

in the Northwest, led by the Santa Fe metro; a larger margin here would force the Republicans to rely on big turnout and a wider margin in the pro-Republican, heavily rural South and Northeast region. And even in that region, a larger Democratic margin in the Las Cruces metro might make it hard to just hold the line, much less increase the GOP advantage.

## Arizona

(See the full report on four Intermountain West states by William Frey and Ruy Teixeira at [http://www.brookings.edu/papers/2008/08\\_intermountain\\_west\\_frey\\_teixeira.aspx](http://www.brookings.edu/papers/2008/08_intermountain_west_frey_teixeira.aspx))



**A. Arizona's fast growing population is highly concentrated in the Phoenix and, secondarily, Tucson metros. New voters there hold the potential for turning this long term Republican state if not blue, a much lighter shade of red.**

**B. Arizona's eligible voters population parallels Nevada's in some respects and, like its fast-growing cousin, shows strong increases in minorities and white college graduates.** In contrast, white working class voters are growing very slowly and their share of Arizona's electorate is dropping sharply, especially in the Phoenix and Tucson metros.

**C. The GOP's solid margin in Arizona in 2004 can be attributed to very strong support from white working class voters plus a relatively small deficit among Hispanic voters.** However, the white working class is declining as a share of voters, while Hispanics and white college grads, far more Democratic than the white working class, are growing. The Tucson metro shows the weakest performances for the GOP among both white working class and white college grad voters.

**D. Political shifts in Arizona since 1988 have moved the fast-growing Phoenix and Tucson metros, 80 percent of the statewide vote, toward the Democrats.** The North region, led by the Flagstaff metro, has also moved strongly toward the Democrats. However, the Southeast region has shifted toward the GOP, partially counterbalancing these trends.

**E. Key trends and groups to watch in 2008 include the white working class, where the GOP needs to maintain its strong support; white college graduates, a growing constituency who could tip in this election from Republican to Democratic; and Hispanics, a growing, traditionally Democratic constituency, but one that has recently given relatively high levels of support to the GOP.** These trends will likely determine whether and to what extent the Tucson and especially the Phoenix metro continue to move toward the Democrats and cut into the GOP's statewide lead.




**A. Arizona's fast growing population is highly concentrated in the Phoenix and, secondarily, Tucson metros. New voters there hold the potential for turning this long term Republican state if not blue, a much lighter shade of red.**

After Nevada, Arizona is the second fastest growing state this decade, and one that has gobbled up Electoral College votes—adding one each after the successive censuses of 1960 though 1990, and two after 2000. Its current 10 electoral votes can now make a difference in a close election. Arizona is the home of Barry Goldwater and a conservative Republican tradition. Yet, its dramatically shifting demographics have prompted many observers to contend that it would be “in play” in 2008 had not Arizona Senator John McCain become the Republican presidential standard bearer.

The regions for Arizona are shown in **Map 13** with related population and growth statistics in **Map 14**, and **Figures 12 and 13**. The regions are as follows:


**1. Phoenix** - Maricopa and Pinal counties, coincident with the Phoenix-Mesa-Scottsdale metropolitan area. Metropolitan Phoenix, with a population of 4.1 million, constitutes 66 percent of the state population, and since 2000 has grown 27 percent, faster than the state as a whole and the second most rapidly growing large metropolitan area in the U.S. (after Las Vegas).

**Figure 12. Share of 2007 Population in Arizona Regions**



Source: Authors' calculations of Census population estimates

**Figure 13. 2000-2007 Population Growth in Arizona Regions**



Source: Authors' calculations of Census population estimates

**2. Tucson** - Pima County, commensurate with the Tucson metropolitan area, which is the state's second largest with a population of 967,000. It is the home of the University of Arizona and comprises 15 percent of the state's population. Its growth rate is 14 percent since 2000, lower than for Phoenix or the state as a whole, but it continues to attract both immigrants and domestic migrants.

**3. North** - includes Coconino County, commensurate with the Flagstaff metropolitan area, along with Apache and Navajo counties. It contains a substantial native American population. The North region comprises less than 5 percent of the state's population and grew a modest 8.7 percent from 2000-7

**4. West** - consists of rapidly growing Yavapai County, coincident with the Prescott metropolitan area, as well as equally fast growing Mohave County, La Paz County on the western border, and Yuma County, bordering Mexico and coincident with the Yuma metropolitan area. Due to the very rapid growth in the northwest part of this region that borders both Nevada and California, the West increased its population by 22 percent between 2000-2007. It constitutes 10 percent of the state's population.

**5. Southeast** - consists of Graham, Gila, Greenlee, Cochise and Santa Cruz counties all located in the southeastern part of the state, bordering New Mexico and Mexico. The region comprises just 4 percent of the state's population and grew at a modest 6 percent since 2000.

Overall, it's the rapidly growing metropolitan Phoenix region that has the greatest potential for affecting the next election's results, as well as longer term political trends in the state.

***B. Arizona's eligible voters population parallels Nevada's in some respects and, like its fast-growing cousin, shows strong increases in minorities and white college graduates.***

Arizona's profile is similar to Nevada's in its percentage of minority eligible voters (28 percent) and work-

**Table 12. 2000-2006 Percent Change in Eligible Voters by Demographic Attributes: Arizona Regions**

<b>Attributes</b>	<b>Phoenix Metro</b>	<b>Tucson Metro</b>	<b>North</b>	<b>West</b>	<b>Southeast</b>	<b>Total State</b>
<b>Key Demographic Segments</b>						
Minorities	38	17	14	33	4	29
Whites Age 65+	13	11	21	22	23	14
White, Working Age College Grads,	28	20	13	8	7	25
White Working Age Non College Grads	10	1	5	16	7	9
<b>Race-Ethnicity</b>						
White	14	8	9	17	11	13
Black	45	12	14	35	-6	37
Hispanic	40	18	10	41	5	31
<b>Age</b>						
18-29	19	8	16	38	7	18
30-44	8	-7	-4	5	-7	4
45-64	36	25	18	17	16	30
65+	17	16	25	26	19	18
<b>Education</b>						
HS grad or less	13	8	8	16	5	12
Some College	17	2	15	28	6	15
Coll Grads	35	26	16	17	24	31
<b>Industry of Worker</b>						
Manfg and Other Goods Production	8	10	26	23	21	10
Trade	19	7	11	14	-19	15
Education and Health	30	9	0	18	14	22
Info, Financial and Prof. Services	26	19	12	44	33	26
Other Services	25	10	30	28	4	22

Source: Authors' analysis of 2006 American Community Survey

ing age white working class voters (40 percent). (See Appendices A and B). Compared to Nevada, however, Arizona has higher percentages of white college graduates and of white seniors. Another similarity between the two states is that minorities are growing fastest and that both minorities and white college graduates are growing at rates far higher than for white working class or white senior voters. Still another similarity with Nevada is Arizona's high share of eligible voters who were born out state. This group has shown especially fast growth among those born in California and abroad.

But as in Nevada, statewide patterns do not hold in all regions and there is considerable divergence in the demographic profile of individual regions. For example, both the Phoenix and Tucson metros have significantly larger shares of white college graduates (**Figure 14, Table 12, and Appendix**).

The North region, on the other hand, is heavily minority, due to its very large Native American population; most of the remaining “minority white” population is comprised of working class whites and white seniors. The small Southeast region also shows a substantial minority shares, mostly comprised of Hispanics. In contrast, the West is the “whitest” of all regions, with white seniors comprising a quarter of eligible voters, and the white working class outnumbering white college graduates six to one.

In terms of growth profiles, the Phoenix and Tucson metros are quite consistent with statewide patterns (**Table 12**). Both Phoenix and Tucson show growth in their minority and white college graduate populations which is far higher than for working class whites or white seniors. This is not a growth pattern shared by any of the other regions.

In the fast growing West region, for example, white seniors rank second to minorities on growth and white college graduates are growing the least—a function perhaps of lower middle class movement to this region from California in search of affordable housing. And white working class voters are growing faster in this region than any other. As discussed below, this dynamic could help the GOP continue their dominance of the region, given the Republican leanings of the white working class.

In the Native American-dominated North region, white seniors show the highest growth rates in 2000-2006, with solid growth also among white college graduates and minorities. In the smaller Southeast region, the largest gains by far are among white seniors.

Overall, due to relatively slow growth rates, white working class voters are declining as a share of voters in the state as a whole and in every region (even the West because minorities and white seniors are growing so much faster there). The sharpest declines in white working class shares of the electorate are in the Phoenix and Tucson metros, which also have seen the sharpest increases in shares of minority and white college graduate voters. These trends are likely to make these areas more friendly territory for Democrats.

### ***C. The GOP's solid margin in Arizona in 2004 can be attributed to very strong support from white working class voters plus a relatively small deficit among Hispanic voters.***

We now turn to how Arizonans have been voting in recent elections. **Table 13** displays some basic exit poll data from the 2004 presidential election. In 2004, Arizona voted solidly Republican by 10 points, an improvement over Bush's margin of 6 points in the 2000 election. Bush's victory was based on 59 percent to 41 percent support from white voters, 79 percent of all voters according to the exit polls. This more than made up for Bush's deficit among the 5 percent of (predominantly Native American)

**Table 13. Arizona Voting by Selected Demographic Groups, 2004**

Group	2004 President		
	Democrat	Republican	Dem-Rep
White	41	59	-18
Hispanic	56	43	13
Other	56	42	14
Men	41	58	-17
Women	47	52	-5
White Men	36	63	-27
White Women	45	54	-9
HS Dropout	59	39	20
HS Graduate	44	55	-11
Some College	36	63	-27
College Grad	46	54	-8
Postgraduate	56	43	13
White Noncollege	34	65	-31
White College	48	52	-4
18-29	48	50	-2
30-39	41	58	-17
40-49	41	59	-18
50-64	47	52	-5
65+	44	56	-12
City over 500,000	50	49	1
City 50,000-500,000	53	47	6
Suburbs	39	59	-20
City 10,000-50,000	31	69	-38
Rural	44	56	-12
Total	55	44	-11

*Source: Authors' analysis of 2004 Arizona exit poll*

voters who were “other race” (56-42 Democratic) and among the 12 percent of voters who were Hispanic (56-43 Democratic).

Bush carried men by 17 points, but women by just 5 points. An even larger gender gap can be seen when comparing white men and white women, who Bush carried by 27 and 9 points, respectively.

Bush's best education group was followed by those with some college (+27), followed by high school graduates (+11) and college graduates (+8). However he lost postgraduates by 13 points. He carried all age groups, including young voters (though by just two points). The exit poll also indicates he lost large cities (Phoenix and Tucson) by 1 point and cities of 50,000-500,000 people by 6 points. However, he carried the suburbs by an impressive 20 points and small cities and rural areas by 38 and 12 points respectively.

Turning to the white working class, Arizona white working class voters supported Bush over Kerry by 31 points, considerably above the national average . This is the key to Bush's solid victory along with his relatively small deficit among Hispanics (his 13 point deficit among Arizona Hispanics was significantly below his 19 point deficit in the nation as a whole and far below typical GOP deficits of 30 points or more). But among white college graduates, Bush won by a slender 4 points, far below the nationwide average.

Bush's support among white working class voters varied by region of Arizona. Using the exit poll regions, which match up fairly closely with the Phoenix and Tucson metros, but have a third region that roughly combines our South, North and West regions ("Rest of State"), we find that Bush's white working class advantage is greatest in the Rest of State region (38 points), also very high in the Phoenix area (34 points) and significantly less in the Tucson area (17 points). The Tucson area also had unusually high support for the Democrats among white college graduates (30 points), while the other two regions showed GOP advantages among this group.

#### ***D. Political shifts in Arizona since 1988 have moved the fast-growing Phoenix and Tucson metros, 80 percent of the statewide vote, toward the Democrats.***

**Maps 15A-15C** show how these patterns of support have played out geographically. For 2004, 1996 and 1988, they color-code each county by its margin for the victorious presidential candidate (deep blue for a Democratic victory of 10 points or more, light blue for a Democratic victory of less than 10 points, deep red for a Republican victory of 10 points or more, light red for a Republican victory of less than 10 points). Looking at the 2004 map, only two regions have any blue in them: the Tucson metro and the North region. As shown in **Table 14**, he carried both regions by 6 and 11 percentage points, respectively. These were the only regions Kerry carried in Arizona.

Bush carried the other three regions, including the Phoenix metro (bright red) by 15 points. Since the Phoenix metro contributes 62 percent of the statewide vote, this is obviously central to the GOP's victory. Bush also carried the Southeast (bright red, except for Santa Cruz County) by 17 points and the West (bright red) by 23 points.

As shown in the 1988 map—when Republicans carried the state by 21 points—there were only two blue counties in Arizona, located on the far eastern border and very lightly populated. But in 1996, Clinton carried the state by 3 points and diversified the color scheme, turning the entire North region and the



Maps 15A-C. Arizona County Voting for President, 1988-2004




Table 14. Democratic Margins for Arizona Regions, 1988 and 2004

Region	Democratic Margins		
	1988 President	2004 President	Change, 1988-2004
Phoenix	-30	-15	15
Tucson	-2	6	8
North	0	11	10
West	-26	-23	3
Southeast	-10	-17	-7


Source: Authors' analysis of Arizona election returns

Tucson metro blue and Maricopa County in the Phoenix metro light red. Much of this blue recedes by 2004 but the Tucson metro remains blue, as does most of the North region, including the Flagstaff metro. And Maricopa County returns to bright red but, as we shall see, not quite as bright red as it was before.

**Map 16** provides a visual representation of where political shifts in Arizona took place over the 1988-2004 time period. Counties that are dark green had margin shifts toward the Democrats of 10 points or more, light green counties had margin shifts toward the Democrats of 10 points or less, orange coun-



**Map 16. Arizona Voting for President, County Change 1988-2004**



Source: Authors' analysis of election statistics

Source: Authors' analysis of election statistics

ties had margin shifts toward the Republicans of 10 points or more and light yellow counties had margin shifts toward the Republicans of 10 points or less.

The Southeast region, where three of four counties are yellow or orange, is the only region which moved toward the GOP over the time period (by 7 points). The West is split evenly between light yellow and light green (though the light green counties are the two metros in the region, Yuma and Prescott) and had a modest 3 point move toward the Democrats. The North region had a strong 10 point move toward the Democrats, led by the dark green Flagstaff metro.

Much more significant than these shifts though is what happened in the two big metros of Tucson and Phoenix. Tucson, colored light green and 18 percent of the Arizona vote, shifted toward the Democrats by 8 points. And the Phoenix metro, 62 percent of the statewide vote, led by Maricopa County (dark green), shifted toward the Democrats by 15 points. Between these two metros, that's 80 percent of the statewide vote on the move.

ties had margin shifts toward the Republicans of 10 points or more and light yellow counties had margin shifts toward the Republicans of 10 points or less.

It's interesting to compare the political shifts in Map 16 to the population growth map (Map 14). The slowest growing region, the Southeast (6 percent since 2000), containing the only declining (red) county in Arizona plus three slow growth (yellow) counties, is also the only region that has moved toward the GOP since 1988. And the fastest-growing region, the very populous Phoenix metro (27 percent since 2000) is also the region that has moved the most sharply toward the Democrats.

Better news for the GOP is that the pro-Republican West region is the second fastest-growing region (22 percent since 2000) and has exhibited only a modest shift toward the Democrats since 1988. But the West only provides 9 percent of the statewide vote compared to the pro-Democratic Tucson metro which is also growing fairly fast (14 percent), has had a sharper shift toward the Democrats and contributes 18 percent of the Arizona vote.

These population growth patterns appear, on net, to reinforce the general Democratic trend in the state. That said, it seems likely the GOP will continue their hold on the state in this election, given the relatively large deficit the Democrats have to make up and the fact that an Arizona favorite son will be the

GOP candidate. More long-term, however, the continuation of current trends, especially in the two big metros, could well put the state's red status in doubt.

***E. Key trends and groups to watch in 2008 include the white working class, where the GOP needs to maintain its strong support; white college graduates, a growing constituency who could tip in this election from Republican to Democratic; and Hispanics, a growing, traditionally Democratic constituency, but one that has recently given relatively high levels of support to the GOP.***

The GOP did manage to win the last presidential election in Arizona fairly solidly. But the Republicans' ability to hold the state, especially beyond 2008, will depend on the demographic groups and trends we have reviewed in this report. Here are some things to watch out for in the 2008 election.

One critical question is whether the declining white working class will continue its strong support for the Republicans. If they start moving toward the Democrats, especially in the Phoenix metro, where their share of voters is dropping fastest, this could cut substantially into the GOP's statewide lead.

Another trend to watch is whether white college grad voters, who are actually increasing their share of voters, especially in the Phoenix and Tucson metros, move further toward the Democrats.

Also very important is whether the growing Hispanic population continues its relatively high support levels for the GOP. The party's relatively modest 13 point deficit among this group in 2004 made a significant contribution to the GOP's election victory by keeping down the Democratic vote. If that deficit widens substantially in 2008—very possible given current polling—that could have a big impact, particularly in the Phoenix metro, where 40 percent of eligible voters are Hispanics and where their share of voters is growing most rapidly.

In terms of regions, the key areas are obviously the fast-growing Phoenix and Tucson metros, with special emphasis on the Phoenix metro which is both growing fastest and already has the largest share of the Arizona vote (62 percent). If Republican margins continue to decrease in Phoenix and Democratic margins increase in Tucson, that will inevitably make the state a great deal closer. Also interesting to watch is whether the Flagstaff metro in the North continues to move sharply Democratic and whether the two metros in the West, Prescott and Yuma, will continue their modest pro-Democratic trend and possibly weaken the GOP hold on that region.

## Appendix A. Demographic Attributes of Eligible Voters in Intermountain West States

Share of Total	Colorado	Nevada	New Mexico	Arizona
Key Demographic Segments				
Minorities	19.8	28.3	50.3	27.4
Whites Age 65+	12.1	13.4	10.9	16.5
White, Working Age College Grads,	25.8	13.9	13.8	17.0
White Working Age Non College Grads	42.3	44.4	24.9	39.2
Race-Ethnicity				
White	80.2	71.7	49.7	72.6
Black	3.5	7.5	1.7	3.4
Asian	2.1	5.5	0.8	1.7
Other	2.0	3.2	10.3	5.4
Hispanic	12.2	12.1	37.5	16.9
Age				
18-29	22.3	20.5	23.2	21.8
30-44	28.6	28.0	25.4	26.3
45-64	35.0	35.0	33.8	32.6
65+	14.0	16.5	17.6	19.3
Education				
Less than HS	10.0	12.1	15.0	12.7
HS grad	25.5	32.8	29.4	27.5
Some College	31.9	34.6	32.3	35.0
Bachelors Degree	21.4	13.7	13.9	16.2
PostGraduate	11.2	6.8	9.4	8.6
Industry of Worker				
Manfg and Other Goods Production	18.0	15.9	17.0	17.6
Trade	15.1	13.6	13.8	15.4
Education and Health	18.3	14.8	23.1	19.2
Info, Financial and Prof. Services	25.5	20.5	19.5	22.7
Other Services	23.2	35.2	26.6	25.1
Birthplace				
Same State	35.0	12.4	46.8	26.3
California	6.7	22.1	5.8	10.4
Other Western State	7.8	13.4	8.8	9.2
Non Western State	46.1	41.6	34.5	47.6
Abroad	4.3	10.5	4.1	6.51

Source: Authors' analysis of 2006 American Community Survey

**Appendix B. 2000-2006 Percent Change in Eligible Voters by Demographic Attributes  
in Intermountain West States**

<b>Attributes</b>	<b>Colorado</b>	<b>Nevada</b>	<b>New Mexico</b>	<b>Arizona</b>
<b>Key Demographic Segments</b>				
Minorities	17	45	15	29
Whites Age 65+	11	17	8	14
White Working Age College Grads	16	36	11	25
White Working Age Non College Grads	5	7	-3	9
<b>Race-Ethnicity</b>				
White	9	14	3	13
Black	9	36	7	37
Asian	55	74	18	59
Other	-2	11	15	12
Hispanic	18	52	15	31
<b>Age</b>				
18-29	10	25	17	18
30-44	-5	6	-9	4
45-64	26	31	17	30
65+	13	24	13	18
<b>Education</b>				
Less than HS	-10	-14	-17	-10
HS grad	16	30	16	27
Some College	5	19	13	15
Bachelors Degree	16	40	17	29
PostGraduate	26	52	18	34
<b>Industry of Worker</b>				
Manfg and Other Goods Production	0	30	8	10
Trade	7	19	1	15
Education and Health	14	36	14	22
Info, Financial and Prof. Services	12	40	23	26
Other Services	11	14	10	22
<b>Birthplace</b>				
Same State	16	33	12	27
California	20	32	26	33
Other Western State	12	22	9	21
Non Western State	4	8	1	7
Abroad	31	50	10	37

*Source: Authors' analysis of 2006 American Community Survey*

### Appendix C. Demographic Attributes of Eligible Voters, Colorado Regions

Attributes	Denver City	Denver Inner Suburbs	Denver Outer Suburbs	Boulder Metro	Colorado Springs Metro	East	Southeast and Central	West	Total State
Race-Ethnicity									
White	63.4	78.0	89.6	88.7	79.7	78.5	77.3	87.2	80.2
Black	10.7	4.3	0.6	0.8	5.9	2.3	0.5	0.4	3.5
Asian	2.5	2.7	3.0	2.1	2.7	0.7	0.8	1.1	2.1
Other	2.4	2.1	1.4	2.1	2.7	1.2	2.0	2.0	2.0
Hispanic	21.1	13.0	5.4	6.3	9.0	17.3	19.5	9.4	12.2
Age									
18–29	20.6	20.6	19.4	28.2	24.2	20.8	23.0	25.3	22.3
30–44	32.1	28.1	33.5	25.8	29.5	25.0	27.5	26.3	28.6
45–64	31.5	37.2	38.1	34.1	33.7	34.8	35.1	33.7	35.0
65+	15.7	14.1	9.0	11.8	12.7	19.4	14.3	14.7	14.0
Education									
HS grad or less	36.5	36.9	22.5	19.4	32.9	48.0	39.0	39.5	35.5
Some College	26.0	34.1	29.6	30.6	35.7	33.9	27.8	32.1	31.9
Coll Grads	37.5	29.0	47.9	50.0	31.4	18.1	33.1	28.4	32.6
Gender/Marital Status									
Married Women	19.0	26.8	33.5	23.3	28.4	27.2	28.0	28.2	27.1
Unmarried Women	31.3	24.3	16.6	27.1	22.9	21.6	20.2	22.1	23.3
All Men	49.7	48.8	49.9	49.6	48.7	51.2	51.8	49.7	49.6
Industry of Worker									
Manfg and Other Goods Production	11.8	16.5	15.5	15.4	17.0	21.3	21.2	24.0	18.0
Trade	14.0	16.5	14.9	11.9	14.4	15.4	12.4	15.7	15.1
Education and Health	19.3	17.1	15.8	24.1	17.6	19.4	17.0	20.0	18.3
Info, Financial and Prof. Services	30.2	27.2	35.0	27.6	26.7	15.6	20.7	18.1	25.5
Other Services	24.7	22.7	18.8	20.9	24.3	28.2	28.7	22.3	23.2
Birthplace									
Same State	36.5	37.5	26.3	21.1	22.1	53.2	41.7	37.8	35.0
California	5.4	6.1	7.7	7.6	9.3	4.9	5.8	7.0	6.7
Other State	51.0	50.8	61.6	67.2	64.4	40.1	50.8	52.3	53.9
Abroad	7.0	5.6	4.3	4.0	4.1	1.8	1.7	2.9	4.3

Source: Authors' analysis of 2006 American Community Survey

### Appendix D. Demographic Attributes of Eligible Voters, Nevada Regions

Attributes	Las Vegas Metro	Reno Metro	Rural Heartland	Total State
Race-Ethnicity				
White	66.8	81.0	84.6	71.7
Black	10.1	1.9	1.3	7.5
Asian	6.7	4.2	1.2	5.5
Other	2.7	3.2	5.5	3.2
Hispanic	13.6	9.7	7.4	12.1
Age				
18–29	20.6	20.5	19.9	20.5
30–44	29.3	25.5	24.6	28.0
45–64	34.2	37.5	36.0	35.0
65+	15.9	16.5	19.5	16.5
Education				
HS grad or less	45.3	38.1	50.7	44.9
Some College	34.3	36.4	34.0	34.6
Coll Grads	20.5	25.4	15.3	20.5
Gender/Marital Status				
Married Women	25.2	24.6	26.7	25.3
Unmarried Women	24.9	25.0	21.5	24.4
All Men	49.9	50.4	51.8	50.3
Industry of Worker				
Manfg and Other Goods Production	13.1	17.5	28.8	15.9
Trade	13.3	15.7	12.0	13.6
Education and Health	13.7	17.9	16.3	14.8
Info, Financial and Prof. Services	22.1	18.8	14.2	20.5
Other Services	37.7	30.2	28.6	35.2
Birthplace				
Same State	9.6	16.9	20.8	12.4
California	19.2	29.1	28.2	22.1
Other State	59.0	45.0	47.1	55.0
Abroad	12.2	9.0	3.8	10.5

Source: Authors' analysis of 2006 American Community Survey

### Appendix E. Demographic Attributes of Eligible Voters, New Mexico Regions

Attributes	Albuquerque Metro	Northwest Metro	South and Heartland	Total State
Race-Ethnicity				
White	51.9	39.3	55.4	49.7
Black	2.3	0.4	1.9	1.7
Asian	1.1	0.7	0.5	0.8
Other	7.1	24.4	2.9	10.3
Hispanic	37.7	35.1	39.3	37.5
Age				
18-29	23.0	23.2	23.3	23.2
30-44	26.7	24.6	24.5	25.4
45-64	34.0	36.0	31.8	33.8
65+	16.3	16.1	20.4	17.6
Education				
HS grad or less	39.0	48.8	47.9	44.4
Some College	33.6	27.7	34.4	32.3
Coll Grads	27.4	23.5	17.8	23.3
Gender/Marital Status				
Married Women	24.2	24.9	26.0	25.0
Unmarried Women	28.2	26.6	25.7	26.9
All Men	47.7	48.5	48.3	48.1
Industry of Worker				
Manfg and Other Goods Production	15.2	17.3	19.3	17.0
Trade	14.5	13.8	12.9	13.8
Education and Health	22.6	21.7	25.1	23.1
Info, Financial and Prof. Services	23.3	19.2	14.3	19.5
Other Services	24.4	28.1	28.4	26.6
Birthplace				
Same State	44.8	55.5	42.1	46.8
California	6.7	4.5	5.8	5.8
Other State	44.1	37.9	46.8	43.4
Abroad	4.4	2.1	5.3	4.1

Source: Authors' analysis of 2006 American Community Survey



### Appendix F. Demographic Attributes of Eligible Voters, Arizona Regions

Attributes	Phoenix Metro	Tucson Metro	North	West	Southeast	Total State
Race-Ethnicity						
White	74.7	69.2	47.7	81.3	62.2	72.6
Black	4.1	2.7	0.9	1.0	2.7	3.4
Asian	2.0	1.8	0.5	0.8	1.2	1.7
Other	3.0	3.9	44.3	2.7	4.4	5.4
Hispanic	16.1	22.4	6.6	14.3	29.5	16.9
Age						
18–29	21.8	22.1	27.4	18.2	21.0	21.8
30–44	28.1	23.6	26.3	20.4	23.7	26.3
45–64	32.5	33.3	32.6	31.8	33.5	32.6
65+	17.6	20.9	13.7	29.5	21.8	19.3
Education						
HS grad or less	37.9	37.9	49.5	50.2	48.3	40.2
Some College	35.4	33.8	33.0	36.1	34.0	35.0
Coll Grads	26.7	28.2	17.6	13.7	17.7	24.8
Gender/Marital Status						
Married Women	26.0	25.4	24.9	29.3	28.4	26.3
Unmarried Women	25.1	26.5	26.1	22.1	21.0	24.9
All Men	48.9	48.1	49.0	48.6	50.6	48.8
Industry of Worker						
Manfg and Other Goods Prod	17.4	17.6	17.5	18.5	20.6	17.6
Trade	15.9	14.2	13.1	15.4	12.6	15.4
Education and Health	18.2	22.6	24.5	17.3	21.0	19.2
Info, Financial and Prof. Services	25.3	20.2	9.7	15.6	16.8	22.7
Other Services	23.1	25.4	35.1	33.2	29.0	25.1
Birthplace						
Same State	24.4	28.9	56.9	15.7	34.9	26.3
California	9.6	9.5	5.5	20.1	7.1	10.4
Other State	59.1	55.2	36.5	58.3	48.3	56.8
Abroad	6.9	6.3	1.1	5.9	9.6	6.5

Source: Authors' analysis of 2006 American Community Survey