Report

Addressing the other COVID crisis: Corruption

and

Introduction

The need for oversight of Trump administration coronavirus spending has reached an inflection point.1 Over the past few weeks, there have been reports that 27 clients of Trump-connected lobbyists have received up to $10.5 billion of that spending;2 that beneficiaries have also included multiple entities linked to the family of Jared Kushner and other Trump associates and political allies;3 that up to $273 million was awarded to more than 100 companies that are owned or operated by major donors to Trump’s election efforts;4 that unnecessary blanket ethics waivers have been applied to potential administration conflicts of interest;5 and that many other transactions meriting further investigation have occurred.6

All this comes in a climate of Trump administration hostility to oversight. During negotiations on the CARES Act, the president claimed that he personally would “be the oversight.”7 He backed up that assertion with a signing statement after passage of the CARES Act stating that he would not treat some of the inspector general reporting requirements as mandatory.8 The Treasury Department followed his lead by initially refusing to disclose the recipients of Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) funds.9 They only relented in the face of crushing public and congressional pressure, resulting in a bevy of startling disclosures that call out for oversight.10

In this paper, we offer an assessment of how newly established congressional and executive branch COVID-19 oversight authorities should proceed in the face of these developments. In part one, we outline the four principal new oversight structures, assess the largely nascent state of their work, and point to strengths and weaknesses in their overall structure. We note that the two executive branch authorities appear already to have been threatened or adversely affected by President Trump, putting more pressure on the two congressional structures to achieve high functioning.11

“The existence of vigorous oversight will ensure that the money disbursed by the CARES Act gets to the people who need and are entitled to those funds.”

In part two of the paper, we outline what these new oversight authorities can—and must—do to meet the urgency of the moment. That includes moving (more) rapidly, coordinating their operations and providing complete data. The existence of vigorous oversight will ensure that the money disbursed by the CARES Act gets to the people who need and are entitled to those funds. Conversely, inadequate oversight will mean favorable treatment for friends of the president and less relief for struggling small business owners and other American firms and individuals. The former is essential and the latter, abhorrent.

Part 1. The new oversight mechanisms: Strengths and weaknesses

There are four new oversight bodies concerned with Trump administration coronavirus spending. The CARES Act established three of them that have different ambits and powers to oversee disbursement of the funds and their impact on the economy: The Congressional Oversight Commission (COC),12 Pandemic Response Accountability Committee (PRAC),13 and the Special Inspector General for Pandemic Recovery (SIGPR).14 Additionally, the U.S. House of Representatives established a Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, meant to provide its own oversight of spending and other matters.15

A. The Congressional Oversight Commission (COC)

The COC is composed of five members, including one chair, each selected by a Congressional leader.16 The four current members are Pat Toomey (R-Pa.), Bharat Ramamurti, Donna Shalala (D-Fla.), and French Hill (R-Ark.).17 The chair is meant to be selected jointly by House Speaker Nancy Pelosi (D-Calif.) and Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.); the position is still vacant even though the other members had all been named by April 17.18 Press reports had indicated that Gen. (ret.) Joseph Dunford, was being vetted for the role of chair, but he has recently withdrawn from consideration, seemingly putting the search back to square one.19

The COC’s purpose is to submit monthly reports that assess the impacts of the CARES Act funds on the economy as a whole.20 To do this, they can hire staff, hold hearings, and obtain official federal government data, but do not have subpoena power.21 Of the trillions of dollars appropriated to deal with the crisis, the COC is meant to assess a $500 billion slice allocated to Treasury to lend to businesses and state and local governments to support and stabilize the economy.22

Without a chair, the COC has had a slow start. It has published three reports as of this writing.23 The first, on May 18, was mostly comprised of background information on the coronavirus crisis and the ensuing legislation, as well as questions that the commission would seek to answer in its later work.24 The second report, published on June 18, found that while the Federal Reserve had established five lending facilities in which Treasury could disburse the money, less than $100 billion of that $500 billion had actually been disbursed thus far, and only two of the five facilities had made any loans.25 The $500 billion invested in the facilities is ultimately intended to support nearly $2 trillion in lending, but as of the report date, the facilities had lent just $6.7 billion.26 The majority of that money—$5.5 billion—was spent by the Secondary Market Corporate Credit Facility, meant to support businesses by purchasing corporate debt and ETFs to instill liquidity in the credit market.27 On June 2, the Fed made its first loan through the Municipal Liquidity Facility, a $1.2 billion disbursement to Illinois.28 The other facilities, meant to support businesses by purchasing majority stakes in their loans, have not yet made any loans.29 The Main Street Lending Facility has begun accepting registrants but has not yet announced any disbursements, and the Primary Market Corporate Credit Facility and Term Auction Loan Facility are not operating at all.30

“[B]ecause of possible gaps in other oversight, a high-functioning Congressional Oversight Commission is critical to the overall oversight structure.”

While COC awaits full functionality, journalists have attempted to fill some of the void, and their work only highlights the urgency of getting the COC up and running. A recent investigative report found that the Treasury official running the coronavirus bailout maintains financial ties to a firm—founded by his father—that primarily trades in corporate debt, including junk bonds.31 This conflict of interest is made more concerning by the facts that the Fed has never before bought corporate debt, and that the facility buying corporate debt was the first Fed facility to be capitalized.32 COC member Bharat Ramamurti addressed the story on his personal Twitter account: “In the nine weeks since Congress gave the Treasury and the Fed $500 billion for economic ‘stabilization,’ they’ve used less than 10% of the money to create a single program that has serious conflicts of interest and, at best, a weak connection to stopping ongoing job losses.”33 This comment is important, but means less coming from a single member of the Commission on his Twitter account than it would from a full Commission, with adequate staffing, publishing regular reports, and holding regular public hearings. Indeed, upon publication of the COC’s second report, Ramamurti opined that the lack of an appointed Chair and staff posed “serious obstacles to performing robust oversight.”34

It is urgent that the COC gets a chair and a full staff so it will be able to fully undertake its work on the impact of the CARES Act on the economy. Until that happens, we cannot judge its effectiveness. As we shall see, because of possible gaps in other oversight, a high-functioning COC is critical to the overall oversight structure.

B. The Pandemic Response Accountability Committee (PRAC)

The PRAC is currently made up of 20 inspectors general from across the federal government (and will expand to 21 when the Special Inspector General for Pandemic Recovery eventually joins). Nine members were specified by the CARES Act, and 11 others have come from various agencies.35 The PRAC chair—appointed by the Chairperson for the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency (CIGIE)—is currently Michael Horowitz, who is also the inspector general (IG) for the DOJ.36 Horowitz, who is also the chair of CIGIE, had appointed Glenn Fine to be chair of PRAC on March 30. However, President Trump replaced Fine as acting IG of the Department of Defense, making him ineligible to serve as PRAC chair.37 Horowitz appointed Robert Westbrooks to the position of Executive Director on April 27, and personally stepped in to serve as Acting Chair of the PRAC.38

Unlike the COC, the PRAC is designed to prevent and detect fraud, waste, and abuse in disbursement of CARES Act funds by auditing and reviewing those funds and contracts made under them.39 The PRAC also has a public-facing role, as the legislation requires it to set up a public website to promote transparency in CARES Act funding, providing detailed information on any disbursement over $150,000.40

The PRAC has a wider array of powers than the COC. In addition to the ability to commission audits, studies, and analyses, the PRAC has several ways of gathering information.41 The CARES Act provides a muscular subpoena power.42 The PRAC’s subpoena power allows it to compel both documents and testimony from non-federal employees, unlike the standard IG power that only allows for documents.43 From federal sources, the statute allows the PRAC to request and obtain information directly from the federal government, and “immediately” report the circumstances to Congress if the information is not provided.44 The PRAC also shall report to the Attorney General if it has any reasonable concern that federal criminal law has been violated.45

Other agencies are also required to report monthly to the PRAC on disbursements over $150,000. Each recipient of funds over $150,000 from any agency is required to provide quarterly reports to the disbursing agency and the PRAC on the total amount of funds received, and detail how disbursements over $150,000 were used, including the name and description of project, and the estimated number of jobs created or retained by the project.46

Related Content

The PRAC set up its website on April 27, per the legislation.47 The website contains a high-level overview of what industries and bodies funds were appropriated for, as well as several spreadsheets outlining the disposition of the funds in somewhat more detail. One spreadsheet depicts how much each federal agency has spent, totaling over $17 billion, and describes to what type of institutions the money went.48 Website users can also look through contracts at the state and county level, with each individual contract broken out with identifying information, including agency, amount, and a (very) brief description of the good or service contracted for.49

It is too soon to tell whether the PRAC will provide the robust oversight hoped for from it, and the president’s assault on Fine was a blow. Acting Chair Horowitz is capable and dedicated, but already has two major jobs at DOJ and CIGIE. There is no telling if the president will also interfere with or remove the next permanent chair. Because of the president’s power over IG’s, and his demonstrated proclivity for abusing it, this pillar of oversight remains at risk despite its broad powers and the many hard-working and talented IG’s associated with it.

C. The Special Inspector General for Pandemic Recovery (SIGPR)

The SIGPR is nominated by the president and confirmed by the Senate.50 This IG takes a fine-grained look at the loans and investments made by the Treasury Department under the CARES Act, auditing them to determine whether each business was eligible for each sort of funding; explain why it was appropriate to make each transaction; describe each person made to manage each loan; and calculate the amount of loans made, and the government’s loss or gain on each one.51 Quarterly, the SIGPR is to issue reports summarizing the above information.52

To accomplish these goals, the SIGPR can hire experts and commission studies, and request information from the federal government.53 If requested information is not provided, the SIPGR too can report the circumstances to Congress.54

The SIGPR’s subpoena power is limited to that of other federal agency IGs.55 Thus, the SIGPR can only subpoena documents and records from non-federal government entities but cannot compel testimony.56 Further, the IG statute does not allow IGs to subpoena even records from federal government agencies, instead providing that “procedures other than subpoenas shall be used by the Inspector General to obtain documents and information from federal agencies.”57

Brian D. Miller was nominated to be SIGPR on April 6. He had previously worked as a White House lawyer for the president, and there were profound questions about whether he could provide the type of rigorous oversight that is required. As a result, he spent some time making his way through the confirmation process.58 He was confirmed by the Senate on June 2 on a mostly party-line vote, with just one Democratic senator voting to confirm.59 This record does not inspire confidence that the SIGPR will do the job that is needed. This puts more pressure on the other entities in the oversight structure to function at a high level.

D. The U.S. House Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis

One final oversight body was created independently of the CARES Act. The United States House Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis was voted into existence on party lines on April 23.60 The Subcommittee is chaired by James Clyburn (D-S.C.) and its members include six other Democrats and five Republicans. This body was given a broad remit: reporting on the efficacy, equity, and transparency of taxpayer funds used during any aspect of the crisis, from preparedness and response, to executive branch policies, to the economic impact of the crisis, to the executive branch’s response to oversight.61 The Subcommittee can use subpoena power and hold public hearings.62 While they have access to House records, they do not have direct access to federal government data, with the instruction to report to Congress if it is not freely given, as the other, CARES Act-created oversight bodies, do. The subpoena power should allow them to access this information, but the Trump administration has shown itself willing to reject subpoenas and attempt to drag out court fights on a number of occasions and may be willing to do so with respect to the Subcommittee as well.63

“The U.S. House Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis has used its oversight authority and gotten results.”

The Subcommittee has used its oversight authority and gotten results. The day after the Republican appointees were announced, the Subcommittee sent public letters to five companies asking that they return PPP small business loans, and if not, to produce all PPP-related communications between the company and various banks and government entities.64 Each of the companies had market capitalizations of over $25 million, over 600 employees, and had received PPP loans of $10 million. Unfortunately, only the Democratic members of the Subcommittee signed on to the letters and Steve Scalise (R-La.), the Republican leader of the Subcommittee, released a statement calling the action “outrageous” and “harassing.”65

Despite that, the Subcommittee scored a quick win. One company, MiMedx, quickly returned their $10 million loan.66 The four others have not, either stating that they qualify for, and need, the funds due to unique circumstances, or simply keeping quiet.67 In one case, a bipartisan group of congressmembers sent an open letter to the Subcommittee expressing their support for allowing Universal Stainless and Alloy Products to keep the funds, likely bolstering the company’s decision not to return the loan and undermining the effectiveness of the initial letter from the Subcommittee.68

Aside from the PPP dustup, the Subcommittee has taken additional and effective actions, including successfully applying pressure to increase transparency for PPP recipients.69 Congressional urging was an important part of reversing the administration’s initial refusal to provide that information. The Subcommittee has also held hearings on a range of issues, including protections for essential workers, aid to cities, and racial disparities in the impact of coronavirus.70 There was both Democratic and Republican participation in these hearings, though not necessarily consensus. On June 2, the Subcommittee sent a letter to the secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services requesting copies of the contracts that the federal government had made with private companies to manufacture coronavirus vaccines to ensure that they would be affordable when completed.71 This letter was signed by two Democratic members of the Subcommittee: James Clyburn and Carolyn Maloney, with their Republican counterparts cc’d.72

The Subcommittee has an absolutely critical role to play given the doubts about the SIGPR, the presidential danger to the PRAC, and the limited remit of the COC, not to mention the COC’s failure so far to achieve full functionality. The Subcommittee should continue to ramp up its work rapidly and impactfully. We now turn to how it, and the other oversight authorities, should do that.

Section 2. Three main strategies for oversight

As the new oversight bodies seek to gain momentum, they would do well to take lessons from what did and did not work in past oversight efforts, including of the funds spent in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis. Three principal points stand out: providing fast disclosure, making complete disclosure, and deconflicting oversight.

1. Fast disclosure

The speed of disclosure is crucial not only for spotting trends and adjusting on the fly, but so that funds can be disbursed before too many small businesses collapse and industries unduly consolidate. One immediate outcome of the Treasury Department’s decision in the 2008 financial crisis to rescue large banks while letting smaller ones collapse was consolidation among the biggest and healthiest banks; “America’s largest banks today manage an even greater fraction of the nation’s wealth than before the crisis.”73 Further out into the future, there was potential for even greater consolidation; bigger banks were considered safer by investors because they had more assets to fall back on and were more likely to be bailed out by the government in a future crisis.74

“The speed of disclosure is crucial not only for spotting trends and adjusting on the fly, but so that funds can be disbursed before too many small businesses collapse and industries unduly consolidate.”

These concerns are no less important in the current crisis, including because the coronavirus crisis if anything affects a broader range of businesses and sectors of the economy. If CARES Act funds are not spent quickly enough, smaller businesses without sufficient financial cushion will either fail, or will be bought out by larger ones, increasing consolidation across the board. This is particularly troubling given the already-high levels of both product and labor market consolidation across a wide variety of industries.75 Excessive consolidation is not necessarily a danger for every industry the way it was for banks after the 2008 crisis. For some industries, such as non-chain restaurants and mom-and-pop small businesses, the greatest economic concern is not industry consolidation, but outright failure due to an inability to pay their bills. Fast disclosure is crucial for these types of businesses as well, since systemic errors in disbursement that take too long to catch can result in failure of these businesses.

Fast disclosure can prevent these dramatic shifts in the economy by allowing oversight bodies to stay on top of the range of government agencies disbursing money across industries, ensuring that the money gets to the appropriate parties as quickly as possible, and making recommendations as needed to enable small businesses to survive beyond the crisis. For example, when the Federal Reserve initially announced the terms of its Municipal Liquidity Facility (MLF), the parameters would have excluded the 35 most African-American cities, whose residents were already disproportionately affected by the pandemic.76 In response to this problem, the Fed expanded the standards to include some of those previously left-out cities.77 This correction only occurred because the Fed was fully transparent with its terms early in the process and journalists, politicians, and academics were able to identify the issue and raise the problem. Had the terms been secret, the disparity would only have been discovered much later, after the impacts of denying loans to those cities had occurred.

Each of the oversight bodies has the power to obtain data from the federal government and should use this power frequently to fully obtain the information necessary for analyzing the efficacy of the program. It should be noted that the speed of the disclosure has already been hindered from multiple quarters. President Trump fired the first PRAC Chair, leading to replacement with an acting chair and a 20-day delay until a new executive director could be appointed. The COC still does not have a chair. The SIGPR was just confirmed on June 2. All told, it is crucial that these bodies begin their work as quickly as possible to prevent unfortunate knock-on effects resulting from delayed action.

2. Complete disclosure

Just as important as the speed of disclosure is completeness. Especially in an unprecedented situation like this, complete disclosure allows for the government, the oversight bodies, and watchdog groups to fully analyze the data and adopt to unexpected trends. The initial release of PPP data this week was welcome but represents just a small fraction of spending to date. Full disclosure is urgently needed.

History offers a guide to the difference this can make. To take one example, during the 2008 financial crisis, the Treasury Department made the logical assumption that providing funds to banks through the Capital Purchase Program (CPP) would spur them to lend to businesses. In reality, a retrospective analysis by the Congressional Oversight Panel (COP) found that there was no correlation between provision of CPP funds and new lending by banks.78 Because Treasury did not gather the data to assess this at the time, they undoubtedly wasted vast amounts of money on this program that could have been better spent elsewhere. Better collection and analysis of data could have directed the funds in a more effective manner.

The oversight bodies should use the most cutting-edge technology available to build on the model established by the Recovery Accountability and Transparency (RAT) Board to anticipate problems and assess disbursement of the funds.79 By tracking the funds and using data analytics to highlight suspicious activity, the oversight bodies can better focus their resources on problematic areas and ensure that accuracy is not sacrificed in the name of speed. Federal government transparency of TARP funds improved over time, and the coronavirus oversight bodies should push the agencies to begin from where TARP was at its most transparent and go even further.80 At a minimum, Treasury should offer information as to where every dollar is going, and what it will be used for, disclosing every step in the process. As was done by the end of TARP, Treasury should post contracts online and disclose the identity of subcontractors.81

“Comprehensive disclosure has already been hampered by the administration.”

Comprehensive disclosure has already been hampered by the administration. The IG of the Treasury Department reported that “Treasury has not provided user-friendly means for recipients [of CARES Act funds] to meet reporting requirements.”82 When the IG raised this issue with Treasury, the department initially asserted that the reporting requirements only applied to part of the CARES Act (Division B, and not Division A), which would exclude much of the Act from oversight.83 Relying on this reasoning, the reporting requirements would have excluded the vast majority of the CARES Act, including the $349 billion PPP, the nearly $500 billion for the Fed facilities, and the $150 billion directed toward states, territories, and tribes.84

Under pressure from all sides, Treasury relented and released PPP data this week, but even that disclosure included less than 75% of the total PPP money and 15% of the borrowers.85 Treasury also backed down from their overall claim that only Division B was subject to reporting requirements in a recent letter.86 Nevertheless, there is much more information, about the PPP and other programs, that the government can and should provide.

3. Deconflicting oversight

The four bodies have separate but overlapping powers and areas of responsibility. It is paramount that they liaise with each other and share information to effectively coordinate, reduce redundancy, and improve the efficacy of each of the other bodies.

With its mandate to detect systemic waste, fraud, and abuse in disbursement of CARES Act funds, the PRAC should focus on gathering and analyzing data. That will ensure the public knows where every dollar is going and what it is being used for, and allow the PRAC to spot trends in order to adjust the legislation and priorities as needed. This requires a far more detailed public analysis than is currently available on the website. The PRAC should publicize its existing website to encourage and empower citizens to find out information relevant to their zip codes and report suspicious activity they are aware of.87

SIGPR should take a closer look at that information to drill down on bad actors to recover misused funds and, where necessary, turn over fraudsters to the DOJ for prosecution. To date, the SIGTARP has recovered $11 billion, a return on investment of over 3,000%, and convicted 384 people with a 97% conviction rate.88 Importantly, the SIGPR should be staffed with industry and CARES Act-specific expertise to catch fraudsters, especially those who will use the new law to commit fraud in novel ways.

Standard law enforcement personnel will investigate and prosecute frauds as they come upon them as well; this has already happened even in the program’s infancy.89 Nevertheless, with trillions of dollars going out the door, there is simply too much activity to rely on traditional law enforcement personnel alone to police every fraud. It will be essential to have dedicated and expert staff to investigate the sophisticated frauds that will undoubtedly occur.

“[W]ith trillions of dollars going out the door, there is simply too much activity to rely on traditional law enforcement personnel alone to police every fraud.”

Within its ambit, the COC has a broad mandate (though no subpoena power). It should continue its efforts on assessing the holistic effects of the CARES Act on the overall financial system, including any racial or economic disparities. The COC’s first reports were effective in bringing new information to light on disbursement of funds and getting some initial questions answered by Treasury and the Fed, but there is far more work to be done.

The House Subcommittee has subpoena power and the most media-ready platform. It should use these elements to publicize the most important findings of the other bodies, or pursue them further in public hearings. Working in a bipartisan fashion will be crucial to its effectiveness. The Subcommittee’s first action was undermined by the Republicans on the Subcommittee stating that the letters sent by their Democratic counterparts were ill-conceived. Given the urgency of the crisis, hopefully more responsible bipartisanship will be forthcoming. Targets of oversight are going to be far less likely to comply with Subcommittee requests if their every action is followed with a criticism of that action from the minority members of the same Subcommittee.

The four oversight bodies will, and should, overlap to an extent; some redundancy will be useful to make sure that all ground has been covered. Nevertheless, the oversight bodies should communicate with each other to ensure that their redundancy is purposeful and meaningful, rather than accidental and extraneous.

Conclusion

“Extraordinary government programs can benefit from, and indeed may require, extraordinary oversight.”90 There may be no situation more extraordinary than the coronavirus crisis, which saw Congress near-unanimously appropriate trillions of dollars to rescue the economy. With that amount of money flowing, and with the recent warning signs of possible abuses, it is crucial for the economy as a whole and for individual businesses that oversight bodies do that work and do it well.

Appendix 1: Matters for further investigation—Selected excerpts from press reports as of July 22, 2020

Appendix 2: Additional matters for further investigation—Selected excerpts from press reports as of Aug. 2, 2020


PPP

Public Health Spending

Lobbying

Federal Reserve Emergency Lending

Disclosure, Conflicts of Interest & Personnel Issues

Miscellaneous

The Brookings Institution is a nonprofit organization devoted to independent research and policy solutions. Its mission is to conduct high-quality, independent research and, based on that research, to provide innovative, practical recommendations for policymakers and the public. The conclusions and recommendations of any Brookings publication are solely those of its author(s), and do not reflect the views of the Institution, its management, or its other scholars.

Footnotes

  1. For related discussion, see Norman Eisen, Damon Silvers, Lisa Gilbert, and Liz Hempowicz, We need Congress to watch pandemic spending closely. Here’s how it can do it, The Washington Post (May 13, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2020/05/13/coronavirus-spending-house-oversight/ and Norman Eisen and Victoria Bassetti, Implementing CARES honestly and effectively, in Reopening America: How to Save Lives and Livelihoods, eds. John R. Allen and Darrell M. West (Washington: The Brookings Institution 2020), 79-82, https://www.brookings.edu/interactives/reopening-america-and-the-world/.
  2. Mike Tanglis and Taylor Lincoln, COVID Lobbying Palooza, Public Citizen (July 6, 2020), https://www.citizen.org/article/covid-lobbying-palooza/.
  3. See e.g., Caleb Melby and Shahien Nasiripour, Trump’s Waikiki Partner, Kushner Family Among PPP Borrowers, Bloomberg (July 6, 2020), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-07-06/trump-s-waikiki-partner-devos-tied-company-among-ppp-recipients, detailing payments to a Trump International Hotel, the firm of one of Trump’s top lawyers, an affiliate of the Kushner family company, and the company of Trump’s longtime associate David Pecker.
  4. Briand Slodysko and Angeliki Kastanis, Trump donors among early recipients of coronavirus loans, AP News (July 7, 2020), https://apnews.com/00a34243825661313f2cb6a0f6a21720.
  5. Jonathan O’Connell and Aaron Gregg, SBA exempted lawmakers, federal officials from ethics rules in $660 billion loan program, Washington Post (June 26, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2020/06/26/sba-exempted-lawmakers-federal-officials-ethics-rules-660-billion-loan-program/.
  6. We itemize additional reporting in the Appendix.
  7. Seung Min Kim et al, Trump’s resistance to independent oversight draws bipartisan scrutiny, Washington Post (April 9, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trumps-resistance-to-independent-oversight-draws-bipartisan-scrutiny/2020/04/08/d9776f48-79af-11ea-9bee-c5bf9d2e3288_story.html.
  8. Donald J. Trump, Statement by the President, The White House (March 27, 2020), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/statement-by-the-president-38/.
  9. Aaron Gregg, Trump administration won’t say who got $511 billion in taxpayer-backed coronavirus loans, Washington Post (June 11, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2020/06/11/trump-administration-wont-say-who-got-511-billion-taxpayer-backed-coronavirus-loans/.
  10. Aaron Gregg and Jeff Stein, In big reversal, Treasury and SBA agree to disclose details about many small business loan recipients, Washington Post (June 19, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2020/06/19/treasury-sba-ppp-disclosure/.
  11. This paper principally addresses new, specially created coronavirus funding oversight efforts. Separately, the preexisting congressional oversight process is also working to answer a range of questions related to coronavirus. See Molly E. Reynolds et al, How is COVID-19 affecting House oversight efforts?, The Brookings Institution (July 13, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/fixgov/2020/07/13/how-is-covid-19-affecting-house-oversight-efforts/.
  12. CARES Act, Title IV, Subtitle A § 4020.
  13. CARES Act, Title VI, § 15010.
  14. CARES Act, Title IV, Subtitle A § 4018.
  15. H. Res. 935 (2020).
  16. CARES Act, § 4020(c).
  17. Kyle Cheney and Melanie Zanona, Pelosi, McConnell name picks to serve on coronavirus oversight panel, Politico (April 17th, 2020), https://www.politico.com/news/2020/04/17/french-hill-coronavirus-oversight-panel-192660
  18. Id.
  19. John Bresnahan et al, Dunford withdraws as pick to lead coronavirus oversight commission, Politico (July 14, 2020), https://www.politico.com/news/2020/07/14/joseph-dunford-withdraws-coronavirus-commission-361077.
  20. § 4020(b).
  21. § 4020(e).
  22. Id. at 4.
  23. The third report was published as this paper was going to press. See Congressional Oversight Commission, The Third Report of the Congressional Oversight Commission (July 20, 2020), https://www.toomey.senate.gov/files/documents/Oversight%20Commission%20-%203rd%20Report%20(FINAL)_7.20.20.pdf.
  24. Congressional Oversight Commission, Questions About the CARES Act’s $500 Billion Emergency Stabilization Funds, (May 18, 2020), https://www.toomey.senate.gov/files/documents/COC%201st%20Report_05.18.2020.pdf.
  25. Congressional Oversight Commission, The Second Report of the Congressional Oversight Commission (June 18, 2020), https://www.toomey.senate.gov/files/documents/Congressional%20Oversight%20Commission%20Report%20(June%2018,%202020).pdf.
  26. Id. at 5.
  27. Id. at 5.
  28. Id. at 6.
  29. Id. $46 billion was also allocated for loans and loan guarantees to the airline and industry and businesses critical to maintaining national security, but none of these funds have been allocated yet either.
  30. Id.
  31. Justin Elliott et al, This Treasury Official Is Running the Bailout. It’s Been Great for His Family, ProPublica (June 2, 2020), https://www.propublica.org/article/this-treasury-official-is-running-the-bailout-its-been-great-for-his-family.

    As ProPublica notes, former Treasury Deputy Assistant General Counsel for Ethics and Alternate Designated Agency Ethics Official Elizabeth Horton defended the financial arrangement as compliant with applicable ethics rules, stating that “the Treasury ethics office correctly advised him [the official in question] that he did not need to divest his holdings in his family business because of the generalized nature of his work on tax reform legislation,” and that, when his duties changed, “I advised Mr. Muzinich that an exchange for a fixed value note was an appropriate way to divest.” The article also notes that the Office of Government Ethics approved the arrangement.

    Conversely, the article also includes criticism from outside ethics experts, including Kathleen Clark, law professor at Washington University in St. Louis, who referred to the arrangement as “something akin to a fake divestiture." The article further notes that "ProPublica reached out to four ethics officials, including two former Treasury ethics lawyers. None could recall a similar divestment transaction. Three of the four disagreed that it resolved Muzinich’s conflicts," and one did not. One of those former Treasury officials noted, for example, that “the terms of the loan suggest something less than a bona fide transaction.”

  32. Id.
  33. @BharatRamamurti, Twitter, (June 2, 2020), https://twitter.com/BharatRamamurti/status/1267867244631076864.
  34. @BharatRamamurti, Twitter, (June 18, 2020), https://twitter.com/BharatRamamurti/status/1273635755705991168.
  35. § 15010(b)(2).
  36. § 15010(c)(1); Pandemic Response Accountability Committee, PRAC Members, https://pandemic.oversight.gov/about/prac/members.
  37. Ellen Nakashima, Trump removes inspector general who was to oversee $2 trillion stimulus spending, The Washington Post (April 7, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/trump-removes-inspector-general-who-was-to-oversee-2-trillion-stimulus-spending/2020/04/07/2f0c6cb8-78ea-11ea-9bee-c5bf9d2e3288_story.html.
  38. Robert A. Westbrooks, Pandemic Response Accountability Committee, https://pandemic.oversight.gov/about/prac/members/robert-a-westbrooks.
  39. § 15010(d).
  40. § 15010(g).
  41. § 15010(e)(2).
  42. § 15010(e-f).
  43. § 15010(e)(3)(A)(ii).
  44. § 15010(e)(3)(c).
  45. § 15010(d)(1)(B)(x).
  46. § 15011(b).
  47. Pandemic Response Accountability Committee, https://pandemic.oversight.gov/.
  48. See “COVID-19_Report.xls” at https://pandemic.oversight.gov/track-the-money/contracts.
  49. See https://pandemic.oversight.gov/track-the-money/contracts
  50. § 4018(b).
  51. § 4018(c).
  52. § 4018(f).
  53. § 4018(e)(3).
  54. § 4018(e)(4).
  55. § 4018(d)(1).
  56. Morton Rosenberg, When Congress Comes Calling, The Constitution Project at 111 (May 23rd, 2017), https://archive.constitutionproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/Chapter-9.pdf.
  57. 5a U.S.C. § 6(a)(4).
  58. Brian D. Miller - Department of the Treasury, Congress.gov (last updated June 2, 2020), https://www.congress.gov/nomination/116th-congress/1715.
  59. Roll Call Vote 116th Congress-2nd Session, United States Senate (June 2, 2020), https://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm?congress=116&session=2&vote=00107.
  60. H.R. 935.
  61. H.R. 935 § 3.
  62. H.R. 935 § 4.
  63. See e.g., Jeremy Diamond and Allie Malloy, Trump at war with Democrats: “We’re fighting all the subpoenas”, CNN (April 24th, 2019), https://www.cnn.com/2019/04/24/politics/donald-trump-fight-subpoenas-don-mcgahn-ridiculous/index.html.
  64. House Coronavirus Panel Demands that Large Public Corporations Return Taxpayer Funds Intended for Small Businesses, Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis (May 8, 2020), https://coronavirus.house.gov/news/letters/letter-ceo-tim-abood-evo-transportation-energy-services-inc.
  65. Scalise Slams Dems For Partisan Select Committee Action, Office of Congressman Steve Scalise (May 8, 2020), https://scalise.house.gov/media/press-releases/scalise-slams-dems-partisan-select-committee-action.
  66. Company Returns $10 Million in Taxpayer Funds Intended for Small Businesses in Response to Select Subcommittee Inquiry, Office of Congressman Andy Kim (May 11, 2020) https://kim.house.gov/media/press-releases/company-returns-10-million-taxpayer-funds-intended-small-businesses-response
  67. See e.g., https://www.globenewswire.com/news-release/2020/05/09/2030693/0/en/Statement-of-EVO-Transportation-Energy-Services-Inc-Regarding-PPP.html; https://www.cbsnews.com/news/quantum-corp-paycheck-protection-program-loan-funds-keeping/; https://www.gulfisland.com/news-media/press-releases/detail/219/gulf-island-reports-first-quarter-2020-results.
  68. https://www.republicanwhip.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/2020-0511-Universal-Stainless-and-Alloy-Products-Letter.pdf
  69. Select Subcommittee Launches Investigation Into Disbursement of PPP Funds, Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis (June 15, 2020), https://coronavirus.house.gov/news/press-releases/select-subcommittee-launches-investigation-disbursement-ppp-funds.
  70. https://coronavirus.house.gov/news.
  71. Clyburn and Maloney Seek Copies Of Contracts For Coronavirus Vaccine Development, Select Subcommittee onthe Coronavirus Crisis (June 2nd, 2020), https://coronavirus.house.gov/news/press-releases/clyburn-and-maloney-seek-copies-contracts-coronavirus-vaccine-development.
  72. Letter from James E. Clyburn and Carolyn B. Maloney to Secretary of Health and Human Services Alex Azar (June 2nd, 2020), https://oversight.house.gov/sites/democrats.oversight.house.gov/files/2020-06-02.Clyburn%20CBM%20to%20HHS%20re%20Vaccine%20and%20Treatment%20Contracts.pdf.
  73. March Oversight Report: The Final Report of the Congressional Oversight Panel, Congressional Oversight Panel (March 16, 2011) at 184.
  74. Id.
  75. See e.g., Gustavo Grullon, Yelena Larkin and Roni Michaely, Are US Industries Becoming More Concentrated?, University of Toronto Economics Seminar Paper 70104 (October 2016), https://www.economics.utoronto.ca/index.php/index/research/downloadSeminarPaper/70104; Jose A. Azar et al., Concentration in US Labor Markets: Evidence From Online Vacancy Data, National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 24395 (February 2019), https://www.nber.org/papers/w24395.pdf.
  76. Aaron Klein and Camille Busette, Improving the equity impact of the Fed’s municipal lending facility, The Brookings Institution (April 14, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/research/a-chance-to-improve-the-equity-impact-of-the-feds-municipal-lending-facility/.
  77. Christopher Condon and Amanda Albright, Fed Expands Muni-Debt Program to Cover Smaller Cities, Counties, Bloomberg (April 27, 2020), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-04-27/fed-lowers-population-thresholds-for-municipal-debt-program.
  78. Congressional Oversight Panel Final Report at 157.
  79. Danny Werfel, Fighting fraud in the CARES Act-Rebuild the ‘ROC’, The Hill (April 22, 2020), https://thehill.com/opinion/technology/493877-fighting-fraud-in-the-cares-act-rebuild-the-roc.
  80. Congressional Oversight Panel Final Report at 157.
  81. Id.
  82. Memorandum from Deborah L. Harker, Assistant Inspector General for Audit, Interim Audit-Update – Coronavirus Relief Fund Recipient Reporting, Department of the Treasury Office of the Inspector General, at 3(May 27, 2020), https://www.treasury.gov/about/organizational-structure/ig/Audit%20Reports%20and%20Testimonies/OIG-20-036.pdf.
  83. Id. at 4.
  84. CARES Act, Division A
  85. Jonathan O’Connell et al, Treasury, SBA Data show small-business loans went to private equity-backed chains, members of Congress, Washington Post (July 6, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2020/07/06/sba-ppp-loans-data/.
  86. Letter from Frederick W. Vaughan, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary, Office of Legislative Affairs, Department of the Treasury to Representative Carolyn Maloney, Chairwoman, Committee on Oversight and Reform (July 2, 2020), https://oversight.house.gov/sites/democrats.oversight.house.gov/files/2020-07-02%20UST%20Letter%20to%20CW%20Maloney.pdf.
  87. Jory Heckman and Jason Miller, Recovery Board’s roadmap would suit pandemic oversight panel just fine, experts say, Federal News Network (April 9, 2020) https://federalnewsnetwork.com/agency-oversight/2020/04/recovery-boards-roadmap-would-suit-pandemic-oversight-panel-just-fine-experts-say/
  88. Christy Goldsmith Romero, SIGTARP Semiannual Report to Congress, Office of the Special Inspector General for the Troubled Asset Relief Program (March 2020) https://www.sigtarp.gov/Quarterly%20Reports/April_30_2020_Report_to_Congress.pdf#page=2
  89. One individual in Georgia was charged with bank fraud after using $1.5 million in PPP loans to buy personal items rather than paying workers. See Jonathan O’Connell, Reality star charged with sending funds from federal small business program on jewelry, Rolls-Royce, The Washington Post (May 16, 2020) https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2020/05/16/reality-star-charged-with-spending-funds-federal-small-business-program-jewelry-rolls-royce/.
  90. Congressional Oversight Panel Final Report at 191.
  91. Lauren Hirsch and Jacob Pramuk, Trump administration releases list of companies that received most money from small business bailout loans, CNBC (July 6, 2020), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/07/06/coronavirus-stimulus-list-of-ppp-small-business-loan-recipients-released.html.
  92. Id.
  93. Caleb Melby and Shahien Nasiripour, Trump’s Waikiki Partner, Kushner Family Among PPP Borrowers, Bloomberg (Updated on July 7, 2020), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-07-06/trump-s-waikiki-partner-devos-tied-company-among-ppp-recipients.
  94. Id.
  95. Id.
  96. Id.
  97. Id.
  98. Jack Gillum et al, Trump Friends and Family Cleared for Millions in Small Business Bailout, ProPublica (July 6, 2020), https://www.propublica.org/article/trump-friends-and-family-cleared-for-millions-in-small-business-bailout.
  99. Id.
  100. Id.
  101. Id.
  102. Id.
  103. Brian Schwartz, Companies with Trump ties got coronavirus small business loans, CNBC (July 7, 2020), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/07/07/coronavirus-small-business-relief-companies-with-trump-ties-got-ppp-loans.html.
  104. Id.
  105. Id.
  106. Brian Slodysko and Angeliki Kastanis, Trump donors among early recipients of coronavirus loans, AP News (July 7, 2020), https://apnews.com/00a34243825661313f2cb6a0f6a21720.
  107. Id.
  108. Id.
  109. Id.
  110. Id.
  111. Elana Schor, Virus loans helped entities tied to Trump evangelical allies, AP News (July 7, 2020), https://apnews.com/88a957426a09eb3b7db2dbceeffa25c0.
  112. Id.
  113. Id.
  114. Id.
  115. Karl Evers-Hillstrom, Company that gave six figures to pro-Trump super PAC got PPP loan worth at least $5 million, Center for Responsive Politics (July 7, 2020), https://www.opensecrets.org/news/2020/07/company-that-gave-six-figures-to-pro-trump-super-pac-got-ppp-loan-over-5-million/.
  116. Nick Schwellenbach and David Szakonyi, “Inside the Pandemic Cash Bonanza for Private Equity-Backed Firms,” Project on Government Oversight (POGO), July 15, 2020, https://www.pogo.org/investigation/2020/07/inside-the-pandemic-cash-bonanza-for-private-equity-backed-firms/.
  117. Brian Slodysko, “Trump Donors Among Early Recipients of Coronavirus Loans,” AP, July 6, 2020, https://apnews.com/00a34243825661313f2cb6a0f6a21720.
  118. Jack Gillum, Isaac Arnsdorf, Jake Pearson and Mike Spies, “Trump Friends and Family Cleared for Millions in Small Business Bailout,” ProPublica, July 6, 2020, https://www.propublica.org/article/trump-friends-and-family-cleared-for-millions-in-small-business-bailout.
  119. Juliana Kaplan, “At Least 32 Companies with CEOs Making Over $1 million Reportedly Received Small Business Funds,” Business Insider, April 22, 2020, https://www.businessinsider.com/32-companies-ceos-making-1-million-received-small-business-funds-2020-4.
  120. Nick Schwellenbach and David Szakonyi, “Millions in PPP Loans Went to Chinese State-Owned Companies,” Project on Government Oversight (POGO), July 23, 2020, https://www.pogo.org/investigation/2020/07/millions-in-ppp-loans-went-to-chinese-state-owned-companies/.
  121. Lauren Leatherby, “Coronavirus Is Hitting Black Businesses Owners Hardest, New York Times, June 18, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/06/18/us/coronavirus-black-owned-small-business.html.
  122. Megan Cerullo, “Up to 90% of minority and women owners shut out of Paycheck Protection Program, experts fear,” CBS, April 22, 2020, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/women-minority-business-owners-paycheck-protection-program-loans/.
  123. Lydia DePillis, “The Small Biz Double Dip: Temp Companies Got Cheap Government Money, Got Paid by Clients for the Same Workers,“ ProPublica, July 27, 2020, https://www.propublica.org/article/the-small-biz-double-dip-temp-companies-got-cheap-government-money-got-paid-by-clients-for-the-same-workers.
  124. Eric Levai, “White House Press Secretary’s Parents Received Millions in PPP Loans,” Daily Dot, July 9, 2020, https://www.dailydot.com/debug/kayleigh-mcenany-parents-construction-ppp-loan/.
  125. Robert Kuznia, Katie Polglase and Gianluca Mezzofiore, “In Quest for Vaccine, US Makes ‘Big Bet’ on Company with Unproven Technology,” CNN, May 1, 2020, https://www.cnn.com/2020/05/01/us/coronavirus-moderna-vaccine-invs/index.html?fbclid=IwAR2fJb__uZbmE2wi6Qizuj1EhC1RvZpIAlhP4C0ae3s-BI_o5FBufNQNOpk.
  126. Christopher Rowland, “Trump Administration Makes It Easier for Drugmakers to Profit from Publicly Funded Coronavirus Drugs, Advocates Say,” Washington Post, July 1, 2020, https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2020/07/01/vaccine-coronavirus-barda-trump/.
  127. Nathaniel Weixel, “Trump Vaccine Czar Will Not be Required To Disclose Pharma Ties, IG Rules,” The Hill, July 17, 2020, https://thehill.com/policy/healthcare/507815-trump-vaccine-czar-will-not-be-required-to-disclose-pharma-ties-ig-rules.
  128. Norm Eisen and Victoria Bassetti, “Reopening America: Implementing CARES Honestly and Effectively,” Brookings Institution, pp. 79, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/Brookings-Reopening-America-FINAL.pdf.
  129. Derek Willis and Yeganeh Torbati, “A Company Run by a White House ‘Volunteer’ With No Experience in Medical Supplies Got $2.4 Million From the Feds for Medical Supplies,” ProPublica, June 26, 2020, https://www.propublica.org/article/a-company-run-by-a-white-house-volunteer-with-no-experience-in-medical-supplies-got-2.4-million-from-the-feds-for-medical-supplies.
  130. Ibid.
  131. Erin Kissane, Robinson Meyer and Peter Walker, ”What’s going on with COVID-19 Hospitalization Data,” July 28, 2020, The COVID Tracking Project, The Atlantic, https://covidtracking.com/blog/whats-going-on-with-covid-19-hospitalization-data.
  132. Dina Temple-Raston and Tim Mak, “Irregularities In COVID Reporting Contract Award Process Raise New Questions,” NPR, July 29, 2020, https://www.npr.org/2020/07/29/896645314/irregularities-in-covid-reporting-contract-award-process-raises-new-questions.
  133. Heidi Przybyla, House Democrats find administration overspent for ventilators by as much as $400 million, NBC News (July 31, 2020), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/congress/house-democrats-find-administration-overspent-ventilators-much-500-million-n1235252.
  134. Eric Newcomer and Michael Tobin, Kodak Pivots to Drugs After Abandoning Photography, Crypto, Bloomberg (July 30, 2020), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-07-30/kodak-pivots-to-drugs-after-failing-at-photography-and-crypto.
  135. J David McSwane, “How Profit and Incompetence Delayed N95 Masks While People Died at the VA,” ProPublica, May 1, 2020, https://www.propublica.org/article/how-profit-and-incompetence-delayed-n95-masks-while-people-died-at-the-va.
  136. Aaron Boyd, GAO: More Than Half of COVID-19 Government Contracts Not Competitively Awarded, NextGov, July 29, 2020, https://www.nextgov.com/cio-briefing/2020/07/gao-more-half-covid-19-government-contracts-not-competitively-awarded/167313/.
  137. Nick Schwellenbach, “White House Official-Turned-Lobbyist Cashed in on CARES Act,” Project on Government Oversight (POGO), July 16, 2020, https://www.pogo.org/investigation/2020/07/white-house-official-turned-lobbyist-cashed-in-on-cares-act/.
  138. Mike Tanglis and Taylor Lincoln, “COVID Lobbying Palooza: Lobbyists Who Worked for Trump’s Campaigns, Committees and Administration Are Feasting on the Public Health Emergency,” Public Citizen, July 6, 2020, https://www.citizen.org/article/covid-lobbying-palooza/.
  139. Ibid.
  140. Ibid.
  141. Mike Tanglis and Taylor Lincoln, “COVID Lobbying Palooza: Lobbyists Who Worked for Trump’s Campaigns, Committees and Administration Are Feasting on the Public Health Emergency,” Public Citizen, July 6, 2020, https://www.citizen.org/article/covid-lobbying-palooza/.
  142. Theodoric Meyer and Adam Cancryn, “Chris Christie cashes in on coronavirus lobbying,” Politico (July 23, 2020), https://www.politico.com/news/2020/07/23/chris-christie-cashes-in-on-coronavirus-lobbying-380640. 
  143. Justin Elliot, Lydia DePillis and Robert Faturechi, “This Treasury Official Is Running the Bailout. It’s Been Great for His Family.,” ProPublica, June 2, 2020, https://www.propublica.org/article/this-treasury-official-is-running-the-bailout-its-been-great-for-his-family.
  144. The Third Report of the Congressional Oversight Commission, Congressional Oversight Commission (July 20, 2020), https://www.toomey.senate.gov/files/documents/Oversight%20Commission%20-%203rd%20Report%20(FINAL)_7.20.20.pdf.
  145. Jeanna Smialek, “How Pimco’s Cayman-Based Hedge Fund Can Profit From the Fed’s Rescue,” The New York Times, July 30, 2020 https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/30/business/economy/fed-talf-wall-street.html?smid=em-share
  146. Tim Mak, “Pence’s Chief of Staff Owns Stocks That Could Conflict With Coronavirus Response,” NPR, May 28, 2020, https://www.npr.org/2020/05/28/860927054/pence-chief-of-staff-owns-stocks-that-could-conflict-with-coronavirus-response.
  147. Charlie Savage, “Trump Suggests He Can Gag Inspector General for Stimulus Bailout Program,” New York Times, March 27, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/27/us/trump-signing-statement-coronavirus.html.
  148. Sean Moulton, “Administration Seeks to Minimize Transparency of Coronavirus Relief Funds,” Project on Government Oversight, March 13, 2020, https://www.pogo.org/analysis/2020/05/administration-seeks-to-minimize-transparency-of-coronavirus-relief-funds/.
  149. Tom Hamburger, Jeff Stein, Jonathan O’Connell, Aaron Gregg, “Inspectors general warn that Trump administration is blocking scrutiny of coronavirus rescue programs,” Washington Post, June 15, 2020, https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2020/06/15/inspector-general-oversight-mnuchin-cares-act/
  150. David Corn, "Donald Trump’s Corruption Is Killing Americans,” Mother Jones, July/August 2020, https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2020/06/trump-coronavirus-corruption/.
  151. Tim Mak, “In Another Pushback Against Oversight, Trump Removes Pandemic Inspector General,” NPR, April 7, 2020, https://www.npr.org/2020/04/07/829136780/in-another-pushback-against-oversight-trump-removes-pandemic-inspector-general.
  152. Ilya Marritz and Katherine Sullivan, “’I Can’t Speak Negatively About the President,’ Say Official Charged With Stimulus Oversight,” ProPublica, June 10, 2020, https://www.propublica.org/article/i-cant-speak-negatively-about-the-president-says-official-charged-with-stimulus-oversight.
  153. Kayla Tausche and Stephanie Dhue, “So Much Money, So Little Oversight: Coronavirus Bailout Cash Is a Big Target for Fraud,” CNBC, May 7, 2020, https://www.cnbc.com/2020/05/07/coronavirus-relief-cash-is-a-big-target-for-fraud.html.
  154. Helena Bottemiller Evich, “Multi-Million Dollar Food Bank Delivery Contracts Go To Firms With Little Experience,” Politico, May 13, 2020 https://www.politico.com/news/2020/05/13/usda-food-bank-contracts-256452?nname=playbook&nid=0000014f-1646-d88f-a1cf-5f46b7bd0000&nrid=0000014e-f0f7-dd93-ad7f-f8f7e20e0002&nlid=630318.
  155. Eric L. Green, “DeVos Funnels Coronavirus Relief Funds to Favored Private and Religious Schools,” New York Times, May 15, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/15/us/politics/betsy-devos-coronavirus-religious-schools.html/.
  156. Koh Gui Qing, “U.S. Watchdog Finds Flaws in Government Pandemic Response, Chew Out Transport Department, SBA,” Reuters, June 25, 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-gao-coronavirus/us-watchdog-finds-flaws-in-government-pandemic-response-chews-out-transport-department-sba-idUSKBN23W28O.
  157. Justin Elliott and Jeff Ernsthausen, The Airline Bailout Loophole: Companies Laid Off Workers, Then Got Money Meant to Prevent Layoffs, ProPublica (July 7, 2020), https://www.propublica.org/article/the-airline-bailout-loophole-companies-laid-off-workers-then-got-money-meant-to-prevent-layoffs.

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