A Brookings National Issues Forum

SEPTEMBER 11, ONE YEAR LATER: WHAT'S AHEAD FOR AN ALTERED HOMELAND?

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Keynote Speaker and Address:
PAUL WOLFOWITZ
Deputy Secretary of Defense

Welcome and Introduction:
STROBE TALBOTT
President, The Brookings Institution

Public Opinion Survey Results
ANDREW KOHUT
Director, Pew Research Center for the People and the Press

Moderator:
E.J. DIONNE, JR.
Washington Post Columnist; Senior Fellow, Governance Studies

Panel One: How September 11th Changed Foreign Policy and the International Scene

Participants:

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Panel Two: The Domestic Scene

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****THIS IS AN UNCORRECTED TRANSCRIPT****

MR. STROBE TALBOTT: Good morning to all of you. I want to thank you for coming out so early to help the Brookings Institution join the rest of the country in reflecting on September 11th and its aftermath.

During the course of the morning you're going to be hearing from a number of distinguished speakers and panelists. Those include Andy Kohut who is one of the world's great experts on public opinion and who has some data that he will be sharing with us that I think you will find to be both relevant and revealing. You're also going to be hearing from a number of Brookings scholars who have led this institution in its own response to September 11th.

In about a hour my colleague, E.J. Dionne, who is going to be introducing Andy Kohut and moderating the panel will tell you a bit more about the full program. But first it's my honor to introduce our lead-off speaker today. It's hard to imagine someone who's career as well as his present high post in government could be more appropriate to this occasion and also more appropriate to the mission of an institution like Brookings.

Paul Wolfowitz has achieved distinction and exercised leadership both in academe and in government. Between his stint as Secretary Wolfowitz he has been Dean Wolfowitz. In that latter capacity at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies just down the street he was a neighbor and a partner of this institution.

From my own vantage as a journalist who covered Paul when he served in the Defense and State Departments in the 1980s, I can testify that his powerful intellect was key to his effectiveness as a public servant. I associate him with a determination to make the pursuit of American interests one and the same as the advancement of American values.

He was, for example instrumental in helping guide the Philippines toward democracy, a project on which he worked very closely with our own Mike Armacost. As Ambassador to Jakarta, Paul was the point man in managing the U.S.' ties with the largest Islamic nation in the world. That last accomplishment is germane to one of the subjects that Jim Steinberg, Martin Indyk and others here at Brookings have put on the Brookings agenda since September 11th and that subject is America's relations with the Islamic world. That just happens to be the topic that Paul has chosen for his remarks this morning.

So ladies and gentlemen, please join me in welcoming both to this podium and back to this neighborhood, Paul Wolfowitz.

[Applause]

DEPUTY SECRETARY WOLFOWITZ: Thank you Strobe, for that very nice introduction and let me extend my congratulations to you on your new job as President of this great institution. Your own long record of public service

and intellectual contributions to the public debate have made their marks on policy and I know that's something you're going to continue to do here at Brookings.

In my last job at SAIS I wasn't supposed to say nice things about this place across the street, but now I can and it's something I'm delighted to do, especially since Brookings is doing something very important with this series, which is trying to put September 11th and its aftermath into context.

I know there are some, including quite a few of you in the back of the room who have come here this morning with great expectations. Big hopes that I'll put at least one topic into context. On that score you'll be happy to know that I plan to take bold preemptive action. [Laughter]

Now that seemed to get your attention! I refer to my boss Donald Rumsfeld who did a masterful job of putting so much into context in his press briefing on Tuesday, especially when he said about that particular regime, I'm sure you can guess which one, he said, and I quote, "It has not been playing tiddly winks." If you missed Tuesday's briefing you missed one of the all-time great briefings. They're all great, but he was in especially fine form on Tuesday and knowing there would be a few media folks here today I decided to ask Rumsfeld himself for a few pointers.

So this morning before I left I said to him, you handle the press pretty well. Is there anything I should keep in mind over at Brookings? There might be a few media types around, you know.

He said, whatever you do don't try to be hard-hitting, witty or clever. In other words, don't try to be like me. Just be yourself. [Laughter]

I could see he was warming to the subject. His hands were getting animated and he said here's how you deal with the media. Begin with an illogical premise and proceed perfectly logically to an illogical conclusion. After all, they do it all the time but if you do it first they'll be eviscerated.

Now some of you may not know it but eviscerated is the famous word that passed the lips of one of our distinguished Marine generals who had the Taliban stomped a few weeks ahead of their time. To that my hard-charging Marine colonel military assistant quickly added, "We Marines may not know how to spell eviscerated, but we sure know how to do it."

In the vein of people who know how to do things well I must say I cannot think of a more inspiring time to be part of America's national security team than right now. It is a distinct privilege to serve with President Bush, Vice President Cheney, Colin Powell, Condi Rice, and Don Rumsfeld. The American people have every reason to be both proud and appreciative of how that team is pursuing both this nation's noblest goals and its fundamental security objectives.

That gets me to the point of my speech today. Even if I don't talk about a particular regime today, and I'm not going to, I know that most of you in this audience will still listen to what I have to say and take it seriously and that is

really why I appreciate this particular crowd and that is why I'm going to ask you to bear with me for a speech that is a little longer than usual but which addresses some issues that are extremely important and I think may be in danger of being missed. If any of you are just waiting until I get to that other subject, you might as well leave now.

Today just a week shy of the first anniversary of the attacks it is appropriate to take the opportunity to go beyond the headlines to get some altitude and some perspective on the situation we face today.

On that Tuesday last September there was one American who looked on the aftermath of the attacks from a very great altitude, literally from a vantage point some 250 miles above the earth's surface. Aboard the International Space Station astronaut Frank Colbertson and his Russian crew members could clearly make out the plume of smoke that wafted from the World Trade Center. Later they could see a black shroud envelope the Pentagon. A day later Colbertson reflected that even from space he could clearly observe a dramatically changed world beneath him.

Meanwhile here on earth Shafi Gabra, a Palestinian and a professor of political science at Kuwait University was directing Kuwait's public information center here in Washington that September 11th. Three weeks before he had visited the World Trade Center with his seven-year-old son and taken photos there. Looking back on the attack from the distance of almost a year he observed last week in the New York Times that "a small number of Muslims killed a much larger number of Muslims in New York City."

Each person's view of what happened that day -- an American in space and an Arab Muslim here in America -- in its own way captures a fundamental truth. What happened in the United States cannot fail to have its impact on the rest of the world. It certainly was no mistake that the World Trade Center, a symbol and hub of America's economic dynamism, was a target. And when the American market was damaged shock waves reverberated and rumble still around the world. But the attacks also shined a searchlight of truth on the real intentions of the terrorists. As Shafi Gabra pointed out, "The terrorists seek to target not just America but Muslims and Islam by attacking the ideals of tolerance, justice, and openness that are the aspirations of millions of Muslims around the world as well. If the terrorists are successful in destroying these ideals, East and West alike will suffer."

As I've been pointing out to audiences since that day, the terrorists target their fellow Muslims upon whom the aim to impose a new kind of violent tyranny. A tyranny that pretends to be based on Islam but which owes more to the totalitarian impulses of the 20th Century than to the great religions that the terrorists are attempting to hijack.

The hundreds of millions of Muslims who aspire to modernity, freedom and prosperity are just as much on the front lines of the struggle against terrorism as are we.

Nowhere was this struggle more evident than Afghanistan where totalitarian brutality imposed

by the Taliban offered sanctuary to terrorists with their own radically backwards and chauvinistic distortion of Islam. The United States and its coalition partners mobilized against that grave threat and we now fight a war on terror. This is a war that we will win.

But we also must fight the much larger war that was exposed last September. This is a war too, that we must win. This larger struggle is part of another dimension of the war, a dimension that President Bush addressed in his State of the Union message but one that in my view does not get emphasized enough. That larger war we face is a war of ideas. A struggle over modernity and secularism; pluralism and democracy; and real economic development. In his State of the Union message President Bush declared that in this fight "America will lead, he said, by defending liberty and justice because they are right and true and unchanging for all people everywhere. We have a greater objective," the President said, "than eliminating threats and containing resentment. We seek a just and peaceful world beyond the war on terror."

Part of building that just and peaceful world that the President envisioned lies in the next step that we must take in that larger struggle. For what we have before us is less a clash of civilization as some have theorized than a collision of misunderstanding between the Muslim and Western worlds.

I acknowledge that my view on the subject of East and West, one that has been shaped by more than two decades of personal experience, is decidedly optimistic. But that does not mean that I can't see a truth that we must confront today. So let me be clear. There is a dangerous gap between the West and the Muslim world and we must work to bridge that gap and we must begin to do so now.

Part of bridging that gap is helping to expose the lies at the heart of the terrorists' message and convincing their potential followers that theirs is a blind alley leading to defeat and ignominy. Part of exposing that blind alley, though, is to offer a better alternative. The alternative of liberty and justice as President Bush has said, fundamental pillars of a just and peaceful world.

When it comes to certain countries and individuals around the world we may be a very long way from that better alternative but that is all the more reason why we need to start working to bridge that dangerous gap now.

The arena where we most readily be judged in how we narrow the gap is Afghanistan and that is one of the reasons why it is so important that we succeed there. As we look at Afghanistan 11 months after the war on terrorism began, we see quite frankly a mixture of good news and bad news. But some of the bad news I think has been exaggerated and is in danger of drowning out the fundamentally remarkable news. Afghanistan has been unbelievably transformed for the better in less than a year.

There are still a great many problems that remain to be solved but that is hardly surprising in a country that has suffered from 23 years of civil war and brutal invasion. Our challenge is to preserve what has already been achieved and to build on it and help the Afghan people establish a peaceful, just and prospering society.

We can't expect to solve all the problems of the last two and a half decades overnight and there are many problems. We are quite attuned to the existing challenges. But on the whole I would say that over the last 11 months there has been much more good news from Afghanistan than bad.

The Afghan people have been liberated. The Taliban regime is out of power, and along with large numbers of al Qaeda they are killed or captured or disbursed and on the run. That fact alone has paved the way for other significant developments some of which are transforming the landscape in that war-torn region, both literally and figuratively.

Early last September the U.N. was warning that more than five million Afghans, some of whom were surviving on cattle feed, grass, and insects, were facing death from famine without international help. It's worth noting that even before last September the United States was the largest contributor of humanitarian aid to Afghanistan and when military operations began last October, humanitarian efforts were an integral part of our military mission from the very beginning.

The U.N. World Food Program supported by the U.S. government provided 575,000 metric tons of food to almost 10 million Afghan people including record amounts of food during the bombing campaign.

Today the picture is vastly different. Famine has been averted and refugees are returning in unexpectedly, indeed record large numbers. That success itself presents a new challenge. The returning refugees will place new strains on a still tenuous food supply this winter, but we are no longer worried about widespread starvation.

In support of the great work being done by USAID and the United Nations our soldiers have pitched in and along with Afghan labor have built some 50 schools. That alone means that 62,000 more children, boys and girls, youngsters whose first lessons taught them that the sound of gunfire was a natural part of life can now go to school and learn new lessons, dream new dreams. That is certainly one of the most far-reaching ways we can help these young Afghans build their own better world.

A Ministry of Women's Affairs is up and running, in itself a counterpart to the old regime as stark as anything that might have been imagined just a year ago. And President Karzai recently promoted Afghanistan's only remaining female air force parachutist to the rank of general. Farmers have returned to their fields and with the help of U.S. seed programs crop production has increased some 82 percent over last year.

As the social infrastructure gets slowly rebuilt, so too does the political framework. In another encouraging development the Loya Jurga or Grand Council elected Hamid Karzai President of the two-year transitional government in a process based on traditional principles of representation, ethnic balance, accountability, and legitimacy.

One senior advisor to Karzai said that for the first time in more than 20 years the people of Afghanistan are acquiring a voice. But now we must empower the Afghan government whose ministries are weak and whose governmental coffers hold less than a third of what their modest budget requires. And we must reinforce President Karzai's popular mandate with enough resources to fulfill promises to the Afghan people.

A crucial factor in sustaining representative government in Afghanistan is first and foremost sustaining a stable and secure environment in which such a government can gain a firm hold and ultimately flourish. The United States is deeply engaged with the Afghan Transitional Authority and the international community on this task to include training the Afghan National Army which our soldiers consider one of their most important tasks in Afghanistan today.

The recently graduated battalions of the Afghan National Army represent a critical first step toward the formation of a true national security force, along with police and border guards. We're also taking immediate steps to improve security in particular regions of the country by having people from the State Department and some of the provincial areas team up with our Special Forces to help encourage harmony among the regional leaders and between regional leaders and the central government. Our people can help mediate disputes, smooth over conflicts, and play an unheralded but pivotal role in supporting Afghanistan's political equilibrium.

Security, although far from perfect, is far better than it was just a year ago. The International Security Assistance Force in Kabul under the able leadership of first the British and now the Turks has played an important role in this regard.

It's important to remember that the original business of the ISAF was to prevent that capital city, the capital of all Afghans, from being dominated by a single ethnic group a development which in the mid 1990s contributed significantly to the rise of the Taliban. ISAF has been accomplishing that mission successfully and one of our most urgent tasks is to identify a new lead nation to take over when Turkey's commitment to that role expires in December of this year.

We are also considering the possibility that ISAF could play some useful roles beyond Kabul if ISAF could be enlarged. We do not oppose ISAF expansion. I think there are some benefits that could possibly come from using ISAF in ways outside the capital that might include patrolling, training the Afghan National Army in regional locations along with police and border forces, and assisting with the new Afghan Army National Battalions as they are deployed.

We welcome and support these developments and encourage the international community to provide the leadership and resources necessary to make it happen. But while we consider the possibility of a new and larger role for ISAF, our highest priority must go to sustaining ISAF in its current mission.

We must also help reconstruct a stable economy. It is difficult to exaggerate the importance of economic assistance, not just for the economy but for security and political stability as well. The more

resources that flow through the country and through Kabul the more readily we can ease discontent and increase everyone's stake in a new institution. Once a major transit point along the fabled Silk Road, Afghanistan can once again become an important hub for regional trade. That can only happen through the resourcefulness of the Afghan people which exists in abundance; with adequate roads, which clearly must be rebuilt; and with international economic assistance which we also need in abundance.

Through the leadership of the State Department we secured pledges of substantial economic assistance at the Tokyo Donors Conference earlier this year. Having said that, our biggest single concern now is that the economic aid is not coming through at the levels pledged in Tokyo. Quite simply, some of the donors are not giving their fair share. In fact only a little more than 30 percent of the $1.8 billion pledged for the first year has been delivered so far. Most of that money was needed for humanitarian assistance projects with many Afghans still waiting for real reconstruction to begin.

As cash only trickles in the potential for risk promises to grow. Winger approaches and for those refugees who return from Pakistan and Iran, and I mentioned earlier, it's a record number, some 1.6 million, the largest return of refugees in modern history, their gamble on the pledges of the international community could mean disaster, but it should not.

The United States is now the predominant supporter of the multilateral relief and recovery effort and we're glad to lead the way but we can't do it alone.

So to those who have promised their support I offer the college students' familiar plea: Send money -- Now.

Looking ahead, another reason why this assistance is so important is that as I suggested, over time it will help create the kind of incentives that can bind the country together. Giving regional leaders a stake in the system and gradually building national institutions. That is essential to stabilize and strengthen Afghanistan's legitimate national institutions.

We support President Karzai and the Afghan Transitional Authority and we continue to look for ways to help Afghanistan build a secure and unified country. Our emphasis is on helping Afghans establish the means to provide their own stability and security. Our mission in Afghanistan is one of liberation, not occupation.

We know very well that we have a huge stake in Afghanistan's success. We remember the steep price that we had to pay when Afghanistan was a failed state. Having come this far and done so much, we must not walk away.

As the situation in Afghanistan improves it's encouraging to note that there have been some important positive developments in other parts of the Muslim world as well in the last couple of months, and I refer specifically to Turkey and Indonesia. Although these developments haven't grabbed the headlines that the arrest of individual terrorists or the uncovering of new plots typically garner, they

could prove in the long run more important for building a lasting peace.

In the same way that we must acknowledge what's wrong if we want to progress forward, it is equally important to recognize what's right. That recognition itself is a way to encourage true progress and further accomplishment.

A country that occupies one of history's great strategic crossroads has through a recent series of reforms put itself at a historic crossroad as well. Last month Turkey's Parliament adopted some truly groundbreaking reforms.

Turkey addressed broad political reform by granting television, radio broadcasting and education rights in Kurdish and other regional dialects. It also broadened freedom of expression, stiffened penalties for illegal migration, changed its death penalty statutes and recognized the jurisdiction of the European [Supernational] body.

Turkey's Economy Minister rightly summarized those reforms as a huge mobilization in favor of Europe. Should Turkey be allowed to join the EU it will in fact be a mobilization in favor of us all.

Through the years Turkey has been one of America's most steadfast allies, quickly offering support after the attacks last September including ground forces in Afghanistan. Today Turkey carries out another tough responsibility as the leader of that International Security Assistance Force in Kabul following Britain's initial six month tour.

But Turkey's leadership goes far beyond its role as soldiers and peacekeepers. Turkey's aspiration to join the European Union is one that should be welcomed by all people who share the values of freedom and democracy. I know that our European friends may grow weary of having Americans tell them about the importance of bringing Turkey into the EU, but especially in the light of Turkey's latest reforms what is at stake is more than just a technical process of EU accession. It goes back to that point about the struggle of ideas. In the long run the way to defeat extremism is to demonstrate that the values that we call Western are indeed universal. To demonstrate that the benefits that we enjoy, the benefits of free and prosperous and open societies area available to all Muslims as well. Never has our stake in Turkey been greater.

Turkey offers an important model to the Muslim world as it embarks on its own road to representative government. As a great American scholar of Turkish history Bernard Lewis has observed, "Turkey's experience shows the entire Muslim world that democracy is difficult, but also that it is possible."

History attests that fashioning and sustaining democracy and free markets is a difficult undertaking. In the West it too centuries, but Turkey chartered its course through the 20th Century with enormous courage and determination. Now it is positioning itself for the 21st Century. Its historic commitment to modernity and moderation deserves support and vindication. America and Europe can

bolster Turkey and help it continue to succeed. In so doing we amplify the message that Turkey's success can send to the rest of the Muslim world and indeed to the developing world as a whole. This is a model worthy of emulation.

Indonesia is another important example of a country seeking to build a democratic government based on a culture of inclusion and participation, even in the face of its extraordinary diversity and enormous economic obstacles. And like Turkey, Indonesia has chosen to take some bold steps forward.

In fact in the last year alone, Indonesia has arguably made more progress toward democratic reform than its entire 57 years history. Indonesia's highest legislative body recently passed a series of amendments to its constitution to further solidify its democratic transition including one provision that provides for an early end to the privileged position of the military in the Parliament.

But as important as the amendment that were passed is an amendment that was rejected. Although some religious parties pressed to have Islamic law or Sharia be recognized in Indonesia's national law, the national legislature rejected that proposal and rejected it overwhelmingly.

In so doing they confirmed the powerful belief in religious tolerance that is shared by the great majority of Indonesians -- Muslims and non-Muslims alike -- in the country that has the largest Muslim population of any in the world.

In a visit to Indonesia last month Secretary of State Powell praised Indonesia's support for the war on terror which has been significant. He also encouraged Indonesia to step up the pace of legal reform, reforms which will not only contribute politically but will help economically by encouraging investors. His visit helped move our two nations closer to normal military-to-military cooperation, a step that ultimately will pave the way to more effective dealing with the threats posed by terrorists. Secretary Powell and Indonesian leaders including President Megawati discussed how the Indonesian armed forces can improve not only military effectiveness but give professionalism to reforms to safeguard against human rights abuses. That would be the aim of our cooperation.

My three years in Indonesia as Ambassador gave me a unique opportunity to study and appreciate that remarkable country, its people, its rich cultures, and most importantly it traditions of tolerance. That experience and experiences before and since have strengthened my appreciation of the fundamental common ground between East and West. Many people do not realize that Indonesia's Muslim majority is the largest in the world. But even many who know that fact to not realize that Islam is not the state religion, that the state accords equal status to the five major religions of its people.

There is every reason to believe and to hope that Indonesia with its own traditions and culture can move forward because when people are free to work and keep what they produce they work hard and organize creatively. If we are serious about opposing terrorism we also must be serious about helping Indonesia in its quest for a stable democracy and a stable country.

Finally, while we wage the war on terror we must also be mindful of that larger war, the struggle against enemies of tolerance and freedom the world over. One tool we have in this struggle is our ability to reach out beyond governments to people and to individuals. We must appeal to broad populations, especially those voices struggling to rise above the din of extremism. Voices that tell us the Islama Muhammed is not the religion of bin Laden and his suicide bombers.

I am convinced that the vast majority of the world's Muslims have no use for the extreme doctrines espoused by groups such as al Qaeda and the Taliban. Very much to the contrary, they abhor terrorism, they abhor terrorists who have not only hijacked airplanes but have hijacked one of the world's great religions. They have absolutely no use for people who deny fundamental rights to half their population or who indoctrinate children with superstition and hatred.

In winning this larger struggle it would be a mistake to think that we are the ones to lead the way, but we must do what we can to encourage moderate Muslim voices. This is a debate about Muslim values that must take place among Muslims, but it makes a difference when we recognize and encourage those who are defending universal values. And when we give them moral support against the opposition they encounter we are indeed helping to strengthen the foundations of peace.

When Egypt sentenced human rights campaigner Shadin Ibrahim to seven years in prison for his efforts to promote democracy, President bush expressed concerns about Dr. Ibrahim's case directly to President Mubarak. As you know, we also recently turned down requests for additional aid beyond the Camp David Accords because of that issue. The State Department will continue to press our concerns with Egyptian authorities.

When the American and noted Muslim Sheik Mohammed Isham Kabhani spoke at a State Department sponsored panel on terrorism in January of 1999 he addressed what he called the authentic traditional voice of Islam which is moderation and tolerance and love and living in peace with all other faiths and religions. He went on to caution that there was at that time an imminent threat of catastrophic terrorist attack on America, on American soil by Islamic extremists.

Following his message some Muslim organizations here in the United States public condemned him for what they called false and disclamatory allegations and organized a boycott against him. But learning tolerance and progress, these are qualities that we espouse but that the extremists today consider subversive.

In that same article I mentioned at the beginning, Kuwaiti political science professor Shafi Gabra described studying here in the United States, a time when he'd been influenced by the anti-American slogans popular at the time. But Gabra's American professors surprised him with their tolerance, and tolerance he wrote, "even without accepting the other view does have a moderating power on people and permits for the repetition of the cycle of understanding. Tolerance breed tolerance."

As a professor of political science at Kuwait University he says, "I practice my old professors' techniques on my own fundamentalist students."

This past Tuesday an Egyptian-born resident of the United States reflected in the New York Times on what we might call the dangerous gap between her view of Islam and that of her fellow Egyptian Mohammed Atah, one of the hijackers. Mona Eltahawi's Islam embodies tolerance and acceptance of others, a view that questions why Atah allegedly in the name of Islam was filled with such hatred.

She writes of the debate here in America about the relationship between Islam and modernity and notes that she is saddened that such a debate has not taken off with equal vigor in other parts of the world. But Eltahawi concludes, that debate must continue for, as she puts it, "only by reclaiming our own voice can we silence the zealots."

In his State of the Union message President Bush spoke powerfully of the brave men and women who raised their voices to advocate the values of human dignity, free speech, equal justice, respect for women, and religious tolerance. They are out there as we have seen. The system will progress only when we all become truly serious about supporting and encouraging those voices abroad and here at home.

I have spent a good deal of my career, more than two decades, thinking about East and West and my experience has convinced me that we share a fundamental common ground. It is on that ground that we can build the ancient dream of peace and freedom prosperity and security, a dream that we share. On this ground we can build a better world, one that proceeds on a path from crisis to opportunity.

A year after the horrific attacks on America we can affirm this truth. The single greatest threat to peace and freedom in our time comes from terrorism so this truth we should also affirm, that the future does not belong to the terrorists. The future belongs to those no matter what their creed who dream the oldest and noblest dream of all, the dream of peace and freedom. The future belongs to those who labor with courage and commitment to build a better peaceful and tolerant world. Thank you.

[Applause]

MR. TALBOTT: In addition to asking all of you to join me in thanking Secretary Wolfowitz for being with us this morning and getting the program off to such a good start, I would also ask that everybody please keep in their place so that I can escort him out to his car. He has another appointment. He's on a very tight schedule. Once we're out of the room we'll have a break for five or ten minutes, and then E.J. will reconvene after everybody's had a chance to get up and maybe get a cup of coffee. But please hold for a moment while I take him out, and once again, join me in thanking him.

[Applause]

[Recess]

MR. E.J. DIONNE: I want to thank everyone for coming this morning. As Strobe suggested, it is right and just and fitting that we honor and remember those who perished on September 11th at the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. There are many appropriate ways in which to do this, and surely one of them is to reflect on the impact of this terrible incident on both our nation's domestic life and foreign policy and that's what our purpose is today.

That purpose is not just to look backward, but especially to look forward, to see what we can learn from the last year so that we might minimize the chances of a horror of this sort ever happening again and also to ponder how we might use September 11th as a prod, as a reminder of our obligation to build a more just and peaceful world.

So I first of all want to thank all our panelists in advance for their contributions to that work, not only today but their ongoing work toward that purpose.

I'm going to sort of go through what our plan is for the morning.

We are first going to hear, as Strobe Talbott mentioned, a great presentation from Andy Kohut. Andy has done a fascinating survey that he will tell you about, a survey that focuses not only on the nation but also describes the differences, rather notable differences and the reactions to September 11th and the nation as a whole, and in New York City and the Washington, D.C. area.

We are then going to have two panels that will run roughly an hour each. The first panel will focus on foreign policy and international issues, and the second will focus on domestic issues. The panels will be informal in the sense that we'll be seating, people won't be giving speeches from a podium, and the audience will have a chance to join in and subject our panelists to withering questioning, or even friendly questioning if that's what you wish.

Because this is a democracy and because public opinion plays, and rightly plays, a large role in our deliberation, Andy Kohut is going to sit in on both panels. So he will help turn the panels into a kind of focus group perhaps, though I don't think so.

Let me just briefly introduce Andy. Andy is a great researcher, and I can say from personal experience a wonderful person to work with. He is the Director of the Pew Research Center and has been involved in polling and public opinion research for more than 20 years. Formerly the President of the Gallup organization Andy in 1989 founded Princeton Survey Research Associates, a private polling and market research firm based in Princeton, New Jersey. He served as Survey Director for the Times Mirror Center, the forerunner to the Center he now direct, the Pew Research Center. He is a frequent contributor to the New York Times, the National Public Radio, and the News Hour with Jim Lehrer.

He is also a columnist for the Columbia Journalism Review and America Online News.

Andy, we're very very grateful that you're with us today.

[Applause]

MR. ANDREW KOHUT: Thank you, E.J. I'm very happy to come here and share with you the results of three surveys that we've conducted about reactions to the 9/11 attacks one year later.

Most of you serious poll watchers know that many of the dramatic reactions of the public to the 9/11 attacks have slowly faded. The spike in trust in the government that the polls picked up in the fall last year is mostly gone. The public once again is as critical of the news media as it's been for decades. And even President Bush's ratings have come down from the stratosphere. This poll has them at 60 percent. That's only nine percentage points higher than we had Bush on September 10th.

It's also clear from this polling and I'm sure the waves of polling that we're going to feel in the next couple of days, measuring the impact or the reaction to the anniversary of 9/11, that the American public is firmly affected if not imprinted by these attacks.

On a personal level the attacks touched the lives of virtually all Americans. At the start of the interview we asked people before they knew what the survey was about what was the most important thing that happened in their own lives over the past year? Many people mentioned births and deaths and marriages and changing jobs and a whole range of things, but as many as 38 percent mentioned the 9/11 attacks -- volunteered the 9/11 attacks. That's a very substantial number in an open-ended question.

In New York and in Washington the percentages were 51 and 44 percent respectively, that is higher than nationwide. That's because there are considerable differences in reaction to the attacks depending upon the section of the country.

People in the New York area report far more emotional consequences than do Americans in other parts of the country including Washington.

Forty-six percent of the people that we interviewed in the New York area knew a victim of the 9/11 attacks. That compares to just 21 percent in Washington and 11 percent nationwide.

We have a sub-sample of people in our New York survey who were in New York City, about midtown or south, on September 11th, and 59 percent of them reported knowing a victim of the attack.

It's little wonder that the people that we interviewed in New York City report many more emotional aftershocks than people in the rest of the country and here in Washington. Reports of

depression, insomnia, continued sadness are all much greater there.

But New Yorkers along with Washingtonians experienced more direct life consequences as a result of the attacks than people in other parts of the country. Reports of lost jobs, wages, consideration to career changes, consideration to moving are all sharply higher in New York and Washington than elsewhere. And Washingtonians and New York area people have also developed and adopted more defensive behaviors than people outside of the attack areas. They avoid air travel more, at least they tell us so; they avoid crowded public events more than do people in other parts of the country; and there's much more caution in handling the mail.

The Washington area while not as affected emotionally as New York is definitely more on edge about future attacks. Sixty-nine percent of the people that we interviewed of the 400 people we interviewed in the Washington area say they feel they live or work in an area where a future attack might occur. That compares to 42 percent in New York and 32 percent in the rest of the country.

I think it's important to bear in mind that while people in New York and Washington have most affected personally, the vast majority of Americans that felt emotional impact of these attacks and virtually all of the people that we spoke to, 80 percent, say they feel the country has been changed by the attack.

What comes out of this survey very clearly is seeing the country out vulnerable is the most obvious legacy of those horrible attacks.

Concern over a terrorist attack has fluctuated over the course of the year in the surveys that we've conducted but it's never fallen, worry has never fallen below the 50 percent level. Currently 62 percent said they were very or somewhat worried. Less than the 76 percent that we recorded in June when there was a lot of reporting about the dirty bomb suspect. But that worry is persistent and it's not likely to go away.

What the poll shows in terms of policy is that the national consensus despite the worries and despite the impact, the national consensus about the war on terrorism is beginning to fray.

First the polls document steadily eroding confidence in the government efforts to combat terrorism both at home and abroad. The percentage of people rating the government's homeland defense program as excellent/good have fallen from a peak of 69 percent in October right after the attack to 57 percent in the current survey. When we asked people about local antiterrorism efforts, they give even lower ratings.

But Americans want more of a focus on homeland defense rather than rooting out terrorist networks abroad than they did back right after the attacks. Last fall we had a 36 to 45 percent plurality giving greater priority to military action overseas and homeland defense, but now those numbers have reversed to 51 to 30 percent and there's been a steady change in that attitude over the course of the

year.

I should say that public confidence in our military effort is sagging as well. Fewer Americans believe it is going well than was the case even at the beginning of the year. Sixty-nine percent rate our military effort positively now, as compared to 89 percent in January.

I was surprised very much by some of the questions that we asked about the way the war on terrorism is going both at home and abroad, 70 percent told us they think it's too early to tell whether the war in Afghanistan has been a success; only 15 percent believe it's been a success. And surprisingly, just a third of the people that we questioned believe that terrorists are less able to launch an attack on the United States than they were a year ago. Most people say, 39 percent, a plurality at least, say that their capability is pretty much the same.

As the public has grown more critical of the government, there has been a steadily diminished willingness to give up personal liberties for the sake of preventing terrorism. The percentage of people, for example, in the survey saying they favor mandatory national identity cards fell from 70 percent in October of 2001 to 59 percent in the current survey.

Americans are also even more opposed to government monitoring of their credit card purchases and personal phone calls than they were back in October.

Despite a declining consensus about the war on terror, however, two profound changes in public opinion remain. First, the public continues to be disposed to the use of military force in the war on terrorism, and secondly, the Americans favor the United States taking an active role in the world as a way of preventing future attacks.

As to the first, we found a 48 to 29 percent plurality saying Americans' increasing use of military presence overseas would be a more effective way of combating terrorism than reducing it.

Secondly, 58 percent give high priority to taking military action against countries that seek to develop nuclear weapons; and 53 percent give high priority increased defense spending. These numbers haven't changed a bit since the beginning of the year.

When we tested the concept of preemption in another survey, it got broad public support. Not as much support as deterrence, but the American public is disposed to use military force and that's one of the reasons why we see in almost all of these polls [fixed intent] at least in the first question in the poll saying they're inclined to support the use of force for the sake of a regime change in Iraq.

But it's not all one way. As many people believe it's important to reduce U.S. dependence on MidEast oil as a strategy for reducing terrorism in the United States as believe in the use of military force. And the public continues to support U.S. engagement in world affairs by a 53 to 34 margin. Americans favor the U.S. being very much involved in solving international problems as a way of

combating terrorism. This has slipped a little bit since we first asked the question in October, but still a 53 to 34 percent majority is very different than the kind of attitudes that we saw expressed in the 1990s when the public was very wary of involvement in global trouble spots around the globe.

Further, while the poll finds reluctance to use economic aid in a general sense as a weapon in the war on terror, a 56 percent majority favors continuing coming to the aid of Afghanistan to help rebuild it and two-thirds accept the idea that the United States will have to continue to deploy troops three to maintain civil order for some time to come.

Somewhat surprisingly compared to the fall, we found more support for basing U.S. antiterrorism policies mostly on national interests rather than strongly taking into account allied interests. The margin on that question was 45 to 35. It had been 30 to 59, just the reverse. The shift is more among Republicans in favor of a unilateral approach to dealing with the war on terrorism, and to be honest with you I don't understand why we've had such a remarkable change on this question. It could be a reflection of public backlash to what it sees as reports of allied criticisms of American policies. I'm not sure. I think we need to know more about that, but I was started by that survey result.

Whatever the change in the go-it-alone strategy, the multilateralism issue in general is we found very little support for a go-it-alone strategy in Iraq. While 64 percent favor using military force to get rid of Saddam Hussein, that level of support withers to just 30 percent if we have to do it without our allies. This is the second time we've found the drop in support and it's apparent in other polls as well.

I think the most important thing about Iraq in this survey is that a much smaller percentage than was the case on the eve of the Gulf War, a much smaller percentage of Americans say they've given a lot of thought and consideration to whether we should use force. Forty-six percent say they thought a great deal about it; it was about 66 percent in January of 1991.

The President has yet to make his case to the public. I August of '90 50 percent of Americans thought Bush had made a clear rationale for putting troops into the Gulf for Desert Shield. That percentage went up to 80 percent by the time we were ready to use force to drive the Iraqis out of Kuwait.

Today just 37 percent say that this President Bush has clearly articulated reasons to use force to end Saddam Hussein's rule. There is great conceptual support, particularly relevant to the kinds of attitudes we've seen in the '90s about the use of force with regard to Iraq, but the President hasn't yet made the sale. Public opinion is very much still at a formative stage.

Finally I'll close with one year later. Despite the continued threat of terrorism, as an issue it competes with the economy for public priority. When we asked the public what's more important for the President to do, to concentrate on the economy or the war on terrorism, 39 percent said the economy and 34 percent said terrorism.

Thank you.

[Applause]

MR. DIONNE: Thank you very much.

If our first panel could come up I'll introduce everybody, and if somebody could save me a seat in the middle there so I can watch everybody as I toss out some questions.

By the way, Andy, what is your web site? One of the great things about Kohut polls, if you are not familiar with them, is Andy has a history of asking the same question a number of different ways so you end up with a much more sophisticated sense of public opinion than you would with a single question. What's the web site?

MR. KOHUT: People-Press.org.

MR. DIONNE: This is a great panel we have for you here and I'll just introduce everybody briefly and I'll ask my first question to Jim Steinberg from up here and mosey on over to that seat.

Jim joined Brookings in September 1st, 2001 as Vice President and Director of the Foreign Policy Studies Program after a year as a Senior Advisor to the Markel Foundation. Jim has held several senior positions in the Clinton Administration including Deputy National Security Advisor to the President from December 1996 until July 2000. He was Director of the State Department's Policy Planning Staff from March 1994 to December 1996. He was Deputy Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and Research from September 1993 to February 1994. In other words he's held all the jobs that qualify him to answer any questions that come upon this panel.

Prior to joining the State Department he worked as a Senior Analyst at RAND in Santa Monica. He was a Senior Fellow at the Institute for Strategic Studies in London. His bio goes on and on and on, but you can see how qualified he is.

Lael Brainard is the New Century Chair and Senior Fellow in Economic Studies and Foreign Policy Studies at Brookings. Her recent publications have assessed the links between global health, bioterrorism, and international development. She's also examined the implications for globalization of the campaign against terrorism.

She too has served our country in the government. She served as Deputy National Economic Advisor and Deputy Assistant to the President for International Economics under President Clinton. Before coming to Washington she was an Associate Professor of Applied Economics at MIT's Sloane School.

Martin Indyk, Ambassador Indyk, I always feel I have to call him ambassador, he was our

ambassador to Israel first during the Rabin years from 1995 to 1997, and then he served in 2000 and 2001 during effort to achieve comprehensive peace and to stem the violence of the Intafada. Prior to his assignment in Israel, Dr. Indyk served as Special Assistant to President Clinton and as Senior Director of Near East and South Asian Affairs at the National Security Council. Before entering government service he served for eight years as Founding Executive Director for the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.

I am a sucker for accents, and just so you know where Martin's comes from, he was born in London and he was raised and educated in Australia. So that great mix of all the various ways of speaking the English language will be on display here today.

Finally, Mike O'Hanlon is a Senior Fellow in Foreign Policy Studies at Brookings. He specializes in U.S. defense strategy, budgeting military technology, homeland security, it sounds like a long list. What you have to understand is that Mike O'Hanlon produces books the way some of us produce newspaper columns. If I read you all the books that Mike has written recently we would use up the entire panel.

He most recently co-authored with six colleagues our volume here at Brookings entitled *Protecting the American Homeland: A Preliminary Analysis*.

Before joining Brookings Mike was an Analyst at the Congressional Budget Office. He worked at the Institute for Defense Analysis, and he served as a Peace Corps volunteer in Zaire from 1982 to '84, what was then Zaire.

Welcome to you all.

Let me just start with Jim. There's a lot to be said for the obvious so I'm going to begin with the obvious. It would be helpful if you could sort of talk to us about the continuities and differences pre and post September 11th and perhaps simply assess how are we doing in the war on terrorism?

MR. JAMES B. STEINBERG: That's obviously a big question these days.

It's tempting to say because of the drama that Andy Kohut has identified in terms of emotional impact of September 11th, the fact that everything has changed. This has fundamentally reoriented American foreign policy, that we live in a very different world now with a new set of challenges. But I think it's important to look at the extent to which things have not changed as well as places where they have, particularly in the way the Administration has been pursuing its strategy toward the United States.

I think the greatest continuity is that there is an ongoing view of the world about how the United States pursues its interests in the world which was very much the view that President Bush brought to office in January of 2001 and it's persisted through this period. It is a view that believes that the United

States needs to be much more active about pushing its own national interests in the international environment; needs to be clearer about defining this unique character of U.S. interests, and to recognize that the United States plays a unique role, has a unique degree of power, and therefore is in a position to pursue its interests in a way that no other country in the world can and perhaps no other country in history has ever been able to do.

What that means is that the United States needs to accumulate power and its ability to act that allows it to act without constraints by others. To recognize that while it's possible that the support of others can be useful, that as Secretary Rumsfeld often says, the mission should define the coalition, rather than the coalition defining the mission. The process of engagement with others is to seek support for our point of view rather than to seek common ground. And to paraphrase Secretary Powell who was asked to describe the way the United States approaches the question of consulting with our allies. He said first we formulate our principal position, what needs to be done; then we seek to persuade others that that's the correct answer; but if we're not successful in persuading them of that we will proceed based on what we believe is the right answer.

I think you've heard that from Vice President Cheney again in the last several days, and I think this has been a consistent theme throughout the Administration, a view that international organizations and international rules are often designed as a way of constraining the United States and that those are institutions and approaches which on the whole ought to be taken only from a utilitarian point of view. That is when they are useful we'll use them, but when they are not, we need to be able to move beyond it. That was classically expressed in the way the Administration approached the problem with the ABM Treaty; we've seen it in connection with the International Criminal Court; with the biological weapons protocol; and a number of other international regimes, the Kyoto Protocol being one.

I think that has remained a consistent pattern even in the post-9/11 environment. That we've seen the way in which the Administration believed it ought to pursue its efforts in Afghanistan, we've seen it again with the continued very very sharp presentation of our view about the International Criminal Court in what I think is one of the most contentious disagreements with our allies that we've seen, not only in the debate in the U.N. Security Council, but also in this now debate about whether the so-called Article 98 exemption from the Court.

So I think there's a lot of continuity in the question of how we pursue our interests and how the United States acts in the world.

The place it has changed, though, is how we see what those interests are. I do believe that September 11th marked a sharp change in the Administration's perception of that problem.

Without getting into the great debate about who should have known what before September 11th, I think it's fair to say that the fight against terrorism was not the dominant priority for this Administration. There were a lot of other concerns it had. Clearly missile defense a priority which was something the Administration acted on quickly. Clearly the concern about China, the potential largest

threat to the United States and to our allies and friends and to stability in East Asia and around the world were dominant factors in the first nine months of the Administration.

Also a sense that we needed to prioritize more our engagement in the world and a reluctance to engage as the
President said during the campaign the nationbuilding and activities of that sort.

I think 9/11 changed that. I think it is true since September 11th that the Administration has fully and thoroughly internalized the notion that terrorism is the predominant threat to the United States, that the asymmetric threats posed by terrorism are the thing around which we need to organize our foreign policy. You can see this very dramatically for example in south Asia where before September 11th we had a strategy primarily focused on strengthening U.S. relations with India, not a lot of interest in Pakistan one way or the other. Now we have a whole new strategy in South Asia that is designed obviously to continue that relationship with India, but in new engagement with Pakistan to try to get Pakistan to be our supporter not only with respect to the war in Afghanistan but the longer struggle against Islamic fundamentalism in the region. A whole new engagement in Central Asia with countries which have at best questionable practices of governance which have now become virtual military allies of the United States. And of course dramatically in the case of China which has now gone from being a country that was a strategic competitor during the campaign to one in which we now see increasing emphasis of the Administration on how can we work together. This very dramatic, symbolic measure as Deputy Secretary Armitage went to Beijing last week and put the Shinzang East Kurdistan Liberation Front on the list of terrorist organizations, a focus and a concern that has been of great importance to Beijing and something that is unlikely to have happen in a different kind of context.

Martin will talk about the Middle East, I'm sure, but the way in which our engagement in the Middle East has now been redefined as seeing it through a counterterrorism lens I think is very dramatic.

So I think what we're seeing is a prospective, in sum, the same view about how we should interact with the world but organizing around this new set of definitions of what our interests are.

As to how we're doing, it's early days but my judgment is not different from Andy's view about what I think the American people feel, which is there was an initial sense of the Administration in a very focused way, trying to develop a strategy to deal with the problem of terrorism. I think there was a general sense that the way in which it began, the campaign in Afghanistan was a success. But I think there is a concern now about whether that focus is beginning to be diffused by the concern, the focus on Iraq as opposed to other things which may be more centrally related to the problem of counterterrorism, the difficulty of getting factions with a number of countries in carrying out this fight. Ivo will talk later in the second panel about problems on the homeland security front where defense, focus and momentum I think is still very much in doubt. We've become I think preoccupied with the reorganization problem and not as much focused on the substance problem.

So I think it's a mixed scorecard on how we're doing but I think there are an awful lot of serious

challenges ahead, particularly in the area of how we work with other countries because I think it is critical in the long run if we're going to have a successful antiterrorism strategy we've got to have cooperation from the broadest possible range of other countries, and I think that's what's at issue right now.

MR. DIONNE: I want to comment you, Jim. You have achieved something that has alluded the Administration almost all summer. You've synthesized the views of Cheney, Powell, and Rumsfeld into a coherent whole. Thank you very very much.

[Laughter]

Lael, has September 11th had a profound effect on our economic policies. And you could also talk about our trade policies, as it has on the national security policy.

MS. LAEL BRAINARD: I think there is an important change that is perceived in America's international economic posture, but it's far more subtle than what we've seen on the national security side.

There's been a big change in the public debate in the United States, certainly about foreign aid, slightly less so about trade. There's been a big change in our foreign partners' expectations of us on the international scene, but I believe that there's still a gap between the actual policies on the ground and the nature of the debate here and the expectations abroad.

It's important though to remember what did not happen in the wake of September 11th on international economics. If you think back to World War I, for instance, in the wake of World War I we saw a massive backlash against immigration, against trade, and the world changed. That has not happened despite the prognostications of many experts in the immediate wake of September 11th, and in fact American attitudes towards immigration with exceptions having to do with what they perceive as heightened security groups, and attitudes with regard to trade and even more importantly foreign aid, remain at least as international as they were before and perhaps more so.

In terms of what's actually happened on our economic policies, on trade in the immediate aftermath of September 11th we heard this big patriotism scheme, especially going into the Doha Round or the Doha launch of the WTO round in November of last year and there was this first linkage between trade opening on the one hand, particularly towards the developing world, and national security. That is something that we really hadn't heard to the same degree since the Cold War and it carried the debate certainly in Doha to a certain extent. I'm not sure it had as much impact on the political debate at home. Nonetheless there have been two big movements forward on the trade agenda -- one on the international scene, the decision to move forward on a global round, and one at home. But both of them are procedural.

When it comes to concrete tradeoffs, concrete sectoral concessions to Pakistan on textiles, on farm subsidies, in other important areas like steel safeguards, the actions have actually been very much in tune with domestic politics and out of tune with the need for international coalition building abroad.

Secondly, on the foreign aid front, there we've seen a massive shift in the debate, both on the Republican side and on the Democratic side, going into the Monterey Summit in Mexico President Bush made a very important announcement that U.S./foreign economic aid would double, essentially double by the year 2006, a $5 billion increase per year. That was good news, and we have seen a heightened focus on the same kinds of things. Minority Leader Gephart has called the case for foreign aid a strategic rationale. We haven't heard that kind of debate in awhile. But when it has come to very immediate aid issues, debates over allocations, appropriations in this year for HIV/AIDS for instance. A supplemental request of $500 million was first walked back to $200 million by the Administration and then vetoed and now we're talking $100 million. So when you look through the debate that was going on in Johannesburg over the last few days and you see these positions taken by many of the African representatives there asking show us the money, it's more understandable that there is still skepticism about a gap between rhetoric which has moved and actions which have not moved as quickly.

MR. DIONNE: Thank you very much.

Just on your point of how things have changed, it's unlikely, is it not, that a year and a half ago either Paul O'Neil would have traveled with Bono, or Bono would have traveled with Paul for real, and I just think that has some real as well as symbolic importance. [Laughter]

Martin, Paul Wolfowitz mentioned the Ibrahim case in Egypt. I think it would be helpful if you could talk about, all the hijackers were either from Saudi Arabia or Egypt. One year later, what is the impact of 9/11 on our relations with those two allies and if you could talk more generally about the Arab world.

MR. INDYK: First of all, g'day. [Laughter]

MR. DIONNE: Isn't it great? I love to hear him.

MR. INDYK: I thought that Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz gave a very important speech today but it was particularly noticeable for what he didn't say. In a speech on U.S. relations with the Muslim word, he understandably pointed to the examples of Turkey and Indonesia, but other as E.J. mentioned the reference to Shadin Ibrahim jailing in Egypt, there was not a word said about relations with the Arab part of the Muslim world. That's because the common ground that Paul Wolfowitz spoke about that has been so important to the future of our relations with the Islamic world, in the wake of September 11th it simply does not exist between the United States and the Arab world.

Those small voices that he pointed to were given somewhat of an audience in the Arab world in the immediate aftermath of September 11th when there was some willingness to focus on what went wrong and to try to look at the ills in Arab society. But those voices have effectively been stilled and have certainly not led us to produce any kind of vigorous debate within Arab intellectual circles or in the Arab press.

Instead, I would say that the level of anger is growing on both sides. We're angry because we were attacked, and we feel that not enough is being done in the Arab world to deal with that reality that E.J. mentioned, that the suicide bombers came from the Arab world.

But the Arab people are angry with us in the wake of September 11th. They see the way that we have behaved in the aftermath of September 11th not as so much as a natural act of self defense, but rather as part of what they see as a war that we are now promoting against Islam.

Samuel Huntington's [Crash of] Civilization that book that hardly represents American foreign policy is nevertheless just about the only book that has been translated into Arabic and has been read widely and is believed to be the basis of our policies post September 11th.

Instead of a dialogue being promoted between the United States and the Arab world, what we have is in effect a dialogue of the deaf. We talk, as Paul Wolfowitz did this morning about the need for tolerance and democracy. They talk about our double standards, our unwillingness to support democracy when it comes to the most important countries in the Arab world, Saudi Arabia and Egypt.

We say Iraq; they say Palestine. We say there's no distinction between good and bad terrorism; they say that the Palestinians are fighting to end the occupation, not conduct terrorism. While we say that the Palestinian suicide bombers are homicide bombers killing innocent people; they say it's Israel that are the terrorists. This kind of anger and tension and dialogue of the deaf I think manifests itself most clearly in our relations with our two most important Arab allies, Saudi Arabia and Egypt.

In the case of Saudi Arabia in particular, here is a country in which you would expect that our relationship would be able to adjust because we have such a strong common interest. We in the free flow of their oil at reasonable prices; they in our ability and will to protect them since they live in a very dangerous neighborhood.

But in fact post September 11th the relationship has deteriorated quite dramatically and I think that's something that we should be concerned about.

We want them to take action to dry up what we call the swamp, the funding of terrorist organizations like al Qaeda; the exporting of intolerant, Wahabi religious doctrine that has taken hold much in Saudi Arabia and elsewhere in the Madrasas and schools that they have funded across the Muslim world, in particular in South Asia.

Secondly, we want them to join us in phase two of the war on terrorism, that is the effort to overthrow Saddam Hussein in Iraq.

As far as the first issue is concerned, they're basically in denial as to the problems involved and are extremely reluctant to take significant measures to deal with the problem. And as far as the war on Iraq is concerned, even though they have always been with us in the past when it comes to overthrowing Saddam, they're now saying that we should not do this, that they can't tolerate the regime itself if confirmed. That the U.S. Army occupying Baghdad at the same time the Israeli Army is occupying Ramallah is going to create significant instability across the region and perhaps in Saudi Arabia itself.

Egypt is a slightly different problem but the strains in the relationship are very much there. The example we had this morning from Paul Wolfowitz I think helped to highlight this. Here we have the United States in the wake of September 11th where we've had good cooperation from the Egyptians on the counterterrorism issue, finds itself in the position where it is actually refusing to consider an Egyptian request for an increase in aid even though we're increasing Israel's aid and the Egyptians have always, since Camp David I, think these things go together. This is a way of sending a signal to them that we do not appreciate President Mubarak jailing this democratic voice, Ibrahim.

But there is also a good deal of difference between us and the Egyptian government when it comes to Iraq, or phase two.

So I would say to conclude, one year after September 11th one of our biggest challenges remains how to get the Arab world to deal with the problems in their own society, how to get them to buy onto our agenda of promoting tolerant Islam and fighting terrorism and promoting democracy, and how to listen to their concerns, how to address their charges of double standards, and how to take seriously the issues that I think they do have reason to complain to us about, particularly our lack of engagement on trying to promote peace between Israel and its Arab neighbors,

MR. DIONNE: Thank you very much, and I'm sure we're going to get back specifically to the Israeli/Palestinian conflict.

One of the reasons Mike gets to write so many books is that the government provides lots of material and action for critical analysis. So I'd like to ask Mike two questions. The first is simply how well was the war in Afghanistan waged, successes and failures? And I'd like you to pick up on a point that was implicit in what Jim and Martin said which is the relationship between but also possible contradiction in the broader war on terrorism and a possible war with Iraq. If you could sort of start with Afghanistan and then move a couple of countries over.

MR. MICHAEL E. O'HANLON: Thank you, E.J.

I'm a little more positive on the track record of the campaign in Afghanistan than some of the polling results suggest. There are still some obvious

limitations of this campaign and I think in many ways it's wound down. At this point it's largely an harassment operation against al Qaeda. But I think it was on the whole relatively successful. Again, with a big caveat that I'll get to.

I would divide the war into three main phases. The October/November phase when we drove the Taliban and al Qaeda essentially from power and largely out of the country. The December phase when we were consolidating that effort by the bombing around Tora Bora where I think things did not go as well, although we really don't know. And then the mop-up phase which continues to this day and may be a couple of year long mop-up as things continue as they are at the moment. That's probably inevitable. I'm not sure there's any real alternative.

The first phase I think was waged brilliantly. I think this will go down as one of the most impressive American military campaigns, frankly, of the last 50 if not 100 years. I think last October/November a lot of people felt it would be very hard to dislodge the Taliban from power in Afghanistan, especially in the south where they had support from their fellow Pashtun tribesmen. There was a real possibility and there were seminars given here at Brookings -- not by any Brookings analysts, but by outsiders who predicted the campaign would fail in the south of the country. An important clarification. But I think many of us at Brookings were also uneasy about the pace of the war and were really unsure just how well it would play out, even if it succeeded up north with the Northern Alliance in areas like Mazar-e-Sharif. To the extent that it could succeed in Kandahar was really an open question.

I think the Bush Administration, and not just Donald Rumsfeld but General Franks and also George Tenet got it right. Use the basic strategy of American Special Forces in conjunction with American air power in conjunction, of course, with Afghan resistance forces to try to find just the right political and military footprint on the ground to have enough capability to defeat the Taliban but not so much capability and foreign presence that we incited general Pashtun support for the Taliban when the going got tough. Many people were worried of course that the first thing Afghans would do would be to rally against the foreign invaders. Maybe they never wanted the Taliban to stay in power enough for that to have been a serious concern. Maybe in this case they would have essentially taken our side or taken the side of the Northern Alliance regardless of the details of how we had waged the war, but I actually worried that if we had gone in lighter with a smaller air campaign we could have failed to have the effectiveness needed to make this basic military strategy work, and if we had gone in heavier as people like Bill Crystal were advocating by October, considering ground forces at that point already, we might very well have encouraged the very opposition that we were most afraid of.

So I would say the October/November phase was absolutely brilliant and I'm a big admirer of what happened in that period of time.

But perhaps that success and over-confidence then led to what I think was the biggest mistake of the war in December which was the decision not to use American ground forces and trying to prevent any escape of al Qaeda in the vicinity of Tora Bora. Not only did we, by the way, not put in American ground forces, we told the world that we thought bin Laden was there -- something that Congress is

taking a lot of heat for right now, for having revealed what they knew about our signals intelligence, but actually Vice President Cheney and Pentagon briefers were telling the world we thought bin Laden was in Afghanistan back at that point and one of their main sources of information was the very signals intelligence they were telling the Congress not to talk about publicly. So that's a side issue that I think has actually not been sufficiently scrutinized at this point and it's fairy important.

In any case we told bin Laden we thought he was there, we told him we were coming after him, and then we relied on poorly dressed, poorly motivated Afghan resistance forces in that vicinity to close off escape routes for the Taliban and al Qaeda. These people did not want to stay up in the mountains of Afghanistan in the middle of December without shoes on their feet, and I can't blame them. They didn't have night vision equipment.

The idea that these people are going to prevent escapes by bin Laden and his cohorts during the campaign of December was a fundamental mistake and there were military alternatives that were being analyzed, that were being proposed, that CENTCOM actually looked into that were not utilized. I think this was a mistake perhaps of over-confidence, perhaps of casualty aversion. It boggles my mind to think the United States would not have risked the lives of its ground troops in response to an attack that killed 3,000 American citizens, or 3,000 citizens in general, most of them Americans, here in September of 2001. But I actually think there may have been a certain casualty aversion to risking American forces in that vicinity.

It would have been dangerous to fly them in the bad weather, in the high altitudes. We could have lost dozens of people due to accidents. There's no way to rule out that possibility. But it was still the thing that in my judgment we should have done. So the second phase, the Tora Bora bombing, was not nearly as impressive.

Now bin Laden may still have been killed there for all we know. Bin Laden might have gotten away even if we had put in American ground forces, and I don't want to over-emphasize the importance of bin Laden and his top terrorist cohorts anyway. So maybe even if we had done all the things that I think we should have done, the fundamental course of the campaign would not have been that much different. And I still think the success of October/November was quite impressive regardless of the setbacks in December. But nonetheless, it's a mixed record.

So the mop-up phase has been just that. It's been the sort of low, often frustrating kind of effort you would expect as implied by the term mop-up phase. I think the main mistake we're making now is not to do more of what Secretary Wolfowitz seemed to want to talk about which was nationbuilding. He was very proud, and rightly so, of many of the accomplishments in nationbuilding that have occurred in Afghanistan since our war effort began, but he of course by implication, you might have thought we would have been doing even more, trying to consolidate the rule of law in the rest of the country, and I don't see why we haven't gotten to that point already. Certainly we can find several thousand American forces to contribute to that effort. Certainly with a good role model playing effort we can convince our allies to do the same. I don't see why we have made this mistake. I think it's a fundamental mistake to

have ISAF concentrated just in Kabul.

Nonetheless, the mop-up operation has kept al Qaeda off balance and I think it's been on the whole reasonably good.

I realize I've already used up a fair amount of time, E.J. so I'll maybe just begin the Iraq discussion, touch on it as my colleagues have, by saying the main point I would want to drive home if we go to war against Saddam Hussein is that you have to see this as a large military operation. Martin and Phil Gordon and I have just been writing about this in Survival. I think it's essential to think of this as a large operation for a number of reasons that I'll just tick off and then stop for now.

One of which is you want the Iraqi military to be intimidated. You want to split off the conscripts from the Republican Guard at a bare minimum and you would, of course, like to have the Republican Guard itself so intimidated that it quickly falls once they see the inevitability of their demise.

You don't create that kind of intimidation factor by talking about 30,000, 50,000 American elite forces testing out some new style of combat by a small operation into the heart of Baghdad. We're very good at urban combat, but we're not as good as we are at desert combat. The idea that we can go in and out-muscle an Iraqi military of 425,000 active duty strength with 50,000 elite American forces is betting unnecessarily and risking the lives of those 50,000 American troops unnecessarily, and increasing the chances that Saddam will be able to convince his forces to fight for him because they will think, without complete lack of justification, that they actually had a chance to win. You don't want to fight this war with a small American force.

Moreover, you have to envision an occupation where you try to hold Iraq together. You have to send messages to the Turks that you're not going to encourage an independent Kurdistan. You have to send messages to the rest of the region that you're not inviting a competition for spoils. You have to envision this as a major, quick victory followed by a serious stabilization campaign otherwise you're not going to get the regional support you need and you're not going to have the chances of intimidating the Republican Guard into quickly folding and collapsing which of course should be our top battle goal.

So if you're going to do this you have to do it big. That means you're going to need a quarter million American forces, plus or minus; you're going to need three or four months to build this force up even once you've secured the bases; and therefore if this is going to be a winter war in 2003 it's going to have to begin to be prepared very very soon.

MR. DIONNE: Thank you very much. You've put a lot of issues on the table.

I want to follow up on Iraq with Andy. Two things have struck me looking at data, your data and others. One is there appears to have been a decline over the last couple of months of public support for an invasion. There still is a

majority for war against Iraq. But on almost all the polls I've seen, as soon as some qualifier is added to the polling question, would you still be for it if we did it alone and without allies; would you still be for it if it required a certain amount of time, the support for the war drops again by at least a quarter, that is to say at least a quarter of those who initially support the war develop doubts.

What is your sense of the direction of opinion and how, given where public opinion is, what kind of arguments do you expect to hear from both sides?

MR. KOHUT: I think it's not surprising that the numbers in Gallup and ABC, Washington Post on basic support for use of force in Iraq have gone down because the public has mostly heard about criticisms about a potential war. They've heard not a great deal from President Bush, and that was one of the messages in this poll. In the end, it's the President who has to sell war and he hasn't sold war yet.

As to these questions that qualify public support, we asked these kind of questions ourselves, they're a little bit unfair because they only ask about the downside, casualties. They don't also ask about rationales for going to war as opposed to, pitting the upside against the downside. They talk about would you favor it if it meant thousands of questions. A different kind of question might say would you favor if it meant thousands of casualties even though the prospect for Saddam Hussein having nuclear weapons is very great, or something that balances off just the cost and not the benefits of doing this.

In a funny way I'm struck by how much support there is for a war when you raise the question of casualties without raising the question of rewards. I think Bush does have the ability to get the American public to accept casualties, a significant number of casualties. The public doesn't have an endless appetite and disposition to do this, but this is an American public that really has a different point of view about the use of force than was the case prior to September 11th, and that's really apparent in the polls about Iraq.

MR. DIONNE: I'm counting on you to ask all those questions in your coming surveys.

I don't' want to turn to the audience without turning to both Martin and Jim to talk briefly about the Israeli/Palestinian conflict. That is something that I think has gotten demonstrably worse of the last year. Could you talk about that briefly each of you?

MR. INDYK: It certainly has gotten demonstrably worse. We saw in the wake of September 11th a significant increase in the incidents of suicide bombings and the effectiveness of them in terms of large-scale attacks on Israeli civilians.

We also saw in response the Israeli army going back into the West Bank cities and towns first of all for a major operation, and then secondly it chose to reoccupy where they are now and take complete control of security within the areas that were supposed to be under the control of the Palestinian Authority. We've also seen the virtual collapse of the Palestinian Authority, certainly of the security forces many of whom have gone over to the terrorist campaign.

Having said all of that I think what we have noticed in the last four to six weeks is a significant decline in the incidents of terrorism and this is partly a function of the fact that the Israelis are now reoccupying Palestinian main centers of population. But I think it's also a product of the exhaustion factor. On both sides. The Palestinians and Israelis are exhausted by this Intafada that's gone on for two years. But on the Palestinian side in particular, that exhaustion and the fact that much of the West Bank population is now under curfew has created a debate amongst Palestinians with the main representatives, the nationalist group, arguing to the Islamic terrorist organizations that it's time to stop. We saw that very clearly in terms of the new Ministry of Interior, General [Yakia] coming out and saying strongly, publicly, what he's been saying in private to these groups which is we have to stop the violence and the terrorism.

I think there is a reckoning now in Palestinian society, an understanding that this has brought disaster upon them and it's very clear in an open letter that's been written by a former Minister to Arafat that's just been published in the last couple of days, detailing this kind of criticism.

It's matched by something that Sharon has said over the last couple of days in which he kind of quietly declared victory by saying the Palestinians have come to understand that violence and terror won't get them anywhere and he's let slip that a senior
Palestinian has contacted him wanting to resume the negotiations. He is thereby beginning to lay the groundwork for a political engagement by himself personally in trying to create some political way out of this.

So actually, although the news has been horrendously bad for much of the year since September 11th, we now see, I think for the first time, a glimmer of light at the end of that tunnel, albeit dimmed by the fact that the terrorists are still out there. This morning the Israelis found a very large explosive car, loaded with explosives, and there's always the potential for that to go on. But I think the trend is now clear out of the Intafada and back to some kind of negotiation.

MR. DIONNE: That is the most optimistic view I've heard in months which means it can't possibly be true. [Laughter]

MR. STEINBERG: In line with our theme, I think the way in which the Administration has approached the Middle East problem since September 11th is really a dramatic illustration of the way in which the counterterrorism framework has defined the way we see the international landscape. It's very clear.

I think one of the most dramatic illustrations was in April after the Israelis went into the West Bank and we had the President for the first time sort of stepping into the Middle East problem, calling very specifically for a withdrawal of the Israeli forces from the West Bank. There was an immediate outcry, especially by conservatives in the United States saying the President had lost his moral clarity, that he had failed to see the problem that the Israelis were facing as the equivalent of what we were

facing from al Qaeda and that we ought to be of the same view that just as we were prepared to use force to the extreme to deal with our terrorist threats that the Israelis ought to be supported in the same kind of approach to their problem of terrorism. And in the space of 72 hours the Administration policy changed dramatically. All of a sudden it was no longer that they had to pull out immediately, but they had to pull out basically when they had finished doing what they had set out to do.

I think since that time it's been very clear and in the President's sort of major speech since that time outlining the overall approach that the President does not want to allow the optics that we are using to deal with this problem to stray too far from the optics that the Administration wants to use on the overall war on terrorism which is that they are with us or against us, it's a very black and white, good and evil framework, and that we I think made it very clear we could not deal with -- Not only would we not criticize the Israelis for using force to deal with the problem of terrorism but that we would not deal at all with those who were "tainted" by terrorism on the Palestinian side. I think that's a really dramatic illustration.

It's also shown I think one of the great, deep problems between the United States and our allies. Just as the President's initial statement in April about Israeli restraint was very welcome by the Europeans, I think there's a deep division now about how we're pursuing our strategy to try to help support the peace process between the Israelis and the Palestinians in the way in which the Europeans and the U.S. sees it. The Europeans I think support the general idea that we should see reform among the Palestinians, but they think this needs to be a more, in their view, more balanced approach and that it can't be seen exclusively through the terrorism lens.

MR. DIONNE: Thank you very much. Mort Kondraki?

QUESTION: Urban warfare. We have the vision of having to take Baghdad. How could it be done and what would the casualty levels be like?

MR. O'HANLON: A tough question but an important question.

I think the best model is a much smaller scale, but to give some first approximation to your good question is the 1989 invasion of Panama. Of course a much smaller country, we had U.S. military bases in the country before the invasion so it almost didn't count in that sense. But the basic approach of taking down a number of objectives simultaneously, quickly, and with an overwhelming sort of shock operation I think is the basic approach you would want to use in Baghdad. That would be tempered in this case by the fact that you have to deploy a quarter of a million people in advance and then begin to move them towards the city.

But once you get in position I think what you try to do is to take major military infrastructure, major command and control facilities, major government ministries, you try to seize these facilities. You have some options depending on where they're located in the city, whether you try to move in using armored forces through streets or whether you try to move in using helicopters and airborne forces. The

latter obviously is quite dangerous in a city where the Iraqi military is much better armed with anti-aircraft weaponry than the Mogadishu militias were in 1993 and they still managed, of course, to shoot down a couple of our helicopters.

So you have to be very careful and nervous about how close will you bring helicopters and airborne forces into this sort of vicinity. But if you're able to use air power, use night fighting techniques to limit the Iraqis' ability to reinforce whatever point you attack, you may be able to use some air operations in certain cases.

But it's going to be a tough one and there's no doubt that there will be an ability for Iraqi forces to shoot down low-flying airplanes in some situations, to ambush our forces as they move through streets where Iraqis are hiding, get the ability to have the first shot at us, the sort of thing they generally could not do in Desert Storm, but they will be able to do in this sort of a battle, get the first shot.

I think when you put it all together even factoring in our excellent abilities in urban combat which are often under-appreciated but still quite good, you have to assume that we're going to lose several thousand people potentially, if the Iraqis fight hard.

I'm trying to give an upper bound. I think that's a relatively and reasonably worst case scenario, losing several thousand Americans killed in action.

I would expect the numbers could be more likely into the hundreds and maybe into a couple of thousand, and maybe they will be very low if the Iraqis crumble. That's part of why you have to try this approach with a big force.

The benefits of going in small, whatever surprise that buys you, I think are too limited because it's not going to be a real surprise in any case. Therefore, you want to go in big and try to intimidate the Iraqis into not fighting very long.

One final quick point, chemical weapons. I think the Iraqis would certainly have an incentive to consider using these, but I think the greater effect of chemical weapons may simply be for us to have to prepare against their possible use we're going to have to operate in protective gear and bring along decontamination equipment. That's going to make our operations more cumbersome. U.S. military personnel don't do a lot of their infantry training with chemical protective gear on. It slows you down, it makes it hard to fire your rifle, harder to carry your supplies. I think the effect of chemical weapons may be less in the direct casualties they cause than in the added preparations and added cautions they induce in our operations.

So on the whole I think we would win this battle. I think we would win it relatively quickly. But I think it could be some of the bloodiest fighting in American military history since Vietnam and probably on a scale with Vietnam for the duration during which it occurs, but I hope it wouldn't last more than a few weeks of this intensive phase.

MR. DIONNE: To follow upon that, it seems to me a lot of the argument over Iraq, part of it is based on an assessment of whether their army would or would not crumble. That assessment seems often based as much on faith as on analysis.

How do you assess in practical terms the likelihood that they will crumble versus the likelihood that they won't? How is someone outside that debate to make any sense of it?

MR. O'HANLON: It's a hard question and I'm glad you put it that way, E.J., because I think often what is voice is just belief, or worst case or best case thinking.

I think the first thing to say is you have to assume they will fight. Anything else is irresponsible. And if they're not going to fight it's going to be because they're intimidated and sure of their demise if they do. The only way you guarantee that or increase the chances of that is to go in with a big force.

The second thing to say is you have to distinguish within the Iraqi military between two broad categories of troops. The regular conscript army which is a majority of the 425,000 which is not very good, not very loyal to Saddam, and the Republican Guard and Special Republican Guard which are actually not that bad. They're pretty mediocre but they're not that bad. And the line that Ken Adelman always tossed out about how Iraqi forces surrendered to Italian film crews in Desert Storm does not apply to the Republican Guard. They fought even when they were getting pummeled and they fought longer than they probably wisely should have against American ground forces during that campaign and they escaped in many ways largely unscathed as we've all known and revisited the history since then to question whether the decision was correct to stop the war as soon as we did.

So the Republican Guard, Special Republican Guard. This is about 100,000 people. They're pretty loyal to Saddam. They're at least a passable military. And you combine that with the advantages of fighting in an urban setting where our high technology does not buy us as much, and they could be a serious force to be reckoned with. Not a serious enough force to cause any doubt about the outcome, but a serious enough force that you can't talk about this being a casual, quick win.

MR. DIONNE: Mike's book on the Iraqi military will not fly off the shelves with the title "Pretty Mediocre". [Laughter]

QUESTION: Two points. In the Gulf War it took six months and the help of our allies in the Middle East and all of NATO and it nearly exhausted our logistic capacity to build up to the Desert Storm invasion force. So I would argue that it's completely unrealistic when Mr. O'Hanlon says to put in a force of 250,000 or more in three or four months preparation. It would take at least a year, maybe more, considering that we would not have the cooperation of either our NATO or our MidEastern allies.

A second point is, I agree with Mr. O'Hanlon about his praise for the right amount of force, not

too little to avoid defeating the Taliban, not too much to engage the nationalist energies of the Afghans. Why is that not a considered approach to the problem of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq? After all, our real goal is to destroy the weapons of mass destruction and there is reason to believe that could be done by a combination of Special Forces and air power at a much smaller scale than a big invasion of Iraq that is not likely to receive a lot of allied or public American support. It's at least worthy of equal consideration with a massive invasion and might achieve our objectives more speedily.

MR. DIONNE: This gentleman also up here. I was thinking as you were talking it's the Goldilocks imperative -- not too much, not too little, just right. [Laughter]

QUESTION: I have question to all of you. If anyone has justification for the fact that we have not national [inaudible] September 11th.

MR. DIONNE: Let me start with Mike briefly for that gentleman's question.

QUESTION: And why this question is not among questions in the survey.

MR. DIONNE: When you investigate what happened, are you talking about what happened with our intelligence and the FBI and all of that?

QUESTION: Everything.

MR. O'HANLON: Two points, very quickly. Without simply reiterating my belief that we can do this in three to four months there is a fundamental uncertainty that I would acknowledge which is the limited capacity of ports and airfields in the Middle East once you factor the Saudis out of the equation as we apparently may have to do.

I still believe you can do this in a few months time, largely because we have the kinds of ships that are very good at unloading themselves, roll-on/roll-off ships. But there is admittedly a concern about the ability to unload at airfields and this could slow us down. The six-month deployment, as you know, was done largely in two main phases and we're talking now about deploying 250,000 American forces as contrasted with 550,000 in the Gulf. So I think the basic proposition that this may be doable in three or four months is still sound, but we do have to worry about port and airfield capacities.

One more reason why I would really like to find a way to get the Saudis behind this operation, and one more argument for sort of an ultimatum strategy as opposed to a unilateral decision to go to war strategy, but I'll leave that for Martin and others in a future question if you want to bring it up again.

On the issue of Special Forces raids, the problem is we don't know where the stuff is. You do that, you're inviting the Iraqis to go ahead and attack your Special Forces and quite possibly to do pretty well at it.

If you have a very risky strategy one thing you might want try to do is lure the Iraqis into attacking your Special Forces so you can then counter-attack them with air power if they don't fully appreciate what we can do in that situation. But I worry that they actually do know what we can do in that situation based on Desert Storm, and if we're going after weapons of mass destruction sites, a lot of them are going to be in the cities where we have a hard time protecting our forces from counter-reinforcement with air power alone. The Iraqis are going to be able to move forces through the streets and go to the sites where we've attacked and counter-attack us.

Moreover, they're going to protect those sites very well with anti-aircraft artillery and with surface-to-air missiles. I just think you're asking for trouble. I want to either do this right or not do it all, myself.

MR. INDYK: A couple of quick points. One is it's not a good comparison to say it took us six months last time in 1990 because a lot has happened since then in terms of our gaining access and prepositioning of materiel and troops out in the Gulf. We probably have 50,000 troops already there in the vicinity. Some reports suggest even up to 100,000 deployed around the area. Don't forget forces have been deployed to neighboring Afghanistan and that region.

So we've got a lot of stuff that's already there or more easily deployable to the region because of a lot of things that were done post 1990, in the ten years since then that laid a basis for a much much quicker deployment than we had at that time.

A second point I'd like to make about tactics, and I'm not a military expert, but I think as well as what Mike argues about the psychological imperative of having a large force to try to produce the crumbling which is the best way to achieve a quick victory with limited casualties, is we have to at the same time be aware of the consequences of reliance on air power which could cause a lot of civilian casualties on the Iraqi side which could immensely complicate our situation in the broader Arab world.

The broader Arab world doesn't care about Saddam Hussein and would just as soon see him gone. But they do care about the Iraqi people. He's managed over the last decade to build a lot of sympathy for the plight of the Iraqi people. It will be a heavily media intensive coverage of this war and largescale civilian casualties is something that we need to avoid as much as possible.

MR. DIONNE: Let me give a sort of order of things because we are running out of time. I would like Andy briefly to answer the gentleman's question because I think it is interesting why there has not been more pressure for more investigations.

Then I want to turn to Lael because I want to come back to trade

If people out there promise to ask very short questions I'd like to get a few more voices in. Then the panel could conclude because we're going to have to move on to the next.

Andy, if you could first give a brief answer to that gentleman's good question.

MR. KOHUT: There has been a lot of polling on this issue and the American public thinks to a certain extent we were asleep on the job. But most of this polling finds the public thinking that hindsight is 20/20 and these attacks could not have been prevented on the basis of the intelligence that was not heeded, intelligence warning that was not heeded.

MR. DIONNE: And that reduces the pressure to investigate because whatever we found we couldn't have prevented.

MR. KOHUT: Yes.

MR. STEINBERG: Jim Lindsey, another colleague and I, have written a piece about this arguing that we should have this investigation. I think it is important. I think the fact, the Congress has not been able to handle this very well. The Intelligence Committee is really all balled up in trying to figure out how to look at this question, that we've become distracted by the Department of Homeland Security organization, and some of the real issues about how we think about this problem. I think there was a lot of good work done by commissions prior to September 11th, not all of which was heeded. I think there really is a very compelling case, and I'm not sure that this will entirely go away. There are still a number of members of Congress who think this needs to be done. I think that right now we're willing to give the existing congressional panel some crack at this but I think the country deserves that kind of outside look,

MR. KOHUT: Jim, there's very little public appetite for recriminations.

MR. STEINBERG: I agree with that but I don't think it's a question of recrimination. I think it's a question of a substantive need for us to look at it which is very hard for the institutions themselves that are involved, including Congress, to give us the kind of not backward looking but forward looking question of are we really ready to deal with the threat.

I think the experts who are dealing with this problem believe that we are in dire danger right now. That we are at great risk for further attacks, and the implications to this country if there are further attacks are going to be I think far more dramatic than the first ones. That's why I think it's not so much trying to reconstruct what happened, but thinking about what is the strategy going forward.

MR. DIONNE: I've been surprised that the call for a national commission seems to have receded and I suspect you may be right that it will come back.

Lael, one of the things that's happened, you talked about a sort of greater emphasis on internationalism, but there were the small matters of steel and the farm bill. What has that done to our relationships with the rest of the world not only on trade, but on these broader issues that we're talking about.

MS. BRAINARD: I think the world sort of looks at the United States in the wake of September 11th and scratches its head because the dominant characteristic is inconsistency. We came out of September 11th onto Doha. We must have a round, and did in fact make a few concession for instance on allowing the world to put negotiations on antidumping on the table which was a huge one from the U.S. Congress' point of view, and came back to bite the Administration in the debate over trade promotion authority.

But subsequent to that there were some interesting moves that were taken by the Administration that gutted any seeming internationalist tendencies.

First in the trade promotion debate in the House, the way that the vote was won by a single Republican vote which we essentially walked back textile commitments that had been made already to the Caribbean, a very impoverished region of the world.

Secondly, a massive safeguards case was taken by the Administration, very unusual for an Administration to initiate a safeguards case, with rather sweeping implications for steel access into this market.

Subsequent to that, of course, that action has been slightly walked back by an Administration that was looking at potential massive immediate retaliation from the Europeans and the Japanese.

So a little bit of question mark now among the domestic groups saying hey, is this protection for us or in fact is this just a political compromise that could disappear tomorrow?

Then of course on the farm subsidies bill, the U.S. is in a good position in Doha because agriculture access is one of the most important development issues for Africa, for India, for a lot of most important developing nations. And quickly, thereafter, a massive increase in farm subsidies came out of the U.S. Congress and the Administration signed it without first caveating how they would go forward on their commitments in the WTO while at the same time raising farm subsidies.

So what we've seen is African leaders who have come to the G8 have now come to the Johannesburg Summit expecting to engage in this new partnership based on trade and investment, are asking how is it possible that our agricultural products can compete? Yes, they're giving us market access but it is more than offset by these big increases in subsidies.

The subsidies in the developed countries right now to the farm sector alone, before the increase in the U.S. farm bill was more than the total annual income of sub-Saharan Africa.

So the picture that emerges I think for the developing countries is, so what's the reality here? So far I think quite skeptical.

MR. DIONNE: Thank you very very much.

QUESTION: History of war has shown that weapons of mass destruction have been used with a smaller degree or a bigger degree. Now is the war against Saddam Hussein and Iraq is being unleashed because we will aid al Qaeda or is aiding al Qaeda with weapons of mass destruction? Or to prevent him from using the weapons of mass destruction in case of war?

QUESTION: A quick question and that has to do with the notion of the President making the case for war. The question is, is this simply a matter of sort of a formal rhetorical matter that the President makes the case for war and therefore the case for war is made? Or does the President have to think more in terms of the way in which the case for war, loosely put, in October of 1962 [sic] was made? Does he need to bring new information and a genuinely new perspective to the table, or is it just simply a formal rhetorical matter?

QUESTION: I'd like to ask Lael if she'd care to speculate on the effects an invasion of Iraq would have on oil prices and on the world economy and subsequently the value of the Brookings endowment. [Laughter]

MR. DIONNE: Let's start with that, a terrible critical question.

MS. BRAINARD: Let me just be careful to caveat that Brookings is not taking its position on whether we should go to war with Iraq based on the impact on the endowment, although we all care about our salaries.

I think the story on the economy has been predominantly one driven by domestic factors to this point. The bursting of the tech bubble, questions about appropriate governance, and some spillover from the international point. Some sectoral dislocations in particular like airlines, like insurance, and some questions about the Administration's ability to sort of walk and chew gum at the same time in terms of handling a war plus grappling with this corporate malfeasance crisis.

But clearly discussions with people on Wall Street suggest that some of the uncertainty afflicting the market does have to do with the potential for higher oil prices going into a war with Iraq.

So while I wouldn't suggest that that would be the dominant thing at this point, there is some question as to whether that's the next knock-on effect that would continue to postpone recovery.

QUESTION: On these other two gentlemen's questions and any closing remarks. Jim?

MR. STEINBERG: I think what's interesting about the issue of the President's rationale here is it will have I think more than the usual impact because how he defines why we're doing this has a lot to do with how we will end up doing it. That is to say the more this is defined in terms of dealing with the problems of weapons of mass destruction the more the President I think is going to be driven to have to

answer the question of those who say why don't you try inspection, why don't you try to look at some of these options that are focused on weapons of mass destruction. And the more that the President makes the broader rational, it's too dangerous, he's gassed his own people, it would make the region more stable to have him out, the more it will point towards a unilateral response because first of all the inspectors would not solve that problem; and second, it's a rationale which will not be accepted by anybody else among our allies, although maybe tacitly by others in the Middle East, will not be one that they can embrace.

So I do think in this case it is going to be more than a question of just saying we need to do this because we need to do this. I think one of the reasons why the Administration has had such a hard time getting the President out front is they haven't quite made up their mind about exactly which of the many rationales they might want to use as the principal one they want us in there.

MR. DIONNE: Andy, will any old rationale due or does he need a good one?

MR. KOHUT: I think the case of the war in 1990, and you see a very clear building of a rationale on the part of the first Bush Administration with the American public, and it's not a matter of getting up and saying we have to do this. The President has to give a really concrete reason for risking the lives of potentially thousands of American service people and also give the American public some sense that this decision is not being made in isolation, or the Administration is not doing it alone without Congress, without some sense of world participation. And all of those factors helped in 1990 and 1991 and I think they have to be in play here for the President to really get the public on its side and take that latent support and make it real.

MR. DIONNE: Quick last words from Michael and Martin?

MR. O'HANLON: I'll defer to the guy with the nice accent. [Laughter]

MR. INDYK: I'll defer to you too, but before I do -- [Laughter]

I think that one of the interesting things about what Andy and Jim say about the need to develop this debate and the rationale is that when you combine that with Andy's figures about the drop in support when we look like we're doing it unilaterally as opposed to working with alliances is going to drive the Administration in the direction that Jim was talking about to making the case for inspections. In fact Colin Powell has already embarked on that course. If we can do that successfully, it's a big question in my mind, but if we can do that successfully, if we can garner some international support and a plausible justification -- plausible beyond our own borders -- that will make it easier for us to garner support in the Arab world that we will need in terms of access to bases.

If this also coincides with a more serious effort on our part to take advantage of the lull I've described in the Israeli/Palestinian front and do something there, expectations in the Arab world have been significantly reduced as a result of our inaction, so we wouldn't have to do very much to actually

check the box there. We could in fact ease the concerns of our Arab allies going into this war with Iraq in a way that could garner their support.

So basically what I'm saying is there is a way of doing this that can get popular support here, congressional support, some international support and Arab support as well, but it's going to require a concerted approach by an Administration that I'm afraid is deeply divided about all of these issue.

MR. DIONNE: I want to thank this panel very much. As my favorite television chef Emeril Lagasse from my home town, he always likes to say let's kick it up a level. Thank you all for kicking these conversations up a level.

Please give them a round of applause. We'll take a five minute break and then bring up the new panel.

[Applause]

[Recess]

MR. DIONNE: Sorry for the brief break, but we went long on the other panel and I don't want to short-change our colleagues here.

Let me introduce this distinguished panel and we're going to be focusing more on domestic issues though it's not inconceivable that somebody in the audience will still want to talk about the issues raised in the first panel, notably Iraq. Ivo is always ready to talk about Iraq.

Tom Mann is the W. Averell Harriman Chair and Senior Fellow in Governmental Studies at the Brookings Institution. Between 1987 and 1999 he was Director of the Governmental Studies Program. Before that, Tom was Executive Director of the American Political Science Association. He too, like so many people on these panels, is the author of many many books and many of us here were drawn to Brookings because of Tom Mann, and I'm one of those people. So bless you Tom, and thank you.

Ivo Daalder is Senior Fellow in Foreign Policy Studies at Brookings where he also holds the Sidney Stein Chair in International Security. He is a frequent commentator on current affairs. Those of us who write OpEd columns worry all the time about his competition. He's very good at that. He is a specialist in foreign policy. Prior to joining Brookings Ivo was an Associate Professor at the University of Maryland School of Public Affairs. In 1995 and 1996 he served as Director for European Affairs on President Clinton's National Security Council Staff.

Peter Orszag is the Joseph A. Pechman Senior Fellow in Economic Studies at Brookings. He previously served as Special Assistant to the President for Economic Policy in the White House. It's beginning to have the feel of a government in exile here somehow, which is often the case here with both

parties. He was a Senior Economist and Senior Advisor on the President's Council of Economic Advisors and he was an Economic Advisor to the Russian government as well as an adjunct member of the Economics faculty at the University of California at Berkeley. He too gives one a great running on the OpEd issues and he speaks more sense on the budget issues than just about anyone I know.

Finally but not lastly, Isabel Sawhill, a Senior Fellow in Economic Studies at Brookings. She co-directs the Welfare Reform and Beyond Initiative. She also directs the Brookings Roundtable on Children. Prior to joining Brookings she was a Senior Fellow at the Urban Institute. She was an Associate Director of the Office of Management and Budget from 1993 to 1995. I want to honor her for her work as President of the National Campaign to Prevent Teen Pregnancy. That is one of those rare non-profits that can actually look at the numbers and count an enormous amount of success from the time the organization was started until the present.

I'd like to start if I could with Ivo. Again, the simple questions are the best questions. Are we safer now than we were on September 10th of last year?

MR. IVO H. DAALDER: That has a short answer with a long explanation. The answer is yes. But is it because of what happened on September 11th? Not particularly what the U.S. government has done since September 11th.

On September 11th we all remember where we were. We all remember what we saw on television. There are 200 million other Americans, minus the ones that are here, who remember what happened on that day. As a result, these people, you and I, are taking actions that we weren't taking on September 10th that makes us safer.

When we see a piece of luggage in an airport lounge we go to personnel who may want to investigate that piece of luggage and we take that kind of action. Constantly. We're on guard, we're aware of what happens. We are willing to suffer greater intrusion in our lives as we go through airport lines and security checkpoints. In that sense we are safer. We have made the lives of the terrorists and their ability to operate in our society more difficult than was the case on September 11th.

We're on edge in a way that we weren't on September 10th.

More importantly, the people who have some responsibility for dealing with terrorism, for preventing them from being able to do us harm are protecting the sites that are important. These first defenders if you want to call them that -- the firemen, the policemen, the doctors and hospital workers who look for infectious diseases, the border agents who are monitoring who comes into this country, the Coast Guard which protects our force. The Coast Guard has increased its port security activity by 800 percent over the past year.

These people are doing their job in ways they weren't doing it on September 10th because of what happened on September 11th. They now know in a way that nothing else could have prepared the

country for, they now know what it means to be attacked and that I think has made our country safer, it makes our country more secure. It's not anything, however that the government has done.

I would argue that the government in fact has failed to focus on this problem and despite all the talk, despite all the money, despite all that has been happening, the government hasn't really focused in the kind of way that it needs to be focused to deal with the threat of terrorism.

It's done three big things and in all three I think it has fallen short. It has put a budget forward to increase spending on homeland security, the FY 2003 budget. It has proposed the creation of a Department of Homeland Security. And it has put out a national strategy for homeland security. All three I think fall far short of what needs to be done.

On the budget, that budget was basically organized to fight the last war. To prevent another September 11th. We in this country are spending $6.8 billion this year on improving airport security. I'm all in favor of making airports more secure, but airport security and terrorism was an issue that for practical purposes was solved within about 45 minutes of the second airplane hitting the trade center. That is when Flight 93 was taken down by the passengers. No airplane in this country is ever again going to be hijacked and allowed to be able to go into a chemical plant or a nuclear plant or a building because the crew won't let it happen and the passengers won't let it happen. So the worst thing that can happen is a disaster involving the people actually in that airplane and perhaps those who are on the ground, God forbid that it falls into a city. That's horrendous, but it is nothing compared to what can happen. We're paying $6.8 billion to improve security which has already been done by the fact that 280 million Americans, and many others in fact, are already first defenders.

We're not paying any money for making sure that the containers, 16 million of which come into this country each year, are safe and secure. That is the kind of misappropriation of funds, misappropriation of direction that is deeply worrisome.

We are spending in that budget a lot on first responders. The only thing that worked on September 11th, the only thing that worked was first responders. They saved many many thousands of people. There were things that went wrong among the first responders. The fact that firefighters and the NYPD didn't talk to each other. There were no policemen lost in the towers because they had all been pulled out, but 300-some firemen who didn't have the communication capability stayed there. That was a major mistake. We need to improve, there's lots of work to be done. But we didn't prevent the terrorists, we did very well on first response, and yet we're spending a lot of money on first response and we're not spending enough, in fact we're not spending nearly enough on the question of how to deal with preventing terrorism.

The second big thing that the Administration has done is the Department of Homeland Security. A proposal to merge 22 disparate agencies doing as many different things as you and I can think of the U.S. government does and put them in a new building with a new seal. It's not a well thought out idea. We have done many analyses of this in Brookings to demonstrate that it's not a well thought out idea. It

was driven by politics. It was driven to get the national commission, quite frankly, off the table. It was announced on the same day that the FBI agent in Minnesota was testifying on the Hill. Those are the kinds of compromises on which, coincidences on which policy is made.

I can go into great detail on DHS and its proposal but the fundamental factor that if you want to take 170,000, in fact probably 210,000 people and reorganize where they live, you're adding a massive task on your hands that's going to take you two to three years to complete at which time you are not spending time on your day job.

Let's remember, the man in charge today, the only single person responsible aside from the President for coordinating and leading and mobilizing the effort for homeland security, Mr. Tom Ridge, has not been doing his day job since June 6th when the President put his proposal on the table. He has been spending all his time convincing you, me, and the Hill and the media that the Department of Homeland Security is a good idea. Who is protecting this country right now when Mr. Ridge is spending all his time convincing Mr. Lieberman that we need civil service repaired rules?

Finally, the national strategy that was announced after, not before, after the Department of Homeland Security was put out. It is a thing that we at Brookings could have written in a week, in fact we wrote it in a week. When we put out in April our own national risk strategy, we had more ideas about how to do this than that document that came out at the time. It is a laundry list that has no priorities. It is not a strategy, because strategies need priorities. I read that document, you read it, 80 pages, and you tell me where to spend the next marginal dollars. It won't give you the answer. It is in that sense a good document with lots of things that we need to do, but not a very helpful document in terms of what our priorities ought to be.

That's what this nation has done in a year. It's a problem. We need to have a much more focused effort in the next two years, in the next few months in fact, than we have so far because ultimately 280 million first defenders make us safer than we are on September 10th, but not safe enough unless the U.S. government does what it needs to do.

MR. DIONNE: Thank you very much. You should all know that Ivo has reserved his more critical comments until later in the program. [Laughter]

I want to ask Tom Mann, are there any signs that 9/11 has led to fundamental changes in politics? How many of all the grand changes we talked about a year ago have simply gone away?

MR. THOMAS E. MANN: If you think back to the searing events of 9/11 and the aftermath and the weekends that followed, we saw as dramatic a set of changes in American politics and government as we have seen in many decades. An extraordinary rally effect for the President, for the Congress, for government. An abrupt shift in the agenda. A radical reshaping of the Bush presidency, both its purpose, its weight, its coalitional strategy, and altered

relations among party leaders within and between the branches.

That led at least some of us to look longingly to the possibility of some enduring changes in our politics as a result of 9/11, all the while suspecting that broad forces that inexorably shape our politics would slowly reassert themselves.

What were our hopes? Well, we thought maybe we'd raise the stakes of the public debate in this country. Maybe a little less scandal talk and a little more talk about real problems that affect our security and well being. We thought maybe we can slow the permanent campaign, the artificiality of everyone trying to shape public opinion to advance their own well-conceived political agenda. Maybe we can re-engage citizens in public affairs after decades of withdrawal and disengagement.

MR. DIONNE: I'm afraid of where this is going. [Laughter]

MR. MANN: Maybe we can diminish the intense ideologic al polarization between the political parties that's developed in recent years. Maybe we can end the partisan standoff that's given us a 50/50 country and denied us an opportunity for a genuine party realignment that would put in place a governing coalition capable of advancing its agenda. Maybe we could have more genuinely constructive relations between the President and the Congress.

Now I'm not saying any of us longed for some artificial sterile consensus, absence of vigorous debate or of spirited electoral competition. We just wanted and hoped to see some improvement in the fabric in the quality of our public lives.

I think there have been some improvements. Just to show you it's not -- Before I get to my punch line. There have been some encouraging signs. We were reminded how well our constitutional system works in the face of a genuine crisis and threat. We come together, we do what we have to do. The President and the Congress fulfill their roles and responsibilities and those early months were really quite successful.

I think on the reengagement side there have been some genuine efforts now bipartisan to support a service agenda for this country and broader support for Americorps and other things than we've seen before.

If you look at some of the experiences in the primaries, you see the candidates whose trademark is outrageousness, who didn't fare very well, whether it be Bob Barr on the right or Cynthia McKinney on the left. There are kind of certain standards that we expect now, don't mess with 9/11 and the images and the patriotism in the sense of national unity associated with it. So there are some encouraging signs. But anyone looking on our politics over the last six months has to see the obvious signs of a return to normalcy in American politics. While the stakes have been raised on some issues, on others we see a return to the micro-agenda. I now see, in spite of the fact that there has not been an increase in the kidnapping and abuse of children, the fact that it was on the news agenda meant that the conservative Bush Administration had to have a program for this and a registry and the like. It reminds

one of the Clinton many agenda that came after the 1994 election. If you listen to some of the debates you'll get discouraged.

The permanent campaign has been accelerated, not slowed. George Bush makes Bill Clinton look like a piker when it comes to the permanent campaign. Signs of participation in elections, signs of interest in politics, signs of trust in government have diminished, not increased over time. And if anything, because of actions taken by our leaders in part we've seen a reassertion of the ideological polarization rather than some movement towards the center that would suggest a more civil and constructive deliberation and engagement on policy.

If you look at the nature of presidential/congressional relations after the initial very encouraging moves by the President we've seen a return to a very spirited defense of executive prerogatives, reliance on secrecy. The only encouraging sign I've seen was yesterday. The President I thought very importantly and significantly said he would go to the Congress for approval of military action if he were to make that choice. If ever the provision in our Constitution that gives Congress the power to declare war was relevant in our history, it is now, and today. And certainly that was an important acknowledgement and concession. But I think the same level of tension and distrust between our leaders, among our leaders, has returned.

As far as the final point, the possibility of creating some broader majority that could get us off this 50/50 politics which puts so much pressure on each word spoken by the President and congressional leaders, each piece of legislation, every marginal speech. What I would say there is that it's a story of lost opportunities.

The President had an opportunity to take some risks after 9/11, to call for real sacrifice on the part of the American people, whether it's financial or service, to call on real sacrifices from his political supporters and his political base to broader the coalition, to alter the agenda. He declined to do either one of those which means our politics is going to revert to normal more quickly than it might have been and the opportunities of fundamentally reshaping it have been lost.

MR. DIONNE: Thank you very much, Tom. I knew you'd get there eventually. Again, I was worried about that.

First of all, thanks for raising the service issue. If I could just call your attention to an insert in your packet it's from the new issue of the Brookings Review that a bunch of us have worked on. It's on the subject of national service. It's also got a companion web site to it. The issue itself will be out in a couple of weeks.

Tom also allowed me to go to the question I wanted to put to Bell, in full disclosure. This is going back to a thought she sent to me and I feel like quoting it because I think she put it so well. "I'd be interested in talking about the lionizing of blue collar workers -- fire, police, construction, rescue workers -- combined with our unwillingness to do anything that might make their job more rewarding,

i.e. raise wages and benefits." [Laughter]

Could you talk about that, and this idea of service in general. Our colleague Alice Rivlin has written about our propensity as a country to engage in what she calls recreational government bashing. Is there any decline in recreational government bashing since September 11th?

MS. ISABEL V. SAWHILL: I knew you'd like that theme about the first responders, the blue collar workers who have done so much to respond to the initial attack and to help rebuild afterwards. We lionize them, we really do. We read article after article talking about what a wonderful job they've done and what unsung heroes they are, and then we sing about them in the press and in parades and in other public events, but if you ask them what it is they need and want to make their lives work better and to do their jobs better, they need more resources, including higher pay and benefits and government assistance of various kinds. Health insurance would be an obvious example.

I would just link all of this to Tom's theme which I also would agree with. Many of us hoped that as part of the domestic response to this threat from abroad we would come together as a nation and understand that we're all in the same boat, and being all in the same boat we need to share our resources amongst ourselves at the beginning of being capable in the future to withstand additional attacks and to be strong as a country. The fact that we have continued to have these very partisan debates and to not be able to move forward on even a moderate or centric domestic agenda is somewhat discouraging.

That's sort of the public policy aspect of this which is a little different from the assignment I was given for today which is how has this affected our daily lives. Do you want me to say something about that now as well?

MR. DIONNE: Please.

MS. SAWHILL: I was very interested in what Andy said at the very outset this morning about polling data that shows that people have been emotionally affected and they do feel more vulnerable and there was an increase in depression and anxiety, particularly in the respective cities of New York and Washington right after the attacks. And as Ivo has said, I think we are all a little more watchful than we used to be. The public debate certainly has shifted particularly with respect to the balance between civil liberties and security. I think even now there is a very strong public support for security over civil liberties compared to pre-9/11.

But I think my bottom line here is that very little things have changed in terms of the way we live and what we do in our daily lives. How much we work, where we live, decisions about having children, whether we should give to charity, whether we go to church. We may spend a few extra hours in airports, but other indicators whether it's attitudes or behaviors, what I see is what I call a yo-yo effect.

In other words, right after 9/11 the polls all changed. Trust in government went way up, confidence in the media went up, church-going went up, charitable giving went up -- all in a major way. But then when you look at what's happened more recently, all of these things have waned or declined, and most of these indicators are approaching their base line levels. In other words if Tom's theme again only applied to our daily activities, back to normal is the theme I think here.

It's very hard, by the way, and I want to introduce this caveat, to find any hard data on these things. I took my assignment for today rather seriously and I went looking for studies and data on whether we're doing things differently, whether we're changing jobs more frequently, whether people are moving out of New York, whether people are giving more to charity, all these sorts of things. And granted, I haven't done as much as I probably should have on that front but I was amazed at how little hard data or good evidence I could find on any of this other than the kind of polling data that Andy has talked about.

But with that caveat, I don't see any big changes. I've read journalistic articles about people deciding to leave New York. Move to the suburbs or move to Oregon or wherever. So I said to my research assistant, let's look at what's happening to the population of New York City, if people can see anything. Well, the data are not really available yet to look at population but we have monthly data on the labor force of New York City. The labor force of New York City has increased dramatically since September of last year. I was quite taken aback by that data. Now some of that may be economic recovery, some of it may be even the rebuilding process that's attracting workers into the city, but for whatever reason people don't seem to be leaving New York.

I guess the next question is why have we not changed our basic lives in a more fundamental way given that everyone feels this was a profound shock to America. I think there are three possible reasons. One is the sense that this would be giving in to terrorists, that we should continue life as normal as much as we can.

The second is that these kinds of major changes in the way we spend our lives are very hard to bring about and we may see some changes over the longer term that we haven't seen yet.

The third I think is that sort of a psychological defense mechanism. We have conveniently and perhaps for our own mental health forgotten about the threat. It doesn't seem as imminent any more. We have repressed it to some extent. On this front it seems to me the objective threat is still there very very strongly that there is going to be some other attack. It's not a matter of whether there's going to be another terrorist attack, it's a matter of where and when. And yet when you look at the data on this, I find it very surprising, I think Andy mentioned it earlier, that only 23 percent of the public believes that another terrorist attack is very likely and only 63 percent think it is somewhat likely. If there are 37 percent of the American public that don't think another terrorist attack is even somewhat likely is a kind of, if you will, objectively head in the sand response. It may be psychologically healthy, but it may also have some implications for our whole response to the public debate and also the way we live our lives.

MR. DIONNE: Thank you very very much.

I want to turn to Peter and then I want Andy to comment on the yo-yo effect. We're collecting book titles out of these sessions.

Peter, basic questions. What are the implications of homeland security for the federal budget, and I think I know what you're going to say, but how much of the deterioration in the budget outlook can we attribute to increased homeland security and defense needs and how much to other factors?

MR. PETER R. ORSZAG: Let's start with the homeland security piece outside of defense. What's happened there if you split the numbers, take out defense and take out the piece that's paid for, for example through airport taxes, is that in 2001 spending in that category was $10.5 billion. The base level of 2002 spending before the attacks occurred was $12 billion. The various supplemental appropriations that have occurred since then added another $12 billion to that figure so you get up to $24 billion. So we move from $10.5 to $24 billion in a year. The Administration's proposing for this upcoming fiscal year $25 billion on that same definition. That's an increase of call it $15 billion over a year or two which is a non-trivial increase, but in the context of all the other things that are occurring is not the major explanation for the shift that we've seen in the budget.

One way of grappling with that is to take that increase and project it out over ten years and it would add up to, with debt service, added interest on the debt, about $200 billion between 2002 and 2011. The projection for that same period has deteriorated by $5.3 trillion since January of last year, of which $2.3 trillion is due to changes in economics and things like the economy and things like the stock market. That leaves you with $3 trillion that's due to policy changes. $200 billion out of $3 trillion is obviously not the major story going on.

There are additional things associated with the defense budget which one could indirectly attribute to homeland security, but basically it's inescapable that the major driver over the next ten years in the deterioration in the budget outlook is the tax cut that was passed last year which cost $1.65 trillion -- much larger than the $200 billion associated with homeland security.

That factor sort of appeared in a lot of the maneuvering over the short-term situation. We've got this very difficult scenario now where the short-term situation is debatably amenable to further fiscal stimulus is one such debate that one could have, but clearly over the long term more fiscal discipline needs to be put in place and how we move from the short run to the long run is particularly challenging given that at the end of this fiscal year which will occur in 25 days, the budget rules all expire. So all of the things that over the past decade or so have helped to try to pus the system towards fiscal discipline, discretionary spending caps, the pay bill requirements, one can argue they haven't worked perfectly and they surely haven't, but they have helped. Those all go away. You already see those people who are in favor of further tax cuts saying let's just wait until maybe there's a lame duck session after October or

after November in particular. All of the restrictions in the Senate, the 60 vote points of order etc. that have restrained some of these proposals in the past will then be gone in the absence of some budget resolution or congressional resolution to the contrary. And, for example, removing the estate tax has well more than 50 votes in favor of it. It doesn't have 60, but it has more than 50. Under the current rules it wouldn't pass. Without those rules which expire, it looks much more likely.

So the short answer is homeland security spending has gone up but it's not even close to being the major story for why the budget dollars have deteriorated.

MR. DIONNE: Doesn't the disappearance of those rules also mean the filibuster would be back in play, so what you lost in one end you might pick up at the other end?

MR. ORSZAG: Yes, but as the people here who are political scientists know, it's much more difficult to always be invoking the heavy club of a filibuster than to have the natural default being the budget rules on your side that you need to overcome 60 votes. Absolutely. And it's not only that, it's in addition to the filibuster the Senate is controlled by Democrats and the schedule of votes is under the control of the majority leader to some degree and therefore it's not necessarily guaranteed that a vote for example on the estate tax would come up and may be filibustered if it does. That changes the whole dynamics of the debate in an inauspicious way in my opinion.

MR. DIONNE: After I turn to Andy I'm going to go to the audience because I want to get you all in right away. But I want to ask Andy about this yo-yo effect that Bell talked about.

If you could talk a little bit more about the side of your poll that discusses the personal issues.

MR. KOHUT: Sure. I've thought a lot about this yo-yo effect, but first as to your search for numbers, they're hard to come by. I'm not suggesting that I know the facts here, but I would guess that if you were to look at real estate prices, the trend in real estate prices in the District maybe even in New York you might see much more softness than you'd expect.

MS. SAWHILL: You can't see it here in the District of Columbia.

MR. KOHUT: Well, our taxes have gone up, our valuations have gone up, and also I've heard tell of declining applications to Washington universities. But it's very hard to find real numbers.

MS. SAWHILL: Mostly anecdotal.

MR. KOHUT: On the emotional reactions of the American public, one of the expressions of validation of public opinion polls is how much they all went up and then they all went down, almost in unison. So they were really measuring something real. We don't know a heck of a lot about this. We know a lot about the emotional response of people to traumatic experiences, nearly dying or getting very sick, but this is not a public that is accustomed to those kinds of shocks so this is our only

experience with it. I think it's a little bit like a person, an individual's experience. You almost die and you begin to make yourself promises about the way you're going to change your life and you think differently about things for a few days, but pretty soon you're working too hard and you're short of temper and all the things you used to do. I think this is our only experience for this generation with an emotional shock to a public and we've got a lot to learn about how to interpret it, and this is part of that.

MR. DIONNE: Can I just on one thing you said draw from a little project Amy and I worked on together courtesy of the Pew Charitable Trust, or St. Pew as I like to call them. After September 11th there were all these news reports about people rushing into houses of worship, and yet when the first surveys came out you didn't notice, there was no evidence that more people were going to church or synagogue or mosque so we were trying to figure that out.

What we discovered in this polling that we did is that it was indeed true that more people were going to houses of worship but they were people who were already religious who were doing more of what they had done before, in effect, not new people being drawn in. And I've been wondering ever since what kinds of other measures are there like that where there were anecdotally and analytically reported things that were actually true but that didn't quite mean what we thought they meant at the time, even half the time.

I just toss that one out as a favorite example.

MR. MANN: Public opinion is a funny thing and we sometimes rely too much on a literal meaning of the question and imagine people are responding as we frame the question when in fact they're registering something else.

Remember on September 13th, maybe 12th, but 13th we had polls out in the field reporting the President's job approval had gone from 51 to 91 or 92. Now there wasn't time for the public to make a measured judgment of the presidential performance, but obviously it became a measure of patriotism, of national unity. I think some of the responses to the sort of personal reactions were of a similar kind. You're kind of saying what you think you ought to. You're confused, you have some sort of strong feelings but over time that's going to wear away and sort of more natural forces are going to begin to reassert themselves.

MR. DIONNE: And people said that in those first days.

MR. KOHUT: So glad you called. [Laughter]

QUESTION: I'm curious that nobody has talked about the impact of 9/11 on immigration in terms of public attitudes and the government approach, especially its efforts to somehow link it to the anti-terrorism campaign.

MR. KOHUT: We have an unpublished survey which shows a decrease for opening up --

Greater support for restricting immigration. We have a long-term trend on it and it's a pretty precipitous drop. I think Gallup has shown similar things. The public is much more wary of immigration, legal, illegal than they were pre-9/11. It's one of the things that's really sticky.

MS. SAWHILL: The other thing that's happened is we've seen a huge increase in the number of immigrants applying for citizenship, whether out of fear of discrimination if they're not citizens or for other reasons. But that is a very clear trend.

VOICE: The other indicator is the extent to which the President's sort of Mexico agenda has been put on the back burner in the aftermath of 9/11.

QUESTION: Bell Sawhill and Jim Steinberg both referred to the same thing so let me ask if anyone's brave enough to take on the question, what do you think might happen if there were a second attack of a substantial kind? Do you think there would be more of what you've described so far, or would this make a fundamental difference?

And can I just ask Mr. Kohut about one aspect of that question particularly, as to whether there's any evidence in public opinion that might support a sort of big shift towards outright isolationism?

MR. KOHUT: There's no indication of a shift toward isolationism. If anything, to the contrary.

QUESTION: [inaudible]

MR. KOHUT: You see the same thing. I wouldn't suggest that has to do with isolationism. You see the same thing in Europe. No one's accusing the Europeans --

QUESTION: [inaudible]

MR. DAALDER: I think on the question of a reaction to an attack, it's very difficult to know. I think there are two possibilities, one that I actually think is not unlikely. One is that the immediate reaction is why didn't you protect us? That is one of the great vulnerabilities that any Administration, even one that had done far superior on homeland security would face is exactly that issue. You knew they were out there, you told us they were out there, and you didn't protect us. So I think there would be a lot more recrimination in a post second attack than there was in the post first attack towards the government. So I don't think you're going to get stratospheric approval ratings for the President, and I think that's something the President ought to be worrying about. Spending time talking about how civil servants ought to be treated is not a good way of protecting the country. I think he ought to get worried about that.

A second issue is the question of whether the international psyche might, if I were a betting person which I'm not, I think that the temptation to really hit back hard would be even greater now than it would be the first time. Rather than the temptation to say let's cut ourselves off from the world. I think

there's realization you can't cut yourself off because these people are probably here, to start off with.

So I think the liberty/security tradeoff will be looked at even differently. The nature of our military response, the demand for a military response is going to go up if casualties go up and you're not going to see the kind of isolation, but you'll see even more of a unilateralism, go it alone, this is really about the United States, it's not about Western civilization kind of attitude. In both instances that's explainable, but not necessarily the right way to go about it.

MR. ORSZAG: Two thoughts on that. One is, and this is just a guess, but I actually think that in terms of the psychological/confidence factor that could follow another dramatic set of attacks would be less damaging than a series of disparate suicide bombing type attacks on child care centers, schools, things that are in the middle of Nebraska or Iowa, not in Washington, D.C. That no one is safe kind of feeling instead of if we just stay away from New York and Washington we're okay, could hit deeper and harder.

The second thing I'd say is that one of the most frustrating aspects of the Administration's efforts to date, in my opinion, and this was actually highlighted in the front page of the Post this morning, is the reluctance and the lack of movement in basically intervening in some critical private sector setting to improve security. I think that could change dramatically following a second attack.

I was frankly surprised. My initial thought following the attack was that this is a perfect opportunity for the Bush Administration to prove that it wasn't the cronies and big corporate lobbies that wanted to, when the national interest required it, it was willing to stand up and say we know this will be costly for you but you have to do X. That has not happened. It hasn't happened in chemical facilities, it hasn't happened in agriculture, it hasn't happened in a whole variety of areas that are arguably quite important to the effort to better protect the country at reasonable cost, and I think following another attack that dynamic could shift dramatically.

MR. MANN: Just to the first part of your question, Ivo may be appalled by this conceptualization but let me try it out.

On attitudes towards U.S. engagement of the world, I sort of see a continuum. At one end is isolationism. At the other end is a kind of soft multilateralism. In between I've got a muscular unilateralism closer to the isolation. Then if you will, a sort of smart multilateralism. I think the American public --

MR. DIONNE: Which one do you think you'd pick? [Laughter]

MR. MANN: The American public moves -- of course I'm agnostic on any of this. But I think the American public moves back and forth between the two middle categories. Andy had evidence supporting sentiment for both of those in his own poll.

I think what it means is that a President and a set of political leaders can build a domestic

political base for either of those middle categories in that another attack would probably move us more toward the muscular unilateralism, but to have effective policy it would probably be worth the President's while to move more in the direction of smart multilateralism.

MR. DIONNE: You've just seen a psychology built before your very eyes. [Laughter]

QUESTION: I wonder if Ivo might elaborate a little bit on the strategy that you talked about, the homeland security strategy. You did mention that the priorities didn't appear to be priorities set in the strategy, but what are some of the other strengths and weaknesses of it?

MR. DIONNE: This is your, Ivo, what would you do if you were President of the United States question.

MR. DAALDER: Luckily there's a book available in the book stores that Peter and Mike O'Hanlon and I and four other people worked on setting out that strategy.

The basic notion that drove us was preventing terrorism is better than responding to it. If you want to prevent it you've got to do it as far out as you can which that is one of the things we didn't talk about, but logically in our strategy is that the kind of military operations and intelligence operations and law enforcement cooperation that has been ongoing, and in fact has been quite effective is your first line of defense.

The second thing you need to do is if you improve the way you organize protection at the border of both people and goods. We were long supporter and believe it was right to integrate an enforcement arm of INS, the Customs Service, the Coast Guard and the people who work in similar things on a daily basis, they all have similar patches on their uniforms -- not this nonsense when you get to Dulles you have three different people and you've got to go through three different lines because they work for three different agencies and have three different databases, none of which talk to each other, that they would be integrated so you have some chance that you get bad people before they can do bad things, to use the President's favorite terminology.

Then ultimately what you really need to do is internal preventive measures. Tracking people. Doing more to track people. And protecting critical infrastructure in a coordinated fashion.

A year after September 11 we still don't have a national assessment of the vulnerability of our critical infrastructure. That's something Tom Ridge keeps on telling us the Department of Homeland Security will do.

Well, as far as I know the Department of Homeland Security doesn't exist and we do have a critical infrastructure, it is vulnerable, it needs to be assessed, why it is vulnerable, so you need to have an assessment.

So rather than worrying about which box goes where on the org chart, I would have hoped that Mr. Ridge would have spent a little bit more time on figuring out, assessing the critical infrastructure. But if those are the priorities on the prevention side then the protection of those infrastructures becomes critical and finally the response, that if you can mitigate the consequences of an attack not only in order to save people but for example, to take the example of containers.

If you have a container initiative that really gives you some degree of confidence that the containers coming from certain ports on certain shipping lines with certain kinds of goods are unlikely to be tampered with and a container is blown up and it comes from a different port or a different shipping line or has gone through different kinds of routes, then you don't have to stop all container shipments. You can let the ones that you have confidence in continue to go. But at the moment if we don't have any confidence in container shipments we're going to shut down container shipments into this country if a container were to be blown up, which would shut down the world economy. That's the consequence.

So consequence management in that sense, to give you a concrete example, is how you need to deal with this issue. It's not just about being able to contain [inaudible] the immediate impact on people and the economy, but a larger societal impact that you need to look at and you need to look at it systematically.

MR. DIONNE: Let's try to get in a bunch of comments.

QUESTION: My name is Elisa Shepherd, I'm with the Newseum. I live in Arlington and only about a half mile from the Pentagon so I can't imagine, I know I'm in danger or feel I'm safe, but Isabel, I'm not going to move or change jobs or pull kids out of school, so I think you're going to have to measure the long-term results for a major change.

I just wanted to mention, Andy mentioned it earlier, that look at college applications in the D.C. and New York area. That's hard data that might show a significant difference.

And Andy, I wanted to ask you, I've just finished a book about journalists and 9/11 and I wonder, one of the things that we concluded in the book is that journalists on that day behaved in a way that the public really doesn't see on a regular basis. I think they were heroic, they were courageous, they were determined.

Why is it that the public refuses to sort of see the media as more noble or more human?

MR. KOHUT: Journalists are much more comfortable with the public hating them than --

MS. SHEPHERD: We've had a hard time promoting the book for just that reason. No one in the media wants to talk about how the media did well that day and what a crucial role they played in defending the constitutional protection of the First Amendment.

MR. KOHUT: Although I have critics of the media say all the time any book or program that says somebody did something right is never seen as selling. Even about journalists. Maybe especially about journalists.

MS. SHEPHERD: I'll throw in that the book is called *Running Toward Danger* which is what journalists do.

QUESTION: I was struck by Ivo's point about strategies to sort of organize around fighting the last war and how different that is from a strategy that organizes around having a keen sense of history. That led me to a point that I've wondered about really since the beginning of Brookings' deliberations on that and that is it seems to me that our picture of terrorism is essentially angry Arabs with boxcutters. We've forgotten about angry Americans driving U-Haul vans and pickup trucks. I guess the question that comes out of that is to what extent does the work that's been done on homeland security and terrorism recall that we had those problems before 9/11 and domestic in nature?

MR. DIONNE: Hold that thought for a second. This gentleman was so worried about the Brookings endowment he's got to have another shot at it. [Laughter]

QUESTION: I wonder whether anyone at Brookings is considering how we might use some of that $200 billion in non-military manners that would enhance the security of the United States, perhaps addressing some of the fundamental causes for the terrorism.

QUESTION: I'd like to know, especially from you two, if there's anything different -- I always ask these questions -- about the younger people in the poll and if the A, responded differently, appear easier or more difficult to engage, suffered more because of what's perceived as an Administration's failure to summon the will to be more of a contributor, and some of the research that you all have done about federal employment issues in the future and whether all of that's connected in this younger generation and if there is any difference in the responses.

QUESTION: I have a question but before question I'd like to say that is not necessary to learn on your mistake. You can learn on mistake of others. If experience from Soviet Union, I came from Soviet Union and events of September 11th never happened in Soviet Union. It was protected. We have in place homeland security, we have KGB. Everyone spy on each other, but we destroy the country.

My question is about Homeland Security Department. Is discussion about [inaudible] to do [inaudible], but the basic question. IF we need Homeland Security Department is the main question. And please, maybe I am wrong. But we need to see in the future. Let's say we solve the problem [inaudible], what we will do with this huge department?

MR. DIONNE: Brookings likes to get the fundamental questions. That is a fundamental question. So whoever wants to start. Maybe Andy could start on the polling question on the youth and

others. I'll just work down to Bell.

MR. KOHUT: The public likes the job the press did on the day of the attacks and subsequent because this is a story that needed reporting and the press did a good job.

The press has since moved on to more contentious stories, stories that reflect partisan divisions, arguments on social issues, and there's a degree of shoot the messenger when the public is looking at the media covering such stories relative to a terrible story that wasn't so contentious and brought us together rather than divided us.

Also, however, the public would probably say that the media is back to its old habits of hyping the news, the [inaudible] to make stories and so on and so forth.

As to the engagement issue and younger people, there's little indication that the engagement gap has been narrowed by this attack. Young people haven't been drawn to the news in any greater extent. In fact people are drawn increasingly to serious news, some from the cohorts and the educational classes that are traditionally heavy consumers of news and people who are engaged in public affairs issues.

The only thing we tend to see is that younger people judge these attacks in an historical context more seriously, more gravely than let's say relative to Pearl Harbor than do older people, but that's a natural reaction.

MR. DIONNE: Just to footnote that, Peter did our issue on national service, Peter Hart talks about some polling which shows that younger people reacted less cynically to the government in a whole series of ways than older people, and in some ways it reverse certain trends. That's going to be out in a couple of weeks. It's just very interesting data he's collected.

MR. MANN: Which is encouraging. On the other hand, it's still the case that younger citizens are active volunteers but remain disengaged if not cynical about government and public affairs. As best we can tell there's been no increase at all in engagement in the broader political community.

The story about the press is, and Andy's absolutely right, the press is evaluated largely in terms of the stories they are covering. When politicians are grappling with really serious matters with high stakes, then the press looks like it's doing a good job. When they seem to be returning to form then somehow the press is doing a lousy job.

A final point, my plea, Ivo, that we get rid of the term homeland security. It seems to me it fits the old Soviet Union much better than the open society in which we are privileged to live. All open societies are vulnerable to some extent and ours always will. It's a question of finding the proper tradeoff between security and liberty. We will I think almost always err on the side of liberty.

MR. DAALDER: Amen to that. As a Dutchman who grew up in a Jewish family, Jaima rings whenever I hear homeland, but homeland but that's a different -- My mother would never forgive me if I said that.

The question of American terrorism. Part of what you're doing on efforts to secure the nation against attack which is the way I prefer to talk about it is of course going to be just as useful against American or foreign terrorists. That is the protection of the infrastructure and the whole response element. It doesn't matter where it comes from but we can protect against it or enhance our protection against it and deal with it.

But there is a danger, quite frankly, that we're going to forget about the Timothy McVeys to at least some extent, or put it another way, there's an opportunity for the Timothy McVeys of this world as everybody focuses the prevention side on particular personages with particular colors of skin with particular backgrounds. I think you put your hands on it, so it's something to think about.

In principal of course there's nothing that prevents you from expanding the range of your preventive activities, but I think the 200 million Americans have a particular image in their minds, so do all the first defenders who are being paid to protect us.

The Soviet Union never had an attack like September 11th. We didn't have an attack like September 11th until September 11th, which is important to remember. So I don't think the two are necessarily related to each other. The Soviet Union could have had that attack. I don't think it was impossible. More difficult, but certainly not impossible.

Final question, do we need a Department of Homeland Security? No, we don't. But we're going to get one. [Laughter]

MR. ORSZAG: I guess on the question about could the funds for homeland security be better used in some other way, the argument that international assistance or other infrastructural approaches to try and get at the problem could help really doesn't speak to the immediate issue. You're not going to go and change the world even if it's possible over a longer period of time immediately, and therefore there is a justification for increased expenditure now. In fact the Brookings volumes frankly called for more levels of government expenditure than the Bush Administrations FY 2003 budget. We have differences about the composition of that but the level is actually higher.

My point was just to say this is not the primary or even ranking among the most important causes in the budget deterioration over the past year and a half or two.

Finally, to return to your question about the Brookings endowment, I'm hoping that the Brookings endowment managers have purchased lots of call options on oil prices so even if there is an attack and oil prices spike we are held harmless and will continue to survive just fine.

MR. DIONNE: Thank you for that advice.

MS. SAWHILL: I want to go back and try to answer this really challenging and impossibly difficult question you raised about what would be the reaction to another attack, and put it in terms of what would we wish we would have done if we could foresee that now, and built on some of the seeds that I think have come out of these discussions.

I think there are four things that we would have wished we would have done. One, in terms of foreign policy going back to what Jim Steinberg said, I think we would have wished we had made more common ground with our allies, that we had worked more closely with them to build a really robust coalition around the world.

Secondly in terms of spending money, I think we would have wanted, even though Lael pointed out we spent more on foreign aid, I think we would have wanted to spend even more. I think we would not have wanted to offend people in Africa and elsewhere with our agriculture policy and some other things we've done. I think we would have wanted to maybe spend more on homeland security but differently allocated as both Peter and Ivo have suggested.

I think the third thing we would have wanted to do is to bring our domestic agenda together in a way that was left partisan. It's the lost opportunity story that Tom told. That if we want to be prepared as a people of the United States to cope with the tremendous trauma of another attack, I think we need to find ways of working out our problems domestically and finding some more centric common ground in terms of social problems at home.

Finally, in terms of the fact that right after 9/11 there was a tremendous yearning in this country, including amongst young people, to know what they could do to help in this effort. And all we asked them to do is maybe volunteer a little more. We haven't asked them to give up any of the large tax cut that, as Peter's writing has emphasized, is the major element in the deterioration of our budgetary situation and which would provide the resources to do all of these other things that I talked about.

So that's my personal summary in answer to your questions.

MR. DIONNE: Bless you. That’s a great conclusion.

Former Senator Joe Sidings of Maryland once ran on the slogan, "He doesn't duck the tough ones." And Bell only takes the tough ones. Thank you. That's true of all our panel. Thank you so much.

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