Center for East Asia Policy Studies

If Trump does not feel an urgency for denuclearization of North Korea, then why would Kim?

[The outcome of the Trump-Kim summit in Hanoi points to] the limits of personal rapport and the importance of process.

[North Korea’s demands on sanctions relief still went far beyond what was likely to be accepted in exchange for limited steps toward denuclearization.] Trump demonstrating his desire for substantive actions on denuclearization was important because Kim has been ignoring U.S. negotiators and banking on his personal appeals to Trump, whom he probably judged was more malleable.

[Regarding the potential for North Korea to use a peace declaration to object to criticisms of its human rights record] If we start talking about human rights or we start talking about military exercises, [North Korea] can say, "I thought we had an end-of-war declaration. Why are you being so hostile and war-like?"

[A U.S.-North Korea peace declaration] would reinforce President Trump’s narrative that he has brought peace to the Korean Peninsula....[China would take] a peace declaration as a sign that the U.S. and North Korea are still getting along, and that it bodes well for peninsular stability, which is Beijing’s primary concern.

[Regarding Hanoi's market reforms Doi Moi in 1986] Vietnam's choice to liberalize its economy was one made out of desperation...Vietnam's socialist experiment was failing, growth was at a standstill and inflation was running at something like 500% per annum. The regime had no choice but to reform if they wanted to survive.