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WELCOME REMARKS

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Presentation of Survey Findings

PRESENTATION OF SURVEY FINDINGS

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IMPLICATIONS OF THE SURVEY RESULTS

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P R O C E E D I N G S

RICHARD BUSH: Why don't we go ahead and get started. We have a lot to do, and we don't have very much time to do it. My name is Richard Bush. I'm the director of the Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies at The Brookings Institution next door. For this noontime, imagine yourself in a Brookings space. Thank you all very much for coming. I think that this is going to be a very interesting program. It's a very important program, and we are very pleased and proud today to collaborate with the Chicago Council on Global Affairs. It is led by a dear friend and former colleague of mine, Marshall Bouton, and the project that we are going to hear about, Soft Power in Asia, was directed by Christopher Whitney, who is an important person at the Chicago Council. Two other good friends of mine, David Shambaugh and Gordon Flake, are on the program as well. But I think that we should move right into it and I would like to invite Marshall Bouton to say a few words of welcome.

MARSHALL BOUTON: Thank you, Richard. It is a great pleasure to be working with Richard anytime. We do go back a long way together and I've always valued the colleagueship and the friendship.

On behalf of the Chicago Council on Global Affairs, I want to welcome you all here today. The great turnout here is one part -- certainly one part due to the convener, The Brookings Institution and CNAPS, and one part, I hope, due to this study, which we think is particularly timely. And we thought we had planned it well in terms of the timing, but the timing has turned out to be even more fortuitous. I want to thank Brookings and the Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies and Richard, in particular, for collaborating in the release of the study. There's no better way to get the word out.

First a few words of background about the study. It is a joint project of the Chicago Council on Global Affairs and the East Asia Institute in Seoul, Korea. It's funded by the -- primarily by the Korea Foundation for which we are very grateful, and also by the *JoongAng Ilbo*, a daily newspaper in Korea for those of you who don't know. In fact, the *JoongAng* carried an article in this morning's edition in Seoul.

The origins of the study go back into the Chicago Council's now 34-year history of working on public opinion in the United States, concerning international affairs and U.S. foreign policy. In recent years, as some of you may be aware, we decided to extend our work and to, from time to time, do comparative public opinion studies. We started that in 2002 with a focus on Europe. And then in 2004 had comparative work on Mexico and Korea, which led us into a close collaboration with the East Asia Institute and in particular, Kim Byung-kook, then its director and now national security advisor to President Lee.

The decision criterion behind the selections was that we were always trying to look at parts of the world that were in some kind of dynamic relationship with the United States. In the case of Europe, you know, this was 2002 – after the great rupture between ourselves and the Europeans over Iraq had begun to rip the fabric of transatlantic relations. In 2004, our relationship with our neighbor, Mexico, was in trouble because of the immigration issues, and, of course, Korea was going through its own changes. The North Korean nuclear issue was front and center in a very divisive way. And then in 2006, we did a much broader study looking at perceptions in the United States and China and India, Japan, Korea, of the changes in relationships between the United States and China and India, particularly. That was a report that came out under the guise of the title of "The Rise of China and India."

East Asia Institute approached Chris Whitney not long after that study was completed and asked if we would be interested in working with them on a study of soft power in East Asia because the 2006 study revealed a number of very interesting public perceptions of how the relationship was changing. And so we went ahead with the support of the Korea Foundation, clearly knowing that this was probably going to come out sometime before the Olympics.

The person who really masterminded the concept as well as the implementation surrounding this study is Chris Whitney, our executive director for studies, who has also been our director of, frankly, all of our task forces and study groups and public opinion work over the last seven years and has done a fabulous job. He's unfortunately leaving us at the end of this month and going to be coming to Washington, D.C., to take up an important new position here. But both Chris and I felt we had need of expertise in this area that neither of us possessed, and we turned to David Shambaugh who became the senior project consultant for our work. We immersed him in the technicalities of public opinion work, which I think was painful at times for him, but hopefully a net benefit over time. He, of course, brought great expertise and insight on the issues we were trying to probe.

Steven Kull of the Program on International Policy Attitudes here in this building, who has collaborated with us in our other public opinion work, and Ben Page of Northwestern University, two of the leading public opinion specialists in this country who work on international issues, are parts of the team, as were Silvia Veltcheva of our staff and David Tolya of our staff and Greg Hollock as a consultant to the Chicago Council.

As you will hear in considerable detail from Chris in just a moment, the findings – the key findings of the study are surprising to many – surprising to a degree that we had not anticipated. In particular in two respects, and there's sort of good news and bad news here. And, in particular, good news and bad news for an incoming U.S. administration, whoever its leader is. And we

hope that this study will prove useful to incoming policymakers as they try to set new policies for this part of the world.

On the one hand, the kind of big headline, as you may have seen in the *New York Times* today, is that the U.S., despite all our worries about the decline of U.S. influence and reputation in East Asia, is still doing pretty well in terms of perceived soft power. Even as, arguably, our hard power, or certainly our ability to project our hard power, both military and economic, is being stretched by economic difficulties at home and by the demands on our military that are coming now from the Middle East.

On the other hand, the bad news, if you will in this story, is very clear findings that Chinese and American attitudes towards each other's countries are diverging rather dramatically. This presents a big challenge to the incoming administration, to the incoming President, to enter into a conversation with the American people and to develop a narrative for the American public around which we can build consensus on a long-term and sustainable relationship with China. But right now the American public is moving away from even a kind of constructive acceptance of the rise of Chinese power. Perhaps the greatest risk, of course, in all of this -- as you here in Washington know well, but I in the Midwest perhaps know even better because we're not in the Beltway -- is that the risk that the incoming administration will just not pay much attention to Asia at all. Given the demands that we've placed on it to address critical issues in the Middle East, as well as a whole bucket full of domestic concerns.

So with that, I thank you again for being here and thank Richard for joining with us and ask Chris Whitney to come and present the results.

CHRISTOPHER WHITNEY: Well, thank you. I'm going to walk us through the key findings of the survey. There's a lot more content included in the overall survey results than what's here. We passed out copies of the reports, and even that really is only touching on some of the overarching key results that we came across. And if you want, on our website, actually as we speak, there are already copies of that report together with the top-line results that go into much greater detail on the wide variety of issues that we looked at.

As Marshal indicated, this is something we did with the East Asia Institute. It involved survey research in six countries: The United States, China, Japan, South Korea, Vietnam, and Indonesia, with representative national samples in each. In total, over 6,000 people were surveyed, and the fieldwork was carried out in January and February of this year. There were approximately 40 to 60 questions asked in each country, and we generally structured it so that there were three corollaries of inquiry. First, we wanted to look at overall levels of influence or perceived influence for the four critical countries of the United States, Japan, China, and South Korea (how they were perceived by the other five). Then we

wanted to look very specifically at soft power as defined by five key areas: economic, cultural, diplomatic, political, and human capital, and asked a variety of questions related to each of those. And then finally, we wanted to look at attitudes towards regional integration and what that means for East Asia as a whole.

I will try to explain to the greatest degree possible the actual results as I go through them. I realize this is a very long room and the people in the back may not be able to see all of the numbers. But I'll give you a sense of exactly what is included. Most of the graphics that are in here are actually in the report, so you'll be able to see them there as well.

Before we start talking about the soft power findings, I think it's useful to just look at a few key results related to the overall U.S.-China dynamic and perceptions of the rise of China. And as you probably would expect, there is a strong sense that China is on the rise and that it is going to be the future of Asia.

This graphic shows the results from two questions. The first asked the respondents whether or not China will be the leader of Asia in the future. And there you see very clear majorities in every country, with the exception of Indonesia, saying "yes" to that. And the second question asked people whether or not they were comfortable with this as an outcome. And there you see much lower responses. You actually have majorities in every country, with the exception of Vietnam, saying that they are "very or somewhat uncomfortable" with that potential outcome. On a separate question, we asked whether or not people perceived China to be making a mainly positive or mainly negative contribution on a whole in Asia, and there you get majorities in every country saying it's actually making a "positive contribution." So the picture is relatively nuanced. People have a positive perception of the role China is playing in Asia, but they are worried about where China would go as it develops its power in the region.

On the flip side of this, you have very strong and potentially surprising findings or results related to the U.S. role in the region. People do not see the U.S. diminishing as a power in Asia. This question asked whether or not over the past ten years the level of U.S. influence in Asia has decreased, increased, or stayed about the same. And what's really interesting is that for all the Asian countries, you have either majorities or pluralities who say that U.S. influence has actually "increased" over the past ten years, and that the Americans are concentrated with a plurality saying it's remained "about the same." Now Americans are actually the least optimistic about the level of U.S. influence in the region. They're behind all the Asians on this. And you only have very small minorities who say that U.S. influence has actually "declined." On a separate question, majorities of Japanese, Koreans, and Indonesians all say that the United States has the greatest military influence in Asia, and Chinese actually give the

U.S. military influence a slightly lower level than they give themselves, 8.0 compared to 8.1. This is on a different question -- that's on a 0-10 scale that 8.0 versus 8.1. And in addition, majorities in every country surveyed, with the exception of Indonesia, say that the United States is playing a "mainly positive role" in Asia.

One troubling thing that we found, and Marshall touched a little bit on this in his opening remarks, is that there appears to be a worrying disconnect between how Americans and Chinese perceive each other. And you can see it from this very basic graphic here. This is showing on a 0-100 scale overall favorability ratings for the other country, and you can see that American attitudes towards China have declined from 2004 to 2006 to now in 2008, starting at 44 and now lowered to 35. Whereas Chinese attitudes or favorability to the United States have actually increased from 2006 to 2008, from 51 to 61, and if you look at the 2008 total, there is a 26 degree gap separating Chinese perceptions of the United States and U.S. perceptions of China. And this is reinforced as we will see in a lot of the data points where the Chinese tend to be much more positive about the United States than Americans are about China.

Now turning to the actual soft power results, as I mentioned before, we looked at five categories. This is the first one: economic power. And at the most basic level, you have a graphic here that looks at overall economic influence in Asia. This is on a 0-10 scale. It compares the results for China and the United States, and you have two pretty interesting findings here. One, that people in these surveyed countries generally see the two countries as being approximately at the same level. One is slightly ahead of the other for each of the six. And the second interesting thing is that Americans, Chinese, and Japanese, the top three groupings or the grouping at the top, all see China as being slightly ahead, whereas Koreans, Vietnamese, and Indonesians all see the United States as being slightly ahead in terms of economic influence in Asia.

But there's much more clear differentiation when you look at the importance of the United States and China as economic partners. Here the United States does better than China for every country, with the exception of Indonesia where they are tied as an economic partner. What's really interesting here is looking at the gaps that separate U.S. perceptions of China and Chinese perceptions of the U.S. The Chinese are much more optimistic about the value of their relationship with the United States than Americans are about the value of their economic relationship with China.

Turning to Japan, this is the same question. It's looking at overall level of economic influence in Asia, and the scores for Japan generally are at the same level or slightly lower than that of China. The scores for Vietnam and Indonesia, in particular, are both number one overall. They're both tied with the scores they gave to the United States, 8.0 and 7.9, with China trailing. And the

U.S. score for Japan at the very bottom, 7.3, is actually higher than the score given for China as well, whereas in the other countries, they see China as ahead of Japan. South Korea is seen as a middle-level power in terms of its overall economic influence in the region.

In turning to the economic -- the importance of the economic relationships, Japan does very well here, as well, particularly in Southeast Asia. This is something we'll see throughout the results; Japan does very well across the board in attitudes among Indonesians and Vietnamese in terms of its economic relationships, its cultural relationships, diplomatic relationships, and other areas. The U.S. score for Japan at the bottom, that 7.2, is significantly higher than the 6.5 score that they gave China. So Americans value the economic relationship with Japan at a higher level than they do with the relationship with China.

Now these are just a limited few of the economic results that we have. We asked a wide variety of questions and we thought in order to facilitate the presentation of these results, it made sense to develop a series of indices. These indices were developed using questions that were equally scalable; they're all on 0-10 scales or 0-100 scales, so that you could take the results and average them out. They were all parallel across countries, so you're always comparing like and like. And this graphic here shows the results for the economic soft power index. It's on a scale from 0-1, so the columns down show the soft power ratings for, first, the United States, then China, then Japan, then South Korea. And then on the left you have the individual countries that rate them. We did not ask people to rate their own countries, so within the United States, China, and Japan, they're only rating three other countries. But the Indonesians and the Vietnamese rated all four. This index is actually composed of twelve separate questions. It includes the ones we just looked at, economic influence and the importance of economic relations. It also includes questions related to product quality, the importance of product origin on purchasing decisions, the role that different countries play in helping other countries develop their economies, the competitiveness of those economies, the degree to which countries have leading multinationals, and a few other questions, and at the very back of the report there is a listing of the questions that went into each one of these indices.

Now as you see from looking at this -- and this is going to be a consistent pattern across the board -- the U.S. does very well, particularly in East Asia. It's number one in China, Japan, and South Korea. And Japan does very well in Southeast Asia. It's number one in Indonesia and Vietnam, with China generally in third place or sometimes in second place for all the countries. South Korea's generally seen as not doing as well in this area, but that is probably to be expected. As we'll see going forward, it actually does better in other areas, particularly cultural and diplomatic.

And turning to diplomatic soft power, this graphic is on a 0-10 scale. It compares China and the United States and their effectiveness in promoting policies to people in Asia. And what you see from this is that the United States generally is seen as being more effective in promoting its policies to people in Asia. Only the Chinese think that China's more effective. On a separate question, only small minorities in all the surveyed countries, with the exception of China, have heard much if anything about the Chinese concept of a "harmonious world". The U.S., in turn, does actually quite well here. The scores are all between 6.1 and 7.1, which is actually relatively high compared to some of the other questions we've seen. On several other questions that we looked at, the U.S. is seen as being pretty effective in policy promotion. Its democracy promotion over the last few decades is seen as positive in Asia by majorities in every country. And its ideas on free markets are seen as highly influential by majorities in all of the countries surveyed as well. The United States is also seen as better than China at diplomatic problem solving. This looks at overall problem solving of diplomatic problems in Asia on a 0-10 scale. The United States is ahead of China in every country, with the exception of Indonesia, at the very bottom. It's very striking to look at the difference between the U.S. score for China and the China score for the U.S. Chinese give the U.S. a score of 6.0, and Americans give China a score of 3.8. It's a very substantial gap there.

We also asked two very specific additional questions that got at actual situations and evaluated the diplomatic abilities of the respective countries. Of those, the first related to reducing tensions between China and Taiwan, and it found a very surprising result. You get two-thirds of Chinese who say that the United States has been somewhat or very effective in reducing tensions between China and Taiwan, whereas the Chinese are seen by majorities of Americans, Japanese, and South Koreans as being ineffective on the same question. We then asked a similar question on the North Korean weapons program, and the U.S. again does very well in reducing tensions and resolving that, whereas China is seen by majorities among Chinese, Japanese, and South Koreans as being effective in that, whereas only the Chinese see China as being effective in helping to solve the North Korean problem.

Both Japan and Korea are generally seen as effective in policy promotion. This is the same question that we just saw. What's really interesting is looking at the China score for Japan, it's near the bottom: it's 5.9. This is on a 0-10 scale and it's surprisingly positive. It's not the equivalent of 59 percent, but it's above five, it's above the mean point, and it's reinforced by some other findings that we had -- which indicated that China is not uniformly negative on Japan. You get a majority of Chinese who say that Japan is playing a positive role in Asia. And here, and in some other questions, you actually see recognition of some Japanese diplomatic efforts in the region as well.

These scores for Vietnam and Indonesia for Japan are actually at the top, generally tied with the United States. And this reinforces the point I made earlier about the very positive attitudes in Southeast Asia towards Japan.

And here is the diplomatic soft power index. It's comprised of eight questions, including the ones we just looked at, together with the degree to which countries respect sovereignty, the degree to which they build trust, the degree to which they provide assistance in responding to humanitarian crises, their leadership of international institutions as well. And here again the United States does very well; it's either first or second in every country. Japan is, again, first in Southeast Asia. It's also first among Americans, and South Korea is number one in the eyes of Chinese, and that's something that we consistently found that the Chinese have very high regards for Korea and its various attributes within the soft power categories.

Then we looked at political systems and this graphic is a comparison -- it's a question that asks, on a 0-10 scale, the degree to which the U.S. and Chinese political systems serve the needs of their people. And we did not ask the Americans and Chinese to rate their own systems; they only rated each others. And what you see is a consistent pattern of people rating the U.S. political system as being better for the needs of Americans, and they rate the Chinese system as being good for the needs of Chinese. And there's a very significant gap at the bottom between Chinese perceptions of the U.S. system, 7.4, and American perceptions of the Chinese system, 4.0.

And here is the political soft power index. It's comprised of only two questions. The question that we just saw (we also asked that question for the South Korean and Japanese political systems, but for time purposes, we can't really go into the display of that here), and a question on the degree to which countries respect human rights and the rule of law. And here the United States generally does very well again. It comes out first and second in Indonesia, which is very interesting because the Indonesians tend to rate the U.S. lower on some of the other categories we looked at, but there's general admiration for the U.S. political system. And Japan also does very well. China tends to lag behind both, and sometimes behind South Korea as well here.

Next we looked at culture, and we had a whole series of questions that looked at cultural influence. Start off by looking at the most basic level. This graphic looks at two separate questions. The first the degree to which U.S. – here we're looking at U.S. culture – has influence on the popular culture of each other country. And the second question looks at the percentage of people in those countries who think that that influence is positive. And what you see is a very broad, pervasive sense that U.S. cultural influence is quite strong in Asia. The scores for overall influence are either first or second for every country asked. And you get majorities in every country saying that that influence is positive, with

the exception of Indonesia. In addition, the United States scores highest on having an appealing popular culture in every country, with the exception of Vietnam. And U.S. cultural spread or the spread of U.S. culture in Asia is seen as positive by majorities of every country, with the exception of Indonesia. Finally, we asked the question on frequency of watching movies and using -- or watching movies and listening to music and using other cultural products of countries, and the U.S. scores the highest on frequency of use by far across the board. What's really interesting is the Indonesia result here. The Indonesians say that they give the U.S. the highest score for having an appealing popular culture; they give the U.S. the highest score for level of cultural influence in Indonesia, but they tend to think that that influence is negative, which is an interesting result.

China, in turn, scores lower generally across the board, but – or more so in East Asia – this is looking at the same two sets of questions. It does very well in Vietnam. Those are the highest scores, I believe, that the Vietnamese gave. But China does less well in the United States and in South Korea. What's really interesting is that you get very mixed attitude among Americans and South Koreans on whether or not Chinese cultural influence is positive. You actually don't even get majorities in either country who say that it is positive. And on a similar question on the spread of Chinese cultural influence being positive or negative, it's seen as positive by every country, but again, Americans and the South Koreans said that it is not positive. And so the Koreans, in particular among the Asians, are showing a very mixed outlook towards China and its influence in Korea.

This is a similar graphic, looking at Japan and South Korea. This is the area where South Korea appears to do the best. Its culture is seen as quite influential in most of the countries surveyed. The Korean scores for Vietnam were number two overall after the China score, and Japan also does very well in both of those countries. What is interesting is the South Korean score for Japan is 7.0, meaning that they perceive Japanese culture as being very influential in Korea. The Japanese score for South Korea is lower, 6.1, and as we will see in the next slide which looks at the degree to which those influences are positive or negative, there's a general flipping of that attitude where Koreans are much more negative on whether or not that's a positive influence or not. Only 49 percent say it's positive, whereas the Japanese, 79 percent of them say that Korean cultural influences in Japan are generally positive. Vietnamese are very positive on both. Indonesians look like they're much less positive, but that 52 percent who say that Japanese cultural influence in Indonesia is positive is actually the only majority in Indonesia that said that for any country.

One final note that's interesting here is that the China score for Japan, 59 degrees, is surprisingly positive -- or 59 percent of Chinese saying that Japanese cultural influence in China is positive is surprisingly positive; it reinforces the earlier point that I was making.

And then here is the cultural soft power index. It's comprised of seven questions. It includes the ones we just looked at together with the degree to which each country has an appealing popular culture. Its richness of cultural heritage, its value as a tourist destination, the frequency of use or viewing for cultural products, and again, the U.S. does very well in East Asia, does not do as well in Southeast Asia, it's actually generally last or second to last among the Vietnamese and the Indonesians. And that's where China does the best in that region. China is actually scoring the highest in Indonesia and Vietnam, and it also scores the highest in -- or excuse me, and in turn South Korea does very well here, with the Chinese saying it's number one for them.

We asked four questions related to human capital. One looked at the importance of different languages to success in the world. The second looked at levels of education of different populations. The third looked at science and technological advancements. And then the fourth looked at the quality of universities in the countries. And this is probably where the United States does the best overall. You get 96 -- majorities of 96 to 100 percent in every Asian country who say that it's necessary to know English in order to succeed in the world. U.S. universities score the highest of all of the schools that were surveyed, and U.S. technological achievements are seen as being on a par with those of Japan, at the top. Japan also, for obvious reasons, does very well here, with China and South Korea tending to lag behind.

And then finally on the indices, this is an overall index, it's just an average of the five others. And it's a general repeat of what we've seen. The U.S. comes out first, then China, Japan, and South Korea, and Japan comes out first in the United States, Indonesia and Vietnam, with China being third in every country and South Korea either second or fourth.

Finally – and this is just a few final slides – we looked at the issue of integration in Asia, whether or not it's happening and what it means for the region. Here -- and whether or not there's an emerging East Asian identity that can be measured. This graphic looks at three separate questions: self-identification among Chinese, Japanese, and South Koreans; comparing their own nationality; their sense of being Asian; and their sense of being East Asian. And it's descending from being one's own nationality to being Asian, to being East Asian, with the Chinese consistently the most optimistic and the Japanese having the least sense of identification of this. What is interesting is that even the weakest score here, 5.4 for Japanese perceptions of being East Asian, is still above 5.0, so there's some sense even at the weakest level of identifying with that construct. And in addition there is support among those three populations for deepening trade and, in some instances, political relationships in the region. On the left you have the percentages who favor a free trade area, including China, Japan, and South Korea. And you have strong majorities in all three countries

who support those. But you only have support among the Chinese for including the United States in that. What's really interesting is that you have 56 percent of Americans who would want to join this if it were to happen. That's despite the fact that only 41 percent of Americans would want to have a free trade agreement with China. We did find that you get 59 percent of Americans who would want a free trade agreement with Japan, and a plurality of 47 percent who would sign one with Korea.

And then finally on the right you have an EU-like constructing forum, and they are the Koreans and the Chinese. You get majorities supporting that, but the Japanese generally don't want to have any part of it.

And then finally, looking at the potential for conflict, we wanted to see whether or not perceptions of integration meant that the potential is declining or not. And here you're looking at the percentages in each country who view China, Japan, or the United States, as a potential future military threat. And they tend to be quite high. China is seen by 76 percent of Americans and 62 percent of Chinese as a potential military threat in the future. South Koreans, 74 percent see China as a future military threat, and 66 percent see Japan as a potential future military threat. What's also interesting is that the results for the U.S. in South Korea and Japan are surprisingly high, 43 percent and 49 percent. I don't think that's indicative of a sense that the United States is going to attack either country, but rather that the U.S. might take actions that would be seen as detrimental to their interests.

And then the very last slide looks at what would happen in the region if the United States decided to withdraw its military forces. And you get majorities in every country who say that the likely result would be that China and Japan would compete in an arms race for supremacy in East Asia.

So I will stop there and turn it over to Richard.

DR. BUSH: Thank you very much, Christopher, for walking us through what is a very rich and detailed report. No Washington program would be complete without the expert panel, and we haven't disappointed you here. Our first expert is David Shambaugh from George Washington University. David.

DAVID SHAMBAUGH: Thanks, Richard. First I'd like to commend the Chicago Council for not only undertaking this study, an unprecedented study in fact, of enormous importance to the study of international relations of East Asia, but bringing the results to the attention here in Washington, a city obsessed with hard power. It's very important, I think, for us in this city to pay some attention to these issues. And the report has, as Christopher has just indicated, produced a number of counterintuitive, and you might call counter-popular, findings. I'm not going to run through them; he's already noted several.

But to any old Asia hand, there are a number of things in this report that jump out at you statistically. Some that surprised me, many that surprised me, some I anticipated. But I, myself, just want to thank you for involving me in the project. I learned an enormous amount, particularly on the methodological side. It took me back to my graduate school days.

So that's the first broad point I'd like to make. Secondly, neither Marshall nor Christopher mentioned this, but what results you have before you today are just the tip of the iceberg. There is a fuller report that will be released later in the summer, much more lengthy and nuanced and detailed, although the raw data you have available to you today.

Third, I think for me there are three big takeaways from the findings of this report, some of which Christopher has already noted. The first of which is that American soft power in Asia remains extremely robust despite questions over the last eight years about the degree of American commitment, diplomatic commitment, to the region. Now this is a very good basis on which the next administration can build, and it's evidenced that Asians as people in other parts of the world can distinguish between U.S. government and U.S. society. But I would say there still needs to be a major investment made in public diplomacy, American public diplomacy, in Asia and at home. In fact, the very last sentence of the report I would draw your attention to on the need, particularly in the U.S.-China case, to work on public education here in the United States about China.

Second big takeaway for me has to do with China, and that China soft power is not nearly as great as it's been cracked up to be. I had a kind of intuitive sense that this may be the case, but I didn't really realize the extent to which until the data came forth. While the PRC does receive a fairly positive rating as to whether its influence in Asia is positive or negative, it scores decidedly less well on a whole variety of other indicators.

High levels of Asian publics, except Vietnam – and here's one of the counterintuitive findings given the historical and contemporary animosities between those two countries – are very uncomfortable with the idea of China one day becoming a leader and most powerful nation in East Asia, although, as Christopher pointed out, they expect it to be. Concerns about China -- the growth of Chinese military power anticipated and confirmed. They are particularly pronounced. But what another surprising finding is that perhaps as a result when asked about – and it's in the report, but not in the slides that Christopher just gave you – high percentages in Japan and Korea, 69 and 68 percent, respectively, favor the United States seeking to constrain or contain – I think the term used in this question was contain – the rise of China's regional political and military power, while only 51 percent of Americans do so, that is to say seek to contain or think it's a good idea to contain China's rising military power. Now this finding is particularly surprising for me with respect to South Korea, but it may show that,

in fact, there has been a rather progressive erosion of the honeymoon in that relationship and that the South Korean perceptions of China, about which Gordon will talk more, have soured somewhat. But all nations surveyed, as the slide indicated, want the United States to remain very engaged and deployed in Asia. But it's interesting that, at least in the South Korean and Japanese cases, they favor, seem to favor, what in this town is called the U.S. hedging strategy against China, which is a kind of pseudonym for soft containment. So that's an interesting finding.

Surprisingly, China's regional diplomacy is also not seen to have been all that constructive or important. That's kind of counterintuitive; we give the Chinese a lot of credit for the Six-Party Talks for example. And even Myanmar, and even with restraint in cross-straight relations. All three of those are found not to be the case in this survey, minus Myanmar. We didn't ask the Myanmar question. China gets lukewarm ratings on the Six-Party Talks and on Cross-Strait relations. I smuggled into the questionnaire this question about the harmonious world, because anybody who goes to China hears about it ad nauseam. The Chinese are investing enormously in propaganda resources and popularizing this concept of the harmonious world, yet their investments have not paid off. It resonates next to nil across the region, so there's a lot work for the Chinese propaganda authorities to do there.

But on a whole range of issues concerning China as a government society and culture, the essence of soft power, the PRC fairs poorly, more poorly than expected. And figure 4 in the report is indicative of that. China's cultural heritage, history, competitive economy, and science and technology, those four elements fair well, but with respect to whole cluster of societal soft power indicators, brand names, product quality, sports, music, clothing, movies, food, religion, television, universities, intellectual contributions, and so on, China scores modestly to poorly. All nations surveyed, except Vietnam, also said that they do not share values in common with the Chinese. So these are sobering findings when one reads books like Joshua Kurlantzick's *Charm Offensive* and other writings in recent years about China's soft power successes in Asia.

Now when it comes to U.S.-China relations, Christopher's already tipped you off about the main finding there. The sort of discordant findings between positive Chinese perceptions of the United States, and negative American perceptions of China, and in the American case, declinigly negative perceptions of China. The thermometer index shows that the Chinese rate the United States as an average of 60.8 percent, while Americans rank China at a mean of 35 degrees -- sorry, 60.8 degrees, Americans rank the Chinese at an average of 35 degrees with 51 percent of Americans ranking China below 50 degrees -- this is on a Fahrenheit scale, of course. So in the Chicago Council's 2004 and 2006 and now 2008 surveys, we find a decline of 44 to 40 and now to 35 percent favorability ratings by the American public towards China. Not good

news, but this is good social science. So there's a big disconnect here between American views of China, generally negative, and Chinese views of the United States, generally and surprisingly positive frankly; didn't expect to find that either. But there's a lot of educational work that needs to be done in this country in regards to China. So overall, despite China's distinct progress at home in recent decades, it apparently continues to meet with mixed-to-negative reactions in the United States and in Asia. And, indeed, if you put this together with the recent Pew Global Attitude survey on Europe, which showed China now in all European Union countries, except Spain, to be the number one threat to European publics, I think eclipsed the United States after eight years in that dubious category. We see some pretty negative views abroad about China worldwide.

The final takeaway for me is on China-Japan, and there is much more positive news here certainly. And again, somewhat unexpected given the history here and the numerous polls that have been done on both sides of this dyadic relationship in recent years, but this survey shows a general -- a considerable positive warming trend in mutual perceptions across a whole range of indicators in the post-Koizumi period. And we know in the post-Koizumi period, there has been an uptick in diplomatic exchanges -- most recent of which was Hu Jintao's state visit to Japan last month, and the joint statement that was issued during that visit, and even in the last few days the joint agreement on oil and gas exploration. .Because this survey was carried out before Hu Jintao's visit to Japan and certainly prior to this agreement, one, therefore, might find even more positive imagery today if we were to take it out.

But the importance of this I cannot overstress: East Asia is simply not stable unless China-Japan relations are stable. The last century plus of history shows that to be true in spades. And so we see now, both at the state-to-state level but also, according to this survey, at the kind of society-to-society level very important qualitative changes. Buried within those changes the most important of which I think is that the Chinese now welcome a regional role for Japan, a., and b., in concert with China. If you read the joint statement, in particular, and the speeches of both leaders of both sides, the Chinese are no longer trying to keep Japan in a box, which is essentially, crudely put, what they have been trying to do for the last quarter century. China now apparently welcomes Japan's regional role, even global role, and seems willing to work with it in tandem in East Asia for the maintenance of joint security and stability. This offers, I think, the United States a major challenge but also a major opportunity. Richard is going to speak more to the American side of this, but I think it's time for the U.S., China, and Japan, to start giving some really creative thought to a whole series of trilateral governmental-level cooperation. It's time that our American President, Japanese Prime Minister, and the Chinese President, begin to meet together for an annual summit. I would suggest the same thing, by the way, for the U.S., E.U., and Chinese leaders. And to think about things like joint maritime security cooperation, counterterrorism, a whole slew of nontraditional security issues, but I

think that this offers a great opportunity, not just a challenge for all three countries. Thank you.

DR. BUSH: Thank you very much, David. Now we turn to Gordon Flake, the executive director of The Maureen and Mike Mansfield Foundation. Gordon?

GORDON FLAKE: Well thank you. It's a great pleasure to be here as well and to focus on kind of the odd man out in this process. I should start off by complimenting the authors of this report and their co-sponsors in Korea because in looking at this report, it's very easy when you think about Northeast Asia to think of China, Korea, Japan, United States, but in the words of the Sesame Street rhyme that I used to sing when I was a little kid, "One of these things is not like the other." You've got three enormous super powers, you know, both military, economic -- and then you have a relatively small middle power in South Korea. And I was just doing sort of a back-of-the-envelope calculation over there, looking at the initial chart. I might refer to -- those of you who have on your seat the actual report -- I might refer to a couple of the charts that I point out, things that I found particularly interesting, but if you look at the initial chart on page 3, I just kind of totaled up, you know, county by country each of the columns and it's quite remarkable that in terms of the overall soft power average, that South Korea slightly outranks China, right? And again, we can just take that for granted, but if you step back and think about it, a tiny country with a population of 45 million people, you know, sitting next to 1.3 billion people and the presumptive, you know, "next super power of the world" at this point is outranking them in the rankings of the other countries. And so it's a very interesting and useful perspective of a way of looking at this. It's also interesting how relatively little variance there is between the other four and the broader, kind of -- there isn't like this stark day-and-night difference when you put them all together, when you're looking at three different perspectives.

What I would propose to do today is first just give some things that really struck my attention in going through the process, and then try to put this in the context of Korea itself and really focus most of my remarks and context in Korea. I do think that the particular focus on Korea's soft power is interesting in that this was co-sponsored by one of the kind of new and really emerging think tanks in South Korea, the East Asia Institute. That really has come to kind of represent the vibrant civil society in South Korea, where in China or Japan you'd be hard pressed to find another think tank along that same mold that would be able to, or competent to, participate on this level on a project like this. And the fact that that was supported by the Korea Foundation I think gives you an idea of the investment the Korean government is putting into their soft power in the world. And that kind of gives you some idea in terms of why the results are coming out the way they are.

One other kind of broad overview comment before I go into my specific comments on the survey itself is in the introduction, the survey noticed that it missed the whole reaction to Tibet. And again, that's a very important thing. In the context of Korean views, of China in particular, I think there's actually all different Korean views of the U.S. It's impossible anytime to grab kind of a snapshot, anything more than a snapshot, but there have been in the last few months some, I think, rather seismic events in South Korea that are going to fundamentally affect the way they view the region. First and foremost was not just the Tibet rallies, but (and it didn't get much play in the U.S. press) during the torch rallies that went through South Korea, there was a situation where a large group of Chinese students were involved in demonstrating against the Tibet forces during the torch rally, and actually there was physical violence where the Chinese were beating up South Korean protestors in Korea. And that just so fundamentally affected the South Korean views of China that I think my presumption is I'm really looking forward to next year's report. Because this is a wonderful baseline and I would love to have had this report, you know, four or five years ago. You know, Korea had this long honeymoon with China and my guess is that Korean ratings for China would have been through the roof five years ago before this Koguryo incident regarding the history of the region, the ancient kingdom of Koguryo, in 2004 that kind of dropped China down by about 50 basis points. And my guess is that you're going to see another drop in next year's report, so I think that will be interesting. On top of that obviously you can't pick up the *Post* or any other paper right now without seeing the beef demonstrations and how that's going to impact on views of the United States, but it would be interesting to see.

Let me also make one final comment about the methodology and really I'm complimenting the authors here. In years past I've used the work of the Chicago Council, but it would primarily rely on just opinion polls. It had the same challenge that any opinion poll in Korea has: the extreme volatility of South Korean opinions, right? Because it's such a relatively small homogeneous society, it's almost impossible to factor out the expected response. And so there's all of these questions that when put in an opinion poll format, trigger the societal expected response and it's very difficult to kind of weed that out. But by taking a whole series of questions in each sector and then, you know, breaking it down into this matrix we've got here that gives you an ingenious way of really being able to rank, you know, over the course of not just one question, but of a whole series of questions. And as such, I find it far more informative than, you know, the straight opinion poll kind of format that we've had in the past, so again, my kudos.

Let me just point out three or four quite interesting findings in the report that should help us understand what's going on here. Secondly, if you look again -- if you go back to page 3 and you look at the overall kind of summary of the soft power index there, it's interesting if you note that Korea outranks Japan

for the Chinese, and Korea outranks China for the Japanese. You know, and so despite the improvement that was noted I think in China-Japan relationships, I think those results tell you more about the relationship between China and Japan than they do about Korea. And so it's interesting to do it in that prism.

The second thing that I would observe, several times throughout this there's references to education. And again, one of the things that I didn't see coming out here as explicitly as I'd like to have seen – and I even went through the more detailed data, but didn't quite find at least what I was looking for – is the importance of the education system in the United States to how it factors in upon these views. And I think most of you know here that, you know, in terms of the total number of college students, university students studying in the United States, Korea ranks second between -- behind China and India, right? And again, it's very easy for us to take that in a straight nation-by-nation ranking, but again, if you look at it in a per capita basis, right? You know, here you have a country of 1.3 billion, you have a country of, you know, 1 billion people, and yet Korea's number three ahead of Japan and other countries. That's had a tremendous impact over the years on that. And if you factor in non-college students, elementary school students, high school students, boarding school students, by every account right now Korea actually outranks either China or India. And the reason I point that out in this context is because it seems to me that this is one of those issues where a report like this can have a very important role to play when we start talking about the lag time in terms of the impact of recent policies in the United States that have made it harder for Koreans and other Asians to come to the United States to get their education. So when we begin to worry about that concern, it's not going to show up this year or next year or down the line, but the argument that I would make – and it'd be interesting to figure out some way to measure it – is that that educational experience serves as the basis or the foundation for the effectiveness of U.S. public diplomacy. And so while it's possible that if I look at this and say "Wow, this is great, U.S. public diplomacy is doing a lot better than it was in the past."

If you look at the trend lines, you're seeing a big shift in education going to China, focused on China, and an increasing difficulty in the United States. And it seems to me that that might be one of the seismic longer term trends that we ought to be concerned about because what we're observing in this snapshot taken today is what was invested in ten and twenty years ago, you know, I would think. Again, I'm not sure how to capture that, but I thought that would be a useful thing to look at.

Just a couple of other short points and then I'll move on. Trade I think is extremely interesting. If you look at page 10 of the survey, it's remarkable to me that both – if you look at views particularly about including the United States in some type of a broader Northeast Asian regional trading agreement – it strikes me that both South Korea and Japan are so low, you know,

40 points in both those cases, right? And it's ironic because if you looked at it earlier, in one of the earlier questions, where they're asking about U.S. economic soft power, the South Koreans and the Japanese both rated them about a mere .75, very very high. The other thing that kind of makes this confusing to me – and it's why I don't quite understand this – is public opinion polls in South Korea consistently show very strong public support for the currently proposed Korea-U.S. free trade agreement, upwards of 75 percent. So here you have a South Korean public that says 75 percent support a free trade agreement with the U.S., but only 40 percent want the U.S. part of a regional thing. And again, I don't know how to measure this, but it seems to me that couching things in a regional context makes them by nature exclusionary, you know, it makes it the other. And so that's just something that might be interesting to try to find some way to kind of account for and take out.

Two final points: I find it very interesting that the largest discrepancy that I could find in kind of tabulating among the survey, among the areas, is in terms of U.S. perceptions of Japan. In other words, as I went through and tried to figure out where are the biggest gaps in terms of where we are, if you look at it – and go back again to the overall survey on page 3 – U.S. perceptions overall of Japan's soft power, you know, are 20 points higher, or .20 higher than that of Japan. That's the highest in the entire survey that I found in that thing. So it's remarkable to me that in an era where there's still ongoing handwringing concern in Japan about Japan passing, about not liking Japan, that Japan continues to rank so remarkably high when again there's so much fear about the focus and interest and attention all being paid to Japan. Also again, the flip side is true as well, you know, there's .18 higher in terms of Japanese perceptions of the U.S. So where almost the rest of the survey was very, very close and relatively narrow bands, but those I found were quite outstanding.

The final point: I thought it would be interesting to look at areas where there were discrepancies between Korea and Japan, and where they were most marked, given the fact that these are two alliance relationships in Asia. And that might be informative in terms of how we've dealt with these allies and what kind of things we can conclude from that. And for the most part, I think the Korean responses and the Japanese responses tracked remarkably together. From my, you know, back-of-the-envelope calculations, it's probably 70 to 80 percent of the time Korean and Japanese responses track. So there wasn't a discrepancy. You know, for example, they both ranked their relationships with the U.S. -- or the U.S. soft power higher than their counterparts, Japan or Korea, second and then China and so on. And that tracked for most of the things. But there are a couple of things that were different. First, views of China in terms of -- if you go back to page 5 – it's quite remarkable – and again, this is a different way of looking at it. If you look at it again, there's more than a 20-point spread in terms of the Japanese or the Koreans that think that China's going to play a major role in the future over the Koreans that do. And more telling still, again, it's a flip way

of looking at -- rather than looking at the China threat, twice as many Koreans are comfortable with Chinese influence than Japanese are in terms of that percentage. So I thought that was worth noting.

Then the final thing – going back to that same chart on page 10 in terms of economic integration – it's very clear that one of the biggest discrepancies there is that the Koreans are much more comfortable with regional economic integration than the Japanese are. And again, I presume that has to do first and foremost with the Japanese perception of their primacy and they're concerned about their primacy in the region or not and the Koreans' role in it at large.

But again, let me conclude by saying I thought this was an extremely informative survey. I've been reading these surveys for ten years. This was far and away the most informative. I thought it was creative, and then by creating these indices, it really kind of brings into relief a lot of issues that I think will be very important for policymakers to focus on, which is why I'm glad we're hearing from Richard Bush next.

DR. BUSH: Thank you very much, and I appreciate the opportunity that Marshall and Chris gave me to think more about soft power. It was very instructive.

On the surface, the results of this poll are refreshing for an American. But I chose to, in my remarks, think about the implications for U.S. foreign policy and I chose to take the vantage point of an American official, which I've been. And in that vantage point, I confess to a feeling of unease and not being very reassured. And that's what I want to talk about. Part of this unease is that despite the findings, you have things like the bitterness that Chinese people have expressed, and bitterness and resentment concerning the Western reaction to the instability in Tibet, and a feeling that the West, and particularly in America, was going to deprive China of the glory of its Olympic moment. So I -- and, of course, the poll, the polling was done before all that, but it demonstrates that this soft power is a tricky thing. Now part of what makes it tricky is that we're assessing several different things at once. This excellent survey – and I do believe it is excellent, I agree with Gordon on that – it assesses the attitudes of publics regarding several different kinds of soft power. And this is opposed, among other things, to the attitudes of officials and elites. In terms of the implications for U.S. policy, I believe what we're most interested in is the impact of soft power influence on the actions of governments. And so there I would think that the attitudes of officials and elites are more important and if we're talking about republics, then there's got to be a mechanism to translate public attitudes into government policies and that's very complicated. Also I'd say that not all kinds of soft power are necessarily relevant for government policy.

Now I tried to narrow the focus in thinking about the implications for the United States, and look solely at the survey's treatment of diplomatic soft power – and you can find the scores for that on page 14 and the questions that go with that on page 15 – and there the answers weren't terribly comforting as putting myself in the place of an American official. Now it is true that the scores for Indonesia and Vietnam are relatively high, but they're high across the board, so something funny is going on with the Indonesians and the Vietnamese. They just -- they were in a good mood that day I think. And so I just threw those out.

The views of U.S. diplomatic soft power -- if you look at them, they aren't that great. China 0.6, South Korea 0.59, Japan 0.56, they're all clustered, they're all about the same, but for the United States to get 6 out of 10 on a 0-10 scale and the questions are mostly about Asia, that doesn't strike me from a U.S. government point of view as that ringing an endorsement. So my sense of unease got a little bit deeper. And so to help me get a better fix on the current situation, I decided to go back to the work of the Sensei, the Sensei on soft power, Joe Nye, and I discovered something very interesting. And he says that fundamentally, soft power is not just being well-liked, it's not being attractive, it's the ability to set the political agenda in a way that sets the preferences of others.

Attractiveness is important, but it's kind of the intermediate variable, the independent variable is that ability to set the agenda, to define the framework of [inaudible]. It's associated with intangible resources such as an attractive culture, ideology institutions, it arises in large part from our values, the policies we pursue domestically, how we conduct ourselves internationally, but you know if you're not setting the agenda, then nothing necessarily flows from that. The effort to set the agenda doesn't guarantee success; it's the gossamer thread of legitimacy that induces others to accept the leader's act of agenda setting, or the reality of agenda setting. Now I do agree from, you know, a U.S. government point of view, putting myself in those shoes, that if we can set the agenda globally and in Asia, then -- in a way that shapes preferences, we're much better off, makes it a lot easier to exercise power in other ways. But the opportunity to set the agenda doesn't come around every day; there are magic moments when you get the chance to do it. But what I'd like to do then is to inventory some of the ways that we've been setting the agenda for good or ill for the world and Asia. Some of this may sound like partisan criticism, but it's not. A lot of this is bipartisan failure, and I take no pleasure in criticism. But let's run down the list: What have we done in terms of exercising responsibility for macroeconomic stability? Well, we don't save and we run government fiscal deficits. What have we done to exercise responsibility for the management of capital markets? Well, we were missing in action in the Asian financial crisis and now we have the subprime mortgage thing. What have we done with respect to the prudent and necessary use of force? Well, arguably Iraq was a negative example. What have we done when it comes to the protection of internationally guaranteed human rights? Well, Abu Ghraib is a pretty sorry example of what not

to do. Now Mike Green has done an interesting article in the *Washington Quarterly* recently about how Iraq and Abu Ghraib haven't hurt us in Asia; I tend to think that he's used the evidence that supports his case. I don't think I'd want to be the one to go to the Chinese and suggest they stop engaging in torture and have Abu Ghraib thrown back at me.

What have we done in terms of the competent provision of public goods in a variety of areas? Now I think we're good most of the time at a lot of things, but when we screw up badly, really badly like Katrina, then we lose a lot of our aura. I would note that most of what I've been discussing, or all of what I've been discussing, has nothing to do with Asia; it's not in the purview of any Asian official in our government, but it affects how we're seen in Asia. Turning to Asia, what have we been doing in terms of defining the regional architecture in a general way? Remember that soft power begins with setting the agenda and shaping the preferences of others, and creating regional architecture is the big deal in Asia today. Where are we? Pretty much missing in action. What are we doing when it comes to shaping regional economic integration? President Bush has proposed an FTA for the Asia Pacific and I happen to believe that there's a case that could be made, and that's the best way to do economic integration. But I think that's basically being ignored for now.

What are we doing to set the parameters for resolution of regional conflicts in Korea, Taiwan, and Iran? I think we've done a pretty good job in Taiwan; Korea, some would say we've outsourced that to China. Iran, I think we get bad marks for not talking to the Iranians. Now with respect to Asia, I'm not saying it's bad that Asian countries are taking responsibility for the affairs in their region, and I'm not asserting that any other country is necessarily defining the agenda and shaping other's preferences to the detriment of the United States. China's influence is growing, though it's mainly through its economic influence. I am saying that gradually and imperceptibly, we've -- in losing the role of defining the agenda in Asia or for Asia on critical issues, no matter how attractive Asian publics find our culture and our society, and I think it will take time for us and effort to regain that position if we have the will to do so and if we have the skill to regain the legitimacy that's required.

Now since we seem to have fallen behind the curve in setting the agenda from which our soft power flows, we need to consider what should be done to restore that position, if that's what we want to do. Some of these have nothing to do with Asia. It has to do with rebuilding our national strength and competitiveness, particularly economic, it has to do with reaffirming our core values in a meaningful way.

With respect to Asia, I would say it means showing up first of all. It means participating in the building of Asian regional architecture, showing that we really take it seriously, participating in the building of Asian regional

integration, again showing we take it seriously and not expecting Asians to accept our solutions. Don't reject or denigrate Asian nations' image of themselves because that's the driver of nationalism. And at this stage, I think we have to do a lot of listening and be willing to reshape our understanding and our action based on what we hear.

So, my takeaways: Asian publics' views of various types of American soft power: better than what I would have expected, still there is the China-U.S. problem that has been mentioned. Asian perceptions of American diplomatic soft power: not that positive. The U.S. role as an agenda setter appears to have atrophied, therefore, the next U.S. administration cannot be complacent. All of this would be true without the rise of China; with the rise of China, it's imperative that we get our act together. Thank you.

DR. BOUTON: I'd like to add a thought here, but first I want to thank Chris and David and Gordon and Richard for very typically insightful, thoughtful, comments on the study and its implications and what we can't also necessarily draw from it. I wanted to make a little comment about Richard's very interesting angle that he took on this, which is the gap, if you will, between what the public opinion, particularly Asian public opinion, of the United States on the one hand and our – what he has listed as our if not failures, at least inaction on a variety of fronts – seems to tell us. The kind of broader comment that flows from that is that there is no hard mechanical causal connection we all notice intuitively between public opinion and leaders, elites, policymakers, call them what you will. We have come to view public opinion in most societies, averaged out over time, as a limiting factor, an enabling factor, in some cases a positive resource, in some cases a negative resource, but actually what's notable in our own society which arguably ought to have the tightest connection between public opinion and the opinions, attitudes, of elites where we have this couple of centuries of democratic practice and a tradition of all but kind of formal plebiscitarian thinking in our country with polls constantly and so forth. But actually there is a serious disconnect between -- on many issues between what the U.S. public wants or thinks it wants, expresses, how it expresses those priorities on the one hand and how our foreign policy elites think. There's a wonderful book that Ben Page did a couple of years ago – some of you may have seen it – called *The Foreign Policy Disconnect*. It just won the APSA prize last year for the best book on U.S. national policy. It was based entirely on Chicago Council's survey data over the last decade. And he demonstrates this very vividly, but he goes on to argue that over time, policymakers ignore the will of the public, certainly in a society such as ours, at their peril. And I think we're probably witnessing one of those episodes now with the 29 percent approval rating that the Bush administration has. So we need to put this in a little context, but at the same time I am not suggesting that you adopt what is often the attitude of folks like ourselves. The so-called specialists and people who've had experience in government, and say, you know, what does the public know about anything? You know, there are a lot

of variations about which the public is relatively ignorant, but it is quite remarkable if you look at the patterns of the data and how a public that has reasonable access to information – good, bad, and indifferent information – is able to somehow sort things out. And there's -- which refers to another book that Ben Page did many years ago called *The Rational Public*. So I just wanted to put this whole issue of public opinion in context for you.

The good news, all that said, I'll agree with much of what Richard said about our actual track record and at least three issues we need to address in Asia. We have a stock of reputational capital in Asia. It would seem quite systematically throughout the region that an incoming administration can still draw it. Our hypothesis going into this study was that that stock of reputational capital had seriously declined. Now we don't have an empirical measure going back a decade, to Gordon's point as well, by which we can prove that point to you, which leads me to my final sort of technical comment. Richard spoke about, well, a .66 score on a scale of one to ten, that ain't so great. But I want to suggest to you that you need to actually think of it not in a zero to ten frame because there is in all other things, as in all other things sort of semi-statistical, there is a regression to the mean. There is a tendency to cluster to the center in people's responses. So the effective ranges here are probably between about .3 and .7 and you see that in the numbers here. You don't see anything, any index that's below .3 -- I don't think -- maybe one or two. You don't see any that's above -- well, not only, a few that are above .7. So when you think of that .66, it's right up there in the upper quartile or even the upper decile of the distribution, the real effective distribution. If we had had time, we would have normalized these scores. Instead of taking the zero to ten, scale you'd take all the scores and you see what the effective distributions are and then you define new scores that normalize them. That's a technique that one can employ. So, I don't want you to just think absolutely about .66 out one.

DR. BUSH: Okay, let's open it up. I'm sure you have a lot of questions. If you have a question, wait for the mic. My colleagues from the Communications Department at Brookings, who have been very helpful on this event, will come to you. We'll give Chris Nelson the first question. Identify yourself.

QUESTION: Thanks. That would be me. This may be impossible to answer, but especially as you were again and again showing Indonesia as not the outlier – as having definitely negative opinions about the U.S. across the board – have you been able to correlate how people get the information that leads to these results? Just hypothetically, if they get it mostly from the entertainment media, or mostly from blogs, how do people find out in a popular culture what the other country is doing and form these opinions, because I would think it would make one hell of a difference if you're getting it from Hollywood versus the *New York Times*.

DR. BOUTON: Chris, I think, probably should answer that.

MR. WHITNEY: We did not ask a specific question about source of information. We've done that in the past and actually in 2006 when we did a survey in Indonesia, we had a question in there on where people got their information from. To my recollection, it's pretty consistent across countries in terms of -- it's not looking at popular culture versus other types, but newspapers versus television versus other radio and other means. And there is consistency there. It probably would be useful for future thinking to look at it in the way that you framed it to try to dig deeper to get a better appreciation for what's driving that. But I don't think there's anything that's unique that's going on in Indonesia. There was a comment made earlier about the Indonesian scores and the Vietnamese scores being higher. That is a consistent pattern across surveys that they just tend to score things higher. And what's important there -- and this is something that we emphasized in the report and in our analysis -- is not to compare the Indonesian or the Vietnamese score against the U.S. score or the Chinese score, but to compare within the country -- so how they rank the U.S. compared to China compared to South Korea -- and that does away with that.

QUESTION: Colonel Datta, Foreign Policy Association. I do not wholly agree with the survey being undertaken without India. India has got a very profound effect on China and, considering the soft power, shares a border with China 14,000 square miles, has gone to war with China, and also earlier had gotten to the principles, five principles of cooperation. China and India are the leaders in hard- and software production. And U.S.A. has reached an agreement with India which is affecting China directly, indirectly in the future. And then recently the oil-silk route between India and China has been opened. How have you pointedly ignored India?

DR. BOUTON: I think I probably ought to take that. I think my, perhaps my credibility in speaking to that question is just marginally greater than that of my colleagues. Well, first, as I mentioned in my introductory remarks, in 2006 we did a major, major study of Indian, Chinese, U.S. opinion. We focused primarily on the three countries, but we also had a Japanese survey which we published on the same issues -- not all of the same questions. It was published separately in Japan. And then we also collected data in Korea. And that looked at every dimension of the India-China relationship very thoroughly as well as perceptions upon the part of the United States and so forth. A lot of the same issues, not always the same questions though. Secondly, we were particularly interested in this case in digging deeper into the soft power perceptions in Northeast Asia and limiting, purposely limiting it to Northeast Asia because of the history and the interrelationships and while you're absolutely correct, sir, that the Sino-Indian relationship has developed in ways none of us could imagine, have imagined 10 or 15 years ago, it's still not comparable in scope and depth to the

Sino-Japanese relationship, or the Korea-China relationship and so forth and so on. So it was a conscious exclusion, if you will, omission, but we will come back to the India subject at some point in the future.

DR. BUSH: Joe Winder.

QUESTION: Thank you very much. I have three things I take away from this panel, all of which are very deeply troubling to me and a lot of good stuff. But I'm focusing on three things and I don't know that I have a question as much as just a comment. First of all, going back to Indonesia, the thought that 27 percent of Indonesians think that the U.S. cultural influence on Indonesia is positive is really terrifying. Given the impact that they said, that two-thirds of them said that we do have a big influence. Only 27 percent, outside your 30 to range, thought that was positive. I began my career in Asia in 1980 in Indonesia, and at that time, the Indonesian hands said, look, we've got to do more on Indonesia. We've got to get more understanding in America of Indonesians, in Indonesia of Americans. That was 28 years ago. And it's 27 percent right now. And I just don't know, I don't have an easy answer, but I think part of the answer is that Northeast Asia tends to dominate the thinking of most elites, foreign policy elites on Asia and somehow we've got to get Indonesia higher in the horizon, in the view of the elites, the public policy makers to get that number up somehow for reasons that we all understand, the largest Muslim country in the world, etc.

The second thing I heard that troubled me was Richard Bush's comment that on the Asian financial crisis, the U.S. is missing in action. We started out missing in action in Thailand and we didn't help missing in action in the case of our response to the Japanese initiative. But South Korea under the United States leadership, the IMF and World Bank put together the largest single bailout program for any country in history of the world -- $57 billion or whatever. So the United States got off to a slow start, but not missing in action. And finally I am absolutely terrified that David Shambaugh, coming from a Korean perspective now, that David Shambaugh is suggesting that there ought to be a trilateral, three way summit -- U.S., Japan and China. South Koreans are just going to go crazy with that idea. I mean somehow the South Koreans cannot be left out of being at the center of U.S. security, political security relations with Northeast Asia because if they're not in our mind central, then Korea has been the hot spot in Northeast Asia as we all know for a long time and if they can't count on us as somebody who is going to be there when they need us, then they're going to be bouncing back and forth from Japan, China and who knows what -- not to mention Russia. So I'm very scared by that. I don't know if any of you want to comment on these thoughts.

DR. SHAMBAUGH: I'll just say a word on the last point. I know it's a radical thought and indeed the South Koreans – but also perhaps Australia would feel, not to mention ASEAN – would feel left out of such a triangular

dialogue. But I think that this is one of those moments we have real opportunity, not just to get Sino-Japanese relations right, but to normalize Japan's relations in its own region and with East Asia. I would argue Japan's role in its region has been very un-normal for a very long time. One reason it's been un-normal is because the Chinese wanted to keep it un-normal. Here we have the Chinese finally giving the Japanese a chance to step up and play an appropriate regional role, and I think that's in America's interest. It's not in America's interest – my personal view – for Japan to be tethered to the United States as some sort of allied appendage. It's important for Japan to take its own place, but we don't -- we, the United States, should not be excluded from that. That's why I suggest that we triangularize these dialogues and begin to think about trilateral cooperation amongst our three countries on a whole range of security-related issues. I would also note that I learned last week in Beijing that in the second half of this year, there is going to be the first time a trilateral summit between Japan, China, and South Korea spinning off from the ASEAN Plus Three Summit. So they're going to decouple that for the first time and have an autonomous Northeast Asia [inaudible] level -- not all three together.

QUESTION: [Inaudible]

DR. SHAMBAUGH: Yes. Okay. Well that's not so novel then, but it was explained to us that this is an outgrowth of ASEAN Plus Three. The whole point about regional architecture -- Richard's right. This is the big thing in Asia. The point I would like to make is that regional architectures are overlapping, kind of like tectonic plates. None are to the exclusion of others and they reinforce, in theory, should reinforce each other including a Northeast Asia peace and security mechanism which is another missing in action case. This is a hot topic in Asia. All the relevant governments have position papers drafted. Discussions are going on. The United States is just sort of absent on the whole issue of Northeast Asia peace and security mechanism. So, you know, I think there's a great opportunity to bring Japan more into the region. That's in our American interest, but we, the United States, need to party to that. Indeed, the Japanese, I would assume would seek that. So, I don't think it's such a radical choice. You know, then you can have a three plus one -- South Korea being the one. But, let's face it. These are the three big powers in Northeast Asia. South Korea is not one of the major powers in the region.

DR. BUSH: This gentleman here and then we'll go to the back.

QUESTION: I think the results seem to show that in actuality the Chinese attitude toward its neighbors are actually more positive than the other way around and I'd like to hear the comments from the panel of, you know, how do you explain that and, you know, what might have contributed to it?

MR. FLAKE: I can give a very short answer. Increase in Chinese

confidence. They think they're dealing from a position of power. They can be more magnanimous. And then as they grow in power and confidence, the other countries are increasingly ambivalent and afraid.

SPEAKER: Richard, do you want to comment on that?

DR. BUSH: I'm not sure I understood the question entirely.

QUESTION: Why are Chinese so, apparently across the board, more favorably inclined towards their neighbors and vice versa?

DR. BUSH: I share Gordon's assessment. They are very confident of their position in the region today. They harmonize and normalize relations with everybody around their periphery including India, and are acting from a position of increased strength and they thought influence. These, you know, this survey is going to be most negatively -- if that's the right word -- it's going to have the greatest shock effect in Beijing. This is not what they think of their own position in the region actually.

DR. BOUTON: One quick and then I want to hear what Harry says about this. But, if you took questions from our 2006 study and our 2008 study, this study, and tried to, and constructed a sort of index of we love globalization or we don't love globalization, the Chinese would be off the charts. You know, they are pro-globalization, pro-trade. You know, we'll join any trade arrangement you put on the table for us, you know. Their confidence – and this was in 2006 when we first noticed this – that confidence of the Chinese people about their growth, their position in the world, their influence, without at that time appearing to have a strong nationalistic tone, was it jumped off the data at you. And I would say we're still seeing that here.

DR. BUSH: Harry Harding.

QUESTION: Thanks very much. First of all, Marshall, I want to congratulate you and your colleagues not only on this study, but the whole series of studies going back years that the Chicago Council has been doing on public opinion both in the U.S. and comparatively. It really is extraordinary. I also do have a question about what has been left out. Not a country in this case, but a set of questions. Maybe it's in the full report. I am surprised that you did not in your tables include how countries perceive their own levels of soft power, because I think this speaks exactly to the question of whether we see ourselves – all of us – Americans seeing Americans, Chinese seeing Chinese, Japanese seeing Japanese -- whether we see ourselves as others see us or differently. And one conclusion that I did get from the few cases where these questions were asked, is, for example, that while America does rank well above China in soft power in general, that Americans rank China lower in soft power than anybody else. And, of

course, the Chinese rank themselves in soft power higher than anybody else. And that gap I think is really interesting because in any kind of competitive situation, seeing yourself clearly – how much power you actually have as opposed to how others think you have – can be extremely important. So I wonder if there is any other data that you can share with us about the gap between self perception and perception of you by others.

DR. BOUTON: Harry, the -- it was difficult for us to ask the full set of questions that we wanted to ask for space reasons and also because it becomes complicated in dealing with respondents in asking them to go through very large numbers of scaling questions. After a while, you get fatigue and as such we intentionally limited the number of questions where people were asked to, in effect, evaluate their own country. Where we did ask those questions tended to focus on the higher level evaluations in terms of overall economic or military influence and overall influence. And, as you stated, there is a consistent pattern of some countries either over evaluating their own level of influence compared to how others see them, or in some instances under evaluating them. The Japanese, I believe, tend to actually under appreciate their own power compared to how others see Japan. And the Chinese tend to be doing the reverse. Looking forward, it's definitely something that we would like to look at, but given the very large number of categories and questions that we had included, it just really wasn't an option for us to be able to add another 20 or so questions to actually get into the full detail.

DR. BUSH: Scott Harold, in the back.

QUESTION: Scott Harold, Brookings. I just would like to ask a question. I noticed *Renmin Ribao, People's Daily*, ran an article this week talking about the importance of the Obama candidacy and certainly it's being recognized in Europe that for the first time, the son of a white woman and an African immigrant may legitimately have a chance of becoming president in this country. If we look at Vietnam and Indonesia, these are two countries that have had interesting leadership events over the last decade -- a minority in Vietnam, a woman in Indonesia. But none of the other countries in the survey – China, South Korea or Japan – have really had this. I'm wondering if we look forward, is this something that if Obama were to be elected, do you think this would have a substantial effect on enhancing the appeal of the U.S. model as a place where anything can happen, the kind of image of American identity that Americans may find appealing themselves or is this something that really will have no impact? And I recognize that one of the panelists may wish to opt out of this.

SPEAKER: Yes.

DR. BUSH: I would only comment that what I've heard from Chinese friends is that if Barack Obama were to become president, it would have

a huge, quick and automatic impact on America's image in the world. That such a thing could happen in the United States, it would sort of help us a lot. Mindy, did you have your hand up?

DR. BOUTON: Can I just follow up on that and ask you, Richard and David and Gordon and Harry and others here to respond? I've just spent two weeks in China and this -- we were a group of Chicagoans, so many people in my group are involved with Senator Obama's campaign, so we were asked a lot of questions by our Chinese interlocutors about Barack Obama. And the impression I got was, number one, what Richard just said that, you know, the sense of something really fresh on the political scene, it will have an immediate effect. But, a lot of questions at best, kind of insipient doubt at worst about what kind of -- whether an Obama administration policies would be the kind that China wants, particularly on the trade issues, but on a range of other issues and whether he would, you know, really pay attention to China and have the kind of realist conservative stance, vis-à-vis China, that we've seen through a number of Republican Administrations. That was my quick take away.

DR. BUSH: There's a delegation a day trying to get answers to those questions. Mindy?

QUESTION: Mindy Kotler from Asia Policy Point. I think Dr. Bush may be on to something, which makes me wonder about some of the questions that may have been asked. It's difficult from looking at the back of the booklet that you gave us if those were all the questions that you were asked. I'm sure there were more and I sort of wonder if these questions had really discussed some of the more fundamental issues that affect societies in general and that's the issues that how a country treats its women, its children, its families and the fundamental issues of society and how society is often judged on how it treats its weakest members. And I noticed in the questions where you had markers, you didn't ask about women's leadership or women's employment or domestic abuse or many of the markers where actually where the United States excels on, where we do protect the weakest members of our society or at least we try. We try to address these kinds of issues. And I noticed also that it seems like the panel and the people that you discuss who worked on it were political scientists and, maybe more important, all male.

MR. WHITNEY: You are correct that there is no gender specific question in the survey. The closest we got was a question on respect for human rights and the rule of law within each country. But we did not do that. And we did not intend for this to be a fully comprehensive assessment of every possible area that might influence overall perceptions of these countries or, more specifically, their perceptions of their soft power potential. But, you raise a very valid point and it's something to think about going forward and it's just -- we will keep that in mind.

DR. BUSH: Garry Mitchell.

QUESTION: Thanks. Garry Mitchell from the Mitchell Report. I was struck by two of the sort of data points which I think I got correctly. Let me just be sure I did -- that East Asians, if I were to paraphrase it, East Asians believe it's important for the U.S. to maintain its military presence in the region because if we were to leave, there would be this arms race. And the second was that the Chinese have a – in simple terms – Chinese have a positive view of us. We have a negative view of them. That brings me to Marshall Bouton's point about the gap, and between the sort of foreign policy establishment and the folks. And I guess it leads me to ask a question which is not just relative to East Asia, but elsewhere. Is the implication of the gap that the foreign policy establishment needs to do a better job of communicating? Or does it mean they need to do a better job of listening?

DR. BOUTON: That's a good question. It's a very long, complicated answer which I'll try to, to such the extent it's an answer, but I'll try to give you a quick thought or two and I'd like Chris to jump in this if he wishes because he's been very involved in this same research. First of all, the gap is not there always and everywhere. You know, it depends on the issues and there's been a lot of work on this. In fact, we did -- the last time we did a leader's study as well as a public study, was in 2004 and it was quite extensive and we really – Steve Kull. I saw Steve walk into the room at some point. Is he here? Steve? No. Steve did a very in depth analysis of this data and then as I mentioned, Ben Page did as well. The general argument that they have made in their, in their papers on this disconnect – and in this case a book – is that the leaders ought to be listening more. Not that they can always act directly on a public will for a particular policy course. There are other constraints. But what they did was to go back and ask leaders what they thought the public thought and then we asked the public what they thought the leaders thought they thought. And it is truly a disconnect. So the leaders think they know what the public thinks, but they actually don't. And the public thinks that the leaders know what they think, but they actually don't. So that sort of affirmed this finding that the leaders are not even really aware on many issues of what the public thinks.

The other point that comes in here very importantly – I'll do this quickly – is the issue of salience. If an issue is highly salient to the public and there is a strong majority opinion in the public, then it tends to get right into the policy marketplace real fast. If it's not highly salient to the average person, voter, constituent, even if he or she may have a very strong opinion about it, or a whole group of people may have a strong opinion about it, then other interests intrude into the political marketplace and drive the decisions. I'll give you the example par excellence in terms of domestic policy. You know, over 60 percent of the American people have consistently over almost decades expressed a preference

for stronger gun control in our society. Now, you can, that means a lot of different things, right? Some people think that means no automatic weapons. Some people think that means you can have everything but, you know, an atomic bomb in your basement. But, it's a very robust question to ask for many decades. Have we gotten stronger gun control buy and large? No. We've probably gotten more of it at the local level with the Federal level, which tells you something about responsiveness of leaders. But it's just not that salient to most people.

DR. BUSH: Chris, did you want to?

MR. WHITNEY: Well, just very, very briefly. There are very pronounced gaps that we found when we surveyed in the past -- leader attitudes compared in the public attitudes. And where they are the most pronounced on are on issues that I would assume would be the least salient in terms of voting decisions. And where they are the least pronounced is on issues like immigration and protecting American jobs where clearly people realize that those are voting decisions. But the final take away I have for that is that what's important, even where there are those gaps, is not just, is not really that these are low saliency items, but rather that we as, or the government tends to misread what the public is willing to support on a wide variety of areas. It very significantly underestimates. The policy elites very significantly underestimate the degree to which the American public is multilateral and would be willing to support a wide variety of increased multilateral ventures.

DR. BOUTON: Let me add something on this because it's directly relevant. Here, we're asking the question in the context of the United States. But this survey is regional in nature and that question is a disconnect. I would argue that there are some very different situations in Japan in terms of how the public, you know, and the leaders react and interact in China, of course. And obviously right now you have the most immediate case in the case of South Korea where you have a president that's been there for three and half months. You've got mass demonstrations on the street kind of jumping over the normal process or connection between leaders and the people and their opinions. And so it's a very important question not just for the United States, but region wide.

QUESTION: Thanks. Ray Thornton. My question just related to a country that was excluded -- Russia. I was just kind of wondering why, obviously with its vast border with many of these countries in the region, its history of territorial disputes with Japan and China, etc., it has been excluded from the survey. And if anybody on the panel would like to offer a short assessment possibly of its soft power potential in the region.

MR. WHITNEY: I can talk about the former very quickly. We were limited in the number of countries that we could survey for financial reasons. We had a core group of the United States, China, Japan and South

Korea. And then we spent a good amount of time trying to find additional resources to be able to poll in Southeast Asia, which we viewed as critical. Yes, it would have been great to have India in there as well and Russia and there are other countries. We wanted more countries in Southeast Asia. We just didn't have the resources to be able to do that. Looking forward, it's something that would be of interest. Does anyone want to comment on Russia?

DR. SHAMBAUGH: Russia is a non-actor in East Asia in soft power terms I would assert. And it's barely an actor in diplomatic terms. In trade terms, minimal. The only way Russia projects its influence into East Asia is through military arms sales to China and its increasing energy source, potential energy sources to South Korea and Japan, but there have been hold ups on pipelines and other issues there. But, unlike the EU where Russia is a significant energy contributor, it's a peripheral one in Asia. So Russia, I would submit, is an East Asian nation only by geography.

MR. FLAKE: I might comment there as well. Given the fact that the Koreans were supportive of this effort and they came out so relatively well in the soft power front compared to the big super powers, I think they would like to put the Russians in there because that would put them right in the middle of the pack. Yeah. Ahead of two super powers and right in the middle.

DR. BUSH: We have some more questions, but unfortunately we have to break off at this point. I don't own this space. We're here at the kind indulgence of the Carnegie Endowment whom I'd like to thank. I'd like to thank you all for coming, but most of all I'd like to thank the Chicago Council on Global Affairs for making this event possible. Thank you very much.

DR. BOUTON: Thank you, Richard. Thank you to Brookings.

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