

**A Forum Co-Sponsored by
The Brookings Institution and The Migration Policy Institute**

UNITED NATIONS INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION REPORT

**The Brookings Institution
Falk Auditorium
February 12, 2003**

Moderator:

AUDREY SINGER

Visiting Fellow, The Brookings Institution Center on Urban and Metropolitan Policy

Panelists:

JOSEPH CHAMIE

Author and Director, UN Population Division

ROBERTA COHEN

Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy Studies, The Brookings Institution

CONSTANTINOS FOTAKIS

Head of the Social and Demography Analysis Unit, European Commission

CHARLES KEELY

Herzberg Professor of International Migration, Georgetown University

LAVINIA LIMON

Executive Director, Immigrant and Refugee Services of America and U.S. Committee for Refugees

DEMETRIOS PAPADEMETRIOU

Co-Director, Migration Policy Institute



MS. AUDREY SINGER: Good morning everybody. I want to welcome everybody to Brookings this morning for our panel discussion of the new report on international migration that's just been released by the United Nations Population Division. My name is Audrey Singer. I'm a Visiting Fellow at the Center of Urban and Metropolitan Policy here at Brookings and I'll be moderating the discussion today.

First I'd like to express my thanks for their support to our co-sponsors of this event, one of the newest policy shops on the block, the Migration Policy Institute. They are an independent non-partisan, non-profit think tank dedicated to the study of the movement of people worldwide.

The UN report on international migration tells us that there are approximately 175 million people who are residing outside of their country of birth, which is about three percent of the world's population. This figure has more than doubled since 1970. In the past decade most of the growth in migrant stocks have taken place in the more developed regions of the world.

There are several ways national populations can change. The primary demographic drivers or population change within a country are birth and death, and we generally consider births and deaths to be permanent events so record keeping is fairly straightforward and most countries in the world have administrative systems to track these events.

Collecting information on the movement of people across borders, that is people leaving one country and entering another, is much harder. And it's much harder for many reasons including the fact that people can migrate more than once during their lifetime. In addition, countries do not usually keep track of persons leaving countries, and different countries have different definitions of who is considered a migrant.

Many of us are familiar with the story of international migration to the United States. The U.S. has a long history of receiving immigrants and in the 1990s it received more immigrants than in any prior decade. In this country we're very much aware of the social, economic, political and cultural impact of immigration on the nation as well as in our cities and neighborhoods.

For those of us who are used to thinking about migration within our own context and within our own framework, whether they're U.S.-based or somewhere else, this report puts many things in perspective because it addresses worldwide migration flows. When viewed at the global scale it reminds us of the many causes of population shifts occurring from migration including wars, political change, the search for economic opportunity, and family reunification, and not just the consequences of migration.

All of this is to say that putting together global data on a somewhat slippery subject with imperfect information systems and inconsistent definitions is a feat, and the coverage in this report is remarkable. There are data for almost every country in the world on migrant stocks, flows between regions of the world including more and less developed regions, refugees, labor migration, migrant remittances, undocumented migrations, and government views and policies on immigration and emigration.

This report is as comprehensive as they get and rich in statistical information, but I'd also like to remind us that behind the numbers are people's lives and the real-life opportunities and consequences that come with migrations which may get lost when we look at them in the aggregate.

We are very fortunate to have a distinguished panel with us today and let me just tell you how we will proceed this morning. First we will hear from the author of the UN International Migration Report who will present the findings of the report. After that presentation I'll ask the panel to come up and introduce them and they'll discuss various issues and implications related to the report, and then we will open up to questions from the audience.

I want to remind everybody that we have copies of the report available outside the room as well as other related material. The transcript of this event will be available sometime either this afternoon or tomorrow on the Brookings web site which is *brookings.edu* and you can look at that and other materials related to this.

Let me not delay this any further and introduce Joseph Chamie, the Director of the UN Population Division and primary author of the UN International Migration Report. Joe has been with the UN for nearly 25 years and is one of the foremost experts on international population issues. You have his file and you also have the bios of all of our speakers in the packet of information that you got when you came in so I won't give you a lengthy introduction to Joe or anybody else, and I will allow Joe to start. Thank you.



MR. JOSEPH CHAMIE: Thank you very much. Let me begin by thanking the Brookings Institution and the Migration Policy Institute for co-hosting this event, and thank Demetri and Audrey especially for their support and hard work organizing this.

As you know, it's hard to believe I've been at the UN for 25 years, such a young person as myself you'd never guess it. I'm a demographer, and many of you know that demographers are not noted for much humor. As some of you know, I've often described a demographer as an accountant without a personality. [Laughter]

Today I'm going to be talking about a number of things and of course some of you may hear me say things that I may have difficulty expressing. We're speaking English. At the UN we're often speaking different languages and they're being translated, interpreted, and often there's confusion. Let me give you a couple of examples. Maybe we can dim the lights.

This is an expression, "It takes a strong man to make a tender chicken." Frank Purdue sold chickens up in New York. They needed an expression, some kind of saying, and he got on television and this is what they put up. "It takes a strong man to make a tender chicken."

This was translated into Spanish, and the translation is the following -- "It takes an aroused man to make a chicken affectionate." [Laughter]

This is not what he intended. The message in this, they were concerned about what this meant for them.

There was another well-known company many of you know, "It won't leak in your pocket and embarrass you." Of course these are your ballpoint pens, and they translated that also into Spanish and they put it on the side of the buses. What the translation shows was the following, "It won't leak in your pocket to make you pregnant." [Laughter]

So we have to be very careful what we say on migration. It's a very sensitive issue. Of the three components of population change -- fertility, mortality and migration -- migration in my view is one of the most sensitive. It's also been the step-child of demography. Princeton, Michigan, Berkeley, Texas, major places, they usually don't like migration. Too messy. In contrast to mortality and fertility, especially mortality, once you're dead, you're dead. In contrast to migration which is very confusing to demographers. But in our office we have taken up the challenge. We have been working on migration for over 50 years, and this report is an attempt to force the international community to deal with numbers and put them all together for all countries all areas and for the region. If there are problems with the numbers, we can discuss those, but this is one of the first attempts that we've had on putting trends, stocks, remittances, policies, all in one place.

This is a quote from the Secretary General last year. This quotation, "It is time to take a more comprehensive look at the various dimensions of the migration issue which involves hundreds of millions of people and affects countries of origin, transit, destination. We need to understand better the causes of international flows of people and their complex integration with development."

Kofi Annan has taken this on as his personal issue of priority. It's in his report on reorganizing the priorities of the United Nations. It's a major issue that he's put in for the next few years and they're now in the midst of dealing with this institutionally. However, there is great resistance.

Those of you who are familiar with Cairo may recall that the drafting of Chapter 10 of the program of action was very problematic. Although most of the attention was on especially abortion and a dialogue between on the one side the Vatican and some conservative countries, and on the other side some of the Western countries on the abortion issue. There was a great deal of difficulty with the Chapter 10 on international migration. Eventually there was a compromise, they adopted the chapter with the proviso that they would discuss it in New York, the General Assembly.

1995, we discussed it. 1997, we discussed it. 1999, we discussed it. 2001, we discussed it. And 2003, in November, we're going to discuss it again. Reports going on and on with the issue of some countries wanting an international conference on international migration and others, primarily the developed countries and many of the labor importing countries, resisting a conference.

This issue is a very sensitive one and will likely be on the agenda for a good number of years. And what I'm going to be presenting today is why international migration, especially international migration to developed countries, has become such a critical issue.

Your perspective on migration depends on what kind of work you're doing. 175 million is a relatively small number compared to 6.2 billion -- roughly three percent. This can be perhaps understood in terms of where you are standing.

One of my colleagues once said where you stand is where you sit, and this issue of migration perhaps could be seen with regard to a short story I often tell about the Lebanese President visiting China. The biggest country in the world, China; Lebanon one of the smallest countries. They were at a state dinner and the Lebanese President, being a very talkative person, asked the Chinese President how large is the current population of China. And the President replied through the interpreter, we're 1.3 billion people. And there was some silence. Then the Chinese out of courtesy asked the Lebanese President how large is the population of Lebanon? Well, the Lebanese President took a deep breath looked at the President of China and said we're two million. In reply the Chinese President said, well the next time you come, bring them with you. [Laughter]

So the perspective you have depends on where you're sitting. So let's look at some issues on population. The past, yesterday; what's going on today; and what we see for tomorrow.

First, world population.

You in this room have lived through the most dynamic period in the world's history demographically. Many people don't recognize this and I want to emphasize this. The 20th Century, if you look from 1000 to about 2050, the population growth in billions. For the longest time we had very little growth in the world. Why? Birth and death balanced each other. Lots of births, lots of deaths, very little growth.

In the beginning of the 20th Century, in 1900, world population was about 1.6 billion people. 1999, nearly at the end of the 20th Century, it was 6.1 billion. Very rapid growth occurred in the 20th Century. Unparalleled, probably never going to happen again, and I'll go into more details of the 20th Century in a moment.

Another thing that happened that's very very important is urbanization. The world population was the majority for the longest time, even up to around 1900. It was only about 10-15 percent of the total world population. Very much agrarian, rural. We're moving now, and most of you here will see it, where the majority of the world's population will be urban dwellers. That has profound implications for the world's politics, consumption, living patterns, relations, families and so on. Those of you who have ever lived in New York realize living in New York is very different than living in Omaha.

Why was the 20th Century so special? I'll give you a number of reasons. First, the population nearly quadrupled, went from 1.6 to 6.1. We had the highest growth rate ever recorded. We estimated that in the late 1960s the world's population peaked at two percent. We're almost half that level now, about 1.2 percent.

Third, we had the largest annual population increase. We added 88 million people per year in

the late 1980s. We're adding today about 76-77 million.

So we've passed the peak growth rate and we've passed the peak growth in terms of annual increments.

Fourth, we had the shortest doubling time. Those of you that remember Kennedy when he was elected, and those of you who remember approximately when Bush came in, George W., the population nearly doubled -- from three to six billion in a very short amount of time. You won't see that happen again.

Fifth, the shortest time to add a billion persons. We added between five billion and six billion -- one billion people of course, in a period of 12 years. 1987 to 1999 we added a billion people in 12 years. The next billion will probably take 14 years. The shortest period.

We also have declines in mortality. These declines are impressive, affecting every one in the world, every family, every individual. Life expectancy at the beginning of the 20th Century was about 30 years, now we're past 60. This will continue. The slight footnote to this of course is the AIDS crisis. We can talk about that a bit later.

We also had unprecedented declines in fertility. This is often underrated, the impact it's had. In my view it was one of the major engines for the feminist movement.

I was at a conference last week at Camden, the audience was much older than this audience. I asked a show of hands if any woman ever gave birth to ten children. No one. Let's take a poll here. How many women -- forget about the men. We demographers don't care about the men. The reason why is that we're certain at the birth the women are there. The men may be there.

Let's see a show of hands. How many women have given birth to seven or more births? Zero. Six? Zero. Five? Zero. I'm going to fill the men in now, get the men involved. How many have given birth to four children or more? No four's. Oh, one gentleman has four. So we have one with four. Three? One gave four, one gave three. You don't have to be a demographer to figure out it's going to go on now, right? Two? Five gave two. One? Four. Zero?

You figured out what's going on. Birth rates are coming down. People are gaining control. This is wonderful. Women now can decide when they want to get pregnant, what the spacing is, and if they ever want to have children it's their decision. This revolution unprecedented, giving enormous control for women, and we'll see how this is relating to migration streams.

We've had increased urbanization, we talked about this. And we've had the emergence of mega-cities. Enormously large cities no one ever imagined -- five million, ten million, 15 million, 20 million, cities the size of many countries.

Finally, significant international migration. The percentage is about the same but the volume has almost doubled since a generation ago. And in many countries the number has tripled or quadrupled.

Think about the Netherlands, Denmark, where the number has quadrupled or even increased five-fold over the last 30 years. The percent of immigrants.

Look at some graphs. This is what the population looked like in the last 50 years and the next 50 years. We've grown rapidly. We're about 6.2 to 6.3 billion today, and we project we're going to add about another three billion.

We're coming out with our new estimate projections at the end of the month. We do it every other year. These numbers are based on figures we produced about a year and a half ago. The numbers will be about the same. Don't worry about a 100 million this way or that way. Between friends, what's a 100 million people? [Laughter] We're going to add at least three billion more people to the world.

This is what's happening with the distribution. The blue is developed countries, the red is developing countries. Virtually all the growth in the next 50 years will be in the developing world. Almost all of it. Like 98 percent, 97 percent. And it's interesting, just remember three numbers -- the numbers two, four, seven. Have you got those? Two, four seven.

1950, for every person in the developed world there were two in the developing. Today for every person in the developed world there are four persons. And by 2050 we project for every person in the currently developed world there will be seven in the developing world. The distribution is changing.

These are the main contributors to population growth today. The top ten. Six contribute half of the world's growth. India is first by far, 21 percent, followed by China, Pakistan, Nigeria, Bangladesh and Indonesia. Six countries, these six, half the world's growth.

India alone has as much as the next three. India has as many people in the world today as China, Pakistan and Nigeria together.

Another way to see this, take the European Union, all 15 member states. They're going to add 10 more, throw those in as well. Twenty-five member states of the European Union, the future European Union. Take the growth rate last year, births minus deaths. The entire growth rate of the new European Union India achieved by January 7th of this year. One week. One week of India's growth equivalent to the growth of the European Union. That's how rapid it is.

This is the growth rate for least developed countries. Forty-nine countries, the poorest countries in the world, primarily in Africa. It also includes Haiti in the Western Hemisphere, Bangladesh and some other very very poor countries. This is our projection of their growth -- high, medium and large. The least developing countries are going to be growing very rapidly basically because of the difference between births and deaths. Relatively low death rates and high birth rates.

Some more examples. Nigeria. A very rapidly growing African country. It's currently around 150 million and we project it will probably add another 100 million, 125 million, and reach around 275, it could be even higher.

Pakistan. Pakistan's interesting because of the conflict we have now in Afghanistan. Pakistan in 1950 was less than 50 million people. Today it's 150 million people. And by the mid century it could be as high as 350 million people in Pakistan.

A picture of the more developed regions of the world. All of this is Europe, North America, skip down to Australia and New Zealand. The red is our median variant and the blue line shows you what would happen to the developed regions without migration.

Some of you may know, but many people don't know, that Europe's population has been growing for a long time. It peaked at the end of the 20th Century. Around 1997, 1998, Europe's population ceased, and now it's on the decline. 1900 Europe was about 24 percent of the world's population. Today it's 12 percent. Europe's population in 2050 will be six percent. Changing distribution of the world's population due to population growth.

Another example, Italy. Italy's population is decreasing. We project that by 2050 Italy's population will be smaller than it was in 1950. Many people have commented on Italy's population. That Italy could become Europe's theme park, a type of Disney World where people visit, see the ancient ruins, the pictures, the sculptures, then go home.

Another country, Japan. Japan's future is similar. Decline, substantial decline. In fact the Japanese have projected their population for the end of the 21st Century and it's about half of the current size of its population.

One more European country, Sweden. Also declining despite the fact of generous paternity/maternity leave and other benefits.

Let's look at North America. Here's Canada. Canada is growing. Why? Migration. Without migration the bottom blue line, Canada's population in 2050 would be about the same size as today. The average number of births for a Canadian woman today is 1.5. Of course we know you have to have two children per family to replace yourself, roughly. They're about 25 percent below the replacement level.

Now we come to the USA, most of our interest. The United States is growing. It's a very unusual developed country. We've been talking a great deal about why the U.S. differs from Europe, Canada, Australia and other places. It's an outlier. Why is fertility so high in the United States? It's about replacement levels. But even with replacement level we projected the U.S. population and we see that the majority of the future growth is due to migration.

We project, like the Census Bureau, that by mid-century the U.S. will be about 400 million people. Today there are around 285, 290. They're going to add another 110 million people. Eighty percent of that growth we project will be due to migration -- immigrants and their descendants.

What's happened as a consequence of these changes? Here's an important graph showing the

distributional change. In 1950 Europe's population was much greater than Africa's, almost three times as large. Today they're the same size. But by 2050, even with AIDS, we project that Africa's population will be three times as populous as Europe.

Another example of the change, Russia and Pakistan. Two countries with nuclear arms. Russia in 1950 was almost 2.5 times as large as Pakistan. Today Pakistan and Russia are about the same size, but due to rapid population growth in Pakistan and a decline in Russia, Pakistan will be three times as numerous as Russia in 2050. In fact Pakistan's growth is so rapid that I've calculated that between now and 2050 despite the smaller size of Pakistan, it will add more people than China. Pakistan will be the fourth largest country in the world by 2050. India first, followed by China, the United States, and then Pakistan.

One consequence of declining fertility around the world is aging. This is a graph showing the proportion above 65 for the world in blue, Italy in red. You can see between now and 2050 for Italy the number above 55 is going to double, as well as for the world. Today it's about seven percent of the world is above 65, 18 percent in Italy. But by 2050, one out of three people in Italy will be above 55.

This is a figure we came up with, this potential support ratio. Demographers use dependency ratios. I've always hated them because they don't make much sense to the public. The potential support ratio is very simple. The number of people and their working age, 15 to 64, for everybody above 65. So you take the entire working age, 15 to 64, and you calculate that per one person above 65.

So if you look in 1950, 11.6, there were about 12 people in the working age for every person above 55 and for Italy it was about eight. That number is coming down. For Italy today it's about four, 3.7, and for the world it's 9.1. We see by 2050 there will be 1.5 people in the working age for every person above 65. That's every man and woman 15 to 64 per person above 65. We see a decline in the number of workers in working age for everyone above 65.

Let's look at some calculations of some potential support ratios for some countries. China is now about ten, France is about four, Germany 4.2, Italy 3.7, Canada is 5.4, and the U.S. is 5.4. We make projections and we calculate very simply how many there will be, what would be the support ratios in 2050. China goes down to 2.7.

China is benefiting right now from the demographic bonus -- a very favorable age structure. Korea, Japan, a lot of the East Asian countries benefiting from a very favorable age structure. Limited number of children, limited number of relatives to the working age.

France, their support ratio goes to two; Germany, 1.8; Italy, 1.5; Canada, 2.5; and the U.S. 2.7.

When this debate about immigration comes up saying we don't need migrants, especially the European countries. Maybe we can simply work longer. I calculate, if you want to keep these ratios that we have today for these countries -- 10, 4, 5.4. If you want to keep those ratios as they are what would have to be the age of retirement for these countries? In other words, if we retire at 65 in the U.S.

or in China and we want to keep 10 and 5, how long would you have to work? How many more years would you have to work to keep those ratios?

So the next chart shows the age in 2050 to maintain the current potential support ratio. Same countries -- China, France, Germany, Italy, the U.S. In China you'd have to work to 78.7, and according to our projections this is higher than their life expectancy. So even for communists going to them and telling them good news, you have to work longer. How much longer? You'll have to work your entire life.

For the French, 74. Some of you may have read recently, 400,000 French protesting increasing the age for retirement. To tell them they have to work until 74 I think would create enormous public dissent, civil unrest. Germany similarly, they'd have to work to 76 years. Italy, 76.5. Canada, 75. And the U.S., 73.1. Very unpopular public policy.

Here's Germany, again, projected population and the decline expected if you had no immigration.

These are graphs, and my experience has been you often can't visualize what we're talking about so I have a little visualization for you.

Imagine one meter representing 100,000 migrants. One meter, 100,000 migrants. You see the red is our median variant so we assume some migration for Germany. How much? So for Germany we assume two meters. Two meters, 200,000 per year. Got that? That's what we have for our assumption.

Now we've done some studies on how many migrants you'd need if you simply wanted to keep the population constant. The string's a little longer. Almost four, to keep the population constant. You could do it through migration.

What if you're really not interested in the population staying constant but you want to keep the labor force constant? How many migrants would you need? Almost five meters, almost half a million per year to keep the labor force constant.

People say well, we're not really concerned about the labor force to the population, we want to keep the ratio constant. We want to keep the ratio between the workers and the retirees constant because of social security.

How many migrants would we need then? Slightly more. Demetri, you catch this and pass it back behind you, pass it back -- No, we need more room. Pass it back to them, you pass it back, when it goes to the back row keep passing to the other side. [Laughter] This is the number of migrants, if you find the string just keep passing it. Okay? Then the last gentleman, the lady, pass it across to that side.

What are we trying to achieve? We're trying to stop population aging through migration. Don't drop the string. Pass it forward.

Remember I said one meter, 100,000. More than 45 meters. 4.5 million per year for 50 years.

The lesson here is immigration cannot stop aging. You may be able to influence the population size because of immigrants coming in, you may be able to influence the labor force, but population through immigration cannot really be addressed.

I've given this talk before. People say a few years ago I saw you. I don't know what you were talking about but I remember the string. [Laughter]

Maybe Germany doesn't matter. Maybe the European Union. The same case for the European Union. The median variants we assume less than 200,000 for, two million for all of Europe in the median variants, very small numbers. Then it shows you here roughly how many you would need per year for 50 years and you can see to keep a constant ratio between the workers it's really impossible.

The conclusion is you're going to age. You're going to have to adjust to aging. Immigration can play a role, but not really influence population aging.

Let's look at the government's policies to immigration and in the report I'll come to that in a moment. We've been monitoring this since the Bucharest conference in 1974, we've been monitoring the views of governments relating to immigration.

At the beginning we counted six percent of the countries indicated policies that limit immigration, to lower immigration. It's been increasingly almost uniformly since '76, and today, 2001, it's 40 percent roughly. Slightly higher for the developed countries, 44; about 39 for the developing countries. The average, 40 percent of the countries of the world want to reduce immigration.

Our report now. This report was produced about a week ago. It's sitting in the basement of the UN. We boxed it up and sent it here overnight. You in this room who have it are very fortunate because even the United Nations hasn't distributed it yet. This report was produced and has a number of contents. There are two parts.

The first part has two reports. One talking about measuring international migration, all the problems of data, definition and so on; and the second part talking about policies. What are government's policies on immigration and emigration. Also in part one, two reports from the General Assembly, actually the report we prepared in 2001 on the issue of international migration and development with the question of convening a conference on international migration. That was submitted to the General Assembly and the resulting General Assembly Resolution on what they decided. Often when the member states, like Congress, when they can't come to a decision they ask for another report. We're producing another report.

The second part, definitions and sources of the terms and sources of the data, and then the profiles by area, region and grouping, then also profiles by individual countries.

Major findings, I'm going to highlight these and then some of the other speakers will be going into some details. Number one, 175 million migrants. Nearly double from a generation ago. The majority in the developed world, about 50 percent, about 40 percent of the developing world. Sixteen million refugees we estimate. The numbers of refugees are two sources, UNHCR and UNWA. About 12 million from UNHCR and about four million Palestinian refugees recorded.

The net flow is about 2.3, we estimate, per year globally. And a great number of those, maybe half, are coming from the United States.

\$62 billion of worker remittances. I won't say much on this. Charlie Keely will be talking about remittances. I think this is under estimate. These figures are coming from IMF. I think the number is much larger and this accounts for a good number of countries, a substantial proportion of their GNP.

They indicated that 40 percent of the countries have policies aimed at lowering immigration levels and 20 percent have policies lowering emigration levels -- concern about the loss of their talented people.

In addition, for all of the countries and regions we've indicated if they're parties, if they ratified the UN instruments relating to international migration. I should bring to your attention that the 1990 International Convention on Protection of Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families. We indicated in this report when we went to press, to the printer, that there were only 19. East Timor has ratified it, making it 20 so that it will go into effect now. So that is a change in this report since it went to press.

Here's our web site. If you want more numbers and more details we're going to be putting this report on our web site. It isn't up yet. Also we have our projections and estimates and our studies on international migration.

In addition to this report a few months ago we came out with this wall chart some of you have seen. It came out in November. It was for 2002, no trend data. It's basically one point in time showing similar types of numbers.

Also some of you may be interested, this study came out in 2000, replacement migration, is it a solution to declining and aging populations? This discusses the issue of how many migrants would be needed to keep the population constant, how many to deal with the labor force and so on.

One of my colleagues at Michigan wrote me when this came out and said you made a mistake. I said what was the mistake? He said for Korea, to keep the labor force constant, the aging, you said they'd need six billion immigrants. I think you mean six million. No. Six billion.

If Korea wants to keep its support ratio of 12 people in the working age for every person, by 2050 the entire world's population would have to move to South Korea. [Laughter]

Another demonstration that you cannot deal with aging through immigration.

There's something else here that we've come up with that you may not have seen, even demographers. We try to measure how much immigration has an impact on the population. If you start playing with the numbers and you take migration and the gross rates, you get all sorts of bizarre numbers. So we came up with another indicator. Those of you that have it, you can open it up. Take Mexico.

If you look at Mexico we came up with something. What we did, we took the number of migrants per 100 births, and you probably haven't seen this before. So for Mexico, for every 100 births there are minus 13 migrants leaving. You go through here and you get a sense of what is the addition to the population, what's the deletion from the population, and you can compare it.

So Mexico, for example, we have minus 13. If you look at the United States in comparison you have migrants per hundred births, 31. This is an indicator of the relative impact of immigration per births.

I think that ends my talk. I'll be happy to answer any questions. And thank you for your patience, especially with the string.

[Applause]

MS. SINGER: Thank you very much Mr. Chamie for that presentation. I always tell my colleagues that demography can be fun and they don't really believe me, so I think if I had a bag of tricks like that it would be a lot more interesting for some of my talks.

I want to open up our discussion now with our panelists. You'll notice we only have three, we have five listed. Constantinos Fotakis at the last minute couldn't be here, and he sends his regrets. He is unable to travel. He is the head of the Social and Demography Analysis Unit at the European Commission.

We will start with Demetrios Papademetriou who is the Co-Director of the Migration Policy Institute. He will be followed by Charles Keely, Herzberg Professor of International Migration, Georgetown University. And Roberta Cohen, Senior Fellow and Foreign Policy Studies here at the Brookings Institution.

Our other guest, Lavinia Limon who is the Executive Director, Immigrant and Refugee Services of America and U.S. Committee for Refugees I'm told is on her way and we hope she'll be joining the panel shortly.

So we'll start with Demetri followed by Charles and Roberta.



MR. DEMETRIOS PAPADEMETRIOU: Thanks, Audrey. I'm going to give you a half a second to sort of ratchet down your expectations. I have no strings, I don't have a special thing, nothing is going to come out of that particular contraption so don't look up there, look at Joseph.

I've had the misfortune to follow Joseph during the Jubilee Year, the 2000 -- Well, the Jubilee Year in Rome a couple of years ago as one of the keynotes and I suffered enormously. Ever since then I developed a complex. What can I say? [Laughter]

What I am going to actually talk to you about since this is Washington and this is a think tank and I know that Brookings has EDU after it's name, after the dot. But I suspect EDU toward policymakers is more than exactly what they're focusing on and so do we.

Let me just put my hat on as a policymaker, an advisor to policymakers, and believe me this is a hot enough topic for everyone to be seeking advice on this. The Europeans have finally got it, as it were, in particular. And I'm sure that you will hear later on all sorts of aphorisms. Demography is not destiny. This is one of the standard phrases that demographers use and they will give us examples from the 1930s, what happened in the United States, and from many other places around the world where indeed the demographic turn was reversed. It certainly was stopped, maybe reversed, and that's fine. And indeed, things may reverse themselves.

I will actually give everyone the benefit of the doubt and recommend the best guess for all of us, there are roughly 95 percent women and five percent men here, but suppose that whatever, we all go back home and do our duty, okay? In about nine months or 12 months later we have a baby, each one of us. If we keep doing that, I suspect that we're going to prove Joseph dead wrong. Notice he is trying to predict what's going to happen. He's telling us what's going to happen if assumption A, B, C, D indeed bears itself out. That's great.

We are, however, still faced with a gap of about 20 years. The time that it would take between having a child and making that child be at best a quasi-productive member of the labor force. With all due respect to all of you young people, some of whom who work with us who are very productive at a very young age, I suspect that you may not represent your generation, but let's say you do. So I'll give you 20 years. When I speak in Europe I give them 28 years because usually that's how long it takes for these people to sort of get themselves motivated enough to enter the labor market. [Laughter] That is a matter of fact which is reversible, okay? We can always make people do things that they don't want to do.

I've tried that on my kids for years. I'm not going to tell you how successful I've been.

But what I wanted to sort of say a few words about today, and I will have to leave around ten of 11:00 because I have to catch a shuttle, focus on the support ratios. Some of you probably used to call or still do, I do, dependency ratios, which is the number of people that would be required to be working and pay taxes in order to support all the rest of us. I'm 56 years old, that makes me sort of like I think the first year of the post-war generation. Sometime in the next five, ten, 30 years I will retire. So I'll focus on the labor market. I don't want to replace the world's population. I don't give a damn if the world population comes down to three billion. But I'd like to see what it might take in policy terms in order to keep the support ratios reasonable. Trying to keep the 12 to 1 support ratio of Korea is an anomaly. It has nothing to do with anything. But let's say that 4 to 1 or 3 to 1 is something that we all go

after. One person is working in order to support three others. Is that right? The other way. Three workers to support a person.

So what do we do about this? I've come up with a series of policies, policy options. I'm not going to give you any answers. I don't have them. Nobody asked me to do it for them. But I want you to draw your own judgments and conclusions about it and I want you to think of something that in politics and policy, the two unfortunately are often one and the same, ultimately win the day, which is the path of least resistance. And you draw your own conclusions about the path of least resistance among the seven or eight options that I will give you.

The first one is let's get all of those damn people who are just sitting on their hands working. The unemployed, the discouraged workers, the young ones. Why not start work at the age of 14? Didn't our parents do that? The lazy ones. And those retirees. I mean what do you mean retire at the age of 55? What do you mean the government has an early retirement program? Work until you're 70. That's one of the things that you might wish to do.

The second one I alluded to already with my introductory comments. Let's have more babies. It's fun. [Laughter] For some. I think gender may play a role in this. Joseph, I'm not a demographer and I'm not an accountant so I have very little to say. So let's have babies, which is just fine.

It's not really as easy as it sounds. An awful lot of governments, as Joseph already mentioned have what we used to call pro-natalist policies, and some of them go to extremes. In Japan when Japan had a little extra cash, actually the private sector in addition to the [inaudible] was getting a \$10,000 bonus, etc., etc. The private sector contributed, depending on the employee, a very significant amount to people who did their duty. And not as a result of it, despite it, Japan's total fertility rate from the mid '90s when it was about a little under 1.4, a little over 1.4, it's probably now closer to 1.3. I'm guessing.

MR. CHAMIE: Good guess.

MR. PAPADEMETRIOU: There are lots of good guesses here now.

In Greece by the time that you have your third child not only do you not have to pay any taxes, but you actually start getting. Your wife stops work. She gets paid for the rest of her life a regular salary. When you have four children you have preference in employment and all that. This has been around forever. Total fertility rate for Greece probably about 1.25, 1.3.

I can go and sort of give you these examples. Lavinia just came in. Lavinia, come on up.

So France, very interesting things. A new set of policies. They're basically going down and they're getting themselves dirty in all of this. All sorts of additional advantages. Free child, assistance with children, assistance with education, etc., etc. They are at about 1.5, 1.6, France.

MR. CHAMIE: 1.9. They're celebrating.

MR. PAPADEMETRIOU: They're celebrating. Oh my God, maybe it's working over there.

Again, as I said, it may or may not be the answer. It does not address the issue of the next 20 years.

We can try to take active measures, and here I'm joking, to decrease life expectancy. Now you all know that the way that we have been going at this my father being 94 years old now as we speak, and I know I'm not going to get there, but theoretically my generation with all of the gains in medicine will do better than my father is doing which would be, in terms of the kinds of things that we're discussing here, a catastrophe.

Why would it be a catastrophe? I'll talk about it in a minute.

Now euthanasia, as you probably know is a Greek word. It means to die well. Maybe we can assist people. There are actually governments that sort of, the Swiss, for instance and the Dutch as you know, and Oregon, that do have the beginnings of a euthanasia policy. Maybe we expand the coverage of it. I don't know whether you want to do that or not.

The problem is not only have these old folks don't contribute anything. They don't work. They suck up all of the social security benefits. But in many places including this place, they use far too much in health benefits. It's a hell of a problem. Particularly since the cost to keep all the people, not just alive but in good health, increases exponentially every time you add a decade to someone's age.

The [inaudible] a few years ago estimated that the unfunded total cost of health benefits for all of these elderly people, the advanced industrial world was in the neighborhood, in the range of 30 to 53 trillion dollars. Somebody has to pay for it which brings us back to the support ratios.

What else can you do? You can get, and I'm becoming more serious again, you can increase the retirement age. And you know this, by the time that I may want to retire I have to work until the age of 66 before I can collect government benefits. The relevant part of this sentence is not the collect, it's the government benefits.

The government retirement age is all about collecting government benefits. Well if most of us in this room have to live on the \$1500 that the government may or may not give us we're going to be in deep trouble. In other words, increasing the retirement age does not mean that people will work until the age of 66. There is a major gap, a major [inaudible] in thinking that somehow says let's make people -- That's what it means, making them work until the age of 73. Somehow people will work until the age of 73 in order to collect government benefits. And even if the private sector simply coordinated their retirement policies with the government, a highly unlikely event. Because you know, the older we get, the more we cost to the owner of the business, the owner of capital, then possibly the less productive we become. Possibly.

So retirement age, again, possibly we do something there.

Tax benefits. Everybody's going to try to do that. But I want you to use your judgment and think politically here. Who will really dare to cut benefits to the degree required? Suppose that we have a series of wise governments. I want to sort of suck you into this syllogism. A series of wise, rather than opportunistic governments who will get reelected or who will get themselves elected by saying these people cut your benefits? I'll bring them back up. So wise governments who are really thinking about the public good.

How many of these folks, what will it take and how far do you have to go down to really make a dent into the kinds of things that we're talking about?

Or we can increase enormously our [social] expenditures but target them to certain things. For instance an awful lot of people willingly or unwillingly end up working in part-time work. They have no benefits or they have very few benefits, etc., etc. Well, maybe instead of trying to make everyone work full time, we make it easier for them to work part time, etc., etc., etc. Recall that President Clinton about eight years ago when he had started talking about welfare reform, he was going to put just about all of the savings, a big chunk of the savings into child care in order to get people to go back to the labor market. So you're not going to get that many savings in the short, the medium, or the long time around.

I've been trying so far to avoid the M word, migration, or the IM word, immigration. But I'm running out of options. We don't have time to go through all of them. I'm running out of options. And eventually we get to migration. And Joseph said correctly and others will probably say, this time of migration is not going to be the answer. Cannot be the answer for all sorts of reasons. You know them. But I will add another one. Those dumb immigrants, they get to be very [thin] like us. They age. And they have sort of expectations. Retirement income, health benefits, etc., etc., etc.

So you only buy yourself a little bit of a breathing space with migration. Unless, and I will leave you with this, unless we stop thinking bimodally when we talk about immigration. All these immigration assumptions and the laws, the rules of migration that migration cannot be a big part of the solution -- not the solution, it can never be, assumes that there are two types of people. People who migrate and people who don't. And assumes that people who migrate, migrate forever.

We're victims of our own thinking of migration in this regard, that we celebrate refugee flows, which is mostly permanent migration; we celebrate family reunification, mostly permanent immigration; we celebrate permanent immigration for work. This is all great. This is not criticizing all this. And somehow we abhor, we turn the other side of our face to something that in the past has given us an ugly experience which is temporary migration. Circular migration. Predictably regulated migration.

Some people will say well, you know, [inaudible] not experience about it but suggested a big chunk of that becomes permanent. And the answer to that is, as part of the calculation in developing those kinds of policies you have to make a judgment as to what, 30 percent? Forty percent? Fifty percent? Of these immigrants will actually stay permanently. But another part is not.

So migration not all the answer, probably not the biggest part of the answer even under the

circumstances that I have outlined here, but it is going to have to be part of the answer the government will use.

Don't get fooled by Joe's responses by government because that's where the data comes from. Forty percent of the government says we are lowering migration. That's nonsense. Because most migration, most governments lie about migration. And most migration takes place particularly in places that, the hardest if you will, takes place below the radar of the government.

So even though I would bet, for most of this countries would actually say we intend to lower migration. If you look at their actual migration figures every year -- don't listen to their reports. Do your own calculation. You will actually find out that they takes of various forms of migration are increasing every year despite the official policy of lowering migration.

So migration is going to increase. We have the evidence that it already increased from somewhere in the 150 or so million people in the last, about six, seven, eight years ago to somewhere in the 170-180. Don't forget these are numbers that come from all sorts of different sources. I wouldn't take my children's educational fund and put it on any of these numbers, or at least not many of these numbers, but the fact remains it's increasing and it will continue to increase.

We suggest, in view of the conversion today that the challenge with regard to migration policies are to manage that increase and to try to deny it or sit back and enjoy it.

Thank you.

[Applause]

MS. SINGER: Let me just remind the rest of our panelists that we have 45 minutes left, and we want to save some time for questions, so --



MR. CHARLES KEELY: Thank you very much.

I'm going to say three things. The first thing is demographer talk.

Number one, one of the things that wasn't said is most of the migrants in the world today are in developing countries and most of them will continue to be in developing countries. They're not in the developed countries.

Second, concerning projections. Joe knows this and Demetri referred to it. But one thing we know about the projections from the UN in 2050 is that they're wrong. We have to always keep that in mind. These are used as ways of looking at things. Don't [reify] them. If you [reify] them you may miss some things.

For example, suppose just for purposes of discussion that retirement age in the developed countries where there's this gap did go to age 70. How difficult or how bad would the situation be in

those countries? Age 70 would require a lot of changes, but kinds of changes in 50 years like that have taken place. It's not totally impossible. It's not out of the realm. I'm not sure the sky is quite falling.

The final thing I'll say on this is demography sorts of things. I know Demetri mentioned that a less serious issue was euthanasia. It's not not serious to some people. To some people it is. But in his discussion he said old people don't contribute anything. God almighty, why are we at that point for this to say old people don't contribute anything? I'm not sure I want to live in that kind of a society.

My second set of remarks has to do with remittances, and here Joe -- it's up. I want to say something about remittances. Migration in the world today is extraordinarily important for development and remittances is one of the reasons. Note here that the remittances went between '90 and 2000 from \$45 to \$62 billion. In the developed world notice that the amounts went down but in the developing world remittances in that ten year period doubled from \$24 to \$49 billion. That's a huge amount of money, most of it going to families. It's not trickle down, this is perking up. A different kind of an economic impact has to be looked at.

Look at a few countries. There are a number of countries like Ecuador, for example, and look at the change that happened in Ecuador in that ten years from \$50 million to \$1.3 billion. In ten years. Which is contributing \$104 to Ecuador for every man, woman and child in that country.

El Salvador, a country that asked the United States not to send migrants back because of the problem of absorbing them but also because of remittances, went from \$358 to \$1.8 billion in ten years. And in the year 2000 the remittances were equivalent of 13 percent of the gross domestic product of that country. That's a big industry.

Mexico I put up there just because of the closeness to the United States. But in Mexico the issue is \$6.5 billion going into that economy. It's probably the third largest earner after oil and tourism.

I switch to other parts of the world now and I'm looking at two countries that had a lot of migration to the oil exporters. Egypt is an example of a country where the amount of remittances has gone down. A situation that was predicted for most labor exporters to the oil exporting countries and it didn't happen for most countries but it did happen for Egypt. Egypt now only gets almost \$3 billion where ten years ago it had over \$4 billion. Also I should point out, obviously a declining part of the gross domestic product.

But a country like Jordan which is heavily dependent on migrant remittances, it was not a decline. If anything, it's almost over 3.5 times as much money in remittances now goes to Jordan as a decade ago. And it's almost one-quarter of the gross domestic product.

Now in Asia, South and East Asia, areas that sent large numbers of workers to the Middle East after the '73 oil embargo and the rise in prices, Bangladesh has gone up almost 2.5 times, almost \$2 billion goes into Bangladesh. Pakistan is one of those examples where the amounts have gone down. And the Philippines is a country that has very much gone down, and the Philippines is one of the countries that very much organized itself to export labor.

The last thing I put here was Turkey, just as an example of a country that used to send lots of people to Europe, and notice that Turkey's remittances have gone up. This indicates I think the idea that countries with long stayers overseas do not necessarily lose remittances. Do not presume that because people stay in a country for long periods of time that they send home less money. It's not that the number of Turks overseas has increased so much, they continue -- they have, but they continue to remit very large numbers.

I just used these as illustrations. I happened to pick these out. I didn't pick them out on purpose. For example Ecuador absolutely jumped out. I used Ecuador because I knew that Ecuadorians are starting to go in the last decade to Spain in large numbers. A lot more Latin Americans, by the way, are going to Spain. I think the Europeans like the Latin Americans better than people from Islamic countries. I [shouldn't] say that too loud. But Ecuador is a huge change. That has changed serendipitously as I looked at various countries.

So what does this say? Large amounts of money. Oil embargo and oil prices, lots of them are paid for by labor overseas.

Another way you could look at these data is to look at remittances as a proportion of imports or as a proportion of exports and it becomes extraordinarily clear how important remittances by foreign labor is in the national economies of many countries. Extraordinarily important.

The remittances are still growing in many places. They're extremely important, as I said, for the macro-economy. There are some negative downsides to this, too. Remittances can increase the money supply, the M2, and lead to inflationary impact. And the last thing I mentioned before, long stayers don't stop remitting necessarily.

That's on remittances. So this report gives lots of very good informative data to underscore the important role. It's not just that people are moving. There is a redistribution of wealth by exportation of labor to help economies that would be in sore trouble.

For example, if we did like the projection, the no migration. Suppose we did today there were no remittances. Let me tell you lots of countries would be obviously in really bad shape.

A final thing I want to say about the report is a different topic. It has to do with asylum. The discussion of asylum in the report I think, and I said this to Joe, is one-sided. It gives an impression about the developed countries that the developed countries are, in a typical term, having a fortress mentality. There is another way to view what's going on.

I'm going to play devil's advocate and what I'm trying to do here is to illustrate that there is a debate here, not necessarily who's right.

For example, one could say that the asylum system in Europe during the Cold War perverted the refugee system. It was not to help people who were in need, it was used to encourage people to

leave their country, particular from the East.

The asylum system went beyond the requirement of international law. For example, international law does not require an asylee to be given permanent residence. In fact international law does not require a person to even be admitted to a country. They must not be sent back to their own country, but that doesn't mean they can't be sent to a third country or to some other place. That's what the international law requires.

The approval rate of about 30 percent do not indicate on the face of them that there's a fortress mentality. There are a lot of people who apply for asylum who do not fit the Convention definition. That's just a fact of the matter. Policies like expedited removal do not necessarily mean that people who are real refugees are not getting asylum.

For example in the United States over 90 percent of people in expedited removal who ask for asylum in fact are approved to go to a full asylum hearing, and in the United States we have 30 to 35 percent plus approval rate.

Those approval rates, for example, if the UN High Commissioner for Refugees thought the process was really bad, I would assume they would speak up. They have spoken for example, about U.S. and other countries' policies on detention which shouldn't be happening, and also policies on HIV zero positively as a bar for refugees to be admitted.

So if there was something wrong with the asylum adjudication system in terms of its fairness, that the 3-0 percent or 30-plus percent somehow is indicative that people who were really refugees were being turned away by European and North American countries, I would assume we'd have heard vigorous protests from the UN.

As I said, having said all of this please don't shoot the messenger. What I'm trying to say is there are other views of this and it's not clear that these are not debatable. And this report, as I see it, basically says on the face of it, it's clear that there is no justification for the kinds of things that have been going on in refugee and asylum. I think that's overstating it. I think it is at least debatable.

Let me just say however, my personal opinion is that I think expedited removal stinks. I think putting people on Guantanamo and not admitting them stinks. I can go on and on with it. But on the other hand, to say that a person who is seeking asylum has a right to choose their asylum country I think goes beyond what is required in international law. I think if a person can get asylum in a country that may not be the most desirable, like Poland as opposed to Germany, if you're really seeking asylum that doesn't necessarily give you the right to choose the country that you want to go to.

Anyway, my point here is it's debatable. This report makes it seem as if the asylum process is not a question of debate. It is entirely off course. I think it's very much off course but I don't think necessarily entirely off course.

That's all. Thank you.

MS. SINGER: Thank you, Professor Keely.

Roberta, I'd like to ask you to go next.



MS. ROBERTA COHEN: I'm here today really to plant a seed because I'm going to focus on an issue that's not addressed in the UN report but which has a definite bearing on international migration.

Joe Chamie mentioned that people stand where they sit, and I'm going to do that because where I sit is to co-direct the Brookings Institution SAIS project on internal displacement so it's the subject of internal forced migration that I want to speak about because I feel it has a definite bearing on international migration and yet has not made its way into this kind of report.

There is a section in the report on refugees and asylum seekers that does briefly mention this question. It points out that there's been a decrease to 12 million in the number of refugees of concern to UNHCR, and it says that this has been accompanied by an increase in the number of internally displaced persons.

For anyone here not familiar with the term IDP or internally displaced persons, these are persons forcibly displaced from their homes, primarily for the same reasons as refugees, but who remain within the borders of their own country.

The report notes that asylum and migration were long viewed as separate issues by governments, but that today asylum policies are at the core of the discussions on migration in many parts of the world.

I would venture to say that there's a strong relationship between refugee movements and internal displacement that cannot always be separated, either. As one refugee expert described it, internally displaced persons are the hidden face of the refugee problem.

A discussion of how the decline in refugees is related to an upsurge in the number of IDPs would be very valuable. We know that the political advantage that motivated many states to accept refugees during the Cold War gave way in the 1990s to a desire to limit their entry. It's not only Western governments, but those in other parts of the world as well that have become less willing to receive large numbers of refugees.

As this inhospitality to asylum seekers grew with increasing numbers of countries finding it too costly, burdensome or destabilizing to admit refugees, the numbers of those displaced within their own countries began to rise significantly.

There are today an estimated 25 million IDPs -- twice the number of refugees of concern to UNHCR.

When first counted by the U.S. Committee for Refugees in 1982, there were 1.2 million in 11 countries. By 1986, the total was 9.5 million. By 1997, more than 20 million were reported. Today there are 25 million. That's an overall upward trend. I would imagine that the response to September 11th will no doubt contribute to further increases in the numbers of IDPs.

There is also an interchangeability at times between refugees and IDPs which makes separation of the two difficult. Internally displaced persons, after all, are potential refugees. Sometimes they're even counted as such.

In the Iraq crisis today UNHCR -- the High Commissioner for Refugees, has decided with international approval that it will assist refugees who cross the Iraq border and also potential refugees -- those who manage to reach the border but who cannot cross over into neighboring countries because their borders are closed. It's calling these people asylum seekers even though they're really internally displaced persons.

IDPs therefore are being counted as asylum seekers even though they're still within their own countries.

Conversely, returning refugees who find no safety or sustainable solutions in their home countries easily become internally displaced or internal refugees as they're sometimes called. In Afghanistan or Sierra Leone, substantial numbers of returning refugees -- those who are returning from Iran or Pakistan-- are becoming internally displaced.

In other countries refugees, returning refugees and IDPs are intermingled together, making it almost impossible to distinguish among them.

Changing borders or uncertain borders can also make it difficult to distinguish who is a refugee and who is an IDP. In the former Yugoslavia, IDPs became refugees overnight and vice versa, depending often on one's particular view of state borders and sovereign authority.

In the case of Kosovo, I've often been asked the question whether Kosovar Serbs who flee to Serbia are internally displaced persons, refugees, or asylum seekers. And what about the Meghkehan Turks? They were deported by Stalin, they are considered internally displaced persons at the time. By now with new borders in the former Soviet Union you have local authorities in the Russian Federation arguing that they're some kind of international migrant and they try to expel them.

It should be noted too, that in the Russian Federation the law on forced migrants does not distinguish between IDPs and refugees. It treats all forced migrants uniformly.

In other parts of the world as well there is not always clarity. The other day I was asked whether a Palestinian on the West Bank whose house had been demolished was a refugee or an IDP. Can you be both a refugee and an IDP when a refugee is supposed to be outside his or her home country and an IDP is supposed to be within his or her home country?

The Economic Community of West African States, ECOWAS and the International Organization for Migration held a meeting in October in Senegal on international migration which I found quite instructive. I participated in this workshop. It brought together all the ECOWAS member states. And they agreed that internal displacement should become a part of regional migration policy. Given the strong relationship between internal and international migration in this African sub-region it was decided to include internal displacement in the permanent migration observatory which is going to be created at the regional level. A definition of IDP was decided upon, and it was agreed that data collection and the development of migration legislation would extend to internal displacement.

I would say that initially when the discussions began I wasn't really persuaded that anyone was going to agree to integrate this into their observatory. But they were so very enthusiastic about this because of the internal displacement facing their countries in West Africa, and because there is so much intermingling of refugees, internally displaced persons, and returning refugees among the West African countries, that there was no debate over this issue. It was just considered a rather natural part of looking at these issues with the understanding that collecting data about IDPs is a very different thing than collecting information about refugees and migrants over international borders.

Should ECOWAS appoint a focal point on migration as was recommended, the position also will include both internally and externally displaced persons, and I would recall too that the constitution of the International Organization for Migration encompasses displaced persons who both migrate internally and internationally.

At present there is no part of the United Nations that systematically collects data on internally displaced persons or analyzes trends and policies. To be sure, internal displacement is a sensitive political issue. Now Joe Chamie was saying how migration is a sensitive political issue. I would submit this is even more of a sensitive political issue. But the time may well be coming for the UN to begin to collect data on this phenomenon and analyze its relationship to international migration.

Now that's not to suggest there should be a blurring of the refugee and IDP categories, but rather a better understanding of the relationship between the two.

It will be of interest to note too, that Georgetown University's Institute for the Study of International Migration has been floating the idea of a UN High Commissioner for Forced Migrants. That would include both those internally and externally displaced because of repression, conflict, natural disaster, environmental degradation and development induced displacement.

Although there are caveats to combining refugees and internally displaced persons under one roof, the proposal reflects the search for a more comprehensive approach to international migration.

Thank you.

MS. SINGER: Thank you very much.

I'm happy Lavinia Limon was able to make it here on time, and we will now hear from her.



MS. LAVINIA LIMON: Thank you, Audrey. Not on time. They closed 395 for an hour so I spent a lot of time in the car reading the report.
[Laughter]

What really struck me about it very broadly was that there is so little data to work from. The kinds of things we can pull from. There's a lot of data, but it's not consistent. People have looked at it differently, they haven't dealt with it the same and the sources are difficult. I was thinking, now why is that? Why do people not collect data in this day and age? I was thinking there are a couple of reasons. One, you don't always want to know what it says, so in terms of governments having to deal with migration, sometimes they just can't deal with it and they don't want to know what's going on. But probably, more importantly, nobody thought this was too important until a couple of decades ago and that's quite evident by the fact that people up here are considered experts. [Laughter] I don't think any of us have degrees in migration. I know when I was going to college there was no such thing. People didn't even look at it. So all you young people out there take heart. We're still in the beginning of a very, I think, important field.

So the question is, if people didn't think it was important and it's only recently recognized as important, I think we have to acknowledge that we're basically in the infancy of our understanding of these issues. We don't really know why people move. We don't know where they go, and we don't know what indicates their movement and what the indicators might be. And there's so much we don't know. And then when you look at government policies, what's interesting is people don't know a lot but they still think they can control it. And when they try and control it we can see they're not real effective at it.

When you look at, when they try and close one door another door opens up, a back door opens up, trafficking, undocumented, asylum applications of which you're right, and you said it's debatable. Only 30 percent of asylum applicants really have a claim under the 51 Convention, then that's being used as a doorway because other doors might have been closed.

So on one hand I think it's sort of a testimony to the human spirit that people go ahead and try and do whatever they want to do anyway, but you can also see the government trying to exert control.

Let me move to refugees because that's clearly what I know most about.

When you talk about controls, and the report actually says that the restrictions on granting asylum seem to be primarily viewed by governments as an appropriate response to growing anti-immigrant feelings in large segments of their population.

I would also argue that one of the reasons you see these restrictions is that yes, we can control to some extent refugee flows into your own country. And certainly in terms of resettlement, you can control that. You can decide not to bring people in. Europe of course, and to a lesser extent the United States is having a great deal of trouble controlling their asylum applicants coming in and then claiming

asylum. So that becomes the biggest issue in Europe as we see.

But I think when you look at the sort of history of refugees and you see post World War II and the Conventions, and if you can only imagine yourself sort of in their mindset, I don't think they really ever thought they were going to get a lot of people on their doorstep from Afghanistan. It was far away. They're probably never even seen anybody from Afghanistan. You couldn't imagine that a good deal of numbers of people could actually make it to Germany or England from Afghanistan. So when you think about the way they were thinking about the world when they made these Conventions, and a lot of them aren't terrific -- very idealistic, really great, and some of them clearly don't give rights that we think now people should have, but the reality is that it was a different world and they were really thinking, I believe if you think about it, they were thinking about people from France to Germany. A couple of countries here or there. They don't expect a whole continental kind of exodus.

Then I would agree that the refugee conventions were sort of perverted during the Cold War. We used to laugh that if you were a Russian ballerina you had no trouble whatsoever getting asylum and refugee status in the United States, and a whole bunch of people around the world had a great deal of trouble getting recognized as refugees.

But I would also argue that if you look at post World War II, it was a major milestone in refugee law and conventions and thinking, then you look at the Cold War, the perversion of that, then you have to look at post Cold War as a whole different take on it. You don't know who your enemies are, then which refugees are you going to take to embarrass your enemies? If you're not serious, then suddenly maybe you don't have to take anybody. There's no geopolitical interest particularly to taking anybody and second, it's often guided by domestic ethnic politics and we've seen that with the different flows that come. And so I think there is a confusion in the refugee world, post Cold War, on which refugees should we care about and why. But we sort of limped along because there was a whole structure and the structure kept its momentum.

The third event I think you have to really look at is 9/11. I think it's starting to control because after 9/11 and Demetri, you know these numbers. How many people come into the United States every year and tourists and for business reasons and everything else. Thirty-five million? So we all are sort of like wow, who are these people coming in? Well the only flow that was stopped was refugees. Why? Because they could, first of all. It's very important to know that. Hence, because they actually had to make a proactive decision to go ahead and continue it. September 11th, I mean by October 1st the President has to sign a presidential determination to the year-end refugee act saying so many refugees can come into the country.

This is a proactive political act he had to make. That's not an easy thing to do in a post-9/11 world. [Inaudible] bringing people from the Sudan. So they went to security, da, da, da, da, da. November 23rd he finally says okay, fine, let's bring in 70,000 refugees. But this was stopped because they could and because they didn't have to take responsibility for it. Meanwhile the tourists and students and other people continue coming into the country.

The last fiscal year we had 27,000 refugees enter the United States, the lowest number in a quarter of a century. This year we're actually behind that, even though the President again signed the 70,000, although with a bit of subterfuge, only giving 50,000 actual operational numbers. We've had slightly over 5,000 people enter the United States this year. The guess is, for those people who know this sort of thing, we'll probably get less than last year. We'll probably get below 20 of people coming in.

What does that mean? When you look at refugee durable solutions, and obviously the preferable solution is repatriation. The next preferable solution is resettlement in place. The last and least preferable option is resettlement in a third country. That has been the thinking, the regime, the point of view for 50 years.

So if you look at repatriation, we have had actually some interesting repatriations recently. Afghanistan, Angola, a few others, lesser numbers. And that's a good thing when it happens and when people can repatriate and actually have something to go back to which is not always the case, particularly Afghanistan. I think if you look at the kind of money and resources that are put to the solutions, I actually don't think that that much thinking, resources and expertise goes into repatriation. It isn't really something that has been able to be done in largescale and with any kind of confidence.

So it's important to understand that because I think we should be thinking more about repatriation, we should be dealing with that more. If it's the more preferable option then let's look at it more closely and figure out how do we do it right, how do we do it in a way that refugees see it as a preferable option when it's safe to go home.

The second option, durable solution, is resettlement in place. There's some of that, but basically countries aren't real happy about that, governments aren't really happy about that, and that has not been a real viable solution for a long time.

The third solution, resettlement. As we know the United States and the other [countries] that have followed suit, it has never been a solution for very many refugees. Usually less than one percent of all the world's refugees are actually resettled some place else. In fact that's not a solution.

So what's happening to these people? I think you can say a couple of things. One, they're being warehoused. We have many refugees that have been in refugee camps 10, 20, 25 years. A whole generation. And the other thing are those alternative ways of finding a solution for yourself. Being trafficked -- paying someone to get you some place. As Demetri put it, being under radar. Being basically undocumented people, going anywhere, filing for asylum. You see those kinds of movements increasing as the durable solutions become less and less tenable.

Let me just wrap up because I know we do want to wrap up, but I think that when you look at this there's clearly I think a need to relook at the kinds of thinking and philosophical underpinning of the refugee program, of the refugee regime, the international laws. And I hesitate to say that because the possibility for mischief, for making it a lot worse, is quite great. On the other hand if you have countries sort of wholesale, not following the laws that they've pledged to follow then in fact you've sort of made it

a hollow exercise in the first place. So I think it would be worthwhile, maybe not in a UN-sponsored meeting, but maybe in some think tanks like this or other places for people to really look closely at the reality of a post World War II, post Cold War, post 9/11 world and what really happens to refugees and what governments are really willing to do. Maybe that would end up in a different kind of regime of law.

Finally, and I'm stepping way out of my level of expertise but I did want to also comment when reading this, that I really am quite an optimist. I'm also from LA. I moved away a long time ago, then I moved back to LA, then I moved away from LA about ten years ago shortly after the Rodney King riots and seeing the kind of wholesale change in population that was taking place in LA from the place I grew up in to when I left ten years ago. In the recession of the early '90s lots of things happen, and there continued to be the immigration and the rest of it.

One of the interesting things that I think, just a little anecdote. My father, Mexican-American, born in Los Angeles. He remembers being a little kid listening to a bunch of his great aunts sitting around the table saying Los Angeles has really changed. There are so many anglos here now. That was their experience because when they were young and grew up there in fact were a majority of Hispanics. now we've come full circle and that's true again.

But when you look at Los Angeles and the sort of unworkability of the city, and I still have a great love because I am from there, but you also see some things. You see people moving out. And you see immigrants choosing not to go to LA. Even undocumented immigrants not to go to LA. Instead they're going to go to Lincoln, Nebraska, where there's housing, where there's jobs, where their kids can grow up better, where there's not gangs. And you see the kind of displacement in the United States of immigrants as well as the folks going here. I don't live there any more.

So my point is, I think there's kind of a stasis that takes place that again, human beings make choices in their own self interest as they perceive it. And they don't perceive their self interest to be going to places that are untenable and unworkable. They go places where things work for them.

So in terms of being an optimist, you think of words like migration, you know, and I'm really kind of silly. If they'd just get rid of all the borders, people would discover where it works for them. That's not going to happen any time soon, but they will do that whether or not the borders are open. So I think it's one of the things to really recognize, that again as an optimist, ultimately I think the end result is people finding a better life for themselves and their families and therefore contributing to the overall economy and good things about living in this world.

Thank you.



MS. SINGER: Thank you Lavinia. Thanks to all of our panelists for your thoughtful comments. We do have time for questions.

QUESTION: Thank you very much. Rosario [inaudible] from Ukraine, and I'm the head of the Department of Demographic Policy in Ukraine and

[inaudible] American University.

Thank you very much first of all to all of you for a bright presentation and for the panelists for discussion of populations. I'd like to connect my comment about the connection between migration and demographic development.

I absolutely agree that migration does influence demographic situation and particularly in demographic aging. But talking in national context and in the country context I guess that migration can improve the demographic situation for receiving countries maybe for one generation because migrants mostly are young and middle aged people, and in the case of migration from transition countries educated and professional. But for some countries, for countries of exit, that [inaudible]. For example for different countries the demographic situation can become more worser and maybe forever.

As for Ukrainian case now the less educated, young and middle aged population, and I was the research director for two national reports connected with labor migration and [inaudible] of [women] from Ukraine and I can say that migration, emigration has very hard consequences for demographic development of Ukraine, because the demographic situation is worsening as a whole situation. [Inaudible] decline, the rise of [inaudible] and lowering of those rates.

So migration, maybe you can clarify, what is the influence of migration in your report on demographic situation for transition countries? Thank you.

MR. CHAMIE: Thank you very much. That's a very good question. The countries in times of transition are in particularly difficult conditions right now. As you mentioned, they've had setbacks in mortality. Mortality in some of the countries has actually increased, infant mortality rate. At the same time they have extremely low birth rates. For the Ukraine, for example, its decline would even be greater than the Russian Federation, and they're going down at a very fast rate and projections indicate a very large decline in the total population of Ukraine as well as the other countries in Eastern Europe, countries in transition, especially Latvia, Lithuania, Bulgaria. And migration has a very large role.

I want to say a couple of remarks. Number one, our projections are projections. Anyone who's done a projection understands that we're trying to see what's going to happen 50 years from now or more. Fifty years are median terms. We go 100 years. Sometimes even beyond 100 years. You have to make assumptions. What's your best view of the future?

Now we've been doing this for over 50 years. The National Academy of Sciences came out with a report that was done, the National Research Council for the U.S., they reported that our estimates of projections from the '50s, 50 years into the future -- not too bad. Four percent error on a global level. More error at the country level. You have to make projections. We all do it. If you're 25 years old now, in 40 years you're going to be 65. You're planning for your future. You need the numbers.

In the case of Ukraine, going back to Eastern Europe, the situation there is extremely discouraging in terms of growth.

The other point I want to make is that you cannot see migration without looking at the total complex of the other variables -- fertility, mortality, urbanization and so on. That's why I tried to give you an overview.

The future, as you described it, is precisely the way we've been thinking. There will be an out-growth in these countries, continued out-growth. I know Bulgaria as well has been very concerned because of the people leaving. It's not only the number, it's the quality of the people, the educational levels and so on, and it's very natural that people who are educated and well trained are going to be going to places that have better opportunities.

So the situation in Eastern Europe is likely, as you described, to become very difficult in the coming years and decades because of the low birth rates, out-migration, increasing mortality or stagnating mortality levels, and economic performance.

The other concern that we've had, we yes have now had examples of countries that are declining and aging rapidly that can maintain economic growth. That's a very important research question. Economic growth in light of rapid declines and rapid aging. So Germany, Japan, Italy, Ukraine, Russia. Those questions will become paramount.

I don't want to talk too much more because we've got a limited amount of time. I'd be happy to talk to you and anyone after the meeting because I've left some time before I go back to New York. But they're very key concern, especially for these countries, but I want to stress our numbers are projections. Anyone that does projections can understand what they are, what they mean. We spend 80 percent of our time making estimates; 20 percent of our time doing projections.

The birth rate for Ukraine and for Europe, most demographers do not see them going back to replacement. If it's 1.2 for Italy; 1.3 for Japan; 1.5 for Canada; they may increase because the mean age of child bearing is dropping, but we don't see it going back to replacement in the near future. That seems to be the consensus of most demographers.

Therefore, if you're below your placement for 20, 30, 50, 100 years, you're going to decline. If you're above replacement you're going to continue growing. It's as simple as that. And mortality plays a role. I didn't discuss AIDS. AIDS is a very big issue for the African countries. Mortality is going to play a very large role in African growth, and I'll be happy to answer any questions on those. Thank you.

QUESTION: I'm Becca Jones from the Population Resource Center. My question is when you're calculating dependency ratios and the role of migration and aging populations, what sort of age structure do you assume for the migrants coming in and how long a stay?

MR. CHAMIE: A very simple question with regard to the age structure of the migrants coming in. We try to make it as simple as possible with regard to the replacement migration studies. We brought in migrants in a distribution that we thought migrants usually come in -- very little children, mostly in their working ages, and then keep them in the population so they increase.

So in our projections age structures are different by country. But for the exercise on migration we have somewhat standardized [numbers] I can discuss with you afterwards, but it's not the normal distribution that you would see in the host country that's receiving them. They're coming in at young ages, in their 20s and their 30s, and staying there and then we also apply in this case the fertility rate of the national population. You can argue that fertility rates are going to be slightly higher, but after several generations the fertility rates generally converge. In some of the projections we do make an allowance for differential fertility rates for the migrants, but in most cases in the [age stats] we made for replacement migration rate studies we kept the fertility rates very similar.

We also assumed in another scenario, if you keep the potential support ratio at three, how many migrants would you have to get in. But the age structure of the migrants is very different than a normal population and it varies. If you had information about it, like for Canada and the U.S., you can put that in the projections.

QUESTION: Somewhat along the same lines, I'm Bob Engleman of Population Action International.

I'm curious about the biennial projections that you mentioned that are coming out later this month. I'm looking forward to them.

It seems a bit that in the process of doing this you've gotten increasingly high resolve to changing your assumptions by country. HIV has entered into this in a big way. Can you say something about the migration assumptions? Are they done country by country? Do they vary by low, medium and high projections? In the past I think you phased out migration in the future, international migration. You made the assumption that by a certain year it would no longer occur. Are you still doing that? And how do you arrive at sort of the when migration actually ends?

MR. CHAMIE: Migration is the most difficult of the components. It's the most unstable. Mortality is relatively stable except for the cases of AIDS and maybe the Eastern European countries in transition could expect it to get worse. We've always had the assumption that mortality will continue to improve, rates will keep coming down, but we see in the countries in transition that's not the case. The AIDS crisis, we have continually got a worse and worse case scenario.

I started in the 80s working projections when the AIDS crisis had begun. Our colleagues at WHO and we said well, maximum prevalence 12 percent; two years later we said maximum 18 percent; two years later, maximum 24 percent; now we're up to what, 35-40 percent prevalence. We're constantly underestimating it. AIDS. That is a problem. We're going to have new numbers coming out next, I would say probably the end of this month, beginning of March. AIDS is much worse than it was in the 2000 revision. The 2002 revision will see many more deaths due to AIDS than we anticipated, and the modeling that we're using I think will reflect more deaths.

With regards to fertility, our assumptions basically, we've changed our assumption for the 2002. We always in the past have assumed in the long term, medium term I mean, that they go back to

replacement. We're finding now that countries, Mexico, Brazil, Tunisia, Iran, Indonesia, Thailand, are not necessarily staying at replacement. So we've reduced the floor. Countries can go down now on average 1.85. Serious change.

It's in the news. Two weeks ago it was in the *Wall Street Journal*. It's going to come up again. Remarkable change in our thinking on fertility.

Now migration. We go all the way. 2050. We used to stop, four or five years ago, at 2025 and phase it out. It didn't make sense. We knew that. So it goes all the way to 2050. How do we make our assumptions? It's based on government numbers and government policies. Canada says we want so many migrants, we assume so many migrants. The Europeans are similar. We want no more migrants, refugees, some families. So we take the national and we adjust them somewhat with real situations and make our assumptions and they go all the way out to 2050. We don't stop. They're very highly subjective in terms of looking at the specific country in question.

QUESTION: Are they very much a [inaudible]?

MR. CHAMIE: We have several variants. The difficulty comes in that most demographers and [technical] people want more than three different variants. All the possible combinations, you probably end up with 35, 45, 50 variants. Great for demographers. Horrible for policymakers. Policymakers don't want three, they want one number. They want your best guess. We give them three, high, medium and low. But we do have some variants. We have zero migration assumption, but for migration we don't have high, medium and low. We have basically one, the medium. It's just become too complicated when you get all the permutations.

QUESTION: Thank you very much for a very nice presentation, all of you. I am Iliano Sol from the Voice of America, the Latin American branch of it.

My question is related about the Latin American trends of migration, going to the developed countries of the world. How do you see those trends? Will migration increase? Will it increase considering that we are in the course of a very very long crisis in Latin America in general, especially in Argentina where the gap between rich and poor completely increased, where the salary, the annualizations got decreased from \$8,000 to \$2,150 in the current decade, where we have complete hunger and famine in the north, and considering that Brazil is doing a lot of cuts in terms of the budget. How do you see those trends of migration? Do you see that they will increase? Do you see them as decreasing? How do you see that? And do you think that this situation will last in the long period or if it will basically last medium or short term?

Thank you very much.

MR. CHAMIE: One of the benefits of doing projections is you're very explicit. We're not hiding any numbers or assumptions. You can go to our projections and look at Argentina and see what we assume. For the next 50 years. You can assume that we're expecting more migrants. In brief, our projections show continuing migration trends as many of my colleagues have said. Migration will

continue and in some cases we see some increases because of economic differences and political differences and so on.

Whether this will come true or not is another matter, but to answer your question yes. We see a continuation and likely increases. And one factor, of course is economics.

Now if you really want to see the difference, I've done this before. Pick an American and tell them if you move tomorrow to another country I'll give you ten times your monthly salary. Ten times. Twenty times. And these people will start saying when do I leave? When do you want me to leave? Many people move for economics.

For a Bangladeshan or a Haitian that's making one-tenth of the salary they can make in Kuwait or Saudi Arabia or Italy, it's a great incentive.

Second, you have other social and political reasons for moving, great incentives as well.

So in brief yes. We see continuation of the migration trends and in some cases increases due to the economic, social, political situation.

MR. KEELY: ?? Can I just say vis-à-vis Latin America, most international migration in Latin America is within Latin America. Number one.

Number two, as economic integration and free trade agreements become more and more in vogue that will probably increase international migration within the whole Western Hemisphere region. It's already beginning.

The third issue that needs to be focused on Latin America, other areas and regions of the world as well as Lavinia mentioned, the concept of -- temporary migration is becoming more and more, and temporary can be anything from a few months to a few years. But people don't necessarily stay for the rest of their life and that trend is increasing all over. So that has important implications for social and economic policy but it's not easily captured in this idea of projections. Maybe if I looked at 2033 they're there, 2037 they're not. But it can have an impact while they're there on all kinds of things including productivity, job creation, etc., particularly of the highly skilled.

MS. SINGER: Thank you very much. I'm sorry we're out of time. For others who may have questions, maybe you can talk to some of our panelists.

I want to thank everybody for coming, for being our guest, and especially to our speakers today. Thank you very much.

###