THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION
CENTER FOR NORTHEAST ASIAN POLICY STUDIES

CHARTING CHINA'S EVOLVING VIEWS OF THE KOREA-U.S. ALLIANCE

Dr. Jae Ho Chung
Professor of Political Science and International Relations
Seoul National University;
Former CNAPS Visiting Fellow, 2002-2003

The Brookings Institution
Washington, D.C.
Thursday, September 6, 2012

[PROCEEDINGS PREPARED FROM AN AUDIO RECORDING]

ANDERSON COURT REPORTING
706 Duke Street, Suite 100
Alexandria, VA 22314
Phone (703) 519-7180 Fax (703) 519-7190

PARTICIPANTS:

Introduction:

RICHARD C. BUSH
Senior Fellow and Director, Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies
The Brookings Institution

Presenter:

JAE HO CHUNG
Professor of Political Science and International Relations
Seoul National University;
Former CNAPS Visiting Fellow, 2002-2003

P R O C E E D I N G S

JAE HO CHUNG: [In progress] today, the first part talks about China's views during the Cold War years, basically the 1950s and 1960s because I can see the 1970s as transformative years where a lot of changes are taking place.

During these two decades, the 1950s and 1960s, China's view of the Korea-America alliance is threefold. First, China held a highly antagonistic and negative perspective as Beijing considered the Korea-America alliance a serious threat to her security interests. China regarded the Korea-U.S. alliance as an important pillar of Washington's encirclement strategy; other pillars being the Japan-U.S. strategy -- I mean, the Japan-U.S. alliance and the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization.

China paid very close attention to the inherently asymmetrical nature of the Korea-U.S. alliance in which South Korea's sovereignty was viewed as being seriously inflicted upon. That is to say being a nation that is almost hypersensitive to the issues related to sovereignty and equality, China held a view that this content and potential for conflict were deeply embedded in the Korea-America alliance, and I think this will pop up again for the Chinese view of the Korea-America alliance in 2000.

Third, I think more interestingly, China viewed the Korea-U.S. alliance not only as Washington's design to prevent North Korea's aggression but also as Washington's design to prevent South Korea's unilateral action against the North. And this was sarcastically dubbed in China as peaceful but opposed to unification. In Chinese they call it *he er, bu tong*. And this is very analogous to the Chinese view of the U.S.-Japan alliance because China has viewed the U.S.-Japan alliance as a design to constrain Japan or prevent Japan from becoming too aggressive in military terms.

Now, let me talk a little bit about China's view of the alliance from the 1970s through the mid-1990s. President Nixon's surprise visit in 1972 and the subsequent rapprochement between Washington and Beijing created changes, significant changes in China's view of the Korea-America alliance. I think there is ample documentation regarding these perceptual changes concerning China's view of the Korea-America and Japanese-America alliances. China no longer viewed the U.S.-Korea alliance as detrimental to her security interests. Premier Zhou Enlai reportedly commented that America should retain military forces in Asia and in the Korean Peninsula in order to maintain a stable balance of power there. Of course, he was talking about the Soviet threat.

Since the systemic reforms and multidirectional opening in the late 1970s, China regarded maintaining peace and stability as the utmost priority of the Chinese government. Naturally, North Korea's confrontational strategy became increasingly incompatible with China's policy preferences. In January 1980, then the Foreign Minister Huang Hua commented in an internal speech that "it is unlikely that the two Koreas will be unified in the immediate future. Therefore, we, China, share with the United States and Japan the perspectives on the American forces stationed in South Korea. Maintaining

stability on the Korean Peninsula is central to sustaining stability in the region." This sort of statement is really different from what North Korea would say about the Korean Peninsula.

China's view of the Korea-U.S. alliance during the 1980s evolved in a more positive direction. China continued to assess that the presence of the alliance could be a contributing factor in coping with the growing Soviet threat in East Asia, at least up to the late 1980s. Compared to the previous periods, which is the '50s and '60s, Beijing's stance on the alliance became more nuanced and mediated. Two reasons account for these changes. For one, in the immediate aftermaths of the diplomatic normalization with the U.S. in 1979, China was not eager to pour cold water on warm relations with Washington by taking issue with the latter's alliances in Asia. Another reason is that China was at the time involved in a clandestine process of normalizing or improving relations with South Korea and was not willing to ruin the valuable opportunity by unnecessarily provoking Seoul.

From the early to mid-1990s, right after the long-awaited diplomatic normalization between Seoul and Beijing, China and South Korea had what I would call a period of honeymoon during which both Seoul and Beijing were highly willing to accommodate each other. And during this period, China did not make any -- did not take any issue with the Korea-America alliance. In fact, in 1992, during the diplomatic negotiations, negotiations for diplomatic normalization between Seoul and Beijing, we had three preliminary negotiations and one main negotiation, and China did not mention the phrase Korea-America alliance even once. That has not been on the agenda. And during this period, the early 1990s to mid-1990s, some Chinese viewed the Korea-America alliance as a mechanism of checking on the rise of Japan. And naturally, China's view of the Korea-America alliance of the early to mid-1990s was not yet under deep suspicion and high alertness.

Now, let me talk about Chinese views of the Korea-America alliance for the period of 1998 through 2007, which is in Korea called the Progressive Period during which President Kim Dae-jung and President Roh Moo-hyun ruled the country.

The decade of 1990s started with colossal changes as you all know, the demise of the Soviet Union and the collapse of Eastern Europe. I guess one unexpected outcome of such changes was bringing China up front in the face of the United States. With the sudden contraction of Russia's global tentacles, China's threat was prematurely trumpeted in certain circles in the U.S. and Japan. From 1997 onward, South Korean politics also went through radical changes. The progressive opposition party led by Kim Dae-jung took power for the first time and the Kim administration, which lasted from 1998 through 2003, pursued a dual-track strategy. That is to say, a strategy of engagement with China on one hand and the Sunshine Policy toward North Korea on the other, neither of which made the U.S. very happy at the time.

The Kim Dae-jung administration's decision not to participate in America's missile defense plan, the Sunshine Policy and the Inter-Korean Summit in June 2000,

which endorsed the Beijing version of the policy, which was independent and peaceful unification as opposed to the Washington version of peaceful reunification. In other words, the word "independent" was added.

A few months before the election of Roh Moo-hyun as president, South Korean media were literally flooded with reports and columns commemorating the 10th anniversary of diplomatic normalization with China. At about the same time, the South Korea-U.S. relations plummeted to a record low in the wake of anti-American demonstrations, ignited by the incident where two schoolgirls, Shim Mi-sun and Shin Hyo-sun, were overrun by a U.S. Army vehicle. So there was a sort of growing popularity of China in South Korea at the same time U.S. Korea relations hit bottom.

And I think the Roh administration, which lasted from 2003 to 2008, early 2008, had external strategies that were quite distinct. In other words, unconventional in the sense that they sought for some breathing space of their own by diversifying diplomatic leverage of South Korea and adjusting their alliance ties with the United States.

I think Beijing's awareness of these changes shaped China's mainstream view of the Korea-America alliance during this period. Let me say a few things. First, the Roh administration inherited the Sunshine Policy from the Kim Dae-jung administration without changes, thereby leading China to conclude that significant changes were taking place in the alliance with the United States. Second, in dealing with South Korea's traditional allies, the U.S. and Japan, the Roh administration underlined the need for independent diplomacy with self-esteem. That is to say policy differences were to be explicitly noted rather than concealed or unilaterally imposed. And improvements and adjustments were openly called for in changing the Korea-U.S. alliance.

And also, the geographical priority of the Roh Moo-hyun administration was placed on East Asia and Northeast Asia and multilateralism in Asia often at the exclusion of the United States. The novel concept of the Northeast Asian balancer *dongbu ga geunyoungja* was also interpreted by China as Seoul's proactive efforts to dilute America's influence over the region, which was therefore received rather positively by Beijing.

Seoul's negotiations with Washington since 2003 concerning what is called strategic flexibility, that is to say on what terms the U.S. forces may be deployed in and out of South Korea to cope with regional contingencies. This was indicative of the Roh administration's agony on maintaining good relations with both the U.S. and China. And China considered this South Korea's position on strategic flexibility as giving some thought -- serious thoughts to the Chinese position on this.

China's view of the Korea-U.S. alliance of this period was multiple. Let me say a couple of things. First of all, China paid very close attention to the key sources of discord embedded in the alliance. According to the Chinese publications, they referred to the sources of discord as cacophonies (*buhexie yindiao*), or layers of contradictions (*chencheng maodun*), or serious differences (*yanzhong chayi*). And actually, in 2005, a

very popular magazine published by the Chinese Foreign Ministry, which is called *Shijie Zhishi*, carried an article entitled "Does South Korea Still Need an Alliance with the United States?" A Chinese analyst even commented that Washington's efforts to disrupt South Korea-China relations was baffled by Seoul. Another Chinese analyst even went so far as to argue that the Korea-U.S. alliance with a 50-year history is now facing great challenges due to the China factor.

And also, many Chinese analysts predicted that in the long run strategic differences between Seoul and Washington are going to amplify to such an extent that the Korea-America alliance would eventually dissolve itself and South Korea would get out of the American orbit. That means it will get into the Chinese orbit.

It should be noted that during this period, many Chinese analysts chose to use the term *lianmeng* instead of *tongmeng* in describing the Korea-U.S. alliance. In Chinese language, these two terms are often synonymous and can be used interchangeably, but if you want to find out a difference between the two you could actually do it because some Chinese use the term *lianmeng* as a more loose and less military-oriented relationship while *tongmeng* is a much tighter and military-based relationship.

Of the 35 Chinese journal articles published on the Korea-America alliance during 2000 through 2011, which were continually analyzed in this paper, seven used the term *lianmeng* instead of *tongmeng*, and six out of the seven were published during the Roh Moo-hyun administration. So you can see how Chinese feel the changes in the Korea-America alliance during the Roh Moo-hyun administration.

However, China was unwilling or unable to see that the favorable views of China declined very fast in South Korea at around that time. South Korean perceptions of China made an about-face with 2004 as the watershed, and we all know why that was the case. Because in 2004, the Goguryeo controversy, the history controversy erupted and then Korean public opinions about China really began to go down.

So during the Roh administration, not only the Korea-U.S. alliance was undergoing serious challenges, actually, the seeds for growing concern with the rise of China were also planted. Seoul's rather unexpected decision to negotiate and reach an agreement on a FTA deal with Washington, not with Beijing, although the proposal was first made by Chinese for an FTA deal, but actually a deal was made with Washington first. And I think that is probably an indirect indication of South Korea's dualistic view regarding China during the later years of the Roh administration.

Now, let me move on to the Lee Myung-bak period, 2008 up to this year. The election of the Grand National Party's Lee Myung-bak, as new president in December 2007, put an end to a decade of progressive government in South Korea. And subsequently, not only was there a surge of new conservative elites, but the Lee administration's foreign policy priority was placed on the revival and consolidation of the Korea-U.S. alliance.

Then there came the two solemn tests for China-South Korea relations, 2010. As we all know, in March there was a Cheonan incident and in November there was a Yeonpyeongdo bombing. I think more serious from Seoul's viewpoint was China's stance on the Yeonpyeong shelling because the Yeonpyeong shelling, although the South Korean government made a technical mistake in putting the Cheonan and Yeonpyeong together in one basket, and I think that was a very serious mistake because the Yeonpyeong bombing was a completely different type of incident from the Cheonan because the Yeonpyeong bombing was the first ever attack by North Korea on land territory of South Korea since 1953. And I do not understand why that has to be dealt with in the same manner as the Cheonan incident.

And also, in the Cheonan incident, all the deceased were soldiers. Soldiers can die in a battle situation, but in the Yeonpyeongdo situation, two people who died were civilians. So I think the two incidents were very different. And I think China's position on the Yeonpyeong incident was a little different from that on Cheonan, and I think that really angered many South Koreans, which contributed to the further decline in South Korean views of China, which sort of contributed to the further consolidation of the Korea-America alliance, not only at the elite level but also in the public opinion level.

China's view of the Korea-U.S. alliance during this period of great reversal is multifaceted. I think since 2008, if you look at the Chinese publications on the theme, you can sense a sort of reawakening on the part of Chinese with regard to the Korea-America alliance. Candid reflections are easily identifiable on the fallacy of hastily generalizing the changes that occurred in the Korea-U.S. alliance during the Roh Moo-hyun administration.

Strategic flexibility again is the issue in which China has shown the most intense interest regarding the Korea-U.S. alliance. As far as the issue of strategic flexibility is concerned, now China appears much less optimistic than it used to be. Chinese analysts now think that even if a Sino-American military dispute should take place in the Taiwan Strait, Seoul would be unlikely, and probably unable, to stop American forces stationed in South Korea from being deployed there.

China has also very closely watched the issue of wartime operational control. As you all know, now South Korea has a peacetime operational control, and originally the wartime operational control was to be transferred back to South Korea in 2012, early 2012, but has been delayed for three years until December 2015. When the decision was announced to postpone the scheduled transfer for three more years, the Chinese government issued no formal statement; however, *Huanqiu Shibao* published a statement that the South Korean government proactively, *zhudong*, delayed a transfer of wartime operational control. But different opinions were expressed within South Korea.

Chinese analysts and policy experts have already begun to offer some specific recommendations as to what Seoul has to do, and some recommendations are rather surprising because they advise that Seoul must weaken her relationship with the United States as America is bound to decline and China will invariably hold the key to

resolving key regional issues, like North Korea's nuclear problem. Some of these open recommendations contain more radical and explicit policy advice, asking Beijing to strive hard, to weaken and dilute the Korea-America alliance, which may someday be used to encircle and contain China.

Other recommendations suggest China must be ready to take advantage of South Korea's growing economic dependence on China. Actually, this sent chills to South Korean intellectuals because in 2010, when China used the rare earth products as a weapon against Japan, South Koreans were also very much shocked. So this recommendation that China might be using -- might use this economic dependence on China as a weapon against South Korea, this was a very serious one.

And also, some recommendations argue that China should actively seek to strengthen regional multilateral cooperative ties, such as ASEAN Plus Three and Korea-Japan-China trilateral networks so as to upset the influence of the U.S. over South Korea.

So I guess China's view of the Korea-U.S. alliance over the past six decades can be summarized as follows. First, during the Cold War era, China's perception of the Korea-America alliance oscillated in accordance with Beijing's strategic calculus, vis-à-vis the Soviet Union and the United States.

Second, during the transition from the Cold War structure, China was similarly tolerant of the U.S.-Korea alliance as Beijing did not wish to jeopardize her newly burgeoning relationship with Washington, as well as with Seoul.

Third, during the post-9/11 era where Soviet threat disappeared and U.S.-China rivalry became a new characteristic of international politics, China's voice regarding the Korea-America alliance is becoming louder.

Fourth, while China was primarily concerned with the U.S.-Japan alliance for most of the period concerned, Beijing has become increasingly more sensitive to the Korea-U.S. alliance in recent years.

Fifth, domestic politics and policy reversals in South Korea were additional factors in shaping China's view of the alliance. That is to say the upcoming presidential election and who will become the president of South Korea will determine again China's view of the Korea-America alliance.

I'll stop there.

RICHARD BUSH: Thank you very much for a richly nuanced and illuminating presentation. We have about a half hour for questions. I have questions in mind but I'm not going to preempt all the brainpower here in this room, so I'll let you just field the questions. And if you need to know who somebody is, just say so. Who has the first questions?

DR. CHUNG: Bonnie?

QUESTION: Thanks Jae Ho. Very interesting set of remarks. My question is about how the Chinese view OPCON transfer, and I wasn't quite sure what you were saying by quoting *Huanqiu Shibao,* so I'm going to try and draw you out on that a little bit.

My sense from talking to the Chinese is that they have come to the understanding that one of the great uncertainties is that in some kind of, you know, instability scenario that South Korea might act, even though the United States might not want to. That in fact, you know, Seoul might want to go north and that the United States could be a restraining factor so that I have heard very explicit questions from Chinese officials as to whether the transfer of OPCON to South Korea would then have a limiting impact on the U.S. ability to restrain South Korea. So I'm wondering if you see it differently, what concerns you have heard from the Chinese in that regard.

DR. CHUNG: Well, I heard that from my own personal conversations with many China experts but it cannot be systematic. What I based my arguments on in this paper is on content analysis of 30-some articles. Those articles don't really talk about OPCON transfer because they consider it as something -- some business between the U.S. and South Korea. They don't want to talk about it. That's why there's no official statement from the foreign ministry or even in *Renmin Ribao*. But only one media report in *Huanqiu Shibao*. They say -- they just -- two lines, you know, South Korean government proactively -- I think this is where the emphasis should be placed. Proactively. You know, China, I mean, if I have to identify one lens with which China views other nations, I would say that it's sovereignty.

If you talk to people at the military academy in Beijing they will say it was supposed to be in the hands of Koreans, right? That's the reaction you get. So obviously, in private conversation they all welcome the transfer of wartime operational control back to South Korea because they think it might create some problems, troubles logistically and otherwise for the U.S., which will probably be they think is beneficial to China's security interests.

Gordon.

QUESTION: Thanks. Gordon Flake from the Mansfield Foundation.

It's a kind of article of faith here in town that the Chinese are concerned about or worried about closer Korea-Japan cooperation, you know, and that they are wary of, particularly in the military or defense realm, Korea and Japan working together. So if you look at the last six months, you know, the collapse of the GSOMIA, the military intelligence sharing agreement between South Korea and Japan, in the last month alone this rapid deterioration of Korea-Japan relations. How is that viewed in China? Is that viewed as a victory? A positive thing? I'm curious to your view.

DR. CHUNG: Yes. When the -- after President Lee Myung-bak paid a visit to Dokdo and then the Japanese government made an official complaints and so on, there was a 10-minute special on CCTV about the Korea-Japan relationship under strains or something like that. I think the Chinese basically welcomed the strained relationship between Korea and Japan. And actually August 31st -- August 31st, there was a big occasion at the People's Hall in Beijing, commemorating the 20th year anniversary of diplomatic normalization [with the Republic of Korea].

Before -- actually, originally we heard that Dai Bingguo would be the host for the occasion, but somehow it was changed and upgraded to Xi Jinping. And I don't know what is going on but, you know, everybody welcomed the upgrading of the Chinese host for the occasion. But I think things are becoming interesting after Korea-Japan relations became sour. So we'll see what happens.

Jonathan.

QUESTION: Jae Ho, thank you very much. I'm wondering if you could talk beyond the kind of the strategic logic, if you will, of this -- of the U.S-Korea alliance. Are there specific areas of U.S-China -- U.S.-ROK alliance collaboration, specific issue areas, let's say missile defense or some other area -- that you think from reading -- from your content analysis suggests a particular Chinese sensitivity to areas of collaboration? Or are there some that they seem more relaxed about?

DR. CHUNG: The most sensitive area I would say is strategic flexibility. As you all know, the first strategic dialogue between Korea and the U.S. – Ban Ki-moon and Condoleezza Rice in Washington, D.C. – they had the agreement but the agreement was very simply worded. South Korea was supposed to honor, respect America's need for strategic flexibility. America is supposed to respect South Korea's concern about strategic flexibility or American forces in Korea being deployed in a region -- in the region which South Korea does not want to be getting involved or something like that. Very simple. But no details actually.

But now I think the question that I get in Beijing is what happens if something happens in the South China Sea? Because when that agreement was made, actually, the agenda was about Taiwan. The Taiwan Strait. But now the South China Sea became so hot, people began to ask me what is going to happen, if something happens in the South China Sea. Of course, I don't think, you know, American forces stationed in Korea will be deployed back to Southeast Asia because we have very few Marines. So, but, you know, who knows? So strategic flexibility is the most sensitive issue area.

Yes, Michael.

QUESTION: I'd like to ask a slightly different question, and that is it strikes me in many other areas in many parts of the world, the Chinese understanding of the motivations of countries is very much something that arises from how Chinese think about the nature of politics as applied to the Chinese experience and so on. But South

Korea in a sense is part of, if you like the cultural world of China. How far do you think the Chinese have paid attention or understand the nature of the changes that have taken place in South Korea and society and South Korean politics? After all, I think you argue that a major turning point in South Korean views of China was the history issue.

Now, although it seems to be the Chinese have not said anything about this very much in public, I think privately they recognize that was a mistake and have not really emphasized that very much. But I'd like to hear your views on it.

DR. CHUNG: That's a tough question actually, but I think a lot of people take for granted that Korean culture is so similar to Chinese culture. I wonder whether that is one important myth because we are very Confucian, yes. But are Chinese still very Confucian? What happened in the last six decades? You know, I'm not quite sure. Maybe we take that for granted too easily, too casually.

The second one, actually my conversations with Chinese experts about East Asia or the Korean Peninsula, many of them actually acknowledge that they were too hasty in generalizing the changes that took place under the Roh Moo-hyun administration. They underestimated the solidarity of the Korea-America alliance and so on.

But I think one important point that I want to make is many Korean experts in China don't read Korean anymore. I think becoming quite similar to many Korean experts in the U.S. who only rely on the English materials and so on. And I think it's very strange. I think there is sort of a generational shift in Beijing. Of course, there are still a few Chinese experts on the Korean Peninsula who read and speak Korean, but I think overall the number is decreasing. Maybe that's sort of a side effect of China becoming a great power.

QUESTION: There is a serious negotiation going on between the United States and South Korea on missile range. Obviously, South Korea wants to expand missile range, but I wonder how China views this issue. How serious this issue is do you think?

DR. CHUNG: I was surprised that China offered an official position on this. I thought China always considered sort of missile development as a domain of sovereignty, but I think China is just -- I think this morning China offered a statement opposing the extension of missile range -- South Korea's missile range. I don't know what that really means. I can understand if Japan did that, but I don't quite understand whether that really indicates certain significant changes in China's policy on proliferation and missile developments or is it just applicable to Korea? I'm not quite sure.

Yes.

QUESTION: Claude Barfield, AEI. Has the Chinese government had any reaction, either in terms of pressure either in terms of quiet pressure or anything said publicly that I don't know about, about the decisions Korea will have to make in the next couple of years of the economic architecture? Should they join the Trans-Pacific

Partnership? Should they go forward first with either a bilateral or a trilateral agreement on China, Japan, and Korea?

DR. CHUNG: I didn't get the first part of your question.

QUESTION: Has there been any Chinese reaction or position, either publicly or privately, about Korea's decisions over the next couple of years, about the economic architecture, about whether they should -- the economic architecture. Whether they should join the Trans-Pacific Partnership which the United States is pushing, or go on to some intra-Asian, which would include a China-Japan-Korea or a Korea-Chinese FTA?

DR. CHUNG: China is not in a position to say anything about South Korea joining TPP or what. We are already in official negotiations with China on FTA. We are also in the process -- the simultaneous process of negotiating for Korea-Japan-China FTA deal. I'm not sure whether we all have, you know, human resources and attentions pan to do both successfully or not, and there is also the election circle -- I mean, cycle, whether the deal could be made before the election or it has to be delayed up until a new president comes in.

QUESTION: A deal, you mean a China-Korea FTA?

DR. CHUNG: Yes. See-Won?

QUESTION: There seems to be growing emphasis on economic reform and opening on China's approach to North Korea. And I'm wondering what are the prospects for Chinese and South Korean convergence on facilitating North Korea's reform and opening, especially if the new administration in South Korea favors engagement towards the North? And the prospects for this becoming a point of tension in the U.S.-South Korea alliance, especially with respect to the implications for denuclearization?

DR. CHUNG: I think we have experts in this room who know much more about denuclearization of North Korea than I do. Jonathan Pollack, for instance. Richard Bush. I am very pessimistic about what can really be done but, you know, let me answer your first question. I think South Korea would like to cooperate fully with China in opening up North Korea and helping in any way possible, but there was a very interesting report about Xiyang Group, which is a Chinese enterprise group which made a very huge investment in North Korea. And it got out of China and lost $50 million -- at least $50 million USD. And there was a media report yesterday, and that report quoted the spokesperson of the Xiyang Group as saying, "The Chinese government should not encourage Chinese enterprises to invest in North Korea." And I don't know what that really means for Sino-South Korean cooperation for North Korea. And I don't think it's a good sign but, you know, if we all agree that Chinese assistance to and Chinese investment in North Korea is a key to North Korea -- the success of a new North Korean regime, then I think it's really bad news. And some -- I mean, we already had a Kum Gang Mountain experiment, right? Some Korean and South Korean enterprises, including Hyundai, poured a lot of money into it but nothing is happening. They cannot even use the facilities there.

So that's other bad news.

Yes.

QUESTION: Li Nan from Brookings. So when I was in China there three hot topics that Chinese expert likes to talk about. The first one is who -- which one is taking the most military burden in this alliance and who will be taking most important issues in this alliance? And second is the anti-Americanism in South Korea and independent feeling in this area, in this country. And third is how much America will assist South Korea if the unification occurred? Or the regime has collapsed? So when you are in China, what do you think of Chinese experts' view on the vulnerability of this alliance?

DR. CHUNG: Well, burden sharing is a natural thing. I think South Korea will probably have to bear more burdens, particularly given the fact that the U.S. defense budget is going to be cut. So anti-Americanism, actually, if you compare South Korean public opinions of the U.S. and China in the last five or six years, actually, South Korean views of America are getting more favorable than South Korean views of China. And I think China made a very bad mistake by evoking this history of controversy in 2004. Since then, in 2004, this is really a watershed. After that, South Korea's views of China began to decline continuously up until today.

Third, unification. Well, the Chinese official position is to support unification only and only if the unification takes place in a peaceful manner based on the consensus between the two Koreas. But comparatively, historically, and logically speaking, that sort of unification rarely happens. Look at the Yemen case. They had the civil war again and divided, so what China supports is actually the least likely option. So, and whether China will support unification in a manner that is different from that position remains to be seen.

Richard.

QUESTION: This is a bit of an abstract question but I'm interested in the way Chinese scholars or others do their analysis of South Korea. And the question is I assume that they associate South Korean external policy, including the alliance, with certain interests. And do Chinese analysts see South Korea's interests as in some way fundamental? You know, maybe adjusted with changes in political leadership or changes in the external environment, but it's fairly immutable. Or do they see interest as just a function or an artifact of political changes or the external environment? I mean, if you view interest as fairly fundamental, then you may conclude that it may not be easy to split the alliance if that's what your goal is.

DR. CHUNG: I think during the 1990s, I think China viewed South Korea as an important partner and asset in itself because back then China didn't really have this strategic suspicion or strategic concern because they didn't really meet with the U.S. face-to-face. But after 2000, I think things began to change and they began to pay much more attention to the strategic ramifications of the Korea-U.S. alliance, which can be used as a

sort of means for encirclement and containment of China. So now I think they see South Korea not necessarily as an important actor in itself but as sort of an attachment to the alliance, attachment to the global and regional dynamics which is a part of the great power competition, U.S.-China rivalry, and so on, which is not necessarily good news from the South Korean point of view.

Yes, Gordon again.

QUESTION: Have you made any attempt to bifurcate public, you know, netizen, average person views of Korea versus government official positions? And I say this because there have been several things recently. You know, during the Olympics there were quite a few articles about how the Chinese public kind of viewed Korea as uppity and problematic and there was really -- they were rooting against Korea on a regular basis. There were polls done in South Korea that showed Chinese students who study in Korea tended to be more anti-Korean out of their experience. And so on a public level there seems to be a level of animosity there in China and among the netizens that may be a little bit different from official newspapers, official government positions, and I'm curious whether you've looked at that.

DR. CHUNG: That's right. I think there are two books. If you can read Chinese you should read these two. They were published by -- actually written by two scholars at CASS. Both are ladies, Wang Xiaoling and Dong Xiangrong – Dong Xiangrong is now in New York for one year. They have done extensive surveys. I'm sure not all of them were published in those two books but one is about South Korean attitudes towards China and the other book is about Chinese views of South Korea. And both books indicate that mutual perceptions are declining. So it's not just the South Korean view of China is declining according to the Chinese surveys, but also Chinese opinions, public opinions of South Korea are declining very fast. So this is a very important source of concern for both countries.

And I think the Chinese government has made continuous efforts to control these, which we cannot in South Korea, but in China they have certain means to control the media to a certain extent. At least in official media you don't really see that sort of outcry against South Koreans, but in terms of Internet, you can find easily very negative sentiments about South Korea.

David.

QUESTION: Just to follow up on that, can you explain a little bit the factors that you think are shaping this increasingly negative public view in China of Korea? What's the source of it?

DR. CHUNG: A couple of reasons. First of all, I think there are certain resentments among the Chinese that South Koreans have looked down upon Chinese because of the per capital income level and the overall quality of life and issues. Many South Korean travelers go to China, you know, maybe had some unpleasant encounters

and so on, which was reported in the Internet media. Recycled, popularized, creating very negative sentiments. And also, there is, well, I cannot substantiate with empirical indicators, but my hunch is that many Chinese tend to view South Korea or many Chinese perceptions of South Korea are affected by U.S-China relations. They do not necessarily see South Korea standing on the side of China but standing on the U.S. Therefore, if something happens in U.S.-China relations, their views of South Korea become very negative and so on. So corollary effect or some sort of -- have I answered your question?

Yes, Jonathan.

QUESTION: I'm wondering whether in a comparative sense, a relative sense, you could compare Chinese attitudes of the U.S.-Korea alliance with Chinese attitudes to the U.S.-Japan alliance. Now, admittedly, those are very -- they are different in scope and scale, although they are both very consequential for the American strategic position in Northeast Asia. Do you see qualitative differences here just given that Japan just looms as such a perpetually negative theme in Chinese public attitudes and historical connotations?

DR. CHUNG: I can say at least one thing. What is notable from the publications, articles in journals and so on, there is an increasing number of articles that compare the Korea-U.S. alliance and U.S.-Japan alliance, which is, you know, very rare let's say 10 years ago. And another sense I got is that the Chinese view of Korea-America alliance is becoming more -- they tend to view the Korea-U.S. alliance is more important than before. I'm not sure whether they are saying the Korea-U.S. alliance is more important than the Korea-Japan alliance, but actually, you know, they pay more attention to the Korea-U.S. alliance compared to the past, which is an interesting development.

DR. BUSH: I think we've run out of questions but you stimulated a lot and they were good questions. So thank you all. And please join me in thanking Jae Ho.

(Applause)

DR. BUSH: You actually worked very hard today. Now you can take a rest.

* * * * *