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TURKEY'S POLITICAL JOURNEY: FROM WHERE TO WHERE?

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P R O C E E D I N G S

MR. TASPINAR: Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. Welcome to Brookings. I am Ömer Taspınar, the Director of the Turkey Program here and we are very happy today to have two analysts with us to look at a very important question, a question which relates to the difficulties of democratization in Turkey. Our goal here at Brookings is independent analysis and we try to usually bring together diverging views so that you can an opportunity to hear the debate as it is in Turkey.

I think part of the problem in Washington and in the West in general is there's this perception in Turkey that the real political struggle is between Islam and secularism and this is becoming a kind of cliché, conventional wisdom, and as in most clichés and conventional wisdom, there is an element of truth to that. There is indeed a clash between Islam and secularism. However, that is often the façade, and beyond the clash between secularism and Islam there are analytical studies that show that there is also a power struggle and there are some studies that also talk about a struggle between democracy and authoritarianism. Those are all polarizing issues and I'm sure as for all of you who follow Turkey, Turkey is a polarized country today. So our goal today is to try to go beyond the conventional wisdom and the facade and the cliché of Islam and secularism and to look at the nature of this power struggle by looking at essentially two questions, the civil-military dimension of the power struggle, in what ways the civilian government and the military interact and the relevance of this question of civil-military relations for the large issue of democratization. And second, to try to understand the dynamics within what appears to be a new actor in the Turkish political struggle which is the judiciary. What is the role of the judiciary? Recently in the Turkish political context there has been a lot of analysis which talks about the politization of the judiciary which is

a very troubling notion for all democracies since democracies are supposed to be based on a separation of powers. By looking at the civil-military dimensions and the judiciary we'll try to understand the larger democratization problem and unavoidably the question of Ergenekon, this case about an underground organization which allegedly tried to destabilize the country for an eventual coup is very much part of this discussion, yet it is not the entire issue. There has been a lot of focus on Ergenekon, and Gareth has published an important analysis of Ergenekon and some of you may be familiar with that.

We are very pleased to have both Gareth Jenkins who is currently a Senior Fellow at the Central Asia and Caucasus Institute which is part of Johns Hopkins University, and that institute has a particular program called the Silk Road Studies and the Turkey Project. He is a Senior Fellow with them, but more importantly, he has been an independent analysis living in Istanbul since 1989 I think and he has published a number of very important studies including on civil-military relations. We're very pleased to have him back in Washington and we'll start with his analysis. He will speak for 20 minutes. Then we'll go to Etyen Mahcupyan. We are very proud and happy to have Etyen Mahcupyan among us here. Etyen wears many hats. He is the Director of the Democratization Program at TESEV which is I think one of the first and most prestigious think tanks in Istanbul in Turkey. In addition to his important job at TESEV, he is also the editor-in-chief of the Turkish-Armenian newspaper "Agos," and he is also a columnist for a newspaper that some of you may know which has become an important newspaper especially in this context of civil-military relations and the Ergenekon case called "Taraf." So we are very happy that Etyen is here. He will speak after Gareth. Then we will have I think about an hour for the Q and A. Thank you all for coming, and with that I'll let Gareth start.

MR. JENKINS: What I'm going to try to do is to answer a very simple question but probably won't give a very simple answer to it, is Turkey becoming more democratic? It's something that we're hearing a lot recently. I'm going to start with democracy. I think we have to go back to this because the word is bandied around so freely without anybody being able to pin down a precise and universally accepted definition of what it means. Just to give some basic criteria which are usually included, of course, one of the things is, is it a mechanism or is it a set of values is the first question that we have to answer. Is it merely a process through which the majority of the population elects a government or does it bring with it a certain accepted set of values? The tendency today is usually to say that it brings with it some values and this is just a kind of very checklist, there are other things I'm sure you could add to this as well, such as free elections, a free press which is essential if you're going to have a public who can make an informed choice about their governments, general freedom of expression, an independent judiciary, security forces who are independent of any political influence, a military which is under civilian control, a transparent governmental system, a government which is accountable, checks and balances within the system and separation of powers. In practice, and I think the only reason I mention this and I'll come back to it toward the end, you also need to have an effective and viable opposition so that you have an alternative to whatever party is in power.

If we look at the situation before 2002 before the AKP, the AKP Party, came to power, is it possible to say that Turkey met all of these criteria? No. Elections were fairly free. Certain parties were banned. There were restrictions on what you could say in the press. There wasn't really any accountability of government which is still a striking feature of Turkey today that we do have ex-ministers or ex-bureaucrats in prison for corruption. Anybody who has been familiar with Turkish politics in the last 20 or 30

years knows there should be quite a lot of them in prison for corruption. So we really didn't have accountability before.

Did we have independent security forces and an independent judiciary?

Yes and no. Independence of a political party, yes, I think certainly in the period 1983 to 2000. I'm not saying that it necessarily changed afterwards; I'll come to that in a minute, but in this period before 2002. Completely political independent? No, I don't think anybody can realistically say that. In terms of people who were opposed to the official ideology, then they didn't have the same rights as those who were supportive of the official ideology. The two bastions of course of the official ideology of Kamelism were a secular state and a unitary Turkish state. So people opposed to the prevailing interpretation of secularism in Turkey and those who were opposed to the unitary Turkish state did tend to have their views suppressed and I think it's very difficult to argue that they were treated equally by the judiciary. Really I think before 2002 we already have in Turkey a semidemocratic system.

One of the most striking features of Turkish politics of course over the last 50 years but particularly since 1980 with the military coup has been the position of the military and civil-military relations. The way the military exercised political influence up to 2002 was, although it had certain rights embodied in certain laws, had membership on the National Security Council, I won't go through all the details. If you want to get into some of these details in the Q and A I'll try to answer your questions. But it influenced mainly through informal means. I think it's very important particularly for the pressure that the European Union put on Turkey to change that the main influence of the Turkish military was behind the scenes expressing an opinion and informally setting parameters outside which no government would dare to step. Within those parameters governments had quite a lot of leeway. It was only when the military saw a government trying to step

outside those parameters it tended to apply pressure to the government. Again it was mostly informal, expression of opinion sometimes on an institutional platform like the National Security Council, sometimes behind the scenes in one-to-one conversations between military officials and governmental officials. If that didn't work you'd often get an expression of an opinion by a leading member of the military in the expectation that then the government would toe the line. And up until 2002 broadly speaking they did in terms of not doing anything which was contrary to what the military wanted.

Did that mean they always did what the military wanted? No, it doesn't. Even very famously with these 28th of February measures in 1997 when you look at how many of those who were in the military presented at the time with an ultimatum how many of those were actually fulfilled, it's not very large, but they did not actively do anything contrary to what the military told them.

The three main bastions of the Kamelist establishment protecting the official ideology of Kamelism, certainly in the pre-2002 period with the military itself, the judiciary, particularly the higher echelons of the judiciary most strikingly of course the Constitutional Court, and YOK, the supreme educational body which oversees education in the universities. That means a lot in the Turkish context because of the ban on women wearing headscarves at Tonden University. The prevailing interpretation of secularism in Turkey is regarded as a breach of secularism. So in order to preserve that, YOK assumed enormous importance as a body overseeing university education.

In November 2002 when the AKP Party came to power, it came to power with approximately one-third of the popular vote which under the Turkish electoral system gave it approximately two-thirds of the seats in parliament. It was very, very nervous about the military. It was quite convinced that the military could evict it from power. In reality, despite what often appears in the press particularly in the last year or so, the

military was aware at the time that it couldn't stage a coup to topple the government but that didn't mean that the government was itself aware of this. So you had during AKP's first term in power it behaving very, very cautiously from 2002 in November to July 2007 when there were fresh elections.

In terms of its caution, it meant that something if it attempted to change something, it got a reaction from the military and it backed down. The most striking example came out of the local elections in March 2004 when it announced some educational reforms. It got a very good vote with 40 percent of the popular vote in these local elections, it had a sudden surge of confidence and decided that it was going to change some things to make it easier for graduates of the preacher training school, Imam Hatip Lisesi, to enter university and also to try to move toward lifting the headscarf ban in universities. When it got a reaction from the military it immediately backed down because it still feared that the military could stage a coup.

Under this period of course coincided in 2002 certainly up until 2005 with a major reform drive for E.U. membership. Now there is a temptation to say that the AKP initiated this reform drive, this democratization drive. This is slightly misleading, not completely misleading but slightly misleading in that the reform started before the AKP came to power. The AKP certainly accelerated the reform drive. Some of the subjects which previously had been taboo to discuss particularly on things like Kurdish rights; those restrictions began to be eased. I think if you look at what the AKP did during its first years in power, late 2002 and again through to 2005, I think it's difficult to argue that any of the other parties in parliament or outside parliament would have displayed quite the same energy as the AKP did in trying to push through these democratizing reforms. The key question probably here to ask is why did the AKP do it and look at the reforms themselves that were pushed through.

At the time the AKP was trying to get a date for the opening of official accession negotiations with the E.U. It also believed I think sincerely that once Turkey got in the E.U. there would be lifting of a lot of other restrictions as well most notably and most importantly from the AKP's perspective the expression of religious identity in public life. So there was an element of self-interest, that's not the only explanation, but it did have an element of self-interest for people who thought similarly to the party itself and also it was very desperate to get the date for the opening of accession negotiations.

Once the AKP for the opening of accession negotiations in October 2005, the reform drive died and still hasn't been resurrected. Most famously in the beginning of April 2007 the then chief of staff General Yaşar Büyükanıt posted a statement on the military's webpage implicitly though not explicitly threatening a military intervention if the AKP pushed ahead with its candidate for the presidency. The AKP responded by calling fresh elections which it won with a landslide.

When Büyükanıt issued the warning, when we look at when the military intervened in 1997 to the 28th of February process to force a previous Islamist government out of power, the ultimatum, the measures that it presented to the government were backed up by a very sophisticated propaganda campaign. Some of it was fairly open; some of it was behind the scenes. When Büyükanıt posted the statement on the military's webpage, that's all he did. He just posted the statement and the military didn't do anything else, didn't spread propaganda, didn't try to undermine the government in any other way. So really what the AKP did by going to fresh elections was to call the military's bluff. In July 2007 it won 46.6 percent of the popular vote, a very big increase on the 34 percent it had got in November 2002. It was a humiliating rebuff for the military. It had been publicly demonstrated to the military that it could no longer rely

on this game of bluff of issuing statements to the government expecting the government to follow its instructions.

In December 2007 there had been appointment of a new head of YOK, the board controlling the universities in Turkey. The new head of this board who was appointed by President Gul was known to be sympathetic to the AKP, a very old associate of now the Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu, and effectively by appointing this man Yusuf Ziya Özcan to head up YOK, even if the AKP didn't take complete control of the university administration, it certainly removed what had previously been one of its main obstacles. If we look at what I mentioned about the three bastions of the Kamelist establishment in terms of the military, YOK and the judicial system, we have now the military in late 2007 humiliated and to a certain extent marginalized by the failure of Büyükanıt's memorandum of these threats to the government, we now have somebody sympathetic to the government in charge of university education, so that we only have one bastion of the Kamelist establishment so far untouched.

This huge vote that the AKP got in the election gave it a massive surge of confidence. You had a lot of discussions through the second half of 2007 about a new constitution. All of these talks about a new constitution were promptly dropped when in January 2008 the AKP was notified by the MHP that it was prepared to back the government in trying to lift the headscarf ban through the existing constitution. These changes were passed in February 2008 and were eventually shot down by the Constitutional Court.

We also saw after the election a campaign that began against the military, I won't go into all the details, but the main thrust of the campaign was in the Ergenekon investigation. It's no coincidence that the Ergenekon investigation accelerated at a time when both the AKP Party and its supporters thought that the

military was no longer a threat. Previously they'd been very frightened of the military. After the election victory in 2007, particularly AKP supporters within the judicial system, the lower echelons of the judicial system, the top is still being controlled by Kamelist sympathizers, thought they could do whatever they want. The Ergenekon investigation is highly controversial. Some of those of you who have been following it will have seen the polemics that exist in the Turkish press and of course there were a lot of polemics against me after I wrote the report that Ömer mentioned. One thing I think is important to emphasize is if you really want to find out what's going on in the Ergenekon investigation, don't listen to me, don't listen to the people who think differently to me, go and have a look at it yourselves. If you go and have a look at it yourselves, it's an enormous amount of material I know, but you'll see a huge number of manifest abuses of Turkish law, there are many, many breaches of regulations, and these have accelerated. People have been kept in prison for a long time without even being charged or knowing what they're going to be charged with. A lot of people who have merely been opposed to the government have been taken in under accusation of being a member of the Ergenekon organization. There is no proof in any of the indictments or anything that's been brought to court that this organization as described in the indictments actually exists.

We've seen more recently particularly this year two other cases in particular against the military, one the so-called Cage Plan. I won't go into details but we can come back to this if you want. And the other is the Sledgehammer Operation which is supposed to portray a plot for a military coup which was formulated in December 2002 and discussed at a military seminar in March 2007. Again if you look, don't listen to me, go and have a look yourselves, at what this so-called plan is supposed to contain, you will see that falls apart immediately. Again in the questions and answers if you have any questions I'll give you some details or some examples of how it falls apart.

The cumulative effect of these campaigns mainly against the military has forced the military onto the defensive. All of them share the same characteristics of claiming that the military was planning to stage not one but a series of coups. Because so many political from the military both serving and retired offices have been detained very often on absolutely no evidence whatsoever, in many cases in manifest breaches of Turkish law, and recently they've been redetained even after a judge ordered some of them to be released, they've been detained again. The explanation given by the judge who ordered rearrest was there was no evidence that they should be allowed to go free. So we have the situation now in Turkey where the accused are going to be presumed as being guilty unless they can prove something to the opposite.

This is a very worrying development in terms of the rule of law in Turkey and the fact that so many of the governing party's opponents have been lumped in together with members of the military and have also been imprisoned has led to a situation in which people are now afraid to talk out against the government. This has been accompanied of course; some of you will be familiar with the series of tax fines against the Dogan Group the main media group in Turkey. To be honest, this is not a group which I am particularly fond of. But at the same time, when you look at the timing of when they've had these tax fines, when you had the prime minister attack them in September 2008 after they publicized the corruption case which led to some people who were very close to the prime minister himself and he warned people not to take newspapers from this group into their houses, you then get a series of tax inspectors suddenly turning up at their offices. I don't think anybody in Turkey genuinely believes that these tax fines are not politically motivated. Tax evasion is a national sport in Turkey. You can find a huge number of companies who avoid paying their taxes. It's quite possible that the Dogan Group has not been paying all of its taxes, but it doesn't

explain why it's been singled out, it doesn't explain why it's been asked to pay at the moment \$3.3 billion in fines.

These two campaigns I mentioned, have they been effective? Yes. The military now is very, very cautious. Serving and retired officers are frightened of even picking up the telephone to speak to their friends. Other opponents of the government are frightened to speak to their friends on the telephone. I was talking to a businessman of a foreign business a couple of weeks ago and he hadn't been to Turkey for a couple of years and he asked why is it now that whenever meet a Turk they dismantle their cell phone before they'll talk to me including taking out the battery? So you have a climate of fear which has certainly forced the military onto the defensive. It certainly created a lot of fear and intimidation amongst the government's opponents.

You've also seen a shift in the way that the Dogan Group newspapers now cover politics. There were some personal changes at the end of 2009 and the newspapers are now a lot more cautious in their criticisms of the government. If you talk to Turkish journalists, a large majority, not all of them, there are still some people who write what they think, a large majority of those who are opposed to the government are now frightened about writing what they really want to write because they fear they're either going to have some kind of tax fine against them or that they're going to end up being arrested as a member of Ergenekon.

I mentioned the third bastion of the Kamelist establishment; I shall finish in just a couple of minutes, the judiciary. We have seen recently some moves to try to increase the governmental control over some of the high judiciary bodies particularly the Supreme Council of Judges and Prosecutors, in Turkish acronym the HSYK, and the Constitutional Court. The AKP certainly has a very strong case to make in claims that the Constitutional Court's decisions have often been politically motivated. There is also a

very strong I think case to make when you see some of the decisions of some of the other high judicial bodies as also politically motivated. The most obvious case of course is the March 2008 closure case against the AKP which was actually upheld by a margin of 10 to 1 in that the Constitutional Court ruled that the AKP had as the public prosecutor had argued tried to erode secularism but they just chose not to close down the party. So the AKP has got a point when it thinks that some of these bodies are still politically motivated in terms of trying to protect what they see as the state ideology.

But if you look at some of the other instances involving the judiciary, the judiciary now is very deeply divided and dangerously divided between opponents and supporters of the government. The classic case we saw happened in the early part of this year, again I can go into more details in the questions and answer session, where one antigovernment prosecutor was removed from his post and he has now been charged with membership of Ergenekon. And then afterwards a pro-government prosecutor was removed his post by the HSYK, by the supreme body. So we have a deeply divided and politicized judiciary.

At the moment there are some constitutional changes which are being discussed in the Turkish Parliament which would increase the government's control over the election of the members of the higher bodies in the judiciary. The government is claiming that these are part of the E.U. process and these are part of the demands of the E.U. This is not true. Some of them are, some of them aren't. Basically what the government has done, it's chosen those demands of the E.U. which suit its purposes, and again in the Q-and-A session I can give you examples if you want, and ignore the other demands of the E.U. which don't suit its purposes.

To sum up, in terms of is Turkey becoming more democratic, no. There was a brief time when the AKP first came to power when certain subjects could be

discussed with greater freedom. That era is now long past. I've just come from a television studio and I've said we've gone from an AKP spring straight into a winter without going into summer in between and this is what happened in terms of democracy and freedom of speech particularly in Turkey over the last few years.

Has the political influence of the military been reduced? Undoubtedly. The demilitarization of the Turkish political sphere is not the same as democratization of the Turkish military sphere. Unfortunately what we've seen over the last 2 years in particular is the shift from one form of authoritarianism to another form of authoritarianism, the one which had the Kamelist establishment behind it, the one in which now it's the supporters of the government who are acting very authoritarily.

I'll come back very briefly to what I said at the beginning, about I would come back to why the opposition is important, I am often very critical of the AKP and devote little attention to criticizing the opposition. I think anybody who follows Turkish politics will understand immediately that's because the opposition is so incompetent nobody seriously thinks they have a chance of ever taking power. But when it comes to democratization of Turkey and is this a battle between authoritarianism and democratization? No. I think if you look at the opposition parties, in many ways they are no more democratic than the AKP is certainly in the ways they operate internally. The AKP, the CHP, the MHP, all operate in very authoritarian manners. And the problem we have in Turkey at the moment is as Ömer said there's an element of a battle between secularism and Islamism or particularly a form of secularism and a particular form of Islamism, but it's not a battle between democrats and authoritarian antidemocrats. We have this battle between two different forms of authoritarianism and perhaps the tragic thing for Turkey at the moment is there aren't any democrats waiting in the wings to take over. Thank you.

MR. TASPINAR: On that happy note after this gloomy picture we'll get to Etyen for some sun maybe.

MR. MAHCUPYAN: Hello everybody. Mr. Jenkins invited you to look at things and not to listen to him and of course to me. That means that you'll have to go and look at the documents and so on and you have to look at the people. So I would like to start with some observations by looking at the people.

The polls that were done in April asking the judicial reform and the constitutional reform to the Turkish public end up with such results. If you ask does Turkey need judicial reform, 70 percent say yes. Constitutional reform, 70 percent say yes. If you ask should this parliament do it, 65 percent say yes. These are not AKP people. These are not AKP constituency. This is the Turkish public.

Another observation I have, Mr. Jenkins has written a report which is widely accepted in the West, but it's not very much used in Turkey, not even "Hürriyet" or "Vatan," newspapers like that made a big piece out of it. The only defender of the report that you wrote and the person who is constantly referring to it is Deniz Baykal, the leader of CHP. So we have to ask why? Why the Turkish media did not use it and why the Turkish public did not pay attention to it? Maybe because they are living there. Maybe because they are looking at things and they are seeing it.

That's why I want to start with Ergenekon itself. It seems it's the juicy part of the story. But believe it's not. It is the only superficial thing that we are living through. The really interesting thing is going within the Muslim community today, the real change is happening there, and if you want to understand what Turkey is going through you have to go and look really to that. There is a kind of inclination with the secular community in Turkey, maybe it's the same with the Western world, they tend to look at the normative to understand the positive. They tend to look at the ideal to understand the

real. So for example, they tend to look at the Koran to understand what a Muslim is, but you cannot go like that. You have to go and look at the Muslim himself so that you can understand why he reads the Koran as he reads it today which is very different than yesterday. Another thing again done in some circles in Turkey and maybe in the West too is to look at the political actor to understand the community behind it as if that political actor really represents that community. But mind you, no one looks at Deniz Baykal to understand me, a secular and a Christian, by the way. But we look at what Tayipp Erdogan is saying and doing to understand what and who Muslims are, and again this doesn't work. You have to go and look at the public itself, to the change itself.

Having said that, I want to come to Ergenekon. Does it exist or not? For an organization to exist what do we need? We need members. We need some kind of hierarchy. We need a conversation system, a communication system. And we need to have some goals, a coherent structure that tries to succeed with some goals. We have all those things with Ergenekon so it's very difficult to say that it doesn't exist. If we look at the evidence, we have the people, we have the names. We have the documents. They have the plans and they have the finance. The Ankara Chamber of Commerce has found to have or to keep 5 billion Euros in its case. And they have the tools, all those guns hidden in the ground. And of course, actions, the killings. The killings of the priest Santoro, the people killed in Malatia and Hrant Dink and the assassination in the Council of State and so on. The people in Turkey at least they know because it is very transparent now. It was not like this a year ago but now it is quite transparent and we see the links and it's quite obvious.

But we have a problem with the name Ergenekon and the problem comes from two sources. One is the media and the other is the prosecutors themselves. The first one coming from the media is that we use it, I myself also, as if it is a generic

name to explain everything because it's so easy, it's so convenient. You use the name, only one word and everybody understands what it is. But what they understand, it's not just the Ergenekon gang, but the whole scheme and the whole scheme includes many other plans done within military circles which is not really directly connected with the Ergenekon case, but informally and indirectly yes.

The one, what the prosecutors did, the prosecutors wanted to link Ergenekon with all the other plans because in the other plans you have words, you have tapes, you have documents, but there are no actions really. With the Ergenekon case where you go to that limited area you have the actions. And the Ergenekon case is the only case, the only political case, in the whole history of the republic which is based solely on evidence found. There is no torture, for example, and everything is revealed in the courts. So the prosecutors are quite keen not to go behind that so they want to be and remain legitimate. That's why they want to expand the case so that they can include the other plans also within it. That was one of the motives.

The second motive of the prosecutors is that they prepared such indictments that include everything together, crucial, noncrucial, all the details together and this is a habit of prosecutors in Turkey in the last 5 or 10 years because if you don't do it, you lose evidence afterwards. It kind of evaporates, the evidence. So what they do is they unite, they combine all the things that they know in the same indictment so that it's there and if someone tries to find it, can find it.

Why do we have such a gang called Ergenekon and what does it serve? In order to understand it we have to go to the long tradition of coups d'état in Turkey and how they work and why at this time, stuck in 2002, 2003 and so on, they needed such a thing. There is a classical version of coups d'état in Turkey. We can imagine two pillars. One is the active force as a pillar and the other is a supporting force. We had three

coups d'état between 1960 and 1980 and all were done according to this classical scheme where the military plans everything and delivers everything, and then the supporting section let's say, the supporting pillar, comes ex post as a supporting factor. And what is that? The judiciary first, the media and then some institutions like universities, trade unions and business associations. Everything is done by the military, but then there is an ex post support by those "civil" institutions.

The 1980 coup d'état had something else in mind because the Cold War was over and it was obvious that this was going to be a different world and it was very difficult from then on do a military coup according to the old style. What they tried to do is have a new constitution so that we won't need another coup d'état and the political system acts according to the wishes and choices of the military as if there is a continuum of coups d'état. It's a tutelage system and the system works because of the judicial kind of patronage over the system. So the military ranked back one step and instead of that we had the judiciary batting down several things, for example, some identities or ideological demands from the political sphere which means that it is a narrowing down of the political sphere so that of course it's not a democracy at all and by this way you can leave out some of the actors from the political sphere, some of the idea, some of the demands and so on and so forth, so that was the idea. But of course there is a limit to the usage of the judiciary because the judicial system should be a referee. You cannot overuse it. So in 1997 when we had this Islamic government there was a new votay (?) in the classical scheme. The military used the media directly as a manipulative force and through the media the civil society. And this time for the first time this supporting factor was an ex ante factor, that is, before the coup the media was in the picture, the civil society was in the picture before the coup was done and that's how they accomplished

the 1997 coup which is called the postmodern coup because of this new understanding, you are using the public as well.

But once it was done as early as 1998-1999 it was obvious that this cannot be repeated because there was a new party, the AKP. Many were people were waiting or expecting that there was no other, we wouldn't have any other maybe Islamic party for a while at least, for another 3 or 4 years or they expected that there would be two Islamic parties so that each one of them gets 10 or 15 percent so that no one of them gets to the government, but it was not like that. And with AKP there was a more heterogeneous picture in the media and in the civil society and as the media gets more heterogeneous, it means it gets more transparent because if one part of the media becomes manipulative, the other part of the media can show it. So it was obvious more and more that we cannot go with the same scheme like in 1997.

So you need something else and that something else was this Ergenekon gang the document of which we know, the first document at least that we know of is back at 1999 and it says "Analysis and Reconstruction" shortly put. And of course we know that the political analysis of Turkey, the people who work on Turkey, know that the Ergenekon name is a very well-known name. It's a used name within military circles. There is an informal core, an institutional like organization let's say within the military, informal called Ergenekon for so many years, and now this Ergenekon that we know of as of 1999 was very, very closely connected to -- if you want to translate that which is --

MR. TASPINAR: Modelization is what?

MR. MAHCUPYAN: It doesn't mean much the words because it's like the Gladio organization in Italy and we know now that there is a connection between this Ergenekon gang or the network and the -- and when we look at the Ergenekon itself you

see all retired generals and around them civilians. It is like we have concentric circles and intersecting circles and so on. But this is the second layer if I may so of the coup d'état scheme. The top layer is the Army itself; the second layer is the Ergenekon. It's a manipulative body which is out in the streets doing killings and many other things. And the third layer is the civil society and the public at large.

This is the scheme and many people are talking that we don't know the number one and so on of the whole scheme. You never know the number one. For example, in Gladio we still don't know the number one in Italy. But the thing is for example when you look at the 1960 coup d'état, the top general, the number one was chosen only 2 days before the coup d'état. So what do you do in the military? You prepare the plans, you keep them ready and you don't know when it is going to be used and who will use it. But when the time comes according to the bargaining or the power struggle within the military, one of them or several of them will take a step and use it. So that's why we have that Balyoz hammer sledge or Sledgehammer.

MR. TASPINAR: Sledgehammer.

MR. MAHCUPYAN: Sledgehammer plan. When you look at it it's a routine plan done in the first --

MR. TASPINAR: First Army.

MR. MAHCUPYAN: The first Army command. When you look at it it's a routine procedure it seems. But they are using actual names; actual places and they are making lists of actual people who will be thrown out who would be put into prison and so on and so forth, actual people. And they are doing this in 2003 right after the election of AKP. But you must not be astonished with that because when we look at again the 1960 coup now we know that the first plan was done in 1952 right after the election of the Democrat Party, the new party, the election was 1950, and as early as 1952 within the

military there were plans to throw them away from the government. So it's a routine job of the military in Turkey to do that.

Why is that? Because the main threat is the internal threat in Turkey according to the military. It's not Greece. And after the Cold War it's not Russia anymore. The real threat comes from within and this is the Kurds, this is the Muslims, this is the non-Muslims or whatever. And now since the threat comes from the internal structure of the society, the careerism in the military has changed, and now what do we see? For example, Cetin Dogan who is at the head of the 1st Army Command in 2003 was at the head of the -- Western Working Group which planned the 1997 coup. When you look at Büyükanit who was one of the interrogators of Sakuk for example, he was very much involved in those things, you can trace him back and you can see that there is a line of ascendancy of the stairs of the military echelons let's say. And this is the same in the judiciary as well. The judiciary as well starting from 1980 has a different concept of society and so on. They are defending the regime so they want to be independent but they are not neutral. According to liberal ideology at least, the main thing is neutrality because the judiciary is a referee organization, a referee institution. We want it to be independent so that it can be neutral so that it can do its job. But here in Turkey we have body of judiciary which is not neutral and which wants to be independent. So more independent, more worse because they are ideologically defending something and that something is very far away from the demands and choices of the society.

Another thing within the judiciary, it's a caste system which has divided the whole judicial system horizontally. At the top of the system we have -- the High Council of Prosecutors and Judges made up of several people and five of them are chosen by Council of State -- which is --

MR. TASPINAR: The -- is Council of State.

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MR. MAHCUPYAN: No -- is Council of State. Council of -- maybe. Anyway, another high-level legal body.

SPEAKER: Court of Appeals.

MR. MAHCUPYAN: Court of Appeals. Yes. Thank you very much. Court of Appeals. So the five people are coming from the Court of Appeals and Council of State. But what about the members of the Court of Appeals and Council of State? They are chosen by the seven people who are at the top. So the first level is choosing the members of the second level and the second level is choosing the members of the first level. And underneath you have thousands, tens and thousands of lawyers, prosecutors and judges. And the passage through is ideological. From that bottom level to go up, you have to be a Kamelist or whatever.

So what is happening today in Turkey is not a clash between the AKP and the military. If we didn't have a clash within the military and within the judiciary, AKP could not have done anything because AKP you have to understand is an illegitimate party according to the official ideology. They are Muslims. They are not the illuminated ones. They are the backward ones.

SPEAKER: Islamists more than Muslims.

MR. MAHCUPYAN: They are called Islamists but they are Muslims. So under the banner of Islamists, you are putting away the Muslims, so by putting away the Muslims you are narrowing down the public sphere to that extent then that you don't need a democracy anymore. You have your own community, the second community, you have your own judicial system which can ban any wrong ideas let's say, you have the military anyway, and of course you have the media and universities and so on as one of the main supporters.

The real cleavage happened in the military and that's why we have the documents today. You have to see the picture that the Balyoz, the Sledgehammer documents, the date was 2003 and we have nearly the whole document, everything with the tapes and so on which means that someone has kept them from 2003 and that someone or the group of people within the Army have not taken that bundle that they have to the top levels of the military. Why? Maybe they thought that it's the same, they have the same attitude regarding a new coup d'état. So what they did, they kept it for 7 or 8 years and now we know them. So if there were not those people in the military as far back as 2002 and 2003, we wouldn't have this Ergenekon case right now. We wouldn't know about those plans right now. But of course the main cleavage which is causing all those things is the cleavage within the secular community. A part of the secular community is defending democracy now and the other part of the secular community is defending the old military tutelage system and that's the main clash or whatever in Turkey.

Now let's come to a more as I use the word juicy problem, why the military wants to do a coup d'état. Because we are stuck in a vicious circle as of 2000-2002. You can imagine a circle with four segments. The first segment to simplify starts with the European Union and it says that if we are going to have the European Union accession process and those close links with the European Union, then that means that we will have a more democratic understanding of what democracy is, so more human rights, more freedoms and enlargement of the public sphere for sure. The second segment says that if we are going to have an enlarged public sphere then for surely we will have more actors, political actors, and majority rule. That's the basics. The third segment, if we are going to have majority rule, then obviously we will have an Islamic government or Muslims in the government. The fourth segment, what happens if the

Muslims are pro-Europeans? Then we have a vicious circle because then it means more democracy, more majority rule, more Islamic governments and again more democracy and so on and so forth. And once you start with this cycle there is no going back. It has to be stopped. So the Army, the judiciary and all those people, the secularists in Turkey, they want to put an end to that vicious circle before it's too late.

Before that there were some check walls let's say to stop this vicious circle. The first one is that we didn't have majority rule anyway. Although we called ourselves a democracy, it was never a majority rule, because as I said, the public sphere was narrowed down that much. Secondly, if we had to bear an Islamic government, it was illegitimate so that it could be tamed to the military's wishes very easily, and if not, there was always the chance of a coup d'état. And the third wall let's say, security wall here, was the ideology that the secular people and the Army had regarding the Muslims, and this was a very modernist approach, a very positivistic approach that still goes on in parts of the West too which says that the backward people, the Muslims, first have to be secularists so that they become democrats or they become liberals and that implies that they have to be like us first so that they can become liberals and democrats. But the world is going somewhere else. We have a different dynamic within the Muslim society today in Turkey and it says that, it shows us that they are not becoming like the secularists but they are secularized still. So this is happening in the last 15 years. I think sociologically speaking it's the biggest reform coming from the bottom which is happening in Anatolia maybe in the last 300 or 400 years.

If I summarize, it means two things. First, it means the segmentation of the Islamic sphere. When you go 20 or 30 years back, for a Muslim it was very difficult to separate the economic activities from social, from the cultural and from the political and so on and so forth. It's not like that anymore. The economy is something else, culture is something

else for a Muslim and the politics is totally something else. That's why we don't have political Islam. We have Muslims doing politics, but it's not political Islam now. And the second much more important change is what we can call personification which is we have Muslims now who are calling themselves religious. In fact, when you ask they are calling themselves more religious than before, but when you ask them what is religion and what is religiosity, you can see that it's a way of adaptation to the daily life and to modern life in fact through their understanding of religion so they are recreating the religion and religiosity today. This is in fact a change in the mindset. And to conclude, AKP is a result of this and is only one of the results of this and we have about maybe 20 to 25 of the AKP constituency today in Turkey who are much more ahead of AKP in terms of freedoms and whatever, all those modern, new ideas and so on. They are much more ready to adapt to the modern democracy as we have in the West than AKP of course. But I have to add that AKP did not promise anyone that they are democrats and they will be democratizing the country and so on and so forth. They are just a political party, but their existence is democratizing Turkey whatever they do just be existing because until now we didn't have the public as it is, the Muslims, the majority, really having a hand in the political system.

Okay, I can stop here.

MR. TAŞPINAR: I'm sure we have three good questions, and we'll have about 50 minutes for Q&A. I'll take the opportunity to ask the first question, because I think you both agree -- although you disagree on many points, especially the Ergenekon, and we can spend hours discussing the Ergenekon, which I don't think would be a very productive way of spending the next 50 minutes -- but what you seem to both agree on is that Turkey has an official ideology. There is an official ideology. And democracies usually are not in the business of having an official ideology. Britain does not have an

official ideology. Sweden, Denmark don't have official ideologies. Democracies -- democracy and -- usually you don't need to have institutions such as -- especially such as the military that need to defend that system, that official ideology under a system of military tutelage. So, help us understand, especially those among us who are not Turks and who are not familiar with the official ideology of Turkey, what this official ideology is, especially in the 21st century. What is the military trying to defend? What is the judiciary trying to defend? What is the York trying to defend? And what is the tread perception? Can Turkey be more -- can Turkey become democratic, in other words, without challenging an official ideology since, in my opinion at least, official ideologies and democratization and democracies don't really match. So, help us understand what Kemalism means, if this is the official ideology in the 21st century context.

Gareth, let's start with you.

MR. JENKINS: First, you said not to mention (inaudible) I have to say this. Etyen went to read the indictments. I know this, because we -- that's why I say go and look at these things yourself. It's a legal case; it should be based on proof. There's not one shred of proof in the indictments this organization exists. There's not one shred of proof there were people are members in the sense of knowing they are members. There's not one shred of proof there's 5 million Euros that was in the vault of the trade union was going to be used for Ergenekon. The only link between this trade union and another organization named in the Ergenekon investigation, the Association for Kemalist Thought, is once a trade union paid the (inaudible) sandwiches at an organization, at an event organized by the Association for Kemalist Thought. There's no other evidence there whatsoever.

The same with these killings he mentioned. There is no evidence linking Ergenekon to the -- in this sense from a legal perspective, it doesn't matter if Ergenekon

exists or doesn't exist. It matters whether you can prove it exists. That is the basis of the rule of law. And I think that's a very important thing if people form a (inaudible) like Etyen who hate the military want to see the military behind everything. Even if you're right, you have to prove it. This is just the rule of law. It's a very, very important distinction. So, come toward -- I must say Etyen and I agree -- we don't have to agree. It's in the Turkish constitution. The Turkish constitution says that Turkey has to be loyal to the precepts set down by Kemal Atatürk.

I think the problem here is not so much what Kemalism says; it's the interpretation of what Mustafa Kemal Atatürk said. As I mentioned when I gave my presentation, the two most important principles from the perspective of the military in particular are secularism and the Turkish unitary state. Most of those things are embedded in the Turkish constitution, and the problem in Turkey has always been what do you mean by the Turkish unitary state and what do you mean by secularism?

If you ask me, Turkey isn't a secular state. If you have -- though you ban the wearing of the head scarf university but the incocation of Sunni Islamic beliefs are compulsory in all high schools, according to the constitution that's not the secular state. So, I think you have to be very careful about some of these terms. But the adherence to Kemal (inaudible) is in the constitution. It's not really a matter for Etyen and I to decide.

Under those two principles, I think the key question is how you interpret them, not what they are. And that's where I think also there are lots of the people on the Islamic side of the political spectrum. They would say the problem is not in the unitary stage or with secularism. It's how you interpret these two things.

In terms of whether any democracy has an ideology, yes, some of them do, particularly with religious -- in (inaudible) to a religious belief that they do. Whether -- from my perspective, whether they should have or not is another thing. I don't think any

ideology should be in there. But there are democratic states that have an ideology embedded in their constitution. We don't -- in Britain, we don't have a constitution. Simple as that.

MR. TAŞPINAR: Easy way out.

Eteyen, do you have anything else?

MR. MAHCUPYAN: Well, regarding the Ergenekon, okay, have new ideas, but I wonder what -- for example, if you come to Turkey and tell this to Dink family, for example, what do they think of your ideas, I mean, it's, I mean.

In Turkey, we are living in it, and we have been living in it for a hundred years now, what -- our fathers have lived in it, our grandfathers have lived in it. So, yes, you are right. I mean, there has to be proof, and, you know, if there's no proof and they are, you know, set -- they are let, you know, go out, you know, from the jails and they are free, I mean, I'm not disturbed myself. I mean, that's okay with me. The important thing is that the public, the population, the people of Turkey can understand what is happening really. So that we cannot repeat it. That's the important thing. Not punishing the people.

But coming to the constitution of (inaudible), of course, that -- the constitution is made in 1980 that we use today after the coup d'état by the military people, you know, and if you say that since it's in the constitution everything stops, then the constitution is like a holy book, and you know then, well, why -- you know, why, well, what have we against the Islamic thing, you know, because they have a holy book also and, you know, if we cannot change the constitution, if we can just scrap it and realize again what are we, you know? We are not democrats anyway. We are not -- it not a democracy anyway, so on so forth. So, I mean, constitution means nothing. It can be rewritten to the wishes, demands, and choices of a society, and in fact theoretically it is rewritten every day, so if the demands are changing, it should be changed, and, you

know, in our constitution there are articles that cannot even offer to change. No. And those articles are so weak that you can put everything into those linked -- everything into -- link everything to those three articles and cite doesn't stop any reforms in Turkey, and that's what the judicial system is doing for many years now.

So, let's go to the ideology itself. Now, Kemalism -- if we are going to call it that -- ideology, if you look at it from the standards of what we have today, does not go very deep. It's a very superficial ideology. I mean, it's to be modern, to be contemporary, to be secular, and so on. But also an authoritarian mindset.

So, what is happening there is Turkey has imported modernism or modernity, which has two legs, in fact. One is the relativistic mindset where you have the individualization and so on so forth; and the other is the authoritarian mindset where you have the nation state and so on. But we don't have the first one. For so many decades we didn't have it. Still I'm not very sure we have, you know, digested it properly. But we have the second one where (inaudible) very, you know, strongly. The nation state and authoritarian tutelage system over it, and thus inner threats, the public, the population has mistaken as a drawback and so on. So, this is the official way of looking at things, and I don't think that it deserves respect at this age anymore. I mean, it's something passé, but it has created a polar situation, and the polar situations are based on institutions, which have their own culture and their own power relations; and, of course, they repeat itself you know. So, it's not very easy to go recreate the system.

In Eastern Europe, the system had collapsed first, and then they changed it for a totally different perspective. The thing that is done in Turkey -- what we are doing in Turkey, what we are living for in Turkey is changing it while the system persists, and that is totally something else. That's why we have Ergenekon. Yes, we have to prove it still, but we know that it's there. And it is not only outside us there as an

organization that can be, you know, just put away by the Australians and so on. It's there because of the official ideology. That is the official ideology. So, what military is doing is a military system for a routine work, for its routine work, is planning coup d'état. That's a totally different picture than what a democracy is and what it should be.

So, the official ideology is a power system of the military and judiciary, mainly the bureaucracy, over the political system, which is linked to the demands and choices of the population.

MR. JENKINS: Now that we solved this problem, we can move onto other ones.

MR. TAŞPINAR: Other ones, please. Yes, sir.

MR. KAUFFMAN: Microphone?

MR. TAŞPINAR: Yes, it's coming. Please identify yourself. You just passed --

MR. KAUFFMAN: Thank you. Okay, I'm Don Kauffman. I'm a retired U.S. Foreign Service officer.

A Turkish officer once told me that prosecutors in Turkey are judged not by the number of cases they win but by the number of cases they bring, that their responsibility is to charge as many people as much as possible and leave it up to the courts to straighten things out. I'm wondering what -- whether there's an element of careerism in this Ergenekon operation.

MR. TAŞPINAR: Element of careerism in the Ergenekon operation.

MR. JENKINS: You want answers. It's impossible for me tell, to say. I think there's a large element in our defensiveness in -- because even though this Ergenekon thing -- organization doesn't exist. These so-called sledgehammer coup plot is not real. Go and have a look at it in detail and make your decision for yourself. You

don't have to believe me, as I said. But just because these things are absurd doesn't mean people don't believe it. And some of the people involved in the Ergenekon investigations, same as Etyen, even though it doesn't exist, they genuinely believe it exists. And the problem is for the prosecutors and some of the people involved in the investigation -- and you can see there was -- it was a rolling recently about Ergenekon. They couldn't find any evidence to link these accused people actually on a wiretap. If you listen to the wiretap, they couldn't find the evidence of any association with Ergenekon. Therefore, they said that shows how clever this organization is, you know? And that's -- so they said we've got to do something else against it. And there was a real fear amongst the prosecutors and some of the police that because they can't find the organization, because they can't find any real proof, therefore the organization is so immensely powerful they have to take everybody in; otherwise, they're going to get killed. This kind of circular reasoning is absurd I think to anybody who looks at it rationally from outside, but it's a very important element.

I think there's -- we've always seen in the judicial process in Turkey there's certain times people on both sides of the ideological divide who grandstand for their audiences, and I think that can be an element, you know? This is a public event. If I say that one of those prosecutors is doing this, I can be tried myself for slander and anything else. But I think that has been an element in several high-profile cases in Turkey, and I said on both sides of the ideological divide.

MR. TAŞPINAR: As a follow-up to that, Gareth, you keep saying Ergenekon does not exist. Do you think there's a deep-state phenomenon in Turkey? Does deep state exist?

MR. JENKINS: If you read my report, I say at least twice this is Ergenekon investigation is a terrible missed opportunity to go after the reality of the deep

state, because it doesn't deal with the reality of the deep state. It deals with a conspiracy theorist's conception of the deep state.

Etyen mentioned there's not actually (inaudible) military documents in any of these -- the three Ergenekon indictments to date, so you can forget about these patriotic officers in regard to Ergenekon. There's a couple of documents that are cited. One of them is the nationalist pipedream. On page 60 of the first indictment it quotes from it and this is the document Etyen was referring to. It's (inaudible) 1999 called The Restructuring of the State, and says in this quote on page 60 of the first indictment -- it says as a supposed quote from this document, "What are our weak points" -- or our shortcomings, a better translation -- " and it says, "We are not an organization." And yet the Ergenekon indictment says this organization has always existed, and they put the juice, a document, which shows that it doesn't exist. And in fact, where the guys says, "What are our strong points? We're Turkish. We're strong. We're brave. We're prepared to die for our ideals." And there's nothing else there at all. And if you look at -- I say if you look at the indictments, you look at reality what it's claimed to be, every active political violence in the 20 or 30 years in Turkey, including controlling the PKK, including controlling Hezbollah, including killing Hrant Dink, including killing the missionaries in Malatia, including killing the Italian priests in (inaudible), including attacks on (inaudible), everything else it claims to it. And is there any one piece of concrete proof to link it to it? No. Is it possible some of these people (inaudible) by ultra nationalist racists? Of course. Nobody has a monopoly of violence in Turkey. Every political ideology in Turkey has committed violence, has killed people. But there is no evidence to say that it's all done by one huge organization.

MR. TAŞPINAR: Etyen, would you agree that Ergenekon more than an organization, because there's an official ideology in Turkey and because the military is

the guardian of that ideology, is more of a mindset that would do certain things in order to protect the state and the way they do these things is a product of a mindset more than a kind of organization. It's an ideology essentially. It's a mindset more than an organization.

MR. MAHCUPYAN: There are people. There are goals. There are documents. There is money. And, you know, there is an organization. Now, the weak point -- they have told -- they have said for themselves that our weak point is that we are not an organization and what we expect they did the next day. Became an organization. Because why do you put it in a paper? Why do you write the paper like that and say that our weak point -- the weak points are points that, you know, that should be corrected.

So, a friend of mine was saying the other day the system is so corrupt that when you stop talking about it, you solve the conspiracy. You know, it solves that conspiracy. But it's so corrupt, and all those retired generals and so on -- the thing is this is -- this was done before we know them -- this was repeated in several instances in history, and we -- the AKP government after 2002 -- Turkey has come to a historical point which is -- which resembles very, very much 1915, -16, -17, -18, and so on.

A parenthesis is closing now. There was a parenthesis opened up in 1920s and it is closing now. We will have a totally different constitution in 5 or 10 years' time, and we will have a totally different relation of military civil relations, totally different judicial system, and so on so forth. It is very, very difficult to, you know, insist on the same system anymore.

And when we look at the secular community in Turkey, what I see, because, you know, most of our friends, are coming from them -- I mean, from the secular community -- what I see is -- can only be called a calculated ignorance. The secular public -- maybe we have counterparts in the west also. The secular public does

not want to know what is happening, because they know, you know, in their hearts, you know, that the things that -- the reality will not fit into their ideological expectations or their idea -- their approach to politics in Turkey, their understanding of what Muslim is and so on so forth. The secular community I think was shocked seeing a Muslim community rising like it is from -- like it is happening right today Octavia and they were shocked seeing a party like AKP who is, you know, pro-West and pro-European Union and so on so forth, and they want to do these reforms. They want to do all the reforms that is needed to become a democracy, and they cannot do all. Why? Because of their position, who is -- which -- the part which is secular, you know. I mean, there is something wrong here. And if we cannot understand the picture, then of course we cannot understand what the official ideology is and so on. Official ideology is (inaudible) that we don't want to give as seculars. That's the official ideology. And some of the seculars, like myself, we don't want that anymore. We are democrats, and we want to change, and if the majority is Muslim, we want to live with those Muslims as long as they as democrats, too; and they are changing, and that's the good part of it.

MR. TAŞPINAR: You said as long as they are democrats, too, but the problem is that most of the secularists don't believe that they are democrats, that the AK Party is not -- you, yourself, said it's not a very democratic party. They are the agent of change in Turkey, but they're not really people who --

MR. MAHCUPYAN: Sure.

MR. TAŞPINAR: -- were brought up in this democracy or --

MR. MAHCUPYAN: Sure. Sure, they are learning. Well, you know, the reality -- how do you understand the (inaudible)? We look at change, and what is the changing thing, you know, in Turkey? Muslims. Not the seculars. Not the army. Not the judiciary. And when I say change, I mean the real change, the change in the mindset.

Not the change in the power relations and not the change in the, you know, what's the word -- I mean, what you can put in that sentence -- but the mindset. And the Muslim community in Turkey has taken a long step towards being a more -- having a more democratic approach to itself, to its -- to his religion or her religion and also to the world. So, that's why we are having all those problems. Otherwise, if we had a party like (inaudible), the problems are military, you know, because a coup d'état is legitimate then. But with AKP, a coup d'état is not legitimate, because this is a pro-western Islamic party.

MR. TAŞPINAR: Would you agree with that, Gareth?

MR. JENKINS: Which part?

MR. TAŞPINAR: The AK party's approach -- AK party's and pro-change. The AK party is representing the change of the Muslim community in Turkey and that the secularists are presenting more status quo-oriented mentality.

MR. JENKINS: I think really Etyen shot himself in the foot by saying the secularists. It's true to a certain extent there are secularists who don't want to change, but he said it's the idea of projecting saying they know how things how are; they don't look at reality. But you are adopting the same policy towards the Ergenekon case by not looking at the reality of what's there.

I think in the --

MR. MAHCUPYAN: What's there?

MR. JENKINS: There's nothing there. Read the indictment.

MR. MAHCUPYAN: There's always a very easy, you know --

MR. JENKINS: Read the evidence and make a decision. Don't forget.

MR. MAHCUPYAN: I can look at your -- see nothing. You are not there, you know. There's nothing there.

MR. JENKINS: I'm fatter than you think.

When you look at changes in Turkey -- I think if you look at -- you see changes on both sides, and that -- again you say by the military. (Inaudible) this invention of this being this division within the military. It's not true. But if you look at the attitudes of the military how they've changed, they have changed. You know, you look at the military today, particularly the younger officers, and you look at the military 30 years ago, one thing is they know they cannot behave like they did 30 years ago. Even they wanted to, they cannot do it. They -- now, you've got to understand that the military have a lot more contact with the outside world on a lower level than people do in the AK party because they go on these major postings. They have a lot of contact with the fellow officers from other countries. They see how the militaries of all in those other countries, and they see these are countries which are more developed than they are. So, they understand that things have to change, that it has to be a continuous process. Of course there are some very conservatives. There were still, you know, people within the -- I mean, it's a very, very broad term. I think it's a mistake to see the AK party or AK party supporters as a homogenous whole. I think you can see within the AK party a certain number of them. Well, as they've moved into the political mainstream, some of them -- one very prominent member of the AK party said to me directly -- he said you could understand that when we were younger we lived in a very narrow social circle, and now as we've come out of this (inaudible), we understood we cannot do what we want. Maybe we were to, you know -- and ideally we'd like to have Sharia law, etc., some of us. But we can't do it. It's impossible. And if we need to get a majority, but we can't do it. So, I think you do see changes. This idea that, you know, one side isn't changing and the other side is changing I think is over-simplistic.

MR. TAŞPINAR: Yeah. I would like to report I found another issue where you both take (inaudible) that the military is changing, that the military is divided

and they have --

MR. MAHCUPYAN: Well, they are changing politically. They are forced to change. They are changing their strategies, their stance. But what about the mindset? The real change is in the mindset, you know. That will be the change which will change the other things, and having a majority of Muslims in a country is very important. It's very crucial, because if they don't change, really, I mean, in the minds, then there's no democracy ever in Turkey.

MR. TAŞPINAR: Okay. One, please, non-Ergenekon-related question to expand the debate.

MR. CARDITA: Yeah, I'll be more than happy not ask an Ergenekon question. I'm Martin Cardita from Voice of America Armenian Service. Well, we've been following a lot of -- of course, if we can see a lot of transition within the Turkish society at least from outside, it's definitely to debate on the Armenian genocide that has definitely depended a lot more during the last 2, 3 or, I would even say, 5 to 10 years -- 5 years more than 10 years.

We've been hearing a lot of the -- of course the Turkish intellectuals writing about the issue. We've been hearing a lot of the signals coming from within the Turkish society, but we've been also seeing AKP party, as you were suggesting, a new, progressive pro-democracy party, playing a pretty, let's say, changing role within the Army and Turkey discussion. I mean, we just heard the Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoğan announcing twice that he's going to actually deport the illegal Armenian immigrants from Turkey, and only illegal Armenian immigrants, no other legal immigrants. So, this was of concern from the Armenian side.

And of course as you would show, talking about a lot of the different trends within Turkey, while we talk about Armenians in Armenia and Armenians overseas

talk about possible border opening, a lot of fear comes from that perspective, too, Armenia being authoritarian regime itself, the society doesn't want to add more problems coming from Turkey, setting aside the economic and other issues that can be on the positive side. So, within this context, how does the growing genocide discussion, international discussion, impact the Turkish political circles? Because back in the day, the genocide discussion was actually a matter that was more consolidating the Turkish political circles. So, please --

MR. TAŞPINAR: -- question so that Gareth can also participate. You started your debate saying is Turkey more democratic today and your conclusion was no. But I think that other people would agree that the Kurdish question, the Armenian question -- certain taboos of Turkish history are being debated today more openly than before. So, maybe we should take this question in that framework of isn't Turkey after all, despite all these trials and tribulations, going in the right direction in terms of freedom of speech?

Let me first turn to Etyen and then get your feedback on that.

MR. MAHCUPYAN: Well, you're interested in the political circles as far as I see, how they are influenced and so on. Now, when you -- we come to political circles -- you know, we have the political parties as actors. Now, the other political parties, like MHP and CHP, are obvious what they think and do. I mean, they are totally against this opening up the border, and anything related to the Armenian affair and so on is seen as a threat by them. AKP is different, but it's a political party, and like in the Kurdish question, for example, they took one of two steps and they saw that they are losing votes in the western part of the country. So they stopped. Being a political party, they want to be reelected and be in the government. That's the main, you know, thing that they want. So, having (inaudible) real pressure on them from the opposition, so they

are slow, and they're going zig-zags of course. So, it is very difficult to look at what AKP is doing and understand their strategy related to Armenia, because the main thing now is the coming elections in one year's time, and they want to be in the government again, and that's the main thing.

Now, when we come to -- I think is the more fundamental question: How the Turkish public is influenced by everything, you know? They are not influenced positively by the -- by those proposals in the parliaments of the Western countries regarding the genocide. They have a kind of a reaction to that. But when you go into the society itself, when you observe what is going on there, you see that we have a much, much more relaxed society regarding the Armenian issue and Armenian genocide today. When you go -- if you go to Anatolia, you talk to people; they are more than ready to tell you stories. They use the word "genocide," and it's opening up again. And who are doing these things, you know? Who is the opening-up actor in the Turkish society? Not seculars again. In fact, the seculars are against it. But the Muslims. Because the Muslims were the ones who protected the Armenians. If there are Armenians, you know, surviving today in Turkey and elsewhere, they owe this, especially -- when I say "elsewhere," I mean the people who have gone after the genocide, left Turkey after the genocide. I, myself, as well -- we all owe our lives to one or two Muslims who are neighbors to those Armenians. They protected them. Because otherwise the (inaudible) people in the state were willing to kill maybe all of us, you know. So, this is one of the things.

Second, there were many Armenians who live as Muslims today in Turkey.

And third, of course, with this view opening up in the mindset, the Islamic -- the Muslims have realized that the Islamic identity is an identity which does not need

the Turkish identity, you know, as a backup. Islamic identity is the global identity on its own, and it's enough. So, then the distance between that (inaudible) and the Islamic community today became largest, you know. So, there was a more objective view to the (inaudible) era by the Muslims, and then they were much more ready to say what they really feel and, you know, remember. So -- and that will influence AKP as well.

You know, there was a breakfast that the prime minister arranged because -- arranged for the prime minister and about 50 journalists and novelists and so on just last Saturday, and I was there, and in his speech the prime minister said that we are searching -- (inaudible), lucid, let's say -- we are looking for -- we are searching a lucid pool so that we can look at us, at our face, and confront ourselves, and this he said regarding the Armenian question and genocide issue. So, what he was saying is that the water is running so fast and is so blurred that don't expect me to say what I really think or, you know, what you want me to say. But if we reach a lucid pool so that we can look and see our face, you know, in it, then we will be ready to say it.

So, we have to understand that this was -- this is a political party after all, and, you know, they have their own interests and so on. It's a huge political party, and it's the only political party which has some kind of a representational, you know, link, let's say, with the society. So, AKP will change, has to change as the society changes in Turkey, and this will be the case regarding the Armenian issue as well.

MR. TAŞPINAR: Gareth?

MR. JENKINS: I think I mentioned about this cherry picking. I mean, certain -- and I also mentioned about the AKP spring back in the beginning of its first term in power. There are certain issues which are easier to discuss in Turkey now than there were before. But I think Etyen has demonstrated that very clearly in what he said then.

The Armenian genocide is an issue from which the AKP thinks it can distance itself. Of course, Muslims say it's a lot of Armenians. But Muslims (inaudible) with the Armenians. But because the -- it wasn't just that you had the small number of -- you know, three young Turks went and killed everybody. If you look at what happened both in 1950 and now what happened in the 1890s, most of these killings were done by communities there (inaudible), some of whom had suffered ethnic cleansing themselves in the Caucuses and in the Balkans and things like this. But I think this is dichotomy to try to say on one side you've got basically the people who came before Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and the young Turks who did all the bad things -- and we can discuss that, and AKP is allowing people to discuss it and suddenly it can distance itself from it. And there's a lot of cherry picking on what can be discussed and what cannot be discussed. So, you can discuss that, but then if you criticize the government you're going to end up being put in prison as a member of Ergenekon.

I think this is very -- this is a very important thing to look at if you look at the reality of what's happening in Turkey today. Certain previously taboo issues can be discussed more easily if they're not seen as being harmful towards the AKP. We've also seen a retrograde step. We've seen Erdoğan, whatever he may have said on Saturday. He's come up very harshly against dismissing these ideas of a claim of a genocide.

When you look also at what's happening in the technology, it's now however much the Turkish authorities may try to close down YouTube and these other 5,000 sites that we're not allowed to access unless we use a proxy server in Turkey at the moment. It's a lot more difficult to isolate the people than it was before. Technological changes made it a lot more difficult to impose a one-size-fits-all ideology on a population. So, there has been some easing on some of these key issues, but it's also the factor of technology, the internet, satellite television, etc. Turks are interested

and exposed to the other side a lot more than they were before.

I will say on these genocide resolutions, these genocide resolutions are making it a lot more difficult to talk about these issues openly in Turkey. If they want these genocide resolutions being put before parliaments in other countries, the atmosphere in Turkey would be a lot more relaxed. And when we see this -- the greater reaction against -- mentions of that, meaning genocide -- it's when there seems to be pressure coming from outside. So, if that pressure was to ease, I think we would see this issue being able to be discussed in a lot more relaxed manner over a period of time. I say it's important to look at which issues can be discussed and which cannot be discussed, and there is an element of cherry picking going on here.

MR. TAŞPINAR: I'm in the business of bridge building, and I'm happy to say that this is a third issue where you agree that basically these genocide resolutions outside Turkey don't help the debate in Turkey. So, it's remarkable that there is some agreement in this panel.

SPEAKER: Thank you. This is Tanine (inaudible) with (inaudible). I wanted to do a follow-up to Mr. Mahcupyan's remarks. I do hear, in my private conversations in Washington, that the prime minister is open to rethink about the history, and so without getting into those private conversations that I do have, I want to ask you when you talk to the prime minister about this facing what the lucid pool, what do you understand that he is implying, that there is a chance in his remarks that he hints implicitly that he may think about naming what happened in 1915 as a genocide? Is this what you hear from the prime minister?

MR. JENKINS: Well, the context was the Armenian issue when he said that. But let me say that 1915 is just one part of the history. You can't understand the Ottoman history from where you start from 1915, but you have to start from the Ottoman

history in order to understand 1915.

Having said that, now, the Turkish population have had a problem with history, which extends Armenian issue and genocide issue. The Turkish people don't know their own history, you know, what -- in all fields, you know? They don't know the real life of Mr. (inaudible). We don't -- we have not read the letters that he has written to his wife or whatever, you know. It's secret. They still think that it's dangerous for the public and so on, and of course we have a manipulated system in Turkey.

The official ideology again has manipulated the public itself with the education system and so on in such a way that history is recreated totally, and by recreating the history we have recreated the society as the Turkish society. We have renamed the society. The Ottoman society was not Turkish, as such. I mean, they were Turks of course, but legally and, you know, as a political system it was not. And that we come to the (inaudible).

By this process, by starting from history, they have recreated the identity, the Turkish identity. Now, what is mean is very crucial, because the Turkish identity means that the Turkish identity is an identity given by the state to the people, which means that without the state there is no Turkish identity in fact. And that's why the proper Turkish citizen feels obliged to protect the state and say whatever the state wants him to say and so on so forth. And this whole thing boils down to history again. So, you have to look at history again with a different view to change all that, you know, all that thing.

So, when AKP is trying to democratize Turkey, they know -- I think they slowly understand that they cannot change the future unless they change the past also. They have to rethink the past so that they can change the future, so that they can have a different future, and when you go the past, Armenian issue is just one of the issues. The real problem is confronting, facing (inaudible) and the continuity between (inaudible) and

the Republic. That's the main thing. And they are coming to that point very slowly, and of course those are risky, you know, waters, and they don't want to lose wars and so on so forth, so it will (inaudible) time. But I can say that the society is moving much faster than AKP, and I think AKP has started realizing that. So, I'm optimistic in that point because of that.

MR. CHEN: Yeah, Chow Chen, free-lance correspondent. I would like to ask a very political question. Is Turkey in EU? Does EU really want Turkey in, and does Turkey really want to get into EU? This two question is involved in how the two sides interpret democracy. Thank you.

MR. TAŞPINAR: What we will do is to take two more questions and try to wrap up.

The gentleman at the back, very back, there was a question. I'm sorry, the lady. Yeah, my apologies.

SPEAKER: I'm Leila (inaudible), columnist of *Gunes Muriat* newspaper in Turkey. I wanted to correct a certain fact, which I think Etyen Mahcupyan has distorted. He said well, we cannot read or we cannot have access to (inaudible), wife of Mustafa Kemal (inaudible) letters to her. Well, the family, the heirs of (inaudible) has forbidden them to be revealed, and there was this court case, so that's a legal decision, and the family didn't want them to be revealed. That was their private life. So, you cannot say this was an official ban on Mustafa Kemal's private life. Thank you for listening to me.

MR. TAŞPINAR: Alia, let's take two more questions -- yeah, Ali and Atchon, then we'll wrap because it's getting late.

SPEAKER: Thank you. Ali Oslon, Washington correspondent (inaudible). Welcome, Gareth. Welcome, Etyen-bey. My question is to Etyen-bey. You

represent the largest Armenian-Turkish newspaper in Turkey, *Agos*. I'm wondering how does your readership see the direction of Turkey. Do they feel safer? Do they feel Turkey is going in a more democratic direction or less democratic direction? Especially I'm curious how they see the Ergenekon case. What are their views on that? Do they feel safer or more threatened because of the case? Thank you.

SPEAKER: Thank you. (Inaudible), Washington correspondent. My question will go also to you, Etyen-bey. You're also writing in *Taraf*, and we don't get to see *Taraf* people a lot here, so I would like to ask your opinion about the accusations about *Taraf's* so-called mission, that it is a propaganda organ of the AKP and it's getting funding from Islam sources. Could you explain that?

MR. MAHCUPYAN: Well, I would like to start with the third. I am happy to hear this, because I'm not taking my salary for eight months now. The newspaper cannot pay, and many of my friends are like me.

Well, it's -- conspiracy is very -- you know, it's something that we know and we are inclined to think of, but I think we have -- we have to realize that with the change in Turkey there was a change in the secular community as well, and the secular community -- we have to face it -- is divided. And one part has its own newspaper and the other part has its own newspaper, like your own newspaper. And, you know, I never think that -- where it gets its money from. I don't ask those questions. I mean, there's no need, because there is a real public that reads (inaudible), you know?

There are -- there is a concrete part of the society that likes that newspaper and so on, and also there's another part -- real people, you know? Secular people, real people that likes to read *Taraf* and believes in what *Taraf* says and so on so forth. So, I mean, *Taraf* I think is one of the results of the change in Turkey. If we didn't have the AKP government, I don't think we would have *Taraf*, politically speaking. But

there is no connection with AKP government, and some of the headlines that we used in the past made the prime minister very, very angry. That I know. I mean, he doesn't feel that he is very close to *Taraf* at all, because -- I know it, because I have talked to him. That's it. I mean, that's normal.

So, I think we have to get accustomed to the idea that it is not only the state and seculars and the models and so on, on the one side, and the other side are the Muslims and so on, and what -- every time we see a secular defending the AKP or delegate it (inaudible), of course because I don't defend everything that they do, but, you know, they sometimes do things that deserve defending, you know? And then we mustn't think that, you know, there is different kind of connection. There's no need for that, because, as I said when I was doing my speech, the existence of AKP is democratizing the country whether they are authoritarian or democrats, and we know that they are more authoritarian than democrats, but that's something else, because the system is changing, and while the system is changing, it is changing the actor as well.

Look at Tayyip Erdoğan 20 years back, and look at Tayyip Erdoğan today. That's obvious, you know. If he has to -- he wants to remain in the government. He has to change, and he knows that.

MR. TAŞPINAR: The question on Armenian community and Turkey EU.

MR. MAHCUPYAN: Armenian community. Well, at least it's obvious that in the last three years we didn't have any political killings. Armenian community when it looks -- it -- the main problem is the properties of the Armenian community as all the non-Muslim communities have those problems, and what we see -- we have AKP government trying to -- as a government tries to solve the problems. We have a new law, but your position takes it to the constitutional court and so on so forth. So, a typical Armenian, when -- if he looks at the picture, he will say obviously that the secular

community or the CHP does not really backing up the demands of the Armenian people in Turkey and is not very inclined to give the rights of the Armenian people in Turkey, whereas there is a government, and I'm not sure that the government wants to give as much as the Armenians wanted to give, you know. That's something else. But when you compare the political parties, that's obvious that, you know, it's much better for an Armenian to have an AKP government than the CHP government. And I have to add that the Armenian people are more inclined to want the CHP traditionally, and they still do. In the last elections still CHP was higher than AKP was. But the -- when you look at the trend, the rise of the AKP was -- it is rising much, much more faster now in the last two -- when you compared it to the last two elections, and the CHP was going down. So, I can say I think that the Armenian community has moved to a kind of a psychological position where they have become more local again, if I can convey what I want to mean. The Armenians are becoming citizens again in Turkey, because in the last maybe 80, 90 years they were trying to survive by, you know, keeping their mouths shut and closing down to themselves, talking to the state behind closed doors and so on so forth. It is not the case now. They are outspoken. They are out in the public sphere. And this is thanks to the new, you know, environment, political environment. And of course being in *Agos****, which is -- which was the newspaper of Hrant Dink, who was killed by a nationalist lad -- you know, there are many lads like that and doing all the killings and they don't have any connections with any institutions and any networks and no -- they are just, you know, kind of anxious people, you know, doing some work -- I don't know. Well, if you -- taking that into consideration, and I know Dink family, of course. I have to say that they are very, very strong believers of the existence of Egenekon and many other things, and they have much, much more information than you and I, because they are in it now. They are very close to the prosecutors, to the government, and so on, and they

get extra information on many things, which is not said and written.

Coming to European Union, well, the most important thing I think is that the European Union is changing its -- is changing right now, and it tests with change. European Union has not yet decided what it is going to be. And the relation between European Union and Turkey depends on that decision mainly. When we come -- when we look at it from the Turkish side, the main thing is not membership. The main thing is the accession process that is going on, because that accession process is a leverage by which Turkey is democratizing, because the accession process has brought new norms and standards and criteria into the Turkish political vision, and that is changing Turkey as an external factor today.

No matter we are members or not, this link I think is getting stronger, and even now people think that, you know, the reformist view of AKP has stopped and so on. Well, politically, yes but technically, no. When you go at the technical level, there is an increased level of relations, let's say, with the European Union bureaucrats and the Turkish between two bureaucratic systems. And Turkey's adapting itself to it technically, and I'm sure that if we are not a member at all, we will be applying those criteria anyway in 5 more years' time, 10 years' time.

MR. TAŞPINAR: Gareth, any remarks?

MR. JENKINS: Just a few things. I'll try and run through them fairly quickly. I won't go on about (inaudible). I'll be very alarmed when it prints things which aren't true and it doesn't correct them afterwards. That would be nice to see.

On terms of the Armenians -- I think I'll speak that of the Armenian community. I'm not going to speak for any of the other minorities in Turkey. But I think perhaps, Ali, if you'd asked the question about all of the minorities in Turkey; I think this would have been more interesting, though we don't have a representative of the others

here. If you talk to the Jewish community, they're more worried than the last few years. Certainly there's been a big increase in anti-Semitism in Turkey, and there's also been anti-Semitism things written in newspapers, like *Yeni Safak*, which is very close to the AKP, and they are more worried than they have been for some years. I think the Armenians generally tend to be more worried about the ultranationalists, and the Jews tend to be more worried about what they regard as radical Islamics.

And of course the other -- now, the elephant in the room whenever we talk about minorities, say Alovies. It's a huge minority. And we can talk for as long as we want about how the -- discussions about the -- whether or not you can talk about the army and genocide more openly before. We haven't seen any real movement on Alovie rights despite the ruling of ECHR on the education, which I mentioned before with compulsory incocation of Sunny Islam in the schools, even though many of these children are Alovies. So, I think it's a -- when you look at the minorities, it's a lot more nuance picture than people on either side would necessarily have you to believe.

History -- I don't know why Etyen's so obsessed with the Young Turks. Let's have an open discussion of history that includes the Ottoman.

I see often in pro-AKP articles saying for example that non-Muslims were not subject to the Sharia and the Ottoman Empire. Oh, yes, they were. So, let's have a - - if you're going to talk about history openly, why do we have to restrict it to people to whom the AKP are opposed? I'm trying to think I had all the dirty laundry from the Young Turk period. These massacres I mention of the Armenians in 1890 -- they took place in Abdul Hamid, long before the Young Turks came to power. So, we're going to have an objective look at history by all means, but let's look at everything objectively, and let's let all people dare to express their opinions whether it goes against what the AKP thinks in its very strong sense of Ottoman nostalgia, which is increasing credibly the last 5 or

6 years. And if it's -- or whether it goes against the Kemalist's view of history. We want to have an open discussion, an open discussion for everybody on all areas of history.

On the EU, there is no joke, and I think it's probably still true unfortunately. Going around to the corridors of Brussels back in 2000 in which an EU diplomat said to one of his Turkish colleagues look, you promise you want to join and we'll -- sorry -- you pretend you want to join and we'll pretend we want you. And I think there's still a large element of that going on. It's a mistake, of course, to see -- look at the EU is a monolith. I think this is a mistake Turks make very much. And if you talk to any EU members -- I mean, it's a miracle, this organization can get anything done at all. There's so many different competing interests and factions within the EU. And I think this is a mistake to say is the EU for or against Turkey? Certain countries are for. Britain, for example, is for. Spain is for. Some other countries are for. I think for Britain, it's mainly to have another big country in against the old enemy, which of course is France. So, when you look at some of the other countries, particularly France and Germany, Austria, and, to a less vocal extent but still an extent, Greece, of course they against Turkish membership. And the Greek Cypriots are more against it than everybody else put together.

So, it's not a simple case of the EU being for or against Turkey. Different countries within the EU have different opinions about Turkish membership. But we have seen, I think, some developments in the last few years. When is the last enlargement -- in 2004. This was very bad from Turkish perspective. It's got a whole lot of countries coming in, and it caused a lot of problems for the EU. The EU still hasn't digested them. Particularly Poland has been problematic for the EU. Poland is famously half as big and half as poor as Turkey and with a very (inaudible) cultural sector, it's still a major headache for the EU to incorporate Poland, and that doesn't (inaudible) well for Turkey.

There have been other things where the direction has or the accession negotiations -- it's either stalled or it's going backwards. A lot of the things the AKP government has done and Erdoğan, himself, has done in recent years have alienated a lot of people inside the EU. If you look at Erdoğan's attitude when they were going to appoint a new head of NATO. The EU members of NATO were horrified. Erdoğan (inaudible) up and said I've talked to other Muslim countries and we don't want this Danish prime minister as head of NATO, because he was prime minister when there was some caricatures about the prophet Mohammad. You have Erdoğan presenting himself to the EU as effectively the representative of the Muslim world. You have him at the time when there's an arrest warrant going out on Bashar of Sudan not only defending Bashar and famously saying, you know, (inaudible) commit genocide, and if that's not political (inaudible), I don't know what is. But he was ready to invite Bashar to Turkey. You have that kind of thing happening on the foreign affairs. That alienated a lot of people in the EU who previously were prepared -- were looking a lot more favorably on Turkey's membership.

So, you have a movement against Turkey within the EU. On the Turkish side there isn't any movement. There isn't any movement towards EU membership. I think one of the problems with Turks -- always this was an emotional thing. I tease my Turkish friends saying you want the T-shirt; you didn't want the membership. And I think there was this thing -- okay, we're going to join the EU; we're going to member this first-class club, and I didn't look at the reality. A lot of EU members face also the peoples are very unhappy with EU membership. They see the EU as being some vast bureaucratic machine who's interfering all the details of their daily lives. When Turkey's faced up to the reality of what the EU means, then we've seen that the AKP and, to be fair, I think the other parties would have balked at the prospect.

For me, there's two things which have been very disturbing about the AKP's attitudes towards the EU. Both have happened this year. One, as I mentioned about the AKP claiming some of these changes the way that these judges were elected particularly for the HSYK and saying this was for EU standards. A report for EU, page 12 -- a report for the EU on this particular issue -- said the justice minister should not be a member of this body, and AKP is now trying to put him as head of this body and saying these reforms are pro-EU. Also Erdoğan has told Egemen Bağış, who's the chief negotiator, to try to renegotiate the customs union with the EU. If you're serious joining the EU, you don't try to renegotiate the customs union. I don't think it's going to be possible anyway, because once you're in the EU, you're stuck with the customs union.

So, this second thing for me is a very clear indication Erdoğan is not expecting Turkey to get into the EU any time soon, and since 2005 we've seen almost no progress whatsoever. You compare Turkey. Of course there have been meetings between the two. If you look at how many chapters have been closed, you compare Turkey with some of the other EU candidate states and the matter of effort that they have put in. Once a country becomes a candidate for the EU, that is the dominant factor in their domestic and their foreign politics. You look at all of the countries that have joined in the last 10 or 15 years. It's a dominant factor, because you have to change so much. If you're a domestic legislation, you have to change also your foreign policy alignment. It's such a huge task, and you have to give it priority; otherwise, you don't get a chance of getting in. This government hasn't give it any priority at all since 2005. If the opposition party is in power, would they have given more priority? No, they wouldn't either. And I think we're now in this position where both of these two parties are moving away from each other, and I don't think, unfortunately, personally, as a British citizen living in Turkey, it would make my life so much easier. But I don't think it's going to happen.

MR. TAŞPINAR: Well, I'm afraid to say our panel's failed to solve all the problems that we discussed. But at least it gave you a good idea, and it's reflected very well how polarized East Turkey, and I hope you will leave Brookings today with a more informed opinion of at least two different positions of what's going on in the country. Please join me in thanking our two panelists.

majority, really having a hand in the political system.

Okay, I can stop here.

MR. TAŞPINAR: I'm sure we have three good questions, and we'll have about 50 minutes for Q&A. I'll take the opportunity to ask the first question, because I think you both agree -- although you disagree on many points, especially the Ergenekon, and we can spend hours discussing the Ergenekon, which I don't think would be a very productive way of spending the next 50 minutes -- but what you seem to both agree on is that Turkey has an official ideology. There is an official ideology. And democracies usually are not in the business of having an official ideology. Britain does not have an official ideology. Sweden, Denmark don't have official ideologies. Democracies -- democracy and -- usually you don't need to have institutions such as -- especially such as the military that need to defend that system, that official ideology under a system of military tutelage. So, help us understand, especially those among us who are not Turks and who are not familiar with the official ideology of Turkey, what this official ideology is, especially in the 21st century. What is the military trying to defend? What is the judiciary trying to defend? What is the York trying to defend? And what is the tread perception? Can Turkey be more -- can Turkey become democratic, in other words, without challenging an official ideology since, in my opinion at least, official ideologies and democratization and democracies don't really match. So, help us understand what

Kemalism means, if this is the official ideology in the 21st century context.

Gareth, let's start with you.

MR. JENKINS: First, you said not to mention (inaudible) I have to say this. Etyen went to read the indictments. I know this, because we -- that's why I say go and look at these things yourself. It's a legal case; it should be based on proof. There's not one shred of proof in the indictments this organization exists. There's not one shred of proof there were people are members in the sense of knowing they are members. There's not one shred of proof there's 5 million Euros that was in the vault of the trade union was going to be used for Ergenekon. The only link between this trade union and another organization named in the Ergenekon investigation, the Association for Kemalist Thought, is once a trade union paid the (inaudible) sandwiches at an organization, at an event organized by the Association for Kemalist Thought. There's no other evidence there whatsoever.

The same with these killings he mentioned. There is no evidence linking Ergenekon to the -- in this sense from a legal perspective, it doesn't matter if Ergenekon exists or doesn't exist. It matters whether you can prove it exists. That is the basis of the rule of law. And I think that's a very important thing if people form a (inaudible) like Etyen who hate the military want to see the military behind everything. Even if you're right, you have to prove it. This is just the rule of law. It's a very, very important distinction. So, come toward -- I must say Etyen and I agree -- we don't have to agree. It's in the Turkish constitution. The Turkish constitution says that Turkey has to be loyal to the precepts set down by Kemal Atatürk.

I think the problem here is not so much what Kemalism says; it's the interpretation of what Mustafa Kemal Atatürk said. As I mentioned when I gave my presentation, the two most important principles from the perspective of the military in

particular are secularism and the Turkish unitary state. Most of those things are embedded in the Turkish constitution, and the problem in Turkey has always been what do you mean by the Turkish unitary state and what do you mean by secularism?

If you ask me, Turkey isn't a secular state. If you have -- though you ban the wearing of the head scarf university but the incocation of Sunni Islamic beliefs are compulsory in all high schools, according to the constitution that's not the secular state. So, I think you have to be very careful about some of these terms. But the adherence to Kemal (inaudible) is in the constitution. It's not really a matter for Etyen and I to decide.

Under those two principles, I think the key question is how you interpret them, not what they are. And that's where I think also there are lots of the people on the Islamic side of the political spectrum. They would say the problem is not in the unitary stage or with secularism. It's how you interpret these two things.

In terms of whether any democracy has an ideology, yes, some of them do, particularly with religious -- in (inaudible) to a religious belief that they do. Whether -- from my perspective, whether they should have or not is another thing. I don't think any ideology should be in there. But there are democratic states that have an ideology embedded in their constitution. We don't -- in Britain, we don't have a constitution. Simple as that.

MR. TAŞPINAR: Easy way out.

Etyen, do you have anything else?

MR. MAHCUPYAN: Well, regarding the Ergenekon, okay, have new ideas, but I wonder what -- for example, if you come to Turkey and tell this to Dink family, for example, what do they think of your ideas, I mean, it's, I mean.

In Turkey, we are living in it, and we have been living in it for a hundred years now, what -- our fathers have lived in it, our grandfathers have lived in it. So, yes,

you are right. I mean, there has to be proof, and, you know, if there's no proof and they are, you know, set -- they are let, you know, go out, you know, from the jails and they are free, I mean, I'm not disturbed myself. I mean, that's okay with me. The important thing is that the public, the population, the people of Turkey can understand what is happening really. So that we cannot repeat it. That's the important thing. Not punishing the people.

But coming to the constitution of (inaudible), of course, that -- the constitution is made in 1980 that we use today after the coup d'état by the military people, you know, and if you say that since it's in the constitution everything stops, then the constitution is like a holy book, and you know then, well, why -- you know, why, well, what have we against the Islamic thing, you know, because they have a holy book also and, you know, if we cannot change the constitution, if we can just scrap it and realize again what are we, you know? We are not democrats anyway. We are not -- it not a democracy anyway, so on so forth. So, I mean, constitution means nothing. It can be rewritten to the wishes, demands, and choices of a society, and in fact theoretically it is rewritten every day, so if the demands are changing, it should be changed, and, you know, in our constitution there are articles that cannot even offer to change. No. And those articles are so weak that you can put everything into those linked -- everything into -- link everything to those three articles and cite doesn't stop any reforms in Turkey, and that's what the judicial system is doing for many years now.

So, let's go to the ideology itself. Now, Kemalism -- if we are going to call it that -- ideology, if you look at it from the standards of what we have today, does not go very deep. It's a very superficial ideology. I mean, it's to be modern, to be contemporary, to be secular, and so on. But also an authoritarian mindset.

So, what is happening there is Turkey has imported modernism or modernity, which has two legs, in fact. One is the relativistic mindset where you have the

individualization and so on so forth; and the other is the authoritarian mindset where you have the nation state and so on. But we don't have the first one. For so many decades we didn't have it. Still I'm not very sure we have, you know, digested it properly. But we have the second one where (inaudible) very, you know, strongly. The nation state and authoritarian tutelage system over it, and thus inner threats, the public, the population has mistaken as a drawback and so on. So, this is the official way of looking at things, and I don't think that it deserves respect at this age anymore. I mean, it's something passé, but it has created a polar situation, and the polar situations are based on institutions, which have their own culture and their own power relations; and, of course, they repeat itself you know. So, it's not very easy to go recreate the system.

In Eastern Europe, the system had collapsed first, and then they changed it for a totally different perspective. The thing that is done in Turkey -- what we are doing in Turkey, what we are living for in Turkey is changing it while the system persists, and that is totally something else. That's why we have Ergenekon. Yes, we have to prove it still, but we know that it's there. And it is not only outside us there as an organization that can be, you know, just put away by the Australians and so on. It's there because of the official ideology. That is the official ideology. So, what military is doing is a military system for a routine work, for its routine work, is planning coup d'état. That's a totally different picture than what a democracy is and what it should be.

So, the official ideology is a power system of the military and judiciary, mainly the bureaucracy, over the political system, which is linked to the demands and choices of the population.

MR. JENKINS: Now that we solved this problem, we can move onto other ones.

MR. TAŞPINAR: Other ones, please. Yes, sir.

MR. KAUFFMAN: Microphone?

MR. TAŞPINAR: Yes, it's coming. Please identify yourself. You just passed --

MR. KAUFFMAN: Thank you. Okay, I'm Don Kauffman. I'm a retired U.S. foreign service officer.

A Turkish officer once told me that prosecutors in Turkey are judged not by the number of cases they win but by the number of cases they bring, that their responsibility is to charge as many people as much as possible and leave it up to the courts to straighten things out. I'm wondering what -- whether there's an element of careerism in this Ergenekon operation.

MR. TAŞPINAR: Element of careerism in the Ergenekon operation.

MR. JENKINS: You want answers. It's impossible for me tell, to say. I think there's a large element in our defensiveness in -- because even though this Ergenekon thing -- organization doesn't exist. These so-called sledgehammer coup plot is not real. Go and have a look at it in detail and make your decision for yourself. You don't have to believe me, as I said. But just because these things are absurd doesn't mean people don't believe it. And some of the people involved in the Ergenekon investigations, same as Etyen, even though it doesn't exist, they genuinely believe it exists. And the problem is for the prosecutors and some of the people involved in the investigation -- and you can see there was -- it was a rolling recently about Ergenekon. They couldn't find any evidence to link these accused people actually on a wiretap. If you listen to the wiretap, they couldn't find the evidence of any association with Ergenekon. Therefore, they said that shows how clever this organization is, you know? And that's -- so they said we've got to do something else against it. And there was a real fear amongst the prosecutors and some of the police that because they can't find the

organization, because they can't find any real proof, therefore the organization is so immensely powerful they have to take everybody in; otherwise, they're going to get killed. This kind of circular reasoning is absurd I think to anybody who looks at it rationally from outside, but it's a very important element.

I think there's -- we've always seen in the judicial process in Turkey there's certain times people on both sides of the ideological divide who grandstand for their audiences, and I think that can be an element, you know? This is a public event. If I say that one of those prosecutors is doing this, I can be tried myself for slander and anything else. But I think that has been an element in several high-profile cases in Turkey, and I said on both sides of the ideological divide.

MR. TAŞPINAR: As a follow-up to that, Gareth, you keep saying Ergenekon does not exist. Do you think there's a deep-state phenomenon in Turkey? Does deep state exist?

MR. JENKINS: If you read my report, I say at least twice this is Ergenekon investigation is a terrible missed opportunity to go after the reality of the deep state, because it doesn't deal with the reality of the deep state. It deals with a conspiracy theorist's conception of the deep state.

Etyen mentioned there's not actually (inaudible) military documents in any of these -- the three Ergenekon indictments to date, so you can forget about these patriotic officers in regard to Ergenekon. There's a couple of documents that are cited. One of them is the nationalist pipedream. On page 60 of the first indictment it quotes from it and this is the document Etyen was referring to. It's (inaudible) 1999 called The Restructuring of the State, and says in this quote on page 60 of the first indictment -- it says as a supposed quote from this document, "What are our weak points" -- or our shortcomings, a better translation --" and it says, "We are not an organization." And yet

the Ergenekon indictment says this organization has always existed, and they put the juice, a document, which shows that it doesn't exist. And in fact, where the guys says, "What are our strong points? We're Turkish. We're strong. We're brave. We're prepared to die for our ideals." And there's nothing else there at all. And if you look at -- I say if you look at the indictments, you look at reality what it's claimed to be, every active political violence in the 20 or 30 years in Turkey, including controlling the PKK, including controlling Hezbollah, including killing Hrant Dink, including killing the missionaries in Malatia, including killing the Italian priests in (inaudible), including attacks on (inaudible), everything else it claims to it. And is there any one piece of concrete proof to link it to it? No. Is it possible some of these people (inaudible) by ultra nationalist racists? Of course. Nobody has a monopoly of violence in Turkey. Every political ideology in Turkey has committed violence, has killed people. But there is no evidence to say that it's all done by one huge organization.

MR. TAŞPINAR: Etyen, would you agree that Ergenekon more than an organization, because there's an official ideology in Turkey and because the military is the guardian of that ideology, is more of a mindset that would do certain things in order to protect the state and the way they do these things is a product of a mindset more than a kind of organization. It's an ideology essentially. It's a mindset more than an organization.

MR. MAHCUPYAN: There are people. There are goals. There are documents. There is money. And, you know, there is an organization. Now, the weak point -- they have told -- they have said for themselves that our weak point is that we are not an organization and what we expect they did the next day. Became an organization. Because why do you put it in a paper? Why do you write the paper like that and say that our weak point -- the weak points are points that, you know, that should be corrected.

So, a friend of mine was saying the other day the system is so corrupt that when you stop talking about it, you solve the conspiracy. You know, it solves that conspiracy. But it's so corrupt, and all those retired generals and so on -- the thing is this is -- this was done before we know them -- this was repeated in several instances in history, and we -- the AKP government after 2002 -- Turkey has come to a historical point which is -- which resembles very, very much 1915, -16, -17, -18, and so on.

A parenthesis is closing now. There was a parenthesis opened up in 1920s and it is closing now. We will have a totally different constitution in 5 or 10 years' time, and we will have a totally different relation of military civil relations, totally different judicial system, and so on so forth. It is very, very difficult to, you know, insist on the same system anymore.

And when we look at the secular community in Turkey, what I see, because, you know, most of our friends, are coming from them -- I mean, from the secular community -- what I see is -- can only be called a calculated ignorance. The secular public -- maybe we have counterparts in the west also. The secular public does not want to know what is happening, because they know, you know, in their hearts, you know, that the things that -- the reality will not fit into their ideological expectations or their idea -- their approach to politics in Turkey, their understanding of what Muslim is and so on so forth. The secular community I think was shocked seeing a Muslim community rising like it is from -- like it is happening right today Octavia and they were shocked seeing a party like AKP who is, you know, pro-West and pro-European Union and so on so forth, and they want to do these reforms. They want to do all the reforms that is needed to become a democracy, and they cannot do all. Why? Because of their position, who is -- which -- the part which is secular, you know. I mean, there is something wrong here. And if we cannot understand the picture, then of course we

cannot understand what the official ideology is and so on. Official ideology is (inaudible) that we don't want to give as seculars. That's the official ideology. And some of the seculars, like myself, we don't want that anymore. We are democrats, and we want to change, and if the majority is Muslim, we want to live with those Muslims as long as they as democrats, too; and they are changing, and that's the good part of it.

MR. TAŞPINAR: You said as long as they are democrats, too, but the problem is that most of the secularists don't believe that they are democrats, that the AK Party is not -- you, yourself, said it's not a very democratic party. They are the agent of change in Turkey, but they're not really people who --

MR. MAHCUPYAN: Sure.

MR. TAŞPINAR: -- were brought up in this democracy or --

MR. MAHCUPYAN: Sure. Sure, they are learning. Well, you know, the reality -- how do you understand the (inaudible)? We look at change, and what is the changing thing, you know, in Turkey? Muslims. Not the seculars. Not the army. Not the judiciary. And when I say change, I mean the real change, the change in the mindset. Not the change in the power relations and not the change in the, you know, what's the word -- I mean, what you can put in that sentence -- but the mindset. And the Muslim community in Turkey has taken a long step towards being a more -- having a more democratic approach to itself, to its -- to his religion or her religion and also to the world. So, that's why we are having all those problems. Otherwise, if we had a party like (inaudible), the problems are military, you know, because a coup d'état is legitimate then. But with AKP, a coup d'état is not legitimate, because this is a pro-western Islamic party.

MR. TAŞPINAR: Would you agree with that, Gareth?

MR. JENKINS: Which part?

MR. TAŞPINAR: The AK party's approach -- AK party's and pro-change.

The AK party is representing the change of the Muslim community in Turkey and that the secularists are presenting more status quo-oriented mentality.

MR. JENKINS: I think really Etyen shot himself in the foot by saying the secularists. It's true to a certain extent there are secularists who don't want to change, but he said it's the idea of projecting saying they know how things how are; they don't look at reality. But you are adopting the same policy towards the Ergenekon case by not looking at the reality of what's there.

I think in the --

MR. MAHCUPYAN: What's there?

MR. JENKINS: There's nothing there. Read the indictment.

MR. MAHCUPYAN: There's always a very easy, you know --

MR. JENKINS: Read the evidence and make a decision. Don't forget.

MR. MAHCUPYAN: I can look at your -- see nothing. You are not there, you know. There's nothing there.

MR. JENKINS: I'm fatter than you think.

When you look at changes in Turkey -- I think if you look at -- you see changes on both sides, and that -- again you say by the military. (Inaudible) this invention of this being this division within the military. It's not true. But if you look at the attitudes of the military how they've changed, they have changed. You know, you look at the military today, particularly the younger officers, and you look at the military 30 years ago, one thing is they know they cannot behave like they did 30 years ago. Even they wanted to, they cannot do it. They -- now, you've got to understand that the military have a lot more contact with the outside world on a lower level than people do in the AK party because they go on these major postings. They have a lot of contact with the fellow officers from other countries. They see how the militaries of all in those other countries,

and they see these are countries which are more developed than they are. So, they understand that things have to change, that it has to be a continuous process. Of course there are some very conservatives. There were still, you know, people within the -- I mean, it's a very, very broad term. I think it's a mistake to see the AK party or AK party supporters as a homogenous whole. I think you can see within the AK party a certain number of them. Well, as they've moved into the political mainstream, some of them -- one very prominent member of the AK party said to me directly -- he said you could understand that when we were younger we lived in a very narrow social circle, and now as we've come out of this (inaudible), we understood we cannot do what we want. Maybe we were to, you know -- and ideally we'd like to have Sharia law, etc., some of us. But we can't do it. It's impossible. And if we need to get a majority, but we can't do it. So, I think you do see changes. This idea that, you know, one side isn't changing and the other side is changing I think is over-simplistic.

MR. TAŞPINAR: Yeah. I would like to report I found another issue where you both take (inaudible) that the military is changing, that the military is divided and they have --

MR. MAHCUPYAN: Well, they are changing politically. They are forced to change. They are changing their strategies, their stance. But what about the mindset? The real change is in the mindset, you know. That will be the change which will change the other things, and having a majority of Muslims in a country is very important. It's very crucial, because if they don't change, really, I mean, in the minds, then there's no democracy ever in Turkey.

MR. TAŞPINAR: Okay. One, please, non-Ergenekon-related question to expand the debate.

MR. CARDITA: Yeah, I'll be more than happy not ask an Ergenekon

question. I'm Martin Cardita from Voice of America Armenian Service. Well, we've been following a lot of -- of course, if we can see a lot of transition within the Turkish society at least from outside, it's definitely to debate on the Armenian genocide that has definitely depended a lot more during the last 2, 3 or, I would even say, 5 to 10 years -- 5 years more than 10 years.

We've been hearing a lot of the -- of course the Turkish intellectuals writing about the issue. We've been hearing a lot of the signals coming from within the Turkish society, but we've been also seeing AKP party, as you were suggesting, a new, progressive pro-democracy party, playing a pretty, let's say, changing role within the Army and Turkey discussion. I mean, we just heard the Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoğan announcing twice that he's going to actually deport the illegal Armenian immigrants from Turkey, and only illegal Armenian immigrants, no other legal immigrants. So, this was of concern from the Armenian side.

And of course as you would show, talking about a lot of the different trends within Turkey, while we talk about Armenians in Armenia and Armenians overseas talk about possible border opening, a lot of fear comes from that perspective, too, Armenia being authoritarian regime itself, the society doesn't want to add more problems coming from Turkey, setting aside the economic and other issues that can be on the positive side. So, within this context, how does the growing genocide discussion, international discussion, impact the Turkish political circles? Because back in the day, the genocide discussion was actually a matter that was more consolidating the Turkish political circles. So, please --

MR. TAŞPINAR: -- question so that Gareth can also participate. You started your debate saying is Turkey more democratic today and your conclusion was no. But I think that other people would agree that the Kurdish question, the Armenian

question -- certain taboos of Turkish history are being debated today more openly than before. So, maybe we should take this question in that framework of isn't Turkey after all, despite all these trials and tribulations, going in the right direction in terms of freedom of speech?

Let me first turn to Etyen and then get your feedback on that.

MR. MAHCUPYAN: Well, you're interested in the political circles as far as I see, how they are influenced and so on. Now, when you -- we come to political circles -- you know, we have the political parties as actors. Now, the other political parties, like MHP and CHP, are obvious what they think and do. I mean, they are totally against this opening up the border, and anything related to the Armenian affair and so on is seen as a threat by them. AKP is different, but it's a political party, and like in the Kurdish question, for example, they took one of two steps and they saw that they are losing votes in the western part of the country. So they stopped. Being a political party, they want to be reelected and be in the government. That's the main, you know, thing that they want. So, having (inaudible) real pressure on them from the opposition, so they are slow, and they're going zig-zags of course. So, it is very difficult to look at what AKP is doing and understand their strategy related to Armenia, because the main thing now is the coming elections in one year's time, and they want to be in the government again, and that's the main thing.

Now, when we come to -- I think is the more fundamental question: How the Turkish public is influenced by everything, you know? They are not influenced positively by the -- by those proposals in the parliaments of the Western countries regarding the genocide. They have a kind of a reaction to that. But when you go into the society itself, when you observe what is going on there, you see that we have a much, much more relaxed society regarding the Armenian issue and Armenian genocide today.

When you go -- if you go to Anatolia, you talk to people, they are more than ready to tell you stories. They use the word "genocide," and it's opening up again. And who are doing these things, you know? Who is the opening-up actor in the Turkish society? Not seculars again. In fact, the seculars are against it. But the Muslims. Because the Muslims were the ones who protected the Armenians. If there are Armenians, you know, surviving today in Turkey and elsewhere, they owe this, especially -- when I say "elsewhere," I mean the people who have gone after the genocide, left Turkey after the genocide. I, myself, as well -- we all owe our lives to one or two Muslims who are neighbors to those Armenians. They protected them. Because otherwise the (inaudible) people in the state were willing to kill maybe all of us, you know. So, this is one of the things.

Second, there were many Armenians who live as Muslims today in Turkey.

And third, of course, with this view opening up in the mindset, the Islamic -- the Muslims have realized that the Islamic identity is an identity which does not need the Turkish identity, you know, as a backup. Islamic identity is the global identity on its own, and it's enough. So, then the distance between that (inaudible) and the Islamic community today became largest, you know. So, there was a more objective view to the (inaudible) era by the Muslims, and then they were much more ready to say what they really feel and, you know, remember. So -- and that will influence AKP as well.

You know, there was a breakfast that the prime minister arranged because -- arranged for the prime minister and about 50 journalists and novelists and so on just last Saturday, and I was there, and in his speech the prime minister said that we are searching -- (inaudible), lucid, let's say -- we are looking for -- we are searching a lucid pool so that we can look at us, at our face, and confront ourselves, and this he said

regarding the Armenian question and genocide issue. So, what he was saying is that the water is running so fast and is so blurred that don't expect me to say what I really think or, you know, what you want me to say. But if we reach a lucid pool so that we can look and see our face, you know, in it, then we will be ready to say it.

So, we have to understand that this was -- this is a political party after all, and, you know, they have their own interests and so on. It's a huge political party, and it's the only political party which has some kind of a representational, you know, link, let's say, with the society. So, AKP will change, has to change as the society changes in Turkey, and this will be the case regarding the Armenian issue as well.

MR. TAŞPINAR: Gareth?

MR. JENKINS: I think I mentioned about this cherry picking. I mean, certain -- and I also mentioned about the AKP spring back in the beginning of its first term in power. There are certain issues which are easier to discuss in Turkey now than there were before. But I think Etyen has demonstrated that very clearly in what he said then.

The Armenian genocide is an issue from which the AKP thinks it can distance itself. Of course, Muslims say it's a lot of Armenians. But Muslims (inaudible) with the Armenians. But because the -- it wasn't just that you had the small number of -- you know, three young Turks went and killed everybody. If you look at what happened both in 1950 and now what happened in the 1890s, most of these killings were done by communities there (inaudible), some of whom had suffered ethnic cleansing themselves in the Caucuses and in the Balkans and things like this. But I think this is dichotomy to try to say on one side you've got basically the people who came before Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and the young Turks who did all the bad things -- and we can discuss that, and AKP is allowing people to discuss it and suddenly it can distance itself from it. And

there's a lot of cherry picking on what can be discussed and what cannot be discussed. So, you can discuss that, but then if you criticize the government you're going to end up being put in prison as a member of Ergenekon.

I think this is very -- this is a very important thing to look at if you look at the reality of what's happening in Turkey today. Certain previously taboo issues can be discussed more easily if they're not seen as being harmful towards the AKP. We've also seen a retrograde step. We've seen Erdoğan, whatever he may have said on Saturday. He's come up very harshly against dismissing these ideas of a claim of a genocide.

When you look also at what's happening in the technology, it's now however much the Turkish authorities may try to close down YouTube and these other 5,000 sites that we're not allowed to access unless we use a proxy server in Turkey at the moment. It's a lot more difficult to isolate the people than it was before. Technological changes made it a lot more difficult to impose a one-size-fits-all ideology on a population. So, there has been some easing on some of these key issues, but it's also the factor of technology, the internet, satellite television, etc. Turks are interested and exposed to the other side a lot more than they were before.

I will say on these genocide resolutions, these genocide resolutions are making it a lot more difficult to talk about these issues openly in Turkey. If they want these genocide resolutions being put before parliaments in other countries, the atmosphere in Turkey would be a lot more relaxed. And when we see this -- the greater reaction against -- mentions of that, meaning genocide -- it's when there seems to be pressure coming from outside. So, if that pressure was to ease, I think we would see this issue being able to be discussed in a lot more relaxed manner over a period of time. I say it's important to look at which issues can be discussed and which cannot be discussed, and there is an element of cherry picking going on here.

MR. TAŞPINAR: I'm in the business of bridge building, and I'm happy to say that this is a third issue where you agree that basically these genocide resolutions outside Turkey don't help the debate in Turkey. So, it's remarkable that there is some agreement in this panel.

SPEAKER: Thank you. This is Tanine (inaudible) with (inaudible). I wanted to do a follow-up to Mr. Mahcupyan's remarks. I do hear, in my private conversations in Washington, that the prime minister is open to rethink about the history, and so without getting into those private conversations that I do have, I want to ask you when you talk to the prime minister about this facing what the lucid pool, what do you understand that he is implying, that there is a chance in his remarks that he hints implicitly that he may think about naming what happened in 1915 as a genocide? Is this what you hear from the prime minister?

MR. JENKINS: Well, the context was the Armenian issue when he said that. But let me say that 1915 is just one part of the history. You can't understand the Ottoman history from where you start from 1915, but you have to start from the Ottoman history in order to understand 1915.

Having said that, now, the Turkish population have had a problem with history, which extends Armenian issue and genocide issue. The Turkish people don't know their own history, you know, what -- in all fields, you know? They don't know the real life of Mr. (inaudible). We don't -- we have not read the letters that he has written to his wife or whatever, you know. It's secret. They still think that it's dangerous for the public and so on, and of course we have a manipulated system in Turkey.

The official ideology again has manipulated the public itself with the education system and so on in such a way that history is recreated totally, and by recreating the history we have recreated the society as the Turkish society. We have

renamed the society. The Ottoman society was not Turkish, as such. I mean, they were Turks of course, but legally and, you know, as a political system it was not. And that we come to the (inaudible).

By this process, by starting from history, they have recreated the identity, the Turkish identity. Now, what is mean is very crucial, because the Turkish identity means that the Turkish identity is an identity given by the state to the people, which means that without the state there is no Turkish identity in fact. And that's why the proper Turkish citizen feels obliged to protect the state and say whatever the state wants him to say and so on so forth. And this whole thing boils down to history again. So, you have to look at history again with a different view to change all that, you know, all that thing.

So, when AKP is trying to democratize Turkey, they know -- I think they slowly understand that they cannot change the future unless they change the past also. They have to rethink the past so that they can change the future, so that they can have a different future, and when you go the past, Armenian issue is just one of the issues. The real problem is confronting, facing (inaudible) and the continuity between (inaudible) and the Republic. That's the main thing. And they are coming to that point very slowly, and of course those are risky, you know, waters, and they don't want to lose wars and so on so forth, so it will (inaudible) time. But I can say that the society is moving much faster than AKP, and I think AKP has started realizing that. So, I'm optimistic in that point because of that.

MR. CHEN: Yeah, Chow Chen, free-lance correspondent. I would like to ask a very political question. Is Turkey in EU? Does EU really want Turkey in, and does Turkey really want to get into EU? This two question is involved in how the two side interpret democracy. Thank you.

MR. TAŞPINAR: What we will do is to take two more questions and try

to wrap up.

The gentleman at the back, very back, there was a question. I'm sorry, the lady. Yeah, my apologies.

SPEAKER: I'm Leila (inaudible), columnist of *Gunes Muriat* newspaper in Turkey. I wanted to correct a certain fact, which I think Etyen Mahcupyan has distorted. He said well, we cannot read or we cannot have access to (inaudible), wife of Mustafa Kemal (inaudible) letters to her. Well, the family, the heirs of (inaudible) has forbidden them to be revealed, and there was this court case, so that's a legal decision, and the family didn't want them to be revealed. That was their private life. So, you cannot say this was an official ban on Mustafa Kemal's private life. Thank you for listening to me.

MR. TAŞPINAR: Alia, let's take two more questions -- yeah, Ali and Atchon, then we'll wrap because it's getting late.

SPEAKER: Thank you. Ali Oslon, Washington correspondent (inaudible). Welcome, Gareth. Welcome, Etyen-bey. My question is to Etyen-bey. You represent the largest Armenian-Turkish newspaper in Turkey, *Agos*. I'm wondering how does your readership see the direction of Turkey. Do they feel safer? Do they feel Turkey is going in a more democratic direction or less democratic direction? Especially I'm curious how they see the Ergenekon case. What are their views on that? Do they feel safer or more threatened because of the case? Thank you.

SPEAKER: Thank you. (Inaudible), Washington correspondent. My question will go also to you, Etyen-bey. You're also writing in *Taraf*, and we don't get to see *Taraf* people a lot here, so I would like to ask your opinion about the accusations about *Taraf's* so-called mission, that it is a propaganda organ of the AKP and it's getting funding from Islam sources. Could you explain that?

MR. MAHCUPYAN: Well, I would like to start with the third. I am happy to hear this, because I'm not taking my salary for eight months now. The newspaper cannot pay, and many of my friends are like me.

Well, it's -- conspiracy is very -- you know, it's something that we know and we are inclined to think of, but I think we have -- we have to realize that with the change in Turkey there was a change in the secular community as well, and the secular community -- we have to face it -- is divided. And one part has its own newspaper and the other part has its own newspaper, like your own newspaper. And, you know, I never think that -- where it gets its money from. I don't ask those questions. I mean, there's no need, because there is a real public that reads (inaudible), you know?

There are -- there is a concrete part of the society that likes that newspaper and so on, and also there's another part -- real people, you know? Secular people, real people that likes to read *Taraf* and believes in what *Taraf* says and so on so forth. So, I mean, *Taraf* I think is one of the results of the change in Turkey. If we didn't have the AKP government, I don't think we would have *Taraf*, politically speaking. But there is no connection with AKP government, and some of the headlines that we used in the past made the prime minister very, very angry. That I know. I mean, he doesn't feel that he is very close to *Taraf* at all, because -- I know it, because I have talked to him. That's it. I mean, that's normal.

So, I think we have to get accustomed to the idea that it is not only the state and seculars and the models and so on, on the one side, and the other side are the Muslims and so on, and what -- every time we see a secular defending the AKP or delegate it (inaudible), of course because I don't defend everything that they do, but, you know, they sometimes do things that deserve defending, you know? And then we mustn't think that, you know, there is different kind of connection. There's no need for

that, because, as I said when I was doing my speech, the existence of AKP is democratizing the country whether they are authoritarian or democrats, and we know that they are more authoritarian than democrats, but that's something else, because the system is changing, and while the system is changing, it is changing the actor as well.

Look at Tayyip Erdoğan 20 years back, and look at Tayyip Erdoğan today. That's obvious, you know. If he has to -- he wants to remain in the government. He has to change, and he knows that.

MR. TAŞPINAR: The question on Armenian community and Turkey EU.

MR. MAHCUPYAN: Armenian community. Well, at least it's obvious that in the last three years we didn't have any political killings. Armenian community when it looks -- it -- the main problem is the properties of the Armenian community as all the non-Muslim communities have those problems, and what we see -- we have AKP government trying to -- as a government tries to solve the problems. We have a new law, but your position takes it to the constitutional court and so on so forth. So, a typical Armenian, when -- if he looks at the picture, he will say obviously that the secular community or the CHP does not really backing up the demands of the Armenian people in Turkey and is not very inclined to give the rights of the Armenian people in Turkey, whereas there is a government, and I'm not sure that the government wants to give as much as the Armenians wanted to give, you know. That's something else. But when you compare the political parties, that's obvious that, you know, it's much better for an Armenian to have an AKP government than the CHP government. And I have to add that the Armenian people are more inclined to want the CHP traditionally, and they still do. In the last elections still CHP was higher than AKP was. But the -- when you look at the trend, the rise of the AKP was -- it is rising much, much more faster now in the last two -- when you compared it to the last two elections, and the CHP was going down. So, I can

say I think that the Armenian community has moved to a kind of a psychological position where they have become more local again, if I can convey what I want to mean. The Armenians are becoming citizens again in Turkey, because in the last maybe 80, 90 years they were trying to survive by, you know, keeping their mouths shut and closing down to themselves, talking to the state behind closed doors and so on so forth. It is not the case now. They are outspoken. They are out in the public sphere. And this is thanks to the new, you know, environment, political environment. And of course being in *Agos****; which is -- which was the newspaper of Hrant Dink, who was killed by a nationalist lad -- you know, there are many lads like that and doing all the killings and they don't have any connections with any institutions and any networks and no -- they are just, you know, kind of anxious people, you know, doing some work -- I don't know. Well, if you -- taking that into consideration, and I know Dink family, of course. I have to say that they are very, very strong believers of the existence of Ergenekon and many other things, and they have much, much more information than you and I, because they are in it now. They are very close to the prosecutors, to the government, and so on, and they get extra information on many things, which is not said and written.

Coming to European Union, well, the most important thing I think is that the European Union is changing its -- is changing right now, and it tests with change. European Union has not yet decided what it is going to be. And the relation between European Union and Turkey depends on that decision mainly. When we come -- when we look at it from the Turkish side, the main thing is not membership. The main thing is the accession process that is going on, because that accession process is a leverage by which Turkey is democratizing, because the accession process has brought new norms and standards and criteria into the Turkish political vision, and that is changing Turkey as an external factor today.

No matter we are members or not, this link I think is getting stronger, and even now people think that, you know, the reformist view of AKP has stopped and so on. Well, politically, yes but technically, no. When you go at the technical level, there is an increased level of relations, let's say, with the European Union bureaucrats and the Turkish between two bureaucratic systems. And Turkey's adapting itself to it technically, and I'm sure that if we are not a member at all, we will be applying those criteria anyway in 5 more years' time, 10 years' time.

MR. TAŞPINAR: Gareth, any remarks?

MR. JENKINS: Just a few things. I'll try and run through them fairly quickly. I won't go on about (inaudible). I'll be very alarmed when it prints things which aren't true and it doesn't correct them afterwards. That would be nice to see.

On terms of the Armenians -- I think I'll speak that of the Armenian community. I'm not going to speak for any of the other minorities in Turkey. But I think perhaps, Ali, if you'd asked the question about all of the minorities in Turkey, I think this would have been more interesting, though we don't have a representative of the others here. If you talk to the Jewish community, they're more worried then the last few years. Certainly there's been a big increase in anti-Semitism in Turkey, and there's also been anti-Semitism things written in newspapers, like *Yeni Safak*, which is very close to the AKP, and they are more worried than they have been for some years. I think the Armenians generally tend to be more worried about the ultranationalists, and the Jews tend to be more worried about what they regard as radical Islamics.

And of course the other -- now, the elephant in the room whenever we talk about minorities, say Alovies. It's a huge minority. And we can talk for as long as we want about how the -- discussions about the -- whether or not you can talk about the army and genocide more openly before. We haven't seen any real movement on Alovie

rights despite the ruling of ECHR on the education, which I mentioned before with compulsory incocation of Sunny Islam in the schools, even though many of these children are Alovies. So, I think it's a -- when you look at the minorities, it's a lot more nuance picture than people on either side would necessarily have you to believe.

History -- I don't know why Etyen's so obsessed with the Young Turks. Let's have an open discussion of history that includes the Ottoman.

I see often in pro-AKP articles saying for example that non-Muslims were not subject to the Sharia and the Ottoman Empire. Oh, yes, they were. So, let's have a - - if you're going to talk about history openly, why do we have to restrict it to people to whom the AKP are opposed? I'm trying to think I had all the dirty laundry from the Young Turk period. These massacres I mention of the Armenians in 1890 -- they took place in Abdul Hamid, long before the Young Turks came to power. So, we're going to have an objective look at history by all means, but let's look at everything objectively, and let's let all people dare to express their opinions whether it goes against what the AKP thinks in its very strong sense of Ottoman nostalgia, which is increasing credibly the last 5 or 6 years. And if it's -- or whether it goes against the Kemalist's view of history. We want to have an open discussion, an open discussion for everybody on all areas of history.

On the EU, there is no joke, and I think it's probably still true unfortunately. Going around to the corridors of Brussels back in 2000 in which an EU diplomat said to one of his Turkish colleagues look, you promise you want to join and we'll --sorry -- you pretend you want to join and we'll pretend we want you. And I think there's still a large element of that going on. It's a mistake, of course, to see -- look at the EU is a monolith. I think this is a mistake Turks make very much. And if you talk to any EU members -- I mean, it's a miracle, this organization can get anything done at all. There's so many different competing interests and factions within the EU. And I think this

is a mistake to say is the EU for or against Turkey? Certain countries are for. Britain, for example, is for. Spain is for. Some other countries are for. I think for Britain, it's mainly to have another big country in against the old enemy, which of course is France. So, when you look at some of the other countries, particularly France and Germany, Austria, and, to a less vocal extent but still an extent, Greece, of course they against Turkish membership. And the Greek Cypriots are more against it than everybody else put together.

So, it's not a simple case of the EU being for or against Turkey. Different countries within the EU have different opinions about Turkish membership. But we have seen, I think, some developments in the last few years. When is the last enlargement -- in 2004. This was very bad from Turkish perspective. It's got a whole lot of countries coming in, and it caused a lot of problems for the EU. The EU still hasn't digested them. Particularly Poland has been problematic for the EU. Poland is famously half as big and half as poor as Turkey and with a very (inaudible) cultural sector, it's still a major headache for the EU to incorporate Poland, and that doesn't (inaudible) well for Turkey.

There have been other things where the direction has or the accession negotiations -- it's either stalled or it's going backwards. A lot of the things the AKP government has done and Erdoğan, himself, has done in recent years have alienated a lot of people inside the EU. If you look at Erdoğan's attitude when they were going to appoint a new had of NATO. The EU members of NATO were horrified. Erdoğan (inaudible) up and said I've talked to other Muslim countries and we don't want this Danish prime minister as head of NATO, because he was prime minister when there was some caricatures about the profit Mohammad. You have Erdoğan presenting himself to the EU as effectively the representative of the Muslim world. You have him at the time when there's an arrest warrant going out on Abashar of Sudan not only defending

Abashar and famously saying, you know, (inaudible) commit genocide, and if that's not political (inaudible), I don't know what is. But he was ready to invite Abashar to Turkey. You have that kind of thing happening on the foreign affairs. That alienated a lot of people in the EU who previously were prepared -- were looking a lot more favorably on Turkey's membership.

So, you have a movement against Turkey within the EU. On the Turkish side there isn't any movement. There isn't any movement towards EU membership. I think one of the problems with Turks -- always this was an emotional thing. I tease my Turkish friends saying you want the T-shirt; you didn't want the membership. And I think there was this thing -- okay, we're going to join the EU; we're going to member this first-class club, and I didn't look at the reality. A lot of EU members face also the peoples are very unhappy with EU membership. They see the EU as being some vast bureaucratic machine who's interfering all the details of their daily lives. When Turkey's faced up to the reality of what the EU means, then we've seen that the AKP and, to be fair, I think the other parties would have balked at the prospect.

For me, there's two things which have been very disturbing about the AKP's attitudes towards the EU. Both have happened this year. One, as I mentioned about the AKP claiming some of these changes the way that these judges were elected particularly for the HSYK and saying this was for EU standards. A report for EU, page 12 -- a report for the EU on this particular issue -- said the justice minister should not be a member of this body, and AKP is now trying to put him as head of this body and saying these reforms are pro-EU. Also Erdoğan has told Egemen Bağış, who's the chief negotiator, to try to renegotiate the customs union with the EU. If you're serious joining the EU, you don't try to renegotiate the customs union. I don't think it's going to be possible anyway, because once you're in the EU, you're stuck with the customs union.

So, this second thing for me is a very clear indication Erdoğan is not expecting Turkey to get into the EU any time soon, and since 2005 we've seen almost no progress whatsoever. You compare Turkey. Of course there have been meetings between the two. If you look at how many chapters have been closed, you compare Turkey with some of the other EU candidate states and the matter of effort that they have put in. Once a country becomes a candidate for the EU, that is the dominant factor in their domestic and their foreign politics. You look at all of the countries that have joined in the last 10 or 15 years. It's a dominant factor, because you have to change so much. If you're a domestic legislation, you have to change also your foreign policy alignment. It's such a huge task, and you have to give it priority; otherwise, you don't get a chance of getting in. This government hasn't give it any priority at all since 2005. If the opposition party is in power, would they have given more priority? No, they wouldn't either. And I think we're now in this position where both of these two parties are moving away from each other, and I don't think, unfortunately, personally, as a British citizen living in Turkey, it would make my life so much easier. But I don't think it's going to happen.

MR. TAŞPINAR: Well, I'm afraid to say our panel's failed to solve all the problems that we discussed. But at least it gave you a good idea, and it's reflected very well how polarized East Turkey, and I hope you will leave Brookings today with a more informed opinion of at least two different positions of what's going on in the country. Please join me in thanking our two panelists.

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