From the perspective of the United States, the threat environment in Eurasia has changed
dramatically over the last 20 years; primarily because Russia has receded as the global strategic
competitor for the United States with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the dramatic
deterioration of Russian military capability since 1991. The threat of a Soviet nuclear first strike
on the United States has been replaced by the risk of an accidental nuclear launch (as a result of
Moscow's possible loss of command and control over its missile systems); and the worst case,
nightmare scenario, of a "rogue regime" or terrorist group acquiring a Russian nuclear weapon,
(or fissile material, or Soviet-era chemical, or biological agents from across the region) to use
against the United States.
Most other identifiable threats in Eurasia directly threaten the security and stability of the
regional states themselves and their immediate neighbors rather than the United States. But given
the region's geopolitical location, bordering states of considerable concern to the United States,
such as Iran, and China; and the fact that another regional state, Afghanistan, served as the base
for the terrorist networks that launched strikes on the United States in September 2001, none of
these threats should be unduly minimized. Furthermore, in Ukraine, under former President
Leonid Kuchma, the government was implicated in selling radar installations to Saddam
Hussein's government on the eve of the U.S. invasion of Iraq—the culmination of many years of
providing conventional weapons to civil conflicts across the globe from Soviet-era weapons
factories. There are numerous Soviet-era arsenals and factories across Eurasia––in places like
Belarus and the secessionist Trans-Dniester region of Moldova––where leaders are not
necessarily well-disposed toward the United States, and where commercial and criminal interests often take precedence in arms sales and transfers over sober calculations of broader security
risks. Threats such as these have not been given sufficient U.S. or international attention given
the understandable preoccupation with WMD material, but they should also be considered by the
panel.
U.S. policy in Eurasia has certainly taken account of many of the threats in the region since the
collapse of the Soviet Union. By way of a quick summary, U.S. policy has generally been
directed at securing Russia's Soviet-era nuclear weapons and research facilities; reducing missile
stockpiles; eliminating sources of conflict with Russia; and trying to encourage a positive
trajectory in this country's long-term economic and political development. Beyond Russia, the
United States has aimed at preventing the emergence of a security vacuum in Eurasia, or a major
conflict and instability that might lead to military penetration by states with interests inimical to
those of the United States like Iran; and at thwarting attempts to assert a new security monopoly
by Russia or another major power like China. Other more specific U.S. concerns have targeted
ensuring the development and security of Caspian oil exports across the Caucasus to Turkey
through the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline (local military units in the Caucasus are now being
trained for this purpose with American assistance); and, since 2002, addressing new or ongoing
threats in Central Asia that might undermine the U.S.-led project of the stabilization and
reconstruction of Afghanistan.
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