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A Briefing by Refugees International and the

Brookings Project on Internal Displacement

THE CRISIS IN SUDAN:

A REPORT FROM THE REGION

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AGENDA

Introduction: ROBERTA COHEN
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Presenters: RICHARD C. HOLBROOKE
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SENATOR JON S. CORZINE (D-NJ)
Member, Senate Foreign Relations Committee

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P R O C E E D I N G S

[Due to audio difficulties, the opening remarks by Roberta Cohen were omitted. In their place are her prepared remarks.]

ROBERTA COHEN: Called the worst humanitarian disaster in the world by the United Nations and deemed genocide by the United States, the Darfur emergency raises difficult and disturbing questions. What should the United Nations and what should the United States do to effectively stop the killings and displacement? Beyond diplomatic pressure, are sanctions and military force practical options and would they be effective in this case? What would it take to expand the role of the African Union? How can the international community best engage the Government of Sudan in a political process to resolve the conflict?

To address these and other questions, we have three prominent personalities who recently visited Darfur.

First to speak will be Senator Jon Corzine who together with Richard Holbrooke was in Darfur earlier this month. Senator Corzine is a Democrat from New Jersey who was elected to his first term in the Senate in November 2000 after a distinguished career as an investment banker. He was former chair and chief executive officer of Goldman Sachs. In the Senate where he is a member of the Foreign Relations Committee, he has been a strong supporter of foreign aid, of strengthening the Millennium Challenge Account and of efforts to combat HIV/AIDs. He has also been a strong voice in the Darfur emergency. He was one of the first Senators to call for US Government action and co-sponsored the Senate's first resolution on the subject. He then

mobilized Senate support for a resolution deeming the situation in Darfur to be genocide and he was the cosponsor of that resolution. Earlier this month, he visited Darfur to search for solutions.

SENATOR CORZINE: [In progress] -- really is uncommon, because at almost any point in time you can go over the precipice where the kind of stark projections of human life lost are potentially available.

I do think there are other good things that can come from such a tragedy. The global community embracing and elevating the African Union's role and leadership in dealing with sort of a repetitive crisis of political development and economic development in Africa is a great initiative. This is a great place to reinforce the instincts that are already in place among the leadership. Certainly we see that from the Nigerian president, but I think you see it across the board. And I hope that we will be forceful in taking these steps.

Sanctions, by the way, that are unenforced in my view are nice for putting people at ease, but I don't think holding diplomatic passports from Janjaweed militiamen sounds to me like anything very practical. I think we need to get real with what we're doing. I think the African Union force structure on the ground is the place that we ought to be spending most of our emphasis. It would be nice if we could talk about the interdiction of--or sanctions with regard to petroleum resources, but I don't see that happening given how the Security Council works. I think we ought to be putting most of our effort there and developing a long-run structure which Richard can talk even more forcefully about with regard to the United States supporting the African Union by naming an ambassador to it, by getting fully engaged in a diplomatic process.

Finally, though, the last thing I'll say, this is one of those situations that take constant attention of the media, of the public, of the politicians around the globe. Only through visibility and the transparency of what the situation is has there been any movement or any real help for the human beings on the ground. And so the interest we see in this room and the interest that you see through some of the amazing reporting that I've seen in the media and great efforts of folks that have been involved over a longer period than I have I think is absolutely essential. This is one of those things you don't want going off the radar screen three months from now because people say there hasn't been, during the rainy season, a real crisis or that we've taken little bitsy steps. Because this thing has the potential to be a real devastating act of violence against mankind.

MS. COHEN: Senator Corzine will take a few questions.

QUESTION: Senator, you mentioned helping the African Union with peacekeeping. I know Secretary Powell mentioned this in his testimony. The question is do you think the Darfur crisis can help get the Global Peace Operations Initiative back on track, because it seems to have come adrift. And that's, of course, the administration's plan, to train peacekeepers--globally, but, you know, primarily Africa.

SENATOR CORZINE: Well, I think it provides a rationale of why that policy is a good policy that ought to be emphasized. But my worry, and it really gets to--we don't have a lot of time in this particular situation. This is a bootstrap operation. It is time that we act, because every day that we go by, more individuals killed, raped, pillaged, whatever is going on--which there's incredible documentation of--and it is unacceptable to sit by and wait for legislative processes and bureaucratic processes, in my view. This is a time for action. The African Union is prepared to do that, if we heard it right from their leadership, and the global community ought to put its money

where the mouth is, they ought to put C-130s and all the other kinds of airlift support that would make this happen. And then say, if this is a good pattern, then maybe we ought to get to a long-run solution so we're not doing this on an ad hoc basis, so we go forward.

QUESTION: John Suway [ph] of the St. Louis Post-Dispatch. You mentioned the impracticability of going to the Security Council on oil sanctions. Given that, because of the structure of the Security Council, what is the role that you think the Security Council should be playing? What should we be trying to get from the Security Council that would be useful?

SENATOR CORZINE: I wouldn't give up on it. I think the United States ought to use all the diplomatic leverage it can. But we're seeing a real push-back, if I'm reading the information flow properly, that China, Pakistan, others--

MR. HOLBROOKE: Russia.

SENATOR CORZINE: --Russia, resisting the kind of steps that are necessary to protect these million-two or million-four individuals, whatever the number is. So I think there it will take real diplomatic effort to find a coalition outside of the operations of the U.N. if it is unable to act to provide the resources to do those things that are necessary in the short run to protect. And then I think we need to--we just need to keep pressing and pressing and using all of our diplomatic goodwill and economic leverage on those members that are resisting us.

QUESTION: [Inaudible] from Sudan. Senator, I just came back from Sudan after 10 weeks and I visited the same place you visited, the showcase camp. And I agree with you, sir, something has to be done. You talk about action, and you are asking the world community and the African Union to so something. But my question to

you is what are you going to do as senator to help to do something? I mean, it's not just you ask others. What are you doing?

SENATOR CORZINE: Well, I think that in the United States Senate we can push for emergency appropriations to actually provide funding for the kinds of steps that I think could be of immediate help. I think the African Union needs the financial resources, needs access at the logistical support, and that takes legislative approval. And we need the help of the administration to get that done. It's not enough to say we're going to wait another 30 days and, by the way, Congress will be out in 30 days and then we won't be back in till January, and, you know, they'll be shifting around accounts in the State Department, maybe, to get some of this aid. So I think there's a lot to do between now and when Congress leaves session sometime in early October.

I think I'm getting the hook. Probably some people are glad I am. Anyway, I appreciate very much this interest that you all have. This is an issue that needs and deserves the kind of attention that's displayed here today. Thank you.

MS. COHEN: Thank you very much. Good having you.

[Applause.]

MS. COHEN: The next to speak will be Ambassador Richard Holbrooke. He hardly needs any introduction, either as former ambassador to the United Nations or as the chief negotiator of the Dayton Peace Accords that ended the war in Bosnia. But there is one thing I do want to say which is less well-known, and that is that he's been an ardent champion of the rights of refugees and people forcibly displaced within their own countries, the internally displaced. He was the first United States ambassador to bring the plight of displaced persons to the attention of the United

Nations Security Council and to the international media. So to me he is a force for progress on the political and humanitarian front.

MR. HOLBROOKE: Thank you, Roberta. That's very generous of you. And since you started with the question of internally displaced persons, before I add to Jon Corzine's points I want to say something about that issue in a generic sense because most people don't realize--although I think most of you in the room realize--most people don't realize that under the United Nations definition of refugees, it isn't enough to be driven from your home by circumstances, man-made or natural causes; you have to cross an international border. And if you don't, you're not an official international refugee.

So the 150,000 Darfur refugees in Chad get supported by the United Nations High Commission on Refugees, the UNHCR, but the far, far larger number inside the border don't. And even in the so-called model camp that Jon Corzine talked about, it is not as good--if you'll pardon the irony of using the word "good"--it's not as good as a UNHCR-supported camp. And the UNHCR says "not our problem." And other agencies have to pick it up. That's because when the refugee concept was really officially dealt with for the first time after World War II, people saw refugees as an international problem. And internal refugees, IDPs, are something that most countries in the world, and most especially the Soviet Union, were determined not to let the International Committee talk about.

So two-thirds of the people in the world we would consider refugees the U.N. system doesn't so acknowledge. And they get World Food Program aid. There are plenty of NGOs out there. The Medecins Sans Frontieres, Save the Children, International Rescue Committee, Oxfam, and many other great organizations are out there, but they're not getting the full support of the UNHCR.

And Roberta and Francis are the only people I know in the world who've written books about this. I consider this a scandal, and I have repeatedly tried to make people accept the responsibility for IDPs under the UNHCR. And I've been totally unsuccessful, so Roberta's generosity has to be put in the context of "nobody pays attention" and this administration has actually moved away from that concept. I heard that first-hand when I got in a pretty heated argument with some highly courageous and impressive aid workers on the ground outside Al Fashir and Geneina week before last. I admire them, they're courageous, they're working in hellish conditions. But they were very narrow in their approach to this bureaucratically.

I think it is a major problem. Remember, again, two-thirds of what you and I would consider refugees don't fulfill that criteria. Once a person becomes a refugee--or, even worse, bureaucratic initials like "IDP"--they're dehumanized. The people we saw--and I want to stress to you the so-called model camp, the one Colin Powell and Kofi Annan visited which we also went to, is a model camp only the standards of the other camps. Once you become an IDP, you're sitting--you've been dehumanized. The people you see in these camps might have been farmers or merchants or pharmacists or garage mechanics or professional people. But they're living in cardboard boxes left over from the WFP program. They don't even have the UNHCR blue sheeting. They're living in a situation where one heavy rain--and it's the rainy season--will wash it away. Even if the food is getting through--and there's not enough food and not enough water getting through--they are dehumanized.

I can't tell you how much I admire the international aid workers out there, but I don't want anyone in this room to think that the fact that the humanitarian spigots

have now opened, which they have, means they're adequate. There are shortfalls everywhere in the system, even in the so-called model camps.

To me, the strongest image of my trip was a family that I saw squatting in the mud maybe a hundred yards off the beaten path. There are no paved roads in the area, of course. And they were sitting there with kind of a straw thing, they'd done a makeshift straw thing and some cardboard as a roof, which was going to disappear in the first rain. And the man was sitting on the ground and his wife was sitting next to him nursing a baby. And he had a slate maybe this size, and a chalk, and he was writing in Arabic, presumably the Koran, for his other son who was probably 6 or 8. It was perfect family portrait--you know, father knows best, all the things we're used to, except they're sitting in the dirt. And he was gently trying to preserve some family order out of this hell.

We also talked, Senator Corzine and I also talked to--and I don't mean this cynically--the usual victims, the people who had been raped, young girls, the mothers, who told us the stories you've all read about--you all have read about, or you wouldn't be in this room, but the world doesn't fully understand it--of people who have--if you go outside the camp to gather firewood, you're in mortal danger, all these horrible stories.

So the situation is extremely bad. I went there wearing several hats, most importantly as a member of the board of Refugees International, whose president and former president are both here: my old unindicted co-conspirator from Southeast Asia, Lionel Rosenblatt, still the most dangerous man in the refugee community, and most effective, and a very old and close friend of ours, kind of a member of our extended family in my own household; and his successor as president of RI, Ken Bacon, who,

together with Lionel, has done such a great job. And RI has always been on the front lines. IRC, Save the Children, they're all there, and my hat's off to them.

Now, I want to make a second point because Jon Corzine and I are obviously both supporting John Kerry in this election. In my view, this is not a partisan issue. I did a radio show this morning with Senator Brownback on this issue. He has been a leader in this issue. He's co-sponsored the resolutions that Roberta talked about. Senator Kerry has made very strong statements on this, calling for the administration to call it genocide. Colin Powell did do that last week, as you all know. And there is no political advantage in this issue. It is a bipartisan issue. Anything I say going forward in my remarks and the Q&A that implies criticism of the administration--and I will say some things that I think they fall short on--should not be read as in any way connected with the presidential election. Lives are at stake, and bipartisanship is the only appropriate response. There's no political advantage for either candidate or either side in this.

Now, some things are going better than they used to. Because of Colin Powell's and Kofi Annan's trips, the aid spigots have opened up somewhat. Both men are to be commended for making this difficult trip into the vast emptiness of western Sudan. It's a very big area, as you all know, roughly the size of France--just Darfur alone, and Darfur is only a small part of an even larger country which is under extraordinary pressure. We've made a step forward calling it genocide, even if other countries don't yet join us in this, because it helps put more pressure on the government in Sudan.

But if we just restrict ourselves to dealing with this as a humanitarian crisis, we will simply create another long-term refugee problem to go on top of all the

other permanent and semi-permanent refugee problems in the world. To show you how long these problems can last, Lionel and I began our refugee careers in 1978 on the Thai-Cambodian border. It was only this summer that the last refugees left that camp--right?--the last Hmong. And these weren't ordinary refugees; these were people who worked for the CIA. And we still couldn't get them into this country for over a quarter century.

And during that period of time we are throwing money that should be used for development issues--water, food, education, infrastructure, roads, HIV/AIDS--we're throwing it down the drain. And Thailand was far more accessible and our connection to it far greater than Darfur. Furthermore, Darfur, even though Darfur is without question the most serious humanitarian emergency in the world today--I use the word "emergency" for a reason. It is not even the worst place in the region. There is a far higher degree of some of the most pernicious diseases, including dysenterial diseases which kill children under 5, tuberculosis, and so on, in eastern Sudan, over in Port Said, right? Am I getting my cities--

MR. DENG: Port Sudan.

MR. HOLBROOKE: Port Sudan, I'm sorry. I'm sorry, Francis.

MR. DENG: That's okay.

MR. HOLBROOKE: I defer to you on that.

MR. DENG: It was close.

[Laughter.]

MR. HOLBROOKE: Anyway. It's probably bad in Port Said, too.

This is Darfur, and we have the crisis in south Sudan. The Naivasha agreements have been agreed to, but not fully signed. I met with John Garang last week,

the leader of the southern rebels, in New York, and he's ready to sign and he wants a piece of the action. But the Sudanese government is holding out because they think there's some leverage.

So, I want to underscore it: these people in Darfur, in these terrible camps, will be there as long as the IDPs were in Angola--by the way, that's over 30 years, until Savimbi finally met his end last year--unless we deal with the underlying political issues. Because that wasn't done in Angola, you had 2.5 million IDPs, roughly. Francis and Roberta will know the figures better than me. And I visited them, and their conditions were more hellish even than Darfur and nobody did anything about it for 30 years because the underlying political roots of it were not addressed.

Now, those political roots are the key. There are talks going on in Nigeria now under the leadership of President Obasanjo wearing his hat as chairman of the African Union. Secretary Powell, in his statement last week, said of those talks, "I have personnel from the State Department on the ground in Abuja on a full-time basis to assist the negotiators in their work." I was glad to hear that, but my impression was, talking to people in the region on all sides, that the American presence in Abuja is at too low a level and the support and pressure we're putting on those talks is inadequate.

The African Union, as you all know, is a three-year-old organization replacing the wholly ineffectual Organization of African Unity, and this is its first real test--unless you count Zimbabwe, which has already failed. And it is imperative for Africa itself, for the world at large, for the United Nations community, that the AU succeed here. That's going to require an aggressive American involvement. That's why Jon Corzine and I, in the Washington Post article which he mentioned and which is available here, recommended a full-time envoy for these talks along the lines of Senator

Danforth's mission for south Sudan, a mission which I believe was quite successful and I commend Jack Danforth and the Bush administration for that effort. But why haven't they done it for Darfur?

Similarly, the African Union itself is now--our liaison with the African Union is the most junior officer in the American embassy in Addis Ababa. There's nothing wrong with her skills; she's going to be a fine American diplomat over time. But it's her first assignment and she is not at the level appropriate. We have a full-time ambassador to the European Union, extremely senior, a personal friend of President Bush's--and a very good ambassador, by the way. He was preceded under the Clinton administration by people of great stature, like Stu Eisenstadt. Why don't we have a full-time ambassador in Addis Ababa credited to the African Union conducting a separate mission to strengthen the AU?

Powell in his statement says that he has identified $20 million in FY '04 funds for initial support for the AU mission in Darfur. We visited that mission. It is composed of a handful of people. Depending on how you count it, 125 AU monitors--that's the key word, "monitors." The Sudanese won't let them in if they're called peacekeepers. And 125 is pretty small for an area the size of France--backed up by maybe a protection force of 300 people. There is, curiously enough, and none of us realized this till we got there, an American military officer attached to that mission, a Marine major. And a French lieutenant colonel attached to that mission. Both of the men are named George, and they get along just fine. So just--actually, one's named George, and the other's named Georges. But they're very good. I was very impressed with them. It just shows that if you put people deep enough in the desert, of any nationality--

[Laughter.]

MR. HOLBROOKE: And the head of it is a Nigerian general who was involved in Liberia.

The concept is really good on these cease-fire monitors, but they're only in Al Fashir. They have to be in all of the major--at least in the three capitals of Al Fashir, Nyala, and Geneina. And they have to be far more. Why aren't they? Obasanjo's recommended a 10- to 20-time increase. The U.S. has supported it, but not aggressively.

The answer is Khartoum. Khartoum doesn't want them in. Khartoum is now caught between a rock and a hard place, very much like Bosnia 12 years ago. The people who are most responsible for this were unable to finish their genocidal work before the international community came in. And here, I echo Jon Corzine's praise of the media. As in Sarajevo, the media deserves great credit here. They were going to depopulate Darfur, and the world caught up to them. Then they let in a few observers and a lot of aid and thought that would be enough and they continued the job, and they were unable to. And they're now caught--Khartoum is now caught in a very odd position. They've let in just enough media, just enough NGOs--500 international workers backed up by 5,000 locals is a good number so that the world's aware. But they aren't letting in enough aid and they aren't letting in enough monitors, peacekeepers, whatever you want to call them. We have to therefore focus maximum pressure on Khartoum, A, to rein in the Janjaweed, and B, to allow more African Union monitors.

Finally, the rebels. Probably the least understood part of this issue in the West is that there are two rebel armies in the field. One's called the Justice and Equality Movement, the JEM, and the other is called the SLA, the Sudanese Liberation Army.

We met with senior military commanders of both these groups. They're articulate, Khartoum-educated, and they have real grievances against Khartoum. What people tend not to realize is it was these two movements that triggered the current crisis. As they began to get more successful recruiting people, arming people, and making raids on the provincial airports--they took the airport in Al Fashir a year ago, they took hostages, right in the only significant town in central Darfur.

When they did this, that's when the Khartoum government unleashed the Janjaweed. The Janjaweed are just men, with guns, on horses and camels. We saw some of them. They are very dangerous. They're nomadic. In American terms, they're the ranchers and the people being attacked, killed, and raped are the farmers. And the Janjaweed are trying to depopulate Darfur, drive these people into the camps, and get an empty zone. Because the villages they're depopulating are the people supporting this rebellion.

Which is why I end where I started: Only a political settlement can stop this, a political settlement that has to be agreed to by the two rebel groups, JEM and SLA, the Khartoum government, and then enforced--not just observed and monitored, enforced by an international peacekeeping group which should be at its core African Union. But the outside world must support this group. They need planes, they need helicopters, they need communications equipment, they need Jeeps. The AU has no money, and $20 million of funds is not going to be sufficient. The one thing the two George's asked for in Al Fashir was a single C-130, from anywhere. That's all they need, because they need to get to examine the area.

So our role here, as Senator Corzine said, is not to send troops, but to give them everything else. The troops can come from the AU, but everything else--logistics, communication, support money--has to come from the outside world.

Thank you.

MS. COHEN: Thank you very, very much. We are now going to hear from Dr. Francis Deng, who is a Sudanese national and one of the world's greatest authorities on Sudan. He has a distinguished diplomatic career. He served as Sudan's minister of state for foreign affairs and as ambassador to the United States. He also developed an impressive academic career after parting company with the government. He's the author of numerous books on African and humanitarian themes, including a definitive study of Sudan entitled "War of Visions," which can be found the Brookings bookstore.

From 1992 until August of this year, Francis Deng served as representative of the United Nations Secretary General on Internally Displaced Persons, and he tirelessly traveled around the world on humanitarian missions, and in that capacity he visited Darfur in July and met with senior government officials to discuss the crisis and the need for more effective humanitarian and political action.

Francis?

MR. DENG: Well, you can tell that I'm being introduced by a friend.

[Laughter.]

MR. DENG: Really, my job has been done very well by the senator and by Richard Holbrooke. Let me just correct something you said, that you failed. I tell you, when you came back from Angola and brought the issue to the Security Council, you shook the system to the point where people have actually tried to reform. To this

day, when people discuss alternatives, your name keeps coming up. So don't underestimate what you have done.

I think we know the basics of the problem in Darfur. We know what caused it, we know the government was involved in the Janjaweed and the atrocities and all of that. We know the humanitarian tragedy. I want to touch on a few things that might shed a little more light.

When I went to the Sudan, having witnessed so many people go, including Colin Powell and Kofi Annan, my question to myself was what does my mission add? And yet there was no way I could not go. You see, that would have been too insensitive. So I decided to go with a dual sort of capacity, as representative of the secretary general, but also as a concerned Sudanese. The significance of that is I wanted to engage people in discussions that would be quite candid, that I'm not here just as a foreign or U.N. representative, I am concerned about what's happening, and only by knowing the truth can we be helpful.

And I think I got a pretty good candid, you know, inside look at the situation. One of the things that I was told by a number of senior people, and I think it's significant here, is that the Janjaweed played a very important role in countering the insurgencies and that some even went as far as saying had it not been for the Janjaweed, the government might have lost Darfur. Now, maybe sometimes it gets exaggerated. But the main point is I was told by some, literally, that the government troops were very truly defeated, except for the Janjaweed. Now, the troops, many of them from Darfur, did not want to fight back, to fight their own people. I think what made this significant is that although the government gives the impression that it is cooperative in dealing with the Janjaweed, the fact of the matter is they were very important vital allies. And

people would tell me quite candidly, how can you expect the government then to turn around and call allies that had played a very important role criminals to be disarmed and punished?

So I think the bottom line is we cannot expect the government wholeheartedly, transparently to deal with this. Reasons will be given, including, you know, the [inaudible] identity of the Janjaweed, they're unknown, they're not controlled by the government, some of them are criminals, well-armed. Some went as far as saying they doubted whether the government had the capacity. What this means, I think, is that the role of the international community becomes critically important. When I was there, there was considerable fear on the part of many in the Sudan that the international community was going to intervene. It was thought that the U.S., together with the British, had serious intentions to intervene. Now, those of us who know a little better knew this was not in the offing and in fact, even if it were possible, some of us did not think that would have been the right thing to do. Because if you were to confront the government over Darfur, certainly there would be resistance, they will use religious bigotry and extremists in the name of jihad holy war, and what you would have is a messy situation where the country's crisis would worsen a great deal.

And so the option that seemed feasible and which everybody's now focused on was the African Union. And what was important about the African Union, they declared, with a certain degree of pride, that this is an African problem and therefore should be solved by Africans. That gave Khartoum a sort of a cover. It made Khartoum feel that anything done by the AU was obviously a lesser evil than international intervention. And so while I was there, I think there was considerable receptivity to the idea of the AU intervening. But mind you, not just as a few monitors

the way they are, 300 or so, but to be increased in number, to have a force increase in number, and the mandate strengthened so that they could protect. And the interesting thing is you have the troops from Rwanada, for instance. Kagame, the president of Rwanda, has said often--I mean, with a background of genocide in his country, and he says there's no way my people are going to be there and watch civilians being killed and do nothing. They will intervene.

Now, once the idea of international intervention began to recede and the argument about AU troops coming in increased numbers and stronger [inaudible], Khartoum has now been sort of more reticent and sort of, in a sense, rejecting--not quite, but appearing to be rejecting. That is where pressure is needed so that the AU is supported, the principle of AU intervention or other involvement, the kind of support that Richard Holbrooke was talking about to strengthen the capacity of the AU, and with the understanding that if the AU were to fail because the government has not been cooperative and they came back to report to the United Nations that sorry, we have failed because we're not getting cooperation from Khartoum, then the idea of international intervention would be more compelling and the AU would have virtually given legitimacy to the involvement of the international community. That kind of option can then be considered more seriously. Because if the problem continues and the AU is not able to do anything and numbers of people threatened continue to rise and people are actually dying, it's untenable for the international community to just watch and do nothing.

Let me make my most important point. We should not see Darfur in isolation. What is happening in Darfur, incidentally, has been happening for decades in other parts of the country and in particular in the south. I come from a part of the

country which has been totally depopulated by the government use of Arab militias to chase away people. The killings, abductions, the enslavement--all of that has occurred. It was at a time when maybe the consciousness of the international community was not yet there. Fortunately, perhaps because of Rwanda, I think there's more alertness about this crisis. And so it's a good thing that, with a bit of delay, we are there. But it is important to remember that what is happening in Darfur is an aspect of a wave of what has been happening now throughout the country.

When the first war started, from '55 to '71, southerners were fighting a separatist war. Then when it resumed in 1983, after a peace agreement was violated, the new movement, led by John Garang, declared that the objective was not secession but to restructure the country in order for it to be rid of discrimination based on race and religion, culture. I think it would be interesting to know that what has been happening in the Sudan when we have this division between Arab Muslim north and African Christian Animist south, it was a simplistic division of a country whose configuration was a lot more mixed.

Now, you see the history of the evolution of Arabism in the north going back a long way, and that if you became a Muslim, you were Arabic speaking, culturally Arabized, and you imagine you have some Arab blood, you were raised to a high level of dignity; as contrasted with being black, a heathen, and a legitimate target for slavery. So it seems Islam allowed people to pass. The people of the north, irrespective of their color, irrespective of their actual composition, were passing as so-called Arabs. The south was the fault line which resisted this Arabization process. Now that the south is saying, look, this country is not the Arab country you've been calling it, and you, many of you, are not the Arabs you have been thinking you are, the liberation movement that

started in the south is beginning to reach the north. So you have the Nuba who are neighboring the south, the Southern Blue Nile also neighboring the south, were the first to join the movement in the war of liberating the country from all discriminations, the war of creating a new Sudan.

Now you have Darfur joining. In fact, Darfur started in 1991 with the support of the SPLM. And that attempt was crushed. The grievances were not addressed. The Beja on the eastern front are now restless and -- anything can happen anytime. The extreme north, Nubia, people who are the closest to being Arabs, are now going back to considering themselves of ancient Nubian identity, proud of their heritage and their ancient civilization. What I'm trying to say here is that these rebellions, these regional rebellions are symptoms of a country that is coming into itself, a country that had been distorted in its image if identity but now beginning to understand better the realities of its configuration.

Now, for Darfurians to be talking about Arabs and blacks, this is new. In the first war, they were the ones fighting in the south in the name of Arabism. Even the Nuba, who are now fully with the south, were the ones fighting in the name of Arabism. And so the choices Khartoum has is to understand this fashion of remodeling the country so that we all come on board and fashion a united framework, or they will continue to be confronting these waves of regional rebellions that are actually exposing the realities of Sudanese identity.

Now, what is important is if we do not deal with Darfur constructively, it is undermining the peace process in the south. The reverse is the peace process in the south not only lays down a foundation for dealing with the southern grievances, but also has provisions for dealing with the grievances of the areas of the north, including Darfur.

And so we are reversing the order of things if we isolate Darfur. If we push the peace process now while the talks go on, even use some of the principles in the agreement for the talks in Abuja but push the peace process in the south, you will have a peace agreement that actually addresses not just the southern grievances but those of the whole country. And so we must see Darfur in this national framework.

Thank you.

MS. COHEN: Francis, thank you very much.

I just want to mention that Francis Deng's statement upon a return from Darfur is out on the table, as is the op ed that Richard Holbrooke and Jon Corzine did upon their return.

Let's turn now to the audience. Please introduce yourself and try to be as succinct as possible so we can call on as many people as possible.

QUESTION: My name is Ammar Abdulhamid. I am a visiting fellow at the Saban Center and I'm also the coordinator of a regional program on the rights of ethnic and religious minorities in the Middle East which started earlier this year. It's called the Tharwa Project.

My question is this, actually. There was just one missing element still in your analysis that I would like to see if we can draw some attention on. It's the internal conflict within the Sudanese regime itself--the conflict between Omar Bashir and Hassan Turabi--and how it's necessary also to address that issue in addition to seeing the Darfur conflict as part of an entire country trying to come up with the terms of its new identity that's actually multi-ethnic, multi-religious. But also we have to see that there is a complicating factor here, which is the internal struggle, and how can we address that. We've heard about the role of the African Union in terms of the planned role of peace

monitors, but how about the Arab governments being able to mediate the ongoing dispute in the Sudanese regime itself? Would that be something that's possible?

Very quickly, the other question is on the denial of the Arabs vis-a-vis the goings on, basically, in Darfur. Just last week there was a group of Islamic scholars led by Yussef al-Qaradawi who went and visited some of the same places you visited, but they ended up coming up with a completely different report denying that there is a genocide and denying that there is a problem on that mass scale or a racially motivated conflict. And they looked at it very differently. These people are very influential in the Arab streets. How are we going to get the Arabs to believe other people?

MS. COHEN: Thank you very much. I have to defer to our speakers. Francis, do you want-- and do you want to comment at all on the response of the Arab League or other--

MR. HOLBROOKE: Let Francis go first.

MS. COHEN: Okay.

MR. DENG: Well, I think you're quite right that there is internal rivalry. In fact, JEM, the Justice and Equality Movement, is said to be allied with Turabi. When I was in Sudan, Turabi was in the hospital. I visited him in the hospital. I didn't want to get him involved in discussing politics, but when he learned that I had just been to Darfur, he certainly was very interested, even though we didn't get into the political details.

MR. HOLBROOKE: I think he's back in jail.

MR. DENG: He's back -- they said there was an attempted coup.

MR. HOLBROOKE: His assistant said that he was back under arrest.

MR. DENG: Right.

Now, you're quite right that there is this internal rivalry. In fact, the two groups are cooperating, SLM and JEM, but not entirely of the same vision. You could say that SLM is closer to the SPLM than JEM. JEM's vision is still tied to some sort of an Islamic agenda. But then, these are some of the details of the contradictions that the country's going through. If we were to come to an agreement, it would have to be comprehensive. In fact, this week we had two figures in town--John Garang himself and the former prime minister, Sadik el Mahdi. Sadik el Mahdi, of course, is in the opposition and was not part directly of the negotiations.

To Sadik el Mahdi, Darfur has overtaken the peace process, and he's advocating a comprehensive sort of constitutional conference, an idea he has been talking about for some time now. This means that until or unless the peace process becomes comprehensive, there will be spoilers. This is a very important aspect of the peace process itself--we have people that have been more directly involved and might want to comment on it, including Charlie Snyder here and the representative of the U.S. in the talks.

And the question of the Arab countries and their mediating, or going there and coming with different findings, first of all, the tendency in the Arab League is to look on the Sudan and the government as an Arab country and therefore an Arab government. Instead of posing serious questions about what is tearing this country apart and what can we do to help the country come together, they simply take a position which is so partial that it alienates the non-Arabs in the country. And when you go in and you report something totally different-- You know, I had an article many years ago whose title seemed to have appealed to the Sudanese so that it gets cited because of the title. It says, What is not said is what divides. And in the Sudan, because of the crisis of identity

and issues that become so zero-sum, people sort of beat around the bush, don't get to the issues because they know the issues are difficult to manage. And so denial is part of the process of not addressing the problems set out.

MR. HOLBROOKE: You're absolutely right that everyone talked in Khartoum and Addis Ababa about a split in the Sudanese government. But, you know, divisions inside a government are not unheard of elsewhere; for example, Washington.

[Laughter.]

MR. HOLBROOKE: I leave it to the diplomats on the ground to give you a detailed analysis of where Taha and Bashir and the foreign minister and all these guys--we met with them all--stand. It is a distinction without a difference. When the secretary of state says the government of Sudan is held accountable, that has to be a correct position. I don't think there's any merit in trying to micromanage a policy based on this.

Second point in the same regard is about the Janjaweed. For those of you who read Samantha Power's excellent article in The New Yorker two weeks ago, you'll notice that her central figure was a Janjaweed leader named Musa Hilal, who operates in the area north of Al Fashir. Well, he comes across as a very powerful warlord, high Janjaweed leader in her article. I accept that. Samantha's a splendid reporter with a lot of insight.

When we were in Al Fashir and Geneina, we asked everybody about Musa Hilal. And the reaction of the government officials was he's a great, great man. One of them, one of the regional ministers picked up his stick, his Wali stick, and said, I was Musa Hilal's teacher of Arabic studies. He's a great man. And he has an aura down there.

And as I listened to them talk about him, I thought of the Omar Sharif character in "Lawrence of Arabia" who, as you all remember, begins the movie by killing some innocent guy who's drinking from his well, but ends up being one of the big heroes in the movie. No, I didn't meet Musa Hilal. Samantha did.

So going back to the point that you made about the Arab envoys' analysis, we had the same experience. We came directly from one of the camps to meet with the Wali. And when we told the Wali about the women who had been raped, the 7-year-old children, right outside the camp by the Janjaweed, he sat there and said to us they're lying or they were raped by criminals, because the Janjaweed aren't in this area.

Well, we'd just been there. And we could see these guys on camels with guns who looked like Janjaweed wandering around as we drove from the camp to the Wali's office. And I was reminded of Groucho Marx's rather appropriate comment: Who are you going to believe--me or your own two eyes?

I mean, the Arab envoys are not going to want to talk about genocide and we all understand that. And because of the confusion about who is an Arab and who is an African--and Francis has just given an extraordinary short course on that for all of us, for which I'm very grateful; I learned a lot from what you just said.

MR. DENG: Thank you.

MR. HOLBROOKE: I understand why they don't like the word "genocide." It's quite clear. But whatever it is, it is awful, and it is being done by the nomadic tribesmen who move through the area against the more sedentary villagers. And there is a political purpose behind it, and we both said what it is--it's to depopulate Darfur in a very clear manner.

So in the end, who are you going to hold accountable? It has to be the government in Khartoum.

QUESTION: My name is Dan Wolf. I was recently in Darfur, in July. I agree with what Francis Deng said, that a lot of the reason that the Sudanese government was receptive to the AU was because of perhaps a miscalculation of the intentions of the United States and Britain. And I think that's also a lot of the reason for the opening. And I also agree that expansion of the AU role is vital and it would be great if we could provide the logistical and financial support to the AU that is needed. But even if that were done tomorrow, the Sudanese government's position today is that it will not permit thousands and thousands of AU monitors into the country, it will not expand its mission to include a civil protection law.

In light of that, what kinds of pressure can be put on the Sudanese government today--bearing in mind that probably no one believes that Britain and the United States are going to send troops--to permit an expanded AU mission into the country?

MR. HOLBROOKE: You're absolutely correct that that is the current Sudanese position. My instinct that, under intense, unified international pressure--EU, AU, US, UN--they will continually increase the number. And Senator Corzine and I put our major focus on that issue with Foreign Minister and Vice President Taha. And we said, look, we're going to get asked this question by the press when we leave. And when we returned from Darfur, there was a short press conference before we left for Addis Ababa. And when we got to the airport, the American chargé met us and gave us a piece of paper and said the government's authorized you to say this. And the sentence--I wish I had it with me, but the sentence was very specific: The government would agree for

you to say that they will consider more African Union monitors. They still have this hangup over what you call them. But if you see the cease-fire commission, it's a step in the right direction.

And as for the perception there won't be U.S. or European or NATO peacekeepers, I don't believe that that takes the pressure off them as long as we make clear that there's a distinction between troops on the ground--because in the real world, you are not going to have American soldiers on the ground. We're stripping Korea to support Afghanistan and Iraq, we're under-manned in both Afghanistan and Iraq. In the real world it isn't going to happen, even if it should.

And by the way, I'm not certain Americans would be effective in Darfur. And as you all know, I've been supporting these interventions in Bosnia, Kosovo, East Timor, Afghanistan. This is a whole different situation politically and logistically. But if we do the airplanes, the 130 I talked about, the helicopters, the Jeeps, the communications, the AU will supply the troops and the combination will work. And the two--the French and American officers on the ground were categorical on that. These are both men, by the way, with substantial experience in the Balkans, who understand the issue and they've both been in Afghanistan.

And Daniel, thank you for your work, too. Dan Wolf was one of the people who briefed us before our trip and couldn't have been more helpful.

QUESTION: I'm John Suway of the St. Louis Post-Dispatch. A question for Ambassador Holbrooke. Do you agree with what I took to be one of Francis Deng's points, that too much pressure on the Sudan government now runs the risk of blowing up the north-south peace process and therefore making the entire situation worse, that if we focus on trying to intimidate or press Sudan to act on Darfur, that much else is at risk?

MR. HOLBROOKE: I did not understand that to be Francis's point. But I'll say in advance that I will never disagree with Francis Deng on the Sudan. That would be very, very dumb. But I didn't think that's what you said.

MR. DENG: No, I think you're absolutely right. First of all, thank you for your generous acceptance.

You know, I was drawing a distinction between pressure and actual intervention by the international community. On the contrary, pressure might actually produce some positive results depending on the nature of the pressure.

Now, the point you were making--I think the government would not want to alienate the AU. It has already alienated the international community. It is being protected by the AU saying this is an African problem. I think they would want to cooperate with the AU instead of appearing to be at odds with everybody. But the pressure here would then support the AU to be acceptable to the government.

MR. HOLBROOKE: But this is--there are two options on Naivasha. One is not to push for its completion and to link it to Darfur, and that's been posed. And the other one is to finish the job. I heard both arguments. I understand the first theory. I would come down very strongly on the grounds that you want to get Naivasha finished.

It's kind of like the Balkans. Some people said don't do Bosnia without Kosovo. And others have said because we did Dayton without including Kosovo, we had the second war. And my answer has been simple for the last nine years: We had a huge war raging in one area; we stopped it; and by linking it to Kosovo, we wouldn't have stopped either. And it's a very parallel situation. You have an agreement which is all but signed. And Garang told me last week, and I'm sure many of you in this room,

that he's ready to get on with it and implement it. So let's get that done. The thing has killed over two million people.

MR. DENG: Can I just add here, you know, Garang has been saying that the problem is not the Janjaweed, it's the government. So change the government to get a new government that will deal with the situation. That may sound to some as though he's saying overthrow the government. What he's saying is if we implement the agreement, then the government in Khartoum would be a different government. It would be a government form of the SPLM--with the government and others--and these would not be fighting the war in Darfur. The SPLM is not going to join the government to fight the war in Darfur. It would join the government to find a solution to Darfur.

MR. HOLBROOKE: Francis, I'd like to ask you a question and include in it not only Naivasha and north-south and Darfur, but also the growing crisis in the eastern part of Sudan. And it's a very basic question. Is Sudan a viable country within its international borders, or is it, like Yugoslavia and Iraq, a legacy of a certain colonial history which, because of its inherent contradictions, can never be held--or Congo, for that matter--which can never be held together except by coercive force or it will disintegrate? I don't understand, given its history, what people feel about it as a single identity.

MR. DENG: Well, it is true that even in Bosnia I had difficulty, except sometimes by names, telling who was, you know, a Serb and who was a Muslim. And even in Burundi and Rwanda, I had difficulty telling a Tutsi from a Hutu. A few looked typical, but many in between I couldn't tell. And I would ask can you always tell a Tutsi from a Hutu--

MR. HOLBROOKE: In Bosnia there is no difference. That's why you couldn't tell.

MR. DENG: Exactly. The answer I got from the foreign minister was, yes, you can tell but with a margin of error of 35 percent.

[Laughter.]

MR. DENG: And in the Sudan, some people tell me, the margin of error is 65 percent.

I do think that there is a reality which has been distorted--a reality that could bring the country together, but a history that has distorted that reality. I also see that the optimism I used to express in writings I'm seeing being played out in the field. Now if you were to see the south, most southerners, given a choice, may still choose to separate. But when they begin to see the people of Darfur, the people of Nuba, the [inaudible], and people of Beja all voicing the same grievances, all wanting a new Sudan that will have no discrimination based on race, I predict that southerners are going to say now wait a minute, why do we need to break away? The whole country is ours, why do we break to a corner? So I do think that there are certain empirical realities that will make the country the argument of remaining together, but it will need to be restructured. And the south will have the option, after six years, whether to separate or not.

The north--even if there were no south, the north is going to have to change its identity. I tell you, when I go to Sudan, so many people--including Sadik el Mahdi telling us the other day his great-grandmother was partially Dinka--and many northerners come out now and say, oh, my great-grandmother was Dinka, or a southerner. And I say we're making progress. You used to keep your grandmothers in the closets. Now they're coming out. So I'm optimistic.

MR. HOLBROOKE: You don't think it will go the way of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union and other states that weren't really nations?

MR. DENG: Except Darfur, which was a state for a while of its own, independent, all those others--you know, if you go back a long way to Nubia or Kush--all the others have been in one way or another part of the Sudan and none has a viability of a state or has been a state. Now, the south might have developed sufficient identity of resistance to the north to possibly be a country. I don't see the others being the same. And I even think southerners also have the prospect of wanting to remain attached to the Sudan.

MR. HOLBROOKE: And what's fueling-- Excuse me, but this is so important. What is fueling the Beja rebellion? Is it Eritrea, or is there a set of separate grievances against Khartoum?

MR. DENG: There is always a grievance which can then be manipulated by those who have their own reasons. I remember at a meeting in Addis Ababa in which we dealt with the problem of the north and the south and then we laid down some principles for Darfur and the peace talks. And there was a passing reference "and other areas of the north, such as the Beja." The Beja who were there complained bitterly: You recognize Darfur as having a grievance, you recognize the south and the Nuba and these others, and you just refer to us in passing? So they, too, have grievances that do not differ that much from what the people of Darfur or the Nuba or Southern Blue Nile have. It's all marginalization, being neglected to a large extent, discriminated, with always that sense of racial connotations, even among Muslims.

MS. COHEN: We have just a few more minutes. What I'd like to do is just take two or three questions and then have the panelists give closing remarks.

QUESTION: I'm Ulla-Maija Finskas from the Embassy of Finland.

Secretary Powell said in his testimony that we desperately need new tools to deal with international problems. I would like kind of to make you imagine maybe, both of you, what would be the new tools that the international community could have at its disposal in situations like Kosovo, like Sudan, that seem to be increasing? What is the situation in the humanitarian community today? What can we do if we dream our best dream?

QUESTION: Susan Kinsley [ph] from [inaudible] U.N. My question is sort of related to hers. I had worked for the UNHCR and I wanted to take exception to something that Ambassador Holbrooke said, that the problem with--the UNHCR could not handle the internally displaced because of bureaucratic problems, presumably within the U.N. As I understand it, it's a legal problem--

MR. HOLBROOKE: That's what I said. It's the mandate from the 1940s, which is ridiculous in the modern world.

QUESTION: Right. It's a legal problem.

MR. HOLBROOKE: That's exactly what I said.

QUESTION: Right. And I'm wondering maybe, you know, since Francis is the expert on the internally displaced and the mandate, if there's some solution that could help UNHCR -- other than convincing the Khartoum government to let them in, something that could be done, the international community could do to expand this mandate to help the IDPs.

QUESTION: [Inaudible], International Center for Religion and Diplomacy.

About the expansion of the African peacekeeping force, it seems like there is a consensus growing about expanding the mandate and increasing the numbers even within the Sudanese government. But there remain some problems about credibility, about abilities. Do you see a role within the context of the African Union for troops from moderate Arab countries like Jordan, Morocco? These countries seem to be acceptable to the Sudanese government and they will bring more credibility and maybe neutrality to strengthen the role of the peacekeeping force and making it more [inaudible].

QUESTION: Gary Mitchell from The Mitchell Report. I want to ask a question also for Ambassador Holbrooke, and that is, coming back to the action steps that you talked about earlier, I wonder if you could just sort of give us a top-line sense what the dollars--I'm talking about U.S. action steps--what dollars are we talking about? What are the key barriers? And tacking onto that, what's the likelihood that there's enough oxygen in the air seven weeks out before a presidential election that we can respond as quickly as I gather you and Senator Corzine have urged?

MR. HOLBROOKE: I'll start with the last question. Jan Egeland, who's in charge of emergency relief for the U.N., says the current shortfall of pledges--not even money received--versus current needs worldwide is $400 million. The normal rule of thumb is that the U.S. tends to provide between 20 and 25 percent, and that gets the rest of the world going. That's only the aid, and I cannot vouch for how accurate that number is. Today's Reuters, from Nairobi, says "as of August 25th, Sudan remains under funded, with $434 million, out of an appeal for $722 million, still unmet." Now, this is the most publicized humanitarian crisis in the world. There are many, many others where the people are in just as desperate shape.

The AU today from Addis urged the U.S. to provide more support after Powell's call of genocide, and in effect pushed him to put our money where his mouth is.

And finally, on your question, the report also in today from Nairobi--all this courtesy of Ken Bacon and Refugees International, I might add; another free plug for RI. Here is a camp in Nyala, in the southern part of Darfur, which, according to the Oxfam representatives in the camp, had 10,000 IDPs--those are human beings, I remind you again--on August 25th and on September 7th it had 40,000. So it went from ten to forty thousand in a space of 10 days.

Lionel and I have seen that happen in other parts of the world--Lionel with the Kurds, myself, with Lionel, on the Cambodian border. I see Sheppie Abramowitz back there somewhere. She was on the border with us. When 30,000 people arrive in a matter of days in an area, nothing can prepare you for it.

So I think that ought to be a partial answer to your question. But I underscore the basic point: It is a bottomless money pit. They'll never catch up with need unless and until the political issue is dealt with. In Gaza we're in the 55th year of refugees.

On the first question, tools for international intervention, which the representative of Finland asked. We're learning as we go along and we learn mainly through bad implementation. In the last 14 years, the period since the end of the Cold War, the international community gets various bad grades on most of its interventions. And even its better grades took too long. East Timor has come out pretty well, but only after several hundred thousand people were killed in a place, now a country, of less than a million people. Bosnia, 1991 to 1995, horrible, inadequate intervention in which the European Union told the U.S. that they could do it without us and the U.S., inexcusably,

stood by and accepted that until much too late in the game. The result: 300,000 killed, 2.5 million refugees before Dayton. And I'm not even talking about Kosovo.

The worst case of all, you all know, is Rwanda, which, as somebody said earlier, was the most unambiguous case of genocide since World War II anywhere in the world. It was absolutely clear-cut. People were singled out by name--their names were broadcast on the radio and they were destroyed if they had--just like Nazis and Hitler--if they had, if even part of their blood was of the wrong ethnic group.

So we learned as we went along. And on that scale, I agree with part of what's in Mort Abramowitz and Samantha Power's article in today's Washington Post, that there has been progress. We're learning. The responses are faster. But even when there's a faster response, we move too slowly.

And the legacy of Iraq has impaired U.S.-European Union communications, as you well know, and it's made everything a little more difficult. And the French have their own vested interests in the area, which slowed down their response. And the U.S. is in the position--we saw this time and time again in our trip to Sudan--where when the U.S. said it was genocide, you know what the Sudanese said: Yeah, and you said there were weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. They just threw that back in our face routinely. Vice President Taha was most explicit about this. He said don't try to send us to Guantanamo. He had his whole shtick laid out. What are you going to say? You say there's no connection, you know what you're doing--of course we said that. But it has impaired the response.

We are making progress. We're learning as we go along. And Colin Powell deserves credit for what he's done. He went to Darfur, and I'm very pleased he did that. I regret to say American officials in the administration I was part of did not go

to Rwanada until afterwards. Then Bill Clinton went twice and apologized, but apologies were not enough.

On the second question about IDPs and the UNHCR, you really did misstate my point. I just want to clarify that. I understand the legal mandate, and I've studied it, and I don't like it, and what I've recommended is it be changed. Since you brought up the UNHCR, an organization which has won the Nobel Peace Prize twice, when I thought it should have gone to Mort Abramowitz and Lionel Rosenblatt, who were the people who lit the fire under these people, let me just say that the UNHCR is the best we've got, and it ain't very good. And I will say flatly that I am very disappointed in their performance.

As for Sudan, they won't accept the mandate, even if the Sudanese let them in, and that gets into the whole sovereignty issue. The Russians and the Chinese will oppose any effort to let the UNHCR inside a country to deal with IDPs not because they have a position on the victims of Darfur, but because of two very simple words--Chechnya and Tibet. That goes back to the arguments of the U.N. But since you brought it up, I need to describe to you the mess and even the so-called model camp.

There is no one in charge in this camp, and again, out of 150 camps in all of Darfur, this is the one they take the VIPs to. And I spent a lot of time with Save the Children, Oxfam, IRC, WFP people, and they're absolutely categoricalness. The old-timer in the camp, somebody, in other words, who had been there four months, said, when he got here, there were three or four agencies, and they met every day or two and coordinated. There are now 40 different agencies in the camp, and they meet once a week with the wali--the governor--who is the man who told me that the rapes were

invented, even though the women showed us their scars, they meet with the wali, who is their enemy, and then they meet without the wali, and it's no coordination.

Five years ago, when I went to Luando, in Angola, I saw the same situation with the IDPs, and I came back to New York--this is why I don't feel that I've accomplished much, Francis, and I told the Secretary General, and the UNHCR and the others, that there was no lead agency really in charge. The U.N. has this lead agency nonsense. They designate one agency to be the lead. All of you who are in the bureaucracy, and from the looks of you, that's all of you--

[Laughter.]

MR. HOLBROOKE: All of you who are or have been bureaucrats know that you can't be dual-hatted. You can't be the representative of a single agency and also coordinate others. It won't work.

The WFP person is not in a position to give instructions to the Save the Children person or the IRC person nor the other U.N. agencies--for example, the OSHA people. Jan Pronk, the Secretary General's special representative, is supposed to be a negotiator. I'm not entirely happy with the way he's performed, but even if he was great, he wouldn't have the authority.

So, in the camp, even the model camp, no one is in charge. And at least in a UNHCR camp, whatever my qualms with UNHCR, and I have beaten up on them or I've alternately supported them and beaten up on them for years, so they don't enjoy it when they see me, but at least they do their job, and they have a history, and they know how to get the plastic sheeting out into the camps, but there's no one doing that anywhere in Darfur. Now, the 150,000 refugees in Chad are within the system, and they're in somewhat better shape.

Finally, the question about the African Union Force. I think there's a real consensus here between the administration, the people on this panel and almost I think absolutely everyone we talk to, but the Obasanjo proposals need to be supported.

The only criticism I'm making is that I don't believe the United States government is actually supporting them aggressively enough, at a high enough level and working the diplomatic route as aggressively as they should, but the Danforth model--and I'm a great fan and supporter of Jack Danforth--has not been sufficiently applied here. Nothing--do not interpret it as a criticism of the American representatives involved in this because they're all working very hard, and some of them are in this room, but they don't have the personal standing, and prestige, and clout that Danforth had because Danforth spoke to President Bush regularly and spoke for President Bush. But we need to help the AU with everything but the troops, and if we're ready to do that, we'll be in.

And by the way, it's very problematical whether the African and Arab countries themselves would want to see American or NATO troops on the ground in Darfur regardless of the circumstances, given the overall political situation today, but they would welcome less-visible logistical support.

As for the moderate Muslim states--you mentioned Morocco and Jordan, if my memory is correct--yes, there's no question that would be a terrific part of the process within the AU framework, supported by the United Nations.

But before we get to that point, we have to batter the walls of resistance down in Khartoum. I believe-- and this goes back to Dan Wolf's comment--I believe that is the next issue, the next obstacle to either jump over or crash through, and more

importantly I think that it is entirely doable if we elevate the intensity of our diplomatic effort and create a unified front.

MR. DENG: I'll have Richard have the last word. I have nothing to add.

MS. COHEN: I just wanted to say that I had always hoped that the 21st century would be the one where people caught up in rampages of violence in their own countries could be protected by the international community.

We now have the Darfur case before us, and we've heard today some progress toward protection, but we've also heard the great difficulties, the great frustrations, and we've heard recommendations for more aggressive U.S. action, and we've heard recommendations for more aggressive action by the international community, by the African Union. Let us hope that will happen, and let us thank the panelists for giving of their time and their concern in addressing us today, and I thank you all for coming to this meeting.

[Applause.]

[Whereupon, the proceedings were concluded.]