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LESSONS FROM RUDOLPH GIULIANI'S SUCCESSES AND FAILURES

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[TRANSCRIPT PRODUCED FROM A TAPE RECORDING]

C O N T E N T S

## Moderator:

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## Panelists:

FRED SIEGEL  
Progressive Policy Institute;  
Author: "The Prince of the City: Giuliani, New York and the Genius of  
American Life"

DAVID BROOKS  
Columnist, New York Times

MICHAEL TOMASKY  
Editor, American Prospect

P R O C E E D I N G S

MR. DIONNE: Welcome everybody. Thank you so much for coming.

Everybody prides themselves on timely events, and I would point out that this Sunday Fred Siegel occupied a more valuable piece of real estate that Donald Trump even owns, which is the front page of the New York Times' Book Review for his new book on Rudy Giuliani.

It's really a great pleasure to have Fred here to talk to us today about Rudy. And also, I'll introduce them later, to have David Brooks and Mike Tomasky here to reply to Fred and sort of begin a conversation, perhaps even a little bit of an argument.

I don't always agree with what's published in the National Review. However, I particularly agreed with what Richard Brookhiser said beginning his review of Fred's book.

"Every one in New York who writes about politics knows Fred Siegel, professor of history and Cooper Union and Senior Fellow of the Progressive Policy Institute.

"He is an intellectual and a raconteur. He collects bright details like a magpie."

I've never thought of you as a magpie, Fred.

"He collects bright details like a magpie, and he remembers damning facts with the stern impartiality of"—and help me pronounce this name—

"Radamanthus,"...

David, do you know who Radamanthus is?

Oh, okay.

... "judge of the underworld. He has seen the clowns tumble and he knows where the bodies are buried.

"The Prince of the City' can be read as Plutarch's 'Lives of the Ignoble New Yorkers.'"

That really captures Fred pretty well, even though I have no idea who Radamanthus actually is.

Fred and I have been friends for a long time. I used to agree with him all of the time. Now I agree with him some of the time.

Fred is wonderfully difficult to peg ideologically. I was thinking on the way here, what would you call Fred? And he's a kind of neo-conservative, neo-liberal, New Democrat, Giuliani Republican, communitarian who writes often for libertarian magazines, with some of the old social Democrat, still in him somewhere.

And that's why Fred is so interesting.

This is a very important book about a very important person. And what we're going to do to day is Fred is going to give a talk sort of that comes out of his book. And then I'm going to invite Mike and then David to reply.

Fred is smart, thoughtful, public spirited. It's really a great pleasure to have you here today, Fred.

Thank you.

MR. SIEGEL: Thank you, E.J.

[Applause.]

MR. SIEGEL: Twenty-five years ago I was stranded in Paris teaching at the Sorbonne. And the French were paying me at their exchange rate instead of, I

thought, at the American rate. I had no money, and E.J. fed me, which is why I could be here today.

Given the events in London, I could begin by talking about terrorism and Giuliani's early interest in terrorism dating back to 1985. I could also talk about Giuliani for president. We can do a little bit of that later.

But I want to take a different tack. I want to tell you first why I wrote the book and then talk about the problem of urban liberalism, what Giuliani meant for it, what's happened to New York and why it's a significant question for liberals nationally.

What made me write the book was a kind of fear. I noticed that David Dinkins was once again an honored guest and Gracie Mansion, given an endowed chair at Columbia, that people had forgotten what the early '90s were like in New York.

And the way to summarize the early '90s is one anecdote. Betsy Gotbaum, who was a good Parks Commissioner, was standing in Central Park. It's 1993 and she's talking about improvements in Central Park. Cameras are rolling. She's in front of the lake. It's beautiful. And as she's speaking a dead body bobs to the surface of the lake.

This all reminded me of the Soviet joke thinking about this revisionism of the early '90s, when people were saying it was all the economy; Giuliani didn't do much. I heard Robert Rubin, who is otherwise an intelligent guy say this. I thought about the old Soviet joke. The quizzical man asked the commissar, he said, commissar, always certain about the future. I know it is always rosy. It's the past that's always changing. And that's what I'm worried about.

New York was the birthplace of modern liberalism—LaGuardia, the New Deal. And just as New York was the birthplace of modern liberalism, it really died there as a viable perspective in the 1990s.

In the 1930s, New York was described as the only part of the Soviet Union where open debate was possible.

[Laughter.]

MR. SIEGEL: Attempts by interest groups to enhance their position in New York are always burnished with the magniloquence of great causes and world historical struggles.

It was always the rhetoric of politics as a ceaseless struggle. It was a kind of mock heroic quality to the rhetoric of New York politics. Every issue, no matter however trivial, is cast in world historical terms.

So city government is turned into the equivalent of a sweat shop boss, liberal administrators looking to expand opportunities for African Americans but denounced as if they were Southern sheriffs.

In that sense, New York is France with small—the same problems of the welfare state, of the hyper-ideological politics, the leakage of reality. All of this is parallel.

The other thing about New York is that New York sees itself as in the vanguard. New Yorkers always see themselves in the vanguard.

You all know the famous "New Yorker" cartoon.

But in many ways, New York is the most hide-bound of cities. The '30s, LaGuardia exerts an almost mythical pull on the city.

My friend Joe Klein used to talk about the civic religion as fear-relativism. And that's right, even to this very day.

The trouble with LaGuardia was as follows. he was a great, great mayor. But when you look at his reforms over time, they had ironic affects.

LaGuardia displaces Tammany Hall. Tammany is terribly corrupt. There is no argument here. It was a good thing that he displaced them. But what he replaced them with was headless nails, called civil servants, who are totally unaccountable.

The good thing about Tammany Hall, when it screwed up, and it did so often, they could be thrown out. They could be thrown out of office. You can't throw civil servants out of office.

And when civil servants later organized into labor unions, public sector unions, they're unmovable.

So in New York and New York, we developed a kind of workers' control where the schools are run for the benefit of the teachers, the hospitals are run for the benefit of the hospital employees. I'll elaborate on this later.

But this tension between New Yorkers, a sense of dynamism, the most dynamic place in the county and the politics, which are completely hide-bound, completely retroactive. Again, a little bit of like France always looking to 1789, never quite getting it right.

New York was one of the last cities in the county to give up elevator operators and trust people to push their own buttons. It was one of the last cities to adopt automated teller machines. Last—we still have rent control, a World War II emergency measure. And we still haven't adopted multiple listings for real estate.

But that will come.

Now, the great solid artistic impulses in the 1930s and '40s and '50s constrain interest group politics in New York. It was a sense of the general purpose, a broad sense of government on behalf of the little guy.

That ended in the 1960s. And by the time of the 1997 mayoral campaign, one of the aides to then-mayoral candidate Ruth Messenger, was stunned—and this is quoting him roughly. The guy's name was Evan Mandery. He wrote a book about the campaign. He said, I'm stunned. I discovered there were all of these different groups in New York, but no New Yorkers, that the general interest has been vacuumed out of the politics of the Democratic Party.

Now, the example of workers' control may seem harsh, but let's take it from another angle. Interests, issues were defined in terms of interest groups.

For instance, in the Dinkins years in New York—he was elected in '89—he was mayor from '90 to '93. The game on crime was this, if the police didn't do too much to hassle criminals, the ACLU wouldn't do much to hassle the police. And everyone was happy except the general population.

In the topsy-turvy world of New York politics where things are defined in terms of interest groups, the '70s when we almost went bankrupt were an okay time because federal money came in.

But the '80s when the city boomed, that was a terrible time because federal money was reduced. And that tells you something about New York.

The late great Daniel Patrick Moynihan, who I know E.J. admires enormously, and I do too, Moynihan for 20 years would issue reports pointing out that

for every dollar New York sent down here to Washington to you nice people, you only sent us back 79 cents.

Now New Yorkers are really smart people. How could they be taken to the cleaners by Washington?

Well, it turns out it makes sense. It makes sense in the following way. The people getting the money are the interest groups that drive New York City politics. It doesn't go into infrastructure. It doesn't go into general improvements, but it does go into those interest groups which dominate the political process.

In an ordinary New York election, again you think New York is an odd place, which is both hyper-politicized and deeply de-mobilized.

In the 2003 off-year elections, the turnout for the city council races was 3 percent. The only people that came out to vote were people who worked for city government directly or indirectly or ideological Democrats, of which there are a fair number still in New York.

Now, the ideological politics and New York's peculiar business cycle are deeply intertwined. We go into recessions earlier than the rest of the country and we come out later.

We went into the early '90s recession before the rest of the country. The rest of the country left that recession, which began nationally in '91. The rest of the country left by the third quarter of '92, not in time to help Bush one, but useful for Bill Clinton, who I supported.

New York doesn't come out of that recession until the third quarter of 1996.

I mention this now for two purposes. One, to make you see that there is a connection between the ideology and the business cycle. What Dinkins did in the depths of the recession was raise taxes by a billion dollars in two years.

Any economist knows you don't raise taxes in the middle of a recession. But interest groups in New York, those well-connected public sector interest groups always held harmless even if it means extending the recession, which we know it certainly did.

Giuliani's greatest accomplishments, by the way, reduction in crime, which I can't go into if you'd like, reduction in welfare, all take place—I shouldn't say all take place—begin, are firmly established before the economy recovers. There is no connection between crime reduction and the economy. No connection between crime reduction and welfare reform.

When the '90s recession hit, Mayor Dinkins responded with a march on Washington. A number of conferences, bringing mayors together and march on Washington.

At that march Baltimore Mayor Kurt Schmoke, who some of you may remember, quote threatened, "We don't want to have to burn down our cities to get more federal money."

This was part of the self-destructive mentality liberalism had come to, that failure was to be rewarded.

What Giuliani broke with was the idea of a dependent city, dependent on Washington and Albany full of dependent people. Part of the reason he engaged in

welfare reform so early was that one out of seven New Yorkers was on welfare. It was unsustainable. The city couldn't survive that way.

And when he came into office, New York was literally bankrupt, finished. It had no cash on hand. They had to delay creditors for months and months.

When John Norquist heard Kurt Schmoke make that statement, Ed refused to go to the march. John Norquist, as you may remember, was the very successful New Democrat mayor of Milwaukee. He said that rattling a tin cup in Washington is a way to destroy cities. He went on, you can't build a city on pity.

This brings me to the general problem of how liberals approach urban problems. And it's a kind of incoherence to this approach. Liberal thought is divided against itself. Liberals in New York and elsewhere both embrace individual choice and embrace structural explanations, deterministic explanations.

So you would endlessly hear in New York, it wasn't Dinkins' fault. He can't do anything about it. It's the structure of government of government relations. it's the structure of the economy.

Structures became an excuse for inaction and failure. And there's a certain irony to this. One the one hand, New Yorkers were told by Dinkins they can only be saved by Washington. On the other hand, New Yorkers know they're far superior to Washington.

So this didn't really make a great deal of sense.

Let me try to bring this home in a very small way.

Dinkins has been defeated. The city has lost 330,000 jobs. Fear is unabated. Crime is down slightly. What's the big issue before the city council? Horse

carriage regulation. For weeks and weeks the debate was always, you've been in Central Park, you've seen the guys, the hansoms, riding people around.

And the issue here is who is the real victim? Was it the horses forced to work in bad weather on traffic and emission-choked streets, or the 396 elderly Irish drivers eking out a living?

Was this a matter of anti-Irish or anti-animal animus?

The council, torn between the militant Irish carriage drivers and the militant horse-loving animal lobby just couldn't decide who it wanted to pander to more.

Quote, "I vote for the people who came in the ships, those who were indentured, those who came here in chains," cried Mary Pinkin (ph) of Brooklyn, an apparent reference to the drivers.

But countered councilman Jose Rivero of the Bronx, "Horses have made a tremendous contribution to our growth and development of our country."

[Laughter.]

MR. SIEGEL: There is nothing you can do with this.

[Laughter.]

MR. SIEGEL: Now, it's 1993, and the city is surrounded by permafrosts, the pessimists. Giuliani wins on a fluke. There is no great change here. If Staten Island secession is not on the ballot—just a little micro-politics here for a minute—the governor's race is the next year. Cuomo is up for governor in '94. He needs the help of the city. He needs to tie in voters on Staten Island. He allows Staten Island secession to come on the ballot. State Island wants to break away. That vote is what elects Giuliani by a very, very narrow margin.

Despite major riots, despite job losses, crime and the sense of hopelessness, there was no great urge for reform. And Giuliani was a terrible candidate. He had a lot of interesting ideas, it would later turn out.

And I say this as someone who helped, having worked with the Democratic Leadership Council on the '92 Clinton campaign, then worked for Giuliani running policy seminars. It didn't take. People were afraid of it. It was not that Giuliani would come into office and do nothing. That would be all right, that he would do something, but that he would do too much, and that would set off riots.

The fear was that whatever was done, any kind of active role against the city's interest groups would set off violence and further breakdown. And this pessimism extended across the ideological spectrum.

Daniel Patrick Moynihan, you know, Moynihan gave a speech, terribly pessimist speech, talking about the out-of-wedlock birthrate in New York and saying the future of the city is spoken for the next 30 years. There is nothing that can be done.

And the right, Charles Murray was making exactly the same argument. Neo-conservatives have given up on New York. Liberals were concerned with lining their pockets. And thoughtful commentators just were afraid that Giuliani wouldn't be able to govern.

Sam Robertson, at the time, one of the city's best reporters, was afraid that Giuliani would be taken to the cleaners—a Republican can't govern New York.

Well, two things here. One thing, it was a tremendous amount of ferment in the early '90s, although I think the recession in the early '90s and recession now, the differences are enormous.

In the early '90s, there was a new paradigm society here in Washington. E.J., I think was part of it. You were at the [inaudible] right? It was like [inaudible]. I hope you were there.

Where people across the aisle were talking about problem solving. The Clintons were part of this, Giuliani was a part of it. And there are a lot of similarities between the two men that are not obvious.

And there's a sense of trying to break through the normal encrustations of not being predictable, of actually working to make—actually using government as an instrument of the general good.

Giuliani takes advantage of that. Now I'm going to say something that I hope you find intriguing. Giuliani was a 1950s liberal. And what I mean by that is he was a liberal, one that is irony and paradox. And that's really the theme that runs through the book.

The title, "The Prince of the City," refers obviously not to prince charming, clearly for Giuliani, but to Machiavelli. And Machiavelli is all about irony, the way in which private virtue like compassion, can be public vice—one out of seven people on welfare. Giuliani's favorite expression, a variant on Machiavelli: I'd rather be respected than loved. And Machiavelli said, "I'd rather be feared than loved."

Machiavelli talks about politicians who speak endlessly, Dinkins, John Lindsay earlier, speaking endlessly about compassion and the poor, what we owe the poor, and yet deliver only poverty and higher rates of crime.

A 1950's liberal treasured public space. That's the glory of cities, the glory of New York and sometimes the glory of Washington, depending upon which

public space I stumble into. Not Dupont Circle late at night, clearly, as I found out getting out of the Metro about 11:00 o'clock last night.

If cities don't have viable public space, if they give up on their public space, if public space is handed over to low-lives, in cooperation with civil libertarians, why live in a city?

There's a wonderful moment—there's a reporter named Marcia Kramer (ph), who confronts Dinkins. She says, Mayor, I want you to know I've left the city. The aggressive panhandling has driven me out.

Dinkins replies, sorry you left. Sorry further that I can't raise your taxes again.

1950s liberals understood irony. That's why when I talk about Giuliani, as a self-satisfied, a self-centered man who places enormous ego at the service of the city's well-being. I'm trying to strike that Machiavellian theme, that theme of irony.

This is a guy, after all, that tells people to shut up and be polite, right.

[Laughter.]

MR. SIEGEL: Stop jaywalking or else.

Now, the reason you need this is that liberal policies had become a mask for disastrous outcomes.

It was under John Lindsay, greatly admired by David Dinkins, that the welfare population was doubled in 1968 in the midst of the greatest boom, economic boom to date, in American history, at a time when the black male unemployment rate was 4 percent. Where we're with that now?

So politics in New York had descended into a kind of gestural radicalism in which gestures in which rhetoric substituted for deeds. Again, something Machiavelli understood quite well.

Giuliani's operatic personality obscures considerable intelligence. Often he would fly into a rage tactically, not always. There were times when he genuinely lost his temper. But most of the time he knew what he was doing.

And here I want to get to the core of why he was effective and successful.

He studied government. He knew where the levers were. He understood how things actually worked.

I remember sitting down with him one day to talk about the city charter. I thought I knew it pretty well. Turns out he knew it far better than I did. He already had been through it eight or nine times.

He just wanted to know what few small points I could add.

So when he wanted to merge the separate police departments, and New York used to have the NYPD for the streets, the housing police for the housing projects, and the transit police for the subways. Mayors had been trying to merge them for 30 years. They had all failed.

Giuliani realized that he controlled the funding of the transit cops. He told the MPA or his budget director, Abe Blackman (ph), a very sharp guy explained to them, we don't have to pay these guys. We'll make the MPA pay this themselves.

The merger began to go through. The housing cops were eventually brought on.

And time and again. The same thing with welfare reform. There had been a city charter change in 1989. Dinkins was the first mayor that didn't have to deal with the Board of Estimates. Think of the Board of Estimates as a small or more unruly United States Senate. You have to get things through no matter what its privileges.

You want to make executive decisions, you had to share the decision with the Board of Estimates. That meant if you wanted to build a school in the Bronx in an overcrowded area, you had to build a school in Queens in an area that didn't need a school. Everyone got their cut.

It's why Wyoming gets—or Cheney—let's take Montana instead. Why Montana gets \$7.00 per capita for homeland security and New York gets \$1.24, even though terrorist attacks in Montana are not terrible likely.

Dinkins, because he was a man of the old order, he was a product of the 1988 Jesse Jackson campaign, which sort of forced him to run, never made use of this power. He never really wanted to be mayor.

Giuliani understood what this meant and he understood that he could impose welfare reform on the public sector unions, because it was control over the budget.

And so people were put to work in the parks. And an amazing thing happened. When people had to show up to go to work in the parks, a lot of people it turned out already had jobs who were on welfare.

There is a wonderful case that sort of dramatizes this. It's 1994, Giuliani wants to announce welfare reform, and he gets this case. A bright guy named Herbert Steve (ph). He's caught bilking \$60,000 from a group of African tourists. Police book

him; they find out he owns a mansion on Long Island, a Penthouse on the East Side, a fleet of Bentleys. And he's also collecting a welfare check, and why not? Who's to know?

Giuliani used this as a kick-off of welfare reform. And then he did something else that was interesting. He achieved certain kinds of reforms at the expense of others. And what I mean by that is as follows.

he used some of the public sector unions as allies against the social services industry. And in New York, it was an industry, right. In New York, federal matching funds were always seen as free money, even though the deal with Washington was negative.

Moynihan was wonderful. Moynihan used to say, New Yorkers can't get over the idea that money from Washington isn't free because they don't see the money coming directly out of their pocket.

If I want to be optimistic about the future of liberalism, urban liberalism in New York, I would end with this quote from Moynihan: "The central conservative truth is that it is our culture, not politics, that determines the success of a society. The central liberal truth is that politics can change a culture and save it from itself."

And that's what New York looked like as Giuliani left office.

The trouble is, New York is backsliding. Giuliani leaves a very limited institutional legacy. He has a—I can't prove this, but I'm fairly sure it happened—there is a kind of deal with Bloomberg, the successor. Bloomberg will not dismantle and policing reform, and in return, he's free to screw up anything else he wants.

And at the same time, when Giuliani runs for president, which he most certainly is, Bloomberg will write him an enormous check.

Now, why is this a problem? Well, because the subtitle of the book is "The Genius of American Life," and the genius of American life is upward mobility for the aspiring poor.

New York had turned poverty into an industry. Wayne Barrett of the Village Voice said that poverty is to New York what oil is to Texas, the way we get our money.

Well, I don't want to suggest all liberals in New York thought this way, but the ones who didn't—Mike Tomasky will be speaking next—I was trying to think of people older than Mike, and Mike Powell, of the Washington Post, you count on the fingers of one hand. It was the sense that this was the way things had to be.

Bloomberg's concept of New York is that of the luxury city. In the luxury city, the middle class is there to serve the wealthy like Bloomberg and his friends, or the very poor.

The idea of an independent middle class doesn't figure into his views. His idea of economic development are stadiums. If anyone can tell me of a study from Brookings or anywhere else—in fact, I just looked at the Brookings report on this—where stadiums have produced economic development, I'll buy them dinner at the best restaurant in town.

It doesn't exist. Stadiums don't produce economic development.

Bloomberg tries to give away a billion dollar property on land owned by the Metropolitan Transit Authority for \$100 million to his friend Woody Johnson, who

owns the Jets with land owned by the MTA, an agency. MTA is so broke it can't maintain the track. And he's doing this while ignoring lower Manhattan.

Is this a guy liberals should like? And yet recent polls show that if Bloomberg was run in the Democratic primary, he would win the Democratic primary?

Why? Well, a cynic might point out that some of this has to do with money. There was a stretch a few years go—and I was beginning to get paranoid—every program I was on, everyone else on the podium had been receiving money from Bloomberg for one thing or another. I understood why I wasn't. I was just puzzled why everyone else was.

But the key here and the key to New York's pathologies, that Giuliani had to govern against, is that with the partial exception of the teacher's union, Bloomberg has done little or nothing to roil the city's interest groups.

When there was a recent racial incident in Howard Beach, Reverend Al Sharpton, who helped to instigate the death of seven people, the murder of seven people by his followers on 125th Street, was there to broker racial peace.

When the city had to deal with the recession, public workers were held harmless again, largely harmless by massive tax increases.

Dinkins again speaks like—excuse me—I often confuse them when I think of it sometimes—as Michael Dinkins or David Bloomberg, which much more money.

Once again, Bloomberg talks about how what's happening really has nothing to do with him. It's really what's happening in Washington or Albany.

The ugly reality is that for all of the talk of principles, liberals in New York, are people tied to narrow interest groups with little or no concern for public well-being. And I realize that, and when I look back at Giuliani's accomplishments against the grain of New York politics, are all the more extraordinary.

Thank you.

[Applause.]

MR. DIONNE: I wore this French blue shirt today because I figured that Fred would somehow find a way to bash the French. He did like French food. I appreciated that kind reference.

And by the way, a lot of what Giuliani did, a number of things came out of a book, Fred wrote earlier, which I didn't mention, called "The Future Once Happened Here." And on that meeting, I have no idea whether I was there or not, but I may have promised somebody confidentiality. So I can't disclose whether I was there or not.

I'd like to invite up Mike Tomasky and David Brooks, who will respond. I'm going to have Mike first and David second.

We'll discover whether Mike wants to embrace the praise that Fred gave him or the opposite.

Mike is the executive editor of the American Prospect, that indispensable liberal magazine. He was previously a senior political columnist and contributing editor at "New York Magazine". He covered the entire Giuliani administration from beginning to end. He worked at the Village Voice of New York Observer.

He is the author of two books, "Left for Dead: The Life, Death and Possible Resurrection of Progressive Politics in America," and "Hillary's Turn" on account of the Senate race of 2000.

Mike mentioned that when his book came out he predicted that Hillary Clinton would be a very effective work-a-day Senator. Everybody said, no, she'll never be like that. Therefore, the book didn't get the attention it deserved. And it turned out that she was exactly as Mike predicted, which is why paperback editions with new afterwards exist.

And I hope it comes out.

David Brooks, as all of you know, is a columnist for the "New York Times". He's been senior editor at the "Weekly Standard," a contributing editor at "Newsweek" and the "Atlantic Monthly" and a whole ton of other magazines. He is a frequent analyst on NPR's "All Things Considered." You know him from "The News Hour" with Jim Lehrer.

He is the author and editor of several books, including "Bo-boos in Paradise" and "On Paradise Drive."

And I don't know if he's ever said this, but I think it's fair to describe David as a McCain Giuliani Republican. And I suspect he likes Giuliani because Giuliani is not in a phrase David invented, a latte liberal.

But so welcome to you both.

Mike, you kick it off, please.

MR. TOMASKY: Thanks.

First of all, Fred, what the heck happened to you in Dupont Circle last night at 11:00 o'clock?

[Laughter.]

MR. TOMASKY: Perhaps we'll get to that later.

Yes, thanks. I do completely embrace Fred's endorsement of my brand of skeptical liberalism from New York in the 1990s.

It's made some of my fellow liberals a little bit upset with me, along with David's good review of my first book. It's that kind of thing that gets me in trouble sometimes.

But no, I covered New York City before I moved down here in the fall of 2003. And I'll try to be kind of quick, because I know that I'm sure people have questions, and just make a few points.

But I covered the city from 1987 until 2003, a long time, 1987 one might say, the height of the crack epidemic. Lots of crime. All of the problems festering for 15, 20 years, seeming at that point completely intractable.

Liberalism, including Ed Koch, who probably isn't much of a liberal these days, but as mayor, you know, you would call him a liberal mayor. Ed Koch and David Dinkins not really have much to do about it.

Urban liberalism, New York style, Fred is right, was certainly in crisis before Rudy Giuliani came along. I think it's still in crisis.

If Mike Bloomberg wins reelection and it certainly looks like he's going to, that will mean that New York City, New York City folks, has had a Republican mayor for 16 straight years. That's never happened.

Right, Fred?

MR. SIEGEL: Never.

MR. TOMASKY: Never happened.

LaGuardia was mayor for 12. The only other Republican mayor of the 20th century, John Purroy Mitchell. Am I right, Fred?

MR. SIEGEL: Yes.

MR. TOMASKY: Right.

MR. SIEGEL: And Lindsay.

MR. TOMASKY: Oh, and Lindsay and Lindsay the first time, yes, right.

Anyway, Republican mayoral teams have been scattered throughout New York's history. There has never been a concentrated block of two men back to back 16 years being the mayor.

Now as Fred signaled, you know, one can question whether Mike Bloomberg really is a Republican, but believe me as far as New York City Democrats are concerned, he basically is.

And you know, he has Dick Cheney to his house. That's all New York Democrats need to know.

So, 16 straight years, that folks is a crisis for liberalism. And it's a crisis that was long in making and that I think Fred well described as far as he went.

I have a slightly—I'll just offer just a couple of things since I guess I'm here to offer the alternative version of the Giuliani story. There are, there is a little bit of a alternative history to tell about New York.

Fred, at the beginning of his talk was talking about the tribal nature of New York politics. And it certainly is that. But it's not folks, like black people started that. That's always been the nature of politics in New York going back, really, to the Tweed era of Tammany Hall when it was Irish Catholics versus Scottish Protestants. Tweed himself was a Scottish Protestant, actually, not an Irish Catholic as is commonly presumed.

As immigration came in the late 19th and early 20th century and large numbers of Italians and Jews, in particular, came to the city, New York City always had a very intense tribal identity politics culture.

The famous phrase is the three Is, right: Italy, Israel and Ireland. And every New York mayor from after the war, well from after 1948 when Israel was created, had to pay homage to each of those countries, make a little sojourn to each of those countries. Well, those were the only three groups.

Then, you know, the 1950s and '60s came along. Lots of African Americans moved from the South up North. Lots of Latinos, Puerto Ricans in particular at first, came to the city. And so the definitions of identity politics expanded, right.

And so, now there was in the '60s a certain kind of cultural change that took place in identity politics. And you know, I don't think there's any question about that. But, you know, it's not like Al Sharpton invented it. It's always been around in New York. Al Sharpton may have taken it to a different level.

But it always has been the way that New York politics has been played largely by Republicans and Democrats until Giuliani came along.

Another thing that happened where I part company from Fred a little bit in talking about the history of New York, is that sometimes, Fred, structural explanations are legitimate and sometimes they are right.

Fred mentioned the welfare rolls in New York City doubling in the late 1960s when the United States as a whole was going through its greatest economic boom in history.

Well, there's some reasons that that happened that don't really have to do with, you know, stupid liberal politicians.

There were structural changes going on in New York having to do with the changing nature of jobs, the changing nature of the New York City employment base, the work force, manufacturing in particular, leaving the city a decision, and not one made chiefly by liberals, to move the Port of New York from Brooklyn over to New Jersey.

See, in the old days, right, you could graduate from high school, and you could go down to the port and get a job. And there were a million manufacturing jobs in New York City, one million in the 1930s and 1940s and 1950s.

The doubling of the welfare rolls almost perfectly—and it's been a long time since I've looked this up, and I'm undoubtedly forgetting something that Fred may correct me on—but the doubling of the welfare rolls in the late 1960s almost perfection coincided with a decline in manufacturing jobs and with the fact it became a lot harder at that point to graduate from high school and go down to the docks and get a job.

So there were some structural explanations for the changes in New York City that weren't entirely liberalism's fault.

That said, there were a lot of things that were liberalism's fault. And I was quite critical—I wrote a piece in 1997 in "New York Magazine". 1997 was when mayoral elections are, '93, '97, 2001 and this year, 2005. And so when the four Democrats were running in 1997, I wrote an article in "New York Magazine" the headline of which was: "Four Democrats and Funeral," which pretty much sums up what the situation was.

And I quoted a person I knew—yes, I did quote him by name so I can say his name—Ed Ott. Fred knows him. He's a long time labor operative in New York City, but a very thoughtful guy. And he said to me, the Democrats have been in power too long, or until Giuliani, the Democrats had been in power too long. New York became a one-party state, and in one-party states, ideas are seditious.

I've never forgotten that quote, three pithy words that really summed up a lot of the problems.

So I agree with Fred that, you know, those problems did exist. And again, as I opened, the fact that you know, once Bloomberg wins reelection and serves four more years, that New York liberals, Democratic liberals, will have been out of power for 16 years, really is something that should make them think. It's not clear that it is, but it really should.

Now, as to Giuliani, and I'll finish up here in a few minutes so David can talk and then we can take questions.

The tribalism that I talked about, the identity politics that I talked about, I think Giuliani's greatest achievement—and he did have some, of course—and by the

way, Fred's is the only half-hour talk about Rudy Giuliani that I ever heard that only mentioned the word crime once.

But Giuliani's greatest achievement, to me, was that he did transcend that kind of identity politics for in considerable ways. With his rhetoric in his '93 race, he would say things like, you know, we are not Italians, we are not Irish, we are not African Americans, we're not Latinos. We're Americans, we're New Yorkers, we're human beings. From those identities do we get our rights and our obligations to one another as fellow citizens.

I thought that was pretty powerful. I thought that that was, you know, that raised a municipal election to something on the order of having, being based on a philosophy, which is a rare thing in a municipal election.

I thought it was right. I thought it was, largely speaking, you know what the city needed and needed to hear.

With the crime reduction, which should be talked about a little bit, you know, I think that that too, in practice, if not always in rhetoric, because of the way he just reflectively defended the cops all of the time when they shot a 16-year old black kid—but in practice, that too kind of transcended New York tribalism because that helped everybody. It helped black neighborhoods more actually than white, reducing the homicides in the worst precinct in the city in East New York from—Fred, I'm sure knows the numbers—but something on the order of 120 down to 15 per year, maybe even lower than that now because Bloomberg has held on the crime reduction.

So I think Giuliani did a lot of very good things. Obviously, the crime reduction made people believe that good things could happen in New York City again.

And I lived there, and I wasn't Giuliani's biggest fan, but I can speak, and some of you may have lived there at the time. It really changed the way you lived your life, and it really changed the way you felt about living in New York. And it just really changed the idea that New York City could actually do something good again.

Because back in Fiorello LaGuardia's day, I'm sure people felt that if New York City was going to do something, it was going to be the biggest and it was going to be the best. The glorious George Washington Bridge in 1931, the public hospital system, which in those days I'm sure was a great system, the system of local community health care clinics, the system of parks.

Every thing that New York City did in those days was great. By the 1970s, the 1980s, everything New York City did was mediocre and shabby and third rate. Giuliani turned that perception around.

What I think, and I'll finish here in two minutes, what I think, though, was his fatal flaw, is that ultimately he did not transcend identity politics. Ultimately, he played identity politics. He had his constituencies. And he was their avatar, their defender. And he really didn't think very much or care very much in his rhetoric and in some of his substantive action, about the constituencies that weren't his.

In fact, he enjoyed pissing them off. And he enjoyed making fun of them. And he enjoyed making great sport with them and antagonizing them and making them feel like they weren't part of his New York.

And this was a real tragedy. And when he won reelection in 1997, on the night that he won, he gave his victory speech—he won by quite a margin, a landslide, I guess—and in his victory speech he said, I recognize that these first four years have not

included everyone in the progress that New York has made. I dedicate my next four years to making sure that everyone who wasn't included will not be included.

And there were great words, and I was hopeful about them. And he turned around and did the same things that Giuliani always does. He had an opportunity in his second term, I believe, to really—Fred said he didn't leave any great institutional mark. I think he had an opportunity in his second term to leave a great institutional and spiritual mark on the city. And I don't think he did it.

And you know, it wasn't in him to do it.

Now everybody knows his great comportment after September 11th. And you know, I was a bowled over as anyone by the way that tragedy kind of enabled him to locate this humanity that was down there inside of him. But he didn't locate that very often, folks.

And for example, like the time when he forgot to tell his wife that he was publicly announcing that they were getting a separation and a divorce, for example.

There are a lot of problems with the man, his personality, his enormous ego, which Fred said, you know, he put in service of the city's well-being, often, yes. Often, not quite. His enormous ego was put in service of what Giuliani needed. And he missed many opportunities, I think, to be a greater mayor.

I'll stop there. Thank you.

[Applause.]

MR. DIONNE: David?

MR. BROOKS: First, I want to apologize. I'm like Fred, I'm going to call him as Michael did, Giuliani and not Giuliani. When I lived on 14th Street, we said Giuliani, but then when I moved above 59th Street, we all say Giuliani up there.

[Laughter.]

MR. BROOKS: Fred is sort of moving right. If he moves as far right as I am, I know he'll say Giuliani as well, if you're going to hang out in Republican circles.

Nuclear and Giuliani are the two words...

[Laughter.]

MR. BROOKS: I'm going to start by reading not from Fred's book, but from another book about, another recent book about Teddy Roosevelt, because I'm going to try to talk about Giuliani in the national perspective since these guys know more about New York than I do.

"Theodore Roosevelt was a man who felt most at peace with himself when he was in a struggle with someone else, and the more powerful he deemed the adversary, the more worthwhile he seemed to feel."

And that applies to Teddy Roosevelt and I also think it applies to the guy who had a picture of Teddy Roosevelt on his office wall in City Hall, Giuliani.

In fact, I think it applies to a stream of politicians, who I want to talk about as a group. And they would start with Roosevelt, you would move on to Bobby Kennedy, and then you would come up to the present in McCain and Giuliani.

And it seems to me these four politicians all have a common trait, which is first of all, a common character. And here I would have a different emphasis than

Fred, I think. I think—Fred's book very correctly emphasizes the policy of Giuliani, but for the essence of the guy, it was character.

Character comes first. His character was much more core to him than his political ideas.

And what these four political guys have in common is a facility for organizing their energy. And the way they organize is they don't shoot out in all directions. They don't look at policy areas where they can make a difference. They look for bad guys, people who are behaving shamefully and dishonestly, and then they charge right in.

Giuliani used to sit around with his staff, watch the "Godfather" and recite the lines. I had a friend who worked for him who said he liked working for him because every morning you got on, strapped on the armor and he went into battle against the dragons.

And I think it's that location of nexuses of shame and dishonor that all of these guys had in common. For Teddy Roosevelt, it was the trusts or the muckrakers. For McCain it's Boeing or Abramoff or campaign finance system. For Giuliani, it was the Fulton Fish Market or school board, the beacons of identity politics or indulgent New York liberalism.

In each case, it was a series of contests against dens of iniquity. And the righteous and ego-gratifying struggle that puts you in the context with.

So it's a style and method first, that Giuliani has. And the importance of this style and method for these four guys, Roosevelt, Bobby, McCain and Giuliani, is that it's the creation, to me, of a viable center in this country.

There is, first of all, in the country politically that we have two political parties in this country, but if you look at the electorate, we have three parties. We have a conservative party, a liberal party and then a McCain-Lieberman party. And poll after poll, there is a center in this country.

But the center does not exist in Washington. And it is not in existence in national politics for an important reason. And that important reason is that the centrist leaders in this country, by-in-large, lack two things—brains and guts.

[Laughter.]

MR. BROOKS: If you look at the centrists on Capitol Hill, by-in-large, they don't have guts. They will not challenge their party leaderships. They're blown around and for the most part, I was described them as well-intentioned road kill. They get walked over by their party leaders.

The second thing they lack is brains. If you go to a think tank on the left or you go to a dinner, there will be a lot of scholars and academics and people with policy vapors. A lot of ideas.

You go to an AEI dinner, a Heritage dinner again, a lot of scholars and think tanks and policy dinners.

You go to a centrist dinner, a liberal Republican dinner or a conservative Democratic dinner, lobbyists. They have no ideas; they just have a lot of lobbyists.

And so to me, if there is going to be a creation of a viable center, first of all, you've got to have a style of guts. And these four gentlemen who were centrists, have this style of guts, which is to me, the first building block if there is going to be a viable center in the country.

The second thing they arrived at and as Fred describes Giuliani arrived at it reasonably late in life, is a political philosophy. And that political philosophy, to me, was built around certain virtues that he admired: independence, decency, order, and competition.

I once asked him what's the core to your whole life or your whole political philosophy and he said it was competition. It was manly combat, so to speak.

Whether it's in the private sphere, or in the economic sphere or the personal sphere. And that creates a certain set of beliefs. And to me it's a belief that grows out of Hamiltonianism, another New York Republican, if I can put it that way. And it goes up through Lincoln, TR, Giuliani and McCain, a belief in limited but energetic government, not a belief in no government, not a belief in the social conservatives, not in a belief in the nanny state, but an independent, decent, orderly society that can create social mobility.

And so, Giuliani was able to create a modern version of this sort of Hamiltonian, Teddy Roosevelt's Republican progressivism that makes him part of the building block of national politics. And that's why I think Giuliani is important and why I think McCain is important. Because if there is going to be a center, it's not going to be Chris Shays or Olympia Snowe. They just don't have the brains and ideology to create a center. But it's going to be somebody like McCain and Giuliani who has the guts and who has basically a set of principles which are the third lost tradition in American politics, which is Hamiltonianism or big city progressivism.

And so, that's why Giuliani is important going forward.

Now, can you imagine Giuliani winning a presidential or Republican nomination for president?

Well, I was out in Oklahoma City recently and I asked a group of businessmen in Oklahoma City, what do you think of Rudy Giuliani? And they loved him. They just loved him. They couldn't stop expressing their admiration for the guy.

Would you vote for him? Hell, no.

[Laughter.]

MR. BROOKS: They didn't use the word hell, because they were Nazarenes.

[Laughter.]

MR. BROOKS: But no way. And so that's the problem he runs in to.

Nonetheless, I don't think—and so the conventional view, and it's probably correct in the near term, is that a guy like Giuliani or a guy like McCain, somebody who represents this manly Zeus-like centrism couldn't be elected.

Nonetheless, I think two things. In the long run create an opening. And the first thing is terrorism. If we have another terrorist attack in this country, or as the terror war goes on and we suffer setbacks, somebody like Rudy Giuliani becomes very attractive if something terrible happens in this country.

And the second thing and the most important thing, I think, and the most reliable thing is the entitlement crisis.

We have in Washington this wall of debt. And I'm in the building where Isabelle Sawhill works and many other people who have warned about the wall of debt

coming at us from the Medicare, Medicaid and Social Security problems. That threatens to bury the country.

We also have a political system, which is in some ways similar to the political liberalism of New York in the 1970s and '80s, stagnant and unable to deal with the central problem that faces it.

And it takes somebody of a Giuliani-like ego, maniacal, bull-headed, looking-for-dragons to slay to solve this problem, to crash through the polarized stagnation we have in this town.

And so to me, as these two problems, entitlement and terrorism, leap more to the fore, the opening becomes possible, the possibility to break through the systems, the parties and they conventionally exist right now becomes possible.

And so that's why I think this tradition, this Teddy Roosevelt party of Zeus, this manly tradition that if it ends up with Giuliani and McCain, is still a viable and really the only—if we're going to have a third party tradition, or a new sort of politics, it will emerge from somebody like him, the Giuliani who is still obnoxious, maniacal and tough, but in his new incarnation, soft and caring as well.

[Laughter.]

[Applause.]

MR. DIONNE: Everybody put on a mike.

I just want to destroy David's presentation as a tough conservative, because I was recently at an airport with him, and I was having a terrible knee problem and he rushed over to get me a wheelchair. And so it can be said this Zeus-like figure is actually a compassionate conservative deep down inside.

[Laughter.]

MR. DIONNE: And I just think that we heard an excellent [inaudible] that we're going to read in about a week.

[Laughter.]

MR. DIONNE: Let me—I'd like to bring in the people from the audience.

Fred wants to reply.

MR. SIEGEL: Briefly.

MR. DIONNE: And then let me throw three questions on the table, which we can deal with now or later.

One, I would like you to deal with the whole President Giuliani prospect, which fills some with hope and others with feelings.

MR. : Dismay.

MR. DIONNE: Secondly, this is a small point in your book, but I found it interesting.

You talk about the distinction between broken windows, policing and community beliefs. And you make a big deal of that. And I, like many people who you condemn as ignorant in the book, have sort of seen the two as being more closely allied than you suggest.

And so I'd be very curious about that.

And the third is, how can a guy go out and campaign for Mario Cuomo and then go out and campaign just as heard for George Bush?

Does this suggest, lets us say, a certain flexibility of principle in Rudy Giuliani?

[Laughter.]

MR. SIEGEL: Just very quickly to E.J. First of all, the key to Giuliani's presidential prospects is New Jersey. It's now—it sounds like an odd thing to say. It's not a joke about New Jersey; some of my family lives there. The key thing here is thing. It used to be you went for New Hampshire to South Carolina. Now you go from New Hampshire to New Jersey.

Giuliani-McCain will do very well in New Jersey.

Let me answer E.J.'s questions and then I'll go back to what Mike and David said. Community policing is what Chicago does. Chicago, with one-third the population of New York has more murders. Community policing is involvement and the neighborhood walking, broken windows policing and COMSTAT. The two parts were not community policing.

Broken windows policing was policing small crimes. It wasn't being friendly and on the beat. It was patrolling order.

If Dino Decka (ph) is found in Dupont Circle at 11:00 o'clock drinking, he's arrested. that sends a signal out to other people that this is not open territory. You have to behave and you have to behave in public.

I have an anecdote...

MR. DIONNE: [Inaudible] transport that would be recorded then Dino (ph) would never be caught in Dupont Circle.

[Laughter.]

MR. SIEGEL: There's an anecdote in the book about a lady on Avenue J in Brooklyn, for those of you who know Brooklyn, an orthodox shopping street, orthodox Jewish shopping street. Some kids are getting rough with her, and she says, better watch out, Giuliani is going to get you. And they stop.

That sense of public order is what broken windows policing is about. It's not about community relations.

Now COMSTAT (ph) was tracking crime. My office is near Cooper Union right near the East Village off of city drug central. In the old days, the tactical squad would hit the East Village and those guys would all come outside my window. I'm on the first floor. I had a listen to them all day or watching them break into cars.

No, broken windows policing and COMSTAT (ph) have nothing to do with community policing. One is a public relations cultivating the community. The other is targeting crime effectively administratively.

MR. : The two can be used together.

MR. : They can be and phased, not simultaneously. In other words, this goes to Mike's point about the second term, the biggest mistake Giuliani made was firing Bill Bratton. The problem is that Brat and Giuliani are the same person.

MR. : Brat was the Police Chief.

MR. : He was the Police Commissioner. He's the guy who really achieved the policing breakthroughs. They're both Type A ramrods. They're both guys when they're in the room there's no air for anyone else to breathe. When they're both in the room you can't even enter.

[Laughter.]

MR. : Giuliani wasn't big enough, and this is problematic, wasn't big enough to allow Bratton to be almost as big as he.

Bratton left, he was replaced by a competent technocrat who was out of touch. After a terrible incident in the city, 2 days later, save for the success, went off to the Academy Awards in Hollywood. This was an enormous problem.

The problem with Giuliani as a presidential candidate goes back to the problem as mayor. He capsizes calm waters. His oversized personality is great for crises. When he came to office, New York was finished. There was an evacuation mentality and he was utterly calm. The city was bankrupt and he never uttered a word. He faced down all the bankers and the Financial Control Board, but he wasn't Teddy Roosevelt-like. David has the wrong analogy. There was none of that. He was Brandeis-like. There's a Brandeisian politics to Giuliani that has to do with competition and smallness in the city. He wanted smaller and mid-sized businesses to be able to succeed. He wasn't just about making deals or cutting down big guys.

The other thing about Giuliani that doesn't fit the manly, and Dave is right, that's there, Giuliani is a student of government. He once described getting a job as an opportunity to have an extended seminar in government. He is much more intellectual than people realize.

I remember two events. This is 1991 and I'm in a room with Bill Clinton and a bunch of welfare experts. Clinton could talk to them on their level. He knew their arguments, he knew the problems with their arguments. Giuliani could do the same thing. I was sitting around with him talking to people about crime. People were panicked, they want this, no, the key thing in New York is crime dropped, police use of

violence dropped even more, and crime dropped without imprisonment increasing. There was actually a reduction in crime. In much of the country when crime went down, it was a function of increased imprisonment. That didn't happen in New York. It didn't happen.

Structural explanations, Michael is right. There was a terrible change, not terrible, the trouble with that is that if you go to the newspapers of the late 1960s, there are page after page of ads for unskilled workers. What he's talking about is beginning to take place and it hasn't taken place. It's in the wake of Lindsey and the city loses 570,000 jobs, larger than most large cities in the United States. That structural problem is coming and what Lindsey does is exacerbates it terribly.

Let me end with this thought to bring it back to the question of liberalism. What Giuliani did, his greatest accomplishment to me, is making the—

[End of side A, begin side B.]

MR. : [In progress] —bringing neighborhoods in New York back to life and that's the combination of crime and welfare reform, pulling people out of the marginalization of welfare. That should have been a great liberal accomplishment. If liberals had any integrity left, that should have been something that was broadly applauded by liberals. Instead, often line up with the charlatan Al Sharpton, a guy three-quarters con man, one-quarter Democratic Party perpetual candidate.

There is something wrong here, and this doesn't speak to Giuliani's presidential—I realize that, but it does speak to what the future of liberalism will be like in the country. The reason I'm reluctant to speak to Giuliani's presidential possibly is I

think so much can happen. If 1997 sees Frankfurt, God forbid, and Amsterdam again, it will all look very different.

The other thing is, I assume, and maybe I'm wrong, that the Republicans are going to take a beating in the off-year elections. If that happens, if there's a sense on the part of the Republicans that the base strategy is maxed out, then Giuliani and McCain could be the ticket. I'm going to change that, McCain and Giuliani could be the ticket.

Let me explain what I mean. The only person I could see Giuliani running with as a vice president, because when he withdrew from the Senate race that Mike wrote about, he never wanted to be a Senator. He doesn't want to be one of 100. This is a guy when he goes to the baseball game, he is managing the score card. He's keeping each batter, each pitch is recorded on his score card. When he reads The Godfather, he's charting organizationally the way—gives his instructions to the lowest-level people in the organization. If he be a Cheney-like administrative vice president to McCain. Other than that, I don't see him taking a vice presidential slot in any ticket.

MR. : Could I ask you, I just want to see some hands so we can get a mike to right in the back there. Let me just ask you something, Fred. The theory of your book in some ways is of Giuliani as a total break, but there's also evidence in your book that there was already a reaction to some of these problems in the city. The two that I think of is in the Koch administration, we've talked about this, actually did have, probably pushed by groups like the Industrial Areas Foundation, a real neighborhood revitalization program where you did actually begin to see life out in the outer-borough neighborhoods in the Koch years, and that Dinkins in an admittedly imperfect way

began to make some of the policing changes that Giuliani pushed much further. Is that a fair view?

MR. SIEGEL: It's half fair. Giuliani builds on things that Koch and Dinkins have done in housing. There is no question. One of the way they do this is there's a cadre of entrepreneurs, black, small landlords, that you can sell buildings to. Part of the revival of Harlem, one of the heroines of the book was a woman named Debbie Wright, Marion Wright-Edelman's niece. Here's an African American woman from the Dinkins administration. This doesn't fit the Giuliani profile. She's in the Giuliani administration. Everyone in the administration, all the higher-ups, want to sell the city-owned housing because massive housing defaults have produced this huge crop of city houses in Harlem. They just want to sell them because the city is bankrupt.

Debbie Wright convinces Giuliani, and this is one thing, you could convince him if you could make a good argument, to turn this over not to the highest bidder, but to local black landlords. It's an enormous, enormous success. Fought, by the way, by Charlie Rangel, a liberal in good standing. If I come back to this and I'm a little harsh on this, it's because the world in New York seems topsy-turvy to me. What was the second part of your question again?

MR. DIONNE: The housing and then the crime.

MR. SIEGEL: What Dinkins did under enormous pressure is increase the police force. But the joke was, in New York the unofficial motto of the NYPD before and after the increases was, don't get involved. The point is, Dinkins did not believe in policing. He thought crime was a matter of root causes. It's really the other way around, crime causes poverty rather than poverty causing crime.

He didn't believe in root causes, so 2,000 more cops were hired, 6,000 were authorized, but they did nothing. They sat on their hands. Crime did drop slightly, but it's interesting, it dropped mostly in midtown Manhattan where versions of broken windows policing were being carried out by business improvement districts, low-level policing was being carried out by business improvement districts.

Let me make one final point on why I'm angry with liberals. If I think about cities—

MR. DIONNE: We could have missed that.

MR. SIEGEL: What?

MR. DIONNE: I say we could have missed that.

[Laughter.]

MR. SIEGEL: Other mayors avoided taking on the crime issue. Rich Daley is a great mayor. Millennium Park in downtown Chicago is the finest public space in America from my point of view outside of Washington. Yet if you leave downtown, downtown is perfectly safe. If you're on State Street or Michigan Avenue, you're completely safe. If you go to the neighborhoods, crime is rampant and it's the kind of agreement he has. He doesn't bother with crime in those neighborhoods and black demagogues don't bother with him.

Giuliani treated crime in Harlem or East New York as every bit as seriously as crime on Fifth Avenue on Park—he should have been applauded. That's the point Mike talks about, and I agree in the second term his ego got the best of him.

Part of what happened to Giuliani in the second term, he got the presidential bug. After he won reelection you could see it throw him off his game and

he doesn't really recover until late in the term, before 9/11, but late in the term. So his ego is an enormous problem if he doesn't have a crisis to match it as a presidential candidate or as a president.

MR. FREEMAN: My name is Jo Freeman. I've been a resident of Brooklyn since 1979.

MR. DIONNE: A neighbor of Fred's you should say.

MR. FREEMAN: A neighbor of Fred's except he lives on the better side of Coney Island Avenue.

I was a Democratic Party precinct captain, we call them—for 10 years, and I served on the Kings County Democratic Committee. You told us how Giuliani governed. I want to know how he got elected. As precedent to that, New York is a quintessentially Democratic city. It votes Democratic for president, governor, senator, congress, state senate, assembly and city council. Yet we've elected Republican mayors for three elections and probably will for a fourth.

For the record, in the first half of the 20th century, there were three Republicans, not two, who were elected mayor, Seth Will (ph) in 1901, John—Mitchell in 1913, and LaGuardia in 1933.

[Applause.]

MR. FREEMAN: What's important about those elections is those were fusion elections. They combined a stronger Republican Party and organized Democrats opposed to Tammany Hall.

The last three elections there was no strong Republican Party. The Republican Party in New York City is probably one of the weakest Republican Parties

outside of the 19th century South. As for organized Democrats, while they are a lot weaker than they used to be, they didn't support Giuliani or Bloomberg. How did he get elected? Why is New York City electing so many Republicans as mayor?

MR. SIEGEL: Go back to 1989. Giuliani is a hero. He's a prosecutor and he's taken down all sorts of bad guys. It's true some of his cases will get reversed.

By 1989 the city is deep in a recession. People forget, Dinkins is a guy who wasn't held in high regard by his fellow Democrats. He has a nasty racially driven primary with Ed Koch. He is damaged goods. He has all sorts of income tax problems, all sorts of personal financial problems. He is very vulnerable.

Giuliani wins the outer-borough ethnic vote, some swing voters, but it's not enough. What's interesting is, 4 years of decline, 4 years of a really terrible situation in New York, Giuliani doesn't pick up any votes outside of Staten Island. He gets virtually the same vote again in 1993 as he did the last time.

Most people in New York, and this is why the Democratic registration numbers are deceptive, are completely tuned out from politics. Most people who could afford to gave up on city government. They've privatized their lives. Their kids went to private schools, they hired private security guards, and so on and so forth. So, yes, on a national level people are Democrats. Having dinner with Dick Cheney, Mike is right, is verboten.

That said, they're not terribly tied to the local Democratic organization. The whole purpose of the local Democratic Party is to demobilize voters, is to keep people not showing up so primaries aren't contested. The average city council race is won by a margin of 70 or 80 percent. Why bother to hold elections?

In the last round of city council elections, the city council candidate was more likely to be murdered than defeated for reelection, and that's not a joke. That's literally the case

[Laughter.]

MR. DIONNE: I want to bring Mike in, and let me throw an additional follow-on question. Go ahead, Mike, and then I want to just ask you a few questions.

MR. TOMASKY: It's an important phenomenon to understand. Everybody in this room knows the phrase Reagan Democrats, right? Then in New York City in the 1990s there popped up the phrase Giuliani Democrats. There was often a lazy conflation of those two terms in the New York City media and it was completely wrong to conflate them.

It's quite true that in some respects Giuliani was the revenge of the Archie Bunker or that kind of thing. That was sort of a bad caricature, too, but Giuliani did have the outer-borough ethnic vote as we call it. But he also had another vote and to some extent in 1993 and to a very great extent in 1997, and I can best relate this I guess with an anecdote that I remember reading from New York Newsday, I can't remember whether it was election day '93 or '97, I think it was '97, Fred probably remembers, there was a story, a profile of a woman on the Upper West Side who was in Barnes & Noble carrying a book bag. Pinned on the book bag was a button that said "I Believe Anita Hill," this is not a Reagan Democrat, who voted for Giuliani.

MR. SIEGEL: It's '97.

MR. TOMASKY: It's '97, right.

MR. DIONNE: He interviewed the woman with the book bag.

MR. TOMASKY: I used it in my book about the senate race. It was very emblematic. That's who a Giuliani Democrat was. Fred is right, the registration numbers in New York City are 5 to 1 Democrat, but it's not like those whatever translates into 2 million or people or, it's not like they're all Paul Krugman. They cover a wide ideological swath.

Even if they are liberal and believe Anita Hill, they believe that the city was out of control and that Giuliani was somebody who they could comfortably vote for at a local level. They won't vote for him for president. There is absolutely no chance.

MR. DIONNE: He got 75 percent of the Jewish vote the second term around. That's not a conservative vote.

Just a quick follow-up on that. Giuliani when he ran in '89 was anticipating running against Koch.

MR. : Koch, absolutely.

MR. DIONNE: As some of you may know that history, that Dinkins ran against Koch and beat him in the primary which surprised a lot of people, although I think it should have been less surprising than it was.

This is a kind of counterfactual question. What would the Giuliani running against Ed Koch have been like, and how might that have changed the whole trajectory of this?

MR. SIEGEL: The key to Giuliani in '89 is he had no position on social issues. No positions. He adopted them for the race. People said to him if you want to run and win in New York, you can't be anti-choice. You have to be pro. He was

moderately sympathetic to gay rights, but those social issues did not involve his core beliefs. I think David got to his core beliefs quite well.

He adopted those issues for that race, and if he runs for president, and you see as Mike points out in his book when he thought about running for the Senate, you'll see him modify those positions. I won't be shocked at all between now and 2007 when we discover he's really not in favor of partial-birth abortion. Those are positions adopted for political reasons.

The question I thought you were going to ask me, the good ones, suppose Giuliani won in '89? Would he have been a great mayor? The answer is no. He wasn't ready. He run in '89 on a kind of conventional I'll be tough on crime. He had no ideas. Ideas really do count in politics. Both Clinton and Giuliani really picked up on that.

Part of what troubles me is that in the early 1990s, the great book about cities and government reform was David Osborne's "Reinventing Government." Of course, Bratton since he could never agree with Giuliani and vice versa had people reading Champy's "Reengineering the Corporation" instead of "Reinventing Government." But nonetheless there was this intellectual ferment.

The big book about cities in recent years has been a marketing device—upper middle-class called Creative Cities which says that upper middle-class people are wonderful and if you cater to them your city will succeed. Visit San Francisco, I suggest which has no economy anymore. It's now just kind of just an adult play land. Nonetheless, this is a book taken seriously by people all over the country.

The collapse of the debate on ideas is really quite stunning.

MR. DIONNE: Please, the gentleman right here has been very patient.

MR. FEEHAN: I'm Dave Feehan and I'm President of the International Downtown Association. I've lived in New York for a short time, College Point, Queens, and a son in Brooklyn, so I spent a lot of time there.

Two questions. The first one is in terms of crime and the drop in crime, from your perspective what are the demographics what kind of an impact have they had?

The second one is you mentioned business improvement districts, New York has 51 of them, Chicago zero, San Francisco zero, Detroit zero. If you look at the crime statistics, New York has a dramatic drop. Murder is down from 2000 to 600. If you look at Philadelphia, a dramatic drop if you look at the cities that have business improvement districts.

But the point is, Giuliani was no friend of BIDs. In fact, he went to war with Dan Biederman and some of the other leaders of the BIDs and he tried to hold them down in terms of their growth in New York.

MR. SIEGEL: Let me take that first. You're absolutely right, BIDs are very important. BIDs engage in a kind of broken windows policing, policing those small crimes right on the spot. You can't get away with doing things. This is the worry about Giuliani as a political figure, he couldn't coexist with other strong people.

Dan Biederman is an extraordinary guy who brought the first BID to midtown and did a fantastic job. Giuliani went to war with him. Hobbes talked about the corporation as a chip off the block of sovereignty. That's how Giuliani felt about any other strong figure, they were a chip off the block of his sovereignty. On demographics they really played no role. The demographics of the city don't change.

Let me put it a different way. Take Philadelphia for a second.

Philadelphia is roughly the population of the Bronx. The Bronx is poor. The Bronx has no downtown to speak of. The crime rate in the Bronx is about a third of the crime rate in Philadelphia. How can this be? Leave aside the corruption and incompetence of recent mayors including Ed Randell who lied about the crime statistics.

This kind of managerial policing really works if you have a competent, professional police force. And as someone who has ridden around with police forces in many cities, I can tell you most cities don't. So New York had this latent attribute, a professional police force waiting to be put to use. Giuliani and Bratton put it to use.

There's one other point on this. This gem was sitting there. Bratton was the Transit Police Commissioner in the early 1990s. He brought crime down there first. People like myself were jumping up and down, this is unbelievable. This is how Bratton was telling Giuliani. Dinkins would not look at it. He wouldn't acknowledge what was going on in his own subway system because ideology overwhelmed the evidence.

MR. DIONNE: Please, over here and over here.

MR. MILLIKEN: I'm Al Miliken, affiliated with Washington Independent Writers. Is there more any of you can reveal about the withdrawn Bush nominee from New York nominated for the Department of Homeland Security? Wasn't this revealing a significant character failure on everyone's involvement that took him seriously and promoted him to the national stage?

MR. DIONNE: There's a paragraph in Fred's book that says almost exactly what you just said. I want to bring David in.

MR. TOMASKY: Very quickly, there was an aspect to Giuliani that his mayoralty, it was a boy's club, it was a men's club, it was a cigar club, and he was that way and I go a lot into my book about the Senate race about how he did that and his whole affair with Judy Nathan who is now his wife, right? Isn't she? They hung out at the cigar bar and all that stuff was just not discussed.

MR. SIEGEL: Kerik was actually a terrific prison commissioner. He and a guy named Michael Jacobson did a fantastic job. They took the number of stabbings at Riker's Island from something like 120 a month down to four or five. As police commissioner in the first 6 months, Kerik was terrific. He was the unacknowledged response to the failures of the Giuliani second term in policing. This guy saved it.

But about 6 months into his term as police commissioner, something odd happened to Kerik. I first noticed it when I found out that he was sending busts of himself out to each and every precinct. Kerik was much taken by himself.

As for homeland security, the Bush people were taken by Kerik. If you met Bernie Kerik, you would like him. The trouble is he never completely shook off the demimonde from which he came. His mother was a street walker who was murdered. He was a rough guy from the streets. This was not Giuliani's choice. Giuliani was embarrassed by it clearly. Giuliani did not push Kerik. The Bust people wanted Kerik, but what Giuliani didn't do is say, by the way, I never did a background check for Kerik in order to become police commissioner. He was my buddy which was Mike's point. Kerik began as Rudy's driver, so, yes, it does exhibit a failure.

When Giuliani runs, everything is going to be dug up. The best thing you can say about his personal life is that he's a serial monogamist.

[Laughter.]

MR. DIONNE: The gentleman over here?

MR. : Yes, hello. I'm an intern over at—E.J.'s office and I grew up in Staten Island and I was born in Brooklyn. We were alluding to Staten Island a little bit in this discussion. As somebody who plans on devoting much of the rest of my life to getting Democrats elected on Staten Island, I'm wondering what's going on on Staten Island, why have the Republicans created this stronghold, because it wasn't always that way. And how has that played into Republicans getting elected for mayoral races?

MR. SIEGEL: Under the old Board of Estimates, each borough no matter what its population had equal weight on this Board of Estimates, on this governing council which had oversight over the budget and the mayor had to share his budgetary and executive—there was a voting rights case brought, because Staten Island has only one-quarter the population, one-sixth the population of Brooklyn, this was deemed a violation of the Voting Rights Act. This produced tremendous estrangement on Staten Island. They felt that they were going to get cut out.

MR. DIONNE: If they'd only do that to the U.S. Senate.

MR. SIEGEL: But Giuliani, and this goes to Mike's point about tribalism, Giuliani could be just as tribalist as anyone else at certain times. Because Staten Island was so important to him, he eliminated the city's only large dump, and you were probably in favor of this, only large dump on Staten Island. That's a fine thing to do in principle, but what do you do with the garbage?

This will come back and we'll hear this in the campaign, at one point we were talking about shipping the garbage to Virginia. The Governor of Virginia objected

and Giuliani made a statement, Virginia should be honored to have New York's garbage.

[Laughter.]

MR. DIONNE: Mark Warner is hoping to run against Rudy Giuliani. In the front here, a couple of questions and then we'll shut it down. We've got about 10 more minutes because we started late.

MR. MITCHELL: Thanks, Gary Mitchell from the Mitchell Report. I want to ask a couple of questions, one a statement by Fred and the other by David Brooks.

I'm curious if you could expand a little bit on the notion about a '50s liberal being somehow who deals in I think you said irony and paradox. I'd love to hear you expand on that.

To David, I'm interested in the notion of McCain-Giuliani as the vital center. Do they have any competition in that other party? Are there vital centrists over on the other side of the aisle?

MR. DIONNE: Fred is still a registered Democrat last I checked.

MR. SIEGEL: I am a registered Democrat. I'm one of the last 12 remaining Joe Lieberman Democrats in captivity. I check the obituary pages every day.

MR. DIONNE: Like the Shakers.

MR. SIEGEL: '50s liberalism was a product of the experience of totalitarianism. There was a recognition that there was evil in the world, that the Soviet Constitution which was to guarantee all wonderful things to everyone had very little to do with how the Soviet Union was actually governed.

One of the most famous books of '50s liberalism is a book by Reinhold Niebuhr called "The Irony of American Life."

MR. DIONNE: American History.

MR. SIEGEL: Irony of American History. This is the world of Moynihan. Moynihan and I used to talk about it. This is the world he came out of.

'60s liberalism was different. '60s liberalism was about who you were, it was about identity, it was about effusive claims about emotional states. '50s liberalism was cold, objective, it understood the world could go radically wrong. It was liberalism purged of its utopian core, and that's crucial because that utopian core corrupts. It corrupts because it allows intentions to substitute for actions.

Moynihan understood this, Giuliani understood this. Michael Novak in an earlier incarnation was a 1950s liberal. I'm still, even though I'm not that old, a 1950s liberal in the sense I admire those people. Unfortunately, most of those people have left the Democratic Party because what Niebuhr understood is that interest groups in claiming to speak for the general good are acting on their own behalf, and you don't break through that, you're going to end up in a calamitous situation.

That's what's happening in New York, and that's what David talks about in—there's where I'm afraid we're headed on a national basis.

MR. BROOKS: First, let me say that's one of my favorite books, The Ironies of American History, and it does have a dark view of human nature which I think Giuliani does have. And I must say, I rode around with him for about a week in his van in 1995, and maybe because I was from Washington, but all he wanted to do was talk about foreign affairs.

I was impressed by how developed his views on Afghanistan, the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and matters of that sort. His views on the Cold War struck me as more developed than his views on domestic policy. I think that's because it's a competition of power and it goes to the things Niebuhr was writing about.

As for the vital center, do I think it exists in the Democratic Party? I think it's withering in the Democratic Party. E.J. and I were together recently with Andy Kohut of the Pew Research Center who did a topography of the American electorate, he does this periodically, and one of the things they found when they looked at the American electorate in the last go-round after the election was that it no longer makes sense to distinguish between New Democrats and regular Democrats, that that category in the electorate no longer exists.

I think that's true in the electorate, I think it's true in Washington. If you look at the number of Democrats who flirt with things like Social Security private accounts, education vouchers, free trade, it's shrinking. The question is, is this simply a reaction against Bush? Once Bush is off the stage, will New Democrats reemerge? Is Bush imposing a more liberal, if you want to put it that way, discipline on the party and uniformity on the party, then when Bush is off, there will be more of a flowering and more diversity within the Democratic Party? I think it's possible but unlikely.

I think it's unlikely because I think the funding base and the emotional base and the intellectual strength of the Democratic Party is now more on the left than it is in the New Democratic Party.

If you were in Washington in the 1990s and you were 25, it was cool to be a New Democrat. It's not cool to be a New Democrat now. It's possible it will reemerge.

MR. DIONNE: Is that why Fred is looking at the obituary pages?

MR. BROOKS: If you're in Brooklyn, it's probably still cool. They're a little behind there. But it could reemerge.

The final thing I'll say is you don't see leaders, remember I talked about guts? The down side of this was when I watched how he ran his administration, and the Bush team is disciplined, but nothing like Bush. The Bush people when you get them over for dinner are robotic in repeating the party line, but nothing like Giuliani people who are much more robotic than the Giuliani people. The Giuliani people I thought were more robotic than the Bush people, and that internal discipline would never work in Washington. That's the down side of the courage to actually lead a movement. I don't see any Democrats in that.

MR. SIEGEL: I just want to add one thing. I think the crucial movement is when the Democrats lose the Senate in 2002. You can chart Lieberman's collapse and Howard Dean's side, the Democratic Party unfortunately becomes unanchored after that.

MR. DIONNE: Just a comment on David's thing about New Democrats. I think that this poll finding is a product of Bush and that Bush has created a kind of solidarity among all kinds of Democrats who oppose him, and I am more inclined than David is to think that at the end of the Bush years—I actually think even before the next election there is going to be a robust internal debate among Democrats and that it may not be exactly so-called New Democrat versus so-called Old Democrat, I just think that

Bush has created a kind of party unity that you haven't seen, and that's true on both ends which is why we're so polarized.

There was a gentleman over here. Why don't we bring in two questions, this gentleman and that lady, and then I'll throw one at you all and we can shut down. Maybe we'll reverse and we'll do David, Michael and then Fred to close.

MR. : I grew up in New York in the late '30s and '40s when it was a fairly safe place, and Bratton seems to have done the job all over again with the local policing. But why is Giuliani getting the credit for crime? I thought Bratton was the one who actually instituted all the technical aspects of the policing and really got the police department working and then Giuliani turns around and fires him.

MR. DIONNE: Hold on that. This lady over here.

MS. HENDRICKSON: I'm Kim Hendrickson and I teach at George Washington and once in a while at AEI.

I have an odd question, but maybe it's good that way. One of the things I appreciate in your earlier book, Professor Siegel, is your unabashed defense of moralizing in mayors and the idea that there was an earlier era where mayors were not ashamed to be moralizers and talked very openly about the moral responsibility of individual citizens.

Then I think about Giuliani, and this style of moralizing is similar but also very different. It's a sort of interest in character without an interest in moralizing. It's a sort of character building without moral condemnation or character building without the same sort of, I don't know, interest in maybe religious or the style of moralizing that you might see in a Fiorello LaGuardia 50 years ago.

Does this shift to character instead of morality seem significant to you or is this just one piece and we're just happen to have it in any form that we get it?

MR. DIONNE: I'm going to amend this. Let's have Fred twice, just beginning and end, but why don't you take those two questions and then I'll throw one on?

MR. SIEGEL: I think there's a lot of LaGuardia. LaGuardia goes and breaks up the slot machines. LaGuardia talks about taking down tin horns.

When Giuliani tells an audience of minority adults that if you support your kids you're not a man, and if you don't support your kids you're a bum, he sounds just like LaGuardia. In many ways, he really is a throwback. That's why the Times always made fun of him as the White Bread Mayor because he seemed to be a throwback to that earlier era. I'm not sure that that distinction holds, but I see what you're saying.

As for Bratton, the thing is, Giuliani saw what Bratton did in the subways. They really were partners. Giuliani backed Bratton 120 percent. But you got to remember something, when Bratton comes in, no one thinks crime can be brought down or at least not brought down rapidly. Giuliani gives a speech into office where he says it's going to take 10 years to make a dent. What happens is is the combination of broken windows and COMSTAT, the computer mapping, it's these two things together that drives this extraordinary change.

The question to ask is, how come so few cities have adopted this and how come many of those who do adopt it can't make it work? That to me is the puzzling question.

As to what happened with Giuliani and Bratton, it's clear. Bratton was getting too famous for Giuliani—the other thing to remember about Bratton besides the fact of how similar he was to Giuliani, Bratton too had political ambitions. He thought about running for mayor. So this wasn't entirely contrived on Giuliani's part.

MR. DIONNE: I want to bring in our other two speakers. Let me just close with a question that could take the whole day but what I would like some reflections on. Looking at Giuliani's successes are quite clear and some of his failures, what lessons are there for both the liberals and conservatives? I'm leaving out David's new neoconservative vital center. There's a sense in which there are a lot of lessons here or so it seems to me, and I'd just like each of you to reflect on that, and also to pick up on any of the other comments that were made already.

MR. BROOKS: I'd have to think about that one. The one that comes immediately to mind on the crime, the decision to not worry about root causes and just address the symptoms of crime was a crucial and important decision and I think that to me comes up in case after case including the war on terror, don't address the root causes, just address the symptoms.

My friend Marshall Wittmann says the main word Democrats have to learn, he's at the DLC now, is the word order and the importance of global and domestic order to people as they vote, and that's something people certainly emphasized.

I want to back to this character versus morality question because I think it's a vital question why Giuliani is not a social conservative but is a 1950s liberal which is a sort of social conservatism. There was a guy named Marvin Alasky (ph) who became Jew for Jesus or a convert to Christianity, actually, not a Jew for Jesus, and he

labeled the McCain-Giuliani types the Party of Zeus. He meant it as a criticism of them because what he was doing was fighting the Athens v. Jerusalem War and it's two value systems. The Athens value system or the Roman value system or the Giuliani value system emphasizes the public virtues of courage, duty, patriotism, service, valor, being fierce against foes, and loyal to your enemies.

The Jerusalem, if you want to put it that way, and really the Bush form of social conservatism, emphasizes the domestic virtues of compassion, of love, and they're different value sets, and ideally the full human being would probably have both, but in reality most of us have one set of virtues and disdain the others.

If you look at Margaret Thatcher, she had the public virtues and was uninterested in the private virtues, and I think Giuliani is very much like that and I think that's why he's able to tell himself he's a good upstanding person, though he's had some peccadilloes in his private life, and that's true for McCain, too.

So I think it's a different way of talking about morality, and I personally think it's a very attractive way of talking about morality. Whether it is possible, again I'm going back to my political pundit role, to talk about morality in this way in America today is an open question.

As to whether you can talk about the Niebuhrian pessimism in an upbeat, optimistic, Hallmark Card America and get elected is also an open question.

I think it's a great way to talk about public morality, I'm just not sure it's a popular way.

MR. DIONNE: Thank you. Michael?

MR. TOMASKY: I agree essentially with David's first point about Giuliani's effect on liberalism. I think we've talked a lot about crime, but it's worth pointing out, and we all kind of know this in our bones, but crime was the great single failure of liberalism from the 1960s forward.

Some might argue the Soviet Union and soft of communism and that sort of thing, but I think really in terms of what discredited liberalism are a variety of factors, but I think urban crime was probably at the very top of that list. As we've said, it seemed unsolvable even to Giuliani and Bill Bratton at the beginning.

The success there has really changed and I think almost universally everybody this side of Sharpton has changed people's presumptions about how a problem like that can be addressed, that it actually can be addressed, and now liberals might still believe that there is such a thing as root causes and poverty and so forth, but that that can be and has to be separated out from fighting crime and that fighting crime is not a function of root causes.

I think that's taken hold in the Democratic Party at large, and maybe not in New York City, Fred, but I think nationally it has taken hold in the Democratic Party at large. When David was talking a few minutes ago about the center not existing in the Democratic Party, maybe not. You can point to CAFTA and certain other things that the Democrats taking a position on, and I'm not much of a centrist myself, I guess, but I think there are other ways in which the kind of lessons that a lot of Democrats learned out of experiences like the New York City crime experience have taken hold.

I think that there's a conversation going on about abortion and social issues in the Democratic Party now that is not a conversation that would have happened

a few years ago. There's yet another story in the New York Times this morning about Hillary Clinton's abortion speech at the end of last year, and we ran it at almost exactly the same time, in fact before Clinton's speech, and we're considered a pretty traditionally liberal magazine, but we ran an article that said exactly the same thing, that the language of the pro-choice groups has been entirely wrong. That conversation is going on.

There's a conversation going on in the Democratic Party about terrorism and foreign policy and national security, and while I would probably acknowledge that the party as a whole is a long way away from adopting a coherent, tough, pragmatic yet also internationalist position, that conversation is at least going on and it's going on in the pages of our magazine, and it's going on in buildings like this one, but there is a recognition now.

It was interesting to hear David talk about having a very strong sense of Afghanistan and the Soviet Union in 1995 when he was a mayor. There's a strong recognition now I think among a lot of Democrats and liberals that we just kind of forgot about foreign policy when the party became a collection of interest groups, and I think that conversation is going on now. These things don't change overnight. It takes a long time to do it.

I think these things are happening in the Democratic Party, so those are the kinds of lessons that have been learned from an experience like the Giuliani experience in New York.

I would just conclude quickly by saying that I haven't really talked about Giuliani as a presidential candidate and I kind of want to. I think that he will—I just can't possibly see it happening. David's theory about the McCain-Giuliani new centrism

is a good theory, it could happen in 20 years, but I just don't think it's possible. I can't possibly imagine today's Republican Party primary electorate voting for a man who announced his separation from his wife before he told his wife, was obviously having an affair, and lived with two gay men when she threw him out.

MR. SIEGEL: Walking around in drag.

MR. TOMASKY: Yes, walking around in drag. That, too.

MR. BROOKS: The drag is okay. The gay men is a problem.

[Laughter.]

MR. TOMASKY: Right.

MR. DIONNE: I'm glad you can arbitrate.

MR. TOMASKY: It just isn't going to happen. We should not at the same time underestimate Giuliani's ability to change his stripes, and Fred referred to something that I had written when suddenly in the middle of that campaign against Hillary Clinton he wrote a letter which Richard Vigery circulated for him about how Hillary was against religion and was going to ban the Bible and he was for having the Ten Commandments in schools. He had already been mayor for 6 years and he'd somehow forgotten to propose that the Ten Commandments should be posted in New York City school classrooms.

So he is capable of flexibility of principle to use a phrase E.J. used about a half an hour ago. He's highly capable of it. For all the principle that he showed in many ways, he's entirely capable of changing his stripes completely. As I said when Fred and I did this in New York a couple of weeks ago, deciding just before the South

Carolina primary in 2000 that in fact the Earth is only 4,000 years old. He's capable of all that.

But I still don't see the possibility that he can be elected by the Republican Party primary electorate.

MR. DIONNE: Fred?

MR. SIEGEL: I think the great lesson is management counts. I think Clinton understood this for a while, Gore understood this for a while. I think it's been largely forgotten that management really counts.

Giuliani was first and foremost a great manager. That's why 9/11 went off so well. He had been preparing for this for years and years and years despite the derision of the New York Times who accused him of being paranoid about terrorism. That's one.

I think the greatest danger for the Democrats as we move into this next round is what Mike talked about, the party of criminal rights, the party of terrorist rights, and if that evolution is completed, nothing will help the Democrats, because even if they come into office they won't be able to govern.

As for Giuliani himself, there are going to be two Giulianis in this race. There's one Giuliani who stood up to the Saudi prince. This is the Party of Zeus guy that David likes, the guy who is no nonsense, the guy who threw Yasser Arafat out of Lincoln Center, rightly so, despite the New York Times being utterly apoplectic.

But there's a problem that we haven't discussed that Giuliani is going to have and this problem comes with being a New York mayor. Giuliani was tremendously supportive of immigrant rights. He turned a blind eye to illegal immigration. If you live

as I do in Flatbush, only a few blocks where some of the 9/11 hijackers lived prior to the attack, this takes on a different meaning. And this question of order, that the Republicans are the party of order, is hard to square Giuliani's position on immigration and the question of order. I was just in South Arizona. That's all people talk about is illegal immigration, public order. Giuliani is going to have to do some fancy footwork.

Having said that, a few more Londons, yes, he will be a very serious candidate for president regardless of the social issues.

MR. DIONNE: Thank you much. I just want to close with two things. One is that I personally liked Rudy more before he gave that speech at the Republican National Convention and then after speaking for all those Brooklyn liberals you talked about.

Secondly, my favorite signal of Giuliani's success making the city a better place, a personal signal, our third child was born shortly before the '97 election when Giuliani was on the ballot for reelection. My dear mother-in-law came to help us with the new child and she said, thank you for keeping me from having to vote for Giuliani, and her point was, that as a Democrat, she kind of didn't want to do that and as somebody who saw what had happened in the city, she felt she had to do that. In some ways I thought knowing my mother-in-law that was a very high compliment to Giuliani, and I think we need to come to terms with that legacy but also need to come to terms with the flexible part of Rudy Giuliani.

As Fred said, I've known him for a long time. I always feel smarter after—well, I feel both dumber and smarter. I feel more enlightened whenever I hear him, and I hope you did, too, Fred. And David and Mike, thank you so much.

[Applause.]

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