

THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION

THE OPPORTUNITY: NEXT STEPS IN REDUCING NUCLEAR ARMS

Washington, D.C.

Friday, October 19, 2012

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P R O C E E D I N G S

MR. INDYK: Welcome to Brookings Institution. I'm Martin Indyk, the director of the Foreign Policy Program at Brookings, and we're delighted to bring you this morning a discussion on arms control. This is a subject which has had little attention. I think it's probably fair to say no attention in the presidential debates. You never know what might come up in the foreign policy debate on Monday, but it is an issue of great import in terms of the national security of the United States, and also in terms, of course, of that burning question of how to deal with the fiscal cliff and the large proportion of defense spending which contributes to it.

Mike O'Hanlon and Steve Pifer have written a terrific book, *The Opportunity: Next Steps in Reducing Nuclear Arms*, which, of course, is available outside and we hope you'll all buy a copy and they'll be happy to sign them for you. They've written this book and we are publishing it now precisely because they feel that it is important to prepare the ground for what the next president will do when it comes to this issue of arms control. And in this handy book there's not only a very useful explanation of the issues involved but some very important recommendations for what the next president should do, written by two deep experts in this subject.

Steve Pifer has had decades of involvement in policy towards Russia, particularly on arms control issues. He's served as

deputy assistant secretary in the European Bureau of the State Department. He's been ambassador to the Ukraine. He's served in the National Security Council responsible for Eastern Europe in the Clinton Administration, and he has since then joined Brookings where he's a senior fellow in the Center on the U.S. and Europe and director of our Arms Control Initiative.

Mike O'Hanlon, his co-author, is a proliferator of books in his own right. (Laughter) But probably his favorite issues to write on are national security issues and he has in particular focused in a number of different ways on the issues that he and Steve have written about in this book, including his book, *A Skeptic's Guide to Nuclear Zero*, which we published two years ago. And his more recent book on how to cut the defense budget. Mike is a senior fellow in the 21st Century Arms Control Initiative here, and he's also the director of research for the whole Foreign Policy Program.

We thought that it would be very useful to put the discussion today in context, and there's no one better able to do that than our very own Strobe Talbott, the president of Brookings Institution. Strobe has had a long history of involvement in this issue, first as a senior journalist for Time Magazine where he reported on these issues and produced two important books that related directly to this, one which was called -- I'll find

it in a moment -- *End Game: Deadly Gambits*, of course, but he's also written the books, *Reagan and the Russians*; *Master of the Game*; *Reagan and Gorbachev*. Of course, *The Russia Hand*, about Bill Clinton's involvement in these issues and his relationship with the Russians, which Strobe had a firsthand role in as deputy secretary of state and President Clinton's point person for dealing with Russia. He, today, is involved not only in the work of our Arms Control Initiative, but he's also involved in a very interesting trek to his dialogue with Madeleine Albright and the Russian -- help me here, Steve.

MR. PIFER: Igor Ivanov.

MR. INDYK: Igor Ivanov. I was going to say Vladimir Ivanov. Igor Ivanov, which is a way to discuss these kinds of issues at a non-official level and generate new ideas for both the Russian and American policymakers that can then help to further the negotiations.

So we're going to start with Strobe putting it in context for us in terms of the long history of arms control between the United States and Russia, and then we're going to turn to Steve and Mike to lay out their analysis and recommendations.

Strobe.

MR. TALBOTT: Thanks very much, Martin. And thanks to all of you for joining in this discussion. I look out across the room and I

see not only a number of friends and colleagues, but some former sources of mine back when I was a journalist. So any number of you in this room will remember firsthand a couple of the points that I thought I would touch upon by way of historical set up for this terrific book that Steve and Mike have written. I've learned a lot from them in the years that we've been associated, and in the case of Steve, he was a tutor and strong right arm for me when I was in the State Department starting about 20 years ago.

I'm going to suggest that since we're all concentrated on the 50th anniversary of the Cuban Missile Crisis that we might just begin with a bit of a mind game and cast ourselves back to the 19th of October, 1962. Were we in that position? And particularly, if we were working in the White House for President Kennedy at the time, we would be three days into the president's knowledge that the missiles -- the soviet missiles had been put on Cuba. He got the word on the 16th. Today is the 19th. And it would be another three days before he would address the American people and the world.

So he had six days where the secret was a secret. And he and his advisors, the so-called Executive Committee, had a chance to deliberate on what they were going to do about this dire situation. And it's a sobering thought to imagine whether any president of the United States, were there to be a crisis of this nature now, would have six days to quietly

and secretly prepare the wisest possible response. In an era of leaks, 24 hour news cycles, not to mention vicious partisanship in this town.

So we're all sorry that that episode happened, but in some ways thank God it happened then rather than now.

Now, the issue of the threat posed by what the Soviets did was very clear to all of us at the time. I look around the room and I see some people with as little hair as I have and some people -- what hair I have is gray and there are some gray hairs. So a number of you remember this. It's not just a matter of history; it's a matter of biography.

I was 16 years old at a boarding school in Connecticut, and I can remember the headmaster calling the entire school into the chapel, and devout believers, agnostics, atheists, whatever we were, we were down on our knees praying that the planet would survive. And that was, I think, the widespread reaction around the world to the incident itself. It was plenty damn bad at the time. And from what we know in retrospect, including recently, it was even worse. For example, the National Security Archives have recently released some Soviet documents that show that even though we always think of this as a 13-day crisis, it actually lasted unbeknownst to us, longer than that. And the Soviets actually kept tactical nukes in Cuba in terms of the regular December.

Now, the good news in that was that the Soviet leader at the

time, Nikita Khrushchev was bound and determined that he was not going to leave those weapons on the island, even though he did everything he could to assuage Castro's anger over the concessions that the Soviets made but Khrushchev was not about to create a situation either where Castro would have anything whatsoever to do with the employment and deployment of those missiles. And he also took very seriously the threat of military action by the United States.

And that goes to, I think, a general point that we need to keep in mind about the history of the Cold War. And that is that on both sides there was at the top, despite the changes in leadership and the Kremlin, and the changes in leadership in the White House. There was always a fundamental belief that this was something new under the sun. This was a weapon so powerful that it rendered itself useless in any legitimate, political sense. In effect, nuclear weaponry turned the most famous maxim of Clausewitz on its head. Clausewitz, of course, famously said that war is the conduct of policy or politics by other means. In the nuclear age, it was just the reverse. Politics and policy had to be the conduct of war by other means and that's how we got the Cold War.

Joseph Stalin may have been a moral monster, but he wasn't stupid and he wasn't suicidal. And he made comments that have since come out, not public comments at the time but comments that have

reached a historical record that a nuclear war would be the end of humanity. His successor, Malenkov said much the same. Every United States president saw that very clearly.

So that was the backdrop, of course, of the doctrine that Bob McNamara -- I see Paul Ignatius here who worked with Bob McNamara -- famously called with deliberate irony "mad or mutual assured destruction." But there was an awareness on both sides that deterrents, mutual deterrents, mutual destruction as a kind of existential fact of life was not sufficient in order to keep the Cold War cold and prevent it from becoming hot. There also had to be regulation. And regulation meant arms control. And arms control, in turn, meant not just finding ways of assuring a degree of balance between the offensive arsenals of the two superpowers; it also meant over time reducing those arsenals in a way that would be stabilizing, that wouldn't increase the danger of a hair trigger attack, and it meant addressing the issue of a two nuclear party world becoming a multiparty nuclear world. That is to say proliferation of the bad kind as opposed to the good kind that Mike O'Hanlon commits with books. And the linkage between arms control, between the United States and the Soviet Union, was always explicit. And it was actually built into the nonproliferation treaty, which entered into force in 1970. And that was essentially a deal with the rest of the world that while the five countries

that had nuclear weapons at the time -- the Soviet Union, China, the United States, Britain and France -- could keep their nuclear arsenals and in exchange, they would be obligated to reduce those arsenals over time and eventually to eliminate them. I assume the issue of abolition and global zero will come up when Steve and Mike take over. And moreover, the nonnuclear world, which consisted of -- it was supposed to consist of every country on the planet except for the N5, would have the benefit of international help, including American help and developing peaceful uses of nuclear weaponry.

The other explicit component of the grand compact that was reached during that whole period was the linkage between reducing strategic offensive weapons and regulating -- not necessarily eliminating, but regulating strategic defenses on the theory that you had to have a degree of certainty that mutual assured destruction was still operative. And if one side went all out and had an anti-missile system, then the logic of that would break down and there would be more temptation for one party to try to strike first against another. And that, of course, was built into the SALT treaties signed by President Nixon and President Brezhnev. So keep that in mind because it relates to some of the observations and proposals that Mike and Steve have to offer.

The last couple of decades have seen a stalling out of this

whole process. And I think part of the reason for that is kind of perverse. It's because the Cold War is over. We don't wake up at 3 o'clock in the morning collectively and worry anywhere near as much about global thermonuclear Armageddon as we did when the Cold War was in full force. And that has meant that there is in a subtle for unfortunately very pervasive way a diminishment of the incentive for robust agreements, renewed agreements, and continuing the momentum and expansion of the global arms control and nonproliferation regime. And I think that's manifest in some things that have happened and some things that haven't happened. I'm thinking here particularly as one thing that did happen, and that was the Bush 43 administration's decision to pull out of the ABM treaty, which essentially broke the linkage between strategic offense and strategic defense that President Bush's very republican predecessor, Richard Nixon, had put in place. And it actually really goes back, I would say, to the Johnson administration when Johnson met with Kosygin in Glassboro and persuaded the Soviets with something that struck them as completely counterintuitive. And that is that defense can be a bad thing. It can be a destabilizing thing and that we were the ones who ended up pulling that leg out from under the chair.

There were, of course, some agreements during the last several years, the Treaty of Moscow, but that was really kind of a two

pager or a placeholder. And then there was the New Start Treaty under President Obama, but he wanted very much to follow that quickly with a New Start Treaty II and simply ran into a buzz saw in the Congress. And then another issue that doesn't get anywhere near the attention it does, but this, too, has an anniversary attached to it. This is the 13th year this month of the refusal of the United States Senate to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, which I think is nothing less than a national disgrace since we were the ones who came up with the idea of limits and ultimately a ban on nuclear testing and there's no sign on the horizon, and I didn't see great optimism on this score in Mike and Steve's book that that's going to change.

But that is all against the backdrop of proliferation.

Remember that magic number five. Well, the not-so-terrific number now is nine, because you've got the two South Asian nuclear powers. Martin and I just came back from South Asia and we heard a certain amount of discussion about this. We were in India, but we heard concerns in India about the fact that India, which of course itself set off nuclear weapons in May of 1999 -- I'm sorry, 1998. And on top of that, when the Pakistanis answered that test, they have roared ahead in the accumulation of nuclear weapons and either are now just about to pass the United Kingdom or have passed the United Kingdom, depending on which numbers you

believe, as now the fourth largest nuclear weapon state on the planet which, of course, is not a party to the NPT. And in addition to that, you have the unquestionably presumed nuclear weapons capacity of Israel and the demonstrated ability of the North Koreans at least to set off a bomb, if not yet to deliver one to target.

And then, of course, we have the issue of Iran, which I'm sure is going to come up here as well. And Martin and I sure heard a lot about that when we were in the general neighborhood of Iran over the last couple of weeks because the big danger there -- we're all conscious of the danger if there's military action against Iran, but if Iran does succeed in getting a nuclear weapon, it's "Jenny bar the door" throughout that whole region. You can easily tick off five countries that would probably acquire nuclear weapons and then there would probably be copycat-ism in other parts of the world, including in our own hemisphere. There are countries like Brazil and Argentina and Chile that have all at least contemplated, if not started, on nuclear weapons programs. South Korean, Taiwan. So the NPT is in dire danger.

And then on top of all that -- and this is the last piece of bad news before I get to the good news, which is these guys have the answers -- and that is that the Russians have now pulled out of the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Agreement. And just before getting into the

details of that, which I'm not going to do, they may, just think of that name. Cooperative threat reduction. If there is any enterprise that should be going on between two countries that have well over 90 percent of the nuclear weapons on the planet, it is cooperative threat reduction. And that's now, if the Russians have their way, a dead letter.

So with all of that, I turn it back to Martin and these two gentlemen will certainly edify you and I've read the book and they'll give us more reason for hope than my opening suggests.

MR. INDYK: Terrific. Thank you, Strobe. We'll come back to you, circle back to you later about prospects of negotiated agreement with Vladimir Putin and the next president.

But first of all, Steve, please give us a rundown of the issues that you see on the -- coming to the desk of the next president and yours and Mike's recommendations for how you should deal with them.

MR. PIFER: Well, part of the reason that we wrote this book was that we wanted to make sure that with everything that's going to be on the president's desk in January of 2013, that arms control doesn't get lost. And it's a tendency sometimes when you're fighting fires not to think about issues where a little bit of presidential time and effort can actually change things very much in terms of improving the U.S. national security. And we see several reasons to do this. I mean, you don't do arms control

for arms control sake; you do it because at the end of the day you believe it's going to leave the United States in a safer and more secure position. So reasons that we saw, even when New Start is fully implemented in 2018, Russia can still maintain up to 1,550 deployed strategic nuclear warheads. We think America is better off if that number can be brought down. Moreover, New Start only addresses deployed strategic warheads. It says nothing about nonstrategic weapons or reserve weapons. In fact, it only limits about 30 percent of the U.S. nuclear inventory. So we think that another agreement would be an opportunity to bring all of the weapons into the mix and reduce that number.

A second reason that we thought about this as in the U.S. interest would be cost savings. In the next several years, the U.S. has to make some very expensive decisions about how to modernize the legs of the strategic triad. For example, replacing the Trident submarine will cost, according to the navy, \$6 to \$7 billion a piece. And that doesn't count the cost of the missiles. It doesn't count the cost of the torpedoes. And if we can get another agreement with the Russians that brings the number down, we have to build fewer weapons in the future, so you can save a big chunk of money.

And then the third reason that we would argue that doing something more in terms of a U.S.-Russia agreement -- and what we're

looking at here is one more bilateral U.S.-Russia agreement. You might call it New START II for lack of a more creative name. But that would improve -- it would strengthen and bolster American credibility on the nonproliferation front. Now, that won't cause -- if we get another agreement with Moscow, that's not going to cause the leaders in Iran to wake up and say, okay, we're going to change our minds. But it does put the United States in a much better position to mobilize third countries to pressure and sanction countries like Iran because they see that we're doing what we're committed to do under the Nonproliferation Treaty, as Strobe mentioned, which is to reduce our nuclear weapons stockpiles.

So we have a set of recommendations really focused on what the next administration can do. And we took very much into account what would be possible. So left to our own devices, we might have come up with some more ambitious ideas on reducing nuclear weapons, but part of the factor here was what would the Russians accept in a next negotiation that would be a bilateral negotiation only? And our idea is that you do one more bilateral round and then probably you then have to get into at least some constraints, some limitations on third country forces. But briefly on the side, what we suggest is that the next negotiation seek not only to lower deployed strategic weapons but also bring in non-deployed strategic weapons and nonstrategic weapons. Basically, you

bring everything into the mix except those weapons that are in the queue for dismantlement. And the idea, we would suggest limited between 2,000 and 2,500 total weapons. That would be about a 50 percent reduction in the current U.S. stockpile. You would take the 1,550 limit in New Start on deployed strategic warheads and bring that down to 1,000 in our proposal. And that would cap the weapons that are of greatest concern to both sides because they're the most readily usable.

So this idea, by bringing everything under a single limit, has the advantage of providing a mechanism that would allow you to get at two areas where the sides are unequal. The Russians have a significant numerical advantage in nonstrategic or tactical nuclear weapons. The United States has a significant advantage in reserve weapons for strategic forces. The U.S. military is basically very conservative on this. As a technological hedge it keeps at least one strategic warhead in reserve for every one that's deployed. If you put them into a single limitation, you force both sides to reduce their advantages where at the end of the day the Russians might remain with a numerical advantage, but it would be significantly below what is now on the tactical side. And on non-deployed reserve strategic warheads, the United States might end up with an advantage but it would be significantly below what it is today. And so that's kind of an elegant way to create some bargaining between the

different classes of weapons.

So that's the proposal for, in essence, for going forward on reducing nuclear arms. We also think that you should do something in parallel on missile defense, bearing in mind what Strobe said about the interrelationship between offense and defense. And the Russians are very focused on this relationship, and the Russians do have a point. If American missile defenses continue to grow in number, if they get better in quality, at some point they could, in fact, undermine the strategic balance between the United States and Russia in terms of their strategic offensive forces. We don't think that's going to happen in the next 10 or 15 years. I mean, I think the Russians have a concern but it's more perhaps 20-25, what happens after that point.

So in order for missile defense to move forward in a cooperative way, the Russians have to make one hard decision and that is to drop their current requirement, which is in essence for a legal treaty regulating missile defense. That won't work, and in Moscow they know it won't work because of the fact that any treaty would have to be ratified by the U.S. Senate, and for a segment of Congress right now missile defense is almost a theological issue. It's sort of the counterpart to -- for some the counterpart is no new taxes; well, you don't limit missile defense. If the Russians can back away from that requirement for a legal agreement, I

think there's a possibility. NATO has already articulated language that could be in a political commitment about not targeting NATO missile defenses against Russian forces. And there's actually been quite a bit of discussions at the working level between the Pentagon and the Ministry of Defense as to what a cooperative missile defense system would look like if we could move past this Russian demand for a legal guarantee.

Transparency, joint exercises. They talked about two jointly managed centers where you would have NATO officers working side by side with Russian officers, one which would take data from both sides, combine it, and send the enhanced picture back to the two countries or back to the two sides. So you'd have a smarter picture about the missile defense environment. Another would be a planning and operations center which would discuss things about how the sides might interact more closely in terms of their missile defense arrangements.

And then we suggest on top of that, which is I think already pretty much there's quite a bit of convergence between Washington and Moscow, but some other ideas for transparency. One would be that the United States would provide the Russians every year, say on June 1st, a declaration that would take every major component of U.S. missile defenses and say this is the number now, and for each year looking out over 10 years, this is the number that we plan to have. And it could be

coupled with a commitment saying, you know, we will give you an advance notice if those numbers are going to change. So, the way I read congressional documents, it takes about two years from a decision to build a new standard SM3 missile interceptor, the time it actually appears in the force. So tell the Russians if that number is going to change you have 18 to 20 months notice. If you're talking about building a new ship with Aegis class capabilities, you're talking about seven or eight years notice. But you can give the Russians a fairly full picture against which they could evaluate and assess whether this really is a threat to their strategic forces.

And then there are a couple of other things that we would suggest, changes to NATO policy as it's now articulated. One is NATO right now says if we get into a cooperative engagement with the Russians, it will change no aspect of NATO's current missile defense plans. That's not something that's going to make this an encouraging effort to the Russians. So what we would suggest is change that and say NATO is preparing to consider adapting its plans provided that it does not degrade the ability of NATO missile defense to defend NATO territory. And I'll give you an example. Right now in phase three of the Missile Defense Plan for Europe, the U.S. plans to put 24 missile interceptors in Poland. The current plan base is on the Baltic Coast and very close to Kaliningrad. About a year ago I had a Russian think tanker suggest to me, well, what

about moving that down away from Kaliningrad because that's kind of a touchy thing for the Russians. Move that down to a Polish air base in southwest Poland. The current NATO position would be no, we're not going to make that change. My argument is, before you respond say, well, could you provide the same coverage for NATO countries -- the Baltic States and Norway from southwest Poland? And if the answer was yes, maybe you think about that change.

The last shift we would make is to make adaptive a part of the European phased adaptive approach. And the way to do that, the Russians are most concerned about what comes in phase four, the last four of America's Missile Defense Plan when interceptors will have some capability against ICBMs. And that's really a link to a projected evolution of the Iranian missile threat. Well, why not tell the Russians if it becomes clear that Iran is not making progress towards an ICBM, we may defer phase four and link that back there. And then perhaps create an extra incentive for the Russians to use whatever influence they may have in Tehran to try to persuade the Iranians not to go down that route.

So those are some of the ideas that we have on offense and defense.

MR. INDYK: Right. Mike, we all heard Steve say that the next agreement with Russia should go down to, I think it was 1,000

Russian strategic -- Russian-American strategic --

MR. PIFER: Two thousand, 2,500 total.

MR. INDYK: Why not go down much lower than that? Why not go down to zero?

MR. O'HANLON: Excellent question, Martin. If I could, let me also thank folks first on behalf of Steve and myself, you and Strobe, and that was really a masterful context. Thank you for explaining where we are in history and thinking back. I guess it was also in the Cuban missile crisis the exact same says of the week. Right? In other words, October 19th back then was a Friday. I think it was the day that Kennedy had his cold and had come back from the campaign trail with his "new illness" to consult. And Monday was the big speech, and that's going to be Monday again this year. So it's fascinating to think it through and track that. And I also want to thank all of our colleagues in the press and our research assistants and Gail Chalef and others who did so much to help us with the book. And Steve's daughter who had the idea for the design. And by the way, our press is amazing and they make this book look beautiful. And hopefully the ideas inside do at least partial justice to the appearance and the professionalism that went along with its production.

But let me now try to answer your question. And one reason why I would not want to go down a lot below 1,000 long-range strategic

warheads for the United States is I am concerned about not tempting our Chinese friends to get into a nuclear competition with us. Now, we have to worry about this from both directions. If we stay too high too long, and we are too blustery about our nuclear superiority, that could provoke a Chinese build-up. But on the other hand, if we go too low, that could also tempt them to want to compete in the big leagues with the nuclear superpowers. They certainly have the industrial capacity to build as many of almost anything as they want, and that would include nuclear weapons.

And so I think we want to find the sweet spot in the next round. And what Steve and I have tried to suggest is that if you go to 1,000 strategic warheads and then you cap tactical and surplus warheads as well, you're still in order of magnitude above these middle nuclear powers, and your aggregate arsenals are about 2,500 each for the U.S. or Russia. They're all in the 200 to 300 range. That's sort of a good next step. Then we try to ask these medium nuclear powers to make some kind of at least an associated political statement or political commitment not to expand their arsenals or at least not to expand them much. And that could be linked to the New START II Treaty. It wouldn't have to be an integral part of it. It wouldn't have to be formally inclusive of them, but it would be a useful way to begin the process, and where we may go in the conversation later today is, of course, the ultimate question of whether we

can aspire to a nuclear free world. And if you're going to get there, you obviously have to involve all the other powers in a process of control, monitoring, and reduction. And so we're thinking with this New START II Treaty, not just of stabilizing further and saving money in the U.S.-Russia competition, but bringing others in in a realistic way. And so whether or not that's the most realistic with the numbers that we've proposed I'm not sure. And I know my friend Ken Lieberthal and other China scholars at Brookings and elsewhere helped me think through the question of missile defense and how that's also on the Chinese minds. And we're going to have to worry about that as well, which is why the transparency concept that Steve developed on missile defense I think could be useful even beyond the Russian part of the equation.

But that's the basic answer to your question, Martin. It strikes us as a meaningful and big reduction, 50 percent, but still keeps us big enough that we are clearly in that realm with Russia of nuclear superpower and hopefully doesn't tempt people to over compete in this next phase.

MR. INDYK: Let me just get your reaction to something Strobe said about the full-on effort to get the CTBT past the Senate. And what's your view, your collective view about how to deal with that problem?

MR. O'HANLON: Well, thank you. I think it begins with talking about the substance of the issue, and the substance of the issue is that we have a nuclear arsenal today that our weapon scientists at Los Alamos and Lawrence Livermore and elsewhere believe is holding up very well, even though it's now also a 20 year anniversary of the last nuclear test by the United States. So another big -- we haven't tested a single nuclear weapon in 20 years. China hasn't tested since, I think, '96, and that was the last time, you know, we saw in France in the mid '90s were the last declared nuclear powers that tested. And then as Strobe knows very well, we saw tests in South Asia in the late '90s and then in North Korea in '06 and '09. But the United States is very confident in its arsenal without testing, and we believe our current warheads will hold up roughly a century. We're going to have to refurbish them. We have to replace nonnuclear components, do some other various things, but we're spending \$7-8 billion a year on a very scientific and science-based approach towards stockpile stewardship. And that is pleasing people, that it is providing a high degree of confidence even 13 years now after the first attempt to ratify CTBT. If anything, we're more confident that the arsenal is holding up and will continue to do so.

Also, even if there is doubt down the road, when we get to a point where all of our weapon scientists in a couple of decades will be

people who never had anything to do with nuclear tests their whole career. Even at that point, we understand nuclear physics well enough that we could envision building as a complement to the existing arsenal, a simple warhead. It would not be a new or modernized or highly capable warhead with new performance characteristics because that is very controversial and I think unnecessary, but it could be very robust to the point where we build in a little more redundancy, a little bit more in the way of insurance that the warhead will detonate properly. Our current arsenal is extremely optimized for high performance to maximize the yield for the weight of a given warhead. Just to give you an example, people tend to think you would need maybe 8 or 10 kilograms of plutonium to build a traditional bomb; I think our bombs, from the unclassified estimates that I've seen, have well under half that much. And the only way you get it to work is to have tritium boost the explosion. That has to be injected into the warhead at just the right instant.

It has to, you know, the physics of this have to be very elegant. And that gets people nervous as they get further and further down the path of the last test. But you could introduce, again, as a complement to the existing arsenal, a type of warhead that would not be quite so highly optimized for high performance but could still give several times the Hiroshima or Nagasaki yields. So there are a number of ways to

address this.

And then finally, the last -- there are a number of things to say on CTBT, but the last thing I'll say now is that we're very confident that we can monitor other countries' tests. And again, Strobe knows this from experience. We've seen it with the North Korean tests. The 2006 North Korean test was probably a fizzle. It was probably less than one kiloton. And just to remind you the Hiroshima and Naga bursts were in the 10 to 15 kiloton range. The North Korean test of '06 was under a kiloton from what we know, and yet we had no trouble figuring out they had tested. And so the ability of any country really almost anywhere on earth to get away with a militarily meaningful test is next to nothing. And that's one more reason for confidence this treaty makes sense for the United States. I think you have to begin with that discussion before you get to the politics of ratification, but you also have to consider the latter.

I don't know how Strobe feels about this. I think it would be even -- the worst thing would be to try to ratify it again and fail for a second time. So Steve and I suggest that before you really go all out to try to get the Senate to approve this with a two-thirds vote that you actually, you know, have the conversation at a more informal level with members of Congress on the substance of the question, and then see if you're anywhere close, if you're at 60 votes plus as a going in position.

And if you are, maybe you go for it. And if you're not, you back off.

MR. TALBOTT: Could I just jump in with a historical point there? In the spirit of nonpartisanship of this platform and this institution, it was a big screw up on the part of the administration that I was part of, Steve was part of but he has the excuse of --

MR. PIFER: I was in Ukraine then.

MR. TALBOTT: What happened 13 years ago this month in the Senate, obviously represented a victory by largely republicans in the Senate but it sure wasn't handled well by the people responsible for counting votes in advance on the part of those advocates of ratification.

MR. INDYK: That brings me to -- just one second, but just a follow-up question, which is sequencing here. If you're going to do a New START II Treaty and get that ratified, isn't the Senate going to be exhausted by that? How do you get the CTBT process underway? Or is it a good time to then go for it?

MR. O'HANLON: Yeah. My quick reaction, and then I look forward to Steve's as well, is I think you need to have the CTBT conversation starting early, but it's going to take a while because there are a number of intense and difficult technical issues. So I think you view this as something you begin to explore as a high priority informal topic of conversation.

MR. INDYK: Even while you're negotiating the New START II Treaty?

MR. O'HANLON: Yeah. Because I think this arms control package holds together -- holds together best when it's viewed as a package, probably for the reason Steve said, that it gives you more negotiating opportunity with the Russians because there are some areas we recommend giving a little more. Some areas we recommend asking a little more. And this would sort of fit in with that philosophy.

MR. PIFER: If you're looking at a New START II negotiation, that's probably even in the best of circumstances two to three years. So you would have time if you had the sense that CTBT was worth doing, to go first.

I'll just make one other observation.

MR. INDYK: To go first?

MR. PIFER: To ratify CTBT.

MR. INDYK: Ratify first?

MR. PIFER: Because the New START II Treaty, in the best of possible worlds, would not be ready for two to three years.

MR. INDYK: Sorry, go ahead.

MR. PIFER: On the CTBT point, because actually I was at the Brookings program at the University of Nevada-Las Vegas last week

and last Thursday got to spend the day visiting what was the old Nevada test site, now the Nevada national security site, and it brought back -- another reason why I think CTBT ought to appeal actually to Senate Republicans. And back in 1988 we did at Nevada and at Semipalatinsk, the Soviet test site, was called the Joint Verification Experiment. And the first thing to remember is the United States has conducted more nuclear tests than anybody else combined. But also the question is how much we learned from them. And in any case, before we did the Joint Verification Experiment in Semipalatinsk, I took a group of about 20 from the Department of Energy Los Alamos and Nevada out to the Soviet site and we were having an orientation tour and the Soviets took us out and they showed us this is a vertical shaft that we drilled for our next nuclear test. And it was a hole about maybe about three feet in diameter and you could look down in the darkness. And one of the guys from Nevada, one of our drillers in his cowboy boots and his parka because it was pretty cold, it was February, says, "Boy, are these guys going to be surprised when they get to Nevada." And I say, "Why?" And he goes, "Because typically we drill our vertical shafts 10 to 12 feet in diameter." And I said, "Why would you do that?" I mean, the weapons aren't that big. They're designed to be small. And he goes, "No, but that gives you more area to hang instruments." And as we explained here last week, there is that

nanosecond to collect data before the instruments themselves are vaporized. So not only did we do more tests, we got more information. I mean, we have a huge lead over everybody else in the world in terms of nuclear tests, nuclear effects, why would we not want to freeze that and maintain that area of advantage?

MR. INDYK: I think you've just proved that what -- an idea that starts in Las Vegas doesn't stay in Las Vegas. (Laughter)

Strobe, come back to the question of how viable is this in terms of your understanding of Putin's priorities and his relationship with the United States.

MR. TALBOTT: I think that the phenomenon of Putinism, a phrase by the way that is featured in one of our colleagues -- two colleagues' books that's just about to come out -- Fiona Hill and Cliff Gaddy have written a terrific book called *Mr. Putin*, which is actually a particularly good title as those of you who read the book will see -- is that Putinism is largely about demonstrating that Russia doesn't need to accommodate the West anywhere near as much as it did particularly during the latter days of the Gorbachev period and throughout the '90s under Yeltsin. It can stand on its own and it faces a strategic threat from the West. You put all that together and it means that it's going to be a steeper uphill climb to make progress, but I think it can still be made for a

couple of reasons, but also a couple of conditions. One is the Russians know that they are -- and I would be interested if you guys would agree with this -- at almost a structural or permanent disadvantage, vis-à-vis the U.S., technologically and otherwise. And therefore, having a bilateral regime that sets rules for both sides assuming, of course, that means that there are actual constraints on the United States is something that they would welcome. Also, if Mr. Putin is the grand strategist that he would like us to believe that he is, he certainly ought to be looking, maybe not 360 degrees, but he should be looking south at the prospect of an increasingly nuclearized soft underbelly of the Russian Federation, and he should sure be looking east at China.

This is stepping back a little bit and I hope not over answering the question, but of all the situations on the earth today that are tailor-made for a true strategic rivalry, it's between territorially the largest country on the planet, which is resource rich and people poor, particularly in the far east, and the most populous country in the world today, which is China, which is people rich and resource poor, and a nuclear power. And I would think that would give thoughtful Russians -- and Putin is not stupid -- to think about what they would insist be a more equitable continuation of the arms control regime but nonetheless to put one in place.

Now, just one last thing though. There has got to be at least

as much of an accommodation to the Russian insistence on linkage between strategic offensive reductions, further strategic offensive reductions, and the principle of constraining strategic defense. And as I said earlier, that's because they have learned so well a lesson that we taught them and then have forgotten ourselves. So I think where Steve and Mike come out in their book is kind of a de minimis that would have to be there for the process to continue.

MR. INDYK: But it's a very creative de minimis in terms of their suggestions.

Let's go back to the American side and the political scene here if it's doable on the Russian side. Clearly, President Obama is committed to arms control and doing what he can to promote disarmament. It's been a high priority in his first term. I think we can assume it'll be a high priority in his second term.

What we know, if anything on this front about what a President Romney would do, and a related question is is what's interesting in a period in which Washington has been deeply polarized on domestic issues, it was nevertheless possible to get two-thirds vote for ratification of this New Start Treaty in the last administration. So what are the prospects that you could actually get this through a new Senate in the next three, four years?

MR. PIFER: Well, let me start with where Governor Romney may be if he's elected on November 6. His campaign literature actually has not said a lot about nuclear arms control, which I don't think is a big surprise because the focus on this campaign is domestic issues and the economy. But certainly back in 2010, he was a very harsh critic of the New Start Treaty. At one point he called it "Obama's worst foreign policy mistake." And if you look at the people that are on his foreign policy team, there are a lot of people who served in the previous administration, and I think it's pretty clear that the George W. Bush administration approach on nuclear arms control was a preference to have flexibility on the U.S. side as opposed to limitations on and predictability about the Russian side.

Now, having said that, I think there -- and maybe I'm an embittered optimist, but there are a couple of reasons why I think a Romney administration might have to think about arms control. One is there will be the same budget realities that he'll face that Obama will face if reelected. And the question becomes do you spend a lot more money on strategic forces as opposed to those sorts of weapon systems that the military is much more likely to need?

The second consideration is one of alliance management. Right now in Chicago at the summit of NATO in May, NATO agreed to a nuclear posture, approved deterrence posture review, in which case a

number of NATO allies, who I think would like to see American nuclear weapons come out of Europe, accepted that posture. But a key element of that is that there will be an effort to engage Russia on transparency, confidence-building measures, and reductions of nonstrategic weapons. So there has to be some dialogue. And I think the risk if Washington chooses not to pursue that dialogue is does that NATO consensus come undone?

There's a really good antecedent for this. Back in 1981, when Ronald Reagan became president, you know, having an arms control negotiation with the Soviets was not high on his list. Within 8 months, 10 months, he had a delegation in Geneva negotiating on medium-range missiles because the European said, you know, we have a two-track decision. We're going to modernize and deploy new missiles in Europe and we're going to negotiate. And I said, "If you want to have that deployment track work, you've got to have a negotiation." And the same dynamic may apply on missile defense where there is a supportive consensus in NATO now for American missile defense plans, but it's also premised on the idea that the United States and NATO would try to engage Russia in a cooperative effort. So there may be some small rays of light on the arms control side in that case.

MR. TALBOTT: Do you want to comment about the Senate?

MR. O'HANLON: Yeah, just to add one point, which is that I think that, in fact, there is a good prospect for Senate ratification of a New START II Treaty, especially if we make very clear those of us who favor this treaty and are also intrigued by the idea of a nuclear-free world, that you can do one without the other. In other words, this treaty is a good thing for the United States even if you are highly skeptical about the prospects for a nuclear-free planet because most of what it does saves us money, tries to limit the possibility for not only U.S.-Russian but U.S.-Chinese future nuclear competition, tries to strengthen our hand on the nonproliferation agenda that Strobe alluded to, recognizes that we are legally and otherwise committed to a nuclear-free world, at least as a goal, and so we should at least do things to give us more information to see if it could ever be possible. And finally, this would begin to develop methods for verifying the location of warheads, not just big missiles and airplanes. And as Strobe pointed out, we're seeing a little bit of slip back on the cooperative threat reduction effort with Russia, apparently, and we need a way to reinvigorate the agenda of controlling nuclear warheads and materials and doing a better job of that because that's the scarier thing over all around the world is small warheads or fissile material getting out as opposed to, you know, SS18s being transferred across state lines or somehow lost track of.

And so I think for a lot of very traditional and pragmatic national security reasons, a New START II Treaty makes sense. And, you know, I'd finish by saying let's keep Sam Nunn's nice image in mind. We want to get to a base camp climbing the mountain where we can see if the summit of a nuclear-free world is even obtainable. Right now we have no way of even knowing. So let's agree not to have that -- we can start that debate as we have already, but let's not pretend we are in a position to resolve it but let's still move to this next step and use the next step of arms control to get us more information that will help inform the debate about whether a nuclear-free planet is ever obtainable.

MR. INDYK: Okay, great. We're going to go to your questions now. Please wait for the microphone, identify yourself, and please make sure there's a question mark after your statement.

MR. THIELMANN: Greg Thielmann, Arms Control Association.

We' had now several data exchanges under the New Start Treaty and the pattern emerging seems pretty clear; the Russians have already gone below the New Start limits of operationally deployed warheads. The United States is creeping down very slowly, well above the New Start limits, giving the appearance it's going to wait a full seven years to get down to the limits. Isn't this an opportunity for the U.S. to, by

executive action under a ratified arms control agreement, to move quickly to the New Start limits and indeed, even go beyond in the knowledge that the Russians, most people believe, are going to go several hundred deployed warheads below New Start before they could go back up again?

MR. PIFER: I think it would certainly be possible to accelerate -- New Start has three limits -- 1,550 on deployed strategic warheads, 700 deployed strategic lorry vehicles, and then 800 deployed and non-deployed launchers and bombers. The latter two I think may be hard to do quickly because of cost considerations. So, for example, under the Navy plan, every Navy submarine by 2018 will have four of its launchers converted so it cannot launch a ballistic missile. The Navy would like to do that as much as possible as submarines go in for their regular overhaul periods. That doesn't mean you couldn't accelerate it, but it would have some cost implications and it might have some operational considerations.

The one thing I think that you could do fairly quickly would be to achieve accelerated implementation of the 1,550 warhead limit. You could just take warheads off missiles, and you could then declare when a Russian inspection team shows up at an ICBN base, you could give them a declaration. You can say these missiles here, they have zero warheads. And the Russians, using the New Start verification revisions, say I want to

go to the silo Kilo 7. Show me that there are no warheads there. So I think that could be done fairly quickly.

And I think it's an idea that -- let's see what happens in 2013. My sense is it's one of those ideas that perhaps the administration didn't think about in the context of a political campaign because there is, I think, a certain maybe a timid approach towards arms control right now on the part of the administration because they don't want to create an issue that they think could be turned against them. But perhaps if the president is reelected, this might be something that they could look to that where we could bring the number of warheads down to 1,550 much earlier than the 2018 requirement in the treaty.

MR. TALBOTT: Could I just add an ancillary point that may have some bearing, and that is that U.S.-Russian strategic relations and negotiations always exist in a broader context of what's going on globally. And even when linkage is denied it's always there. The U.S. and Russia are not in harmony, to put it mildly, over Iran and Syria. If in the next administration -- and I think this could apply whatever the outcome on election day -- there were to be some progress, at least in closing the gap between the United States and Russia on those two issues where I think there's a lot more commonality of actual interest than there is commonality of approach at the moment, that could create an atmosphere in which it

might be possible to restart, as if were, the arms control process.

MR. INDYK: Yes.

MR. ISAACS: John Isaacs, counsel for Leboro.

Question for Mike. One of the reasons you gave for not reducing nuclear weapons any further in Start II is because of the fear the Chinese might build up, "join the big leagues" was your term. Up to now the Chinese have been pretty cautious in not building a huge network of nuclear weapons. They might have 25 or 50 that can hit the U.S., and we have many more that could hit them. But if they decide to build up 200, 500, 800, who cares? What difference does it make to American security? It's a waste of money for them but what impact? Politically there's an impact, but substantively, in terms of U.S. security, what's the impact?

MR. O'HANLON: Thanks for the question, John. And I say this in full awareness that my good friend and co-author Ken Lieberthal is here and probably should be answering the question. But the way I would put it is that I would rather not see any faster changes in the U.S.-China military balance than are otherwise happening and necessary anyway because what we see is the United States and China are trying to, I think, for the most part, work together to manage China's rise and their competition within certain bounds. But obviously, both sides have their own national interests they're pursuing, too. So the Chinese are trying to

be a little more assertive and influential in the broader Asia Pacific. To my mind, they do it generally in a fairly restrained way by the standards of great powers in history, but they're obviously interested in having a little bit more impact on the region than they've had in the past, and protecting their territory more effectively than they were sometimes able to in the past. And that's focused most of the attention of military planners like myself on their conventional force build-up and, you know, China scholars and others are watching these things very carefully as well, but we shouldn't forget to think about the nuclear weapon side of things. And we know that every so often there is a reference by one American or Chinese strategist or another to how the U.S. and Chinese nuclear balance could affect the Taiwan issue. At the moment, the Taiwan issue is pretty calm because the Taiwan president, President Ma, isn't interested, it would appear, in rocking the boat the way his two predecessors did. And pursuing more in the way of autonomy or even any movement towards possible independence and provoking confrontation with China. But I'm not sure we should assume that's a given forever. So I'd rather keep the U.S.-China military competition somewhat restrained and try to avoid anymore disruption that emboldens one side or another than necessary.

So I think it's actually good, for one thing, if we try not to invoke the nuclear balance from our point of view when we talk about

Taiwan. We don't want to make the Chinese feel like we're really threatening them because we've done it in the past and they remember and resent that. On the other hand, we don't necessarily want to see the Chinese equal with us in a nuclear sense to the point where they believe that a nuclear trump card or a nuclear threat could actually help them in a future Taiwan crisis. So I'm interested in gradual change on that issue and trying to keep the nuclear piece of the equation as separate and as muted as possible as we think about the other ways in which we're interacting with the Chinese in the Western Pacific. But a rapid Chinese rise in nuclear capability would run the risk of emboldening some Chinese hardliners that in fact they might have a trump card they didn't have before. That's my concern.

But I think also the broader issue is that it's not going to be good for the general effort towards reducing nuclear proliferation, containing arsenals in general. We have a chapter in the book on pursuing a fissile material cutoff treaty, which again is a hard one to imagine pursuing. And I know you're very familiar with that issue, but if the Chinese decide to add to their arsenal by several hundred warheads, it's going to be hard to persuade the rest of the world to stop enriching uranium or reprocessing plutonium to be able to make more weapons. So we're interested as well in seeing the global trend be towards smaller

arsenals everywhere.

MR. TALBOTT: You might just say a word about the karam (?) effect it could have on South Asia if China builds up that much because we know what the Chinese -- I mean, the Indian reaction will be, which of course will play off of the Pakistani reaction to that.

MR. O'HANLON: Actually, if you -- can I turn it to you? Because I agree that would probably make the Indians at least want to stay within sort of sight of China's arsenal size, but you can, I think, explain it better.

MR. TALBOTT: Well, not better but on the basis of having just been there with Martin, the Indians profess to have a focus on China as the regional power with which they have to balance efforts at cooperation with very real competition, and they clearly see China, or they want to be seen as regarding China as the number one potential strategic threat that they face. But there is a degree not so much of self-delusion as trying to delude the rest of us if I can put it that way because the fact of the matter is there's a much higher danger of war and indeed nuclear war between India and Pakistan. They came to the brink of nuclear war during the Cargill crisis in July of 1999. And that can happen particularly given the deterioration of the integrity, if I can put it that way, of the Pakistani state and combined with the accumulation of their nuclear arsenal.

So if you have China providing either a pretext or an imperative for India to build up its nuclear deterrent against China, it will not be read as a deterrence against China in Islamabad and Rawalpindi, and that's one of the many ways we could be off to the races in the worst possible way in that region of the world.

MR. INDYK: Thank you. Yes, please. Over on the corner here. Just pass the microphone.

SPEAKER: Alex (inaudible) Service.

You mention problems between Russia and China, more resources, less population; more population, less resources. Can you imagine Russia relying on their own nuclear arsenal to keep China at bay right now is a widespread opinion in Moscow at least. Can you imagine the possibility of nuclear crisis between China and Russia in the future? Thank you.

MR. PIFER: Yes. For the -- but not in the immediate -- I don't want to be glib. But referring to my comment earlier, I think down the road there is a lot of danger just built into the combination of geopolitics, geo-economics, and the distribution of population. And the Russians at one point, and I don't know frankly what the state of this is, when they were fixated on the perceived threat from the West, particularly with the expansion of NATO, they were actually thickening their military

cooperation relationship with China, including, and maybe, Steve, you know something about this, how far it went, even sharing MERV technology with the Chinese, which struck me when I heard about it as a possibility as highly counterproductive, which is a Washington euphemism for stupid given the scenarios for the future. But it's a distant future and let's hope it always remains in the distant future.

MR. INDYK: Did you want to comment on this?

MR. TALBOTT: I think the Russians may actually be getting a bit more cautious about weapon sales to China. I think one thing that they've learned is that the Chinese are very good about buying something from Russia and reverse engineering it. So I thought it was quite --

MR. PIFER: Russians are pretty good at that for a long time.

MR. TALBOTT: That, too. Yeah, well, then maybe the Chinese may have learned that from Russia. But I thought it was interesting about two years ago the Russians were marketing -- and I forget which variant of the MIG it was, and there was a variant for India and there was a variant for China. The variant that they were sending to China had significantly less technology because of the Russian experience with Chinese then taking that technology and then saying, "Thank you. We don't need to buy anymore. We can produce our own."

MR. INDYK: These questions, you know, raise a useful

consideration, which is China's rise is affecting the calculations of all of the other players, including our own calculations. Your recommendation is that we look at moving beyond the U.S.-Russian negotiation, essentially after the New Start Treaty. But as you explained this morning, the New Start Treaty is three to four years in the negotiation. And we can anticipate that China's rise is going to be roiling the strategic waters during that period. Shouldn't there be greater urgency to the idea of bringing other players into this kind of strategic arms discussion?

MR. O'HANLON: I'll take a quick stab. And again, maybe I can invite Ken if he wants to add anything or maybe we can get you involved in this if you ask a question or make a comment later, but whenever I talk to Chinese scholars and friends about this, they tend to say you guys are so far ahead of us still that we're not interested really in this conversation just yet in any way that's going to put a restraint on us. And I think it's ambitious to hope that they would even make a political statement capping their current arsenal size once we do have a treaty cutting U.S. and Russian arsenals by another 50 percent. That would be, I think, from what I understand, from the people I've spoken to on this issue in China, a minimal requirement for us to have any ability to even ask them with a straight face to join in this process in a modest way. That's my impression.

MR. TALBOTT: Could you just say a word about our allies, the U.K. and the French?

MR. O'HANLON: You're probably more familiar.

MR. PIFER: I think the British are already -- I mean, first of all, the British have been reducing the number of their strategic warheads over the last eight or nine years just on their own, and they've already said as a matter of policy that at some point they would be prepared to join the nuclear reductions process if it expanded beyond the United States and Russia. The French are probably going to be more difficult on that question. In fact, I think it's not clear who would be the most difficult, the French or the Chinese to get into that.

MR. INDYK: Is there a question up the back? Yes, please. Yes.

MR. McDONALD: Bruce McDonald, the U.S. Institute of Peace.

Steve, I agreed completely with your comment and your thrust about what we're trying to get the Russians to agree to in terms of missile defense for any subsequent negotiations, but I'm worried. Aren't we -- with making that argument, well, you know, you don't have to worry. You'll have plenty of time and it's not really a problem. We don't have that many interceptors. Couldn't the Russians just turn right around and say,

well, why don't you agree to a limit on missile defense interceptors higher than you know you're going to go within a certain period of time and what's the matter with that? And related to that, of course, is the question of the fact that as you go down further and further, even a static level of missile defense interceptors incrementally becomes more effective. How do you deal with that potential sort of judo response to our at least seemingly very reasonable request?

MR. PIFER: Now, Bruce, that's a really good question. We do talk about -- we make mention that it would be possible. I don't think it would be particularly hard to come up with a treaty of 10 years duration. I think it would have to be a finite duration that would allow each side say 125 interceptors capable of accepting ICBMs. I think that number would allow us to deploy the number of ground-based interceptors that we have in Alaska and California and even the 10 or 15 more that we might do, and it would allow us to deploy as many of the standard SM3 block 2B in phase 4 as we possibly could do by 2022. That number would give assurance to the Russians that there is no threat to their ICBM force or their SOBM force, and it would allow us to do everything that I think we see having to do in the next 10 years to cope with either North Korea or Iran. That treaty would be dead on arrival in the Senate. And that's the problem.

Now, we do talk about in the book, I mean, there will be a crunch point. I mean, if you have a president 10-12 years down the road who wants to reduce nuclear forces further, either because he sees zero as a goal or he wants to move in that direction perhaps not being sure whether or not zero can be achieved, there will be a point where we think that president's going to be given a choice, and that choice is going to be, sir, you can reduce the forces further and get the Russians to go along but the price is going to be a binding legal treaty that limits missile defenses. And that's going to be a hard choice. But our argument is that's a hard choice for 10 or 15 years down the road. You don't have to make it now.

And I think our editorial comment would be that in thinking about that choice down the road, our lean would be towards achieving further nuclear reductions in part because if you look over the last 40 years, missile defenses have never been as effective as promised. And there's, I think, a big question about whether we have the technical capability and the resources to build the kind of missile defense that I think some in Congress want. I think it would break the bank and it simply would not work.

MR. INDYK: Okay. Up in the front here.

SPEAKER: (Inaudible) from the Embassy of Spain.

If we ask the Russians to engage in negotiations on tactical

nuclear weapons -- and I say "we" since it was already mentioned this is also a NATO issue -- they are very probably going to ask us to negotiate this together with conventional forces in Europe. They have many times referred to -- they offer new architecture of security in Europe. This will make certainly the negotiating framework more complex and I would like to have your opinion on this, how you see this.

MR. INDYK: Steve?

MR. PIFER: Well, one of the reasons again why we suggest lumping or putting all nuclear weapons together is because that, I think, would give American negotiators some negotiating leverage because they could offer to constrain the American advantage in reserved strategic warheads. But you are right. I mean, the Russians, they've learned a lot of things from us. And in the 1960s and the 1970s, NATO policy was we're not going to match the Soviet Union tank for tank, artillery piece for artillery piece. We'll rely on nuclear weapons. And the Russians have now flipped that around. So certainly, progress on the conventional arms control side would be useful. I think it's going to be hard to achieve in part because you have issues such as how do you deal with self-fulfilling prophecy and aphasia in a future arms control arrangement? And the irony is that while you have that issue sort of blocking an arrangement on conventional arms, if you look at where NATO is going on conventional forces, it's

consistently downward.

I think you could take the adapted CFE Treaty limits, probably cut them by about 40 percent, and it really wouldn't impact many NATO countries. The best example I can throw out is under the adapted CFE Treaty, the United States is allowed 1,800 main battle tanks in Europe. The current number is about 95. And I think there's a chance it goes to zero in about two years as we modernize the striker battalions. So I think you're right. I think though getting a conversational agreement is going to be awfully hard to the extent that we could perhaps try to delink the two. That would serve the cause of progress on nuclear arms control.

MR. INDYK: Okay. Over here, please.

SPEAKER: (Inaudible) from Economy Endowment.

I'm interested in the number of (inaudible) warheads.

Another way to think about the number that is nuclear targeting, that is how many nuclear targets are assumed in the U.S. nuclear war planning? For example, the United States assumes 100 nuclear targets, nuclear war planning, and the 200 nuclear warheads are needed for (inaudible). There you actually would have 800 actual warheads. And this would send some, you know, wrong signals to other countries. Now, other countries would not know that only 200 nuclear warheads are used for nuclear targeting, and not 800 -- not just for the purpose to deter Chinese nuclear build-up.

It's still hard to explain that to other countries. Other countries may feel, you know, to be certain by this, 800 nuclear warheads. So I wonder if you have some discussions on that, on how to match the (inaudible) nuclear warhead and number of nuclear targets. Thank you.

MR. INDYK: Mike.

MR. O'HANLON: Thanks for your question. I'm a big fan of your work, by the way. Thanks for being here today.

One partial answer of how I would think about this -- and we have it in the book also as a way also to save money -- is to actually, whatever American arsenal is allowed under New START II, let's say 1,000 warheads, to have more of it being the bomber force than currently envisioned. Now, those of us who grew up reading all the literature on how to make your force reliable and dependable and capable at a second strike, you know, we all were taught that single warhead missiles tended to be the best thing because they were fast and they could get through defenses if there were any, and they weren't MERV -- I mean, the MERVing raises a second problem but if you avoid the MERVing, you still -- you have sort of the most stable nuclear balance. But in this day and age, partly for the reason you mentioned, I don't think we need nearly as many prompt delivery vehicles. And they also are a waste of money because their only purpose in life is to provide the prompt delivery of

nuclear warheads.

So what I'd like to do is basically cut the Minuteman for us in half and also reduce the Trident submarine fleet by another six ships, convert those perhaps to cruise missile carriers or just obviate the need to build more attack submarines to some extent. And then save money. And at the same time you're saving money, you're putting more of the 1,000 warheads into the bomber force, which everyone knows is sort of a second best delivery system. It's slow. It's not really the way you would try to go out and kill a lot of hard targets promptly, not the way you would do a counterforce strike effectively. And so it sort of achieves that balance of maintaining parity with Russia and maintaining a gradualism to how we reduce. But at the same time distancing ourselves more from traditional targeting concepts that we had in the Cold War.

MR. INDYK: Last question at the front here.

SPEAKER: Thank you very much. I'm (inaudible) Interactivity Foundation where we prompted public policy discussion among the public.

My question to the panel is what issues or policies regarding nuclear arms would be the most useful to discuss -- for the public to discuss? Thank you.

MR. INDYK: Well, the public should just read the book.

(Laughter)

MR. O'HANLON: Yeah. All the answers are right here.

MR. INDYK: Steve.

MR. PIFER: Yeah. No, I think, you know, again, what the book is trying to do is we think that in the huge stack of stuff that's going to be in the president's in box on January 20th, we want to see nuclear arms control there because we think it can advance American -- it can make America safer. And I think Strobe made the point, I don't think there are a lot of people in the Pentagon now who go to bed each night worrying about a Russian ballistic missile attack. And that's a good thing. I mean, but by the same token, we're better off if there are fewer Russian warheads that could target us and vice versa.

So I think in terms of the public interest here is continuing to push on this idea that, in fact, we want to have a world in which there are fewer nuclear weapons. And I'd like back to the cube analogy briefly in the sense that if you look at nuclear deterrence, which is one of the points we make in the book, I think Mike and I are both sort of general supporters of nuclear deterrence. It worked. It kept the United States and the Soviet Union, which were two countries that were opposed militarily, politically, ideologically from going to war. So I worked in that sense.

But we attached one really big qualifier, and that is that at

several points in time we got really, really lucky. The Cuban crisis being the point. You know, one of the things that we did not know in 1962 -- we learned in 1992 -- was that the commander of Soviet forces on the island, although he could not launch the SS4 and SS5 missiles against the United States, had already been given by Moscow release authority for tactical nuclear weapons against invading American forces or against Guantanamo Bay, which at that time was a major naval base.

When President Kennedy chose the option of imposing a naval blockade on Cuba, he overruled most of his military and civilian advisory service who favored a massive air strike on the island followed several days later by an invasion. Okay? And that's what happens. American marines land and, you know, 30-45 minutes later three or four nuclear weapons go off on the beachhead and Guantanamo gets destroyed. We got lucky.

And so one of the reasons for reducing nuclear weapons, and even if you don't, I belong to Global Zero. I think it's a great goal. I don't know if we can get there but you try to design steps where the steps stand on their own in terms of putting you in a more secure position but may move you close t that goal because you have to ask the question in the future, "Are we always going to be so lucky?" Particularly now when you're talking about an equation of which there are nine nuclear powers,

not, you know, a small number in the 1960s.

MR. INDYK: Well, that brings us to the conclusion of our discussion. Thank you to the audience for some great questions. Thank you to Strobe and Mike and Steve, in particular Mike and Steve for producing and writing a great book. And finally, thank you to the Plowshares Foundation which made this research possible. Thank you all very much.

(Applause)

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I, Carleton J. Anderson, III do hereby certify that the forgoing electronic file when originally transmitted was reduced to text at my direction; that said transcript is a true record of the proceedings therein referenced; that I am neither counsel for, related to, nor employed by any of the parties to the action in which these proceedings were taken; and, furthermore, that I am neither a relative or employee of any attorney or counsel employed by the parties hereto, nor financially or otherwise interested in the outcome of this action.

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