




The Political Geography of Pennsylvania: Not Another Rust Belt State

By William H. Frey and Ruy Teixeira



*This is the first in a series of reports on the demographic and political dynamics under way in 10 “batleground” states, deemed to be crucial in deciding the 2008 election. As part of the Metropolitan Policy Program’s **Blueprint for American Prosperity**, this series will provide an electoral component to the initiative’s analysis of and prescriptions for bolstering the health and vitality of America’s metropolitan areas, the engines of the U.S. economy. This report focuses on Pennsylvania. Among its specific findings are:*

A. Pennsylvania is becoming a demographic “bridge” between Midwestern states like Ohio and other Northeastern states like New Jersey, as its new growth is tied to urban coastal regions. While often classed as a so-called “Rust Belt” state, its eastern and south central regions are increasingly becoming part of the nation’s Northeast Corridor, with new growth and demographic profiles that warrant attention in upcoming elections.

B. Eligible voter populations indicate a state in transition, where minorities, especially Hispanics, and white college graduates are increasingly important, but where white working class voters continue to play a central role. While white working class voters continue to decline as a share of voters and are less likely to work in manufacturing and goods production, they are still a critical segment of voters, including in the fast-growing Harrisburg and Allentown regions where their absolute numbers are actually increasing.

C. Recent Democratic victories in Pennsylvania have featured strong support from groups like minorities, single women, and the young but have also benefited from rela-

tively strong support among the white working class, especially among its upwardly mobile segment that has some college education. Compared to 1988, both the latter group and white college graduates have increased their support for Democrats. And both groups have increased their share of voters over the time period.

D. Political shifts in Pennsylvania since 1988 have seen the growing eastern part of the state swing toward the Democrats, producing four straight presidential victories for that party. The swing has been sharpest in the Philadelphia suburbs, but has also been strong in the Allentown region and even affected the pro-Republican Harrisburg region. Countering this swing, the declining western part of the state has been moving toward the GOP.

E. Key trends and groups to watch in 2008 include the white working class, especially whites with some college, who, unlike the rest of this group, are growing; white college graduates; and Hispanics, who have been driving the growth of the minority vote.

These trends could have their strongest impact in the fast-growing Allentown region, which may move solidly into the Democratic column in 2008 and beyond, following the trajectory of the Philadelphia suburbs. The even-faster-growing Harrisburg region remains a GOP firewall, but the same trends could make that region more closely contested in 2008.

Introduction

This report on the political demography and geography of Pennsylvania is the first in a series of reports on 10 key “purple” states in the 2008 election. Purple states are states where the current balance of political forces does not decisively favor one party or the other, as it does in the solid red (Republican) and blue (Democratic) states. But demographic and geographic trends are constantly testing the balance in these purple states and may nudge them not just toward a particular party in this election but toward one party decisively over the longer term.

This report provides a guide to the trends that are currently testing and reshaping Pennsylvania’s balance of forces, determining how this purple state will lean in 2008 and whether it will actually remain a toss-up in years to come.

As presidential politics go, Pennsylvania is certainly a purple state, but in the slow-growing mode. As distinct from purple states like Florida, Arizona, and Colorado, the Keystone State has seen tepid growth in recent decades, linked in large part to the decline of its once-proud steel and other heavy industries.

Yet when it comes to political demographics, Pennsylvania has become less stagnant than in the recent past, with strong growth in college graduates and skilled service industries and increased diversity due to a burgeoning Hispanic population. It defies simple labels like “Rust Belt state” or the now famous description by political strategist James Carville: “Philadelphia and Pittsburgh with Alabama in the middle”

This categorization, always simplistic, was more applicable to the Pennsylvania of the 1990s than today’s Pennsylvania. In fact, given the sharp growth and political transitions occurring in the eastern part of the state, the political future of the state may be determined as much by trends in the growing Allentown region than by any of the parts of Carville’s troika.

Data and Regional Definitions


The demographic, polling and voting statistics presented in this report are the latest available from authoritative sources. The demographic profiles of U.S. states and Pennsylvania regions are drawn from the U.S. Decennial Censuses through 2000, U.S. Census Bureau population estimates for states, and counties through July 2007, and from the Public Use Micro Sample of the Census Bureau’s 2006 American Community Survey. Polling data are drawn from 1988 CBS/New York Times Pennsylvania exit poll and the 2004 and 2006 National Election Pool Pennsylvania exit polls. Additional data on the demographics of actual voters are drawn from the 1988 and 2004 Current Population Survey’s November Voter Supplements. Presidential and Congressional election data are drawn from official county-level election returns for Pennsylvania.

Regional Definitions

Our analysis of eligible voters and election results in the remaining sections of this report will focus on seven regions, depicted in Map 1, which are strategic in terms of their recent demographic shifts and voting trends.¹ In so doing, we also take cognizance of key metropolitan, city and suburban areas within the state.

Philadelphia – Philadelphia County (coterminous with city of Philadelphia)

Philadelphia Suburbs – Delaware, Chester, Montgomery, and Bucks counties in the suburban portion of the Philadelphia metropolitan area



The first two regions separate the city and suburbs of the Philadelphia-Camden-Wilmington metropolitan area (Pennsylvania portion). This reflects the size of the city itself, very different growth patterns for the city (4.2 percent decline since 2000) and suburbs (4.3 percent increase) and sharply different city and suburb demographics which have translated into long standing differences in voting patterns.

Allentown-Scranton-Reading includes the Allentown-Bethlehem-Easton metropolitan area (Pennsylvania portion), Scranton/Wilkes-Barre metro; Reading metro, Pike County (part of the New York-Northern Jersey- Long Island metro) and the nearby counties of Monroe, Wayne, Susquehanna, Columbia, and Schuylkill

The Allentown and Scranton metro areas are Pennsylvania’s third and fourth largest and share cultural affinities and recent political shifts. They differ nonetheless in growth patterns. Like much of eastern Pennsylvania, the Allentown metropolitan region, known as the Lehigh Valley, shows substantial growth since 2000 (8 percent), while the Scranton region, registers a loss (-1.8 percent). The Reading metropolitan area shows healthy growth (7 percent) and the counties adjacent to the New Jersey and northeast New York border—Monroe, Pike, and Wayne—are among the fastest growing in the state. The region is a primarily metropolitan region with 86 percent of its population lying inside metropolitan areas.

Harrisburg-York-Lancaster includes the Harrisburg-Carlisle metropolitan area; York-Hanover metro, Lancaster metro, Lebanon metro, and the nearby counties of Adams and Franklin.

This is another largely metropolitan fast growing region consisting of the state's fifth, sixth, and seventh largest metropolitan areas (Harrisburg, Lancaster, and York) as well the smaller Lebanon metro. These metro growth rates since 2000 ranged from 4 percent (for Harrisburg) to 10 percent (for York) with non-metropolitan Adams and Franklin counties on the Maryland border growing over 9 percent. Overall, 87 percent of this region's population lies in metropolitan areas.

Allegheny County contains the city of Pittsburgh


Pittsburgh Suburbs/Erie includes the remaining suburban counties in the Pittsburgh metropolitan area (Beaver, Butler, Armstrong, Westmoreland, Fayette, Washington counties) and the Erie metropolitan area, and five other counties in Pennsylvania's far west.

Allegheny County, where the city of Pittsburgh is located, is a separate region in light of the county's size, distinct voting patterns, and population decline (down 3 percent since 2000). The Pittsburgh Suburbs/Erie region includes the remaining six counties of the Pittsburgh metropolitan area, only two of which, Butler and Washington, grew since 2000—4 percent and 1.5 percent respectively. Aside from these, the other counties in the region all lost population, including Erie County (the Erie metropolitan area) at a modest 6 percent decline and Mercer County (part of the Youngstown, OH metropolitan

area) down 2.8 percent. The remaining four non-metropolitan counties, accounting for 14 percent of this region's population, showed population declines ranging from -1.9 percent for Crawford to -6 percent for Warren. As will be seen later, not only is the Pittsburgh Suburbs/Erie region largely characterized by population decline, but it has also shown similar voting trends through this decade.

North and Central PA includes the remaining counties in the state, including the Altoona metropolitan area, and the Johnstown, State College, and Williamsport metropolitan areas and an additional 24 non-metropolitan counties (Map 2).

Map 2. Pennsylvania Population Growth by County, 2000-2007



Source: Authors' analysis of US Census estimates

Compared with the other regions, North and Central PA is far less metropolitan in character, with 65 percent of its population residing in non-metropolitan counties and the remaining 35 percent living in the four small metros of Johnstown, Altoona, State College, and Williamsport, each with populations between 100,000 and 150,000. This portion of the state can be characterized by population decline, which is exhibited by three metros and 18 of its non-metropolitan counties. One distinct departure from this pattern is the State College metro area, home of Penn State University, which grew by 6 percent since 2000. Modest growth is also present in four non-metropolitan counties to its east. And little Forest County in the northwest part of this region grew from 4,900 to 6,900 people so far this decade. As our voting analysis shows, however, this part of Pennsylvania has shown consistent voting patterns in recent elections.

Findings

A. Pennsylvania is becoming a demographic “bridge” between Midwestern states like Ohio and other Northeastern states like New Jersey, as its new growth is tied to urban coastal regions.

It is fair to say that Pennsylvania has struggled and survived through a few rough decades. A state with a proud industrial past, it ranked third in population size, after New York and California, as late as 1970. Yet its subsequent deindustrialization led to a growth rate of less than 1 percent over the next 20 years when two other states surpassed it in population size. By 2000, it ranked sixth on that score. And its clout in the all important Electoral College was reduced from as many as 32 votes in 1960 to just 21 today.

Yet, Pennsylvania’s growth picked up modestly though the 1990s though there was a continued decline in manufacturing jobs.² Since 2000, the state’s growth has been a bit over 1 percent. At the same time, several metropolitan areas and counties in its eastern and south central regions registered some of the fastest growth rates in the nation’s Northeast region.

New domestic migration trends are also encouraging. Over the 1990s, Pennsylvania lost a net of 276,000 migrants to other states, the nation’s sixth largest migration loss. Yet thus far this decade, it lost only 37, 000 migrants compared with neighboring Ohio which lost 294,000.³

A Demographic Bridge

In many respects , Pennsylvania represents a demographic “bridge” between stagnating Midwest states like Ohio and neighboring states like New Jersey and Maryland—states that are more diverse both economically and demographically.

Table 1 compares Pennsylvania with neighboring states, New Jersey, Maryland, and Ohio. While many observers tend to group Pennsylvania with Ohio, a so-called “Rust Belt” state, so far this decade, Penn-

Table 1. Growth Rates* for Pennsylvania and Nearby States, 2000-2007

| State | Population Growth | Migration Rates | | Employment Growth** |
|--------------|-------------------|-------------------------|--------------------|---------------------|
| | | Immigration from Abroad | Domestic Migration | |
| Pennsylvania | 1.20 | 1.00 | -0.30 | 1.84 |
| Ohio | 0.90 | 0.80 | -2.59 | -3.56 |
| New Jersey | 3.01 | 4.28 | -4.37 | 1.99 |
| Maryland | 5.79 | 2.44 | -1.02 | 6.31 |
| US | 6.88 | 2.71 | 0 | 4.43 |

* growth rates per 100 population

**nonfarm employment growth

Source: Authors' analysis of US Census estimates, and Bureau of Labor Statistics

sylvania's exhibited a higher growth rate, lower domestic out migration, and greater immigration than its neighbor to the west. Especially with respect to employment growth, Pennsylvania is showing a mini-rebound while Ohio is not.

Of course, New Jersey and Maryland are growing more rapidly than either of their two more industrial cousins. Large portions of their residents reside in the suburbs of major metropolitan areas: surrounding New York City and Philadelphia in New Jersey and Baltimore and Washington D.C. in Maryland. Both states are growing faster than Pennsylvania, primarily due to higher immigration and natural increase resulting from the fertility of their relatively younger populations. Yet, both are losing domestic migrants at a higher rate than Pennsylvania, a state to which many of them are now headed

On several other socio-demographic attributes, Pennsylvania stands between Ohio on the one hand, and New Jersey and Maryland on the other (Table 2). On college graduation rates, Pennsylvania ranks 28th among all states with 25.4 percent of its adults completing four-year degrees—higher than Ohio at 23 percent (ranking 39th) but lower than Maryland and New Jersey where more than one third of adults are well educated. Among these states, Pennsylvania also shows middling rankings on percent professional occupations, median household income, poverty levels and percent in manufacturing jobs.

Pennsylvania lies at or near the extreme on other measures. For example, it is top heavy with seniors. With 15.2 percent of its population aged 65 or older, it ranks third oldest in the country behind Florida and West Virginia. Along with this older population is a high degree of rootedness. Due to reduced in-

Table 2. Demographic and Economic Indicators for US, Pennsylvania, and Nearby States, 2006

| Indicator | US | Pennsylvania | Ohio | New Jersey | Maryland |
|-------------------------------|-----------|---------------------|-------------|-------------------|-----------------|
| State Rank | | | | | |
| <i>Demographic Indicators</i> | | | | | |
| % White | 66.2 | 82.0 | 82.8 | 62.3 | 58.3 |
| State Rank | | 19 | 16 | 39 | 46 |
| % Age 65+ | 12.4 | 15.2 | 13.3 | 12.9 | 11.6 |
| State Rank | | 3 | 15 | 23 | 41 |
| % Born in Same State | 67.4 | 79.6 | 77.9 | 65.6 | 54.4 |
| State Rank | | 4 | 5 | 26 | 39 |
| <i>Economic Indicators</i> | | | | | |
| % College Grads* | 27.0 | 25.4 | 23.0 | 33.4 | 35.1 |
| State Rank | | 28 | 39 | 6 | 3 |
| %Professionals** | 20.2 | 21.0 | 19.3 | 22.6 | 25.7 |
| State Rank | | 16 | 28 | 8 | 2 |
| % Manufacturing** | 11.6 | 13.4 | 17.0 | 9.7 | 5.4 |
| State Rank | | 17 | 4 | 34 | 44 |
| Median HH Income | 48,451 | 46,259 | 44,532 | 64,470 | 65,144 |
| State Rank | | 26 | 33 | 2 | 1 |
| % Persons in Poverty | 13.3 | 12.1 | 13.3 | 8.7 | 7.8 |
| State Rank | | 30 | 21 | 48 | 51 |

* growth rates per 100 populaton

**nonfarm employment growth

Source: Authors' analysis of US Census estimates, and Bureau of Labor Statistics


migration for several decades, four out of five Pennsylvanians were born in the state, compared with one out of two in Maryland, one in five in Nevada.

Also significant for Pennsylvania is its largely white population. Like many northern and Midwestern states, Pennsylvania has not until recently participated in the new immigration surge, and its primary minority population consists of blacks in its major cities. However, there are signs that this is changing. Between 1990 and 2006, Pennsylvania's largely Puerto Rican Hispanic population increased by 125 percent, a pattern likely to continue.

Recent Eastern and South Central Growth

To best understand Pennsylvania's emerging political geography, it is important to recognize that much of its growth since 2000, has occurred in the eastern and south-central parts of the state -- those in proximity to some of the nation's largest coastal metropolitan areas. The link between this growth and these areas can be seen in migration statistics shown in Figure 1 which draws from annual migration data collected by the Internal Revenue Service.⁴ It shows that the net of in-migration over out-migration to

Figure 1. Pennsylvania Net Migration Exchanges with Other States, 1999-2000 to 2005-2006



Source: Authors' Analysis of IRS Migration Data

Pennsylvania became positive for the years 2001 through 2006, and that this gain was primarily due to the state's net migration (incoming minus departing) exchanges with New York, New Jersey, and Maryland. This migration has been fueled, in part, by run ups in housing prices in nearby regions surrounding New York City to the east, and Washington DC and Baltimore to the South. As a consequence, affordable Pennsylvania became an "exurban" destination as residents of these regions moved northward and westward.

The divergent growth patterns within the state are evident in Map 1 which depicts 2000-2007 growth for Pennsylvania counties. Of the state's 67 counties, 29 registered growth, most of them located in the eastern and south central part of the state.

The biggest cluster of growing counties in the east/south central region include the Philadelphia suburbs, metropolitan areas to the north (Reading and Allentown-Bethlehem-Easton) and nearby counties along the border (especially Pike county), and metropolitan areas to the west (Lancaster, York-Hanover, Harrisburg-Carlisle, and Lebanon) and adjacent counties.

The growth of these areas is striking. Pike County, which is the westernmost county in the New York metropolitan area, was the state's fastest growing county in the 1990s at 65 percent, and continued to grow at 26 percent this decade. The York-Hanover metropolitan area and Allentown-Bethlehem-Easton, the state's third largest metro, are the fastest growing metros in the Northeast this decade, at rates of 10 percent and 8 percent respectively.

There are some gaining counties outside of this east/south central swath. These include Butler and Washington counties in suburban Pittsburgh; tiny Forest County, in the north central part of the state,

and centrally located Centre County, home of the State College metro area and Penn State University.

Yet, any assessment of recent political demographic change in Pennsylvania must emphasize the growing “Northeast Corridor” part of the state which is producing gains in its eastern and south central regions. This stands in contrast with most of the western part of the state which, with exceptions like the State College metropolitan area, continues to experience out migration and population decline.


Regions in this Analysis

Of the seven regions, the three growing regions are the Philadelphia suburbs, Allentown-Scranton-Reading, and Harrisburg-York-Lancaster. Together they comprise 49 percent of the state’s population, but are responsible for 100 percent of its growth (Figures 2 and 3). They range in growth from 4 to 7 percent this decade whereas the other four regions showed declines ranging of 1.5 percent for the Pittsburgh suburbs-Erie and North and Central PA to greater than 4 percent for Philadelphia and Allegheny County

The three growing regions also are beginning to increase their racial diversity in a state that does not have very much. They accounted for 75 percent of the state’s Hispanic growth this decade. And Hispanics contributed one third of the total growth in these areas in this decade. While Hispanics comprise only 4.2 percent of the state’s population, they comprise 14 percent of the population in Lehigh County, where the city of Allentown is located, and 10 percent in Berks County where the city of Reading is located.


Each of the four non-growing regions of the state lost white and black populations since the beginning of this decade. The small contributions to growth made by Hispanics, Asians and other races in these areas have helped reduce their overall population declines.

Figure 2. Share of 2007 Population in Pennsylvania Regions




Source: Authors' analysis of US Census Estimates

Figure 3. 2000-2007 Population Growth in Pennsylvania Regions



Source: Authors' analysis of US Census Estimates

Figure 4. Eligible Voters by Key Demographic Segments, 2006



Source: Authors' analysis of 2006 American Community Survey

In sum, Pennsylvania's growth engines—Philadelphia's suburbs and the largely metropolitan regions to their north and west—stand in sharp contrast with the still stagnating central and western parts of the state. The shifting demographics in the former areas are affecting their eligible voting populations in ways that are discussed below.


B. Eligible voter populations indicate a state in transition, where minorities, especially Hispanics, and white college graduates are increasingly important, but where white working class voters continue to play a central role.

More relevant to the 2008 election are the demographics of the eligible voter populations in different parts of the Pennsylvania Eligible voters are Pennsylvanians that are both age eligible (18+) and U.S. citizens. The data presented here are drawn from the 2006 American Community Survey which is the most reliable recent data source for the geographic areas covered.

We first focus on four key demographic segments defined by race, age, and education that are of high political interest this campaign season: minorities, white college graduates aged 18-64, white working class (non-college graduates) aged 18-64 and white seniors (65 and over). The latter two groups are declining but still large and important parts of the Pennsylvania electorate, while the former two groups are growing and increasingly important parts of that electorate.

For Pennsylvania as a whole, almost half (49 percent) of the electorate is white working class of working age, 18 percent are white seniors, another 18 percent are white college graduates of working age and

Figure 5. 2000-2006 Change in Eligible Voters for Key Demographic Segments



Source: Authors' analysis of 2000 US Decennial Census and 2006 American Community Survey

14 percent are minorities. However, there is great variation across the state in the size of these key segments in 2006, as well as in how their numbers have changed since 2000 (See Figures 4 and 5).

White working class voters make up the largest share of the electorate in the Pittsburgh suburbs/Erie (58 percent) and the North/Central (62 percent) parts of the state. But it is interesting to note that two of the three growth regions of Pennsylvania, the Allentown and Harrisburg areas, also have high proportions of these voters (55 and 56 percent, respectively). The lowest percentage of white working class/working age voters is in Philadelphia, with just 24 percent.

When it comes to changes in white working class voters, only the Allentown and Harrisburg areas show gains since 2000. Every other region shows declines since 2000, ranging from a modest drop in the Philadelphia suburbs, to substantial declines in the city of Philadelphia and Allegheny counties.

The largest shares of white seniors—20 percent or more of the electorate—are found in the three western and central Pennsylvania regions along with the rapidly growing Allentown-Scranton-Reading region. Slightly smaller shares are found in the growing Harrisburg and Philadelphia suburbs regions, and a far smaller share in the city of Philadelphia. It is significant that only the Harrisburg region is showing a noticeable gain in white seniors, perhaps reflecting an influx of retirees.

White working age college grads, in contrast, are gaining in all seven regions, but show the largest gains in the Philadelphia suburbs, where they also comprise a substantial share (29 percent) of the electorate. Large gains are also evident in the Pittsburgh suburbs/Erie region as well as the Allentown-Scranton-

Table 3. Eligible Voters by Race-Ethnic Categories for Regions of State

| Region | Share in Race-Ethnic Group | | | | |
|----------------------------|----------------------------|--------|--------|--------|----------|
| | White* | Black* | Asian* | Other* | Hispanic |
| State Total | 85.8 | 9.2 | 1.5 | 0.7 | 2.8 |
| Philadelphia | 44.6 | 43.2 | 3.5 | 1.3 | 7.4 |
| Philadelphia suburbs | 86.7 | 8.0 | 2.8 | 0.7 | 1.8 |
| Allentown-Scranton-Reading | 90.5 | 3.1 | 0.8 | 0.6 | 5.0 |
| Harrisburg-York-Lancaster | 90.5 | 4.4 | 1.2 | 0.7 | 3.2 |
| Allegheny Co. | 85.5 | 11.3 | 1.3 | 0.9 | 0.9 |
| Pittsburgh Suburbs-Erie | 95.1 | 3.1 | 0.3 | 0.7 | 0.8 |
| North and Central PA. | 95.8 | 2.3 | 0.6 | 0.5 | 0.8 |

Source: Authors' analysis of US Census 2006 American Community Survey

* non Hispanic members of race group

Reading and Harrisburg regions. Allegheny County, which already has a large share of this group, also shows gains. In fact, it is only the city of Philadelphia, where white college grad workers hold a small share (11 percent) of the electorate, that this group's gains since 2000 are minimal.

The final key segment, which is gaining in all regions, is minority voters, defined as eligible voters who are Hispanic, Black, Asian and races other than white. (Table 3 shows the race-ethnic composition of eligible voters in each region)

While the city of Philadelphia has the largest minority electorate share (55 percent) of all regions, it also shows the smallest numeric increase in this group since 2000. The greatest minority increases are in the three fastest growing regions of the state—the Philadelphia suburbs and the Allentown-Scranton-Reading and Harrisburg areas. In these three regions, minorities account for 52 percent, 58 percent and 32 percent of total gains in eligible voters since 2000. These gains were dominated by blacks and Asians in the Philadelphia suburbs, Hispanics in the Allentown-Scranton-Reading region, and blacks and Hispanics in the Harrisburg region.

Allegheny County's electorate has a higher share of minorities (14 percent) than any of these three regions, but has shown only modest gains since 2000. The remaining western and central regions are more than 95 percent white.

These data indicate that the state's three fast growing regions are distinct in the nature of their gains. The Philadelphia suburbs, already an upscale region, are attracting primarily white college educated

**Table 4. Percent Change in Eligible Voters for Demographic Segments, 2000-2006:
Three Faster Growing Regions in East and Southeast Pennsylvania**

| Attributes | Philadelphia suburbs | Allentown- Scranton- Reading | Harrisburg- York- Lancaster | State Total |
|---|---------------------------------|---|--|------------------------|
| <i>Age</i> | | | | |
| 18-29 | 8.9 | 10.1 | 12.9 | 3.5 |
| 30-44 | -12.2 | -6.7 | -7.0 | -11.8 |
| 45-64 | 24.3 | 20.2 | 20.1 | 17.8 |
| 65+ | 2.2 | -2.5 | 6.8 | -2.1 |
| <i>Occupations of Male Workers</i> | | | | |
| Managers and Professionals | 8.8 | 0.7 | 13.0 | 4.7 |
| Service | 9.1 | 27.7 | 12.0 | 11.5 |
| Sales | 5.4 | 16.5 | 19.5 | 5.5 |
| Blue Collar | -7.2 | 1.4 | 3.9 | -3.9 |
| <i>Selected Industries of Workers</i> | | | | |
| Manufacturing and Other Goods Production | -7.0 | -7.5 | 1.7 | -6.0 |
| Education and Health | 13.1 | 11.8 | 13.9 | 10.3 |
| Information, Financial and Professional Services | 6.5 | 16.2 | 17.0 | 7.7 |
| <i>Source: Authors' analysis of 2000 US Decennial Census and 2006 American Community Survey</i> | | | | |

workers and non-Hispanic minorities. The more rapid and recently growing Allentown-Scranton-Reading and Harrisburg regions, in contrast, are experiencing growth in white working class and white college-educated voters and are adding Hispanic voters. And, as indicated in Table 4, all three regions are distinctive relative to the rest of the state in attracting young, 18-29-year-old eligible voters, as well as in retaining baby boomers who now occupy a large part of the 45-64 age group. (Note: nationally, the 30-44 age group is declining due to the replacement of the large baby boom generation by the smaller generation X).

Appendix A provides additional detail on Pennsylvania's regions, breaking down eligible voters by level of education, marital status (for women), occupation, industry and earnings. The most interesting data here is the distribution by occupation among male voters (who are working). In Pennsylvania as a whole, blue collar workers (production, operatives, craft, transportation, and laborers) outnumber professionals and managers by 38 to 32 percent. Concentrations of blue collar workers are particularly high in the Allentown-Scranton-Reading and Harrisburg (44 percent), Pittsburgh suburbs/Erie (45 percent) and Central/North (50 percent) areas. But, as shown in Table 4, male blue collar voters declined by 4 percent in Pennsylvania between 2000 and 2006, with a sharper decline of 7 percent in the Philadelphia suburbs. Interestingly, there were modest increases in the

Allentown-Scranton-Reading and Harrisburg regions. However, in both regions, these modest increases were dwarfed by strong growth in male voters who have sales or service jobs.

Professionals and managers show a different pattern. They are most heavily concentrated in Pittsburgh (38 percent) and, especially, the Philadelphia suburbs (43 percent). The Philadelphia suburbs also had faster than average growth in this group between 2000 and 2006, as did the Harrisburg area. The Allentown-Scranton-Reading region, however, had weaker than average growth.

The data on distribution by industry of Pennsylvania's working voters underscore how much the state has changed. Currently, there is a slightly larger proportion of these voters in education and health services alone (24 percent) than in manufacturing, mining, construction and all other goods production (22 percent). By region, manufacturing and goods production is currently strongest in the Allentown-Scranton-Reading and Harrisburg, Pittsburgh suburbs/Erie and Central/North regions—the same regions that have the highest concentrations of blue collar workers. But even in these areas, workers in manufacturing and goods production are significantly outnumbered by workers in education/health and information/financial/professional services. Pittsburgh and the Philadelphia suburbs have the lowest concentrations of manufacturing and goods production and have the highest proportions of working voters in education/health and information/financial/professional services (53 and 50 percent, respectively).

As Table 4 shows, voters in manufacturing and goods production have continued to decline across Pennsylvania between 2000 and 2006, with the Philadelphia suburbs and the Allentown-Scranton-Reading region registering faster than average declines; the Harrisburg region in contrast registered a very slight increase. But all three of the fast-growing regions showed strong growth in education and health services and the Allentown-Scranton-Reading and Harrisburg regions showed double the statewide average in growth in information-financial-professional services. These changes in the occupations and industries of Pennsylvania's voters, especially in the fast-growing regions, indicate that stereotypes of these voters, especially of white working class voters toiling in manufacturing, should be discarded.

C. Recent Democratic victories in Pennsylvania have featured strong support from groups like minorities, single women and the young, but have also benefited from relatively strong support among the white working class, especially among its upwardly mobile segment that has some college education.

So far we have documented the basic demographic and geographic shifts that are reshaping Pennsylvania and sketched a brief portrait of Pennsylvania's electorate. Now we turn to how Pennsylvanians have been voting in recent elections which, as we shall see, is intimately bound up with these changes. The results and analysis not only illuminate how Pennsylvania arrived at its current political coloration but provide some hints about how Pennsylvania's politics might change in the future as demographic and geographic shifts continue.

Table 5 displays some basic exit poll data from the 2004 Presidential election and 2006 Senate election in Pennsylvania. In 2004, Pennsylvania voted Democratic in the Presidential election for the fourth straight time since 1992, albeit by a narrow 51-48 margin. The basic building blocks of Kerry's victory can be discerned from the data in the table. He received 45 percent of the white vote but was able to make up his nine point deficit there by carrying 84 percent of the black vote and 72 percent of the Hispanic vote. He narrowly lost men by three points, but carried women by eight points; the same gender gap can be seen when comparing white men and white women, which he lost by 15 and three points, respectively. And Kerry split married women almost evenly but carried single women by 20 points.

By education, Kerry did particularly well among high school dropouts, but also carried postgraduates and, interestingly, those with some college. In fact, he did a little better among those with some college than among postgraduates—quite different from the national pattern. Kerry also did exceptionally well among young (18-29 year old) Pennsylvanians, carrying them by an impressive 21 points, far better than he did among 30-39 year olds and seniors, the other two age groups he carried. The exit poll also indicates he received overwhelming support in cities of 50,000 or more, while losing heavily in rural areas. In the suburbs, however, he lost to Bush by five points.

In the 2006 Senate election, Democrat Bob Casey beat incumbent Republican Rick Santorum by 59-41, a significantly larger margin than Kerry achieved in 2004. Reflecting this, Casey's coalition was much more broadly based than Kerry's. He carried white voters by 10 points and even carried white men by six points. He also carried married women by 16 points and voters at all levels of education. He did particularly well among voters with a postgraduate education, receiving 70 percent of their votes.

Like Kerry in 2004, he also received overwhelming support from young voters, carrying them by 36 points. But he also carried every other age group. And unlike Kerry, he did carry the suburbs (by 14 points), adding the support of these voters to his big margins in urban areas.

Digging a little deeper into the exit poll data, it's instructive to focus on the white working class vote—the subject of much debate and discussion in the 2008 election season. In 2004, Pennsylvania white working class voters (defined here as whites without a four year college degree) supported Bush over Kerry by 10 points. This compares to a Kerry deficit of 23 points nationally among these voters. So Kerry actually did quite a bit better among white working class voters in Pennsylvania than he did nationally. Moreover, Kerry only ran a slight deficit among whites with some college—the upwardly mobile portion of the white working class, more likely to have white collar or skilled blue collar jobs—losing them by just three points. This compares to a 25 point thumping Kerry received among these voters nationwide.

Interestingly, Democrats' relatively strong performance among working class whites does not provide much explanatory power for understanding the differences in outcome between 2004 and 1988, the last time the Republicans carried the state. According to the 1988 and 2004 exit polls, Democrats ran

Table 5. Voting by Selected Demographic Groups, 2004 and 2006

| Group | 2004 President | | | 2006 Senate | | |
|---------------------|----------------|------------|---------|-------------|------------|---------|
| | Democrat | Republican | Dem-Rep | Democrat | Republican | Dem-Rep |
| White | 45 | 54 | -9 | 55 | 45 | 10 |
| Black | 84 | 16 | 68 | 90 | 10 | 80 |
| Hispanic | 72 | 28 | 44 | 77 | 23 | 54 |
| Men | 48 | 51 | -3 | 57 | 43 | 14 |
| Women | 54 | 46 | 8 | 61 | 39 | 22 |
| White Men | 42 | 57 | -15 | 53 | 47 | 6 |
| White Women | 48 | 51 | -3 | 58 | 42 | 16 |
| Single Women | 60 | 40 | 20 | 69 | 31 | 38 |
| Married Women | 49 | 50 | -1 | 58 | 42 | 16 |
| HS Dropout | 57 | 43 | 14 | 68 | 32 | 36 |
| HS Graduate | 49 | 51 | -2 | 52 | 48 | 4 |
| Some College | 54 | 46 | 9 | 60 | 40 | 20 |
| College Grad | 46 | 53 | -7 | 54 | 46 | 8 |
| Postgraduate | 52 | 48 | 4 | 70 | 30 | 40 |
| 18-29 | 60 | 39 | 21 | 68 | 32 | 36 |
| 30-39 | 53 | 46 | 7 | 60 | 40 | 20 |
| 40-49 | 46 | 53 | -7 | 57 | 43 | 14 |
| 50-64 | 46 | 54 | -8 | 59 | 41 | 18 |
| 65+ | 52 | 48 | 4 | 56 | 44 | 12 |
| City over 500,000 | 81 | 19 | 62 | 85 | 15 | 70 |
| City 50,000-500,000 | 72 | 28 | 44 | 97 | 3 | 94 |
| Suburbs | 47 | 52 | -5 | 57 | 43 | 14 |
| City 10,000-50,000 | 52 | 48 | 4 | 53 | 47 | 6 |
| Rural | 27 | 73 | -46 | 45 | 55 | -10 |

Source: Authors' analysis of 2004 and 2006 Pennsylvania exit polls

roughly the same among this group in both elections. But the other side of the demographic divide—the white college-educated—does help explain this change. White college-educated voters increased their margin of support for the Democrats by seven points across the two elections. Moreover, according to Census voter supplement data, white college-educated voters increased their share of voters across the two elections by 16 points, while the share of white working class voters declined by 17 points.

An intriguing wrinkle in the stability of white working support across the two elections is the difference between whites with some college and whites with a high school diploma or less. The latter reduced their support for the Democrats by 10 points, while the former increased their support by 16 points. The net was stability but clearly the less and more-skilled segments of the white working class in Pennsylvania are moving in different directions. And it is the more-skilled segment that is increasing its share of voters (up 10 points since the 1988 election).


The exit polls also suggest that the overall stability of the white working class vote masks different regional trends over time. Here we have to use the exit poll regions which are: Philadelphia; Philadelphia suburbs; Northeast (roughly equivalent to our Allentown-Scranton-Reading region); Central and Northern Tier (roughly equivalent to combining our Harrisburg-Lancaster-York and Central/Northern regions); and Pittsburgh Area and West (roughly equivalent to combining our Pittsburgh and Pittsburgh suburbs-Erie areas). These data show white working support for the Democrats increasing in Philadelphia, the Philadelphia suburbs and the Northeast (Allentown area) while declining in the Central/Northern Tier and Pittsburgh Area/West.

D. Political shifts in Pennsylvania since 1988 have seen the growing eastern part of the state swing toward the Democrats, producing four straight presidential victories for that party.

How did these patterns of support play out geographically? Maps 3, 4, and 5 provide this information for 2004, 1996 and 1988 by color-coding each county by its margin for the victorious presidential candidate (deep blue for a Democratic victory of 10 points or more, light blue for a Democratic victory of under 10 points, deep red for a Republican victory of 10 points or more, light red for a Republican victory of under 10 points). In addition, our seven regions are shown on each map by heavy black lines.

Looking at the 2004 map, it is striking how much of the map is colored red. How did Kerry put together a victorious coalition when so few counties are colored blue? The answer lies in the distribution of voters. Philadelphia, which is just one county on the map, and a small one, had 674,000 voters—that's 12 percent of the statewide total—and they went for Kerry by 61 points (see Table 6). Then right next to Philadelphia on the lower far right of the map are the four counties of the Philadelphia suburbs. These counties cast 1,234,000 votes (21 percent of the statewide total) and went for Kerry by seven points. Between Philadelphia and its suburbs, that's a third of the statewide vote fairly to very strong for Kerry.

Maps 3, 4, 5. County Voting for President



Source: Authors' analysis of election statistics

Kerry also did well in parts of the Allentown-Scranton-Reading area (927,000 votes; 16 percent of statewide total), particularly Lackawanna county (Scranton). He also carried Lehigh (Allentown), Northampton, Monroe and Luzerne counties in that area. Out in the far western part of the state he carried Pittsburgh (Allegheny county-by itself 11 percent of the statewide vote) by 15 points, as well as several Pittsburgh suburbs (Fayette, Washington and Beaver counties) and Erie county up in the far northwest corner. That was enough to deliver a three point statewide victory despite the sea of red in the middle of the map; Kerry did not carry a single county in either the Harrisburg-Lancaster-York or Central and Northern regions. But that sea of red, despite its imposing presence on the map, only accounted for a quarter of the statewide vote.

Another way of looking at these data is to note that 44 percent of the statewide vote is contributed by Philadelphia, the Philadelphia suburbs and Pittsburgh, which together occupy only a small part of the overall Pennsylvania map. Also, the far eastern portion of the map (Philadelphia, the Philadelphia suburbs and the Allentown-Scranton-Reading area) accounts for about half (49 percent) of the statewide vote.

The Central and Northern region, because it dominates the map, can distort perceptions of political reality in Pennsylvania. That region contains most of Pennsylvania's non-metro (rural) counties. But it accounts for only 11 percent of the statewide vote. Indeed, all non-metro counties together only account for 14 percent of Pennsylvania's voters. That means an overwhelming 86 percent of Pennsylvania's votes come from metro areas. In fact, 53 percent of statewide votes come from just two metro areas (Philadelphia and Pittsburgh) and 70 percent come from the top six metros (Philadelphia and Pittsburgh plus Allentown, Harrisburg, Scranton and Lancaster). The frequent observation in the media that Pennsylvania is somehow a "rural" state makes no sense from a political standpoint.

Table 6. Voting Results from Past Elections: Democratic Margins for Regions of the State

| Region | Democratic Margins: | | | | |
|----------------------------|---------------------|----------------|----------------|---------------|-------------|
| | 1988 President | 1996 President | 2004 President | 2006 Congress | 2006 Senate |
| Philadelphia | 35 | 61 | 61 | 66 | 68 |
| Philadelphia suburbs | -23 | 5 | 7 | 9 | 20 |
| Allentown-Scranton-Reading | -13 | 5 | -1 | 18 | 16 |
| Harrisburg-York-Lancaster | -33 | -18 | -29 | -17 | -10 |
| Allegheny Co. | 21 | 15 | 15 | 34 | 30 |
| Pittsburgh Suburbs-Erie | 13 | 10 | -6 | -2 | 12 |
| North and Central PA. | -15 | -6 | -24 | -8 | -2 |

Source: Authors' analysis of election returns


Turning to the 1988 map—the last time a Republican presidential candidate carried the state—the key differences are dominance by the Republicans in the Philadelphia suburbs, stronger performance in the Allentown-Scranton-Reading area (Dukakis only carried Lackawanna county in that region), but weaker performance in the Pittsburgh suburbs-Erie area (Democrats carried six counties in that region by 10 points or more in that year, compared to none in 2004). That netted out to a two point Republican victory in 1988.

In Bill Clinton's second victory (by nine points) in Pennsylvania in 1996, the key shifts from 1988 were the ending of Republican dominance of the Philadelphia suburbs and much stronger performance in the Allentown-Scranton-Reading area. The comparison of this map to the 2004 map is instructive. Though Kerry's margin was less than Clinton's (three vs. nine points), he retained Democratic dominance of the Philadelphia suburbs plus much of the improved performance in the Allentown-Scranton-Reading area. But, interestingly, the map indicates a marked deterioration of Democratic performance in the Pittsburgh suburbs-Erie region; in fact, Kerry did more poorly than Dukakis did when he lost the state in 1988.

The fact that Democratic performance could deteriorate in the west, relative to 1988, but, through improved performance in the east, still carry the state in 2004 underscores where voting power now resides in Pennsylvania. It is in the east, the part of Pennsylvania that is actually growing, not the west, where population is declining, nor certainly the center, which didn't have very many voters to begin with and is also now declining.

Map 6 provides a visual representation of where political shifts took place from 1988, the last Republican Presidential statewide victory, to 2004. Counties that are dark green had margin shifts toward the Democrats of 10 points or more, light green counties had margin shifts toward the Democrats of 10 points or less, dark yellow counties had margin shifts toward the Republicans of 10 points or more

Map 6. Change in Presidential Voting Margin by County, 1988-2004



Source: Authors' analysis of election statistics

and light yellow counties had margin shifts toward the Republicans of 10 points or less. The pattern here could not be more striking (compare to Map 2 showing the pattern of population growth by county). The eastern part of the state, where growth has been concentrated, shows uniform movement toward the Democrats in the time period. This includes some major shifts in Philadelphia and the Philadelphia suburbs. As shown in Table 6, the Democrats gained 26 points in Philadelphia and 30 points in the Philadelphia suburbs, turning a 23 point deficit in 1988 into a seven point advantage in 2004.

The Allentown-Scranton-Reading region had a margin shift toward the Democrats of a smaller,

but still solid, 12 points. This was led, as one might expect, by the counties with the large population centers: Berks (Reading); Lehigh (Allentown); and Lackawanna (Scranton). But it is important to note that fast-growing, but less populous, counties like Pike (up 26 percent since 2000; the highest growth rate of any county in Pennsylvania with over 10,000 in population) and Monroe (up 19 percent) in the far northeastern corner of the state also experienced sharp shifts toward the Democrats (18 and 27 points, respectively). These counties are experiencing strong growth largely due to in-migration from New York and New Jersey, which no doubt contributes to the political shifts these counties have experienced.

It is also instructive to look at the Harrisburg region on the map. The region is one of the bright spots for Republicans in Pennsylvania since it is not only solidly Republican (a 29 point margin for Bush in 2004) but is growing, in contrast to other areas of Republican strength in the state. But the map indicates that, as the Harrisburg region is growing, it is also moving toward the Democrats, which is attenuating Republican gains from the area's growth. Moreover, the Democratic shift is concentrated in the eastern part of this area, where the population centers of Lancaster, Dauphin (Harrisburg) and York counties are located.

The rest of the map—essentially the declining parts of the state—shows almost uniform Republican gains over the 1988-2004 period, with some exceptions like Centre (where Penn State is located) and Erie counties. The pattern of Republican gain is particularly striking in the Pittsburgh suburbs which all experienced gains in Republican margin of 10 points or more. The entire Pittsburgh suburbs-Erie region, in fact, moved toward the Republicans by 19 points, turning a Republican deficit of 13 points into a six point advantage. Even Pittsburgh itself moved toward the Republicans by six points.

E. Key trends and groups to watch in 2008 include the white working class, the increasing number of whites with some college, white college graduates, and Hispanics, who have been driving the growth of the minority vote.

The shifts discussed above have allowed the Democrats to win four straight Presidential elections in Pennsylvania. But just barely: in the last two elections the Democrats' average margin for the Democrats has been just 3 points. Whether the Democrats keep their victory streak alive—and perhaps expand their margin—or the Republicans stage a comeback will depend greatly on the demographic groups and trends we have reviewed in this report.

Here are some things to watch out for in the 2008 election.

First, will the white working class maintain its level of support for the GOP? If it does not and moves toward the Democrats, this could tilt the state from its current purple status to solid blue. Indeed, given current demographic trends, which are steadily reducing the ranks of white working class voters, the GOP needs to not just maintain, but increase, its support among these voters to have a reasonable chance of carrying the state in 2008.

Particularly relevant to the white working class vote is the vote of whites with some college, the upwardly mobile portion of the white working class. These voters have been moving toward the Democrats, even as their ranks have been increasing (in contrast to the rest of the white working class). If that trend continues in 2008, the GOP's hold on the white working class could weaken decisively.

Second, will white college-educated voters, who are steadily increasing their share of the electorate, continue their movement toward the Democrats? If so, that would make a Democratic victory in 2008 likely and a GOP victory very difficult to engineer.

Third, will minorities, particularly Hispanics whose share of voters is rapidly growing (albeit from a small base) turn out for the Democrats? Given their very high levels of support for the Democrats in the 2004 and 2006 elections, the greater their turnout, the better for the Democrats. Ditto for single women and young voters, who have also been recording very high support levels for the Democrats.

In terms of regions, the fast-growing Allentown-Scranton-Reading area, where every county has trended Democratic since 1988, is perhaps the key one to watch. The white working class—a group that in this region is trending Democratic—is actually adding voters (see Figure 5), white college-educated voters are growing rapidly and minority voters (primarily Hispanics) are burgeoning. Within this region, the key segment to watch is the Allentown metropolitan area, third-largest in the state and primary driver of the region's growth, both overall and among Hispanics. Also worth watching is the far northeast corner of the region where very fast-growing Pike and Monroe counties, which have been trending Democratic, are located. Current trends, if they continue unabated, could push this whole region

solidly into the blue column in 2008 and beyond, following the trajectory of the Philadelphia suburbs, which have already arrived there. Such a development could also tip the statewide balance decisively toward the Democrats, threatening Pennsylvania's current purple (albeit leaning blue) status.

Running a close second, the even-faster-growing Harrisburg-York-Lancaster region will also be critical. Similar to the Allentown-Scranton-Reading region, this region is adding white working class voters (in larger numbers) and white college-educated and minority, primarily Hispanic, voters (in smaller numbers). While the region has remained solidly Republican, there has been a trend toward the Democrats since 1988, possibly linked to the increasing numbers of minority and white college-educated voters. This trend, as shown on Map 6, is in the eastern part of the region and is particularly strong in the Lancaster metro. But it also includes the very fast growing York-Hanover metro, as well as the Lebanon metro and the populous parts of the Harrisburg-Carlisle metro (Dauphin and Cumberland counties). The GOP needs to stop this trend and, ideally, move it back in the other direction to have a reasonable chance of carrying the state in 2008 and beyond. Conversely, if the pro-Democratic trend continues and the parties become more closely-matched within the region, the Republicans' ability to win statewide races would be severely compromised.

The Philadelphia suburbs merit continued attention due to continued growth driven by increases in white college graduates and minorities. This region has trended the most sharply toward the Democrats since 1988, a trend which may well continue in 2008 given these demographic changes. Out west, in Allegheny County and the declining Pittsburgh suburbs-Erie region (which nevertheless shows strong growth among white college graduates), the trend has been toward the GOP since 1988. Watch to see if the reddening trend continues in this election, which, given opposing trends in the eastern part of the state, is vital to the GOP's chances. But if these western regions—especially their white working class voters—start moving back in the Democratic direction, it could be a signal that Pennsylvania is changing its political colors from purple to blue (see Appendix B Maps, which show the pattern of support by county in the 2006 Senate election and the 2006 House elections, for a sense of what recent midterm party strongholds in Pennsylvania look like).

Conclusion

What happens in Pennsylvania—will it become more Democratic, remain closely-divided, or even go Republican for the first time in five elections?—will depend on the complex interaction of the trends enumerated above. What has made Pennsylvania purple in recent elections is the way opposing trends have tended to balance one another out without a decisive advantage for either party. But that could be changing. In the 2008 election, we'll find out whether one set of trends is finally starting to overwhelm the other.


Appendix A. Eligible Voters in Key Segments for Regions

| Attributes | Philadelphia | | Allentown- Scranton- | Harrisburg- York- | Allegheny | Pittsburgh | North and | |
|--|--------------|---------|-------------------------|----------------------|-----------|------------------|------------|--|
| | Philadelphia | suburbs | Reading | Lancaster | Co. | Suburbs- Erie | Central PA | |
| <i>Education</i> | | | | | | | | |
| Total | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | |
| LTHS | 22 | 9 | 15 | 16 | 10 | 13 | 15 | |
| HSGrad | 38 | 29 | 41 | 40 | 33 | 43 | 46 | |
| SomeColl | 22 | 25 | 25 | 23 | 27 | 25 | 24 | |
| CollGrad | 19 | 36 | 19 | 21 | 30 | 19 | 16 | |
| <i>Gender/Marital Status</i> | | | | | | | | |
| Total | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | |
| Married Women | 15 | 27 | 27 | 28 | 24 | 27 | 27 | |
| Unmarried Women | 40 | 24 | 25 | 23 | 29 | 25 | 23 | |
| All Men | 45 | 48 | 48 | 48 | 47 | 48 | 49 | |
| <i>Earnings</i> | | | | | | | | |
| Total | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | |
| \$<15,000 | 22 | 18 | 23 | 21 | 23 | 27 | 29 | |
| \$15-34,000 | 36 | 24 | 36 | 35 | 33 | 35 | 39 | |
| \$35-49,000 | 19 | 18 | 18 | 21 | 18 | 17 | 16 | |
| \$50-74,000 | 15 | 19 | 14 | 15 | 15 | 14 | 11 | |
| \$75,000+ | 8 | 21 | 8 | 9 | 12 | 7 | 5 | |
| <i>Male Occupations;</i> | | | | | | | | |
| Total | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | |
| Managers and Professionals | 29 | 43 | 26 | 30 | 38 | 27 | 25 | |
| Service | 20 | 9 | 13 | 9 | 14 | 13 | 11 | |
| Sales | 20 | 20 | 18 | 17 | 20 | 16 | 14 | |
| Blue Collar | 31 | 27 | 44 | 44 | 28 | 45 | 50 | |
| <i>Industry of Worker</i> | | | | | | | | |
| Total | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | |
| Manufacturing and Other Goods Production | 12 | 19 | 24 | 26 | 13 | 25 | 27 | |
| Trade | 13 | 15 | 16 | 16 | 14 | 15 | 16 | |
| Education and Health | 27 | 24 | 22 | 20 | 28 | 24 | 25 | |
| Information, Financial and Professional Services | 21 | 26 | 17 | 16 | 25 | 15 | 11 | |
| Other Services | 27 | 17 | 21 | 22 | 21 | 21 | 21 | |

Source: Authors' analysis of 2006 American Community Survey


Appendix B. County Voting for Congress, 2006

Senate



- Republican Margin 10%+
- Republican Margin 0 to 10%
- Democrat Margin 0 to 10%
- Democrat Margin 10%+

House



Source: Authors' analysis of election statistics

Endnotes

1. The seven regions are discussed in terms of the following metropolitan area and county components:
 1. **Philadelphia City**—Philadelphia Co. (coincident with Philadelphia City)
 2. **Philadelphia Suburbs**—Delaware, Chester, Montgomery and Bucks Cos. (suburban counties of Pennsylvania portion of the Philadelphia-Camden Wilmington -PA-NJ-DE-MD metropolitan area)
 3. **Allentown-Scranton-Reading**—Lehigh, Northampton and Carbon Cos (Pennsylvania portion of the Allentown-Bethlehem-Easton, PA-NJ metropolitan area), Luzerne, Lackawanna and Wyoming Cos (Scranton-Wilkes-Barre metropolitan area), Berks Co. (Reading metropolitan area), Pike Co. (Pennsylvania part of New York-Northern New Jersey-Long Island NY-NJ-PA metropolitan area), Monroe Co., Wayne Co. Susquehanna Co, Schuylkill Co, Columbia Co.
 4. **Harrisburg-York-Lancaster**—Dauphin, Perry, and Cumberland counties (Harrisburg-Carlisle metropolitan area), York Co. (York-Hanover metropolitan area), Lancaster Co. (Lancaster metropolitan area) Lebanon Co. (Lebanon metropolitan area)
 5. **Allegheny Co.**—Allegheny Co. (contains but is not coincident with city of Pittsburgh)
 6. **Pittsburgh Suburbs-Erie**—Beaver, Butler, Armstrong, Westmoreland, Fayette, and Washington counties (remainder of Pittsburgh metropolitan area) Erie Co. (Erie metropolitan area), Mercer Co. (Pennsylvania part of Youngstown-Warren-Bordman OH-PA metropolitan area), Greene Co., Lawrence Co., Crawford Co., and Warren Co.
 7. **North and Central PA**—Cambria Co. (Johnstown metropolitan area), Blair Co. (Altoona metropolitan area), Centre Co. (State College metropolitan area), Lycoming Co. (Williamsport metropolitan area), and 24 remaining counties not listed above.
2. “Committing to Prosperity: Moving Forward on an Agenda to Renew Pennsylvania,” Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Metropolitan Policy Program, March 2007.
3. U.S. Census Bureau, Population Estimates Program, <http://www.census.gov/popest/states/>, estimates for 2000-2007 and archival estimates from 1990-2000.
4. Public use migration data were purchased from the Internal Revenue Service, described in Emily Gross, “Internal Migration Data: Strengths, Limitations, and Current Trends,” IRS, Washington DC. 2005

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For More Information

William H. Frey
Senior Fellow
The Brookings Institution Metropolitan Policy Program
202.797.6292
wfrey@brookings.edu

Ruy Teixeira
Visiting Fellow
Governance Studies and Metropolitan Policy Programs
The Brookings Institution
202.797.2998
rteixeira@brookings.edu

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1775 Massachusetts Avenue, NW
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