human capital. Daron Acemoglu and Joshua Angrist use changes in laws that mandate a minimum age of leaving school to estimate the social returns to schooling. They find little evidence for human capital externalities using this method, but it seems unlikely that raising the skills of the people at the bottom of the skill distribution would generate the human capital externalities that lie at the heart of new growth theory. Enrico Moretti uses land grant colleges as an instrument for area education and looks at longitudinal data to correct for individual fixed effects. He finds much stronger evidence supporting human capital externalities.

However, the model makes it difficult to interpret either approach unless these instruments are understood to be changes in the skill-specific amenities. Historical human capital levels will be valid instruments only when they have no direct effect on any of the productivity parameters. In the context of the model, this means that they must work through amenities.

Moreover, just as in the case of agglomeration economies, the case for spatial policies that change the distribution of population depends on nonlinearities in human capital spillovers. Using the above framework,

Table 9. Regressions of Wages on Metropolitan-Area Human Capital and Industrial Structurea

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent variable</th>
<th>9-1</th>
<th>9-2</th>
<th>9-3</th>
<th>9-4</th>
<th>9-5</th>
<th>9-6b</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percent of population with college degree</td>
<td>0.814</td>
<td>0.792</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.024)</td>
<td>(0.024)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent with college degree, below-median subsample</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.638</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.792</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.072)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.024)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent with college degree, above-median subsample</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.862</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.862</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.031)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.031)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent employment in top quartile of human capital</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.671</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.027)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent employment in top quartile, below-median subsample</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.035</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.070)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent employment in top quartile, above-median subsample</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.946</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.034)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Herfindahl index for MSA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.087</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Herfindahl index for MSA and sector</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of MSAs</td>
<td>285</td>
<td>285</td>
<td>285</td>
<td>285</td>
<td>285</td>
<td>285</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted $R^2$</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>0.31</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Authors' regressions.

a. The dependent variable is the logarithm of the individual wage; the sample includes fully employed men aged 25 to 55 only. Individual-level data are from the 1990 and 2000 Census Public Use Microdata Sample, as described in appendix B. All regressions include individual controls for sex, age, and education and industry fixed effects (but not MSA fixed effects except where noted otherwise). Data on industry concentration and human capital by industry are calculated from the microdata. Metropolitan-area education data are from the U.S. Census Bureau as described in appendix B. City characteristics are at the level of MSAs under the 1999 definitions, using primary rather than consolidated MSAs where applicable and New England county metropolitan areas where applicable. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered by MSA and industry.
b. Regression includes MSA fixed effects.
where we assume that utility is $U(Y^k, \theta^k)$ and the production function is $A(S^i) F(N^i)$:

**Proposition 4:** (a) A competitive equilibrium, where net unearned income is constant across space, can be a social optimum if and only if both $U(Y^k, \theta^k)$ and $A(S^i) F(N^i)$ are constant across space for every group $k$.

(b) Relative to a competitive equilibrium where $U(Y^k, \theta^k)$ is constant across space, welfare can be improved by moving type $k$ people from area $j$ to area $i$ if and only if

$$
\left( S_i - \hat{S}_i \right) \frac{A'(\hat{\theta}^i) A(\hat{\theta}^i) F(\hat{N}_i)}{N_i} > \left( S_j - \hat{S}_j \right) \frac{A'(\hat{\theta}^j) A(\hat{\theta}^j) F(\hat{N}_j)}{N_j}.
$$

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**Figure 16. Wage Residuals and College Completion Rates, 2000**

![Graph showing wage residuals and percent of population with college degrees](image)

Source: Authors' regressions; U.S. Census Bureau. See appendix B for details.

a. Each observation represents a single metropolitan statistical area under the 1999 definitions, using primary rather than consolidated MSAs where applicable and New England county metropolitan areas where applicable.

b. Residuals from a regression of wages on individual age and education; sample consists of all working males aged 25 to 55, from the U.S. Census Bureau Public Use Microdata Sample, as described in appendix B.
This proposition parallels Proposition 2. Just as in that case, the marginal utility of income, in this case within groups, must be constant across space in a social optimum. Moreover, the spillover effect from the group also needs to be constant across space. If this condition does not hold, then welfare can be improved by moving type $k$ individuals to an area where

$$
\left( S_i - \hat{S}_i \right) A_i(\hat{S}_i) A_i(\hat{S}_j) F(\hat{N}_i) / \hat{N}_i
$$

is higher. Our assumption that productivity depends on average skill levels yields the unambiguous result that if type $k$ individuals are present in numbers below the average in area $j$ and above the average in area $i$, they should be moved from $j$ to $i$, raising the average ability of both places. This implication would not survive a more general skill spillover function that does not depend solely on average skills.

Just as in the case of Proposition 2, this proposition suggests that a federal spatial policy would be beneficial only if there are nonlinear effects. Moving skilled people from one area to another is advantageous only if the impact of skills differs across areas. We do not know of an instrumental variables strategy that can effectively estimate the degree of nonlinearity in the relationship between area-level human capital and wages. The imprecise relationship between instruments, such as historical levels of human capital, and human capital today makes it enormously difficult to reliably estimate the degree of nonlinearity. As a result, we restrict ourselves here to ordinary least squares estimates. We recognize that these estimates are plagued with the two problems facing most attempts to estimate human capital spillovers: the potential correlation between area-level human capital and unobserved individual-level skills, and the endogeneity of area-level human capital.

To illustrate the ordinary least squares relationships, regression 9-2 in table 9 finds that the impact of area skills on wages is slightly higher for more skilled than for less skilled places. The difference between the effects is only weakly significant, and there are many issues with interpreting this coefficient. However, it does cast doubt on the view that policy should be trying to move more skilled people into less skilled areas.

In principle, spillovers might come from different industries rather than different levels of human capital. This would justify government policies that create clusters of either industry or human capital. The U.S. government has never actively embraced such efforts, although certainly many states and localities, such as North Carolina’s Research Triangle, have tried to build areas around particular activities. Many state economic development policies have sought to target particular industries in particu-
lar locales in the hope that the magic of agglomeration economies would make those places thrive. Outside the United States, countries have explicitly tried to build industrial areas or to induce human capital to migrate to particular regions.

Regressions 9-3 and 9-4 in table 9 address the skill level of industries rather than workers. The idea behind these regressions is that spillovers are created by working in cities surrounded by skilled, successful industries rather than working in less skilled industrial clusters. We use the national Census microdata to estimate average skills at the industry level and then use metropolitan area–level data to calculate the average skill level of the industries in the area. We continue to control for industry fixed effects in these regressions. We find that as the average educational mix of an area’s industries rises, average earnings in that area also rise. A 10 percent increase in the predicted share of the industry’s employment with a college degree raises wages by 5.9 percent.

Regression 9-4 finds significant nonlinearities in this effect. Increasing the skill mix of the industry grouping is quite unimportant for areas with a low average industry-based skill mix. The effect gets much stronger for areas with a high predicted skill level. The variable’s impact is extremely convex, which suggests that it might be beneficial to push skilled industries to locate with other skilled industries.

Since the existence of general human capital externalities is also suggested by the link between human capital and area population growth, we performed similar regressions for the average skill level of an area’s industries. In table B1 in appendix B, we show that this average industrial skill level increases area population, as it should if it increases productivity, and population growth. Just as in the wage-level regressions, the impact of this variable is convex in both the population and the population growth regressions (table B2 in appendix B).

There are reasons to be skeptical about the skill clustering policies suggested by regressions 9-2 and 9-4. First, these regressions represent correlations, not identified causal estimates. Second, policies that induce skilled groups to cluster together would tend to increase segregation by skill, which would probably end up increasing inequality as well.88

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88. We also examined the share of the industry’s goods that are exported and the average wage residual in the industry. Both of these variables were suggested by Lawrence Summers. We do not find a significant tendency of wages to be higher in areas surrounded by such industries, nor do we find any significant nonlinearities in the impact of these variables on wages or population growth.
Finally, in regressions 9-5 and 9-6 in table 9 we turn to the question of industrial concentration. Does it make sense for cities to try to specialize in a small number of industries? Are workers more productive in places that have concentrated in a few core areas of excellence? Regression 9-5 controls for individual characteristics, again including industry fixed effects, and looks at the impact of overall industrial concentration at the metropolitan-area level. We use a Herfindahl index based on three-digit industries to measure the degree of concentration. In this case we find that more-concentrated places have lower productivity. This result is in line with the finding by Glaeser and others that industrially concentrated areas grow more slowly.89

Regression 9-6 looks within broad sectors. We measure the degree of concentration based on three-digit industries for each sector within each metropolitan area. This allows us to control for both metropolitan-area and industry fixed effects. In this case the workers in less concentrated one-industry groups earn more, but this is comparing them with other workers in the same metropolitan area. One concern with this type of regression is that if workers can readily move across industries within a metropolitan area, then productivity differences should be eliminated within that area.

Regression 9-6 confirms within broad sectors the result from regression 9-5. Having a wide range of industries helps the entire metropolitan area, and more diversity within a given sector in a given metropolitan area increases wages in that sector. Although neither regression is based on anything like a natural experiment, the consistency of the results supports the value of industrial diversity for an area’s aggregate welfare.

These results suggest that concentrations of skilled workers and skilled industries may increase local productivity. Yet we worry about the equity consequences of a policy that would encourage such concentrations, especially since skilled people already tend to move disproportionately into skilled areas. The results on industrial concentration are certainly only suggestive, but they cast doubt on the view that cities are best off creating specialized industrial clusters.

The strongest results in this section support the view that skilled workers and skilled industries generate positive effects. At the national level, however, there is little evidence to support the view that any gains would be realized by moving these industries into less developed areas. If anything, the results point in the opposite direction. On the other hand, for

local leaders the existence of human capital externalities suggests that attracting skilled workers and skilled industries may be the most promising avenue for improving the success of their region.

Conclusion

Urban economists generally believe that the world exhibits spatial equilibrium, agglomeration economies, and human capital spillovers. The concept of spatial equilibrium suggests that policies that aid poor places are not necessarily redistributive and will have indirect consequences, for example pushing up housing costs and inducing poor people to move to poor areas. Agglomeration economies and human capital spillovers are both positive externalities, whose existence raises the possibility that national spatial policies could increase welfare. However, for these externalities to create a justification for any particular spatial policy, these externalities must be stronger in some places than in others. Even if we accept the existence of agglomeration economies, those economies make the case for subsidizing particular places only if they are nonlinear. Empirically, we cannot be confident that these effects are either convex or concave. Economics is still battling over whether such spillovers exist at all, and we are certainly not able to document compelling nonlinear effects.

This does not mean that urban economics yields no implications for public policy. At the local level, human capital spillovers suggest policies for leaders who are trying to maximize either income or wages. If such spillovers are important, then increasing the skill level of a city, by either attracting or training more skilled people, will raise wages and population. At the national level, investment in infrastructure should be based on the tangible benefits of that infrastructure for consumers, not on the ability of that infrastructure to change location patterns. Indeed, the current tendency to subsidize transportation disproportionately in low-income, low-density states seems to run counter to what little is known about where agglomeration effects are more important.

Urban economics also yields suggestions for housing policy. Support for building new structures in declining areas merely subsidizes construction where it is least desired. After all, places that are in decline are defined in part by already having an excess of buildings relative to demand. A federal policy that enabled more building in those high-income areas that currently restrict new construction through land use controls seems more likely to increase welfare.
APPENDIX A

Proofs of Propositions

The core equations state that demand equals supply for the nontraded good (housing), which means

\[ P_H L_H^m = \beta (1 - \alpha + \alpha \gamma) \left( 1 - \beta (1 - \mu + \mu \eta) \right) a N_i^N K_i^0 K_i^{0(1-\eta)} L_p^{-\alpha}, \]

where \( L_H \) is labor in the housing sector and \( L_p \) is labor in the traded sector. The two wage equations imply that

\[ (1 - \mu) P_H L_H^m = W_i = (1 - \alpha) a N_i^N K_i^0 K_i^{0(1-\eta)} L_p^{-\alpha}. \]

Together these equations imply that

\[ L_H = \frac{\beta (1 - \mu) (1 - \alpha + \alpha \gamma)}{1 - \alpha + \beta [\alpha \gamma (1 - \mu) - \mu \eta (1 - \alpha)]} N_i, \]

and

\[ P = \frac{(1 - \alpha) [1 - \beta (1 - \mu + \mu \eta)]}{1 - \alpha + \beta [\alpha \gamma (1 - \mu) - \mu \eta (1 - \alpha)]} N_i. \]

Solving for traded capital gives us that

\[ W_i = Q_w (a N_i^N K_i^0 L_p^{-\alpha})^\frac{1}{1 - \alpha + \gamma}, \]

or

\[ (A1) \quad W_i = Q_w (a, K_i^0, N_i^{1-\alpha}), \]

The price solves

\[ P_i = \frac{Q_{P,1}}{H Z_{N^i}} a N_i^N K_i^0 L_p^{-\alpha}, \]

or

\[ P_i = \frac{Q_{P,1}}{H Z_{N^i}} a N_i^N K_i^0 L_p^{-\alpha}, \]

where \( Q_{W,i}, Q_w, Q_{P,1}, \) and \( Q_p \) are constants.

Finally, to solve for overall population, we use

\[ U = \theta N_i^{1-\alpha} (1 - t) W_i P_i^{-\beta}, \]

which delivers the result that

\[ N_i = Q_i \theta (1 - t) (a N_i^N)^\frac{1 - \beta [1 - \mu - \mu \eta]}{1 - \alpha + \gamma} (H Z_{N^i}^m)^\beta. \]

Equations 2 through 4 in the text then follow.

Proof of Proposition 1: We are trying to solve for \( \sum \theta_i N_i^{1-\alpha} (1 - t) (N_i W_i + Y_i) P_i^{-\beta}. \) Total earnings of \( N_i W_i + Y_i \) are \( (1 - \alpha + \alpha \gamma) a N_i^N K_i^0 K_i^{0(1-\eta)} L_p^{-\alpha} + \)
(1 \mu + \mu \eta)P_i H_i \sum_{\nu} \kappa^\nu_{i,t} L_{1-\mu}, which, using the demand for housing equation and the wage equation, equals
\frac{1 - \alpha + \alpha \gamma}{1 - \alpha + \beta[\alpha \gamma(1 - \mu) - \mu \eta(1 - \alpha)]} N_i W_i. Thus total utility is a constant times \sum \theta_i(1 - t_i)N_i^{1-\omega}W_i P_i^{-\beta}. Thus the total maximization problem can be written as
\sum \theta_i(1 - t_i)N_i^{1-\omega}W_i P_i^{-\beta} + \lambda_{\nu}(N_f - \sum N_i), where \(N_f\) is aggregate population in all regions.

We use the formulation above where both wages and prices can be thought of as a function of population and exogenous parameters, but not of the tax rate or the amenity level. The derivative with respect to \(N_i\) is
\frac{\partial}{\partial N_i} \theta_i(1 - t_i)N_i^{1-\omega}W_i P_i^{-\beta} = \lambda_{\nu}, which can also be written as \(k U_i - \lambda_{\nu}\), where \(k\) is a constant and \(U_i\) is total utility, which will be equal everywhere in a spatial equilibrium. As such, the decentralized equilibrium is location equilibrium, despite the existence of agglomeration economies and congestion effects in amenities.

As shown in equation 2, population is an increasing function of \(\theta_i(1 - t_i)\), so any choice of \(t_i\) that maximizes \(\theta_i(1 - t_i)\) will also maximize population. Wages (equation 3) are a monotonically decreasing function of \(\theta_i(1 - t_i)\), so maximizing wages per capita will end up minimizing utility. Equation 4 reveals that house prices are increasing in \(\theta_i(1 - t_i)\) as long as \(\omega(1 - \mu + \mu \eta) + \mu \eta(1 - \alpha) - \alpha \gamma(1 - \mu) > 0\) and decreasing in \(\theta_i(1 - t_i)\) if the reverse inequality holds.

Proof of Proposition 2: (a) Social welfare maximization can be written as maximizing the Lagrangian, where \(H_i\) now stands for housing consumption per capita and \(T\) is total taxes:
\sum N_i U_i[Y_i, H_i, \theta_i(N_i)] + \lambda_{\nu}(N_f - \sum N_i)
+ \lambda_{\nu_i} \sum_i A_i(N_i) F_i(N_i - L_i) - T - NY_i
+ \sum_i \lambda_{\nu_i} [G_i(L_i) - N_i H_i],
which yields four first-order conditions: \(U_i[Y_i, H_i, \theta_i(N_i)] = \lambda_{\nu_i}, \lambda_i A_i(N_i) F_i(N_i - L_i) = \lambda_{\nu_i} G_i(L_i), U_i[Y_i, H_i, \theta_i(N_i)] = \lambda_{\nu_i}, and \(U_i[Y_i, H_i, \theta_i(N_i)] + \sum N_i \theta_i(N_i)U_i[Y_i, H_i, \theta_i(N_i)] + \lambda_{\nu_i} A_i(N_i) F_i(N_i - L_i) + A_i(N_i) F_i(N_i - L_i) - Y_i - \lambda_{\nu_i} H_i = \lambda_{\nu_i}. In the competitive equilibrium the marginal product of labor equals the wage, so \(A_i(N_i) F_i(N_i - L_i) = P_i G_i(L_i) = W_i, and consumer optimization yields \(P_i[U_i[Y_i, H_i, \theta_i(N_i)]] = U_i[Y_i, H_i, \theta_i(N_i)]. If U_i[Y_i, H_i, \theta_i(N_i)]
}
$\theta_i(N_i)$ is constant over space in the competitive equilibrium, then the competitive equilibrium is equivalent to the first three first-order conditions. If $U_i[Y_i, H_i, \theta_i(N_i)]$ is not constant over space, then the competitive equilibrium cannot be a social optimum.

The fourth condition can be rewritten as

$$U[Y_i, H_i, \theta_i(N_i)] + N\theta_i(N_i)U_a[Y_i, H_i, \theta_i(N_i)] + U_a[Y_i, H_i, \theta_i(N_i)]$$

$$= A_i(N_i)F'(N_i - L) + A_i'(N_i)F_i(N_i - L) - Y_i - \frac{U_i}{U'_i} H_i.$$ 

If $N\theta_i(N_i)U_a[Y_i, H_i, \theta_i(N_i)] + U_a[Y_i, H_i, \theta_i(N_i)]A_i'(N_i)F_i(N_i - L)$ is constant across space, then this condition will also be implied by the competitive equilibrium, since $U[Y_i, H_i, \theta_i(N_i)]$ is constant across space and

so is unearned income, which equals $A_i(N_i)F'(N_i - L) - Y_i - \frac{U_i}{U'_i} H_i$.

If $N\theta'_i(N_i)U_a[Y_i, H_i, \theta_i(N_i)] + U_a[Y_i, H_i, \theta_i(N_i)]A_i'(N_i)F_i(N_i - L)$ is not constant, then the competitive equilibrium cannot satisfy this condition when $U[Y_i, H_i, \theta_i(N_i)]$ is constant across space.

(b) Moving someone from area $j$ to area $i$ represents setting $N_i = N_{i,c} + \varepsilon$ and $N_j = N_{j,c} - \varepsilon$, where $N_{i,c}$ and $N_{j,c}$ are the competitive population allocations. To determine the value of this change, we take the derivative of social welfare with respect to $\varepsilon$ and evaluate it at $\varepsilon = 0$. Total social welfare can be written as

$$\sum_i N_i U \left[ W_i + Z_i - P_i \frac{G_i(L_i)}{N_i}, \frac{G_i(L_i)}{N_i}, \theta_i(N_i) \right],$$

where total unearned income is $\sum_i N_i Z_i = \sum_i [A_i(N_i)F_i(N_i - L) + P_i G_i(L_i) - N_i W_i] - T$, or total revenue minus labor costs minus taxes.

If the marginal utility of income is constant across space, then this derivative equals $N\theta_i(N_i)U_a[Y_i, H_i, \theta_i(N_i)] - N\theta_j(N_j)U_a[Y_j, H_j, \theta_j(N_j)] + U_a[A_i'(N_i)F_i(N_i - L) - A_j'(N_j)F_j(N_j - L)].$ This term is positive if and only if

$$\frac{N\theta'_i(N_i)\theta_i(N_i)U_a[Y_i, H_i, \theta_i(N_i)]}{\theta_i(N_i)U_a[Y_i, H_i, \theta_i(N_i)]} + \frac{N\theta'_j(N_j)\theta_j(N_j)U_a[Y_j, H_j, \theta_j(N_j)]}{\theta_j(N_j)U_a[Y_j, H_j, \theta_j(N_j)]} > \frac{N\theta'_i(N_i)\theta_i(N_i)U_a[Y_i, H_i, \theta_i(N_i)]}{\theta_i(N_i)U_a[Y_i, H_i, \theta_i(N_i)]} + \frac{N\theta'_j(N_j)\theta_j(N_j)U_a[Y_j, H_j, \theta_j(N_j)]}{\theta_j(N_j)U_a[Y_j, H_j, \theta_j(N_j)]}$$

If the marginal utility of income is not constant across space, but if unearned income from an area goes entirely to the residents of that area, then the condition becomes
Both of these are equivalent to the expression given in the text.

**Proof of Proposition 3:** We can write social welfare maximization as the maximization of a social planner’s Lagrangian:

\[
\frac{N \theta'(N_i)}{\theta(N_i)} \theta(N_i) U_s[Y_i, H, \theta(N_i)] + U_t[Y_i, H, \theta(N_i)] \frac{N_i A'(N_i) A_i(N_i) F_i(N_i - L_i)}{A_i(N_i)}
\]

In a competitive equilibrium, total social welfare can be written as

\[
\sum_i N U [Y_i, H, \theta(N_i), t_i] + \lambda_n \left( N_t - \sum_i N_i \right)
\]

\[
+ \lambda_y \left[ \sum_i A_i(N_i) F_i[K_y(t_i), N_i - L_i] - t_i - N Y_i \right]
\]

\[
+ \sum_i \lambda_{i} \left[ G_i(L_i) - N_i H_i \right]
\]

This yields a first-order condition for transportation spending of

\[
\frac{N U_i[Y_i, H, \theta(N_i), t_i]}{U_t[Y_i, H, \theta(N_i), t_i]} + A_i(N_i) K_y'(t_i) \frac{\partial F_i[K_y(t_i), N_i - L_i]}{\partial K_y(t_i)} = 0.
\]

In a competitive equilibrium, total social welfare can be written as

\[
\sum_i N U [W + Z_i - P_i G_i(L_i) / N_i - N_i - t_i - P_i G_i(L_i) / N_i, \theta(N_i), t_i],
\]

where \( \sum_i N_i Z_i = \sum_i [A_i(N_i) F_i[K_y(t_i), N_i - L_i] + P_i G_i(L_i) - N_i W_i] - T \) again.

The derivative of this with respect to transport spending is

\[
\frac{N U_i[Y_i, H, \theta(N_i), t_i]}{U_t[Y_i, H, \theta(N_i), t_i]} + \sum_i N_i \theta'(N_i) \frac{U_i[Y_i, H, \theta(N_i), t_i]}{U_t[Y_i, H, \theta(N_i), t_i]} \frac{\partial N_i}{\partial t_i}
\]

\[
+ A_i(N_i) K_y'(t_i) \frac{\partial F_i[K_y(t_i), N_i - L_i]}{\partial K_y(t_i)}
\]

\[
+ \sum_i \frac{A_i'(N_i)}{N_i A_i(N_i)} A_i(N_i) F_i[K_y(t_i), N_i - L_i] \frac{\partial N_i}{\partial t_i} = 0.
\]
The added benefit of transport spending is positive if and only if

$$N \theta'(N) \frac{U_e[Y_e, H_e, \theta_e(N), t]}{U_e[Y_e, H_e, \theta_e(N), t]} + \frac{A'(N)}{N A(N)} \frac{A(N) F[K_{\alpha}(t), N, -L]}{\partial N},$$

$$> \sum_{i} \frac{\partial N_i}{\partial t} \left[ N \theta'(N) \frac{U_e[Y_e, H_e, \theta_e(N), t]}{U_e[Y_e, H_e, \theta_e(N), t]} + \frac{A'(N)}{N A(N)} \frac{A(N) F[K_{\alpha}(t), N, -L]}{\partial N_i} \right].$$

**Proof of Proposition 4**: Social welfare can be written as

$$\sum \lambda_i \sum N_i U(Y_i, \theta_i) + \sum \lambda_{\alpha_i} \left( N_{\alpha_i} - \sum N_i \right)$$

$$+ \lambda_{\alpha_i} \left[ \sum A(\hat{S}) F(N_i) - \sum N_i Y_i \right].$$

First-order conditions are $\lambda_i U(Y_i, \theta_i) = \lambda_i$, and

$$\lambda_i U(Y_i, \theta_i) + \lambda_{\alpha_i} \left[ (S_i - \hat{S}) \frac{A(\hat{S}) A(\hat{S}) F(N_i)}{A(\hat{S})} + A(\hat{S}) \frac{\partial F(N_i)}{\partial N_i} \right] = \lambda_{\alpha_i}.$$  

For these conditions to be satisfied in a competitive equilibrium, where net unearned income is constant across space, $U_r(Y^i, \theta^i)$ and

$$(S_i - \hat{S}) \frac{A(\hat{S}) A(\hat{S}) F(N_i)}{A(\hat{S})} \text{ must be constant across space.}$$

Starting with a competitive equilibrium where the marginal utility of income is constant across space, welfare can be improved by moving type $k$ individuals from city $j$ to city $i$ if and only if

$$(S_i - \hat{S}) \frac{A(\hat{S}) A(\hat{S}) F(N_i)}{A(\hat{S})} > (S_j - \hat{S}) \frac{A(\hat{S}) A(\hat{S}) F(N_j)}{A(\hat{S})}.$$  

**Appendix B**

**Data Description**

Census aggregated data are taken from the compilation provided by the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research, under record number 2896. This compilation includes Census county data from
1790 to 2000, including data from various issues of the Census’s *City and County Data Book*.

To analyze the metropolitan-area level data, we aggregate the county data according to metropolitan statistical area (MSA) definitions released by the Office of Management and Budget. Each figure or table specifies the definition used for that particular application. We use different definitions for different purposes in order to be consistent with data from other sources used in a particular figure or table.

A word of caution is in order regarding some aggregate numbers computed from these data. In order to use a consistent set of MSA definitions for each purpose, we need median family income and median house value data at various MSA definitions; these medians are only presented under certain definitions. We therefore estimate the median by averaging the component counties’ median values, weighting by families in the case of family income and by housing units in the case of house values. The resulting numbers are not equal to the true median for the metropolitan area, but they should be a close enough approximation for our purposes.

We obtained the Census Bureau’s 5 percent Public Use Microdata Sample (PUMS) of the 2000 Census from the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS) service of the Minnesota Population Center. The sole geographical identifier included in the PUMS is a Public Use Microdata Area (PUMA), which IPUMS links to an MSA where appropriate. (In particular, IPUMS uses the 1999 MSA definitions, using primary rather than consolidated MSAs where applicable.) This identification is imperfect because the Census does not ensure that each PUMA is contained within a county, so PUMAs do not necessarily map onto MSAs. Nonetheless it is the best that can be done to link the Census microdata to other geographical data.

When running wage regressions on the individual-level data, we include only prime-age men (defined as those 25 to 55 years old) in order to avoid picking up differing labor force participation rates. We exclude anyone who reports not having a full-time job or whose annual earnings are below half of the annual minimum wage. We include dummy controls for each individual’s age (grouped by decade: 20s, 30s, 40s, or 50s) and educational attainment (high school dropout, high school graduate, or college graduate), and in the repeated panel regressions (table 3) we allow the coefficient on each dummy variable to change across Census years.

When we use industry-level data in conjunction with Census industry categorization, it is necessary to match the different industry classification systems used in the different datasets. Census industry codes for manu-
facturing industries, on the 1990 basis, are matched to Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes using appendix A to Census Technical Paper No. 65, which is available online at www.census.gov/hhes/www/ioindex/tp65_report.html. Since there is not an exact one-to-one relationship between Census industry codes and SIC codes, the concordance is necessarily imperfect; we select one SIC code if multiple ones are given, and we use data from the SIC code given even when informed that the Census industry code matches only part of the SIC category. A given Census industry code can be matched with a two-digit, three-digit, or four-digit SIC code, so our resulting dataset uses a mixture of levels of detail. These SIC data are in turn matched to exporting data from the International Trade Administration, available online at ita.doc.gov/td/industry/otea/industry_sector/tables.htm.

Table B1. Additional Regressions*

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<th>Dependent variable</th>
<th>Log wage</th>
<th>Log wage residual</th>
<th>Log population</th>
<th>Population growth, 1990s</th>
<th>Income growth, 1990s</th>
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Table B1. Additional Regressions* (Continued)

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<td>Wage premium predicted by industrial distributiond</td>
<td>−2.1</td>
<td>−3.16</td>
<td>−60.3</td>
<td>2.91</td>
<td>3.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(13.2)</td>
<td>(7.83)</td>
<td>(78.2)</td>
<td>(7.41)</td>
<td>(4.12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Predicted wage premium × above-median subsample</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>3.03</td>
<td>32.3</td>
<td>−2.68</td>
<td>−5.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(14.0)</td>
<td>(8.35)</td>
<td>(83.4)</td>
<td>(7.89)</td>
<td>(4.39)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>9.92</td>
<td>−0.082</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.418</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.007)</td>
<td>(0.1)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of observations</td>
<td>285</td>
<td>285</td>
<td>285</td>
<td>285</td>
<td>285</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R²</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.0006</td>
<td>0.007</td>
<td>0.0006</td>
<td>0.008</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Authors’ regressions.

* Units of observation are MSAs according to the 1999 definitions, using primary rather than consolidated MSAs where applicable. Data for the dependent variables are from the U.S. Census Bureau as described in this appendix.

b. Calculated from the Census Public Use Microdata Sample (PUMS) as described in this appendix. The percent of workers with a college degree is first calculated for each industry code as defined by the Census Bureau. These numbers are then averaged for each metropolitan area, weighting by the distribution of industry employment in the metropolitan area from the 1980 PUMS.

c. Calculated using data from the International Trade Administration as described in this appendix as the value of an industry’s exports divided by the total value of its shipments. The industry-level export fraction is averaged for each metropolitan area, weighting by the distribution of industry employment in the metropolitan area from the 1980 PUMS.

d. Calculated from the PUMS as described in this appendix. A wage premium is first calculated for each industry code, as defined by the Census, as the industry fixed effect in a wage regression containing controls for individual age, sex, and education. These industry wage premiums are then averaged for each metropolitan area, weighting by the distribution of industry employment in the metropolitan area from the 1980 PUMS.
References


Comments and Discussion

COMMENT BY

ROBERT E. HALL  The issues addressed in this paper by Edward Glaeser and Joshua Gottlieb will be coming into focus in the United States in the rest of this century as the country adapts to rising energy prices, including the appropriate carbon tax. The economic geography of the United States features extremely low residential densities made possible by universal automobile travel over good roads. People here live in free-standing houses surrounded by lawns, a style of living almost unknown in the rest of the world apart from our close cousins, Canada and Australia. On the other hand, the United States lags far behind many East Asian and European countries in residential broadband deployment because our dwellings are so far apart.

The economic logic of raising residential density seems powerful, but so far none of the policies discouraging higher density have changed. California puts heavy taxes on cars and gives heavy subsidies to mass transit, but almost nobody uses mass transit, because it does not pass near where they live. Sixty-passenger diesel buses rumble up and down Silicon Valley’s El Camino, seldom carrying more than three passengers. And it is utterly unlawful to develop new land for housing or replace a single-family house with anything other than a new single-family house. Restrictions on land use condemn us to driving cars at a time when any reasonable society would shrink car travel substantially.

Glaeser and Gottlieb’s interesting and wide-ranging paper touches on a number of the research issues underlying the response to higher energy prices and many other policies that involve economic geography. The authors take the standard economist’s position that the primary case for government intervention is the correction of an externality. They find little sup-
port for the view that taxes and subsidies that vary by location alter the distribution of income or that they would be desirable if they did. They believe that an attack on income inequality through policies with direct effects on the income distribution would generally be better than the more roundabout approach of subsidizing the locations where the poor live. This conclusion is unlikely to be controversial at meetings of the Brookings Panel.

One might think that geographic policy faces the classic issue: Build on strength, or focus on improving the weak places? The paper takes the resolutely middle-of-the-road stand that policy should do neither. Policy should strive to do good for its own sake, not to alter the geographic distribution of economic activity.

The paper’s concern with geographic policy gives it something of a European flavor. Such policy is not on the agenda in the United States. In Europe, government puts substantial resources into subsidizing poorer areas, such as eastern Germany and southern Italy. Poor Portugal lost its EU subsidy when the European Union incorporated some of the countries of eastern Europe. I am not aware of any important policy push toward regional subsidies in the United States. We let our airlines sink or swim on their own, more or less—three sank in the week before this Brookings Panel meeting. There is no chance that Alitalia would still be flying if it were a U.S. airline. We tend to take the same tough-love attitude toward poorer regions. The authors set forth a good case for tough love toward cities like Detroit: no need to subsidize new housing there; Detroit already has plenty of cheap housing.

The paper pushes the point that it is not enough to identify spatial externalities to rationalize government intervention. To justify an intervention that moves people, say, from Boston to Philadelphia, one needs to show that the social gain per person moved is greater in Philadelphia than the loss in Boston. I concur with the authors that the earlier evidence in favor of agglomeration externalities is fairly compelling. Much of the interesting new empirical work in the paper shows that the marginal effects of pro-agglomeration policies are roughly the same across cities. The authors find no good evidence that moving people from city to city generates any net agglomeration economies.

The paper confirms earlier estimates of positive agglomeration effects. Using historical population as an instrument, equation 2-5 of their table 2 provides an instrumental variables estimate of the structural response—\((\omega - \alpha \gamma)/(1 - \alpha + \alpha \gamma)\) in their notation—of 0.089, a large effect by the standards of this literature. The authors back away from this finding,
however, saying, “. . . historical instruments of this kind do not naturally solve the identification problem in a spatial model. . . .” Their main concern is that using historical population as an instrument may be invalid, because it is correlated with current productivity differences. They quite properly dismiss the ordinary least squares results in table 2 because the identification assumption that current population is uncorrelated with productivity seems obviously false. One wonders why the pages of the Brookings Papers need to be cluttered with OLS results that the authors believe are invalid.

I am puzzled by some features of table 3. The basic idea is that the growth in income per capita has a structural coefficient of \((\omega - \alpha \gamma)/(1 - \alpha + \alpha \gamma)\) on population growth. Here \(\omega\) is the elasticity of agglomeration productivity with respect to population, \(1 - \alpha\) is the elasticity of output with respect to labor input, and \(\gamma\) is the factor share of fixed capital. The estimated value in equation 3-2 is 0.004. Thus, if \(1 - \alpha = 0.66\) and \(\alpha \gamma = 0.04\), values the authors suggest, then the implied value of the agglomeration coefficient \(\omega\) is 0.04, somewhat above the finding of the earlier literature. But the implied value of \(\gamma\) is a staggering 0.12. What is the basis for making fixed capital so important? Without fixed capital, that is, with \(\alpha \gamma = 0\), the implied value of \(\omega\) is 0.003, which is contrary to the entire theme of the paper that agglomeration is important. The authors defend their implicit assumption about the share of fixed capital by identifying it with nonresidential buildings. But buildings, although fixed in space, are not a fixed quantity over time, but instead are producible. In studying spatial equilibrium, I believe that one should take a long-run view, so that the durability of buildings is not a good argument in favor of the assumption that they are fixed. If fixed capital is limited to land (which is not really fixed either when production competes with housing in a city), the usual view is that its share is only a few percentage points. Thus table 3 seems to undermine the main idea of the paper that agglomeration itself is an important fact.

The authors go on to test whether the agglomeration effect differs by city size. They approach this issue by measuring the extra effect of population growth in larger places. Table 3 reports the results. It goes without saying that regression 3-1 should have been removed from the table, as neither the authors nor any reader is interested in OLS results when the right-hand variables are plainly endogenous.

The third coefficient in equation 3-3 in table 3 finds that the wage-population growth slope was lower in 2000 in larger places. The \(t\)-statistic on this effect is 1.2, indicating moderately persuasive evidence of smaller agglomeration effects in areas with higher population. Nonetheless, the
authors remain agnostic about the variation in agglomeration effects between small and large places. Given that the most important theme of the paper is that differences in marginal agglomeration effects are the primary rationalization for policies with spatial effects, I think this equation deserves a lot more attention. On its face, it contradicts the authors' general skepticism about disparities in marginal effects.

Table 4 investigates the relationship between city size and some of the adverse consequences of size. In this table the odd-numbered equations look for differences between large and small places, and the even-numbered equations look for differences based on centralization. Positive values of the coefficients in the second row indicate a nonlinearity that could be exploited by moving people from bigger to smaller cities. All of the size coefficients are essentially zero, suggesting the lack of any exploitable differences by city size. The coefficient in the fourth row measures the difference in the marginal effect of population in more centralized cities. Here the results are mixed. Congestion is more sensitive to population in more centralized cities, but pollution and murders are less sensitive. Sampling variation obscures any definite conclusion as well.

Although the authors are careful about endogenous right-hand variables in most of the empirical work in the paper, they drop that concern in table 4, where all estimation is by OLS. For congestion and air quality, the direction of the bias seems obviously downward. If a city has a geography that results in naturally high congestion—for example, if it surrounds a bay, so that traffic concentrates on the edges of the bay and along the few bridges that cross it—congestion will be high and population low. This implies a negative correlation between the disturbance in the regression and the right-hand variable, population, and a consequent downward bias. The same argument applies to air pollution, as some cities are in basins that collect polluted air. Los Angeles is smaller than it would be if the air circulated more effectively. Because nothing rules out nonlinear effects from endogeneity bias, the results on nonlinearity in table 4 are less than conclusive.

The authors might make the same point about city-size policy as they do about income redistribution: direct policies are surely better for dealing with congestion, pollution, and crime. Notwithstanding the recent setback in New York City, congestion taxation is making steady advances around the world. Progress in controlling air pollution in developed countries has been astronomical, and even China is beginning to take the issue seriously. Crime rates for less serious crimes have proven remarkably responsive to simple changes in law enforcement: the United States and Western Europe
have switched places over the past few decades, as burglary and mugging have declined here and exploded in Europe.

The first part of the section of the paper titled “U.S. Policies toward Places” deals with transportation and presents moderately persuasive evidence that canals, railroads, highways, and airports shape urban growth. The paper does not delve into evidence on the marginal effects of transport subsidies on different places. The authors conclude, “current spending does not appear to be targeting the high-income, high-density areas where the agglomeration effects are likely to be strongest.” I don’t see where the empirical work supports this conclusion. The authors’ observation that it may be desirable to subsidize transportation in poor areas for its direct effect does not involve agglomeration effects.

The section of the paper on housing policy argues that policy has not made the mistake of trying to attract people to particular places by subsidizing housing there, but rather has made the huge mistake of constraining density and thus grossly failing to achieve the social optimum where land prices are maximal. As I noted at the beginning, these policies may need to relent in the face of high and rising fuel prices, especially when the appropriate carbon tax is included in fuel prices.

COMMENT BY

PAUL ROMER  Economists do not quite know what to make of the yin and yang of cities. More than 150 years ago, Frédéric Bastiat famously captured the invisible-hand yin:

On coming to Paris for a visit, I said to myself: Here are a million human beings who would all die in a few days if supplies of all sorts did not flow into this great metropolis. It staggers the imagination to try to comprehend the vast multiplicity of objects that must pass through its gates tomorrow. . . . What, then, is the resourceful and secret power that governs the amazing regularity of such complicated movements? . . . That power is an absolute principle, the principle of free exchange.¹

So cities are the perfect illustration of the miracle of the market, right?

Not exactly. Turns out that economists can’t capture what goes on in a city with the model of competitive equilibrium that is supposed to capture the invisible hand. Cities are dense with goods and services that are characterized by inherent nonconvexities and therefore cannot be pro-

vided competitively: water, sewerage, garbage collection, electric power, communications, roads, parks, police protection. More fundamentally, in a model of perfect competition, cities should not even exist. If production technologies exhibited the kind of convexity required to show that one can use the price system to achieve an efficient outcome with prices, there would be no reason to pile up so much economic activity on so little land.

Like their colleagues who have had to confront fundamental nonconvexities in international trade and economic growth, economists working on cities have invoked both the Marshallian extension of the competitive equilibrium model based on external increasing returns, and the more recent extension based on monopolistic competition. With these extensions, they can build models in which people are willing to pay high prices for the chance to be around lots of other people. But these extensions get one only partway toward a model that can capture the variety of outcomes in different cities. In the universe of interactions that take place in dense urban environments, the missing markets far outnumber the ones that are present. As a result, the nonmarket mechanisms that city governments use to control public health, crime, traffic, air pollution, noise, sight lines, visual clutter, and the activities permitted in any specific location make a world of difference to the quality of city life. Someone comparing life in Lagos today with life in Paris in 1845 might reasonably conclude that successful cities tell us more about some miracle of good governance than about the miracle of the market.

Getting the right perspective on cities would not matter much if cities themselves did not matter, but of course they do. Half of the people on earth now live in cities. Most of the other half live in grinding poverty. Despite the romance of the rural that infiltrates many discussions of development, it seems likely that this second half will escape from poverty only when most of them can find places to live and work in cities. So even before taking account of population growth, either the world will need a lot more cities, or the existing ones will have to get a lot bigger. It is a pressing priority to understand the appropriate roles for markets and governments in carrying out this expansion.

In a rich country like the United States, the structural transformation that moves most people into cities is largely complete, but the United States will experience significant population growth in the coming century, and so Americans, too, have to think about the processes that will determine where the growth in urban population will take place. Moreover, although the United States does not face the same challenge in reduc-
ing poverty that remains in much of the world, income inequality driven by the interaction between skill and technology will likely be a growing policy concern. The facts that Edward Glaeser and Joshua Gottlieb cite at the beginning of their paper suggest that there may be an important interaction between urbanization on the one side and skills and technology on the other. Moreover, whatever that connection was in the past, it may now be changing.

So the issues that Glaeser and Gottlieb touch on in this paper are among the most challenging for economists and the most important for policymakers. The common thread in my comments will be that economists can provide the most help to policymakers by focusing more on understanding the fundamental issues and less on trying to do their job of designing or advocating specific policies.

This paper has two conceptually distinct parts: a summary of key facts about urban areas in the United States, and an analysis of various U.S. federal policies toward cities and regions. The bulk of the paper is devoted to this second part. Here it seems to me the authors are overly constrained by the requirement (whether self-imposed or externally imposed) that they speak directly to the wisdom of specific federal policies. This part is rich with detail but can be boiled down to a simple summary message: In formulating policy toward cities, economists should focus on the yin and ignore the yang. The authors conclude that there is little evidence to support the expansion or continuation of any of the active government policies they consider. The only positive role they can find is for the feds to suppress an active policy (land use restrictions) implemented by some local governments. If one takes the “do no harm” view seriously, telling government to do nothing may be safe advice, but the contrast between Lagos and Paris suggests that policy errors of omission can be as harmful as those of commission.

There are at least three ways to interpret the conclusion that emerges from this paper—that no policy is good policy. The first is that market mechanisms are all it takes to achieve an efficient outcome, so there is no room for government policy in the development and operation of cities. The second is that government matters, but that in the United States policy has already been optimized, so that no further policies are needed (other than perhaps to drop some old bad ideas). The third is that government policy matters a lot and is far from being optimal, but the required policies are best implemented at the local level, and so the federal government, which seems to be the audience for the advice offered here, had best stay out of the way.
The first of these positions, that government services do not matter, seems intellectually indefensible to me. I suspect that the authors would agree, and if so, it might be worth saying so explicitly, because the paper is simply silent on this point. The second seems unlikely to me, but because I am not a specialist, I am not sure how much evidence one could marshal to undermine it. But as for the third position, if the quality of governance explains part of the difference between Paris in 1845 and Lagos today, might it not explain part of the difference between Pine Bluff, Arkansas, and Sioux Falls, South Dakota? Or between New York in 1970 and New York today?

My hunch is that there is, in fact, a lot of variation in the quality of governance between different cities in the United States, just as there is in the quality of management between firms. Economists might be no better at prescribing what managers of city and state governments should do than at prescribing what managers of firms should do, but it does not follow that the quality of governance is irrelevant. Nor does it follow that economists have nothing useful to say.

For example, if there is variation in the quality of city governance, then the mobility of people has added significance that is captured neither in the model nor in the verbal analysis. But allowing for mobility of people clearly cannot solve all the problems associated with bad city governance. People can move but most physical capital cannot. In principle, one might want to consider mechanisms that could do for the enormous amount of capital that can be trapped in a badly run city what a private equity takeover or a bankruptcy can do for capital trapped in a badly managed firm.

The paper is strongest when it develops or deepens a robust abstract insight. A good example is what the authors call the concept of spatial equilibrium, which is based on the observation that people can freely move between cities. As the authors observe, this fact has deep implications for how one looks at, for example, the difference in average income between Brownsville and Bridgeport. It does not make sense to try to help people living in Brownsville by making Brownsville more like Bridgeport. For someone living in Brownsville, if moving to Bridgeport will not make her better off, moving Bridgeport to her will not help either. This insight is important and not obvious. The paper makes a good start at driving this point home.

There is room to contribute other robust general insights like this one in a model that is more flexible than the one presented in the paper. To illustrate what this model might look like and the kind of results it might gen-
erate, consider two cities on two islands, one larger in area than the other. Workers consume land and a single produced good. Firms produce output using land and labor. To simplify the analysis of migration between the two islands, assume that all land is owned by absentee landlords.

Next, consider adding in two types of agglomeration effects. Suppose first that productivity in a city is an increasing function of its population, precisely as in the paper’s model. In addition, assume that the utility that a consumer can achieve per unit of expenditure is also an increasing function of the number of people who live in the city. The assumption about productivity is easy to rationalize using a variety-in-production model. In just the same way, the assumption about additional utility from being around others can be captured in a variety-in-consumption model.

It seems clear that the following results should hold in this two-island model:

1. If there is any agglomeration effect in production or consumption, population density will be higher on the larger of the two islands.

2. As a special case, suppose that agglomeration effects are present in production but not in consumption. Assume as well that land is used only in production. Because of the agglomeration effect, total factor productivity will be higher on the larger island. However, wages and the marginal productivity of labor will be equal between the two cities. Firms producing on the larger island will face a higher cost of land and use less land per worker.

3. Continue to suppose that there are no agglomeration benefits in consumption, only in production. Now, in contrast to case 2, assume that land is used only in consumption. Then wages and labor productivity will be higher on the larger island. Land will be more expensive there, and land consumed per person will be lower.

4. Now reverse the assumption about agglomeration benefits. Suppose that there are no agglomeration benefits in production but there are agglomeration benefits in consumption. Continue to assume that land is used only in consumption. Then wages will be the same in the two cities, but housing will be more expensive on the larger island. Workers there will consume less land and (depending on the elasticity of demand for land) may have more or less income to spend on other goods. They will derive more utility from each unit of spending on produced goods.

Because the situation outlined in case 4 does not arise in the model considered in the paper, it is worth pausing briefly to evaluate its plausibility. One implication of this case is that because of the broader variety of consumption activities that the larger island offers, someone who is wealthy
and who does not work might choose to live there even though the price of land is higher. This sounds like the behavior one observes in at least some cities, but under model 3, the one assumed in the paper in which the only benefits from density come via production, someone who did not work would never choose to live in the larger and denser city.

The richer class of models outlined here offers several insights that differ slightly from the analysis in the paper. First, in the section on basic facts about cities, the paper’s discussion of agglomeration effects seems to suggest that these effects are present only if wages are higher in more dense or more populous locations. The broader class of models outlined here suggests that agglomeration effects are present any time population density is higher in one place than in another. In effect, once there are cities, some kind of agglomeration effect must be operating. Given this, all that the analysis of cross-sectional differences in wages can do is provide a window into the form that these agglomeration effects take. In cases 2 and 4, wages are the same across cities. In case 2, firms trade higher total factor productivity against higher costs of land. In case 4, consumers pay higher prices for housing to access better consumption opportunities.

A blended version of cases 2 and 4 is particularly interesting because of the key fact cited in the early section of the paper: people who move between cities in the United States do not experience an immediate increase in their wage on moving to a bigger city. Taking these cases and this fact at face value, one has to recognize that the apparent correlation between city size or density and wages may have nothing to do with agglomeration effects. Instead it may simply reflect differences in the characteristics of the workers in different cities—differences that are not adequately captured even with the standard individual variables in a wage regression.

Other basic facts cited in the early part of the paper also suggest that worker heterogeneity and positive assortment of worker types across cities are a crucial part of the observed variation across cities, one that may be becoming more firmly entrenched over time. Skilled cities are becoming even more skilled. Interestingly, they no longer seem to be the fastest-growing cities. It is as if they are limiting population growth and swapping lower-skilled for higher-skilled residents. In a development that may be related, in the 1980s and 1990s, incomes in different cities stopped converging.

All of these facts call for a model with at least two types of workers. To see what this might look like, suppress for the moment the questions addressed in cases 2 through 4 above. That is, set aside the issue of pre-
cisely where the agglomeration effects show up (in production or in consumption) and where a higher cost of land pinches as cities get more dense (on the production side or the consumption side). Instead, consider a very reduced form model in which utility is linear in a general-purpose form of consumption good that is produced from land, low-skilled labor, high-skilled labor, and roads. Roads are provided by the local government and are available at no charge to all city residents. Here roads are a stand-in for any of the many different services provided by local governments. In this simple model it is easiest to take the stock of roads as given by history and set aside the question of how inputs provided by the government are financed and produced.

In this reduced-form equilibrium, the stock of land, skilled and unskilled labor, and roads produce total output $Y$. Skilled and unskilled labor are paid returns that may be greater than or less than their marginal product in producing $Y$. Agglomeration effects will tend to make the private return to an additional worker less than the social return. By itself, unpriced access to a congestible good like a road will tend to make the private return to a worker who comes to this town greater than the social return.

Imagine that the positive agglomeration effects are larger for high-skilled than for low-skilled workers. (This, too, could easily be captured in a variety model where skilled workers are the inputs needed in the fixed-cost process that creates new goods.) Assume that the congestion costs from more users of roads are the same for all workers. If the congestion effects are large enough, the net social return to an additional low-skilled worker could be lower than the private return. At the same time, because the high-skilled workers generate agglomeration effects, the social return to an additional high-skilled worker is higher than the private return. If the stock of roads cannot be changed, cities in this kind of environment might maximize income for those who remain by limiting increases in the total population, particularly if in so doing they screen out low-skilled workers and allow in the high-skilled workers. Better still, they could induce the low-skilled workers already present to leave as high-skilled workers enter.

The point here is that there may be important links among (i) the clustering by ability that may be behind the higher wages observed in bigger and denser cities, (ii) the tendency for skilled cities to become more skilled yet, recently, to grow more slowly, and (iii) intentional growth-limiting policies. Because of these links, flexible theories that let us understand cities more completely and that have a chance at capturing all of the disparate trends outlined in the early part of the paper might offer a better
basis for thinking seriously about the reasons behind growth limitations and what their aggregate effects might be.

The paper’s discussion of growth limitations turns on the observation that the same home would sell for only a slightly higher price if it were moved to a town with regulations that increase the minimum lot size, resulting in a lower population density. The coefficient estimate that the authors report for the effect of density on housing prices suggests that cutting the average lot size in half and doubling the number of houses would reduce the price per house by only about 10 percent. This certainly does seem to suggest that towns are not maximizing the value of their land.

But a closer look shows that the regressions that find this surprisingly small effect of density on house price also show that, holding density constant, each additional regulatory barrier to new construction increases home prices by about 7 percent. This suggests that the barriers are acting through channels other than density. Moreover, the descriptive data show that lower density is associated with a higher percentage of white residents, a lower percentage of residents who are foreign-born, and a higher percentage of residents with a B.A. degree. It therefore seems possible that lot size restrictions are part of a larger package of policies that may actually be adjusting the skill mix in ways that increase the number of high-skilled workers and decrease the number of low-skilled workers.

Without a full model, one cannot say whether decentralized decisions by individual cities about the mix of residents by skill type will be efficiency enhancing or not, even if they do increase the local value of land. Nor can one say what effects such policies might have on overall inequality. Because there are many possible models, and the evidence will probably not narrow them down to just one, any investigation of these issues will probably not lead to precise policy recommendations. Nevertheless, the facts from the first section of the paper about the evolving skill mix across cities, and the changing relationship between skill on the one side and population growth and convergence in income on the other, strike me as the most provocative part of the paper. I think the authors could usefully have devoted less attention to the analysis of specific policies and instead have given us a richer set of models that could help us better understand what these facts are telling us about cities, governments, and markets.

GENERAL DISCUSSION  Lawrence Summers remarked that some of the paper’s conclusions would be shocking to any local politician actually engaged in place-making policies. In particular, most would be surprised to hear that investment in urban renewal has no impact except to create capital gains for homeowners. Benjamin Friedman compared the notion that place-making policies have zero impact to the Malthusian model, which worked under a certain set of conditions but not when those conditions changed. Local politicians may want to know how to discriminate between circumstances in which place-making policies are effectual and those in which they are not. Edward Glaeser replied that his model differs from the Malthusian model in that local investment positively affects the welfare of the whole society, even if utility is equilibrated over space; one party does not gain at the expense of another. For example, if an investment in Baltimore makes Baltimore more productive, the spatial model predicts that utility outside Baltimore will eventually equal that in Baltimore, but the utility of all will be higher. Summers suggested that the authors defend the idea that utility is really the same in all areas, as this is highly counterintuitive to most people.

Robert Gordon observed that the pattern of growth and decline of American cities seems to suggest convergence across regions in terms of income per capita relative to the U.S. average, with a few exceptions. For example, metro-area relative income per capita in the former Confederate states has risen in the last forty years, while that in old Midwestern industrial cities such as Detroit and Cleveland has declined. Urban growth seems consistently driven by desirability of location only in coastal cities, such as San Francisco, Seattle, and the Northeastern cities. To explain low urban density in the United States, Gordon cited four factors that date back to the 1940s: the tax deductibility of mortgage interest, zoning regulations that preclude small suburban lot sizes, the starvation of mass transit, and the subsidization of interstate highways. On this point Lawrence Katz suggested that increasing urban density may not be optimal from a global health perspective, even though it may be optimal from a global pollution perspective.

Katz noted further that the paper focused on static, long-run equilibrium issues. He would have liked to see more discussion of how policies might reduce barriers to migration when people are hit with negative shocks or find better opportunities elsewhere.

Rebecca Blank observed that most place-making policies focus on creating spillovers among neighborhoods within a particular municipality,
not on allocating investment among different regions of the country. She suggested that the paper could address more local, intracity concerns.

Gary Becker expressed surprise at the emphasis on the wage effects of migration. He noted that the impact on real wages of nominal wage versus land price changes is sensitive to how production and consumption processes are modeled. Thus, it is difficult to determine how much regional growth or decline is reflected in movement in wages and how much in changes in land prices.

Martin Baily observed that land use policies have a large impact on productivity growth. Changing industry composition is an important factor in productivity growth, and countries that heavily regulate land use make such change more difficult. In the case of declining areas, it seems clear that whatever equilibrium was once in place has changed, and it may not make sense to preserve places that have lost their economic base. Still, individuals and families in these places can incur major losses (if housing prices decline, for example), and one could make a case for helping them. One way might be to facilitate their relocation to a different city.