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WHO IS RESHAPING THE WORLD?

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## P R O C E E D I N G S

MR. TALBOTT: Good afternoon everybody. There's a few more seats up front for those of you who are looking for a place to sit, please come on up.

I'm Strobe Talbott and it is my great pleasure to welcome all of you to an annual event here at Brookings. This is the fifth of our Raymond Aron Lectures.

This is a series that is brought to us by the France program here at Brookings which is part of our Center on the United States and Europe, which is now under the very able leadership of Dan Benjamin, sitting down here in the front row. And I might add that we're all so very grateful for the support of the Policy Planning Staff of the Quai d'Orsay and to Ambassador Vimont and the French Embassy here in Washington.

I might add that while there are many good friends and distinguished people in the room, I want to particularly say what a special honor it is to have with us our lecturer of two years ago Justice Stephen Breyer who is in the visitor's gallery as it were.

Justice Breyer is, I think many of you know, is a Francophile, a francophone, a great jurist, and a great friend of this institution, and quite a few of us who work here.

Earlier today Justice Breyer invited this year's lecturer Thérèse Delpech along with my wife Brooke, up to the Supreme Court to

listen to him and his eight colleagues hear arguments in a case brought before the Supreme Court on Fourth Amendment protection against unlawful search and seizure. And if the conversation lags when we get to the discussion period, Thérèse, I think Justice Breyer may have a question or two to put to you just to see how closely you were attending to what you heard this morning.

But now Justice Breyer along with all of us has the great pleasure of listening to Thérèse apply her considerable intellect to some of the great issues of our time.

As you all know from her biography and from her considerable reputation Thérèse is a former advisor to Prime Minister Alain Juppé. She is now the Director of the Strategic Affairs Department of the French Atomic Energy Commission and a Senior Fellow at Sciences Po.

She played a key role in producing a very ambitious White Paper, the first such White Paper in 14 years on Defense and National Security that was launched by President Sarkozy after he came to office and was released this past June. Much in addition could be said about Thérèse's extraordinary career and I might add about her human qualities, which as Brooke and I can attest include a genius for friendship.

I would add that she knew Raymond Aron slightly and esteemed him greatly, including for qualities that she herself has in an

abundance and those include clarity of thought, a distaste from extremism, particularly when it's fashionable. Erudition of a sort that is resonant with the facts and needs of the real world and a discerning discriminating critical appreciation of what is good and what could be better about the United States.

She, again, like Raymond Aron is also gifted with a mastery of the written word. As all of you can see from her latest book, which is available out at the entrance to this auditorium.

The title of that book is not exactly a cheerful one; *Savage Century. Back to Barbarism*. And the century in question is the one that we have now left behind. And key to her thesis in that book is that the die was cast in the first years of that century; i.e. a 100 years ago back when there was a lot of, what would you call it? Perhaps irrational exuberance about the peace and prosperity that would come with globalization even though the term globalization had yet to be invented.

We are now, of course, in the first years of a new century and as it is apparent from the headlines all is not well with globalization. So I'm sure that among the questions that Thérèse will address is not just the one in her title; Who will shape the century ahead? But also, how much savagery and barbarism awaits us if the shapers of our world get it wrong?

After Thérèse speaks to us for awhile, my colleague and

friend Phil Gordon who is the founding director of both our France program and our Center on the United States and Europe, will offer some comments and pose a few initial questions and then we will throw the discussion open to all of you.

So Thérèse, thank you for being here today and we look forward to talking with you.

(Applause)

MS. DELPECH: Well, thank you very much Strobe and since you mentioned my activities this morning and in order to prevent any question afterwards by Justice Breyer, I want to say that this was for me an extraordinary experience because it showed how vibrant democracy works and also it shows how those who believe that democracy is only or essentially about elections are wrong.

I mean this was, in my view, one of the most interesting views of how a democracy works. I mean day-by-day, the way the Justices were asking questions – I have to say in such a fair manner to the two attorneys that were presenting and defending the case. It was for me a great, great experience and I'm very happy to have been there. Thank you very much.

What I chose as a title for this talk is a question that the recent events did not make easier to answer, because the question is who is shaping the world at the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century? And if we think

about the situation in the 1990s, nobody in fact would have dared to ask such a question. The answer would have seemed too obvious. America was shaping the world. No one else could, either because of recent collapse (the U.S.S.R.), or because of political immaturity (the European Union), or because of insufficient development (most of the rest).

At that time America's wealth and creativity, America's globalization lead movement, America's numerous security commitments around the world, and finally America's presence on the ground, as well as in the seas, in the air, and in space were so impressive that the unipolar moment looked supreme even if though it was not bound to last forever. Such was America's chains at the time, that for many it even raised the specter of a global empire. Never mind that the American people lacked the will or even the desire to behave as an imperial power, such was at least the perception that one may even contemplate asking this question, who is shaping the world, at the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century is therefore an indication of the profound changes that have taken place during the part 10 or 15 years.

In 2008 the still recent collapse of the U.S.S.R. is now called resurgence of Russia and it is definitely not the resurgence we expected at the end of the Cold War. In the same manner the insufficient development of most countries is replaced by the concept of emerging powers: India, China, and Brazil among them. And many observers go as

far as speaking about the rising powers world as if they were shaping the world today.

This assertion is indeed exaggerated, but on the other side it is absolutely true that those countries, notably China and India, certainly contribute to shape the world more than it was the case 15 years ago. Both do what is necessary to remain at the cutting edge of modern ideas, a vital condition of their emergence as great powers. And their reaction to the current crisis will tell us more about their respective future.

Now as far as Washington is concerned, it faces such a large number of deep crises at home and abroad whether financial, political, and/or strategic that the next U.S. President, whoever he is, should not be envied. Iraq may now be in better shape than many in Europe assume. Or so I read this morning an interesting piece from Peter Galbraith that was deeply skeptical about the long term, validity of this assertion, but in any case there are no solutions in sight in either Afghanistan or Pakistan.

The 2007 deal with North Korea is going nowhere. The diplomatic process with Iran has reached a dead-end. The radical forces wanting to “take apart the entire political and philosophical structure of modernity” may represent a hopeless dream, but these forces use the weapons of the modern world against it now.

And the Russians, almost unnoticed, carefully prepared their

military operations against Georgia. Finally, nobody can predict how damaging the financial crisis is going to be, here and abroad.

So is America still shaping the world as saw it did in the 1990s? If by shaping one means leading, the answer isn't clear. What does the outcome of the Georgian crisis show? American leadership looked dramatically absent in a situation where it should have been the first and ready to face exactly what happened.

If by shaping one means getting things done, what does the Iranian situation tell us after Washington tried almost everything to counter the Mullahs' nuclear ambition? Instead of rolling back or receding, the Iranians appear to be steadily moving forward. If by shaping, finally, one means projecting order, what does the current financial debacle suggest if not the exact opposite?

The contrast with the 1990s is impressive. How was it possible to reach such a low point in such a short time is not easy to understand. Too shallow of a political explanation is easy. When passion comes down, historians may take a different view of what actually happened during the last 15 years.

Let me insist on the naiveté of the view prevalent in the 1990s that geopolitics had disappeared. This was an intellectual, emotional triumph of hope over historical experience and knowledge about empires.

As Henry Kissinger wrote about the Soviet Union in October 1989, "An empire assembled over a period of 400 years by force will not disintegrate passively and the Western Alliance is bound to be shaken by the very event it is celebrating."

If it had not already been confirmed before, as I believe it was, August 2008 certainly told us as much. Historians will also pay attention to American ambivalence about advancing or even supporting an active global role for the United States. They will also explain how difficult it was to react wisely to 9/11 and they will also focus on the lack of an essential component of America's power, Europe, during a crucial period in the 1990s.

Lets' take a brief look at those different points. First, the hope that geopolitics would vanish, it appears very human and even too human after two world wars and an extremely dangerous Cold War to expect some respite. Even those who did not believe peace to be their birthright may have found it logical to have a break in 1989, 1991. But history knows little rest and does not behave kindly to those who dilapidate what I would call Generations of Vigilance.

Nothing fails like success. Strategy, moreover, is about winning in peace as well as in war. And we now face major geopolitical problems that are so close to us that they almost blind us and we discover that we have not strategy to deal with them.

Secondly, the U.S. ambivalence concerning power. It is not easy to be a superpower, not to say anything about a hyperpower (inaudible) that Hubert Védrine liked so much. It's not easy to be a superpower even less a lonely superpower with people who are not really interested in power. And my conviction has always been that even with Defense budget at record highs, the American people are not interested in power at least in the way the Europeans have been for centuries.

Thirdly. The military reaction to 9/11 certainly drove an over militarization later with dubious success and even with a number of dangers. But let's acknowledge that at the time it was blessed by the P5 and the General Assembly.

And lastly, there is the European dimension of the problem that I mentioned. After the end of the Cold War, Europe was so absorbed by itself that it was hardly able to look beyond its reunification, its enlargement, and its new borders. The Balkans for instance, where a tragedy began immediately after the 1991 Gulf War concentrating what European energy had left by the enlargement process.

European ambivalence vis-à-vis the U.S. already present even during the long confrontation with the Soviet Union intensified when the strategic situation appeared to be much more relaxed and on the American side Europe was no longer seen as an essential ally. The idea

that wherever the center of strategic affairs might now lie; the idea that the destiny of the Western world would remain a common one, this idea was absent on both sides.

This may now begin to change and you've noticed in particular the French President insists now, regularly, on the necessary unity of the West but this will only happen with time and only if sufficient leadership is devoted on both sides to the repair work. One has to keep in mind the idea that the unity of the Western world is the only possible beginning of any stable international order.

Allies should stop being problems for each other and start achieving solutions. This is true for both sides of the Atlantic. This is also true in the different regions where the U.S. has real allies, in the Middle East and in East Asia. And in East Asia in particular, Japan is often underestimated but its political transformation and also the fact of being the second largest economy in the world is a remarkable achievement with such a catastrophic history in World War II and also with such a small territory and with the lack of natural resources.

So allies should stop being problems for each other, otherwise let's adopt what George VI said in 1940. He said, "Personally", this is very British, "Personally, I feel happier now that we have no allies to be polite to and pamper." This is not the view that I'm here to defend.

So this may be what historians see when they look back on

the last 15 years: unnecessary division, lack of vigilance, absentmindedness. But it would be wrong, in my view, to conclude from the above that Washington and the West more generally is no longer the most important shaper. The current shock reinforces the decline and relative decline I would say, of the U.S. and of the West. This is certain. But it would be a mistake to conclude that, as I said, the main shaper is no longer the West and in particular America.

It would be wrong because the attractiveness of the American model remains powerful. Wrong because the U.S. is still the only protector of a number of common goods. Wrong also because the ability of the U.S. to resurrect after deep crisis, as well as the ability to correct mistakes is constantly underestimated abroad and sometimes, even at home.

Wrong, finally, because the most powerful political force at work in the world is now probably the new means of exchanging information, not polity, but an invention largely of American origin.

This may be the best description of what if not who currently shapes the world. And the relationship between new ways of exchanging both information and the distribution of power is a major issue. If information technology contributes significantly to shaping the world, an important question is how the spread of information distributes power to state and non-state alike and also who are the main beneficiaries.

And here I have some time, an analogy that you may find bizarre but let me develop it before you and then you will be able to criticize it.

In the 18<sup>th</sup> Century what the aristocracy did in France, and one of the reasons why the revolution erupted was precisely because the aristocracy extended to other classes, and Tocqueville speaks a lot about this in *L'Ancien Régime et la Revolution*. The aristocracy spread to the bourgeoisie, the power it had in a steady and regular fashion and at the end of the day what happened was that in the (French) what represented the bourgeoisie the main question was, of course, we now have part of this power. Why don't we have the power? And so the way the distribution of power, the diffusion of power in the French society worked, came from the superpower in terms of society, the French aristocracy.

What I'm saying here in the way the distribution of information works in the world, there is something similar. It distributes power everywhere and in fact, even if the main beneficiary is still now the United States it plays a role of a multiplier of power for both states and non-states alike. The result of this movement is very difficult to predict, but in my view what is sure is that it is one of the main force transforming the way power is distributed and the emerging power are in fact emerging.

Now if we look at this from a more concrete example, you have for instance the understanding that for America the role of space in

both civilian and military area is so vital that the destruction of satellites is also one of the most important ability to get. And this ability, in fact, is spreading. So is the wide use of the web for terrorist propaganda and education. It should not be a surprise in my view that information technology like any other human invention has two potential sides. But the point here is the extent to which a symmetrical conflict can be won.

The tacit support the Goliath has enjoyed so far, maybe short lived, and may encounter significant setbacks which may come from the hands of what I would call a post-modern version of David, much less charming than the original. The recognition of the benefit that the world gains from America's role is uneven to say the least. For that recognition to sink in, America would have to stop playing its role.

Now let's imagine what kind of world we would get if Russia and Venezuela, instead of America, were to be in charge of natural resources or if China were to be the major global military power or Iran the guarantor of peace in the Middle East.

In our era there may be a number of shapers, but they do not allow for significant changes concerning the major problems of today. Expensive energy, rising temperature, abject poverty, extreme violence, financial and economic turmoil, as well as dangerous tensions in the Middle East, South Asia, East Asia, and now let's recognize it, between Russia and the West.

If the only players with a true and credible sense of direction and initiative are Russia, China, and Iran because they do have a direction and they do have a true sense of initiative. The future will look more dangerous than it appears today. There will be no *dues ex machina* to block unpleasant events at some mysterious juncture. It would also be absurd to expect the next American President to fix it all, but ability to work with others as opposed to try to impose its will on others as Strobe once said, will play an essential role. Only international cooperation will achieve it and transatlantic cooperation should be first in line.

The temptation to each his own mindset, present in better times and very tempting in bad times should be overcome. We just left the most destructive century of history. What we face today is increasing violence and global lawlessness is the possibility of repeating very dangerous mistakes. There is one way to try preventing this from happening. The common will to continue shaping history with more partners certainly, but first with the conviction that the world problem cannot be solved if the Western world does not accept its full share of responsibility in solving it.

Let's hope the American elections will be a significant step in this direction and America's ally will contribute as much as they can in the difficult times that lie ahead. We will need both openness, lucidity, and good nerves on both sides.

Thank you.

(Applause)

MR. TALBOTT: Thank you Thérèse very much. Phil, if you would get our conversation started with some thoughts and perhaps some opening questions for Thérèse.

MR. GORDON: I will try. I'll start by saying what a pleasure it is to be up here with Thérèse. The last time Thérèse we shared this podium together, you may remember, I was the moderator of a Brookings panel and I remember beginning by in traditional Brookings fashion telling you that you had seven minutes to speak to which your response was that you had just flown eight hours to be there. Ever since which I thought it was only polite of us Strobe to offer our speakers at least one minute per every hour flown before they give a presentation at Brookings and I was delighted that we were able to give Thérèse enough time to really hear her views on these big questions this evening.

I think it is usually most interesting when the commentator has strong disagreements with the speaker and that creates some friction and gets a provocative discussion going. That's kind of difficult for me in this case because I thought Thérèse was so persuasive on these points, so rather than expressing a strong disagreement let me try to compliment a couple of points and raise a couple of others, maybe sprinkling in some questions along the way that Thérèse will respond to.

And I'll start by saying that I was pleased, not surprised knowing Thérèse, that you began by talking about an answer to the question who is shaping the world. The answer is still the United States because I think it's so easy and it's probably even easier arriving from Paris to get into this sort of feeling that the American empire is over. We've seen that capitalism doesn't work anymore. American hegemony is passing and the new emerging, you know, the fashion is to talk about the new emerging powers which is entirely appropriate as you did.

But as you pointed out, and I think none of use should lose sight of this. The United States still, and I think will remain the power that is shaping the world for a generation to come. It's still the largest economy in the world by far. It's going through some economic difficulties, but its economic share of the world product has been remarkably stable for 80 years, at you know about 23 percent and we'll probably still be that a generation from now.

Militarily it may be overstretched, but it still spends as much on defense as everybody else in the world put together. So you have a pretty fair amount of room to decline before falling behind others. And we've seen many ups and downs in American power before where people were tempted to say, well, the U.S. isn't shaping the world anymore other countries are. Late '60s, early '70s it was probably easy to believe that: inflation, Vietnam, and so on. Within a few years America was powerful in

shaping the world again.

Late 1980s, I mean, I remember back not even that long ago, just take that decade. We're in an '08 now, 1988; deficits, debt, Paul Kennedy. Within 10 years after a massive boom; technological, economic, and military, we've come out of it again. So I think it is right even in discussion of the new powers shaping the world to acknowledge that it's still the United States and it will probably be the United States for some time.

One comment on one of the things you observed about that where we may not have exactly the same view or maybe I misunderstood, but I think another reason America is likely to continue to shape the world is that Americans want to. Now you pointed out that Americans don't have a thirst for power like Europeans traditionally. That's right, but I think they do have a, maybe responsibility is too flattering a word. They understand that they need to play this role in the world and I don't think that's going away even in the current difficulties.

And so they sense a responsibility that I would say Europeans don't have now. When Europeans wanted power in the past it was often power for power's sake. I don't think America has that and I think that's what you said. But what America does have, what Americans still do have is a notion that if we don't do these things, who else will do them? And if they don't get done the world could be a much more

dangerous place.

A second big theme it seems maybe worth some discussion, is the obvious one that even if America is still shaping the world we're certainly not shaping it alone. I don't want to exaggerate the degree to which anyone thought that in the past, but during the Cold War America was a leader and had an alliance and was the clear leader of that alliance. And it was us and the adversary. But even more after the Cold War there really was a sense in this country that we were shaping the world by golly and we'd do it the way we wanted to do it. And allies were quite nice, if they felt like coming along but they weren't really necessary because we so powerful. That's the world you alluded to at the beginning Thérèse.

And I think that really prevailed in this country in the early part of this decade and I think it's gone now. I don't think Americans have that attitude anymore that we don't need others. Indeed, I would assert that the really striking thing about U.S. foreign policy as you look around the world is the degree to which we need other powers to get things done as you said. And the degree to which we know that.

You think about the big questions on the American agenda today, Iran. There is a strategy for dealing with Iran that involves trying to open the door and offer them incentives for not having a nuclear weapons program while imposing sanctions and penalties if they do pursue that. That's a strategy, you can like it or not, but what everyone I think accepts

is it only works if you can get others to play along. And you mentioned some of the countries that have to; the Europeans, the Chinese, the Russians, the Indians and others. Afghanistan, we're not there alone. We can't be there alone. Nobody wants to be there alone. We have fortunately almost 30,000 European troops and the discussion is how do you get more international help? Not, let's get, you know this coalition out of the way so that we can get on with it.

Global warming, you know there it's obvious. It doesn't matter what the United States does. The United States have been a lagger on this issue but it can't do anything about this unless it gets cooperation. I think if you go down the long list of all of the foreign policy challenges and priorities for the next administration, you are struck by the degree to which we need the cooperation of allies and adversaries alike. And as I would suggest, I think the degree to which we know that.

You mentioned China and India as particular cases. I think that is right, even more than the Brazils and South Africas and others. I mean, to me they're just in another category. I mean put the two together, 2.5 billion people. As Fareed Zakaria has written, 2.5 billion times any number is a very big number and when you times it by what they can produce, what they will consume including energy and food and what they will emit you're talking about world changing events.

And so maybe to you Thérèse as question about that,

because it's a question in my mind I think there are two and you alluded to both, but it might be worth hearing you further and others on it. One is, does their rise destabilize the international system and the peace that we know? Because let's be honest, in the past when great powers rose and displaced other great powers it tended not to be peaceful and these are great powers. In some ways you can say with chips on their shoulder, they want their place in the sun. They have shown that their economic model works. They have size, population, ambitions, energy needs. Is this transition to a different type of world order going to be more peaceful than it historically been?

I think you can construct arguments as to why it might be. But if you're going to, then you have to articulate it because otherwise the historical trend would not be a very encouraging one.

And the second question that I think emerges from that is the one you raised at the end which I also think is absolutely right. And again, I'll press you on it. Are they going to become international stakeholders? As they rise and we decide we need them. We face all of these common problems together, are they going to say all right. Let's meet in the middle and try to tackle these things. It's one thing to call for that, but on a number issues, again, let's be honest. Especially because the United States has always tended to be, as I said before, the country that feels responsibility for world order in these things. It's easier for other countries

to say you do it.

And if you go and talk to the Chinese and the Indians about some of these problems, like for example global warming. It's easy to get the answer we share, you know, we have an interest in that too. We agree with you this needs to be done, but you are the ones who have polluted the world for a couple of centuries so you do it. Or Iran. We need to together tackle the Iranian nuclear issue and the response is agree, but it's mostly your responsibility. What are you going to give us to do it? So again, a question to you; do you think they will respond by being global stakeholders?

And then I guess I'll just end with reinforcing what I thought was your final theme, which I also agree with and in some ways worry about and I'll put it in the form of both a comment and question. You know, the comment is the next administration as it comes in to deal with these challenges as I said, we'll recognize that it needs others. And I think we'll be willing to make changes if the United States was too unilateralist and didn't appreciate the degree to which it needed allies, I think the next administration will appreciate that and be willing to make some concessions in the direction.

I'd be interested if you share that view that America gets it and doesn't believe it can have its way on all of these issues. But even if it does that, will the others respond? And the others, not just or mainly the

adversaries but even the allies and you stressed how important it was to cooperate with our European allies. If a new American administration comes in, it's multilateral, it stops doing all of the things that the Europeans were uncomfortable with, in Iraq and on Guantanamo and on global warming and the International Criminal Court, you name it. And then it goes to the Europeans and says, we've got some common challenges together in Iran, Afghanistan, and the world economy, and stability in Darfur, and whatever. What is the answer going to be?

And I'll just conclude with my concern that if the perception here is that the answer is, well, it's kind of still your responsibility to deal with the world, not ours. It won't be long at all before that multilateral phase is pushed back aside by Americans feeling like they're the only ones with responsibilities and therefore they should call the shots.

MR. TALBOTT: Thérèse before you reply I'm just going to say that the quality of what we all heard is so high, that I think my only role both as a moderator and as a member of the staff of Brookings is to make sure that Thérèse has access to water. So do you have some over there?

MS. DELPECH: I do, I do.

MR. TALBOTT: All right, very good.

MR. GORDON: You're moderating.

MR. TALBOTT: Okay, cheers.

Do you want to make some comments in response to what

Phil has said and then we'll open it up to the floor.

MS. DELPECH: Well, First what I would say is that we should on both sides, I mean, the allies have a clear view of the difficult times ahead. And this is why I ended with that.

The number of challenges whether it is economy, energy, climate, regional issues I mean the list is so long that we will have a very, very tough time to face it without making, I would say, too many mistakes that could have very serious consequences. If we don't understand that to face all these serious challenges the first move is in fact to find an agreement between us, then in my view there will be no solution. And here, I am with you Phil because I believe not on all issues that you mention, but on some of them there will be difficulties whoever wins the election.

I give you two examples, but there are more than two. One is Afghanistan. Whoever is elected here. We'll ask, and it will be one of the first things he would ask the Europeans to do. We'll ask more troops for Afghanistan. In my view, the answer to this question is, to me, a question mark. One of the reasons is that, in Europe, the feeling is that that in Afghanistan there is no strategy, so we are sending troops -- I mean, apart from the fact that we are not always winning, not all the country is concerned in particular. And I am not speaking for my own country necessarily. We are not always willing to send more troops

abroad, but this is not the point I am making. The main point is that, in Afghanistan, there is a big fear that what is done now could lead nowhere because the strategy is lacking. Okay? This is one problem. So the first thing we should do is to speak about what we want to achieve and how; how we deal with Pakistan, because Pakistan is part of the problem; how do we deal with the Taliban, I mean the different types of Taliban; and what is in fact the objective we want? What is the end that we want to reach? Because if there is no agreement on this point, in my view, we won't have an agreement on the question of troops.

Now, on the other side, the Europeans will ask the next President of the United States, whoever he is, will ask a commitment on climate change, and I am less optimistic than you on this because I don't believe that the Americans, whoever comes into power, will be ready to commit themselves to a reduction in the emissions with targets. And here, if I am wrong, please let me know. But I see here problems, potential problems, on both sides.

There is another issue which may be contentious -- I mean again, whoever wins -- missile defense. The problem of missile defense is after Georgia no longer about whether it was a great idea; whether it works or it doesn't work. The problem is more political, because what the Russians are telling us is that they will be ready to have missile defense in, let's say, the U.K. where, as you know, I mean, interceptors there

would be much better located to intercept Russian missiles. But, in fact, in Parliament the problem is political. It is their sphere of inference. So, how do we deal with that? And this is a question related to how the United States and the Europeans are going to deal with Russia. Now, let me tell you that when I'm in Brussels, the message I get is that the most divisive question on foreign policy in Europe is Russia. Do I need to explain why? I believe not with this audience.

Now, concerning the question of the rise of India and China and how these will -- I mean, what will be the consequence in the international, in international relations and the national order? Well, my question -- my answer to that would be a Norman one -- it depends. You know this is what the Normand always answer and I have a Norman ancestry. It depends of what? In my view it depends highly about our own policy, I mean, the policy of the west, the Europeans and the Americans, towards China. It doesn't depend only about that, but it depends in large part about that. We now have a situation -- and I take China because it's a more interesting example -- China speaks about its peaceful rights all the time. Now, it's unclear to me whether these rights will be or will not be peaceful, and it is unclear to me what is the relationship between the peaceful rights of China and the way the Chinese military project is evolving. It's unclear to me whether the peaceful rights of China is consistent with the relations that China has with its neighbors.

So, for that, the first thing in my view that we need, I said at the end of the talk, we would need openness, lucidity and good nerves. Well here, lucidity, openness and good nerves, the three, are very important related to China. We should be open to the rights of China, because China has a legitimate -- I would say a legitimate -- legitimate reasons to consider that after two centuries where China has receded, China now can move forward. Now, there are some conditions, in my view, and in particular, some conditions in international behavior that we should insist on. I mean, let me mention there are four: Bernat, Bernat, that was really a scandal, the behavior of the Chinese concerning what happened in Bernat. The way in Africa the Chinese are destroying one by one everything the Europeans and the Americans have been trying to achieve in terms of governance. I mean, perhaps we haven't done enough -- in my view we haven't done enough -- but what we have done, is destroyed piece by piece. Lastly, there is also the way China behaves in its immediate surroundings and the way the peaceful rights of China goes with the number of missiles that are deployed in front of Taiwan. These may be peaceful missiles, but if you are at the receiving end, you may have a different view. Also, in my view very important not to be in a situation where we do not want to see this because it's unpleasant. If we want to have the peaceful rights, then we should deal with these different problems.

Concerning the question related to power and the difference of view perhaps, you said, well America is in fact willing to be a global force, I would say a global force more than a global power. Well, what I was contesting myself is -- but if you disagree -- you are the American people after all and so I won't -- what I was contesting myself was that, in my view, the Americans where -- I mean didn't want to behave as an imperial power. You see, this was my point. So, if you disagree with that, I retreat.

And now, lastly, talking about the way the Europeans react to this financial crisis. Well, in France there is a new party. It's a marginal party, but it's a new party. Besancenot is the name of their leader. It's an anti-capitalist party, and as you can imagine, I mean what has been done in the last, what has happened in the last weeks, I mean gave an enormous push to this party. My problem is not the dimension of it. My problem is that in the mid-term this financial crisis could encourage the extremists in the Europe, at the left and at the right, and this is a big, big worry for me.

MR. TALBOTT: Let me invite all of you, or any of you who wish, to come into the conversation. I think we have mikes around the room. We'll start with this lady here and then we'll go to that gentleman there. So, over here first. We are going to go until just about 7:00 o'clock everybody, just so you will know.

SIMONE: Thank you very much. My name is Simone Gundthiem, from the Entire Business School.

First of all, thank you for putting such an interesting question and also provocative question to us. I would like to ask Ms. Delpech, you said that during the 1990s Europe or the EU was very inward looking or had to look beyond its borders because it was so concentrated on enlargement, and if I may add, also institutional reform to make this enlargement work. I would like you to expand a little bit on where do expect that Europe to go? Would it become a more effective leader? What is its leadership niche? There are some arguments floating around in Europe that maybe Europe should make the U.S. focus more on this multilateralism that is so important to solve all these important questions or problems for the future that you raised. What do you see the leadership niche for Europe? Can we expect more from the EU in the future.

MR. TALBOTT: Is that it? Go ahead. Go ahead. I am just passing it. We'll take a couple.

MR. TIMMERMAN: Do you want the questions first?

MR. TALBOTT: Yes.

MR. TIMMERMAN: Okay. Ken Timmerman, from News Max. Bonjour, Tess.

MS. DELPECH: Mmm-hmm.

MR. TIMMERMAN: I want to ask you a question about Iran and the French, the current French analysis of the Iranian Nuclear Weapons Program. As you know, the latest national intelligence estimate here, in the United States, was quite controversial. I understand that President Sarkozy received a briefing from an Iranian defector, which in fact went directly contrary to the information from, cited to Iranian defectors cited in the National Intelligence Estimate, and that led him to say that we would soon be facing an Iranian bomb or the option of bombing Iran. So, what is the current analysis in Paris of the current status of the Iranian Nuclear Weapons Program?

MR. TALBOTT: Why don't you take those two?

MS. DELPECH: Okay. Well let's take the last one first. I thought the NIE was dead. It's not? Killed by, not by France, but by the IAE itself, which is a bit bizarre, because the IAE has never been that harsh on Iran. We had even to push the IAE a number of times on the subject, but in fact only two months after the NIE, the IAE came with a number of statements concerning the reigning military program, and including, you know, including after 2003. Now -- I mean, one moment on this, on this NIE report -- what I found myself extraordinary. I read it. I mean, what was, at least what was public. What I found extraordinary in this report is first, that when the report says that the work on the warhead

has ceased in 2003, it didn't say a word about where it was in 2003.

Okay? You don't find that extraordinary? I find it extraordinary.

The second thing that I found bizarre was that there was not a word on the fissile material that I mentioned, because as far as I understand it, I mean, my training is philosophy, so I know very little about nuclear weapons, but still, I know that if you talk about nuclear weapons, I mean, what is important is what is ready concerning the missile dimensions and concerning the warhead itself, the fissile material, the explosives, and the ability towards uranium metal. This is the core of what is needed. Now, there was not a word on the fissile material. Why? This was, for years, the center of the international attention concerning what the Iranians were doing, because the production of fissile material in Iran had no possible civilian purpose. Okay? So, currently the -- so, for me, the NIE is dead and I am following what I find in the IAE reports.

Now, what is the position of the Europeans and the French, in particular, concerning this issue? Well, our position is the following. We have been negotiating with the Iranians for now 2003 -- five years. Our view is that the Americans have not negotiated with the Iranians since 1979, meaning -- and excuse me for saying that -- meaning that perhaps you have something to learn from what we have acquired in terms of knowledge about the Iranians. And, if you want a kind of preview of what the Europeans might tell the new American administration on the subject

what, at least in Paris, you will hear is the following. We have negotiated during five years with the Iranians, different teams, and we came to the conclusion that they are not interested at all in negotiating, but for buying time for their military program. And this is in writing in a number of newspapers. It's in Farsi, not in English, but sometimes we translated it in French, okay, so we know it. And this is what our discussion with them tell us. The last meeting, in June, with an American representative. In this last meeting what was at stake was the following. Are you, Iranians, ready to talk about talks? This was the - I mean, we were -- the meeting was talks about talks, about talks. I mean, don't try to explain that to any public, because nobody would understand that, okay? But this was this is the kind, you know, of diplomacy that we have come to. So, even that, they were not ready to accept. Jalillie didn't give any kind of answer. Jalilie come in and -- I mean, directly -- the linkage is direct. So even this, the Iranians were not ready to accept. And the presence of the American representative didn't change anything. At no point the Iranians during those five years told us, well, if the Americans would be involved; if only we would get security guarantees from the Americans; if only we would get economy investment from the Americans; if only they wouldn't tell us that we are part of the axis of every -- I mean, you name it. They never made any of those statements, at no point at all. Okay? So, if you want to try -- this is my message, Ken -- if you want to try another deal, a big deal,

believing that this will be a new departure and that you will succeed where we failed, good luck. That's for Iran.

Now, concerning the 1990s, the question about Europe. You know the problem, the problem is the following. There are two different points that I want to make. First, the one you made. It is certain that in the 1990s the ramification, I mean the enlargement, plus the Balkans, I mean took all our energy. In addition to that, the Europeans have had one major war of every generation since 17<sup>th</sup> century, okay? This is a lot. So there was also fatigue, but I was calling respite, you know, in the hope -- what's present here was probably not present in Europe as well. So, the -- when you ask what Europe would bring in terms of leadership, well I believe what Europe has brought to the international scene is stability in a part of the world which was deeply unstable for a very long time. So we consider this an achievement. Secondly, we do consider that we are leaders on a subject like climate change, for instance. Certainly, on multilateralism, we talk a lot about it and we have made a lot of progress concerning what we call efficient multilateralism, because you know, the rhetorical defense of this word doesn't mean much. You have to achieve something. And it seems to me that, in particular, the French proposals in the non-preferential areas during the last years have been something I respect, not because I am French, but because I am an expert in this field.

Now, I believe the main witnesses will come with the narrow view of the word. I mean today, if you read the European Securities Strategy, it is still about the immediate surrounding countries of Europe. So, we speak a lot about the Medral, when Africa is still in the picture, but -- and you know, the Balkans and the east. Right now that there are problems in the East, Europe is divided. And, as I said, concerning Russia, I mean there is absolutely no agreement. And this is not -- what I mean is not a difference between the Poles, for instance and let's say the Spaniards. I am also talking about the major countries.

MR. TALBOTT: This gentleman here and then we'll -- and the gentleman right behind you -- right here -- those two and then your response.

MR. FASHIDA: Thank you. Ali Fashida. Still on the subject of Europe, which you just talked about right now and related to the previous question, the point is, when do you think, or do you think it is at all possible to see Europe's potential to come to fruition in terms of unified power. And I really mean specifically, not just the goals and objectives of a foreign policy and to have some kind of apparatus that would create some kind of a diplomatic core and some kind of individual responsible for European foreign policy, but specifically defense policy and specifically this means having the federal authority, if it's conceivable at any point in your view, to have European armed forces, deployable armed forces, that

could be brought to fruition, whether it is in the immediate neighborhood, or as it has been pointed out before in the case of Afghanistan, to which you said, well, we will have to see about the strategies, is there a strategy; is there no strategy? The idea is that there are about 30, I believe, European contingents in Afghanistan of minimal consequence, in general, and the point is, do you see an ability on the part of Europe to bring to bear its strength and its force in terms of its relation to, the relation between the GDP and defense budgets and an integrated armed force that can be indeed a meaningful ally of the United States in the future a more collegial environment? Thank you.

MS. DELPECH: Okay.

MR. TALBOTT: One more. The gentleman right behind you.

MS. DELPECH: Oh.

UNAMED GENTLEMAN: I believe a lot of individuals see the President as the symbol of the United States, and so in light of the upcoming election, what does the Panel believe that the next President can do to restore confidence and faith in America abroad, and especially across the Atlantic?

MR. TALBOTT: Take those two and then Federiga and Jim will have the last two from the floor.

MS. DELPECH: Okay. A short question to you. Any new American President will restore some confidence. I tried to say it in the nicest way.

MR. TALBOTT: Can I come back to you on that, Thérèse? There might be, to use a phrase common in Washington these days, a dark side to your answer, which is that because that's your answer, there may be a major expectations problem, which is to say, do you see it from your side that because there will be -- I think you are telling us -- relief and high hopes, whatever the outcome of the election, those hopes may not be met.

MS. DELPECH: Well --

MR. TALBOTT: Especially going back to your earlier comments about the Administration.

MS. DELPECH: Yes. Yes. Well, my understanding is that it's a different -- a different answer, if you talk about the European people or the European government. Concerning the European people, the expectation is enormous and there might be disappointment. Concerning the European government, we already have a number of changes, and we already know the points where we might agree, where we might disagree. We already know that. So, you know --

MR. TALBOTT: All right. Go ahead.

MS. DELPECH: Is that fair?

MR. TALBOTT: Yes. Thank you. Sorry to interrupt.

MS. DELPECH: Concerning your question -- well, first, the European defense budget are not going to increase, but in the U.K. and France in the coming years. Secondly, it's not necessary to have a European army, if that is what you had in mind, to have a force which could be a substantial element in contributing to what the U.S. could achieve in such-and-such places if we agreed with the operation. The goal that we now have is to have 60 deployable troops, and this goal is stressed again in the White Paper, in the Defense White Paper that the French just published.

Now, there is more deeper element in your question, which is, Europe as a unified power, and to this I will answer very briefly only after a big crisis. Only a big crisis could have this result.

MR. TALBOTT: Federiga and then Jim, and that will be it. I'm going to be to give --

MS. BINDI: Federica Bindi, here at Brookings. I know who will be approving my perfect candidate for succeeding Solan after your speech. But, my question would be, if you were the next American president, what would be your first, second and third action in foreign policy, concretely speaking?

MR. TALBOTT: We'll take the next one to give her time. Jim.

JIM: Strobe is going to kill me for asking this question.

What is your view of the wisdom of the United States pushing for the expansion of NATO to Georgia and the Ukraine, and the expansion of the European Union, of which we are not a member, to include Turkey?

MS. DELPECH: Okay.

MR. TALBOTT: He'll survive. No problem.

MS. DELPECH: You know, concerning Turkey, I am one of the very few French experts in favor of the accession of Turkey to the European Union. Now, this does not mean that I do not understand those in Europe that have mixed feelings about Turkey. Why? Because I can see the way turkey is evolving politically, and in particular, the fact that, on a number of occasions, the values that Turkey, and in particular the democratic values, that Turkey is show are questionable in recent years. Secondly, I also understand that after these large movements of enlargement like we had to digest so to speak such a large and different country from most of the others is a problem. And thirdly, I also understand those who say, well, before Turkey, there are other countries that would deserve to be within Europe, like, for instance, Ukraine. Now, concerning the wisdom of expanding NATO to Ukraine and to Georgia, I believe that in Bucharest we have made the most silly -- I mean, we adopted the most silly compromise that we could adopt, because we did

say no map, but there is some rights supported of those two countries to become members of NATO.

MR. TALBOTT: More than a right; that they would be members.

MS. DELPECH: Yes, that they would be members, absolutely. And those two, together, I find myself silly, because on one side you have what could be considered as a provocation that you don't even have the first step to go in this direction, okay? So, in my view, right now the chances of those countries to become members of NATO, and first to get mapped, is not increasing. It's decreasing. This doesn't mean that the Europeans are not trying to reinforce the ties rights with all the countries that are at the border of Russia. And let me share with you one, one fact that I believe was extremely important, and I got these, this information from a Russian expert, and the information is the following. What really impressed Moscow on the very important day of the cease fire was the President in Tbilisi, of the three boards, the Ukrainian President and the Polish President. This was what really impressed Moscow; meaning that the Europeans should certainly strengthen their ties with all these countries. This doesn't mean that those countries should be integrated in NATO in the years to come, and in my view, in December, what we are going to have is something which would not be very different from what we got in Bucharest.

MR. TALBOTT: And Federiga's question?

MS. DELPECH: Oh.

MR. TALBOTT: One, two and three on the to-do list of the next president.

MS. DELPECH: It's already difficult to be in my own shoes, so -- wait a minute. What I can tell you is that what I would try to achieve, not the first, second or third action, what I would try to achieve, I would first try to restore America's image as a positive image in the world. And this is something that could be done in a number of manners, but which I find very important. Secondly, to get more respect, because I believe that right now, America -- I mean, for all its deployment of force, is not respected. And thirdly, what I would do is to have the allies assure that to be allies to the United States does mean something. These are the three things I would do. What do you think? Okay.

MR. TALBOTT: I think you would get the same answer from a lot of Americans. Phil, the last question or comments?

MR. GORDON: Yes, there were a lot of fascinating things said by Thérèse and others. I will make two brief comments. One, I was struck that the European Union was raised a lot more in the questions than in Thérèse's initial speech or my comments on her speech, which may tell us something. I won't elaborate on this point, but I mean, check the transcript. I'm not sure how much Europe and the EU showed up in a

discussion of who is shaping the world. Thérèse talked about a lot of wonderful things that the EU does, but in terms of influencing the way things are moving, it struck me how it wasn't the central player in this discussion.

Second, a number of people have asked about the U.S., and I was interested in, especially in this gentleman's specific question, about what could be done by the next President to restore our standing in the world and similar to Federiga's question. I mean, a few things were already mentioned; to restore the way people perceive America. And I mentioned, you know, if you go back to the causes of that negative perception: Iraq, global warming, no diplomacy or lack thereof, in addition to the point that Thérèse made about simply changing the incumbent, I think you make a head start. But I want to conclude by just stressing the importance of doing what Thérèse just talked about. You mentioned, I mean, just going back, the idea of what if other countries were in charge of energy, stability or security, and I think one of the striking things, you know, as I travel around and talk to people in different parts of the world, that used to scare people, you know, what if it wasn't the United States and it was X or Y. And now they are kind of unsure about that prospect, because they are unhappy with it being the United States. More than anything, in response to these specific questions about what the U.S. needs to do, if the next President can get us back to the place where

people see American jejunity and stability provision as a positive thing because it's America, then we will have accomplished a great deal.

MR. TALBOTT: In closing this program I'll simply make the following observation, one reason I think it's incumbent upon me, having already made sure that you got a glass of water, to make sure that all of you have two hours to have a really good dinner, lubricated perhaps by some excellent French wine, before you settle down before your television sets to watch another discussion, which is going to take place in Nashville in exactly two hours. There will be a somewhat larger audience for that discussion, but I mean this in all seriousness. If the two participants in that discussion could have listened to what Thérèse in particular had to say tonight, it would be very useful to both of them. One poor guy is going to inherit one of the biggest messes of all times and unprecedented difficulties and responsibilities, but the other one is going to return to the Senate in an extremely important and influential position. And I hope maybe through the agency of people in this room, and there are a few who can do it, that some of the wise, candid, lucid, nery thoughts that Thérèse has shared with us tonight about Europe and about transatlantic relations will find their way to both candidates and to the next President of the United States. So please join me in thanking Thérèse for coming here.

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