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*Pakistan:  
Arrival and Departure*

How did Pakistan arrive at its present juncture? Pakistan was originally intended by its great leader, Mohammed Ali Jinnah, to transform the lives of British Indian Muslims by providing them a homeland sheltered from Hindu oppression. It did so for some, although they amounted to less than half of the Indian subcontinent's total number of Muslims. The north Indian Muslim middle class that spearheaded the Pakistan movement found itself united with many Muslims who had been less than enthusiastic about forming Pakistan, and some were hostile to the idea of an explicitly Islamic state.

Pakistan was created on August 14, 1947, but in a decade self-styled field marshal Ayub Khan had replaced its shaky democratic political order with military-guided democracy, a market-oriented economy, and little effective investment in welfare or education. The Ayub experiment faltered, in part because of an unsuccessful war with India in 1965, and Ayub was replaced by another general, Yahya Khan, who could not manage the growing chaos. East Pakistan went into revolt, and with India's assistance, the old Pakistan was broken up with the creation of Bangladesh in 1971.

The second attempt to transform Pakistan was short-lived. It was led by the charismatic Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, who simultaneously tried to gain control over the military, diversify Pakistan's foreign and security policy, build a nuclear weapon, and introduce an economic order based on both Islam and socialism. He failed even more spectacularly than Ayub Khan and Yahya Khan. Bhutto was hanged in a rigged trial organized by General Mohammed Zia ul-Haq, who took Islam more seriously. With U.S. patrons looking the other way and with China and Saudi Arabia providing active support, Zia sought a third transformation, pursuing Islamization and nuclear weaponization. He further

damaged several of Pakistan's most important civilian institutions, notably the courts (already craven under Ayub), the universities, and the civil service.<sup>1</sup> Zia was very shrewd—and he was also a fanatic with strong foreign backing because his support for the Afghan mujahideen helped bring down the Soviet Union.

After Zia's death, from 1989 to 1999, Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif alternated in office during a decade of imperfect democracy, groping toward the recreation of Jinnah's moderate, tolerant vision of Pakistan. In fact, the 1990s, which often are referred to as the "lost decade" in terms of economic growth, witnessed a high rise in urban and rural poverty levels. The growth rate in the 1980s averaged 6.5 percent, but in the 1990s real GDP growth declined to 4.6 percent.

Benazir and Nawaz were unable to govern without interference from the military and the intelligence services, which under Zia had vastly expanded their domestic political role. The army believed that it was the keeper of Pakistan's soul and that it understood better than the politicians the dangers from India and how to woo outside supporters, notably the Americans, the Saudis, and the Chinese. The 1990s—the decade of democracy—saw Benazir and Nawaz holding a combined four terms as prime minister. In this period the press was freed from government censorship (Benazir's accomplishment) and there was movement to liberalize the economy (Sharif's contribution), although neither clamped down on growing Islamist movements nor did much to repair the state apparatus, which had been badly weakened over the previous thirty years. Nor were either of them able to reclaim civilian ground from the military, which by then had developed a complicated apparatus for fixing Pakistan's elections. Benazir invested in education, but the state was unable to implement her policies, and Nawaz turned to the military to exhume the "ghost schools" that Benazir claimed she had built. There were also ghost computers: one of the projects that she liked to boast about involved the wide distribution of computers to schools and villages, which had never happened.

## **Musharraf: Another Failed General**

When General Pervez Musharraf seized power in a bloodless coup on October 12, 1999, he undertook Pakistan's fourth transformation. Musharraf came to power after he launched a politically and militarily catastrophic attack on India in the Kargil region of Kashmir and then blamed Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif for its failure. He believed that the politicians had had their opportunity. Ten years of imperfect democracy had not turned Pakistan's economy around or addressed the country's many social and political tensions, and

Musharraf, fresh from his coup, told me that “this time he would ‘fix’ the johnnies [corrupt and incompetent politicians and bureaucrats],” setting Pakistan on the right course under the army’s tutelage. He rejected my suggestion that corrupt or guilty politicians be removed and that fresh elections be held to bring a new generation of competent politicians to power, the argument being that it takes time to build a democracy and that politicians should be allowed to make mistakes and learn from them. Musharraf would have none of that, as he was confident that with the backing of the military he could launch still another reformation of the Pakistani state and nation. The highlights of Musharraf’s domestic reform strategy included

- Fiscal and administrative devolution to the districts, which further weakened the powers of Pakistan’s provincial governments; the system was later abandoned.

- Privatization of state-owned assets, which resulted in a huge inflow of money into the treasury.

- Promotion of a poverty-reduction strategy.

- Creation of the National Accountability Bureau, which was extremely controversial; and at one point the bureau was shut down.

- Breaking the monopoly of state-owned media and promoting a free press, although toward the end of his period in office Musharraf declared a state of emergency.

- Empowerment of the Higher Education Commission and establishment of new universities.

- Reservation of seats in Parliament for women.

- Signing of the Women’s Protection Bill in an attempt to reform the rigid Islamist-inspired Hudood laws.

- Enacting anti-terrorism measures, which, although they represented a strong public stance against sectarian violence, were in practice ineffective.

- Registration of madrassas and development of new curriculums, which also was unsuccessful.

Musharraf turned to the technocrats for guidance, transforming the system of local government and selling off many state assets (thus improving the balance of payments problem, which always is severe for a country with little foreign investment and hardly any manufacturing capability). He further opened up the airwaves and in 2000 attempted to tame the judiciary, making them take a fresh oath of office swearing allegiance to him. One of Musharraf’s cherished goals, often repeated publicly and privately, was to tackle “sectarian violence,” the code for Sunni-Shiite death squads and organized mayhem, but it actually intensified. Finally, while having signed up for the G. W. Bush administration’s “global war on terror,” his government never actually stopped

supporting militant and violent groups in Afghanistan, Kashmir, and India itself.

Musharraf did introduce some important changes in relations with India. These were on his mind when he first came to power, and after several years he began to float proposals on Kashmir and a secret back-channel dialogue was established. It was clear from my conversations with other generals at that time that they regarded that approach as naive but were willing to go along with Musharraf to see whether there were any positive results.<sup>2</sup>

Musharraf had an idealized vision of what he wanted Pakistan to become, but he was no strategist. He neither ordered his priorities nor mustered the human and material resources to systematically tackle them one after another. He behaved as president just the way he behaved as a general: he was good at public relations but bad at details and implementation. His greatest accomplishment came when he left things alone—for example, by allowing electronic media to proliferate to the point that Pakistan now has more than eighty television channels, although many of them lack professional standards. On the other hand, his greatest failure—and a calamity for Pakistan—may have been his permissive or lax attitude toward Benazir Bhutto's security. A report issued by the United Nations holds him responsible in part for her murder,<sup>3</sup> which removed the most talented of all Pakistani politicians, despite her flaws, and further undercut Pakistan's prospects.

Musharraf began to lose his grip on power because of his seeming support of an unpopular war in Afghanistan and his strategic miscalculation of Pakistani public opinion, which led him to believe that a public protest movement against his high-handed tactics by judges and lawyers would dissipate. He, like his military predecessors, had to turn to civilian politicians for moral authority after about three years of rule, but doing so failed to generate legitimacy for Musharraf, just as it had failed Ayub and Zia.

In March 2007, Chief Justice Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry was summoned by Musharraf and asked to resign. When he refused to do so, Musharraf suspended him (a first in Pakistan's history), initiating a chain of events that eventually led to Musharraf's own downfall. Chaudhry was subsequently reinstated by the Supreme Court in July, which would soon after deliberate Musharraf's eligibility as a legitimate candidate in the elections. Musharraf declared a state of emergency in November 2007, suspending both the country's constitution and the supreme court judges. Because his decisions were fiercely opposed by the community of lawyers, civil society organizations (both liberal and Islamist), and a very vocal population, Musharraf was almost entirely isolated. In 2008, there was civil unrest, riot-

ing, antigovernment protests, and mass support for the lawyers' movement. One leader emerged from this spectacular display of people's power: Aitzaz Ahsan, a Pakistan People's Party (PPP) member and distinguished lawyer. Ahsan, who was not part of the PPP's inner circle or close to President Asif Ali Zardari, has since kept a low profile.<sup>4</sup> Pro-Islamist sentiments were part of the lawyers' movement, which expanded its popular appeal, riding a wave of anti-Americanism.

There were more frequent attacks on U.S. and Western targets by militant Islamists, who made several attempts to kill Musharraf himself. Besides the 9/11 attacks in New York and Washington, there was another momentous development, this one in Pakistan itself: the razing of the Lal Masjid (Red Mosque). The mosque was located in the heart of Islamabad, close to Islamabad's leading hotel, the diplomatic enclave, and the new headquarters of the Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI). The mosque had close ties to militant groups, some of them patronized by the ISI. The government's attack on the mosque came not at the behest of Washington but of Beijing, regarded by elite Pakistanis as their most reliable supporter. China, like the West and India, was deeply concerned about the growth of Islamist militancy in Pakistan and the training of Chinese Muslims in militant camps. The Chinese ambassador complained publicly about the taking of female Chinese workers as hostages by a women's group associated with the Lal Masjid.


According to military sources, the army's operation killed 102 people, but independent media claim that there were 286 to 300 dead, including many women and young girls. Islamabad residents recalled the stench of rotting bodies.<sup>5</sup> There were other terror attacks by militant Islamists, and Pakistani public opinion hardened against both the United States and Musharraf after Pakistani sovereignty was clearly violated by drone attacks against militants within Pakistan. The army's reputation suffered, and in 2007, officers were warned by Musharraf not to wear their uniforms outside cantonments.

Instances of organized violence, including suicide attacks, have shown no clear trend, but they were more lethal in 2010 than in 2009. There was a major decline in terrorist attacks from 2009 to 2010, with 687 incidents in Pakistan in 2010 (down from 1,915 in 2009) resulting in 1,051 fatalities (down from 2,670). As of December 2010 there had been fifty-two acts of suicide terrorism, down from eighty in 2009, but they were more lethal, with 1,224 deaths in 2010, up from 1,217 in 2009.<sup>6</sup>

Figure 1-1 shows the annual number of suicide attacks in Pakistan from 2002 to 2009, by province. Despite the decline, the figures again ranked the country third in the world in both number of attacks and deaths, after

Figure 1-1. *Annual Number of Suicide Attacks in Pakistan, by Province, 2002–10<sup>a</sup>*

Annual number of suicide attacks by province, 2002–10



Source: Brookings Institution Pakistan Index ([www.brookings.edu/~media/Files/Programs/FP/pakistan%20index/index.pdf](http://www.brookings.edu/~media/Files/Programs/FP/pakistan%20index/index.pdf)).

a. In addition to the attacks noted above, two additional attacks occurred in Azad Kashmir during 2009, bringing the yearly total to eighty-seven.

Afghanistan and Iraq. Suicide bombing is a relatively new scourge in Pakistan. Only two suicide bombings were recorded there in 2002, but the number grew to fifty-nine in 2008 and to eighty-four in 2009, before dropping to twenty-nine in 2010, the lowest level since 2005. Still, in 2010 Pakistan was the site of far more deaths caused by suicide bombing (556) than any other country and accounted for about one-quarter of all such bombings in the world. The largest number of deaths and attacks took place in the Pashtun belt in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), with Pashtuns killing Pashtuns, whereas the so-called Punjabi Taliban (consisting of Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, Jaish-e-Muhammad, and others) targeted Shiites, Barelvis, and Ahmediyyas as well as Christians.<sup>7</sup>

One Indian observer notes that neither the intensified operations by the Pakistan army in the KP nor U.S. drone attacks have dented the motivation of the Pashtun, both Afghan and Pakistani, nor have they diminished the Punjabi Taliban.<sup>8</sup>

## Zardari Treading Water

Benazir Bhutto's widower, Asif Ali Zardari, was elected president on September 6, 2009, with the support of the PPP and in coalition with other secular parties, until the coalition collapsed in January 2011. Politics in Pakistan seems to be reverting to its normal fluid state as parties come and go, leading to uncertain leadership in Sind and Balochistan, in particular. As of 2011 Punjab remains stable, under the leadership of Nawaz's brother, Shahbaz Sharif, but the army seems to be again grooming favored politicians (such as the mercurial former cricket player, Imran Khan) for leadership roles. Being forced to govern in a coalition has its problems, but it has taught Pakistani politicians the virtues of cooperation and some of the "rules of the game" of a democratic political order.

Little was expected of Zardari, a Karachi-born, Sindhi-speaking politician from Punjab's Multan district, but in partnership with stalwart PPP members, his government, led by Prime Minister Yusuf Reza Gilani, has performed better than any prior civilian government—not a great accomplishment, but one that should not be belittled.

The new government's agenda is largely that of Benazir Bhutto: reform and restoration rather than transformation. She had lofty goals, but at the end of her life she understood how badly Pakistan had been governed, even by herself, and she indicated to acquaintances that just as her second term as prime minister had been better than the first, in a third term as prime minister she would have more clarity and purpose. She had the charisma, the international contacts, and the experience of governance that might have given Pakistan half a chance at some kind of success, despite her flaws. That shows that those who killed her knew what they were about, and her death, especially the way that she died, was a tragedy for Pakistan that dramatically reduced the country's odds of emerging from its thirty-year crisis as a normal state.

Zardari lacked his wife's brilliance and charisma. There was a systematic attempt by the opposition and the intelligence services to portray him as corrupt, and his reputation for corruption was one of her greatest political liabilities. Zardari's defense to visitors is that he has never been convicted of any crime, but that, of course, is true of most Pakistani politicians whose reputation for corruption equals or surpasses his. Complaints about corruption have faded in 2011, as the problems facing Pakistan—notably terror attacks—have shifted attention to the military and its inability to control domestic violence.

In the three years of Zardari's presidency, there have been significant changes in Pakistan's constitutional arrangements and an attempt to rebuild some of the badly weakened institutions of the Pakistani state. "Civil society"

is booming, the press tentatively exercises its new freedoms (in 2010 Pakistan earned the dubious honor of being the deadliest place in the world for journalists to practice their craft<sup>9</sup>), and growing concern about social inequality, education, and governance has given rise to all kinds of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), both modernizing and Islamist.

A wide gap remains between the government and the people of Pakistan. Except, paradoxically, for the Islamist Jamaat-e-Islami (JeI), internal party democracy is nonexistent. Distrust still permeates Pakistan's political order, and there remains a deep fear of the security services. The civilian government is still dependent on the military, especially as the internal security situation worsens. Pakistan's foreign friends are as unpredictable as ever.

Zardari's major accomplishments, many of which were the result of cooperation with Prime Minister Gilani, include restoration of the chief justice and deposed judges, unanimous approval by all four provinces of the Seventh National Finance Commission Award, passage of the Eighteenth Amendment to the Constitution, and continuity of national economic policy.

*Restoration of the Chief Justice and Deposed Judges.* Chief Justice Iftikhar Ahmed Chaudhry and all judges previously deposed by Musharraf were reinstated on March 21, 2009, by Zardari, albeit under pressure from the army. There are indications that the new Supreme Court adheres more closely to international judicial standards than its predecessor.<sup>10</sup>

*Agreement on the Seventh National Finance Commission (NFC) Award.* The NFC award is the annual distribution by the federal government of financial resources among the provinces of Pakistan, the terms of which have been the cause of bitter disagreement. Under the Zardari government, the Seventh NFC Award was unanimously approved by all four provinces in December 2009 through a consultative process, leading to improved relations between the provinces and to fiscal decentralization. In a distinct departure from policies of the Musharraf regime, the Seventh NFC Award increased the provincial share of the budget from 47.5 percent under Musharraf to 56 percent in the first year of the award (2010–11) and 57.5 percent in the remaining years. The award also includes relief measures for the provinces of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan.

*Passage of the Eighteenth Amendment to the Constitution.* On April 8, 2010, the National Assembly unanimously passed a constitutional amendment to curtail the powers of the president of Pakistan. In response to some constitutional questions raised by the Supreme Court, the assembly unanimously passed the Nineteenth Amendment in the last days of 2010.

The Eighteenth Amendment reverses the impact of the Eighth Amendment and Seventeenth Amendment, enacted in 1985 and 2003 respectively, which

had turned Pakistan into a semi-presidential republic. It places limits on presidential powers, empowering Parliament and the prime minister. It removes articles from the Constitution that allowed the president to dissolve Parliament and suspend the Constitution and removes the two-term limit on prime ministers, thus paving the way for a possible return of Mian Nawaz Sharif. It also removed all formal executive control over judicial appointments.

In addition, legislative authority was decentralized by the removal of the Concurrent List (an enumeration of areas where both federal and provincial governments may legislate but federal law prevails). The North-West Frontier Province also was renamed Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in recognition of the majority Pashtun population, although there were complaints from the province's minority Hazara community.

The passage of these amendments reversed some of the legacies of both General Zia and General Musharraf and re-erected some legal barriers to a return to army rule. The amendments were widely supported by all political parties, and the military allowed the process to move ahead, in part because in its own judgment, it was not the time for it to take an active, public role.

*Continuity of Economic Policy.* The Zardari government has largely continued the process of both macroeconomic and socioeconomic reform initiated by Musharraf. In doing so the government has been criticized for following an agenda driven by the International Monetary Fund; however, support for the status quo on the socioeconomic side has provided some stability to ongoing processes such as the poverty reduction strategy as well as large social protection programs such as the Benazir income support program.

## Trends through 2011

To summarize trends in Pakistan through 2011:

—A number of constitutional changes have theoretically reset the overarching framework of laws and governance, although Pakistan is still in the process of striking a suitable balance among the judicial, the executive, and the legislative branches of government.

—Civilians continue to grope toward a workable constitutional order. Sixty years after independence there is no consensus on the role of major state institutions such as the judiciary, the legislature, the presidency, and the prime minister or on relations between all of them and the military. The relationship between the state and the provinces—and in some cases between provinces—remains unstable.

—The army's role is recessed but not reduced, and the army remains an unelected center of power with its own ties to each of the formal structures of

government and to foreign governments. Disgraced by Musharraf's activism and widespread use of its services for nonmilitary activities, the army finds a modest role to be in its interest at the moment, but it retains its distrust and dislike of civilian politicians in general and of Zardari in particular. Two years of seeming stability has not restored army confidence in civilian governance, which is still widely seen as corrupt and venal.

—The media have a new role. Government transparency has increased with intense press and electronic coverage of policies that formerly were made behind closed doors. However, this has not increased accountability, whereby institutions are held responsible for their actions and policies. The media remain vulnerable to pressure from the intelligence services, which have real ways of hurting individuals and private entities, such as corporations or NGOs: by harassment, denial of government contracts, rough treatment, and even disappearances.

—Democracy seems to have returned to Pakistan's political culture, and parties are behaving more responsibly. In earlier years it was possible for a general to joke, without contradiction, that the first priority of Pakistani politicians was that they should be in power but that if that was not possible, they wanted the army, rather than a political rival, to rule. After a few free elections, politicians are now taking their responsibilities a bit more seriously.

—The system has not produced any new leaders. Politics is dominated at the top by two families, the Bhuttos and the Sharifs, and intra-party democracy, which might foster the emergence of new faces, remains absent. Instead, new leadership is rising from within various Islamist and separatist militant groups that seek either to transform Pakistan or to obtain a larger share of whatever spoils there are to be had in this economically stagnating state.

—Pakistan conducts active regional and global diplomacy, and in Afghanistan it has semi-clients, notably the Taliban, that are important to the West. It hopes to be a factor in any Afghan settlement, but that is by no means agreed on by the United States or other supporters of the Afghan government, and Pakistan's relations with both India and Afghanistan are strained at best.

—The impact of foreign governments on Pakistan remains considerable, notably those of the United States and China but also that of Saudi Arabia. The government cannot make any decision of importance without calculating its effect on Pakistan's relations with these powers.

—Anti-Americanism grew steadily in the middle class and the elite during Musharraf's reign and continues to rise, particularly among young people,

who constitute an important force given the increasing size of Pakistan's youthful population.

—A few of the home-grown militant outfits have begun to expand their operations, and the Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT) seems to be emulating al Qaeda as it seeks a regional and even global reach with operations in the United States, Great Britain, and South Asia.

—Sectarian violence continues in Lahore and elsewhere in Pakistan, and Karachi, brought under paramilitary control in mid-2011, remains a violent city. It is hard to tell whether the lessening of violence in the capital city is due to increased police surveillance—parts of Islamabad are heavily fortified and secured—or whether a deal has been made with major extremist groups, whose training camps and schools remain untouched.

—The year 2011 began with a commemoration of Benazir's murder three years earlier, interrupted by the assassination on January 4 of her close associate, a secular PPP leader, Salmaan Taseer, the governor of Punjab, who had been outspoken in his criticism of an obscurantist blasphemy law. His security guard shot him down in broad daylight, claiming that Taseer's outspoken comments themselves were beyond the pale. The guard was a member of an elite Punjab security force, and the murder plunged liberal Pakistan deeper into despair, or hiding, or both. On January 26, a U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) operative killed two Pakistanis in Lahore, precipitating a minor crisis in U.S.-Pakistan relations, and in early May the sole Christian minister in Pakistan's cabinet was gunned down by assassins in Islamabad, raising fresh concerns about the rise of militant Islam.

—Five months later, on May 2, U.S. forces entered Pakistan and killed Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad, a city not far from Islamabad, in a secluded compound very close to the Pakistan Military Academy and other military facilities. It is not clear whether Pakistan (after many official denials that he was in the country) was completely ignorant of Osama's presence, or whether the military and intelligence services had covertly assisted the Americans in locating Osama, or whether they were "stockpiling" him for the moment when they could produce him and claim credit. All three theories put Pakistan in a bad light. Pakistanis were themselves unsure whether they should be more outraged at the Americans or at their own security establishment, but the balance tipped against the government and the military establishment after a successful raid by Islamic extremists, possibly affiliated with al Qaeda, on an important Pakistani navy and air force base in Karachi, which starkly revealed the continuing inability of the military to protect key military facilities and also raised questions about the security of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal.

—There will be more crises and atrocities, but the most recent was the gory murder of a crusading Pakistani journalist, Syed Saleem Shahzad, whose death shocked the media and produced sharp criticism of the ISI and the military.<sup>11</sup>

## Analytical Considerations

Three problems need to be discussed as a prelude to examining the factors that will shape Pakistan's future. The first is the rhetoric of hope and failure, the second is sequencing, and the third is the difficulty of "sizing" the problem of Pakistan's future.

Those who make predictions about Pakistan generally fall into two categories: the pessimists, who believe that things will go from bad to worse, and the optimists, who believe that history is about to reverse itself.<sup>12</sup> The Pakistani American scholar Ahmed Faruqi is cautiously optimistic, noting that both France and Britain were mired in "cognitive dissonance" but eventually attained greatness. The consultants involved in the National Intelligence Council study on Pakistan's future were deeply skeptical about Pakistan. Many Indian commentators and some liberal Pakistanis and the Islamic conservatives believe that Pakistan is doomed by its very nature—its cultural DNA—and that transformation must occur or collapse is inevitable. For some, there is a little *Schadenfreude* in their expectations of failure.<sup>13</sup>

On the other hand, most contemporary writers hold out hope; they are cautiously optimistic, although the outright optimists are vanishing quickly.<sup>14</sup> They see Pakistan's known and important assets as evidence of at least the potential for positive transformation. In the words of a distinguished retired Pakistani diplomat, Tariq Fatemi, "Pakistan should be confident of its own abilities and optimistic about its future given its size, location and the qualities of its people. . . . So should the rest of the world, given that Pakistanis have been successful wherever they have gone, and in whatever endeavors they have undertaken."<sup>15</sup>

Hope is neither a policy nor a planning factor, but it is intimately related to success and failure.<sup>16</sup> The hope that things will or can be better is deeply embedded in the human condition, but it also is the mirror image of worst-case thinking, the anticipation of catastrophe. Without hope, there would be little change, in a world dominated by fatalists and pessimists.<sup>17</sup> On the other hand, excessive hope and blind optimism can be the basis for extremist and utopian movements.

Sequencing is yet another important conceptual issue, because it forces one to prioritize. As an Indian Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses study noted, all of the factors or variables shaping Pakistan's future are impor-

tant.<sup>18</sup> But are any factors more important than the rest? Can we distinguish between those that are important but intractable and those that might be amenable to change? The fundamental question is whether some or all of the variables that will shape Pakistan's future must operate in a certain way to enable something resembling success to occur, but that question is also fundamentally hard to answer. It is evident that there are many factors that qualify as critical to Pakistan's future; none, however, are determinative in their own right. Internal social and economic decay is one factor, but so is the incoherence of the Pakistani political establishment; the political establishment's relations with the military, especially the army; and the role of friendly and hostile outside powers. At least six conditions are *necessary* for a stable Pakistan, but none are *sufficient*, and their sequencing and timing are critical.

My view is that modesty with regard to what can be done is the most appropriate stance because these are events that are inherently difficult to understand. To adapt the words of a former ambassador to the Soviet Union, "I don't know where Pakistan is heading, but once it gets there I will explain to you why it was inevitable."

Finally, there is a "sizing" issue. Scientists talk about sizing a problem—stating its parameters—as the first step toward solving it. In discussing the challenges and capabilities of Pakistan at the Bellagio workshop, Sir Hilary Synnott examined the metaphor of the glass that is alternatively described as being half-full or half-empty, noting that perhaps the real problem is that the glass is too large. That is another way of "sizing": if Pakistan's capabilities are inadequate, it may be because its ambitions are too great. This suggests that priorities are critically important and that Pakistan has to decide which of its challenges are urgent and which are secondary and can be deferred. State capacity then can be directed to the most important problems.

One aspect of this "too-large glass" is that Pakistan carries with it the enormous burden of the past. When it comes to its relations with its most important neighbor, India, and its most important international ally, the United States, its overarching narrative is that of victimhood. Pakistan's perception of itself as the victim of Hindu domination has led to the mother of all "trust deficits," a deficit that can never be eliminated because it stems from the deeply held belief that Indians are dominating, insincere, and untrustworthy. In this view, there is nothing that Pakistan can do to normalize the relationship because Indians/Hindus are essentially untrustworthy and have proven that to be true time and time again. My view is that if trust is a component of the problem, it is an eternal one. There can never be enough "trust" between sovereign states, but sovereign states might think of both trusting and verifying, which in Urdu can be translated as *aitemaad aur tasdeeq*.

With regard to U.S. actions, many Pakistanis believe that the Afghan war in the 1980s, the Pressler sanctions, and other harmful or duplicitous policies were instances of the United States using Pakistan and abandoning it. The war destabilized Pakistan, and the sanctions were imposed because of a nuclear program that Washington had earlier chosen to ignore. More recent examples include the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan to attack the Taliban (which itself had not done the United States any harm), pushing radical elements into Pakistan and further destabilizing the country. The U.S. narrative of all of these events is, of course, quite different, and there is a deep trust deficit between Pakistan and the United States as well as between Pakistan and India. With regard to both sets of relationships, any policy that assumes trust is likely to fail.

## Four Clusters

When it comes to Pakistan, everything is important and everything is uncertain. To frame the discussion of the factors or variables that are most important in shaping Pakistan, nineteen of them are grouped into four clusters. The first cluster includes domestic concerns with respect to demographics, urbanization, the economy, and education; these are all closely related, and with the exception of the economy, which is subject to changes in policy, they are less mutable than others. A second cluster concerns the collective identity of Pakistan's people, who identify themselves and act on the basis of their regional, ethnic, and state affiliations. The third cluster concerns the ability of Pakistanis to work for or against a common goal or even to determine what their goals might be. Here are included the bureaucracy and structure of the government; the ability of its officials, notably the military; and the role of the increasingly important electronic and print media. The fourth and final cluster includes the policies and attitudes of important foreign states as well as the phenomenon of globalization. These are the factors that shape Pakistan's environment. Globalization, of course, penetrates into Pakistan in many ways and affects the other factors, shaping economic possibilities, influencing the ambitions and the very identities of Pakistan's citizens, and aiding or undercutting the workings of the state in different ways.

### *Demographics, Education, Class, and Economics*

*Demographics.* Demographic trends, which are both predictable and difficult to change, are very clear for the next decade or more. They will shape Pakistan in several ways. First, Pakistan is undergoing a population boom, and it will soon have one of world's youngest populations. In some countries where

birth rates remain much higher than mortality rates, mainly those in Africa and the Middle East and a few in Latin America and South Asia, growth rates are over 2 percent a year. Pakistan is one of the countries—along with Nepal, Yemen, Afghanistan, and the Democratic Republic of Congo—where the population doubles every generation, or roughly every thirty to thirty-five years.

As a 2009 British Council study noted, half of all Pakistanis are below the age of twenty and two-thirds of those have yet to reach their thirteenth birthday. Birth rates remain high even by regional standards, especially in rural areas. The population, which has tripled in less than fifty years, is likely to grow by another 85 million in the next twenty years. Pakistan's demographic transition from high to low mortality and fertility has stalled.<sup>19</sup> Today, Pakistan has some 180 million people, and the median age of the population is eighteen years. The country's population curve has a classic pyramid shape. For the next fifteen years it will be bottom-heavy. The sheer increase in population will require more food, more energy, and for men, more jobs. Also, an increase in the number of voters places increasing pressure on the state regarding its ability to deliver services, even basic ones such as education, let alone health care or welfare programs.

Second, Pakistan is becoming more urban. The urban population, which amounted to only 17 percent of the total population in 1951, constituted 35 percent of the total population (56 million people) in 2005. However, the rural population is so large and uneducated that some rural cities are not truly urban; they are instead rural or tribal complexes in areas designated as incorporated municipalities.<sup>20</sup> Instead of being calming and socializing, urbanization offers historical rivals a new battleground and in some cases brings previously separated groups into close proximity, where they battle in the urban context. This is especially the case in Karachi, which has strong political parties mobilized to provide resources for city residents and high levels of ethnic tension, with Mohajirs battling Sindhis (displaced from several Sindhi cities, where they used to be the majority population) and both battling the huge influx of Pashtuns, who are migrating from the war-torn provinces of the frontier. In Islamabad mosques such as the Lal Masjid became outposts of radical organizations located in nearby Swat and KP. Radical enclaves have flourished throughout Pakistan, notably in the cities, sometimes co-located with ethnic enclaves. The problem could be managed if police forces were adequate, but they are not. The police therefore find themselves handicapped by the links between politicians and militants and in some cases by the links between militants and the intelligence services.

Third, there is the question of the alleged demographic dividend—whether a population bulge can be used to Pakistan's advantage. The old debate between

the Malthusians, who see population booms as catastrophic, and the pro-growth school, exemplified by Julian Simon, who argues that more people may be better, is resolved by the understanding that population growth alone does not cause domestic or internal conflict. Large-scale violence is almost never caused mainly by population growth; population growth is a challenge, not a threat. The critical mediating factors are state capacity and state response.

In this respect Pakistan fares badly. There has been a strong and positive response by the state and by local civil society institutions to demographic expansion in Indonesia, Malaysia, Bangladesh, and India, states that are predominately Muslim or, in the case of India, that have a huge Muslim minority population. These countries have adopted policies designed to foster tolerance and cohesion, although religious interpretative authority still resides within the conservative religious establishments. The conservative establishment is strong in Pakistan, and while Pakistan is culturally anchored in South Asia, its religious narrative is increasingly shaped by Islamist narratives derived from the more conservative Arab states and the Iranian revolutionary model.

*Education and Youth.* Education is the key to taking advantage of the demographic bulge. The theory is that this is an opportunity to educate the young and thereby leapfrog into a more advanced economy, one that features high-level manufacturing and services that can be marketed around the world. Here Pakistan fares worse than even India or Bangladesh, both of which greatly overestimate their capacity to educate the youth bulge.

Only half of Pakistan's children go to primary school, only a quarter go to secondary school, and just 5 percent receive any higher education.<sup>21</sup> There are no plans to create a national educational corps or to mount a crash program to provide training to the growing number of uneducated youth. It had been suggested that the Army Education Corps be deployed outside of the cantonments to form the core of a national educational system, but that suggestion was rejected by the military. Nor are there plans to bring to Pakistan large numbers of teachers and instructors, and the current security situation is such that few would be willing to live in the country if there were. As is well known, the gap has long been filled by the madrassas, religious schools of marginal practical utility in the modern world. Educating the youth bulge is a popular idea, but there has been no effective state action, either at the national or provincial level; instead, young people get whatever education they can. The likely results, as shown in survey after survey, are shocking: the youth bulge will turn into a bulge of the middle-aged and discontented, ill-equipped for the modern world. An important outlet for the ambitious and the adventurous will continue to be extremist movements, which have displaced the army as the largest recruiter of young Pakistani men.

The Pakistani government as a whole has been unable to address this fundamental failure of the state; instead, private educational systems flourish with little quality control. The rot starts at the top, where overambitious and unrealistic schemes to produce a flood of PhDs, who presumably would strengthen the overall education and research capacity of Pakistan, were promulgated. Those schemes ran against the political culture of Pakistan, which is decidedly not sympathetic to research, except in a few areas pertaining to national security, nor to mass education. Pakistan has the lowest intake of doctors in the world after Africa, and while the number of students in higher education, mostly funded by foreign organizations (notably the U.S. Agency for International Development) has grown, many of them do not return home when they have completed their studies. Researchers who *do* return to Pakistan do not find a congenial environment, despite some efforts to network them (for example, Pakistani researchers have very good U.S.-funded access to the global library system); therefore they often chose to leave again.<sup>22</sup> Without contact with the region's more dynamic educational institutions, Pakistani scholarship and research will stagnate. At its creation, Pakistan had one university with 600 students; it now has 143 universities with 1 million students. Present-day Pakistan was that part of the Indian Subcontinent where there was no tradition of education; it produced good soldiers and traders, not scholars. As the scholar Hamid Kizilbash observed, in Pakistan the message to scholars has always been "Your work is not important."<sup>23</sup> Kizilbash and others believe that the Pakistani government and the elites see education as a threat to them and to their control of the state. He also notes that there is a lost generation in Pakistan, which did not benefit from the reforms attempted after 2002. One result has been, in his words, "Those who were not privileged are finding different ways of punishing us."

*The Middle-Class Myth.* Vali Nasr, an American scholar and former U.S. State Department official, argues that the rise of a new middle class in predominately Muslim societies has the potential for a positive transformation of those states.<sup>24</sup> Noting that the vast numbers of Muslims are moderate or conservative in their social outlook, he sees the rise of a new Muslim middle class as leading to a new round of social and economic transformation in states that had been stuck in traditional ways for centuries; in his view, this new middle class could work easily and comfortably with the West. There will be 1 billion middle-class consumers in the Middle Eastern countries, including Pakistan, and they will be a force for openness, trade, and commerce with the rest of the world and within the Middle East itself. Some of this is true in Pakistan, where economic growth has been very limited but where a new middle class has tentatively emerged, energized and given a voice by the rapid expansion of

electronic media, which have made the ordinary Pakistani far more aware of the world than before.

The logic behind the middle class as democracy's bastion is that it stands to benefit from political openness, trade, better relations with neighbors, and sympathy with other democracies, including the United States. Jonathan Paris notes that all of those conditions would require greater civilian control of foreign relations and domestic resources.<sup>25</sup> However, there is no inherent connection between an urban middle class and democracy. Middle classes in Europe, Latin America, and Asia have supported autocratic and even totalitarian governments. Pakistan has been no exception, and autocrats such as Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and Ayub Khan were popular in their day.

The growth of a middle class might be a necessary condition but it is not sufficient for Pakistan's democratization. India had (and has) democracy, even though it was one of the poorest countries in the world; China has a growing middle class, as does Vietnam, but the communist parties in both states will fight democratization tooth and nail while allowing consumerism to grow. The Pakistani army serves the same functional role as the communist parties of Vietnam and China: it regulates the system to protect both its own interests and what it sees as Pakistan's vital interests. In Pakistan, the economic base for a large middle class does not yet exist, the economy and society remain very pyramidal, and socioeconomic mobility is obstructed by a culture of feudalism. Above all, hopes for a new and rising middle class must be tempered by the economic facts of life: rampant inflation in Pakistan over the last few years threatens a large number of citizens, making their lives economically insecure just as the physical dangers increase because of rising terror attacks and, for many, the floods of 2010.

Finally, the middle classes, when they are dislocated and threatened, have also formed the basis for revolutionary movements throughout history, and those revolutions have not always been peaceful or democratic. Hope of reform led by the middle class is just that—a hope, not an assured process. Even a cursory example of historical parallels shows that a deprived and angry middle class can easily move into a revolutionary direction that rejects many of Pakistan's policies, embraces some form of extremism, and puts Pakistan on the path of authoritarianism or even disintegration.

*The Economy.* Countries often choose inappropriate economic strategies or strategies that once were serviceable but were made obsolete by changes in the international environment. Pakistan is no exception. Guided by the thinking of Sir Arthur Lewis, a British-educated West Indian, it opted for a policy of concentrating economic production in the state sector, then spinning the state enterprises off to the private sector. The policy was very successful early on. It

created a significant upper and middle class in both East and West Pakistan, and at one point Pakistan was poised at the edge of middle-income status.

Pakistan's strategy ignored land and agriculture. First, it never tried to carry out meaningful land reform, as did many East Asian states and, to a lesser extent, India.<sup>26</sup> Second, there was a consistent policy of keeping wages low, harassing unions, and not investing in basic education.

The lack of education became a crippling problem as globalization intruded and Pakistan could not move up the value chain. The country's position on the Global Competitiveness Index was 92 (among 130 countries) in 2007–08, falling to 101 in 2009–10. The World Economic Forum's latest ranking for 2010–11 places Pakistan at 123 among 130 nations. A recent publication of the Competitive Support Fund notes that while Pakistan's economy grew at a healthy rate of 5 percent a year over the last five decades, that was not the case with the competitiveness of the country's goods and services or the value added of its manufactured goods.<sup>27</sup> Instead, it came to depend on the remittances of workers who found employment elsewhere, notably in the Persian Gulf and other Muslim countries. As a result, very few Pakistanis pay income taxes (about 3 million of a population of over 170 million), and the country's tax-to-GDP ratio is just 9 percent. The Pakistani argument is that that was justified since those few Pakistanis were extraordinarily productive, generating most of Pakistan's wealth and earning most of its foreign exchange.

The growth that *did* take place was misdirected. It favored the rich, with the result that Pakistan did not make the broad social and economic investments that would have prepared it for the onset of globalization, the linking of economies and peoples to the point that, in some respects, the world is truly flat. In Pakistan the educated and well-off urban population lives not so differently from their counterparts in other countries of similar income range.

After peaking between 2005 and 2007, most economic indicators have deteriorated dramatically. Pakistan's GDP growth, which in 2005 had reached a record of 7.7 percent, slowed down to an abysmal 1.6 percent during the recession in 2008 and has been estimated at only 2.6 percent in 2011. After increasing steadily over the last two decades, the economy has proven unable to cope with demographic growth, leading GDP per capita to stagnate at around \$2,400 since 2007. In the meantime, further increasing the burden on the population, inflation has skyrocketed; it exceeded 20 percent in 2008. Never before have so many Pakistanis been looking for work; unemployment has now reached a twenty-year record of 14 percent, and it is estimated to continue to increase until 2013 at least. With labor and other productivity indicators having stagnated since 2006, it is not surprising that Pakistan is increasingly forced to rely

on external sources. Inward foreign direct investment, which peaked in 2007 at \$6 billion, is estimated to stabilize over the near future at \$2 billion annually. Pakistan continues to import more than it exports, leading to a current account deficit, which was 2.2 percent in 2009.<sup>28</sup> More important, the country depends increasingly on the generosity of foreign donors. Following the humanitarian disasters of the 2005 Kashmir earthquake and the 2010 floods, external assistance reached unprecedented levels: in 2009 the State Bank of Pakistan recorded a record \$4 billion in incoming development assistance, more than half of which came from multilateral organizations and developments banks.<sup>29</sup>

The social consequences of the country's weak and uneven economic growth are very serious. As Anita Weiss notes, the poor and rural inhabitants of Pakistan have been left with limited resources, clamoring for jobs and decent schools for their many children, plagued by inflation, and living—quite literally—in the dark. Pakistan's ranking in the United Nations Development Program's Human Development Index slipped from 120 in 1991 to 138 in 2002 and to 141 in 2009—worse than the Congo (136) and Myanmar (138) and only just above Swaziland (142) and Angola (143), all countries with far weaker economies.<sup>30</sup>

Weiss and other students of Pakistan argue that with greater numbers of people demanding goods and services and most of them living in densely populated cities, Pakistan's government must create economic space for the general population, not just the rich, and give priority to both economic and political justice. As greater numbers of citizens become aware through better education and the expansion of media coverage of what transpires elsewhere in the world, they will naturally expect—and demand—more. On balance, weighing the few positive elements of the economy against the many negatives, it is hard to project that Pakistan will increase its growth rate, that the current maldistribution of income will change, or that the political class will support a higher tax rate. Nor will outside assistance, including the Kerry-Lugar funds, make up the difference.

Pakistan now barely survives on its own income and most social services are paid for by foreign countries. Were aid to cease, the government would again be faced with financial failure. That happened in 2001, and it was only U.S. intervention after 9/11 that came to the rescue of the fiscally bankrupt state. Both Pakistan's leaders and foreign donors know that given its current tax structure and weak export capability, Pakistan will remain dependent on foreign assistance indefinitely.

In the past Pakistan managed because a literate population was not required for the kind of economic development strategy that it had chosen.

Today, however, an educated population can be a greater asset than oil or mineral resources, of which Pakistan has little, in any case. It does not export many high-value products, it provides only very low-level services (mainly through the export of unskilled workers and professionals to other countries), and it missed the opportunity to modernize its agricultural sector years ago. In fairness, its friends and supporters, notably the United States and China, have not been helpful in either assisting Pakistan to develop modern industries or allowing it to export goods and services, notably textiles, free of tariff restrictions.

One major feature of Pakistan's economy is the large share of the budget spent on defense. Pakistan increased its defense budget by nearly 17 percent, to a total \$5.17 billion, for 2010–11 to keep pace with inflation and new demand for troops and combat operations in Balochistan, tribal areas such as North and South Waziristan, and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Retired general Talat Masood, one of the most respected commentators on security policy, has said that spending on the Eastern (Indian) front remains constant and that the increase is directly related to new counterinsurgency requirements. Since 2001 Pakistan has also received some \$15 billion in direct payments from the United States, two-thirds of it related to security measures.<sup>31</sup>

From the mid-1990s, beginning with General Jehangir Karamat, successive army chiefs have been aware that Pakistan's weak economy made it difficult to keep troop levels high, maintain a ready force vis-à-vis India, and purchase sufficient modern equipment. Although wrapped up in the rhetoric that Pakistan will meet every military contingency and that Pakistani courage and skill will compensate for inadequate arms vis-à-vis India, every recent army chief has had to confront the budget problem and some have supported negotiations with India. Budget problems have been further complicated by the advent of nuclear weapons; new combat requirements in Balochistan, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and the tribal belt; and the absence of transparency, which rules out informed debate on defense spending—the largest portion of the budget.

Of the factors in this cluster, it would seem that Pakistan's economy would be the easiest for policymakers to shape, as the country has shown high growth rates in the past. That may no longer be possible, as Pakistan may have missed whatever opportunities were present when the world economy started to globalize rapidly. It was unprepared in terms of the skill and educational level of its workforce, its domestic political order was too unstable, and it had little in terms of extractive resources. Pakistan has already slipped behind Bangladesh and India in per capita income, and the gap is likely to grow.

## *Identity*

At their core, nations are ideas and the idea of Pakistan has been in flux since it was first promulgated in the 1930s. We look at three elements of Pakistan's identity: the continuing debate over the meaning of Pakistan and what it means to be a Pakistani, the special difficulty of reconciling this identity with Islam, and regional and subnational challenges to the idea of Pakistan.<sup>32</sup>

*The Still-Contested Idea of Pakistan.* Different ideas of Pakistan are held by the establishment, the army, different ethnic and linguistic groups, different Islamic groups (especially with respect to internal sectarian disputes), and Pakistan's precariously situated minorities (who favor a secular state). A new challenge comes from an old quarter: the growth of class awareness and differences among Pakistanis, a development that both Islamists and secularists seek to exploit. In many ways the Islamist movement resembles a class revolutionary movement. The avowedly secular Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM) claims to be moving out of its urban Sindh and Karachi base into the Punjab and elsewhere, gathering support among Pakistan's middle classes and challenging the Pakistan People's Party. The discussion below deals first with the continuing seventy-year-old debate over what it means to be Pakistani and whether new meanings will drive out what remains of national identity and cohesion and then with identity issues that stem from ethnolinguistic and sectarian challenges to Jinnah's idea of Pakistan.

Among Pakistan's elites there is an intense debate over the purpose and meaning of Pakistan, triggered by the widespread sense that things have gone very wrong. This is notable among Pakistan's young people, who do not share the optimism of their cohorts in other Asian states. The English-language media are filled with laments about intolerance, bigotry, and even racism and the rise in violence directed against religious minorities, foreigners, and linguistic outsiders. Long-time visitors to Pakistan, whether Western or Asian, comment that this is not the Pakistan of the 1970s, let alone of the tranquil 1960s.<sup>33</sup>

Can Pakistan continue with this degree of discontent? It probably can, but the discontent is yet another reason for explosion in the distant future. The new normal is abnormal, and even greater divisions about the purpose and meaning of Pakistan can be expected.

*Ethnolinguistic Ambitions.* Reports of a new breakup of Pakistan because of ethnic dissent are not to be taken seriously for the next five years.<sup>34</sup> Pakistan is a very diverse state. It contains many groups, as does India, some of which have attributes of nations: their own language, culture, and even identity. Some polls seem to show that Pakistanis regard themselves as Pakistanis first,

and Punjabis, Pashtuns, Baloch, Sindhis, or Mohajirs second, although the Pew Global Affairs Project shows that Sindhis have a markedly weaker sense of themselves as Pakistanis than as Sindhis.<sup>35</sup> Polling in Pakistan is suspect, especially on such a sensitive issue, and in any case powerful and disciplined minorities can shape the outcomes of identity disputes no matter what the polls say.

Pakistan's ethnic groups are not quite comparable, but all except Punjabis have faced the wrath of the central government as they generated separatist or autonomist movements.<sup>36</sup> The Baloch are a tribal society, Sindhis are predominately rural, Mohajirs are overwhelmingly urban (and displaced Sindhis are concentrated in Karachi and several cities in Sindh). Until now the army has been used only against these groups, but with the 2010 movement of the army into South Waziristan and other parts of the province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (formerly North-West Frontier Province), Pashtuns also have squared off against the military, most importantly in the form of the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), the "Pakistan Taliban."

The rise of ethnic consciousness and the more conciliatory position of the current government in Islamabad could, optimistically, sustain a new balance in Pakistan. New provincial centers of power could emerge, each sustained by reinvigorated civil society and expanding media. The 2010 National Finance Commission Award could lead to new rules and procedures for revenue sharing, returning Pakistan to something resembling its original federal structure. However, few of the provinces—except Punjab—have the administrative capacity to take advantage of their new powers and responsibilities. Should new provinces be created there is a theoretical possibility that Punjab's power will be balanced. Right now it holds a majority stake in the political system: 54 percent (148) of the 272 seats in the National Assembly are reserved for the province. Punjabis, who at 44 percent represent the largest ethnolinguistic group, maintain a central, if not overrepresented, position across a range of indicators: for example, they represent 51 percent of the bureaucracy and 70 percent of the retired officer cadre.<sup>37</sup> Given the disproportionate power of the Punjab, there is unlikely to be a major constitutional adjustment in the next five years, although there is growing support for splitting off parts of the Punjab into separate provinces. That would be an important step toward devolution, and it might have the support of the army if it were, on balance, to reduce the power of the Punjab, thereby strengthening the hand of the army.

In chapter 16 of this volume, Josh White argues that the Pakistani state can contain separatist forces. With the exception of the Bengali uprising in 1971, when West Pakistani elites miscalculated their ability to crush the uprising and did not expect India to interfere militarily to support it, Pakistan's leaders

have contained nationalist and separatist movements, albeit harshly at times. Right now there are insurgencies in Balochistan and among the Pashtuns. India is suspected—without much evidence—of continuing support for the Baloch, but the major threat now comes from the Pashtuns. The most potent movements combine religion and ethnicity, and Pakistanis dread the possibility that the combination of religious passion, territorial claims, and linguistic and cultural commonality will appear in the form of the Pashtun–New Taliban movement sweeping KP, with violent echoes among the larger Pashtun population, especially those living in Karachi.

As White notes, the Pakistani Taliban have emerged as a new vehicle for the expression of Pashtun grievances, but they have been careful to portray themselves solely in religious, not ethnic, terms. That is perhaps because they consider religious mobilization to be more effective than ethnic mobilization or perhaps because their ranks are increasingly supplemented by Punjabis from Kashmir and sectarian-oriented organizations.

The Punjab is the only province that has not yet had forces deployed in significant numbers for internal security reasons, partly because the state is heavily garrisoned by military units facing India. The security problem is especially sensitive in Punjab: it is the army's heartland, the country's population center, and the site of the most intense sectarian violence. It also has experienced savage attacks against seemingly innocuous targets, such as the Sri Lankan cricket team in 2009, and against several key state icons: a navy school, the police training academy, and branches of the ISI and other intelligence services. Without improvement in the police force, the army is reluctant to intervene and turns a blind eye, along with the politicians, to the mayhem that has overtaken most of the large cities, notably Lahore. When stories about the mayhem were published in the international press, the government's reaction and that of the military was to blame the *New York Times* and other newspapers for their anti-Pakistan tilt, suggesting that India or other foreign hands might be involved. In fact, some of the stories were leaked to foreign media by the policemen of Punjab, who did not receive support from provincial or national governments, let alone the army.

*Radical Islamists and Sectarianism.* Islam and "Islamic" grievances such as the Israel-Palestinian dispute have always been at the heart of a country that was founded as a homeland for Muslims. However, three events have accelerated the rise of militant Islam. The first was the Iranian revolution, which provided a potent model for Sunnis as well as Shiites. The second was the expansion of direct support for radical Islamists by the army, both within Pakistan and abroad. The third was the trauma of the U.S. reaction (and that

of much of the West) to the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the related invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan.

Those developments expose a convoluted and dangerous relationship between the state and Islam that is not easily resolved. Like Israel, Pakistan was conceived as a refuge for a persecuted religious minority, but it has had difficulty in defining the proper role of religion in the state and the balance between the two. There is no debate in Pakistan on whether there should be a role for Islam; the question is the extent to which religion should regulate personal life and the degree to which foreign policy should be guided by Pakistan's Muslim identity. On both counts, sectarian differences between Sunni and Shia lead Pakistanis to hold different views.

Pakistan has always sought good relations with other Muslim countries and with Muslim minorities (notably in India and more recently in Bosnia), and there is a widespread belief among Pakistanis that Pakistan has a legitimate and natural interest in good relations with Muslim states everywhere. From the beginning it has also supported separatist and independence movements in India-controlled Kashmir and has backed the fundamentalist Taliban in Afghanistan.<sup>38</sup>

The problem is not that most Pakistanis are Muslims and adhere to deep religious beliefs; it is that those beliefs have been exploited by state bureaucracies—notably the army—that support groups whose beliefs they consider ideologically harmonious with theirs and that view militants primarily in instrumental terms, as tools to advance Pakistan's national interests. For those who support such strategies, this is seen as a legitimate expression of Pakistan's Islamic identity, analogous to the support that the West, notably the United States, gives to democratic groups around the world. Thus, support for Islamism in domestic politics as well as abroad is a civilizational responsibility, not an act of terrorism.

It is not Islam or religion that is the problem; it is how religion has been exploited by the state. The genie has escaped, and much of Pakistan's future will be determined by the effort to contain violent and extremist Islamist groups. The most pessimistic of Pakistanis feel that the battle has been lost, and some seek refuge elsewhere. Pakistan is far from a theocracy—the Islamists are at each other's throats too much for that—but they are driving Pakistan toward a different kind of civil war, one in which religion and sectarian allegiances determine which side an individual is on.<sup>39</sup>

Is the process of creeping Islamization irreversible? Pakistanis are saturated with Islamist slogans. The country was always quite religious, and what is happening in Pakistan is similar to the growing religiosity seen elsewhere,

not only in the Muslim world, but also in Israel (the second state formed on the basis of religious identification and as a homeland for a persecuted minority) and the United States—although not in Europe, Latin America, or South-east Asia.

The admixture of religion and politics is potent, but even some of Pakistan's liberals, who despair at the creeping Islamization of their country, retain the hope that the trend is reversible, given good leadership. Pervez Hoodbhoy, the country's most distinguished scientist-commentator, concludes a widely distributed paper by writing:

I shall end this rather grim essay on an optimistic note: the forces of irrationality will surely cancel themselves out because they act in random directions, whereas reason pulls in only one. History leads us to believe that reason will triumph over unreason, and humans will continue their evolution towards a higher and better species. Ultimately, it will not matter whether we are Pakistanis, Indians, Kashmiris, or whatever. Using ways that we cannot currently anticipate, people will somehow overcome their primal impulses of territoriality, tribalism, religion and nationalism. But for now this must be just a hypothesis.<sup>40</sup>

The idea of a secular, moderate, and democratic Pakistan is under attack from ethnic groups and religious extremists, and Jinnah's vision is not widely accepted, let alone understood, outside the shrinking liberal community. The goal of a more or less secular state, characterized by ethnic tolerance, may be unattainable. Unless there is a radical transformation by the government in the form of a state that supports the Jinnah/liberal idea of Pakistan by word and deed, the erosion of the moral authority of the state will continue and the debate over the purpose of Pakistan will become increasingly fractious.

### *State Coherence*

If nations are ideas, states are bureaucracies. In Pakistan, one bureaucratic organization that neither runs Pakistan effectively nor allows any other organization to do so—the army—has dominated the state. Yet, the actual capacity of the Pakistani state has eroded over the last sixty years. That is evident in comparing Pakistan—the integrity and competence of the state and its supporting institutions, such as the political parties, the bureaucracy, and even the judiciary—with similar states.

*Leadership and Political Parties.* Pakistan's political parties lack both a democratic process and the ability to aggregate interests; most are only vehicles for individuals or narrow social classes. Even in the largest and most open of the parties, elections within the organization are pro forma. When asked shortly

before her death, Benazir Bhutto told me that the Pakistan People's Party was not ready for internal democracy, that it needed a strong leader (herself) to keep its factions together and to develop strategies to protect the party's integrity from assaults by state intelligence agencies. That attitude is not changing. Some of the urban parties, like the Muttahida Qaumi Movement, appeal more to middle-class interests than to clan or family loyalty. But even the MQM has a strong ethnic base in the Mohajirs and their descendants, who are migrants from North and Central India.

Pakistan's political pattern has alternated between weak, unstable democratic governments and benign authoritarian governments, usually led by the army, and that pattern is likely to continue to define Pakistan over the next five years. The present democratic government is not popular, but there is no groundswell for its replacement by either another military leader or a civilian dictator. Periodically, political figures emerged who have been able to inspire and arouse the public to pursue a progressive scenario for Pakistan: for a time in the early 1970s, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto transformed the country's political discourse and reconfigured politics; after 1998, Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif acquired popular electoral mandates that might have broken the familiar mold of democratic politics; and General Musharraf was initially widely welcomed in the expectation that he would use his presidency to create a fresh political ethos and attract a new breed of politicians. But all eventually forfeited the public's confidence.

As noted by some of the participants in the Bellagio workshop and reflected in their chapters in this volume, a transformation of Pakistan's political system cannot be entirely ruled out. The mass support in 2007 and 2008 for a lawyers' movement that championed an independent judiciary and democratic government suggests that a politically passive population can be mobilized for political action. The judiciary's recent assertiveness, together with newly enacted constitutional changes restoring a parliamentary system, could conceivably lead to a stronger system of institutional checks and balances. Some observers see in these developments an important step toward the realization of a progressive democratic scenario. Others worry that an arrogant, arbitrary judiciary in league with the military or an autocratic party leader can become a powerful instrument of repression.

Class disparities and inequities and the absence of a social safety net leave Pakistan with the basic ingredients for political and social upheaval. Pakistanis have reason to doubt that either the current civilian regime or a military-led government is interested in addressing the causes of their discontent.

An effective leader, with access to the liberalized print and electronic media, could tap into the frustrations that have arisen from severe energy and water

shortages, sectarian violence, high food prices, and generalized anger with the United States and the West, not to mention India. High unemployment among the country's youth creates an especially volatile body of participants in extremist movements. For the time being, ethnic differences, persistent patron-client relations, and powerful security forces limit the growth of such national or even regional movements. While that could change quickly as a result of rising extremist forces—or if the military were to be compromised or the middle class to lose its confidence in the system—most Bellagio participants agreed that at least for the next five years, extreme changes are unlikely.

*The Military.* For years the military's role in Pakistan has been central.<sup>41</sup> It is not only an army of Pakistan but an army of one province, the Punjab, which is grossly overrepresented in both the officer corps and among the *jawans* (rank-and-file soldiers). So when the army intervenes politically, it does not do so merely as a state bureaucracy; any intervention also affects Punjab's relations with all of the other provinces.

Until recently the most vehement critics of Pakistan's military were Pakistani liberals and Indians. Now the Western press also finds fault, in part because of evidence of the army's link to terror groups that operate abroad and because of its support for the Afghan Taliban through the ISI.<sup>42</sup>

Three aspects of the army's centrality are important for Pakistan's future.<sup>43</sup> They are the army's understanding of strategic threats to the country, notably its preoccupation with India; the army's relationship to civilian authority; and, most recently, the army's relationship with militant and extremist groups and radical Islamists, although its use of militants was notable in Kashmir in 1947 and in East Pakistan in 1971.

*The Army and India.* An obsession with India accompanied the birth of the Pakistan army. Before 1947 its officers and *jawans* and units were literally part of the Indian army, it fought the Indian army in 1947, and it sees India behind every threat to Pakistan. That some threats are real does not excuse the army's collective obsession, which distorts its professional military judgment and shapes its views toward those who do not see India as the central problem facing Pakistan or who believe that a negotiated settlement with India would be Pakistan's best option. That view has never taken deep root in Pakistan, in part because India itself has generally pursued a tough line toward Pakistan.

*The Army and Civilian Authority.* As Aqil Shah writes in chapter 12 of this book, given history's sticky footprints Pakistan is unlikely to extricate itself from the path-dependent pattern of a military-dominated state with an essentially revisionist foreign policy formed in the country's foundational first decade after independence. The historical sources of this "garrison state,"

including the perceived threat from India and the powerful (praetorian) military spawned by that threat, will continue to make exits to alternative futures less likely.

Shah and others see several futures ahead, the first one being the “freezing” of the political system in the intermediate, gray zone between full-fledged democracy and military autocracy. While exerting sustained civilian control over the military poses a formidable challenge for any transitional democracy, in this scenario—wherein the civilian government is responsible for and under pressure to tackle broad governance issues squarely (especially the potentially destabilizing economic and energy crises)—the military will continue to operate in the shadows and rattle its sabers at will to prevent undesirable outcomes in domestic politics and foreign policy. New centers of power, such as the judiciary, might exert a countervailing democratic effect and help ensure the rule of law. But the scenario of more military mediation of civilian crises will reproduce the depressingly familiar pattern of civil-military relations under formal elected rule (which is corrosive to democracy).

A second possible future involving the civil-military relationship would be the slow and steady stabilization of democracy, but that would require some agreement between the two dominant parties and an increase in their coherence and ability to govern. Their recent bipartisan efforts to consolidate parliamentary democracy by reversing authoritarian prerogatives in the Constitution—such as the infamous Article 58(2)B, which empowered the president to arbitrarily dismiss an elected government—and conceding substantive provincial autonomy augur well for democratization. The two parties have so far resisted openly “knocking on the garrisons’ doors” as they did in the 1990s. Recent reports of an escalating war of words between the two sides that concerns, among other issues, militancy and terrorism in Pakistan Muslim League–controlled Punjab province, may yet erode the uneasy peace. But, on the whole, they appear to have learned from experience that it is better to play by the rules of the game and continue to tolerate each other rather than risk destabilizing the system and losing power to the military for another decade.

On the basis of the experience of the Zardari government, some form of democratic stability is likely if civilians continue to work within a competitive electoral process while slowly reforming the legal and constitutional framework that disfigured the 1973 Constitution. While they continue to defer to the armed forces on critical strategic issues, politicians are acquiring a bit more political space and the now-common practice of working together in coalition governments both at the center and in most of the provinces will strengthen their understanding of how democracies operate.

But the margin for error is thin. It is true that the armed forces do not want to come back to power soon and that civilian governments are strengthened by a new interest in democratic reform by the United States. However, other important backers, such as China and a few of the Gulf states, are not interested in democracy and are not bothered by authoritarian or military rule as long as order is maintained. It may also be that the Islamist parties are being tamed by their participation in local, provincial, and national elections. Twice, once in 1970 and again in 1997, moderate mainstream parties have stalled the Islamists in elections. And while the Jamaat-e-Islami boycotted the 2008 ballot, the relatively more successful Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam–Fazl-ur-Rehman (JUI-F), won only six of the 108 national assembly seats that it contested. However, this moderating trend has to be balanced by the poor economic performance of the Zardari government, the structural problems that it faces in merely governing, and in the growth of extra-parliamentary forces on the right, as evidenced by increased social violence, assassination, and terrorism.

However, as Aqil Shah observes, institutionalization of democracy requires more than balancing just the civilian side of the equation. It also needs a military committed in terms of both behavior and attitude to taking a subordinate role in a democratic framework. The military's behavior appears to have changed since it withdrew from government, but it is important to recall that it did not withdraw to the barracks because of a shift in its core praetorian ethos. Neither the "professionalism" of the army chief, General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, nor Musharraf's lack of professional restraint can explain the military's recent political behavior. In fact, the Pakistani army's problem has never been "professionalism" per se. Shah is correct when he describes the army as having a particular brand of tutelary professionalism that gives it a sense of entitlement over the polity and structures its responses to changes in the surrounding political environment.

Shah's third and most drastic scenario is that of a military coup d'état followed by military-led authoritarian rule. There are both domestic and international factors that may counteract, if not eliminate, this option. If the past is any guide, the military usually waits at least half a decade or so for its next intervention. Pakistan's revived civil society (lawyers' associations, human rights groups, NGOs, and sections of the media) and more democratically oriented parties will, under an optimistic scenario, probably ensure that the military has no real occasion to openly undermine or overthrow an elected government.

I part company with many in Pakistan who believe that in managing the civil-military relationship, it is wrong to "bring the army in to keep it out" through such arrangements as the National Security Council (NSC). As I

wrote in 1985, the army cannot be pushed out of power and be expected to stay there: its withdrawal from politics must be staged, in both senses of the word, and demonstrated civilian competence must replace it gradually as it withdraws from each sector of society.<sup>44</sup> That cannot happen in some spheres, such as natural disaster relief, in which the army is the only institution that has the capacity to manage a crisis. This was the case with the October 8, 2005, earthquake that devastated parts of the NWFP and Pakistan-administered Kashmir; the pattern was repeated with the 2010 earthquake.

Civilian capacity cannot be built up overnight, and adopting an NSC arrangement that has improving the education system and strengthening civilian institutions as part of its core mission would not only solve the serious problem of policy coordination but would also socialize civilians in decisions that had previously been the exclusive responsibility of the armed forces. Senior retired generals and officials have spoken and written about expanding the NSC's role to improve the link between civilian leaders and the army, but nothing has been done to implement those ideas.

*The Military and Internal Militancy.* Pakistan could, theoretically, be on the path blazed by several countries around the world, most recently in South America. There, the ouster of the military from power and, crucially, the lasting reduction of military autonomy were linked to cessation of the internal threats that had originally induced the military to take control of the political system. But Pakistan's dilemma is not only that there are new and serious domestic threats but also that the external threat remains. The army's first reaction was to see an Indian hand behind domestic terrorist and separatist groups. That was not an implausible response, given Indian involvement in the East Pakistan movement. But the irony is that the Pakistan military fostered many of those groups itself and it now faces a classic case of blowback.<sup>45</sup>

The army is gearing up for a systematic expansion of its counterinsurgency operations<sup>46</sup> after earlier dismissing such operations in favor of its traditional "low-intensity conflict" strategy, which involved quick in-and-out operations. Now the military realizes that it must have a strong civilian component to counter insurgents who are deeply embedded in the frontier, a view that is widely reflected in recent army and military writing on the subject.<sup>47</sup> An even more consequential task, although it has yet to be addressed by the military, is that of containing and eliminating groups that have targeted the state (like the Tehrik-e-Taliban in the frontier) but are based in Punjab. The evidence so far is that the army has avoided doing so, pleading that it is badly overstretched in the frontier as it is. The army has suffered huge casualties there, and it finds itself hard-pressed to fight against a Pashtun enemy with a Punjabi army; as one close observer of the process has reported, officers returning from combat in

Waziristan use the term “invaders” to describe their presence there. They are not proud of their role, but given the open challenge to the state in general and to the army in particular, this domestic insurgency is a more immediate threat than India.

An even greater problem for the army is its continued ties to the militant/terrorist group Lashkar-e-Tayyiba, which it created for the express purpose of pressuring India in Kashmir. While the LeT refrains from targeting the army and the state of Pakistan and the army uses the LeT to balance more radical groups, the LeT itself may be growing in its ambitions and capabilities. It has already conducted one politically catastrophic attack on India in Mumbai (putting the United States more firmly on India’s side in the regional terror wars). Senior Pakistan intelligence officials freely admit that the ISI “alumni association” is out of control, a truthful statement but one that is hardly comforting to outsiders.

*Basic Governance.* One of the most devastating developments in Pakistan over the last forty years has been the systematic weakening of the state itself. This is well-documented, and the trend has not and perhaps cannot be reversed.<sup>48</sup> It is one of Pakistan’s critical weaknesses, worsened by the attempts of the army to carry out functions ordinarily executed by civilians. This goes beyond “civil-military relations”; it pertains to the state’s capacity to tax, to educate, and to maintain law and order and the ability to make strategic policy, integrating military, political, economic, and administrative concerns through a central decisionmaking process. The state’s weakness can be measured in terms of Pakistan’s low ranking on almost every governance indicator (crime, corruption, attitude toward the state) and its high ranking on the Failed State Index, where it slipped from twelfth place in 2007 to the current top 10 and “critical” status.<sup>49</sup> Designating Pakistan as “critical” is deceptive; even though the state has lost much of its organizational integrity, it is still a formidable entity, especially compared with states such as the hollowed-out Afghanistan.

Nevertheless, demands on the state are growing as its capacity shrinks, and the population continues to expand at a stunning rate. This could be a race that is already lost. Especially alarming is the incoherence at the very top: in crisis after crisis, especially in security affairs, the state’s decisionmaking system has failed. Whether with respect to Kargil, the Mumbai attack, the response to 9/11, or the failed attempt to get negotiations started again with India (which reflects the incapacity of the Pakistan government to demonstrate to India and others that it has its militants under control), there is ineffectiveness. It stems in part from the civil-military divide but also from the loss of a great inheritance from the Raj: a civil service that functioned and a working relationship

between civil servants and politicians. The root cause, of course, is the military's supersession of both politicians and bureaucrats; so, again, basic reform has to track back to the military's disproportionate role in governance, which may be very hard to reverse. It will take years, if not decades, and a long period of peace, even if civilian competence is allowed to grow.

*The Judiciary and the Lawyers.* The judiciary and the legal profession barely qualify as major factors in shaping Pakistan's future. It is true that the actions of judges, especially the chief justice, predicated a crisis in Musharraf's government and that the Lawyers' March contributed to his downfall, but there is no evidence that, as institutions, the courts or the lawyers will not support the establishment mainstream and will not be strongly influenced by army views. While Chief Justice Chaudhry is very popular and he is a true revolutionary in the current Pakistani context and wants to move Pakistan to a normal democracy in one jump, there is no support for that strategy from either the military or the politicians.

Pakistan inherited a great Western legal tradition, and its lawyers are among the best in the world, but they are constrained. They do not have enduring street power and the idea of the law as supreme is not generally respected in a country where force and coercion play major roles. Judges and lawyers have also been at the forefront in rationalizing the army's regime in the name of stability. On occasion they have stood up to individual military leaders but never to the army as an institution.

*The New Media.* In U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's felicitous phrase, the new media have created a new global nervous system. For years, Pakistan's governments used state-controlled media to bombard and indoctrinate the public. There was an obsession with Palestine and, closer to home, with Kashmir. Taking an assertive stand on these issues was part of Pakistan's national identity. Before Benazir's reforms, the Pakistani press was tightly controlled and several media outlets—notably television and radio—were state owned and operated.

Now both the medium and the messages are ambiguous. Pakistan is being flooded with confusing and contradictory images, and Pakistan as well as "Islam" have become global media targets. That has affected educated Pakistanis deeply; they feel that the Western media have unfairly singled out their country and that they are victims of a media conspiracy. Pakistan's own media—especially cable television—have not produced quality analysis of important events, and the liberalization of the press, which often is hailed as a sign of the strength of civil society, has an underside in Pakistan. As C. Christine Fair notes in chapter 4, Pakistan's private media appear vibrant and diverse, with networks such as Geo TV being world class, but on issues of

national security and contentious domestic affairs, they are heavily self-censored and influenced by commentators with ties to the military and intelligence agencies.

It is evident that new social media and communication methods, such as short message service (SMS) text messaging, are disseminating information quickly and that they help mobilize civil society beyond the grasp of the state, something that senior generals view with frustration and concern. Yet the new mobilization capacity strengthens not only liberal forces—radical and Islamist groups have also used the neutral technology very successfully. The net impact of media liberalization is therefore still unknown, and it is an important question that deserves objective, empirical study.

The press and the new media are thus a pack of wild cards when it comes to mobilizing and potentially transforming Pakistan. The new media and social networks supplant some of the traditional face-to-face patterns of influence and even the impact of Friday sermons in the mosques, balancing traditional Pakistani social conservatism. However, conservatism still reigns in the mosques and madrassas, where the sermons range from the irrelevant to the hard-line.<sup>50</sup>

*Transfer of Power.* Finally, given the fact that one of Pakistan's core problems has been political instability and its inability to manage an orderly transfer of power (its second free election was not until 1988, the first having resulted in civil war in 1970), it is important to look at the way in which one government or regime yields to another. Both Islamist and leftist critics argue, not without justification, that it hardly matters who governs in Pakistan. But the prospect of an orderly transfer of power, one in which winners and losers accept the results and move on, is at the very core of the process of normal political change, and it has been absent in Pakistan since the nation's formation.

The way that power is transferred in Pakistan seems to have undergone some changes. If the country proceeds along its current path, in which the idea of free elections abiding (mostly) by the law and a more normal civil-military relationship has become entrenched, that would be a major change. In the past, there was only the issue of how much the army would tolerate before it stepped in, followed by the rationalizations of compliant lawyers and politicians eager to claim a tiny place at the political table.

Musharraf's accession to power was in the classic pattern: an incompetent democratic government was displaced by a personally ambitious general, to wide international uninterest and with wide domestic support, both due to Nawaz's transparent incompetence and drive to gain power. He was on the road to becoming a dictator; Musharraf intervened in the name of competent government and then proceeded to imagine himself a latter-day Ayub Khan.

The transition to Zardari also followed a pattern. The army was discredited, as it had been under Ayub, Yahya, and Zia. But this time Pakistan was far more important internationally, and influential outsiders shaped and then bungled the transition. Their intention was not to restore real democracy to Pakistan but to keep Musharraf in power, and the United States and Great Britain worked out an arrangement whereby Musharraf would allow Benazir Bhutto to return to Pakistan, contest the election, and probably again become prime minister, in an arrangement dominated by President Musharraf. U.S. ambassador Ryan Crocker and British high commissioner Mark Lyall Grant brokered the deal, but neither government thought it necessary to include other Pakistani politicians, in effect making Benazir the target not only of those who opposed her but of elements in Pakistan that wanted to force Musharraf out as president.<sup>51</sup>

The result, after Benazir's death and Musharraf's disgrace, was a weak president and a weak prime minister—an outcome that was acceptable to the army and to Pakistan's foreign patrons. However, the Zardari/Gilani government showed by 2010 that even a weak government can initiate major reforms, and in some cases it has received support from opposition parties as well as the army's tolerance.

To summarize, indicators of the competence of the Pakistani state are generally negative. Despite the efforts of the Zardari administration to reform the system, all of the levers of power—the civil bureaucracy, the higher decision-making system, and the public-private interface—are incoherent. The state has yet to regain the integrity that it had forty or fifty years ago, even though it is called on to do much more in terms of economic development and public administration. Corruption is rife, but it would be acceptable if the government were able to deliver the basic services expected of a modern state. The media and the NGO community cannot replace the state; nonetheless, fundamental reform is not supported by the strongest institution of all, the army.

### *External and Global Factors*

While the current cliché seems to be that Pakistanis are ultimately responsible for their own fate and they may have an exaggerated view of the pernicious role of outsiders, external factors do shape Pakistan to an untoward degree. The following discussion treats separately the roles of Afghanistan, the United States, China, and India as well as the impact of globalization and Pakistan's status as a nuclear weapons state.

*Afghanistan.* There has always been a two-way flow between Pakistan and Afghanistan. For years, Pakistan has played a role in Afghan politics, largely through its support of the Taliban—first overt, now covert—but there is also

a reverse flow. Pakistan's future will be shaped by developments in Afghanistan, which track back to Pakistan in three ways: Indian involvement in the country, the U.S. presence there, and the connection between Afghanistan and Pakistan created by the Pashtun population, whose traditional homeland spans the border. Of the states with an interest in Afghanistan, only Pakistan's can be said to be vital because the pan-Pashtun movement challenges the legitimacy of Pakistan's borders as well as the original idea/identity of Pakistan, in which unity among South Asian Muslims is regarded as more important than ethnic parochialism.

Several years ago, in its final published report on Pakistan, the National Intelligence Council (NIC) assessed the country not in terms of its own qualities (about which earlier NIC studies were sharply alarmist) but entirely in terms of its relationship with Afghanistan.<sup>52</sup> That approach reflected changes in U.S. priorities. With the presence of U.S. forces in Afghanistan, Pakistan's stability and its future are important but secondary concerns. According to conversations that I had with U.S. officials in 2010 and 2011, even India's role in Afghanistan—or India-Pakistan relations, which are so vital to Islamabad—are on some vague “to do” list of senior U.S. officials and receive little attention.

Pakistanis are properly concerned about the absence of a clear U.S. goal in Afghanistan. Some Pakistanis believe that the United States is there to balance Pakistani power, perhaps by neutralizing Pakistan's nuclear arsenal, or to support an expanded Indian presence; others think Washington's objective is to contain China, Pakistan's friend. Confused signals from U.S. policymakers exacerbate the problem. Pakistan's minimum goals are to reduce the Indian threat in Afghanistan and to ensure that the regime in Kabul is not hostile to Pakistan—and there is wide consensus that stability in the Pashtun population, which overlaps Pakistan and Afghanistan, is a vital interest.

On June 22, 2011, President Barack Obama announced that a drawdown of U.S. forces from Afghanistan would begin in July 2011, with the expected withdrawal of 33,000 troops by 2012. In White House briefings, administration spokespersons claimed that there will be a long-term U.S. presence for an indeterminate period, at an indeterminate level. That presence will not be a Korea-like, firm alliance—Afghanistan will not become a member of NATO—but neither will it amount to nothing. While intermediate options are being considered, it is very difficult to imagine what Afghanistan will look like even in one year—that is, by mid-2012—as the United States enters into still another national debate about its purpose and goal in Afghanistan, this one influenced by the fact of Osama bin Laden's death.

From Pakistan's perspective, if the Afghan Taliban were to assume power militarily or politically or enter into a coalition with elements of the Kabul

government, the odds of a stable arrangement would be slim. If one factors in the Taliban's radical allies—the “syndicate,” as a White House official called them in December 2010—then several groups will be competing for influence in Afghanistan, in opposition to the Western-backed government headed by Hamid Karzai. These groups include the Haqqani network; the Afghan Taliban; the Taliban's former ally, al Qaeda; and the Quetta Shura. Most of these groups would welcome a compromise agreement that would allow them greater freedom to operate in Afghanistan. Without that, they and their former mujahideen allies, notably in the Haqqani network and the Hizb-e-Islami, will be ever more beholden to radical Islamic interests outside the region. Their links to al-Qaeda and jihadi organizations in Pakistan remain strong. Together these groups form a network that aims to remove Western influence and create a sharia state in Afghanistan. And there is no reason not to believe that the Taliban would help launch Islamic militants into Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, as they did a decade ago. Most important, a successful Afghan Taliban insurgency is almost certain to energize Taliban forces that seek to achieve a similar sharia state in Pakistan.

Robert Blackwill anticipates the likely failure of the International Security Assistance Force/U.S. counterinsurgency strategy over the next several years.<sup>53</sup> That would almost certainly promote civil conflict in Afghanistan and set the stage for a war among Pakistani, Indian, Iranian, Western, and even Chinese proxies. Ethnic minority Tajiks, Hazara, and Uzbeks in Afghanistan can be expected to resist any outcome that restores the Taliban to power. They learned a decade ago that the Taliban will not be satisfied with control of just Pashtun-majority areas but will seek to extend its authority over the entire country. With Pakistan as the Taliban's patron, Iran, Russia, and the Central Asian republics will similarly seek spheres of influence in Afghanistan. And for all of Pakistan's concerns about Indian influence, a civil war in Afghanistan could increase Indian activity, perhaps with U.S. encouragement. Furthermore, the possibility of Indian military advisers and arms transfer cannot be ruled out, and some Indians speak of using India's massive training infrastructure to train a new, anti-Pakistan Afghan army. Saudi Arabia also would exert influence through client groups, mostly in order to minimize Iranian gains.

A new civil war in Afghanistan would generate millions of refugees, some of whom would flee into Pakistan, putting a new financial burden on Pakistan. In the face of inflation, unemployment, and a weak, corrupt government, civil unrest in Pakistan provoked by extremist groups cannot be ruled out. The most likely outcome would be a full-fledged return to power by Pakistan's military and declaration of martial rule or its equivalent.

A negotiated settlement between the Afghan Taliban and the Karzai government would be the best way for Pakistan to ensure an India-free Afghanistan and also to avoid a civil war. Pakistan's motives closely resemble those behind its efforts in the late 1980s to promote a post-Soviet coalition government in Afghanistan in order to avoid a power vacuum. The case for negotiations with the Afghan Taliban also is an old one. When the Taliban were in power in Afghanistan, Pakistani officials regularly argued that the leadership under Mullah Omar was capable of acting independently and was not necessarily beholden to terrorist organizations such as al Qaeda; allowed to consolidate their power and given international recognition, the Taliban would be anxious to moderate their policies. Then, as now, Pakistan insisted that its influence with Afghan insurgents puts it in a unique position to broker an agreement. That view is strongly contested by several former senior U.S. officials from the Clinton administration interviewed for this project who dealt with the Taliban; they remain unpersuaded that the "new" Taliban are any different.

Of the many difficulties in estimating Pakistan's future, Afghanistan is certainly near the top. It affects Pakistan's relations with the United States, it has a potential influence on Pakistan's Pashtun population, and a victory for the Taliban would be regarded as a civilizational victory by Pakistan's Islamic extremists. Afghanistan is also a field where the India-Pakistan rivalry plays itself out. My conversations with senior Pakistan army leaders in September 2010 indicate that their strategies for a future Afghanistan may be more nuanced. In saying that "we can't have Talibanization . . . if we want to remain modern and progressive," General Kiyani also suggests that Pakistan is better served if the Taliban do not prevail in Afghanistan.<sup>54</sup> The application of his remarks was even clearer when he said that "we cannot wish for Afghanistan what we don't wish for Pakistan." But, in practice, can the Pakistan army control the Taliban? When the Taliban ruled in Kabul, relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan often were difficult. There is no reason why a resurgent Taliban might not target Pakistan itself, riding the crest of a civilizational victory over the West, and the Pakistan army, already targeted by the Pakistan Taliban.

Theoretically, the best option for Pakistan would be strategic cooperation with India on Afghanistan. That seems unlikely, given the deep roots of India-Pakistan hostility and the lack of interest of major powers in promoting such cooperation. A truly regional approach to Afghanistan is also stymied by the apparent impossibility of U.S.-Iran cooperation on Afghan policy, even though the two did collaborate in the aftermath of the 9/11 attack, when Iran assisted the United States in rounding up the Taliban and al Qaeda.

*United States.* The Pakistani perception is that the United States has repeatedly used, abused, and betrayed Pakistan, beginning with the 1962 war

between India and China, when the United States could have forced India to accept an agreement on Kashmir; during the 1965 India-Pakistan war, when the United States cut off aid to a formal ally, Pakistan, after India crossed the international boundary; and in 1972, when it again abandoned Pakistan in the face of Indian military aggression that led to the loss of half of the country.<sup>55</sup> For many Pakistanis, the cutoff of military supplies by the Pressler amendment and the invasion of Afghanistan were only the most recent examples of U.S. betrayal and untrustworthiness. Their view was formalized in the Pakistani lament that there was a massive trust deficit between the two states, and that, as the larger partner, it was up to the United States to demonstrate that it was a reliable and trustworthy friend. This attitude continues today with regard to U.S. Afghan policy and the U.S.-India nuclear agreement. The Pakistani military is not shy about presenting its view of the Afghan situation and of U.S. mistakes.<sup>56</sup>

Under President Bush, the United States separated its India and Pakistan policies—a policy called dehyphenation—arguing that its relationship with each country should be based on its merits alone.<sup>57</sup> That also confirmed the U.S. lack of interest in India-Pakistan relations, other than when they were in crisis. After the events of 9/11, Pakistan again became central to U.S. policy on Afghanistan, but Washington transformed its relations with India. The centerpiece of the new “natural alliance,” as it was called, was the U.S.-Indian civilian nuclear deal.

Pakistan viewed this new commitment to India with alarm, seeing it as proof that the United States had chosen India over Pakistan. However, Pakistanis still resist the idea of a close, enduring relationship, remaining convinced that the U.S. commitment to them is short term and linked to the situation in Afghanistan. The U.S. government, however, maintains that the India-U.S. relationship should have no bearing on Pakistan’s standing, an assertion that is incomprehensible in Pakistan. Washington has been unable to come up with a central and persuasive theme for relations with Pakistan, as it did for India. Given the diversity of interests embedded in the U.S.-Pakistan relationship, it seems unlikely that the United States can do so. A short list would include Afghanistan, Pakistan’s nuclear program, Pakistan-based terrorism, India-Pakistan relations, and the stability of Pakistan itself.

The United States and Pakistan will remain at odds for the foreseeable future. The United States is impatient with Pakistan’s corruption, its imbalanced civil-military relationship, its support (or tolerance) for the Afghan Taliban, and its permissive attitude toward terrorist groups based in Pakistan, which, in some cases, are supported by the Pakistani government. The United States and Pakistan continue to engage in a fruitless game of pressure and

counter-pressure over Afghanistan. Pakistan's army seems determined to maintain a foothold in the Afghan political theater, and whenever U.S. pressure becomes too obnoxious, Washington finds that its shipments of supplies into Afghanistan are inexplicably interrupted by Pakistan. While dependence on supply routes has been reduced substantially from the 80 percent cited in 2005 and while vital equipment and supplies, such as weapons, are flown in, the ground route is essential for shipment of petrol and bulk supplies.

The ability of Islamists to sell their viewpoint in Muslim societies is closely linked to how those societies perceive Western policies. As Moeed Yusuf argues, if short-term interests continue to dictate the Western agenda and the people of Pakistan see themselves being left out of the bargain, Western policy will continue to fuel the very mindset that it seeks to eliminate. The West's patience, however, may not withstand another terror attack originating in Pakistan and targeting Western property and individuals.

The establishment in Pakistan is skeptical of U.S. policy in Afghanistan and deeply resistant to cooperation on nuclear and intelligence matters. Pakistan believes that close cooperation on intelligence could be turned against it, especially with respect to the security of its nuclear arsenal, or that the United States might share critical and embarrassing information with India regarding terror attacks, as it did by giving India access to David Headley, the Pakistani-American who confessed to being central to the Mumbai attacks.<sup>58</sup> The episode of the CIA officer shooting Pakistanis in Lahore, plus the ease with which Osama's hideout was penetrated by U.S. Special Forces, brought suspicion of the United States to new heights, and relations can easily become much worse.

One event that could cause relations to deteriorate quickly would be an attack on the United States that had its origins in Pakistan, with or without government collusion or knowledge. A successful attack along the lines of the Times Square attempted bombing of May 2010—a plot that was hatched in Pakistan although it used a U.S. citizen and that may have been known to Pakistani authorities—would lead to a powerful popular and congressional reaction to punish Pakistan or at least to stop rewarding it.

A crisis between the United States and Pakistan could also come about for other reasons. U.S. drone attacks against Afghan and Pakistani militants on Pakistani soil (some of them launched from secret bases in Pakistan itself) are a constant reminder of Pakistan's complicity in the war in Afghanistan, even though some of the attacks were directed against individuals and groups that targeted the Pakistan government. There also have been press reports about U.S. plans to send Afghan "militia" groups into Pakistan to attack Afghan Taliban groups operating from Pakistani territory, including the Haqqani net-

work and the former Afghan mujahideen group led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, which, though based in Pakistan, are really part of the Afghan political nexus.

In such cases, lesser grievances—such as the U.S. refusal to grant Pakistan favorable terms for its textile exports to the United States—will become irrelevant and direct U.S. attacks on militants based in Pakistan via drones would be very likely and might signal a shift in U.S. policy toward Pakistan itself.

Yet Pakistan can ill afford to alienate the United States. Although there is talk of a break with America, there is no replacement for U.S. training, advanced weapons, spare parts, and defense budgetary support and developmental assistance. Yet the United States has failed to offer Pakistan a more liberal trade regime, and U.S. patience with Pakistan is wearing thin very fast.

What is euphemistically called a trust deficit has for some time defined the U.S. relationship with both the elites and public of Pakistan, and it will continue to influence the partnership. Conspiracy theories about U.S. collusion with India and Israel to weaken Pakistan and seize its nuclear weapons are widely shared, even at the highest echelons of the army. Despite recognizing the threat posed by the country's militants, most Pakistanis believe that the radicalization of the frontier is a direct result of U.S. counterterrorism policies and military operations in Afghanistan. Less than a tenth of the public holds a favorable view of the United States, and almost twice as many Pakistanis see the United States as a greater threat to Pakistan's security than India.<sup>59</sup> Changing those views is a long-term project that probably has to begin with the United States being willing to offer agreements on trade and nuclear issues, neither of which is in sight over the next several years.

*China as a South Asian Power.* China has systematically expanded its role in South Asia but nowhere more than in Pakistan, where its popularity among elites and in most of the provinces, its economic penetration, and its comprehensive support for the security establishment in the form of military hardware and nuclear technology mean that its already huge role in Pakistan is growing.<sup>60</sup> That was symbolized by the visit of Chinese prime minister Wen Jiabao in December 2010. Aid and trade agreements worth approximately \$35 billion were signed over a three-day period, amid the usual effusive statements from Chinese officials about the importance of Pakistan to China.<sup>61</sup> Almost all media reports and commentaries noted how much easier it was to deal with China than the United States, which made unreasonable demands on Pakistan, including unrealistic requests that Pakistan's overstretched army take on militants in the KP region.

The exaggerated rhetoric used by Pakistan to describe its relationship with China demonstrates both China's importance to Pakistan and Pakistan's distrust

of the United States and, of course, India. Further, the Chinese have figured out how to deal with the Pakistanis—through lavish public praise and private warnings about instances in which Pakistani actions endanger Chinese interests, as in the case of training of Islamist militants of Chinese origin. The rise of an assertive and competent China powered by a growing economy, plus the persistence of the Pakistan-India conflict, means that the strategic unity of South Asia, established by the Mughals and maintained by the British, is gone.

Nonetheless, as C. Christine Fair notes in chapter 4 of this volume, despite its rhetoric, China has grown wary of the management of Pakistan's internal security crises. China is currently the largest foreign direct investor in Afghanistan (having, for example, an investment in the Aynak copper mine in Logar Province), and it has made significant investments in Pakistan, Iran, and Central Asia. It is rightly worried about Pakistan's use of Islamist proxies. Moreover, China's own restive Uighurs have received training in Pakistan and Afghanistan. China has simply displaced India as Pakistan's natural trading partner, not on economic grounds but because of political circumstances. Strategically, China is unlikely to abandon its military ties with Pakistan because it believes that balancing Pakistan's capabilities vis-à-vis India helps contain India as a South Asian power. Finally, Chinese officials and business leaders know how to cultivate their Pakistani counterparts. The Chinese, unlike the Americans, voice their criticisms privately, not publicly. Pakistani politicians and generals make frequent trips to Beijing to firm up relations with China. Only in one area do the Chinese suffer in comparison with other countries: few, if any, Pakistanis want to visit or move to China. For most of them, the first land of opportunity remains the Gulf, followed by Europe or the United States.

*India.* India remains a permanent and likely negative element in affecting Pakistan's future. Pakistan was, after all, the result of a movement by Indian Muslims, and the best historical analyses demonstrate that the creation of the state was almost accidental—which makes Indians less interested in accommodating even legitimate demands and makes Pakistanis even more paranoid about India's intentions.

A majority of Pakistanis still consider India as a major threat and view the United States as an enemy. According to a 2010 Pew survey, they are far less concerned about the Taliban and al Qaeda. When asked whether India, the Taliban, or al Qaeda is the greatest threat to their country, slightly more than half of Pakistanis (53 percent) chose India, 23 percent chose the Taliban, and just 3 percent chose al Qaeda. Roughly 72 percent said that it is important for relations with India to improve, and about 75 percent supported increased trade and further talks with India. Fifty-nine percent of the Pakistani respon-

dents described the United States as an enemy, and only 8 percent trusted President Barack Obama.<sup>62</sup>

Within Pakistan, policy toward India will continue to be dictated by the army, which shows no sign of flexibility on major issues and a great deal of frustration with hard-line Indian attitudes. The army's "India problem" is complicated by the popular view (in the cantonments) that India understands only the language of force, an attitude that led to Pakistan's politically catastrophic crossing of the Line of Control in the Kargil region in 1999.

It will take the army's compliance, strong political leadership, and resolutely independent-minded foreign ministers (hitherto conspicuously absent) to secure any significant shift of approach toward India. A true "solution" to the Kashmir issue—or any of the other outstanding disputes between the two states—is nowhere in sight. A reasonable aspiration would be to manage the issue at the level of a *modus vivendi* no worse than that of the last few years, but that depends on avoiding new incidents, such as the terror attacks on the Indian Parliament and on Mumbai. If Indian political sentiment were to allow it, there would be scope for rapid adoption of some Kashmir-related confidence-building measures (CBMs). But a real and permanent change of Pakistani attitude will require a radical reduction of the role of Pakistan's army and possibly also a generational shift of sentiment. There is good reason to believe that the Mumbai attack was designed to break up the India-Pakistan dialogue, and the effects of further terrorist incidents like Mumbai would be negative. Indeed, crises strengthen not only nationalist sentiments in Pakistan but also heighten the credibility of the country's jihadi and other extremists groups. While a new crisis cannot be predicted, neither can normalization of relations. The current situation, characterized by cool hostility and no real progress on a range of issues, is likely to remain the norm.

The management of Pakistan's relations with India has proven to be a source of conflict between Pakistan's civilian and military leaders and a major cause of regime change: the army regarded civilians as too soft toward India on several occasions and considered that justification for their removal. Further, Pakistan's ethnic cohesion is strained by differences among the provinces in the priority that they give to Kashmir and other issues with India, the Punjab being the most hawkish on Kashmir. A humiliating military defeat of Pakistan's army, as with the loss of East Pakistan in 1971, and an accompanying economic and humanitarian crisis, could test the very integrity of the Pakistani state, but the fact that both India and Pakistan possess nuclear weapons and the possibility of their mutual assured destruction make such a defeat less likely.

As for the Indian side of the equation, C. Christine Fair, in chapter 4 in this volume, has it about right:

India demurs from making any policies toward Pakistan that may be conciliatory, including striking a comprehensive settlement between Delhi and Srinagar. India clings to the notion that its varied elections demonstrate that the Kashmir issue is resolved. However, as any visitor to Kashmir can attest, elections have not ameliorated the pervasive discontent and dissatisfaction with Delhi, much less provided a path toward comprehensive reconciliation. India's strategy appears to be to "wait it out" while India ascends and Pakistan weakens.

As some Indian strategists point out, India has been unable to prevent China from expanding its own sphere of influence in South Asia because of India's dispute with Pakistan over Kashmir plus a whole host of other disputes. India's leadership, centered in the Ministry of External Affairs and the army, has inadvertently brought about the destruction of South Asia's strategic unity and ensures that India will forever be paired with a declining Pakistan.

William Milam speculates in chapter 7 about a scenario in which India and Pakistan normalize their strategic relationship, perhaps beginning in Afghanistan. For Milam and many others who participated in the Bellagio meeting, peace and normalization with India is a necessary condition for Pakistan to build itself into a modern society and state. Realistically, however, darker scenarios of India-Pakistan relations are just as likely, including a major crisis within the next dozen years, possibly involving nuclear weapons or, at a minimum, the continuation of the stalemate between the two, to the detriment of each.

With respect to India the biggest questions are whether the Pakistan army will come to have a less paranoid understanding of the Indian threat and whether India itself will take the process of normalization seriously. That would suggest that over time Pakistan acquiesces to the ascent of its larger neighbor but obtains credible assurance that India will not take advantage of its dominant position. In some sense Pakistan would be better off seeking a resolution of this sixty-year-old strategic rivalry now, before it grows weaker and India stronger. But some in Pakistan still believe that the use of terrorism, carried out under the threat of nuclear escalation, will keep India off balance, a strategy that can be traced back many years. That, of course, does nothing to help Kashmiris, solve regional water disputes, or open up transit links to the benefit of both countries. Attitudes toward India have changed more in Pakistan over the last five years than ever before, but there is little sign of this change in the military, even as it grows aware that there is a new domestic

threat in the form of the Pakistan Taliban, with its links to many other forces that would like to transform, if not destroy, the idea of a moderate Pakistan.

*Globalization and Nuclear Weapons.* Two other external trends will influence Pakistan's future. One is globalization—the more rapid and intense movement of ideas, people, and goods—a process that accelerated quickly in the last thirty years. The other is Pakistan's growing nuclear arsenal, which seems unconstrained by financial shortfalls or strategic logic. The two trends are intertwined. Pakistan received almost all of its nuclear technology from other countries and took advantage of globalization to create purchasing networks that stretched around the world; later it used those networks to share its nuclear technology with several customers.

Contemporary globalization is most commonly associated with the huge burst in trade, telecommunications, and movement of people over long distances that began with the introduction of container ships, wide-bodied jets, and instant global electronic communications over the last thirty years. Pakistan was among the states least prepared for this development. It had seriously underinvested in education at all levels, and its economy does not produce many goods or services that are in high demand. Furthermore, it has become the target, transit lounge, and training center for jihadis of all varieties. Pakistan and some of its allies, notably the United States and Saudi Arabia, encouraged those jihadis, many of whom put down local roots. Finally, Pakistan also became addicted to foreign assistance from major countries and the international financial institutions and never really reformed its economy because it did not have to. In this area, Pakistan's friends did it no favor by supporting its addiction.

Along with the burst of movement of people, goods, and ideas came the end of communism. That became an organizing principle for the young and angry, helping to unleash long-suppressed forces. Religious identity became the rallying cry, beginning in Yugoslavia and moving to the former Soviet Union and beyond. Secular revolutionary movements, like the Palestine Liberation Organization, were challenged by Islamist groups. Pakistan, which had religion built into its national identity, moved in that direction. Militant Islamist organizations and parties filled the space created by the absence of the left.<sup>63</sup> Both Pakistan's Sunnis and its Shiites were influenced by the Iranian revolution, the first modern revolution to take a religious, not a leftist, turn. East Pakistan's had been the first successful postcolonial insurgency based on ethnicity, although with substantial support from India. In Pakistan, the Bengalis were followed by another secular separatist movement, this one spearheaded by the Baloch, while Sindhis and Mohajirs still have one eye on the possibility of breaking away from Pakistan.

As for nuclear weapons, given that Pakistan is a state dominated by the armed forces and at near-war with its major neighbor, it is not surprising that changes in the nature of armed conflict have affected Pakistan. Wherever nuclear weapons are involved, war in the form of an organized battle between industrialized states employing the latest and most destructive weapons is hardly imaginable.

Nuclear weapons have not brought about a genuine peace between India and Pakistan, but their presence ensures that no rational leader will ever employ them, and they have effectively ended classic, large-scale, industrialized war. There still remains the outside chance of an accident or of a madman coming to power in a nuclear state, but the greater internal threat is theft and the greater external threat is the conscious transfer of nuclear technology, or even complete weapons, for political reasons or simple greed. Indeed, Pakistan has been a prominent violator of international norms, transferring sensitive nuclear technologies to at least four states.

Nuclear weapons are as valuable to Pakistan as they are to North Korea, both of which (or their regimes) have some kind of survival insurance—a bizarre kind of immortality—because of these weapons. Pakistan, like North Korea, is “too nuclear to fail.” That is a fact that those involved in developing the nuclear program frequently and publicly mention, but they ignore “Act two”: what a nuclear weapons state does once its gross security problems are alleviated. It is true, as A. Q. Khan and others have frequently said, that no one dares invade Pakistan, but that does not improve Pakistan’s economy, lessen its internal strife, or stabilize its politics.<sup>64</sup> Mubakaramand, one of the leaders of the Pakistani weapons design team, noted, probably correctly, that if it were not for Pakistan’s nuclear deterrent, “Pakistan would have not survived after Kargil, [or the] Indian parliament and Mumbai incident episodes.”<sup>65</sup> These scientists and most Pakistani strategists do not ask whether if Pakistan had *not* possessed nuclear weapons, it would have pursued the provocative strategies that led India to contemplate a military response at Kargil and then go on to promulgate assertive military strategies, such as “Cold Start,” that have complicated Pakistan’s overall defense position.<sup>66</sup>

## Scenarios and Outcomes

Scenarios offer a dynamic view of possible futures and focus attention on the underlying interactions that may have particular policy significance. They can help decisionmakers avoid conventional thinking, which is invariably a straight-line projection of the present into the future.<sup>67</sup> I used this approach in my 2004 book, *The Idea of Pakistan*. Here I present seven scenarios and then

discuss the relationship among various factors, noting which might take precedence over others. I also discuss those factors in terms of their criticality. All are necessary to change Pakistan for what we would call the better, but none seem to be sufficient.

### *Another Five Years: More of the Same*

The most likely future for Pakistan over the next five to seven years—but one that is less likely than it was five years ago—is some form of what has been called “muddling through” and what in 2004 I termed “an establishment-dominated” Pakistan.<sup>68</sup> The military will play a key but not necessarily central role in state and political decisions and not necessarily always. This scenario may also include direct military rule. As several of the Bellagio participants noted, it has not made much difference whether the military or civilians are in power, since both have had progressive moments and both have also contributed to the long decline in Pakistan’s integrity as both a state and a nation.

In this scenario the political system is bound by certain parameters: the military may take over, but only as a temporary fix; it neither encourages nor tolerates deep reform; and civilians are content with a limited political role. The political system is frozen in an intermediate, gray zone between full-fledged democracy and military autocracy. The state is always in transition, but it never *arrives*, confounding both Pakistan’s supporters and its critics. In this scenario the civilian government is under pressure to tackle broad governance issues, especially the sectarian, economic, and energy crises, and military officials continue to operate in the shadows while rattling their sabers to prevent undesirable outcomes in domestic and foreign policy. New centers of power, such as the judiciary, may exert a democratic effect and help ensure the rule of law, but the scenario includes continuing military mediation of civilian crises, which reproduces the depressingly familiar (and democratically corrosive) pattern of civil-military relations under formal elected rule. It also includes the continuation of sectarian and ethnic violence, but neither, apart from other aggravating factors, will drive Pakistan over the edge.

Within those parameters, the economy may improve, democracy may stabilize, and there may be an increase in the government’s coherence, but all or some of those factors may also take a turn for the worse. Lurking in the background will be a steady increase in the population, stagnant economic growth, no serious attempt to modernize the educational system, and continued ethnic, sectarian, and social violence. These trends are very hard to alter and impossible to change quickly. Given the military’s current campaign, extremist violence might be tamed in KP, but a revival of the insurgency is likely, given the absence of real economic growth and the weakness of political institutions. Absent police

reform and a new attitude toward domestic jihadis, it is doubtful that maintenance of law and order will improve in the Punjab and it will certainly worsen in KP. Balochistan could again see a revived separatist movement, perhaps with outside assistance.

In this “muddling through” scenario, similar to General Talat Masood’s “nuanced case,” there may be a visible, slow decline of Pakistan’s integrity as a state and further confusion about Pakistan’s identity as a nation. One important factor in preserving the current arrangement is that just about every major power in the world wants to see Pakistan remain whole and stable. Even most Indian strategists do not relish the idea of a collapsed Pakistan, although they might want a weak Pakistan, strong enough to maintain internal order but not so strong that it can challenge India. Yet in the face of Pakistan’s accelerating decay over the last few years, some Indian strategists are beginning to consider whether or not it is in their interest to accelerate the process.

Pakistan could be pushed very far off its present path by regional separatism, sectarianism, a botched crisis with India, or a bad agreement in Afghanistan triggering new, unmanageable forces or conceivably a counter-movement toward totalitarianism, authoritarianism, radical reform, or the rise of a charismatic leader. All are alternative futures for Pakistan, but none is likely in the near term. Beneath any political developments, demographic and social change continues, leading mostly in the direction of greater chaos. This scenario propels Pakistan toward the dismal and chaotic future predicted in the 2008 NIC study.

### *Parallel Pakistans*

A second future for Pakistan, probably as likely as some kind of “muddling through” within the next five years and already evident now in some provinces, would be the emergence of parallel Pakistans. In this scenario the state carries on with a recognizable central government but some of the provinces and regions go their different ways, not as separate states following a breakup but in terms of how they are governed, how their economy functions, how they educate their children, how they tilt toward authoritarian or democratic traditions, and how they accommodate Islamist, regional, and separatist movements.

The centrifugal forces in Pakistan are intensifying, and Pakistan is heading in this direction. Those who oppose democratization do so in part because they fear the weakening of the state and the unconstrained growth of separatism; those who favor democratization see it as the mechanism by which different and diverse regions and social classes can live together peacefully in the

same state. Current experiments in strengthening provincial autonomy could, if mishandled, have the consequence of tilting the federal balance so that the center loses even more of its authority. Recent decisions to delegate some functions to the provinces might be premature: most of them lack capability already—Punjab excepted—and asking them to do more means, in practical terms, accepting that less will get done in the fields of education, infrastructure building, and social reform, let alone the police and judicial systems.

As the Pakistani state becomes weaker and as divisive tendencies grow stronger, those who favor a strong state will be tempted to invoke the argument that there is an existential external threat to Pakistan that requires the suppression of ethnic, sectarian, and other differences. Such a strategy would do nothing to increase Pakistan's growth rate or address the demographic explosion.

For the near future—over the next five or six years—Pakistan will either struggle on or undergo a more rapid decline, which will be evident in the rise of a more complex and fractious relationship among the provinces and between them and the central government. This will be delayed if the present cooperative arrangement between the politicians and the generals continues, even if there is a change in personalities. General Kayani is not irreplaceable, but the spirit of cooperation with civilian politicians is; similarly, neither President Zardari nor Prime Minister Gilani is indispensable, but their willingness to give the military some political space while attempting to reform Pakistan's government is.

This scenario predicts the emergence of many Pakistans within the framework of an international entity called Pakistan. The army's grip will loosen but not fail, and the problems generated by a bad economy, a bad demographic profile, and bad sectarian relations will deepen. This is not quite the "Lebanonization" of Pakistan, but the rise of the equivalent of Hamas and Hezbollah already has been seen, although their outside supporters are less visible and their impact is not as great as in Lebanon. The army will ensure that the state remains formally intact, but it may be powerless to prevent alliances between and among regional groups and outside powers. China already has considerable influence in Northern Pakistan and is a growing economic factor elsewhere. Some minority sects already look to Iran for protection and inspiration, and Tehran has an incentive to balance out extremist Sunni groups in Pakistan as well as the Taliban in Afghanistan. Some leaders in Karachi and the Mohajir community in particular now look at India from perspectives that are very different from those of their forefathers, who abandoned India, and they talk about an independent Karachi with strong economic and security ties to other countries, just like Singapore. Finally, the Baloch and some Sindhis are

utterly disenchanted with Pakistan, and the emergence of hardcore Punjabi leaders allied to the army would further alienate them.

These first two scenarios encompass the likely future of Pakistan. They are, respectively, bad and worse for Pakistan. However, even in the short time frame of five to seven years, other futures are possible. What follows is a list of less likely but still plausible paths that the country might take.

### *Democratic Consolidation*

It seems very unlikely now, but Pakistan could see the slow and steady stabilization of democracy. That would require a greater degree of bipartisanship between the two dominant parties, some increase in their commitment to democratic norms both in and outside the party structure, and recognition by the army that it cannot govern the state effectively and that it must allow (or even assist) a new generation of politicians to come to real power. In 2010 I described this to senior army officers as Pakistan's greatest challenge, even greater than that of India, but their response was muted. Realization of such a future would also require continued support for democratization from Western states, Indian actions to reward Pakistan for moving in this direction, and no Chinese or Saudi actions that rewarded regression to authoritarianism in the name of stability.

The Zardari government, for all of its obvious problems, has put Pakistan on this path, and other mainstream parties have not obstructed its changes. The process seems to have settled into a pattern of one step forward and one step back, or perhaps a hop sideways. A recent clever scorecard of Pakistan's gains and losses in 2010 comes out to about zero.<sup>69</sup> The parties have resisted turning to the military for support, as they did time after time in the past. They appear to have learned that it is better to play by the rules of the game and to continue to tolerate each other than risk destabilizing the system and losing power to the military for another decade. However, the institutionalization of democracy also requires a military that is committed to taking a subordinate role within a democratic framework.

Were Pakistan to move in this direction, it would not necessarily mean that the economy would recover and it certainly would not mean that the social pressures caused by population growth and urbanization would moderate. These are time bombs, buried deep within the Pakistani state, that will present grave problems for a future democratic regime. But such a regime, one that is freer than the current government from the taint of corruption and that makes a more serious effort to improve the functioning of the state, would also have a much greater claim on international resources and help from India.

### *Breakaway and Breakup*

It is misleading to talk of a breakaway of discontented provinces and the breakup of the state, or total state failure, within the next five years. Those who predict such a future soon are patently unaware of Pakistan's resiliency and capabilities, even if it is failing along many dimensions. Ralph Peters, a retired U.S. army officer, raises the possibility of Pakistan being reduced to a rump of Punjab and parts of Sindh, with Balochistan and the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa breaking away.<sup>70</sup> His views have been much cited as evidence of U.S. malice toward Pakistan, and in my own recent visits to military educational and training institutions, his name and the prospect of an outside effort to break up Pakistan came up repeatedly. Peters suggested that Balochistan might become a free state including parts of Iran's province of Sistan and Baluchistan, while the NWFP/KP would become a part of Afghanistan. It seems that retired military officers like this option. In March 2009 a retired Australian officer, David Kilcullen, predicted that Pakistan would fail in a matter of months. These predictions are a result of anger over Pakistani support for the Taliban in Afghanistan and a lack of familiarity with the society as well as the state of Pakistan. In the longer term the breakup of Pakistan is possible, as I discuss in *The Idea of Pakistan*, but any breakup would be preceded by the disintegration of the army, either after a war or because of ethnic and sectarian differences, or by the splitting of the army by some Punjabi political movement. None of that seems likely or plausible at the moment, but the breakup of the Soviet Union was also unexpected and unpredicted by most Soviet experts.

### *Civil or Military Authoritarianism*

Far more plausible than a breakup of Pakistan would be its slide into one or another form of authoritarianism. That could happen at the provincial level if the army permitted it or if it joined with a regional authoritarian movement. Authoritarianism might have staying power in Pakistan, although an authoritarian regime would face the same problems of state competence and national identity as any other kind of regime. There are four authoritarian models; Pakistan might evolve into one or some combination of them.

First, there is liberal authoritarianism, most perfectly embodied in Singapore. Here a dominant party ensures that the state is well run, dissent is carefully channeled, and the economy thrives. Many Pakistanis would opt immediately for a liberal authoritarian system, especially since, as in Singapore, it holds out the hope of further liberal reform while maintaining economic prosperity and social calm. However, Pakistan has no political party

capable of running such a state, and the army cannot imagine one because it is preoccupied with defense issues and lacks the secular, liberal bent of, for example, the Turkish army.

Classic authoritarianism, along the lines of Saddam's Iraq, is even less likely. While Pakistan may yet see the rise of a brutal but charismatic leader, it is hard to see how that would work in Pakistan, which lacks the resources, such as oil, to sustain tough authoritarianism.

Moderate military authoritarianism, along the lines of Egypt's, is more plausible. Something like this was tried by Ayub, and even Musharraf might have moved in this direction had he not been so intent on pleasing all of his audiences; he lacked the ruthlessness of a Nasser or a Hosni Mubarak. Such a regime would have the support of China or Saudi Arabia and, if it was effective, of many Western powers. Such a soft authoritarianism would have to be linked to outside assistance to succeed, economics being the driving factor. Here, China could be a major factor, building in Pakistan an acceptable Islamic but authoritarian state identity—just Islamic enough to claim legitimacy in terms of its historical roots but not so Islamic that it would support Islamist movements abroad, particularly in China. Such Islamist exports could be confined to India or other hostile neighbors.

Finally, there are two models of Islamist authoritarianism: Iran and Saudi Arabia. The Iranian model does not fit Pakistan and not only because the very large Shi'ite minority would not tolerate the imposition of a Sunni state. Iran's population is quite modernized and very sympathetic to liberal values, although power remains with the clerics and the Revolutionary Guards, two institutions that are absent in Pakistan. The Saudi model does not fit at all. There is no monolithic Islamic clergy, and Pakistan has fewer resources and is vastly larger and more diverse than either Saudi Arabia or Iran. More likely would be the emergence of provincial Islamist governments, especially in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, along with the weakening of the central government. Under the plural Pakistan scenario described above, some provinces could be nominally Islamist and free elections would not be able to remove the Islamists, who would be entrenched in power as in Iran. A provincial government with an Islamist bent (like both the Saudi and Iranian governments) might attempt to export radicalism abroad, and a weak government in Islamabad could claim that the policing mechanisms of the central state were too feeble to prevent such activities.

At the moment authoritarianism would not sit well with most Pakistanis, but if it brought order and a degree of prosperity, it would find a foothold. That is what the Taliban did in Afghanistan, although the prerequisite for such a development would be the collapse of the army, which seems very

unlikely under all current circumstances. In addition, authoritarianism does not match up well with Pakistan's diverse religious or social groups or with its deeply complex South Asian culture. Authoritarianism might be an experiment, but an experiment that would be likely to fail in its incapacity to deal with a society that is traditionally averse to centralization. That would be even more likely in the case of any totalitarian movement that might arise in Pakistan. Among other factors, the new media would make it hard for either form of government to establish itself.

### *An Army-Led Revolution*

There is also a remote prospect of an army-led transformation of Pakistan, one in which the generals became true revolutionaries, perhaps along the lines of the Turkish army years ago or, more recently, the Indonesian army. Though unlikely, this is perhaps more likely than the transformation of the civilian elite into a force for modernity. Indonesia is a promising point of comparison, but it differs from Pakistan in that it gave up *Konfrontasi*, the practice of confronting its regional neighbors and claiming regional leadership. Indonesia then had no external enemy and both its army and its political class could devote their energies to domestic security and reform. The results have been spectacular.

Pakistan's army is attuned to developments elsewhere. Its leadership knows that the country is falling behind its peers, notably India, yet there is no consensus on what has to be done to remedy the situation. It is in the position of being an army that is better than the state that supports it; the strategic challenge is to improve that state without surrendering its own professional status by becoming a political and economic creature. So far the army has become an economic force in Pakistan through its expanding manufacturing and distribution programs, and it remains entangled in mediating domestic crises and enforcing an unviable consensus on foreign and security policy. However, the Pakistan army cannot shoot weapons and think at the same time. While the army is unlikely to return to the Zia experiment, promoting a deeply conservative Islamist reform of Pakistan, it lacks the objectivity to see how it might reduce its own role in the state and thereby contribute to a more normal balance of civilian and military authority. It cannot govern, but it is fearful of civilian governance—and not without reason, given the historical incompetence of many civilian leaders.

### *Post-Crisis Scenarios*

Finally, it is important to note that all calculations about the future of Pakistan can be changed instantaneously should there be another major crisis, especially

one with India or now one involving Pakistan's role in Afghanistan and the actions of terrorist groups that have strong links to Pakistan.

Military defeat frequently leads to the erosion of an army's domestic political power, as in Greece in 1974 after the Turkish invasion of Cyprus and in Argentina in 1982 after the Malvinas/Falklands War. In Pakistan, however, defeat in the 1971 war with India did not result in the army's withdrawal from politics and civilian affairs; it only strengthened the army's resolve to take revenge on India and persuaded the army to back the nuclear weapons program. Pakistan's deep involvement in Indian-administered Kashmir and with Indian Islamist groups precipitated a number of crises and earned Pakistan the reputation of being a reckless state. Pakistan's defeat also strengthened jingoistic nationalism, which, under Zia, was encouraged by the state, some elements of which still have close relations with the hypernationalist "Honor" brigade.

For the army to consider complete withdrawal from politics, which would be transformational, it needs at least to be able to claim a draw on the Kashmir problem and to have some assurance that Pakistan's security environment will be stable and normal. Box 1-1 presents a number of other transformation scenarios.

## Conclusions

At the most abstract analytical level, the interplay between the contested ideas of Pakistan and the integrity of the Pakistani state will determine Pakistan's future. When a state is unable to protect its citizens and to collect the taxes required for the delivery of basic services, its citizens will regard themselves not as citizens but as subjects. They will try to leave the state, seek to transform the very "idea" that holds them together, or fight the state—or all three at the same time. Pakistan has never had a workable arrangement between the state and those ruled by the state. In the words of Hamid Kizilbash, talking about the upsurge in sectarian and political violence, "The people we ignored are taking their revenge."<sup>71</sup>

Five or six things must happen before Pakistan can be safely put in the "normal" state category. They include developing nearly-normal relations with India, reviving the economy, repairing the state, rebalancing the civil-military relationship, redefining the role of the military in the state, taxing the rich, fighting domestic insurgencies more effectively, and allowing a reshaped police force to emerge. The politicians would have to moderate their disputes, concentrating on issues and reform, not on patronage and corruption. However,

### Box 1-1. *Other Transformation Scenarios*

Pakistan is unique, but its core political structure, the role of the military, and potential for revolutionary change can be compared with a number of other historical cases.

In some ways it resembles Czarist Russia, which had a rotting army and was tipped over the edge by involvement in a world war. It differs in that Pakistan's army is coherent, whereas the war destroyed the Czarist forces, which never enjoyed the influence of the court and the aristocracy. The Bolsheviks and others were able to fill the resulting vacuum, in part because they were able to make peace with Germany, but Pakistan's Islamists are unlikely to have such an opportunity as long as the military retains its integrity and might intensify rather than end the conflict with India.

Another case with partial similarities is interwar Japan, where the civil-military relationship resembled that of Pakistan. An aggressive army vied with an aggressive navy to launch Japan on a series of disastrous foreign adventures, leading to its military destruction. Pakistan has nuclear weapons. It can be provocative without fear of retaliation; however, its economic position is much weaker than that of Imperial Japan, and it might collapse even without a war.

Iran and Turkey are sometimes cited as relevant. The Shah's Iran also had the same kind of social dislocation that we now see in Pakistan, but its army was politically weak and its Shiite Islamist movement, led by an organized clergy, was more coherent than anything likely to develop in Pakistan.

Turkey, rescued from a nightmare scenario, has been held up as a model for Pakistan. Vali Nasr writes that Turkey is an exemplary case of capitalist and democratic development, which succeeded "largely with the European Union's help, with the European Union taking the long view in building ties with Turkey, requiring measures on the part of Ankara for it to be further integrated into Europe."<sup>1</sup> Turkish democracy is based on a solid economic foundation, and it has rejected the Islamist revolutionary narrative, which has Israel and the United States at its center. Some of this is still officially part of Pakistan's world view. Pervez Musharraf briefly talked about the Turkish model (he grew up in Turkey), but he retreated from that position even if he personally did not subscribe to the Islamist narrative. However, Pakistan cannot be integrated closely with Europe, let alone the United States. Its natural economic partner is India, although the Chinese exploit Pakistan more thoroughly than any other state. Pakistan's military cannot under current circumstances bring itself to emulate India, the state closest to it in terms of social and ethnic complexity.

Finally, Brazil is the best example of what might have been. With approximately the same population size and level of economic development as Pakistan (both largely agriculture based), Brazil also had an overweening military and at one

*(continued)*

Box 1-1. *Other Transformation Scenarios (continued)*

time also contemplated a nuclear weapons program. However, it never had the kind of external threat faced by Pakistan. Even though it fancied itself as Argentina's rival, it was able to transform its domestic politics to the point that a normal civil-military relationship emerged, and it was able to focus on filling regional and even global gaps in technology and economics, notably through its success in medium aircraft production and its international role as a sports power. Ten years ago, it was the recipient of the International Monetary Fund's largest-ever loan; today, it is lending money to the IMF.

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1. Vali Nasr, *Forces of Fortune: The Rise of the New Muslim Middle Class and What It Will Mean for Our World* (New York: Free Press, 2009), p. 231.

none of these steps seems to be a *sufficient* factor that trumps all others. In the end, "muddling through" will have at least four or five variations.

Historically, states and empires come and go. The United Nations was founded with 51 states and now has 192. The old Chinese, British, French, Dutch, Austro-Hungarian, and German empires have all vanished or shrunk. The British Indian Raj, of which Pakistan is one of the legatees, has vanished, breaking up the strategic unity of the Subcontinent and pitting the two successor states against each other. The Soviet empire also is gone, there being nothing certain about the future of all or any states and imperial operations. As for states, Yugoslavia no longer exists, nor does Czechoslovakia or East Germany. On the other hand, Poland, which was once partitioned out of existence and then subjected to Nazi and Soviet rule, is now an independent country, firmly fixed in the broader European context.

Pakistan's future is not immutable. Pakistan has lasted sixty years, but in the process it has lost more than half of its population in a breakaway movement and barely resembles the tolerant state envisioned by Jinnah. The territory and the people of what is now Pakistan will remain, even if they are altered beyond recognition by population movement, environmental change, redrawn boundaries, or war. Pakistan's nuclear weapons will also remain, even if they are not controlled by a central government.

All of the participants in this project on the future of Pakistan agreed that the greatest uncertainty facing Pakistan is the interplay between the half-dozen or more critical factors that seem likely to shape the future, which are grouped with other variables into the four large clusters discussed above. That is why few participants were willing to predict beyond a few years and all qualified their predictions. The interplay between critical factors (especially

since there was no unanimity on which factors they were or on their order of importance), their sequencing, and their salience in different circumstances are all unknown, and perhaps unknowable. As William Milam writes in chapter 7, most of these factors/variables are both cause and effect; they influence each other and are in turn influenced by other developments. Were the major factors/variables all moving in the right direction, a good-case scenario could not be ruled out. However, as Milam notes, "It will be a long, difficult slog of one or two generations before one could safely wager that Pakistan was going to join the rank of modern societies."

Perhaps the hardest thing for Pakistanis to do is the simplest: to imagine their country as a modern state, meeting the needs of all of its people and escaping from the thrall of religious conflict. Modern states exhibit normal relations between civilian and military elites, and they ensure that state institutions keep up with the legitimate requirements of their people. They do not parody the worst aspects of a colonial empire that vanished sixty years ago. However, achieving modernity is difficult when a state is buffeted by forces of globalization that weaken its institutions and empower separatist and terrorist groups.

Pakistan has resources. It is important in its own right, and because of its nuclearized dispute with India, the international community has a powerful stake in its survival and return to normality. But to move Pakistan ahead will require a concentrated focus on economic and political policies that foster growth and create greater participation of the population in governance. Pakistan's population, which is now regarded as irrelevant by most political leaders, could then become an asset in fighting militancy and ending Pakistan's several insurgencies. Pakistan needs a national debate on what kind of state its citizens believe that they need. In other words, it is critical for Pakistan to set lofty targets for itself and to attempt to meet them with its own resources rather than be subservient to the interest of other states, near or far. Given the short-term perspective of virtually all Pakistani politicians and the institutional obsessions of the military, it is hard to see how such a debate can begin.

### *Six Warning Signs*

I conclude, as I did in 2004, with a list of warning signs. While this project has identified a number of factors, grouped into four clusters, these warning signs point to the immediate and urgent issues, although none alone are sufficient to ensure the normalization of Pakistan.

*Unwillingness to Deal Quickly with Economic Issues.* Pakistan has fantasized about its economic prospects for years, blaming others for its economic failures and claiming phantom successes, yet it is unwilling to tax the rich, let alone use state money to educate its masses. In the post-Musharraf period a

new sense of realism has emerged, but Pakistan is still spending too much on defense and security. If it is to grow in the long term, it must cut its commitments to the military in the short term by building political arrangements that ease the defense problem and by trimming lavish weapons projects and excessive manpower. Economic growth is also the only way to address demographic trends that are creating a large class of unemployed (and unemployable) youth, which in the long run will make Pakistan ungovernable and for some, unlivable.

*Unwillingness/Inability to Rebuild State Institutions.* It may be that Pakistan is beyond the point of no return with respect to its weakened state institutions, whether they concern education, local administration, or the functions of higher bureaucracies. But these problems are not esoteric, and Pakistan needs help from the international community to conduct a massive organizational rebuilding process. Private organizations and NGOs are not a substitute for functioning state institutions. The army will have to allow civilian competence to develop, but whether it will do so depends on both its willingness to adopt a reduced role and the rise of demonstrated civilian competence. Meanwhile, education and state building should be given the same priority as defense policy.

*Absence of Governance at the Top.* In all of its recent crises, whether external or internal, Pakistan's government has demonstrated extraordinary incoherence at the top. The Mumbai crisis saw confusion reign in Islamabad, and when one civilian (the national security adviser, himself an ex-general) tried to set the record straight, he was fired. There was and is no coherent system of presenting alternative policies before the government, no systematic planning process, and no effective mechanism for coordinating the actions of different parts of the government. Usually the military has its way, but there is no question that Pakistan's army does not have the strategic capabilities necessary to formulate a coherent strategy on any but the narrowest military issues. It has been unable to develop a response to the domestic terrorism that rages in all parts of the country, especially the government-free zones of KP. If Pakistan does not create such a mechanism, presumably including a National Security Council (unlike the sham NSC created by Musharraf), it will continue to stumble strategically.

*The Begging Bowl.* Pakistan has fallen into a position of deep dependency vis-à-vis international donors, whether individual states or international lending agencies, and the government is correctly criticized for giving in to them one after another. Pakistan needs to adopt a relationship whereby its dignity and sovereignty are protected. The initiative for assistance must come from Pakistan, not outsiders, as it must from countries that apply for loans from the International Monetary Fund. Pakistan must develop the scope of and crite-

ria for assistance programs and gain the support of donors. The conditions for assistance should come from the Pakistani side, with the acknowledgment that if Pakistan fails to meet those conditions, then the aid or support offered will be correspondingly reduced. Because doing so will require more capacity than Pakistan now has, the government should seek help from competent governments to improve its budget and planning cycle and from the private sector, where there is a great deal of talent. “Tough love” is a suitable standard, and Pakistanis themselves should insist on it.

*Fresh Crises with India.* A more normal relationship with India is necessary if Pakistan is to avoid further deterioration. Although India does not want to see an assertive Pakistan, a failing Pakistan has the capacity to do India considerable damage. The nuclearization of their sixty-year conflict makes the stakes even higher. Further crises, deliberate or inadvertent, will distract Pakistan from the rebuilding task and endanger India itself. The mechanisms are (or at least were) in place for normalization between the two states. If they move down this path, the process should be encouraged by outside powers and by an endorsement from the United Nations.

*Further Appeasement of Islamists.* Pakistan is becoming polarized, with liberal elements on the defensive. The global dialogue on reforming Islam has a Pakistani dimension, but much ground has been conceded to doctrinaire Islamists, who receive considerable state patronage. That has already changed Pakistan markedly, and the problem is not just the strength of intolerant and narrow Islamists but also the weakness of the tiny Westernized elite. Pakistan is becoming one of the centers of global jihad.

### *Policy: Between Hope and Despair*

George Shultz once told me that hope was not a policy; when I recounted that conversation to a retired Pakistani diplomat, he countered that despair was also not a policy. The reality is that humans tend to err on the side of hope, and most conversations regarding Pakistan’s future invariably try to present a hopeful and optimistic future. This tendency toward optimism and hopefulness is well-documented in the academic literature.<sup>72</sup> However, policy toward Pakistan is permeated by both hope and despair. There are no good policy options. Doing nothing and doing the same thing are both unattractive and problematic approaches, but there are no easy paths to the future, and a strong likelihood of policy disaster remains.

Some members of this project were very pessimistic about Pakistan’s future even over the next five years and foresaw greater calamities ahead. One event that the group did not foresee was the massive flooding in July 2010 that submerged a good portion of Pakistan for several months. The flooding was the

result of both a freakish weather event (heavy rains fell on the western but not the eastern portions of Pakistan's river system), plus forty years of neglect of the drainage and water management system by both military and civilian regimes. The consequences of the floods are still being debated, but they did not produce the kind of national rally that some hoped for, and they are more likely to turn out to be a negative "black swan" event.<sup>73</sup>

However, two factors give hope, with the caveat that hope is not a policy. First, there is no question that Pakistan has the human capital to reverse its direction. Its tiny elite are competent and there is a middle class that still wants reform. Pakistan needs to experiment with democracy; it cannot be run as an autocracy, whether by a military or a civilian leader, no matter how charismatic he or she might be.

Second, it is now in the interest of the international community that Pakistan succeed, or at least that it not fail badly. No country, not even India, wants to see Pakistan come apart violently, as real failure could spew nuclear weapons and terror groups around the world. That is why the option to break up Pakistan is both impractical and dangerous.

The Western powers, Japan, and India need to have a concerted policy—one that will strengthen reform and democratic forces in Pakistan, encourage the military to adopt a recessed role, improve Pakistan's economy, and generate more resources to address vital domestic needs. But China, Pakistan's closest ally, is no supporter of democratization and favors harsh measures to control terrorist and extremist groups. The parallels with North Korea are striking; by supporting Pakistan and North Korea, China keeps regional rivals off balance while it pursues its narrow economic and strategic goals.

Right now, as far as the West and Japan are concerned, policy regarding Pakistan derives primarily from U.S. and NATO engagement in Afghanistan. A second policy component is support for Pakistan in the battle against its own Taliban and other radical elements. Third, there is unprecedented economic aid, particularly in the form of the Kerry-Lugar bill. The assumption of the Kerry-Lugar initiative is that a failed Pakistan would be calamitous for the United States, given its size, its location, and above all, its nuclear weapons. This is Pakistan as another North Korea—"too nuclear to fail." Few, however, have advocated a massive nation-building program for Pakistan.

If one assumes that Pakistan might be weak and unstable (the worst variant of "muddling through") or holds the view that Pakistan is headed toward greater autonomy for its various provinces, then it makes sense to search for alternative policies. One would be to encourage India to supplant Pakistan in Afghanistan, providing an alternative route to Afghanistan and thus demonstrating to Islamabad that threats to cut off the supply lines can be circum-

vented. An expansion of this policy would be Ambassador Robert Blackwill's proposal to accept the partition of Afghanistan, throwing U.S. weight behind a Northern Alliance/India group to counter the Pakistan-supported Taliban in southern Afghanistan.

The problem with using India to balance or supplant Pakistan is that it provides negative incentives for the Pakistan army to undertake a program of domestic reform, and it certainly would heighten tensions between India and Pakistan.<sup>74</sup> Those who cling to a reform strategy for Pakistan are unwilling to abandon it for a balancing policy on the grounds that doing so would rule out entirely the possibility of reform.

If one's view, whether based on past Pakistani actions or not, is that Pakistan is not merely a state in trouble but one that will become a rogue state that cannot be reformed, then a balancing policy could be easily transformed into one of containment. That option was rejected by the Council on Foreign Relations task force, but at least one of the members wrote a dissent pointing out that Pakistan cannot be counted on to pursue policies that match up with U.S. interests in a number of sectors, notably relations with India, nuclear policy, and support for terrorists.<sup>75</sup> If one believes that present policies are not working, that aid packages will not have much of an impact, and that Pakistani nationalism trumps Pakistani national interest, then Pakistan should be seen as a threat, not an asset. That view would be confirmed should there be a successful terrorist attack originating in Pakistan against India or a Western country—for example, a successful Times Square bombing that kills many Americans. In that case public opinion would almost certainly demand a reassessment of the U.S. relationship with Pakistan.

Such a reassessment would give India the role of containing a dangerous Pakistan, and it might lead to a policy that placed India at the center of South Asia's geostrategic calculations, with the West working in partnership with New Delhi to "fix" Afghanistan and Pakistan, once and for all. This puts the United States on the side of a rising power, although Indians are deeply ambivalent about undertaking such a regional role.

If Pakistan continues to deteriorate and India does not want to play an active role in containing or balancing a failing Pakistan, then five or six years down the road the United States and its allies might pursue "offshore balancing," an academic/diplomatic euphemism for "cut and run."<sup>76</sup> The columnist Tom Friedman has said that regions such as the Middle East and South Asia eventually work out their difficulties without U.S. intervention.<sup>77</sup> With increasingly scarce resources and unhappy domestic opinion to contend with, the United States and its allies may well decide that the South Asian states can manage their affairs reasonably well and that all they would need to do is to

step in every four or five years to prevent a nuclear war. However, the India-Pakistan rivalry involves other states as well, notably China, which has emerged as a significant South Asian power and is itself playing a balancing game with India and Pakistan. Policymakers need to think through carefully whether U.S. intervention would make a difference in the region and calculate the costs of not becoming involved as a facilitator in the stagnant South Asian peace process.

Two other policies need to be mentioned, although each has serious drawbacks. Steve Coll has forwarded the view that Kashmir is at the root of India-Pakistan differences and that if outside powers worked to facilitate a settlement, then the risks of war would be lowered and Pakistan presumably could devote its energies to reconstruction and rebuilding.<sup>78</sup> That, of course, would be opposed tooth and nail by India, but might be workable if, in exchange, there was a settlement of the Kashmir dispute, which Coll believes was almost achieved. Were Pakistan to normalize its relations with India, then cooperation might be extended across the board, restoring the strategic unity of the Subcontinent, which was lost during the 1947 partition. However, India's reluctance to compromise with a failing Pakistan notwithstanding, China would have every reason to oppose normalization, and it could probably offer Pakistan more reason *not* to settle than India could offer Pakistan to settle. Twenty-five years ago, before it went nuclear, Pakistan offered to abandon its nuclear program if the United States were to provide a security guarantee that included protection from an attack from India. The request was spurned; Pakistan went ahead with its nuclear program, and it has now become even more dependent on China. The prospects of restoring South Asia's strategic unity are now low to zero given China's new influence and India's ambivalence over normalization of relations with Pakistan.

So it is back to the current, and perhaps the least worst, cluster of policies. Politics is an experimental, not a theoretical science; we must see how this experiment plays out over the next two years, but it is hard to be optimistic that the West and the United States will get both Afghanistan and Pakistan "right," or that India will suddenly become generous, or that the Pakistani elite, especially the military, will undertake a program of deep reform. Hope for the best, but at least think about the worst.

## Notes

1. For the best chronology of this process of state-breaking, see Ilhan Niaz, *The Culture of Power and Governance of Pakistan 1947–2008* (Oxford University Press, 2010).

2. For a recent report based on conversations with a senior retired Pakistani officer active at the time of these initiatives, see Aziz Haniffa, "Musharraf Was Never Close to Solving Kashmir, Says Pakistani General," *India Abroad*, December 16, 2010, p. A-16.

3. See the Report of the United Nations Commission of Inquiry into the facts and circumstances of the assassination of former Pakistani Prime Minister Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto ([www.un.org/News/dh/infocus/Pakistan/UN\\_Bhutto\\_Report\\_15April2010.pdf](http://www.un.org/News/dh/infocus/Pakistan/UN_Bhutto_Report_15April2010.pdf)). Other reports, including some U.S. government documents leaked by WikiLeaks, indicate that the army prevailed upon the Zardari government not to follow up on the U.N. report, protecting both Musharraf and perhaps other former officers who may have been implicated one way or another in her murder.

4. For a good overview of his reformist inclinations, see Ahsan's article, "Keep the Flag Flying," *Newsweek Pakistan*, September 13, 2010 ([www.newsweekpakistan.com/component/content/article/38-features/108-keep-the-flag-flying-by-aitzaz-ahsan](http://www.newsweekpakistan.com/component/content/article/38-features/108-keep-the-flag-flying-by-aitzaz-ahsan)).

5. A close analogy to Lal Masjid was the attack by Indian military forces on the Golden Temple, the Sikhs' holy shrine in Amritsar, in 1984. That also set off a sustained battle between the army and police and Sikh militants, with the latter receiving considerable support from ordinary Sikh citizens who were infuriated by the attack on the temple. Prime Minister Indira Gandhi was eventually assassinated by her Sikh bodyguards, just as the militant Islamists tried repeatedly to kill Musharraf. Although they failed, a number of army officers were assassinated.

6. Amir Mir, "2010: Suicides Drop by 35 pc, Deaths up by 1 pc," *The News*, December 24, 2010 ([www.thenews.com.pk/TodaysPrintDetail.aspx?ID=21975&Cat=2](http://www.thenews.com.pk/TodaysPrintDetail.aspx?ID=21975&Cat=2) [June 30, 2011]).

7. Two good sources for numbers are the website of the Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies ([www.san-pips.com/index.php?action=reports&id=psr\\_list\\_1](http://www.san-pips.com/index.php?action=reports&id=psr_list_1)) and the Brookings Pakistan Index, a regularly updated collection of data and figures ([www.brookings.edu/foreign-policy/pakistan-index.aspx](http://www.brookings.edu/foreign-policy/pakistan-index.aspx)).

8. See B. Raman, "Is Letting Pakistan Collapse an Option?" *Eurasia Review*, December 26, 2010 ([www.eurasiareview.com/is-letting-pakistan-collapse-an-option-26122010/](http://www.eurasiareview.com/is-letting-pakistan-collapse-an-option-26122010/)).

9. According to the Committee to Protect Journalists, eight of the forty-four journalists murdered around the world in 2010 were Pakistanis, the largest single number in any country.

10. Usman Manzoor, "Incumbent SC Outperforms Dogar Court by 2:1," *The News*, September 19, 2010 ([www.thenews.com.pk/TodaysPrintDetail.aspx?ID=692&Cat=13](http://www.thenews.com.pk/TodaysPrintDetail.aspx?ID=692&Cat=13)).

11. One of the most remarkable examples is that of Ejaz Haider, a leading journalist who had been sympathetic to the military establishment. See "An Open Letter to General Pasha," *Express Tribune*, June 7, 2011.

12. Ahmed Faruqui, "Reversing History," February 3, 2010, *Outlook India* ([www.outlookindia.com/printarticle.aspx?264103](http://www.outlookindia.com/printarticle.aspx?264103)).

13. For a critique of the honor or virtue brigade—the *Ghairiyaat*—by a distinguished Pakistan columnist who argues that neither the army nor revolution is the cure

for Pakistan but that its salvation lies in the slow restoration of normal democratic political processes through the ballot box, see Ayaz Amir, “The Gathering Rage of the Virtue Brigades,” *The News*, Friday July 23, 2010. Leaders of the *Ghairiyaat* include former ISI general Hamid Gul and A. Q. Khan, the metallurgist who stole centrifuge plans from Holland and persuaded Zulfikar Ali Bhutto that a Pakistani bomb was possible. Khan is one of many who speak approvingly of China as a model for Pakistan and scathingly of current political leaders for their cravenness toward the United States and India. See “Our Leaders Should Learn Lessons from China: Dr. Qadeer,” *The Nation*, December 25, 2010 ([www.nation.com.pk/pakistan-news-newspaper-daily-english-online/Politics/25-Dec-2010/Our-leaders-should-learn-lesson-from-China-Dr-Abdul-Qadir-Khan](http://www.nation.com.pk/pakistan-news-newspaper-daily-english-online/Politics/25-Dec-2010/Our-leaders-should-learn-lesson-from-China-Dr-Abdul-Qadir-Khan)).

14. For two relatively optimistic projections, see Maleeha Lodhi, *Pakistan: Beyond the “Crisis State”* (Columbia University Press, 2011), and Anatol Lieven, *Pakistan: A Hard Country* (New York: Public Affairs Press, 2011). For a grimmer assessment, see the book by former U.S. diplomat John R. Schmidt, *The Unraveling: Pakistan in the Age of Jihad* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2011).

15. See Tariq Fatemi’s introductory paragraph in chapter 5 of this volume.

16. For an insightful essay on hope in the context of the “failure” of recent India-Pakistan talks, see Mehreen Zahra-Malik, “Hope and Its Discontents,” *Friday Times* [Lahore weekly], July 23–28, 2010.

17. For a modern study of disaster and unpredictable events, see Lee Clarke, *Worst Cases: Terror and Catastrophe in the Popular Imagination* (University of Chicago Press, 2006).

18. Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, *Whither Pakistan: Growing Instability and Implications for India* ([www.idsa.in/book/WhitherPakistan](http://www.idsa.in/book/WhitherPakistan)).

19. British Council, *Pakistan: The Next Generation*, November 2009, p. iv ([www.britishcouncil.org/pakistan-active-citizens-next-generation-report.htm](http://www.britishcouncil.org/pakistan-active-citizens-next-generation-report.htm)).

20. Irteza Haider and Murtaza Haider, “Pakistan,” in Brian Roberts and Trevor Kanaley, *Urbanization and Sustainability in Asia: Case Studies of Good Practice* (Philippines: Asian Development Bank, 2006,) pp. 245–71 ([www.adb.org/Documents/Books/Urbanization-Sustainability/urbanization-sustainability.pdf](http://www.adb.org/Documents/Books/Urbanization-Sustainability/urbanization-sustainability.pdf)).

21. See the British Council, *Pakistan: The Next Generation*.

22. Athar Osama, “HEC Scholars: Will They Return? And Stay?” Pakistan Research Support Network, August 9, 2008 (<http://pakistaniat.com/2008/08/09/hec-pakistan/>).

23. Kizilbash’s remarks were delivered at the conference “Empowering Faculty and Transforming Education in Pakistan” at the Woodrow Wilson Center, Washington, April 7, 2010 ([www.wilsoncenter.org/ondemand/index.cfm?fuseaction=home.play&mediaid=E41FB00A-A2E7-7301-113CE5FEFA3FC864](http://www.wilsoncenter.org/ondemand/index.cfm?fuseaction=home.play&mediaid=E41FB00A-A2E7-7301-113CE5FEFA3FC864)).

24. Vali Nasr, *Forces of Fortune: The Rise of the New Muslim Middle Class and What It Will Mean for Our World* (New York: Free Press, 2009).

25. Jonathan Paris, *Prospects for Pakistan* (London: Legatum Institute, 2010), p. 25.

26. All of this is in dismal contrast to India. At one time Pakistan had a much higher per capita income than the much larger (and generally poorer) India. Today,

with its growth rate of more than 8 percent, India is one of the fastest-growing economies in the world, at the top with Brazil and China. India's WIPRO software company has a bigger market cap than all of Pakistan.

27. See Hussain H. Zaidi, "Only Option," *The News*, Islamabad, September 19, 2010 (<http://www.jang.com.pk/thenews/sep2010-weekly/nos-19-09-2010/pol1.htm#5>).

28. *Economist Intelligence Unit*, selected country data and estimates for Pakistan, 1986–2013 ([www.eiu.com](http://www.eiu.com)).

29. See "Aid to Pakistan by the Numbers," Center for Global Development ([www.cgdev.org/section/initiatives/\\_active/pakistan/numbers](http://www.cgdev.org/section/initiatives/_active/pakistan/numbers)).

30. Data from the U.N. Human Development Index (<http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/>).

31. Zeeshan Haider, "Militancy-Hit Pakistan Ups Defense Spending by 17 Percent," June 5, 2010, *Reuters* ([www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE6541UF20100605](http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE6541UF20100605)).

32. See Stephen Philip Cohen, *The Idea of Pakistan* (Brookings, 2004), and Farzana Shaikh, *Making Sense of Pakistan* (Columbia University Press, 2009).

33. For a vivid comparison of today's Pakistan with Pakistan in the past, see Hajrah Mumtaz, "Pakistan, 50 Years Ago," *Dawn*, June 20, 2011 ([www.dawn.com/2011/06/20/pakistan-50-years-ago.html](http://www.dawn.com/2011/06/20/pakistan-50-years-ago.html)).

34. For an excellent overview of ethnicity in Pakistan, see Alyssa Ayres, *Speaking Like a State: Language and Nationalism in Pakistan* (Cambridge University Press, 2009).

35. Pew Global Attitudes Project, "Pakistani Public Opinion," August 13, 2009 (<http://pewglobal.org/2009/08/13/pakistani-public-opinion/>): "Overall, 89% say they think of themselves first as Pakistani, rather than as a member of their ethnic group."

36. See the references in Cohen, *The Idea of Pakistan*, to ethnolinguistic movements, especially Waseem; for a recent study, see Farhan Hanif Siddiqi, "The State and Politics of Ethnicity in Post-1971 Pakistan: An Analysis of the Baloch, Sindhi, and Mohajir Ethnic Movements," Ph.D. thesis, Department of International Relations, University of Karachi, 2009.

37. Muhammad Mushtaq and Syed Khawaja Alqama, "Poverty Alleviation through Power-Sharing in Pakistan," *European Journal of Social Sciences*, vol. 8, no. 3 (2009), pp. 459–68.

38. Praveen Swami, *India, Pakistan, and the Secret Jihad* (London: Routledge, 2007); Rizwan Hussain, *Pakistan and the Emergence of Islamic Militancy in Afghanistan* (Burlington, Vt.: Ashgate, 2005); Barnett Rubin, *The Fragmentation of Afghanistan* (Yale University Press, 2002); Mariam Abou Zahab, "The Regional Dimension of Sectarian Conflicts in Pakistan," in *Pakistan: Nationalism without a Nation?* edited by Christophe Jaffrelot (London: Zed, 2002), pp. 115–28; International Crisis Group, *Pakistan: The Mullahs and the Military*, Asia Report 49 (Islamabad: Crisis Group, March 2003); S. V. R. Nasr, "The Rise of Sunni Militancy in Pakistan: The Changing Role of Islamism and the Ulama in Society and Politics," *Modern Asian Studies*, vol. 34, no. 1 (2000), pp. 139–80.

39. See Pervez Hoodbhoy for a worst-case scenario, "Whither Pakistan" (<http://pakistaniat.com/2009/06/16/pervez-hoodbhoy-pakistan-future/>).

40. Ibid.

41. The army is central in the papers by Aqil Shah, Hasan Askari Rizvi, and Shaukat Qadir, yet almost every paper presented at the Bellagio workshop commented on the military in one way or another. For the original papers, see [www.brookings.edu/~media/Files/rc/papers/2010/09\\_bellagio\\_conference\\_papers/09\\_bellagio\\_papers.pdf](http://www.brookings.edu/~media/Files/rc/papers/2010/09_bellagio_conference_papers/09_bellagio_papers.pdf); this volume contains all of them in revised form.

42. See the needlessly insulting blog post published by Banyan, “Land of the Impure,” *The Economist*, June 19, 2010 ([www.economist.com/node/16377259](http://www.economist.com/node/16377259)).

43. It is Pakistan’s army that is central, not the professional but politically marginal air force and navy.

44. Stephen P. Cohen, *The Pakistan Army* (University of California Press, 1985).

45. The Pakistan army officer corps is not a hotbed of radical Islamic thinking, although it does engage with Islamic theories of war and searches for ways in which Islamic principles can guide it; see Cohen, *The Pakistan Army*. Ambitious officers follow a Western professional model, and many are concerned with blowback from the army’s support for radical Islamists. Their own theology is pragmatic, but they have not yet found a strategy to counter true extremism, inside and outside the army, as they distrust “liberal” political and social thought.

46. For two studies, see Stephen P. Cohen, *Mastering Counterinsurgency: A Workshop Report*, based on a conference with the National Defense University of Pakistan, March, 2009 ([www.brookings.edu/papers/2009/0707\\_counterinsurgency\\_cohen.aspx](http://www.brookings.edu/papers/2009/0707_counterinsurgency_cohen.aspx)), and Shuja Nawaz, “Learning by Doing: The Pakistan Army’s Experiment with Counterinsurgency,” Atlantic Council Report (Washington: February 2011).

47. For recent Pakistan army discussions on regional issues, see, for example, recent editions of *The Citadel*, the journal of the Command and Staff College, Quetta, notably Muhammed Anneq Ur Rehman Malik, “Military Lessons of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF),” vol. 26, no. 1, (2008); Raza Muhammad, “Indian Cold Start Doctrine: A Brief Review,” vol. 27, no. 1 (2009); Saad Mahmood, “Indo-U.S. Nuclear Deal: Implications for Pakistan,” vol. 28, no. 1 (2010); Qaiser Ajmal Khattak, “FATA Problem: A Perspective,” vol. 28, no. 2 (2010).

48. For a contemporary European study that emphasizes the importance of state governance, see Marco Mezzera, “Challenges of Pakistan’s Governance System,” NOREF Policy Brief 2, October 2009 ([www.peacebuilding.no/eng/Publications/Noref-Policy-Briefs/Challenges-of-Pakistan-s-Governance-System](http://www.peacebuilding.no/eng/Publications/Noref-Policy-Briefs/Challenges-of-Pakistan-s-Governance-System)). Numerous academic studies have told of the systematic destruction of state capacity in Pakistan. For a recent comprehensive account that brings the process up to date, see the fine history by Ilhan Niaz, *The Culture of Power and Governance of Pakistan: 1947–2008* (Oxford University Press, 2010).

49. Failed State Index, by *Foreign Policy* and the Fund For Peace ([www.foreignpolicy.com/failedstates](http://www.foreignpolicy.com/failedstates)).

50. There have been very few attempts to study, let alone measure, the impact of Friday sermons and the mosques on public opinion. For a rare glimpse, see the studies carried out by a group of students and observers by *Mashal*, the liberal publication and

reprint house created by Pervez Hoodbhoy. See “Message from the Mosque,” a review of mosque sermons that can be searched by category and topic (<http://imams.mashalbooks.org/>).

51. It may never be known whether it was state incompetence or malevolent intent that led to the neglect of her security arrangements. She added to the problem with her belief that the people of Pakistan would protect her from known elements that wanted her dead.

52. National Intelligence Council, *Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World*, NIC 2008-003 (Washington: November 2008), p. 72.

53. Robert Blackwill, “Plan B in Afghanistan: Why a De Facto Partition Is the Least Bad Option,” *Foreign Affairs*, January-February 2011 ([www.cfr.org/publication/23655/plan\\_b\\_in\\_afghanistan.html](http://www.cfr.org/publication/23655/plan_b_in_afghanistan.html)).

54. Pamela Constable, “Pakistan’s Army Chief Seeks Stable Afghanistan,” *Washington Post*, February 2, 2010 ([www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/02/01/AR2010020102506.html](http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/02/01/AR2010020102506.html)).

55. For a comprehensive history of U.S.-Pakistan relations, see Dennis Kux, *The United States and Pakistan, 1947–2000: Disenchanted Allies* (Washington: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2001). For a unique study of Pakistani negotiating strategies with the United States, see also Howard B. Schaffer and Teresita C. Schaffer, *Pakistan Negotiates with America: Riding the Roller-Coaster* (Washington: U.S. Institute of Peace Press, 2011).

56. “A Pakistani Response to the U.S. Annual Review,” Stratfor, December 21, 2010 ([www.stratfor.com/memberships/178428/analysis/20101220-pakistani-response-us-annual-review](http://www.stratfor.com/memberships/178428/analysis/20101220-pakistani-response-us-annual-review)).

57. See Ashley J. Tellis, “South Asia: U.S. Policy Choices,” in *Taking Charge: A Bipartisan Report to the President-Elect on Foreign Policy and National Security*, edited by Frank Carlucci, Robert E. Hunter, and Zalmay Khalilzad (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 2001), p. 88 ([www.rand.org/pubs/monograph\\_reports/MR1306.html](http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1306.html)).

58. Jane Perlez, “WikiLeaks Archive: U.S. and Pakistan, Ever Wary,” *New York Times*, December 1, 2010 ([www.nytimes.com/2010/12/01/world/asia/01wikileaks-pakistan.html](http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/01/world/asia/01wikileaks-pakistan.html)).

59. BBC, “Global Views of United States Improve While Other Countries Decline,” April 18, 2010 (<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/160410bbcwpoll.pdf>).

60. For a brief but excellent overview of the value of the relationship to both sides, see James Lamont and Farhan Bokhari, “An Alliance Is Built,” *Financial Times*, Friday, July 1, 2011, p. 7.

61. Salman Masood, “China Praises Pakistan’s Fight against Terrorism and Vows to Bolster Partnership,” *New York Times*, December 20, 2010, p. A8.

62. Nicole Gaouette, “Most Pakistanis View U.S. as Enemy, Want War Over, Survey Finds,” *Business Week* ([www.businessweek.com/news/2010-07-29/most-pakistanis-view-u-s-as-enemy-want-war-over-survey-finds.html](http://www.businessweek.com/news/2010-07-29/most-pakistanis-view-u-s-as-enemy-want-war-over-survey-finds.html)).

63. Even secular democracies also became more “religious,” notably the United States, with its angry religious right, and India, with a resurgent Hindutva-inspired Bharatiya Janata Party.

64. Now that the Pakistani courts have ended his house arrest, Dr. Khan comments frequently on nuclear and strategic matters. See his interview in Susan Kolbe, “We May Be Naïve but We Are Not Idiots,” *Spiegel Online*, June 28, 2011 ([www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,770746,00.html](http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,770746,00.html)).

65. Quoted in *Zee News* [New Delhi], May 31, 2009 ([http://zeenews.india.com/news/south-asia/pak-would-not-have-survived-after-kargil-mumbai-attacks-without-nukes\\_535592.html](http://zeenews.india.com/news/south-asia/pak-would-not-have-survived-after-kargil-mumbai-attacks-without-nukes_535592.html)).

66. For a discussion, see Stephen P. Cohen and Sunil Dasgupta, *Arming without Aiming: India’s Military Modernization* (Brookings, 2010), pp. 66–67.

67. “Mapping the Global Future,” Report of the National Intelligence Council’s 2020 Project (Washington: National Intelligence Council, December 2004), p. 21 ([www.dni.gov/nic/NIC\\_globaltrend2020.html](http://www.dni.gov/nic/NIC_globaltrend2020.html)).

68. As Jonathan Paris has informed me, “muddling through” is not a casual term. See the seminal essay by Charles Lindblom, “The Science of Muddling Through,” *Public Administration Review*, vol. 19, no. 2. (Spring 1959), pp. 79–88.

69. See the clever year-end summary by Mahmood Adele, “2010: The Year in Review,” a blog post on *New Pakistan* in which he weighs gains and losses in several categories (press, politicians, the military, NGOs, and the economy) and the tally comes out about even (<http://new-pakistan.com/2010/12/28/2010-year-in-review/>).

70. Ralph Peters, “Blood Borders: How a Better Middle East Would Look,” *Armed Forces Journal*, June 2006 ([www.armedforcesjournal.com/2006/06/1833899](http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2006/06/1833899)).

71. Speaking at the conference “Empowering Faculty and Transforming Education in Pakistan” at the Woodrow Wilson Center, Washington, April 7, 2010 ([www.wilsoncenter.org/ondemand/index.cfm?fuseaction=home.play&mediaid=E41FB00A-A2E7-7301-113CE5FEFA3FC864](http://www.wilsoncenter.org/ondemand/index.cfm?fuseaction=home.play&mediaid=E41FB00A-A2E7-7301-113CE5FEFA3FC864)).

72. For one recent overview see Susan C. Vaughan, *Half Empty, Half Full: Understanding the Psychological Roots of Optimism* (New York: Harcourt, 2000).

73. Stephen P. Cohen, “Lessons from Pakistan’s Latest Catastrophe,” Brookings, August 17, 2010 ([www.brookings.edu/opinions/2010/0817\\_pakistan\\_floods\\_cohen.aspx](http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2010/0817_pakistan_floods_cohen.aspx)). For two balanced overviews, see “Pakistan at Risk: Challenges and Opportunities after the Flood,” Jinnah Institute Conference Report, September–October 2010 (<http://jinnah-institute.org/images/ji%20flood%20conference%20report%20oct%202010.pdf>), and K. Allan Kronstadt and others, “Flooding in Pakistan: Overview and Issues for Congress,” CRS Report for Congress R41424, Congressional Research Service, September 21, 2010 ([http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/R41424\\_20100921.pdf](http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/R41424_20100921.pdf)).

74. This point was made recently in Council on Foreign Relations, “U.S. Strategy for Pakistan and Afghanistan,” Task Force Report, November 2010 ([www.cfr.org/publication/23253/us\\_strategy\\_for\\_pakistan\\_and\\_afghanistan.html](http://www.cfr.org/publication/23253/us_strategy_for_pakistan_and_afghanistan.html)).

75. *Ibid.* See Michael Krepon’s dissent to the CFR task force report, pp. 69–70.

76. For a basic explanation of offshore balancing and other grand strategies, see John Mearsheimer, “Imperial by Design,” *National Interest*, vol. 111 (January–February 2011) (<http://mearsheimer.uchicago.edu/pub-affairs.html>).

77. Thomas L. Friedman, "The Great (Double) Game," *New York Times*, July 31, 2010 ([www.nytimes.com/2010/08/01/opinion/01friedman.html](http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/01/opinion/01friedman.html)).

78. Steve Coll, "Kashmir: The Time Has Come," *New York Review of Books*, September 30, 2010 ([www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2010/sep/30/kashmir-time-has-come/](http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2010/sep/30/kashmir-time-has-come/)). I think it more likely that India and Pakistan might cooperate on Afghanistan, where both have common interests, but only in the context of a new U.S. and Western policy that returns to the idea of a regional consortium of neighbors. For views on this by Indian and Pakistani writers, see Rudra Chaudhuri, "The Proxy Calculus: Kabul, Not Kashmir, Holds the Key to the India-Pakistani Relationship," *RUSI Journal*, vol. 155, no. 6 (December 2010), pp. 52–59, and Khaled Ahmed, "A 'Doable' Paradigm-Shift," *Friday Times*, September 10–16, 2010, p. 3.